

● PSF

State Dept. : Welles

Jan. - April 1942

CONTINUED

heller folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

[REDACTED]

March 6, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

What do you think? I am inclined to think that Kita, on arrival in the continental United States, should be kept incommunicado and not placed with the other Diplomats. Plenty of food but no communications in or out.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W.J.S. Date 2-25-72

F. D. R.

Memo to the Pres. 3/4/42 from the A.T. re Nagao Kita, Japanese Consul in Honolulu, who was charged with transmitting information to Japan regarding our vessels at Pearl Harbor who is being sent to this country, awaiting exchange of diplomats.

also see Francis Biddle's folder

PSF Welles Folder

March 6, 1942

See: Great Britain
Folder for Correspondence
in this.

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a copy of a telegram I have received this morning from the president of the Baltic-American Society.

I suppose that the White House has received a similar telegram. I have no confirmation as yet of the report that Sir Stafford Cripps made the address to which reference is made in this telegram. If the report is correct, it would seem to me that there might be a possibility that certain elements within the British Government are trying to force our hand.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles

Enc.

The President,
The White House.

MR. HOPKINS HAD THIS.

L.M.B.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

PSF Welles Folder

March 7, 1942


My dear Mr. President:

You may remember that I talked to you about this telegram when Admiral Standley and I were having lunch with you and that you suggested that London be informed along the lines laid down in your memorandum to me of March 7.

As a result of our talk I sent on March 6 a telegram to Biddle of which I enclose a copy for your information.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:

Telegram to London,
March 6, 1942.

The President,
The White House.

Welles Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PERSONAL AND
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

Matthews' dispatch, No. 18,
March 3rd, 5 P.M., from Biddle
in London:

I think Sikorski should be
definitely discouraged on this
proposition. This is no time
to talk about the post-war
position of small nations, and
it would cause serious trouble
with Russia.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 7 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have read this and it seems to me that even though the text as submitted were published by the nations concerned, I doubt very much if it would do anything towards winning the war. Nor would it, I believe, be any substantial encouragement to the peoples of these countries.

It seems to me it might be better if the whole thing were left unsaid at this time. All of these small nations are looking after their post-war position and it seems very risky business for us or the British to encourage these statements. I fancy it is being pushed primarily by the Poles.

If I were you I would try to discourage it in case Sikorski brings it up.

H.L.H.

H.L.H.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 4, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HARRY HOPKINS:

TO READ AND RETURN.

F.D.R.

EDA
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased
before being communi-
cated to anyone (MC)

• LONDON
Dated March 3, 1942
Received 12:58 p.m.

Secretary of State
Washington

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

18, March 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION ONE)

FROM BIDDLE FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ACTING
SECRETARY.

Polish Series.

My despatch 119, February 20, 1942.

The following is the draft of a joint declara-
tion which General Sikorski is urging the Allied
Governments established here to sign. While all
these governments have not yet adopted his proposal,
Sikorski intends to present the matter to Mr. Eden
tonight.

MATTHEWS

RR

HRL
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (A)

London

Dated March 3, 1942

Rec'd 2:08 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

18, March 3, 5 p.m., (SECTION TWO)

"The governments of Belgium, Greece, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Czechoslovakia
and Yugoslavia whose territories have been invaded and
are at present occupied by Germany or its satellites,
and the French National Committee,

Considering past experience and taking into
account particularly the fact that a lack of preliminary
collaboration between the states menaced by the Axis
and the superior industrial war potential of Germany
have facilitated the initial successes of the
aggressors.

Conscious of the close economic solidarity which
should unite the allied countries.

Desirous of assuring in the future, the main-
tenance of peace, one and indivisible, on the one
hand, by a close collaboration of all peaceful nations
and, on the other hand, by the adoption of all

measures

-2- #18, March 3, 5 p.m. from London

measures of a nature rendering it impossible in the future for the powers who have been guilty of aggression, again to misuse their economic potential to disturb world peace.

Gratified by the regional agreements concluded by the Governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Greece, and Yugoslavia and considering these agreements as an important step towards a better organization of international relations in Europe,

One / mutually bind themselves not to conclude a separate peace with the Axis powers before the total liberation of the countries temporarily occupied, which they represent, (on Cripps' and my suggestion that this paragraph resembled paragraph two of the United Nations declaration, it was agreed to consider its withdrawal).

MATTHEWS

WSB

HRL

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (A)

London

Dated March 3, 1942

Rec'd 2:13 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

18, March 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE)

Two / Affirm their determination to establish between themselves a close and mutual collaboration in full harmony and solidarity with Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union and China. This collaboration, effected during the present war, will be pursued after victory with the object of attaining a coordination of activities of the interested countries in the political, economic, social and military fields on the basis of principles of Christian morality and national liberty within the democratic order and in a spirit of social justice assuring to workers a well being which is due them, the guaranteeing human dignity.

Three / to this end, the government's signatory to this pact are forming forthwith committees charged with establishing the modalities for this collaboration,

being

-2- #18, March 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION THREE) from London
being guided by the principles defined above".

MATTHEWS

WSE

EJ
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (MC)

London
Dated March 3, 1942
Rec'd 6:18 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

18, March 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION FOUR)

Copies of the above draft were distributed at an informal gathering February 28, attended by representatives of the Dutch, Belgian, Yugoslav and Polish Governments as well as by Sir Stafford Cripps and myself. When asked my reactions by the Polish representative, I stated to the gathering that I would have to study the text before voicing my opinion. Meanwhile, however, I wished to reiterate my former remarks that any such project should be put to the "acid test": would the Russians interpret it as a move to organize a bloc against them, and in that case, would they suspect British inspiration, in view of the presence in London of the Allied Governments concerned?

MATTHEWS

CSB

NMC
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated March 3, 1942

Rec'd 6:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY

18, March 3, 5 p.m., (SECTION FIVE)

Sir Stafford concurred with my remarks, emphasizing his opinion that the Russians would undoubtedly interpret the project in the above light. He urged, moreover, that in conducting further negotiations, care be taken not to incur Russian suspicion of British inspiration. Accordingly, he suggested that a representative of the Allied Governments concerned present the matter to Mr. Eden, in order that he in turn might inform the Russian Ambassador, stating that before discussing the project further, the British Government wanted to ascertain the Russian Government's attitude.

Sir Stafford added that the ideas embodied in the draft declaration differed from the Russian Government's conception of post war Europe. However, he did not exclude the possibility that Stalin might take the establishment of regional confederations, and other points mentioned in the draft, under consideration.

MATTHEWS

CSB

EJ

This telegram must be closely paraphrased before being communicated to anyone. (MC)

London

Dated March 3, 1942

Rec'd 6:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

TRIPLE PRIORITY.

18, March 3, 5 p.m. (SECTION SIX)

Sir Stafford concluded by stating he hoped and thought it was not inconceivable that informal conversations regarding post war questions might take place between United States, the British and the Russians. In such an event it might prove a psychologically advantageous moment to present the aforementioned declaration.

The Allied representatives present expressed the desire to be kept posted regarding the prospects of such talks and said they would meanwhile be guided by his suggestion to approach Mr. Eden.

(END OF MESSAGE).

MATTHEW3

C3B

TELEGRAM SENT

EJ
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (MC)

March 6, 1942

4 p.m.

AMEMBASSY,

LONDON.

FOR BIDDLE.

Your 18, March 3, 5 p.m., Polish Series no. 12.

One. We feel strongly that the issuance of the joint declaration along the lines proposed would not be opportune just now and hope that a way may be found to let the project quietly drop without protracted discussions. Although the proposed declaration does not attempt to establish the precise outlines of a post war Europe, it nevertheless goes so far in this direction that a serious discussion of it would be almost certain to accentuate various inherent differences and might even result in the raising of a number of post war problems the consideration and disposition of which at this time would tend to distract the United Nations from their primary task of winning the war.

Two. Unless you perceive some objection thereto it is, therefore, suggested that you immediately inform Sikorski that your Government is firmly of the opinion
that

-2-March 6, 1942, 4 p.m., to London

the proposal should be quietly shelved with as little further discussion of it as possible. You should make it clear to Sikorski, and in your discretion to Cripps as well, that the views of your Government are not based upon any disagreement with the principles enunciated in the proposed declaration but by its conviction that at the present stage the unity of effort of the United Nations might be better preserved and more effectively utilized if we continue to take our stand upon the principles of the Atlantic Charter. We feel sure that you will be able to handle this delicate matter in such a manner that the interested Governments will understand that our attitude is not prompted by any lack of sympathy or understanding on our part.

Three. Please keep us fully informed regarding your conversations on this subject so that we may be able to supplement your remarks in our talks with Sikorski should the matter arise during the course of his coming visit.

WELLES
ACTING

Eu:EMH:EB

PA/D

Note:

See letter the President wrote to
Archibishop Francis J. Spellman
(Gen. Corres - Drawer 4-42)
March 14, 1942

PSF State Miller Folder

March 14, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

You will remember, with regard to the reports we have received that the Vatican had agreed to receive a diplomatic mission from Japan, that I communicated your message concerning this question to the Apostolic Delegate.

The Apostolic Delegate sent an extremely strong telegram to the Holy See urging reconsideration of this step and emphasizing the extremely bad reaction which this agreement on the part of the Vatican would have on public opinion both in the United States and in the other American Republics.

I have seen subsequently several members of the American hierarchy, including Bishop Hurley of Florida, all of whom have been horrified when they learned that it actually was true that the Vatican was receiving a diplomatic mission from Japan.

Yesterday I received a visit from Monsignor Ready. He handed me, with what he said was "profound regret",

The President,
The White House.

a message transmitted to me, through the Apostolic Delegate, by Cardinal Maglione, the Papal Secretary of State.

I am enclosing a copy of this message for your information.

Monsignor Ready, who is profoundly outraged, said he felt it would be most helpful if you personally would let Archbishop Spellman know how strongly the Government of the United States feels about this decision on the part of the Vatican. Will you let me know if you wish me to prepare a draft personal letter for you to send to Archbishop Spellman in this sense.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enc.

PSF Yvelles Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

Why not name the regular
Minister to Afghanistan now and
get it over with? Perhaps you
can find someone from a demobilized
Embassy or Legation.

F. D. R.

State Department dispatch
from Dreyfus, Tehran, dated March
13, 1942, re this matter.

PSF: *Miles Folder*
State

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE

ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE:

FOR YOUR SECRET FILES.

F.D.R.

Roosevelt's message No. 116 to the former
naval person.

1
PSF Miller, Folsom

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

Was the dispatch from
Schoenfeld, Helsinki, March 17,
1942, No. 22, immediately com-
municated to Ambassador Litvinov?

F. D. R.

*file
personal*

Wells Foster

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In reply to the inquiry contained in your memorandum of March 21, which reads, "Was the dispatch from Schoenfeld, Helsinki, March 17, 1942, No. 22, immediately communicated to Ambassador Litvinov?", I may state that the information contained in this telegram was communicated by Colonel Gunther of the War Department to the Soviet Military Attaché on March 19.

About a year ago the Division of Foreign Activity Correlation in the Department of State was set up to serve as a clearing house for all intelligence reaching the Department of State. The liaison officer of the War Department from MID daily communicates with that office in the State Department and is given, together with the liaison officers of the other intelligence agencies of the Government, all intelligence of this character which the Department receives.

In addition to this, other officials of the Department are in close contact with representatives of


The President,
The White House.

the Soviet Embassy and with the other missions of the United Nations and are daily transmitting appropriate information which we receive to them.

In the case of intelligence of the kind transmitted in the telegram from Helsinki to which your memorandum refers, it has seemed to me desirable that information of this strictly military character had better be transmitted to the missions of the United Nations by War Department or Navy Department officers.

Believe me

Faithfully yours

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. H. Galt", written over the typed phrase "Faithfully yours". The signature is stylized and cursive.

file
present.

Wells Folder

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 21, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

After our talk two days ago, I asked Harry Norweb to inform the President of Peru informally of your hope that he would accept an invitation to visit Washington in May.

I have this morning received a telegram from Norweb, of which I enclose a copy for your information, giving an account of his conversation with President Prado.


I have also asked the Ambassador of Ecuador here to tell the President of Ecuador that you hope that he will visit Washington sometime during the late spring or early summer, and that a similar invitation is being extended to the President of Peru.

I believe that both visits would be extremely helpful at this point.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.



The President,

The White House.

NMC
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (B)

Lima

Dated March 20, 1942

Rec'd 4:25 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

272, March 20, 10 a.m.

STRICTLY ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY
Department's telegram number 234, March 19,
6 p.m.

President Prado obviously was greatly pleased
with the invitation, and told me that he welcomes
the opportunity which a visit to Washington would
to reiterate personally to the President and to
reaffirm to the world Perus policy of cooperation with
the United States and all that it signifies.

Since the visit would require the consent of
the Peruvian Congress, he requests that publicity
be withheld and that the matter be held in confidence
while he arranges for a special session.

He asked me to convey his personal greetings
to the President and to you.

HORWEB

CSB

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date MAR 7 1972

*PSF
State
Welles*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 31, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In reply to the inquiry contained in your memorandum of March 26 in regard to Bill Donovan's memorandum no. 347, which I am returning to you herewith, it seems to me clear that if you agree to the procedure indicated in that memorandum the impression would inevitably be created that this Government favors a Hapsburg restoration.

If Otto is allowed by your direction to see the former Hungarian Consul in New York and the latter transmits messages from Otto to members of the Hungarian Government, these messages will unquestionably contain the added information that this is being done under your auspices. If the suggested information service between Hungary and this country is built up, it would be clearly a Hapsburg information service. If Otto sees you before any of these steps are taken, that also naturally would be regarded as added proof that this Government is backing the Hapsburg restoration.

The President,

The White House.


I do

I do not know what your own thoughts may be with regard to a possible Hapsburg restoration. It would seem to me that the situation is not yet sufficiently clarified for us to be able to form any conclusion as to what particular kind of free-Hungarian or free-Austrian movement this Government should favor. From a message which Halifax gave me last night from the British Foreign Office, the British Government seems to feel pretty definitely that at this stage it would be premature to favor any particular movement.

For the reasons I have stated I seriously doubt the desirability of your agreeing to the request made. There are plenty of ways in which Otto can communicate with Hungary--and undoubtedly is communicating--without utilizing this particular method. The suggestion gives me the impression that it is being laid before you by Otto for the purpose of obtaining what is tantamount to your official benediction.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "W. L. G. Kelly". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent initial "W".

Enclosure:
Memorandum.

PSF:Wells Folder
1-42

*Self
Confidential*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 9, 1942


~~SECRET~~
My dear Mr. President:

In the belief that it will be of interest to you, I am enclosing a copy of a letter from Charles Taussig, dated April 6, which I have just received.

I have sent a copy of this letter to Admiral King for his information. It would seem to me that the Navy Department would wish to check up on some of the information reported by Taussig.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enc.

The President,
The White House.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By J. Schauble Date MAR 7 1972

ANGLO-AMERICAN CARIBBEAN COMMISSION

San Juan, Puerto Rico,
April 6, 1942

Dear Sumner:

I am writing this letter to give you my impressions on some matters that do not directly concern the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission. There is a general impression wherever one travels in the Caribbean that Martinique is being used as a base for refueling German submarines. It is also implied that our government is pursuing a mistaken policy. Perhaps the most outspoken was Sir Grattan Bushe, Governor of Barbados, who, in a private conversation with Governor Tugwell and myself, said categorically that it was his understanding that his government in London disapproved of our policy towards Martinique and, for that matter, towards Vichy. Sir Grattan was, as you may recall, a high official in the Colonial Office, and participated in the negotiations for the bases. I might add that he was most cooperative and cordial to us while we were in Barbados. Officers of our Army and Navy also are inclined to be critical of the Martinique policy with varying degrees of volubility. I am passing this on to you purely as a matter of information as to general sentiment in this part of the world and without directly or indirectly attempting to express an opinion on a matter of policy -

of which I have insufficient facts to even form a personal opinion.

There is, however, one phase of this problem with which I am concerned; if the Martinique policy of the State Department is based on assurances from the Navy that there are no enemy operations out of Martinique it is possible that these assurances are not well founded. We spent a substantial part of day before yesterday with Col. Ring, the Commanding Officer of the Army base in St. Lucia. He told us that a few days after the submarine with the wounded German went into Martinique one of his patrol planes sighted two submarines in the harbor of Fort-de-France. He said that he sent a second plane to confirm this observation and that it was confirmed by the second pilot. He further added that the two officers who made the reports were both West Point graduates and trained observers. He claimed that, although he passed this information on to his superiors, no mention of this incident was ever made in an official report. He further stated that on one occasion a report was received from Martinique that a submarine had been sighted near the coast; that he had a bomber in the air within less than four minutes after receiving the report but that he subsequently learned that the message had taken four hours and nine

minutes to reach him from Martinique. He explained this delay by saying that neither the naval or army base in St. Lucia receive reports directly from Martinique; that this message had been coded; sent to Puerto Rico; decoded; recoded and sent from Puerto Rico to St. Lucia, where it had to be decoded again. Col. Ring introduced me to the Captain who is the signal officer of the base and asked the Captain to give me information concerning communications. The Captain confirmed the fact that they did not even know the frequency of the radio station of our naval observer in Martinique; that all of his messages were routed through San Juan. He also told me that there was no equipment in St. Lucia and he doubted if there was in any of the other bases for intercepting messages from enemy submarines; that such equipment was on order but was not expected till about September. Col. Ring stated that one occasion one of his planes sighted an enemy submarine on the surface of the water with two schooners alongside. He said that they had no armed patrol boats with which they could board the schooners but did succeed in following one of the schooners to another island (I think it was Dominica). It was boarded by the local authorities who found drums and cans of fuel oil aboard - but the captain of the schooner claimed he was merely carrying on a legitimate inter-island trade.

Col. Ring further stated that fishing boats leaving St. Lucia were meeting fishing boats out of Martinique (the two islands are in sight of each other) and he was confident that information was passing in this manner between the two islands. He stated that neither the Army or the Navy had sufficient equipment to stop this practice. Col. Ring is using several local negroes to keep him informed as to what is going on among the natives of St. Lucia. However, he says it is very difficult to get information because of the French background of the people and the fact that they are very incommunicative. One of his local agents, he is quite confident, is also in the pay of the enemy. However, he does get some local information from this source.

The general situation on the island of St. Lucia is unhealthy. The local police are inadequate and poorly disciplined; recently the local authorities requested in writing that the Army assist them in stopping the looting of the two torpedoed ships in the harbor of Castries. United States Marines were used for this purpose and one of the looters was shot. This has caused some bad blood. In conversation with the Administrator of the island, the Superintendent of Agriculture, and Labor Officer, my impression of lack of

loyalty on the part of the native population was reinforced.

At the request of Governor Jardine of Antigua we took as a passenger on our plane to San Juan, Col. Stratton, British security officer for the Caribbean area. He is stopping off at San Juan on his way to Jamaica where he will coordinate intelligence operations of the British, G-2, O.N.I., and the F.B.I. He regarded the situation as so serious in St. Lucia that he was sending one of his security officers to remain there until things get straightened out. He said that the situation was bad from bottom to top.

Both Governor Jardine and Col. Stratton requested me to arrange with the pilot of our plane to go slightly out of the direct course from Antigua to St. Thomas and fly over the French island of St. Bartholomew. Jardine stated that he had reliable reports that substantial refueling operations were being carried out from this island. Col. Stratton particularly wanted to see if there were many schooners in St. Bartholomew harbors. We did see some schooners there but obviously, even flying relatively low as we did, no significance could necessarily be attached to their presence. Inasmuch as we were flying over this area of the Caribbean I decided to continue flying in the vicinity of the Dutch-French island of St. Martin and the

British island of Anguilla, as well as the small islands on both sides of the Anegada Passage. It was regarding this section of the Caribbean that I reported last year indicating the lack of any precautions against the use of these many islands as refueling bases. It was interesting to know that although Col. Stratton is in complete charge of British intelligence work in this area he had never visited this part of the Caribbean. From what he told me nothing effective has been done to patrol these islands. As we flew over them he repeatedly pointed out various bays and harbors, in some cases on uninhabited islands, that could easily be used as bases for enemy submarine operations. During our entire flight of approximately 300 miles from Antigua to St. Thomas, which included circling a number of the islands at low altitudes we saw no naval patrol boats or planes. Col. Stratton is going to make some specific recommendations regarding the protection of this area, which he discussed with me in some detail. I will advise you of this when I return to Washington.

The torpedoing of the LADY NELSON and the UMTATA at Port Castries.

Because of the proximity of Port Castries to Martinique you will probably be interested in details of the torpedoing on March 10th as related to me by Col. Ring.

At about 10:50 p.m. the lookout near Port Castries sighted an enemy submarine. This was fifteen minutes before she fired her torpedoes. There is no telephonic or telegraphic communication between the lookout and the two British machine gun nests guarding the entrance to the harbor so that eight minutes of valuable time was consumed in advising the machine gun crews. The submarine was proceeding on the surface. Col. Ring took us to the exact position at which sub let go her torpedoes, which was slightly inside the entrance to the harbor and about 350 yards from the LADY NELSON and the UMTATA, which were tied up at the Dock. The angle to the targets was a very difficult one. Col. Ring was high in his praise of the German marksmanship. Two torpedoes were discharged almost simultaneously. One struck the UMTATA near the bow; the other hit the LADY NELSON near the stern just forward of the propellers. The alcoa steamer which was in the harbor at the time was completely blacked out and apparently no attempt was made to sink her. The LADY NELSON had her gangway lights on, and although the captain had been warned, he said he had to provide these lighting facilities for the passengers who wanted to go ashore. Both the LADY NELSON and the UMTATA were armed with 4-inch and 3-inch guns but the gun crews were ashore notwithstanding that the captains of both ships had apparently been advised by

both American and British authorities to keep their guns manned while in port as the harbor was totally unprotected. It took three hours to collect the gun crews from the various establishments of pleasure in the town after the attack took place. While the submarine was in position the two machine guns on either side of the harbor opened fire. The gun on the right hand side of the harbor looking toward the town jammed and was out of action. The other gun hit the deck and sides of the submarine and in the opinion of Col. Ring probably prevented the submarine from attacking the Alcoa boat. Ring had one of his planes from the Army base, which is about 25 miles away from Port Castries, over the harbor 19 minutes after he had received word of the presence of the submarine but the delay of 8 minutes in getting the information from the lookout to the Army base was sufficient to aid the escape of the submarine. Ring is of the impression that the submarine was receiving information from the island of St. Lucia. He bases this on several facts; that all of the beacon lights to the entrance of this difficult harbor were out and that some aid must have been given to the submarine to enter; that unless the commander of the submarine knew that the gun crews on the two ships were not at their stations he could not have risked coming into the harbor on the surface and

coming within 350 yards of 3 and 4-inch guns. The ships are still tied up to the dock which is completely blocked. The LADY NELSON has been refloated and will probably be pulled away from the dock within the next few days. The two ships will probably be salvaged. The loss of life was heavy and included 20 passengers. I might add that the harbor is a rather unpleasant place at the moment as an undetermined number of bodies are still in the engine-room of the UMTATA and the odor in the harbor and in the lower part of the town is, to say the least, unpleasant. This, incidentally, does not improve the morale of the people. There is still no submarine net across the narrow entrance to the harbor but there is one on order.

There are two stories being circulated in St. Lucia - both of which seem obviously inspired. One is to the effect that the submarine was an American sub which sank the two British vessels and left the only American vessel in the harbor unscathed. The other is that no Alcoa boat will be sunk (none has been sunk to date) as long as they continue to bring food to Martinique.

The Administrator of St. Lucia requested permission from Governor Popham of the Windward Islands, of which St. Lucia is a part, to make an investigation of the sinking of the two vessels. The Governor stated that

that was a matter for the British Admiralty. The Admiralty refused to investigate and the Governor authorized the Administrator, Mr. Wright, to instigate his own investigation.

Obviously the information contained in this letter does not come within the province of the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission and is in the nature of a personal report to you. It probably would not help Col. Ring to have it known that he spoke so very frankly to me. It is my impression that should anything of major consequence happen in the Caribbean every effort will be made to saddle as much blame as possible on the State Department.

Cordially yours,

CHARLES TAUSSIG

SUNSHINE VILLAGES

The President,

The White House.

DECLASSIFIED
Date 09/11/01
By J. [unclear]

*file
personal*

*ASF State Welles Folder
1-42*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

What have you done about changing the Dutch Legation to an Embassy? I think it would help a lot at this time. To a less degree it would help in the case of Norway, but I suppose this would raise a problem in relation to Sweden. However, if Norway were lifted first and the Swedes made an application for the same, we could grant it to Sweden too. I will most decidedly have nothing to do with Denmark in this matter.

Also, you might be considering in connection with the post-war period a proposal to all the nations to have one standard -- all emissaries to be Ambassadors. Distinction should, of course, be made in the rates of pay. It really seems absurd for us to have Embassies in Bolivia and Paraguay and not to have them in the Netherlands or Sweden or Costa Rica or Nicaragua.

F. D. R.

PSF Wells Folder
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 11, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

I agree with you about the visit of the King of Greece. I should like to suggest that he should come not only as the King but as the head of the Greek Armies and that he should wear at all times a Greek service uniform, as simple as possible, and with not more than one ribbon on his coat. In other words, it will be much easier if he comes as a soldier than as a monarch.

Pass this on to Summie and get word to the Greek Minister.

O.K. about the young gentleman from Yugoslavia.

F. D. R.

April 8, 1942

OK
JDR

My dear Mr. President:

I have received this morning your two memoranda of April 7, one relating to the visit of the King of Greece and the other asking whether, in view of the problem of the King of Greece, we could delay decision on the visit of the King of Yugoslavia for a little while.

You will remember that when I had the opportunity of talking with you yesterday morning you mentioned these two matters to me.

With regard to the visit of the King of Greece, I feel I can only repeat what I said yesterday, namely, that he is the head of the Greek Government which we recognize and in view of the fact that it has already been agreed that he should visit Washington in order to see you on his return to England from Egypt, I do not see how it would be possible to cancel the visit without creating very bad feeling, which would not intrinsically be justified. I appreciate the fact that

The President,

The White House.

there are elements in the Greek population in the United States and among Americans of Greek origin who are strongly anti-royalist. I have no reason to think, however, that these elements are preponderant nor that they have anything which they can allege against the King which would make his visit undesirable from the long-range standpoint. I consequently recommend that we go ahead with the plans for the visit as arranged. You will remember that it was agreed that the visit should be very brief and completely informal.

So far as I know, and I have looked into the matter, there is no such antagonism in the United States against the King of Yugoslavia on the part of the Serbian elements, although at least a part of the Croatian elements are opposed, for the time being at least, to every Serbian. Again in this case the King is the head of the Government which we recognize and he is associated in the minds of his own people with the revolt against German domination. I would, therefore, also in this case recommend that you agree that he be permitted to come to this country during the first half of June, provided that time is convenient for you.

I shall appreciate it if you will let me know what the decision may be since the Yugoslav Government

-3-

has pressed repeatedly for some reply during the past
two weeks.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

File
personal

File
personal

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE PRESIDENT

Mr. Summerlin called to say that the Greek Minister was in to see him yesterday about the visit of the King of Greece to this country. He is not sure that the King can get here by the end of April and Mr. Summerlin thinks he would prefer to come the end of May.

The Greek Minister hinted again about arranging transportation for the Royal party, mentioning that we had a clipper service from Lagos, Africa, to Brazil. I believe he was turned down when he asked for this before and Mr. Summerlin hopes that we will do so again.

G. G. T.

J. C. [unclear]
460

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 7, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE

What do we do about this
confidential memo? Show it
to no one and tear it up.

F. D. R.

Memo addressed to H. L. H.
from Howard Hunter re discouraging
the visit of the King of Greece
to this country.

Wells Folder

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 14, 1942

*file
Confidential*

My dear Mr. President:

I have received today your "Very confidential" memorandum of April 14.

I am returning herewith the papers attached thereto for your own files.

It is quite true that President Quezon has made it known during the past six months or so that he wished Francis Sayre to remain. It is also true that this "change of heart", as Mr. Ickes terms it, occurred about the time that press reports came out alleging that you were going to send Frank Murphy back to the Philippines.

In the talks I have had with Francis Sayre since he returned, he has given me the clear impression that during the last few months both before the Japanese invasion and subsequently thereto, Quezon and he were working well together and that there had been no friction between them.

On the other hand, Francis Sayre told me that he had not spoken with you as frankly as he was willing

The President,

The White House.

Murphy letter of 4/10 filed in Supreme Court Folder



THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

April 13, 1942.

(VERY PRIVATE)

My dear Mr. President:

I gathered at Cabinet meeting last Friday that you might be thinking of sending Frank Murphy to Australia in view of President Quezon's official residence there.

I have always felt particularly friendly to Frank Murphy but I think that I ought to tell you that some time ago, when President Quezon, both in letters and through Resident Commissioner Elizalde was expressing keen dissatisfaction with Francis Sayre, Elizalde, to my surprise, came in to see me one day to assure me that Quezon was entirely satisfactory with Sayre and hoped that he would be continued indefinitely at his post. When I asked the Commissioner to explain this abrupt change of heart he told me that it was because the report had reached President Quezon that you might send Frank Murphy back in place of Sayre. He greatly preferred Sayre to Murphy.

I thought that you ought to know this.

Sincerely yours,

Secretary of the Interior.

The President,
The White House.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 14, 1942.

~~VERY CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE:

I wish you would give me your private and confidential slant on this problem. It had always been my thought that while Francis Sayre had undoubtedly been getting on with Quezon much better during the past six months, Frank Murphy had been much more highly regard by Mr. and Mrs. Quezon.

Incidentally, Frank Murphy is very anxious to do something constructive during this war and is free from court work from June 1 to October 1. I had thought of sending him out to Australia to help Quezon organize a definite Philippine Commonwealth Government in Australia.

F.D.R.

2 enclosures - 1 from Ickes (confidential) passing word along that Commissioner Elizalde hoped that Sayre would be sent to Australia if the report was true that Murphy was going instead. 2. let to the Pres. from Frank Murphy

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 7 1972

*file
personal*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 16, 1942


My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you, merely for your information, a copy of a letter I have received today from Hamilton Fish Armstrong. You may be interested in the suggestion contained in it.

So long as we maintain even nominal relations with the French Government in Vichy you would, naturally, not wish to do what Mr. Armstrong suggests, but it might be that if relations are completely severed later on, you would wish to give further thought to his suggestion.

Believe me

Faithfully yours



Enc.

The President,
The White House

COPY

FOREIGN AFFAIRS
An American Quarterly Review

45 East Sixty-Fifth St.,
New York

April 15, 1942

The Honorable Sumner Welles
Department of State
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Welles:

Your note to Ambassador Henry-Haye seems to me to have been most effectively worded and timed exactly right.

May I suggest that as the present crisis in Franco-American relations develops you keep in mind the suggestion which I made to you some months ago that at an opportune moment the President should address a broadcast to the French people? My idea is that, speaking in French, he would reiterate the historic reasons why they and we have always felt so close, and without necessarily referring to the Vichy Government or to the Free French, would make unmistakably plain that the cause of the French people is part of our cause, that we are fighting for the principles which made them prosperous and great, and that only by our victory can they hope to regain a life worth living. He would incidentally attempt to undercut the German propaganda which says that Britain and the United States have designs on the French Empire. This might be an important preparation for any military moves which became necessary in Martinique, Madagascar, French West Africa or any other French colonial territory threatened by the Axis. In a word, he would try to exploit, to the disadvantage of Germany and the French collaborationists headed by Laval, the repugnance which the French people by all accounts feel for the miserable position in which they find themselves and for those whom they hold responsible.

Believe me, with warm regards,

Yours sincerely,

HAMILTON FISH ARMSTRONG

Person

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 21, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

In reply to the inquiry contained in your memorandum of April 20, with which you sent me the letter addressed to you by Justice Frankfurter under date of April 16, may I remind you of my letter to you of April 16 with which I enclosed a copy of a letter I had received from Hamilton Fish Armstrong.

In his letter Mr. Armstrong made the same suggestion as that contained in Justice Frankfurter's letter to you.

With regard to this suggestion, in my letter to you of April 16 I said, "So long as we maintain even nominal relations with the French Government in Vichy you would, naturally, not wish to do what Mr. Armstrong suggests, but it might be that if relations are completely severed later on you would wish to give further thought to his suggestion."

I still feel that that would be the wiser course for you to take. If a complete severance of relations


The President,

The White House.

becomes necessary, then I think the suggestion of a
broadcast from you to the French people would be well
worth considering.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be 'R. Kelly', written over the typed phrase 'Faithfully yours,'.

Enc.

PSF; Miller Folder
State

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 23, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am sending you for your convenient reference a copy of Kirk's telegram 608 of April 17, 6 p.m., which you have undoubtedly already seen.

In accordance with the request contained in this telegram, I am likewise sending you for your information, in the event you have not already seen them, copies of the reports from the Military Attaché at the Legation in Cairo, of which mention is made in Kirk's telegram.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Encs.
Telegram 608 from Cairo,
War Department telegrams
978, 952 from Cairo.

The President,

The White House.

CORRECTED PAGE 1

B/S
This telegram must be
closely paraphrased be-
fore being communicated
to anyone. (SC)

Cairo
Dated April 17, 1942
Rec'd 1:55 p.m., 19th

Secretary of State,
Washington.

608, April 17, 6 p.m.

PERSONAL FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY

I suggest you see and show to the President
telegram 978 to War Department from Military Attache
to this Legation regarding Malta as well as material
which Fallers has been sending in about Rumanian oil
fields.

Furthermore I hope that both you and the President
are seeing the reports on the war situation in this
area which our Military and Naval Attaches here are
sending to Washington. They should be carefully
weighed as against reports from British sources
for I am unable to satisfy myself that the British
are adequately impressed both by the threats to this
area as well as by its offensive possibilities or
are sufficiently astute and energetic in obtaining and
making effective use of the material suitable for
defensive and especially offensive operations in this
theatre. In April of last year I said that I thought
that we should take the initiative in determining what
is needed

-2- #608, April 17, 6 p.m. from Cairo

is needed out here and in seeing that it gets here. Now we should be in a position to take also the leadership in determining strategy should be determined by the immediate necessity of preserving and developing the offensive potentialities of the relatively few bases from which the German Italian Japanese mainlands can be struck. Such blows struck now even with smaller forces would be more effective than massed attacks later after these bases may have been lost and would go far to end the war. Hitler's open discard of the fiction of Vichy independence increases the threat to this area and to whole African continent. The only reinforcements that can be brought quickly are air reinforcements and the immediate use of high altitude long range daylight bombers may still serve to check the Axis preparations in the Mediterranean. After all we cannot do everything everywhere but we can do something somewhere and I maintain that even in the scheme of all the operations on the limitless front special emphasis on the Mediterranean area is fully justified. In short we need here American planes under American supervision to fight in the American way, and we need them at once.

KIRK

CSB

~~() apparent omission~~

~~SECRET~~

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WAR DEPARTMENT

DECLASSIFIED

INCOMING MESSAGE

DOD DIR. 5800.9 (9/27/58)

From: Cairo
To: Milid G-2

Date- 12-11-69

Signature- RHP

No. 978 Seventeenth (Rev. 1)

Paragraph 1. Your 805. Please read my 972.

Paragraph 2. Air attacks on Malta are so heavy and continuous that antiaircraft and RAF personnel are becoming exhausted. Throughout day men are busy on defense missions. Nuisance raids at night prevent sleeping.

Paragraph 3. Personal opinion is air attacks on Malta is not merely for neutralizations but considerably heavier and more intense than is required for effective neutralizations. Believe German objective is to soften Garrison and Civil population; to deny replenishing of food and fuel supplies; to force Garrison quarter of millions shaken and hungry population to surrender.

Paragraph 4. Believe present softening process will continue until Malta is forced to capitulate or until capture by sea and air will be certain and inexpensive.

Paragraph 5. Malta cannot hold out beyond early June unless food, and fuel supplies arrive. By early June it appears Hitler will need all available planes for theaters other than Sicily. I therefore estimate Germany will attempt the reduction of Malta before June 1st and unless material assistance arrives believe he will be successful.

Paragraph 6. There are 4 methods by which Malta might be relieved: 1, replenishment of fighters on Malta sufficient to protect harbors and convoys; 2, British capture of Benghazi thereby gaining air bases from which to protect supply convoys for Malta relief; 3, long-range bombers based in Egypt to neutralize German air force on Sicily; 4, Sabotage of German planes on Sicily.

Paragraph 7. 1. Effective fighter force cannot be maintained on Malta until German Air Force on Sicily is neutralized. 2. British will not be strong enough to justify a limited objective attack for capture of Benghazi before June 1st which is likely to be too late to save Malta. 3. 6 squadrons of heavy bombers based in Egypt can materially alleviate the attack on Malta so that fighter strength can be maintained there to cover convoys bringing in supplies and to attack German aircraft on Sicily. 4. British have a highly successful sabotage unit which by parachutes and long-range desert patrols has the destruction of 100 Axis aircraft to its credit. This unit is extremely anxious to attempt sabotage of aircraft on Sicily, believing the objective extremely worthy, operation wholly feasible. However, sufficient suitable aircraft are not available in middle east to effect this mission.

Paragraph 8. Although Roumanian oil is clearly the strategic target of the war, most important immediate British objective is German airforce on Sicily. British cannot afford to lose Malta. Malta will be lost if present scale of German attack is allowed to continue.

Paragraph 9. Recommendation: that a minimum of 6 squadrons of heavy bombers be dispatched to middle east immediately.

Paragraph 10. Urgently request this cable and 972 not be shown to British.

FELLERS

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DECLASSIFIED

DOD DIR. 5800.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 12-11-69

Signature- RHO R

~~SECRET~~

WAR DEPARTMENT
INCOMING MESSAGE

From: Cairo
To : MILID

No. 952, April 6th, 1942

Conversation with Air Marshal Tedder discloses he considers Roumanian oil most important strategic target of war, an especially worthy target this period. He would attack it as major objective were suitable for air craft available. Has been endeavoring to secure 3 squadrons of heavy bombers from England. RAF staff of Middle East has made full study of this problem, have had detailed plan for month. Bombs available here, American bombs believed en route. Airdrome Western Desert south of Fuka offers amply suitable bases.

Shall forward as obtained complete data requested your 791.

FELLERS

Telegram 508 from Cairo
War Department telegram
508, 508 from Cairo.

The President,
The White House.

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CLASSIFIED

DIR. 5200.9 (9/27/59)

Date- 12-11-69

Signature- RHP

131
7
S.W.
O.K.
J.D.C.
5/2/44
April 28, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your memorandum to me of April 11, I immediately transmitted to the Netherlands Government, through the Dutch Minister in Washington, the expression of your desire to elevate the rank of our respective diplomatic missions to that of embassy.

I have today received a visit from the Dutch Minister, who has officially informed me, in the name of the Netherlands Government, that the Queen of the Netherlands welcomes your suggestion and is most grateful for it.

The Minister suggests that inasmuch as May 10 is the anniversary of the occupation of the Netherlands, the announcements of the decision of the two Governments be made public on May 8 in order to make it possible to inform the Dutch people by short wave radio broadcast on the anniversary of the occupation of the step which has been taken as a recognition by the United States of the contribution which the Dutch people have made to the cause of the United Nations.

The President,

The White House.

The Netherlands Government believes that the radio broadcast on the anniversary of the occupation would have great propaganda value.

Will you let me know if these steps meet with your approval, and I will then see that arrangements are made in accordance therewith.

I shall appreciate it if you will also let me know whether you now wish me to go ahead and ascertain whether the Norwegian Government is disposed likewise to raise the rank of our missions to that of embassy.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES