

● PSF

State Dept. : Sumner Welles May-Dec. 1942

*Welles Folder*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 11, 1942.

PRIVATE AND ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR SUMNER WELLES:

Please read this and talk  
to me about it.

F.D.R.

Letter from Beatrice Blackman Gould, Editor,  
Ladies' Home Journal, Philadelphia, Pa., 4/23/42,  
to Mrs. Roosevelt, in re plan to form an  
international committee of leading women, with  
Mrs. Roosevelt as Chairman, to discuss principles  
which should underlie our post-war planning for  
peace. At top of the letter is Mrs. Roosevelt's  
notation "FDR to talk to me."

DECLASSIFIED  
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.  
By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 7 1972

Original of this letter returned to Mr. Welles, as per  
President's notation.

5/19/42

hw

Welles Folder

May 18, 1942

"S. W.  
O. K.  
F. D. R."

My dear Mr. President:

On May 12 I wrote you a letter requesting certain instructions with regard to a matter brought to my attention in a personal letter sent to me by the American Chargé d'Affaires in Madrid a copy of which I enclosed with my letter to you.

I have today received a further personal letter from the American Chargé d'Affaires in Madrid dated May 10 of which I am also enclosing a copy for your information.

Because of the reasons set forth in my letter to you of May 12, I believe it would be desirable for me to be enabled to send a reply promptly to the American Chargé d'Affaires. May I have the expression of your wishes with regard to this matter?

The information contained in this second letter from Madrid which I am now sending to you appears to me to be of some significance.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Samner Welles

Enclosure.

The President,  
The White House.

COPY

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Madrid, May 10, 1942

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Mr. Welles:

I refer to my personal and confidential letter to you dated April 4 (It should have been dated May 4). I have talked to the emissary referred to in the third paragraph of that letter. This is his story:

He blames the French in part for the rise of Hitlerism in Germany. In 1938, I believe he said, France established an "Embassy" in Munich the purpose of which was to foster a separatist movement in Bavaria. Hitler joined the movement. He received French money, and this helped him to get his start.

He told this to help to demonstrate that the German people were not entirely responsible for Hitler, and he told a number of stories to indicate that the German people were against Hitler at the present time. Out of eighty million Germans he said only three and a half millions were members of the Nazi party.

He said that the Church, both Protestant and Catholic, was against Hitler.

He said that the Army was against him.

He said, likewise, that Labor, as represented by an outstanding labor leader whose name he did not mention, but whom he identified as the person for whom a chair was left vacant at the last international labor conference in England, was against him. I shall refer to this labor leader again below.

Economic conditions in Germany are becoming much worse. Everything is scarce. On July 1 there will be no wheat in the country. Private travel is greatly restricted, and after June 1 will be entirely prohibited. Rolling stock is scarce and in bad condition. Six thousand (sic) locomotives have been destroyed on the Eastern front. Airplane production is declining. Rubber is scarcer than gasoline, and the quality is inferior.

Losses on the Eastern front have been 2,300,000, of whom 1,600,000 have been killed or otherwise permanently

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date MAR 7 1972

put out of action. The Russians have not been trying to take towns or recover ground. They have been destroying German material, and have been very successful at it.

Hitler has ordered a Spring offensive, which will probably have Maikop, in the Caucasus, as an immediate objective. However, the date for the offensive has not been set.

Now, the German people, including the Army, consider the war lost. They are conscious of the fate awaiting them at the hands of the outraged peoples of Europe unless they themselves clean up on the Nazis first.

The person mentioned in the second paragraph of my previous letter has a plan. Three of the highest generals in the German army, and the labor leader referred to above, are parties to it. Ex-Chancellor Bruening, if not informed concerning it, has at least had contact with the person mentioned.

The plan is for the Army to refuse to undertake the offensive. This will constitute, in effect, a coup d'etat. The Army will then eliminate Hitler and the members of the Nazi party throughout Germany. All they ask is that Germany be not invaded for two weeks in order to give the Army time to complete its work. France may be invaded, but not Germany. At the end of that time Germany may be invaded. The Army meanwhile will have restored the Crown Prince to the throne (or placed him on it, rather), and he will have abdicated in favor of the person mentioned. The German Army will lay down its arms and ask for honorable terms on the basis of having overcome Naziism. If, in addition to the three generals who are now supporting the plan, the support of three other leading Generals can be obtained, the plan will be carried into effect. The decision will be made within three weeks.

The emissary asked my opinion as to whether we would treat with the new government. In reply I merely referred to our traditional policy of recognition of new Governments.

The emissary said Louis Lochner was very familiar with conditions in Germany and well acquainted with the person mentioned. The emissary also claimed to have met Harry Hopkins some years ago at the Frankfort airport, and recalled that Mr. Hopkins had said that if Hitler was right the world was wrong. He said he had been convinced of ultimate German defeat since that time. He is a young man and the meeting, I take it, was casual, so Harry Hopkins may not remember it.

The emissary said the group had no fear of communism arising in Germany if the monarchy were restored.

He suggested that in our propaganda we not refer to opposition to Hitler on the part of given sectors, such as the Church, the monarchists, etc., because this led to reprisals and defeated itself. He suggested that propaganda stress the general opposition to Hitler.

I offer the foregoing for what it is worth. The young man gave the impression of sincerity, and he was vouched for by the intermediary whom I mentioned in my former letter. He said he was seeing me at the risk of his life, and if he is sincere that is undoubtedly true. He of course asked that his name and that of his principal not be mentioned. He was going back but hoped to return to Madrid, in case you think it worth while for me to see him again.

Very sincerely yours,

WILLARD L. BEAULAC

Original of this letter, with copy of letter from  
Willard L. Beaulac, returned to Mr. Welles, as per  
President's notation

5/19/42

hm

May 12, 1942

"S. N.  
O.K.  
F.D.R."

My dear Mr. President:

I have received a letter from our Chargé d'Affaires in Madrid of which I enclose a copy for your information.

My suggestion would be, unless you see some reason to the contrary, that the best thing for me to do would be to send a personal letter to Mr. Beaulac informing him that the information contained in his letter has been brought to your attention, but that you have informed me that you have no reply to make.

I would suggest that in advising Mr. Beaulac to this effect I ask him to inform the member of the Spanish Foreign Service who communicated the message to him that in the event that some reply would be made in the future Mr. Beaulac would inform him accordingly. In this way your name would be kept out of it and yet a channel would be open in the event that it might be considered useful at some time in the future.

Will you let me know if this meets with your approval?

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

(Signed) Sumner Welles

The President,  
The White House.

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Madrid, April 4, 1942.

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 11172  
MAR 7 1972  
By J. Schauble Date \_\_\_\_\_

Dear Mr. Welles:

A member of the Spanish Foreign Service on duty in Madrid, who has given evidence of being friendly to us, has told me the following:

He is a personal friend of Prince Louis Ferdinand, son of the Crown Prince of Germany. They went to school together in Germany. Prince L. F., you will recall, spent some time at the Ford plant in Detroit. I believe he knows the President.

Prince L. F. has asked him, through an emissary, Dr. Otto John, an attorney for Lufthansa, (a batch of officials of Lufthansa has in fact just arrived in Spain) whether he could get the following message to President Roosevelt:

In the event of German defeat, will the President

1. Treat with Louis Ferdinand as a representative of the Nazis, or
2. Treat with him as a representative of the German people?

He inquired also whether his having a Russian wife would make any difference in connection with the foregoing.

I have no opinion as to the significance of this alleged consultation, but I have the impression it is authentic. It is interesting, too, in connection with Westrick's desire to talk to the telephone people concerning which I telegraphed the other day.

Dr. John suggested, of course, that any reply be sent through the same channel.

I made no commitment to the Spanish Foreign Service officer to transmit the message, and I of course have shown this letter to no one.

Very sincerely yours,

WILLARD L. BEAULAC

*BSF State: Welles Folder*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 27, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE  
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:  
FOR PREPARATION OF REPLY  
FOR MY SIGNATURE.

F.D.R.

Letter from Hon. Arthur Bliss Lane, Embassy of the U.S.A.,  
Bogota, Colombia, 5/21/42, to the President, marked  
"Personal and Confidential". In re desire of Colombia  
to cooperate with the U.S.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 2, 1942.

FILE MEMO:

At the President's direction, I telephoned Under Secretary Welles and gave him the following message from the President:

"The President said absolutely impossible for Gen. Arnold, Admiral Towers and Gen. Eisenhower to go to the Near East."

djb

State  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON


May 29, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I feel I should bring the attached telegram from Kirk in Cairo to your personal attention. Do you not believe that it would be desirable to have this recommendation from Kirk carried out if the men in question can be spared sufficiently long from their duties in Washington?

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure  
Tele gram 874  
from Cairo

The President,  
The White House.

PMW  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Cairo  
Dated May 28, 1942  
Rec'd 5:34 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

874, May 28, noon.

PERSONAL FOR HULL AND WELLES.

There is nothing I can add to reinforce the  
statements of my conviction of importance of this  
theater as base for offensive air action against  
Axis in Mediterranean and Balkans and I understand  
during past few weeks appeals along this line have  
been sent to London by British authorities here.  
I now submit suggestion that if situation here still  
permits Lieutenant General Arnold, Rear Admiral Towers,  
and Major General Eisenhower visit this area before  
returning to Washington so that an impetus may be  
given to such air operations and United States  
participation therein.

KIRK

LMS

PSF  
State  
Welles

June 12, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your information a telegram sent by Arthur Lane from Bogotá under date of June 11.

Will you let me know if the general arrangements indicated in this telegram are satisfactory to you? If so, I will ask Arthur Lane to inform the President-elect accordingly.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enc.

The President,  
The White House.

151 Welles Folder  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

This is all right in regard to President-Elect Lopez's visit. For me it would probably be best if he could come to the White House about July tenth -- for one night -- and then I could see him again when he returns from New York.

I think the only entertainment need be a very informal and small dinner here.

F. D. R.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

June 12, 1942


My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing for your information a telegram sent by Arthur Lane from Bogotá under date of June 11.

Will you let me know if the general arrangements indicated in this telegram are satisfactory to you? If so, I will ask Arthur Lane to inform the President-elect accordingly.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'A. H. Sulzberger'. The signature is written in a cursive, somewhat stylized hand.

Enc.

The President,  
The White House.

BR  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (C)

Bogota

Dated June 11, 1942

Rec'd 2:45 a.m., 12th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

RUSH

778, June 11, 7 p.m.

PERSONAL FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY.

My no. 763, June 6, midnight.

On receipt today of the President's letter of  
June 5 I communicated to President elect Lopez the  
President's views contained in the last paragraph  
thereof.

Lopez stated that as soon as the election returns  
from the four remaining departments are received the  
decision of the electoral board can be anticipated.  
He will then immediately give his definite answer  
as to his trip. He expects that the final returns  
should be received within the next two or three days.

If agreeable to the President, Dr. Lopez would  
prefer to have his visit as informal and simple as  
possible. After paying official visit in Washington  
lasting two or three days, if this meets with the

President's

-2- #778, June 11, 7 p.m., from Bogota.

President's approval, he would like to spend one week in New York incognito, in order to give him an opportunity to converse privately with important American interests having headquarters in New York. He would then like to return privately to Washington to have further conversations with Government and congressional leaders. If this program is satisfactory in principle he would plan to leave here about July 1 and to return here about the time Congress convenes July 20.

I should deeply appreciate it if you would telegraph me whether the foregoing in general meets with the President's approval so that I may inform Dr. Lopez. He informed me frankly that he is very worn out and would consequently deeply appreciate it if formal entertainments could be avoided or at least kept to the irreducible minimum.

LANE

WSB

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 6, 1942

*file  
personal*

My dear Mr. President:

Captain McCrea gave me a few days ago your message with regard to the desirability of preventing the Japanese Government, if possible, from getting the Italian Government to influence the Vatican to delay the arrival of the newly accredited Chinese Minister to the Holy See.

You will remember a report had been received that the Vatican might be persuaded to state that no accommodations within the Vatican City could be found for the new Chinese Minister, and that since the Italian Government would forbid his residing in Rome, the new Minister would be prevented from taking up his duties at the Vatican.

As soon as I received your message I sent a cable to our Chargé d'Affaires at the Vatican and I have today received a reply from him which I enclose herewith for your information. From this telegram it would seem to me that arrangements were going ahead satisfactorily and that there was no basis for the report that the


The President,

The White House.

Vatican would allege that accommodations could not be found for the Chinese Minister in the Vatican City.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "A. Kelly". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial "A" and a long horizontal stroke extending to the left.

Enclosure:  
Telegram No. 3108, July 3,  
3 p.m., from Bern.

PMW  
This telegram must be  
paraphrased before being  
communicated to anyone  
other than a Governmental  
agency. (BR)

Bern

Dated July 3, 1942

Rec'd 8:35 a.m., 4th

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

3108, July 3, 3 p.m.

FROM TITTMANN.

No. 113, June 29.

My 106, June 17.

United Nations diplomats accredited to the Holy  
See are delighted with the prospect of Dr. Sie joining  
them as Chinese Minister and are preparing to give  
him an enthusiastic welcome. My British colleague  
has already been in touch with Dr. Sie by letter  
offering him advice on getting settled, et cetera,  
and I myself have asked Mr. Harrison in Bern to convey  
to him my congratulations on his appointment and to  
inform him that it would be a pleasure for me to be  
of service to him in any way. Monsignor Montini tells  
me that the Secretariat of State has also been in com-  
munication with him as to his housing (?) et cetera.  
Monsignor Montini reiterated to me recently that the

Vatican

-2- #3108, July 3, 3 p.m., from Bern

Vatican did not anticipate any difficulty on the part of the Italian Government with regard to the crossing of Italian territory by Dr. Sie en route to the Vatican City.

HARRISON

LMS

*file  
confidential*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

July 8, 1942


My dear Mr. President:

I believe you will be interested in a letter I have received under date of June 12 from our Chargé d'Affaires in the Vatican City. I am consequently enclosing a copy thereof for your information.

I have informed Mr. Tittmann that his understanding of the policy of this Government is entirely accurate.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enc.

The President,  
The White House.

COPY

EMBASSY OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Vatican City, June 12, 1942

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

Dear Mr. Welles:

I should like to report that, according to my British colleague, the Pope and the Holy See are definitely disliked by the British Government at the present time. This unpopularity has reached such proportions that it was only with the greatest difficulty that Osborne was able to elicit a message of felicitation from the King to the Pope on the occasion of the latter's Episcopal Jubilee; nor did Osborne consider it prudent even to suggest to his Government, in its present state of mind, that he be authorized to make a personal subscription to the fund for the erection of a memorial to the Pope, although he was well aware that he would probably be the only Chief of Mission here failing to do so.

It appears that the British Government is convinced that the Holy See, while professing impartiality, is in reality endeavoring to reinsure itself against the possibility of an Axis victory and is accordingly attempting in various ways to placate the Axis powers, necessarily at the expense of Allied interests. As evidence of this the British cite the unseemly readiness with which the Holy See accepted Japanese representation and the pro-Axis activities of certain Vatican and other ecclesiastics in the Near East, which recently became so obnoxious that the removal of several of them was officially requested.

At the same time, the British Government has not hesitated to solicit urgently the assistance of the Holy See in its efforts to obtain information regarding the welfare of British prisoners of war in Japanese hands. Unless the Holy See can produce some tangible results

The Honorable  
Sumner Welles,  
Under Secretary of State,  
Department of State,  
Washington.

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schauble Date

MAR 7 1972

in this field (and there are apparently no signs of success so far), Osborne fears that British irritation will increase still further.

In so far as I am able to judge from this distance, our present attitude toward the Holy See does not reach any such limits of disapproval. On the contrary, unless I am mistaken, our immediate policy is one of extreme courtesy. I have noticed that in spite of the deplorable impression made by the Japanese affair, and perhaps one or two other instances of Vatican behavior with which we might legitimately take exception, the President was careful to send the Pope a letter of felicitation on the occasion of the latter's Jubilee, and, according to the Osservatore Romano, he also addressed a personal letter to the Apostolic Delegate designating Mr. Myron Taylor as his Special Representative at the Jubilee celebration in Washington. Furthermore, I was authorized by the Department to join my Latin American colleagues in presenting a marble font to the church to be built in honor of the Pope, and when this particular project fell through, I was informed that there was no objection to my making a personal contribution instead. This policy of extreme courtesy, I imagine, is not unconnected with the exigencies of our relations with the other American Republics. It would be helpful if I could receive a directing word on this.

Sincerely yours,

HAROLD TITTMANN

Enc.

The President,

The White House.

PSF Welles Folder  
State 1-42

August 3, 1942

Orig in  
Chile Folder

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with our telephone conversation of yesterday, I am sending you herewith a copy of a letter dated August 1 which I have received from the Acting Secretary of War and which has to do with the policy of our Government towards Chile.

The War Department was advised of the policy which we intended to pursue towards the other American Republics, as approved by you, prior to the Rio de Janeiro Conference of January 15 last. I have, therefore, received this letter with very great surprise.

In any event there appear to be expressed therein a considerable number of misapprehensions and an equal number of incorrect statements.

No suggestions have ever been made by this Government that we should take any action "which can be made to appear as a bribe of munitions of war offered to Chile for breaking with the Axis Powers", as

The President,

The White House.

expressed in the War Department's letter. Immediately after Pearl Harbor the Chilean Government expressed its desire to negotiate a Lend-Lease Agreement with us, but we have replied that we would not be in a position to conclude such an agreement until and unless Chile indicated her intention of actively participating in measures for the defense of the Hemisphere. (This, of course, is exactly the same position which we have taken with regard to Argentina, except that in the case of Chile we sent the Chilean Government last winter four batteries and a few airplanes so that Chile could defend her strategic ports in the event of a surprise attack by the Japanese.)

The President of Chile has now sent you word that Chile will break relations with the Axis Powers if this Government believes it necessary, but has at the same time urged that when this step is taken Chile be permitted to obtain from this country munitions of war and armament which we can spare, and which will put Chile in a better position to resist attack, should attack occur. I have informed the Chilean Government that we will consequently be willing to reach an agreement with Chile as to the nature of a Lend-Lease Agreement so that such an agreement can be signed when and

if Chile takes the action which she has said she will take.

The most astonishing feature in this letter, however, is the two paragraphs which read:

"Granted that such action would stop undesirable trade with Japan and eliminate Axis influence in Chile, and granted that such action would have a good effect on Latin America as a whole, it must also be borne in mind that Chilean shipping, now immune from Axis attack, would be subject to hostile submarine action.

"The main concern of the War Department with respect to Chile from a military point of view is the supply of copper. However, it is believed that under present conditions, Chile will continue to export this metal to the United States, as her failure to do so would result in an economic crisis. In the case of a rupture between Chile and the Axis Powers, this supply might well be jeopardized."

As you know, there has been no trade between Japan and Chile since Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, only a very small percentage of strategic materials, such as copper, exported from Chile to the United States is carried in Chilean flag ships. The great bulk of these materials is carried in United Nations flag ships. Under present conditions, therefore, if Japan were able to do so, she would be sinking these United Nations flag ships on their way between Chile and the United States, but the truth of the matter is, of course, that if Japan were

in a position to prevent Chile from sending us strategic materials even in Chilean flag ships, she would undoubtedly do so were she in a position to take effective action in that regard, whether Chile broke diplomatic relations or not.

It seems to me of vital importance that Chile break relations with the Axis Powers as promptly as possible. A break in relations is of the highest degree of importance in our national defense interests because of the fact that the Axis embassies and consulates in Chile are not only today directing subversive activities in the other American Republics which have broken with the Axis but, as you know, these missions are likewise sending a flood of intelligence to the Axis Governments, reporting on conditions in the United States, and what is probably more dangerous, reporting not only on the movements of our ships touching Chilean ports, but also on the movements of United Nations ships throughout South America. Finally, if Chile breaks relations, I am fairly confident that Argentina could not then stand out for long as the one country in the New World which had not broken with the Axis Powers.

I have been concerned for some months past with repeated reports which have come to me that the Chilean and Argentine military and naval officers in Washington

have been reporting to their respective governments that officers of this Government are telling them that we do not in reality wish those two countries to break with the Axis Powers. Similar reports have reached me that the British military and naval officers in Washington and in the capitals of the two countries in question have been telling high officials of the Army and Navy of Argentina and Chile exactly the same thing. This confusion as to policy has not unnaturally created very considerable doubt on the part of the Chilean Government, particularly on the part of the Chilean President, as to what our real desires might be.

As you remember, the Chilean Ambassador is calling to see you this coming Wednesday morning, August 5. He will immediately report to his President the statements you will make to him. I believe that if he understands clearly that you hope that the Government of Chile will break relations with the Axis Powers because of the great assistance which that will render in the defense of the Western Hemisphere, favorable action will be taken in the not too distant future.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

DECLASSIFIED

DDO DIR. 5200.9 (8/27/88)

COPY

WAR DEPARTMENT  
Washington

Date- 7-9-70

Signature- *J. H. D. [unclear]*  
August 1, 1942

~~SECRET~~  
The Honorable,  
The Secretary of State.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I am informed that the Government of Chile, through its Ambassador in Washington, has informed our Government that it will, if we should consider it desirable, break relations with the Axis Powers, but that it could not maintain itself in power after such action unless the United States could transfer to Chile sufficient munitions of war for the defense of Chile.

I also understand that you desire an estimate from the War Department as to the minimum amount of munitions which it would be necessary to transfer to Chile to insure her defense under the present circumstances, and in addition, a statement of what munitions the War Department could recommend for transfer to Chile in order that she might break with the Axis Powers as above indicated.

I think it proper to point out that, from the point of view of the War Department, the advantages to be derived by the United States from the breaking off of relations between Chile and the Axis Powers are questionable.

Granted that such action would stop undesirable trade with Japan and eliminate Axis influence in Chile, and granted that such action would have a good effect on Latin America as a whole, it must also be borne in mind that Chilean shipping, now immune from Axis attack, would be subject to hostile submarine action.

The main concern of the War Department with respect to Chile from a military point of view is the supply of copper. However, it is believed that under present conditions, Chile will continue to export this metal to the United States, as her failure to do so would

result in an economic crisis. In the case of a rupture between Chile and the Axis Powers, this supply might well be jeopardized.

Moreover, should we take action which can be made to appear as a bribe of munitions of war offered to Chile for breaking with the Axis Powers, this action will become known to the other Latin American nations and cannot fail to cause resentment among those who have already declared war, or who are at present affording us material assistance in the use of their territory, and for whom we have been able to do very little in the way of Lend-Lease aid.

Returning to the immediate subject of transferring munitions to Chile, I understand that you feel that it is not advisable at this time to obtain from the Chilean Government an estimate of what they consider necessary for their national defense.

In consequence, I have listed in Annex "A" of this letter, the more important items for which the Chilean Government has to date made official requests. Practically every item listed is critical.

Lacking time to make a complete study of the defense needs of Chile, it is still possible to analyze some of the main considerations.

It seems logical to assume that the most probable hostile action would be the shelling, by submarine, of the more important Chilean ports or the installations located near them. These ports are Tocopilla, Antofagasta, Barquitos, San Antonio and Valparaiso. The best defense against such action is the fire of properly placed light and medium artillery, of which the Chilean Army now has an adequate supply. In this connection it may be noted that the War Department has already supplied Chile with the materiel of four (4) batteries of 155mm guns expressly for the purpose of defending all of the above-mentioned ports, except Valparaiso, to safeguard the copper supply.

Less likely, but still possible, is a hostile aircraft carrier raid directed at one of the above-mentioned objectives.

Effective defense against such a threat would necessitate combined air and ground forces, including especially anti-aircraft artillery.

As will be noted from Annex "B" of this letter, the Chilean Army is reasonably well equipped to supply the necessary ground forces except in the matter of tanks and anti-aircraft artillery, and consequently their request for field artillery and like items cannot seriously be considered.

The Chilean Army is deficient in combat aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery and tanks, and a request for these items is logical, and the amounts requested are not excessive for the defense of the five localities listed above.

Unfortunately these items are highly critical.

It is unthinkable to take such equipment from the hands of our troops, and in consequence, it could only come from future production. The allocation of means from future production is a function of the Munitions Assignments Board and the War Department could not, in the present circumstances or the foreseeable future, recommend the transfer of such equipment to Chile, in the amounts requested. Combat aircraft is at present out of the question.

However, appreciating the urgency of this situation and despite the critical nature of the items involved, the War Department will recommend transfer of the following:

- a. 20 - 37mm antiaircraft guns with 1500 rounds of ammunition per gun to be available by September 1, 1942.
- b. 30 - Mormon-Harrington light tanks to be available by August 10, 1942. This type of tank is operated by three (3) men, armed with one (1) 37mm gun and three (3) caliber .30 machine guns.

It is possible that at a later date, thirty (30) of a slightly different type Mormon-Harrington tank may become available. This latter type employs a crew of four (4) men and is armed with two (2) 37mm guns

and six (6) caliber .30 machine guns. Production difficulties with respect to engines make it impracticable to set a delivery date for this type at present.

In addition, I attach an Annex "C" of this letter certain other smaller items of equipment which could be recommended for transfer in moderate amounts.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT P. PATTERSON

Acting Secretary of War

3 Incls.

Annex "A"

Annex "B"

Annex "C"



*file  
confidential*

*State*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 3, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I feel you will wish to read this telegram  
of August 2 from Kirk in Cairo.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enc.  
Telegram 1366  
from Cairo

The President,  
The White House.

MEC  
This telegram must be  
closely paraphrased be-  
fore being communicated  
to anyone. (SC)

Cairo  
Dated August 2, 1942  
Rec'd 4:37 p.m.

Secretary of State,  
Washington.

1366, August 2, 9 a.m.

PERSONAL FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY.

My 1361, July 31, Noon.

I realize that the assumption is that the parti-  
cular responsibility for military operations in this  
theatre lies with the British and that the role here  
of the United States at present is confined to render-  
ing such aid as is within our power. The general  
responsibility for winning the war, however, is ours  
as well as Britain's and the loss of the Middle East,  
with the grave consequences thereof to the cause of  
the United Nations in the denial of the Mediterranean  
to eventual allied offensive operations as well as in  
the jeopardy to the routes to Russia, India and China,  
would at least postpone the victory for which we are  
fighting. In the sincerity of the deepest conviction  
I submit, therefore, that we have not met that respon-  
sibility unless, in the face of the present danger to  
Egypt, the President and his advisors have acquainted  
themselves with

-2- #1366, August 2, 9 a.m. from Cairo.

themselves with the lines of the present strategy of the allied commanders in this theatre as well as with what those commanders believe is required to implement that strategy and then, have challenged both that strategy and those requirements in the light of their own superior knowledge and broader view. Only in this way can determination be assured of the actual elements involved and the fact be established that everything that is humanly possible is being done to save the situation here while there may yet be time.

KIRK

WWC

PSF

Welles Folder  
State

August 12, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

The enclosed memorandum covering a part of the conversation which I had with the Ambassador of Mexico this morning may be of interest to you.

I think the Mexican Ambassador is reporting accurately. If his account of the conversation he had with Litvinov is accurate, the Soviet Ambassador is, in my judgment, going far beyond the bounds of what is in the interest of his own country.

See  
Russia  
Folder

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enc.

The President,  
The White House.

*file personal*

PSF: Welles Folder  
State 1-42

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON


August 13, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Alexis Leger has been to see me this afternoon and I am sending you herewith a memorandum of my conversation with him. I think you will find the reports set forth in the attached memorandum of particular interest at this time.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enc.

The President,  
The White House.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
*Memorandum of Conversation*

DATE:  
August 13, 1942

SUBJECT: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PARTICIPANTS: M. Alexis Leger;  
Under Secretary, Mr. Welles

COPIES TO:

\*\*\* 1-1400

M. Alexis Leger came to see me this afternoon. M. Leger told me that after our last conversation he had sent a further telegram to Mr. Churchill stating that he felt it necessary to repeat the statement he had made to Mr. Churchill when the latter was last in Washington, namely, that he felt it impossible for him to take any part in General de Gaulle's national committee or to comply with Mr. Churchill's request that he proceed to London and act as number one adviser to General de Gaulle. (M. Leger had already declined a similar invitation addressed to him personally by General de Gaulle.)

M. Leger told me that what he was about to relate to me must be regarded as in the strictest confidence. One of M. Leger's close friends, M. Istel, a scientist and economist prominent in the Free French group in the United States, had just returned from a visit to London where he had gone upon the invitation of General de Gaulle. M. Leger said that M. Istel, while refusing to accept any official mission offered to him by General de Gaulle, had nevertheless fallen completely under the influence of General de Gaulle and had consequently agreed to transmit personally to

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-73  
By J. Schauble Date MAR 7 1972

M. Leger a further urgent appeal from General de Gaulle to join him in the fighting French national committee. General de Gaulle had dictated a message to M. Leger which M. Istel had taken down in his own handwriting and which M. Leger proceeded to read to me.

The message, apart from the personal appeal for collaboration, indicated to M. Leger very precisely the policies which General de Gaulle has determined to carry out and in particular the foreign policy which General de Gaulle desired France to pursue at the conclusion of the war, as well as the internal policies upon which he had determined.

General de Gaulle alleged that the British Government was favorable towards the setting up in France by the Allied Governments, at the time of the armistice, of a French national government headed by General de Gaulle; this government was to remain in power for six months, during which period a general pacification and reconstruction of the country would be undertaken and at the end of this period national elections would be held for a constituent assembly which would determine the constitution of France and provide for the holding of elections for the new government of France.

In the field of foreign policy, General de Gaulle stated that the policy of France must be purely nationalistic and that the basis of French foreign policy must be the closest kind of understanding, both military and political, with Soviet Russia. He stated that only in this way would France prevent the existence in the world of a preponderant British-United States influence. With regard to Great Britain, France's policy should demonstrate suitable recognition of the part which Great Britain had played in the liberation of France, but nothing more. With regard to the United States, France's interests should be purely economic and "on a par with French relations with the republics of Latin America". In the field of internal policy, General de Gaulle specified, although in less clearcut and categorical terms than those employed with regard to foreign policy, that order and discipline must be employed by any government that was to be installed and that the errors of the systems which have prevailed during the Third Republic must be corrected.

policies were totally opposed to any type of international cooperation or of world organization.

During the period of the war General de Gaulle's policy would be to press both the British and the Americans for recognition of the de Gaulle fighting French committee as the provisional government of France with complete authority over all Frenchmen within France or outside of France and with "integral diplomatic relations with the United Nations".

General de Gaulle would continue to press for an invitation from President Roosevelt to visit Washington (although he emphasized that this invitation should not be conveyed through M. Tixier). The prestige of General de Gaulle would thus be enhanced and his influence in France proper would be correspondingly increased.

General de Gaulle would oppose resolutely the shifting from London to Washington of the supreme direction of the present war effort. He did not believe it would be conducive to France's interests were Washington to have the supreme control of the direction of political and military strategy.

M. Leger emphasized his belief that General de Gaulle's insistence upon a rigidly nationalistic policy for France in the future and upon a close working arrangement with the Soviet Union was probably due in large part to his belief that through Soviet influence among the French people and manipulation by the Soviet Government of the French communists, General de Gaulle could secure for himself definite control over whatever French government was to be installed six months after the signing of the armistice.

M. Leger said that this message confirmed completely the deep-rooted feelings and doubts he had had with regard to General de Gaulle and justified in his own mind his repeated refusals to take any part in the de Gaulle committee. He said to him the one ultimate salvation for France was the predominance of Anglo-Saxon influence in the world for a considerable period after the signing of the armistice and that only through some official world organization to be set up after the war did he see any hope of an ultimately peaceful and decent world in which French people could live or hope to return to their old position of world influence. He said it was evident that General de Gaulle's plans and policies were totally opposed to any type of international cooperation or of world organization.

M. Leger insisted that Mr. Eden was primarily responsible for the rather close cooperation which was in progress between the British Government and General de Gaulle, notwithstanding the superficial evidences noted on repeated occasions of friction between the British Cabinet and General de Gaulle and his associates. He expressed the very earnest hope, in the interest of France, that this Government would not go further in its relations with General de Gaulle than the policy already publicly announced by this Government some weeks ago.

In particular M. Leger urged that we should develop our own contacts within occupied and unoccupied France so that the intelligence reports received by this Government should not come to us exclusively through British or Free French sources. He stated that from recent reports he had received from France, the French people were more than ever turning to the United States and that the moment had never been more propitious, notwithstanding the military reverses of the United Nations, for the United States to make use of this state of feeling both in occupied and unoccupied France. He emphasized his belief that we were doing a very wise and useful thing in sending supplies at this time to North Africa and to unoccupied France and that by stressing the humanitarian angle at this moment we were counteracting effectively the discouragement on the part of the French people created by the military reverses of the present summer.

S. W.

ATLANTIC 4234  
ANACOSTIA STATION  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

file  
personal

OXON HILL MANOR  
OXON HILL, MARYLAND

My Dear Mr. President -

It was so kind  
and thoughtful of  
you to send me Sm's  
letter - which I am  
delighted to have.

I am most grateful

In your interest by  
having a copy made  
for me.

I do hope if you haven't  
a little change some  
night you will come  
out again to Open Hill.  
Affectionately yours  
Matthew -

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 14, 1942

BF Welles Folder  
1-42


14 Aug '42

My dear Miss Tully:

My wife has deeply appreciated the letter from the President which she received this morning. I am enclosing her reply herewith. I shall be grateful if you will see that the President gets it.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "B. F. Welles". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent initial "B".

Enc.

Miss Grace G. Tully,  
Secretary to the President,  
The White House.

Waller folder  
1-42



file  
journal

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 28, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am returning to you herewith the letter from  
Ambassador Grew which you sent to me with your memo-  
randum of August 28.

I am sending a copy of the memorandum enclosed  
with Ambassador Grew's letter to the American Amba-  
sador in Lima in order that he may make use of the  
contents thereof in his conversations with the mem-  
bers of the Peruvian Government.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure

The President,  
The White House.

Exchange S.S. GRIPSHOLM,  
August 8, 1942.

Personal and ~~Strictly Confidential~~

Dear Mr. President:

I enclose for your information the record of a strictly confidential conversation which I had on board this ship on August 6, 1942, with Dr. Ricardo Rivera Schreiber, recent Minister of Peru to Japan, regarding the danger of an eventual Japanese invasion of South America, which I feel deserves our Government's careful consideration.

I have likewise brought this conversation to the attention of the Secretary of State.

Respectfully yours,

*Walter D. Fisher*

Enclosure:  
Memorandum of conversation.

The President,  
The White House,  
Washington.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date MAR 7 1972

Enclosure to letter dated August 8, 1942, from Ambassador Grew on board the Exchange S.S. GRIPSHOLM.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

~~STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL~~

By J. Scheuble Date MAR 7 1972

Conversation. Exchange S.S. GRIPSHOLM,  
August 6, 1942.

The American Ambassador, Mr. Grew;

Dr. Ricardo Rivera Schreiber, recent  
Peruvian Minister at Tokyo.

Dr. Rivera Schreiber, until recently Minister of Peru to Japan, with whom during several years in Tokyo I have enjoyed close relations and whose opinion and information I highly value, today told me the following facts.

Toward the end of the period of Dr. Rivera Schreiber's internment at Miyanoshita prior to our evacuation, three Japanese, Mr. Yamamoto, Chief of the American Bureau of the Foreign Office, Mr. Takata, who was one of the two Japanese accompanying us on the ASAMA MARU, and Mr. Hosokawa, came to Miyanoshita ostensibly to apologize for the treatment given to the Minister at his Legation in Tokyo and to say good-bye, but it was evident that they had come for the specific purpose of conveying to him a message of menace. Japan, they said, would unquestionably win the war against the United States and in the course of the war they would invade and occupy Australia. Peru, with its long coastline of 1300 miles, lies directly opposite Australia and it therefore behooved Peru in her own interests to avoid antagonizing Japan and to follow a course of cooperation with Japan. They said that Japan has

many interests in Peru and a very large colony of more than 40,000 Japanese, and that in consequence, geographically, economically and ethnographically, Peru is placed, face to face with Japan, in a very different situation from that of any other South American Republic. They wanted the Minister to convey the foregoing to the Peruvian Government asking it to "consider very seriously Peru's future". The threatening note in this statement was obvious.

Dr. Rivera Schreiber went on to say that Japan had sent a great many fifth-columnists to South American countries and that while Peru had expelled a great many of them, some undoubtedly still remained and they represented a danger to his country. During the entire period of his two missions to Japan, the Minister had been urging his Government to recognize the Japanese threat and to take effective steps to combat that threat, especially in controlling Japanese fifth-columnists in his country. There were, nevertheless, people in his Government who had failed to grasp the seriousness of the future Japanese threat to his country. It is now clear that public opinion in Peru is blind regarding the methods of Japanese penetration and the "true intentions" and criminal purposes of Japan towards Peru. The Minister therefore urged me strongly to recommend to my Government that it leave nothing undone to impress upon the Peruvian Government the seriousness of the

Japanese future threat. What the Minister feared is that the Japanese, while not at present in a position to carry out a full-scale invasion of Peru, will nevertheless in due course land small invading parties, and there would be danger that the Peruvian army, which is not too strong, might not be able to overcome these incursions. The United States being so far away might not be in a position to afford adequate assistance in time. According to his information, the first threats will be, if possible, directed to the Galapagos Islands and the port of Chombote in Peru, with a view to establishing air bases against the Panama Canal. The possibility was also mentioned in Japan of attacking the Pascua Islands off the south Chilean coast.

The Minister went on to say that he had had pleasant relations in Tokyo with General Ott, the German Ambassador, and he had once asked General Ott if the Ambassador did not recognize the danger of the yellow race to the white race. General Ott had replied in the affirmative and had said that Germany was very much disappointed with her Japanese allies. On that ground the Minister had asked General Ott what he thought of the Japanese menace to South America and the Ambassador had answered that "the danger of a Japanese invasion to South America and especially to Peru was latent and evident".

I thanked the Minister for the foregoing information and said that I would bring this information directly to the attention of President Roosevelt on my return to

Washington. I said, however, that there was not the slightest doubt in my mind that we would eventually defeat Japan, and that while this might take a long time I was quite certain that, with our progressively increasing naval and air strength in which we could rapidly outbuild Japan, there seemed to me to be no doubt whatever as to the eventual outcome. Sooner or later we would conduct a systematic offensive in the Pacific moving up from Australia, and I therefore felt that the menace to Peru was not so great as the Minister feared. This menace, however, must be given full consideration and especially the fifth-column activities in the American republics.

Joseph C. Grew

The foregoing is an accurate report of my conversation with Mr. Grew.

Ricardo Rivera Schreiber

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

August 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

SUMNER WELLES:

To read and return for  
my files.

F.D.R.

Confidential letter from Jos. Grew  
on board the Gripsholm, Aug. 8 re record  
of conversation he had with Dr. Ricardo  
Rivera Schreiber, recent Minister of  
Peru to Japan.

PSF: Keller Folder

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

August 30, 1942

*file* →  
Personal and ~~Security~~

My dear Mr. President:

In accordance with your request, I received the Archduke Otto and the Archduke Felix the evening before last at my house. I talked over the general situation with them, emphasizing the point you had made to me that the matter in which they were interested was primarily military and not political and that, therefore, at this stage, the decisions would have to be made by the War Department.

The Archduke Otto made it clear to me that he desired to be the chairman of the committee to be created. I stressed my own belief that this would be highly unfortunate and that if and when a committee was created, the Archduke should remain in the background and not become either the chairman or a member of it.

Before I talked with the two Archdukes, I had consulted General Marshall and I consequently told

The President,

The White House.


DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date MAR 7 1972

the Archduke Otto that General McNarney would be glad to talk with him and his brother. This conversation took place yesterday. I am enclosing a copy of a letter I received from General McNarney giving me a summary of the conversation which he had with the Archduke Otto. As you will see from this letter of General McNarney, the immediate issues raised are being placed before the Secretary of War for the decision of the latter.

As soon as the War Department has completed its arrangements, I shall see the Archduke again in order to try to see that the proposed committee stays within the proper limitations which you indicated to me.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "A. M. Kelly". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent initial "A".

Enc.

WAR DEPARTMENT  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON

August 29, 1942

Honorable Sumner Welles,  
Under Secretary of State,  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Welles:

In accordance with our telephone conversation, I received Archduke Otto and discussed with him the feasibility of recruiting, for our Army, a battalion of Austrian nationals.

Archduke Otto proposed that an Austrian Committee of from five to seven members be formed and be charged with recruiting of Austrian aliens for this battalion. This Committee would have the political and moral responsibility of making sure that the individuals recruited were all right.

Archduke Otto asked that some form of military recognition be given the Committee, and that it be designated as the channel of communication between the War Department and Austrian aliens in this country. In addition, he desires access to the Department of Justice file of alien registrations in order to secure information concerning Austrian aliens in this country. The question of drawing Austrian aliens from Canada and the Latin American countries was discussed. The desirability of transferring Austrian nationals already in the Army of the United States to the Austrian battalion was mentioned by Archduke Otto.

The position of the War Department was explained to Archduke Otto. It was emphasized that the initial conference was exploratory in nature, and that the matter would have to be presented to the Secretary of War. The Austrian Committee would be expected to determine the number of Austrian nationals who, in all probability, would volunteer for enlistment. The War Department would need this data in order to determine the feasibility of the project. At least 800 men of draft age would be needed, and of this number, it would be preferable that a very high percentage would be between the ages of eighteen and thirty. If such a number was

available, an Austrian Battalion might be formed. For its initial training, a cadre of United States soldiers and officers would be necessary. An effort would be made to get individuals of Austrian descent. As the training of the battalion progressed, the training cadre would be transferred out when Austrian officers and noncommissioned officers became available. Austrian officers would normally be required to go to an officer candidate school. The battalion would be an integral part of the Army of the United States and would wear its uniform. A distinctive shoulder patch could be designed and its wear authorized. No commitments can be made by the War Department as to where this battalion would serve or as to what division it would constitute a part.

No publicity would be given the formation of such a battalion until it became apparent that there would be no difficulty in recruiting the necessary number of Austrian nationals to insure a full complement. As soon as this could be determined, the Secretary of War could announce the formation of such a battalion. After this date, all possible publicity would be given the project.

This summary of my interview with Archduke Otto is sent to you for your information.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY  
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army,  
Deputy Chief of Staff.

PSF: Welles  
5-42

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 2, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

J.F.C.

Would you and Sumner Welles  
between you assume responsibility and  
put the matter through?

F.D.R.

Memo to Miss Tully from J.F.C. Sept. 29  
Re: the man at Fort Belvoir who has been  
under the direct responsibility of G-2

DECLASSIFIED

per Mr. R. Dougall

Historical Ofc., Dept. of State, 8-24-67

PSF:Welles

5-42

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 3, 1942


SECRET

My dear Mr. Carter:

I am enclosing a copy of a letter which I have addressed today to General Strong.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,



Enc.

John Franklin Carter, Esq.,  
1210 National Press Building,  
Washington, D. C.

DECLASSIFIED per letter R. Douglass  
Historical Dfc., Dept. of State,  
8-24-67.

October 3, 1942

PERSONAL AND ~~SECRET~~

My dear General Strong:

The President has informed me that he approves the arrangements for the suggested removal of Sedgwick from Fort Belvoir to the establishment which has been discussed with you by Mr. Carter.

In accordance with the President's desire, I am sending you this letter to let you know that the arrangements may be made as suggested, and I consequently assume responsibility for the suggested change. I do this with the understanding that the arrangements proposed are, in your judgment, as satisfactory as possible and that the provisions to be made for security personnel, secrecy, et cetera, are reasonably comprehensive.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,

Sumner Welles

Major General George V. Strong,  
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,  
Room 2416, Munitions Building,  
Washington, D. C.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 6, 1942

*file  
personal BF  
Welles folder  
1-42*


My dear Mr. President:

In the course of a rather long conversation I had with Litvinov yesterday, he brought up of his own accord the subject of the former Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck.

In the belief that it may be of interest to you, I attach herewith that part of the memorandum of my conversation which has to do with this subject.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enc.

The President,

The White House.

*Memorandum of Conversation*

DATE:

October 5, 1942

SUBJECT: Colonel Beck

PARTICIPANTS: Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Maxim Litvinov;  
Acting Secretary, Mr. Welles

COPIES TO: The President, S, A-B, Eu

\* \* \* 1-1400

The Soviet Ambassador called to see me this afternoon. The Ambassador asked me if I had any information about the former Polish Foreign Minister, Colonel Beck. I said that I had not had a word about him for at least six months. The Ambassador said I might then be interested to know that Colonel Beck was at present living in Bucharest in the former villa of Madame Lupescu and that he had recently offered his services to both the German and Italian Governments to set up a Polish government subservient to Axis control, provided the Axis powers would agree to certain boundaries suggested by Colonel Beck. Mr. Litvinov continued that the Germans had turned this offer down but that the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, had expressed the greatest interest in it and was apparently strongly supporting it. The Ambassador said that he was surprised that the Germans had not accepted the offer inasmuch as Colonel Beck had been the most useful servant the Germans had had prior to the outbreak of the war in 1939. He said that obviously he knew Beck well through his long association with him at Geneva and that he had always found him animated by the greatest detestation for Great Britain and France and completely subservient to the desires both of Nazi Germany and of Fascist Italy.

S. W.

U:SW:DMK

*file personal*

*PSF  
Weller folder  
1-42*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 6, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am returning to you herewith the September 26 number of "The Hour" which you sent me with your memorandum of October 3.

You asked me to read the first two pages of this number which have to do with the visit to Washington of Tracy Phillips.

I had never heard of Mr. Phillips before. Upon inquiry I find that Tracy Phillips is a member of the British Foreign Office staff. The British lent him to the Canadian Government as consultant in connection with questions on foreign nationality problems and handling the foreign language press. Phillips is a specialist on the Ukraine and speaks Ukrainian. The Ukrainians constitute the largest foreign nationality group in Canada.


I learn that about three weeks ago Phillips was in Washington. He talked with Cannon, an officer of the European Division in the Department of State. He asked how we were organized to deal with foreign nationality

The President,  
The White House.

problems and the foreign language press; and he was told what work we do in the State Department and of the appropriate section in the Office of War Information. He said they were expanding the Canadian organization and wanted to get what guidance they could from us. He stayed about four days and then went home. He seems to have been regarded as a rather insignificant elderly man of no particular importance.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "A. M. Kelly". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed phrase "Faithfully yours,".

Enclosure:  
"The Hour".

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

October 3, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

TO READ THE FIRST TWO PAGES  
AND RETURN FOR MY FILES.

F. D. R.



# The Hour

100 E. 42nd St., New York  
Murray Hill 5-0688-9

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Number 143

September 26, 1942

## MR. PHILLIPS GOES TO WASHINGTON

Within the past fortnight a dapper gentleman by the name of Tracy Phillips has visited Washington and made a number of calls on the State Department. Phillips, we are informed, has been "advising" State Department officials regarding the European situation and problems of the foreign born in this country. Those State Department officials are doubtless unaware of certain of this gentleman's past associations and of some of the more interesting aspects of his career.

A former member of the British Colonial Office, Tracy Phillips was known to be in close touch with "appeasement circles" in England before the war. Lady Astor and Lord Halifax, whose names were then associated with the so-called Cliveden Set, were among Phillips' intimate friends. Phillips was also said to be a very great admirer of Benito Mussolini. He was a frequent visitor to Fascist Italy. In October 1938, Phillips attended the Congress of the International Colonial Institute in Rome. With him at the time was Viscountess Dorothy Downe, well known in England for her pro-Nazi sympathies and as an intimate friend of Sir Oswald Moseley, the leader of the British Fascists who is now in jail.

The Fascist Government of Italy displayed considerable warmth towards Phillips who as late as March 1940 publicly expressed his admiration for the brutal Fascist colonial policy in Africa. He informed the English public; "the Italian technique of overseas settlement offers us much to learn."

### Interesting Connections

U. S. State Department officials might find of greatest interest the relations that have existed between Phillips and certain fascist-Ukrainians in North America who have been connected with the German War Office and the German Ministry of Propaganda.

Tracy Phillips arrived in Canada from England on June 10, 1940, and was promptly contacted by Luke Myshuha, editor of the pro-Nazi Ukrainian-American newspaper, *Svoboda*. This paper was banned by the Canadian Government subsequent to exposures of its pro-Nazi character appearing originally in *The Hour*. Myshuha hurried from his office in Jersey City, N. J., to Canada to meet Phillips. Myshuha's

newspaper, Svoboda, published an article welcoming the "distinguished visitor," Tracy Phillips. Only a short time before this, Myshuha had returned from Nazi Germany, where he had been a guest speaker on one of Dr. Goebbels' radio programs.

Phillips' visit to Canada had been preceded by that of a fascist-Ukrainian, W. Kissilevsky, who spread the word that Phillips was coming as a "special emissary of Lord Halifax." From the day he set foot on Canadian soil, Phillips was enthusiastically hailed by fascist-Ukrainian organizations set up by representatives of the German Intelligence Service. The very friendly reception accorded to Tracy Phillips by these persons at a time when Germany and England were at war seemed rather strange, to say the least.

As a matter of fact, Phillips' association with the fascist-Ukrainians dates back some years. In the summer of 1939, Phillips visited the town of Alasio, Italy, and spent a week at the Villa Romana, home of Jacob Macchin, a meeting place for Nazi-Ukrainian agents from all parts of the world. Macchin is himself a key representative of a fascist-Ukrainian organization, which has its headquarters in Berlin. According to the London Daily Express of December 5, 1939, Macchin was then proclaiming his intention to lead a fascist-Ukrainian army of 600,000 men, trained and equipped by Nazi Germany, against Soviet Russia. Interestingly enough, W. Kissilevsky who now serves as Tracy Phillips' private secretary, formerly worked as a propaganda agent for Macchin.

#### Aid to the War Effort?

Tracy Phillips has been in Canada for two years. His influential friends in England were doubtless useful to him in securing his present position with the Canadian Department of War Services. Phillips now works with a section of this Department called the Committee on Canadian Citizenship which has the function of organizing the foreign born behind the war effort of the United Nations.

It would appear to The Hour that, in view of his strange connections and expressed opinions, Tracy Phillips is hardly the man to organize effective support of the war effort or to give "advice" to the United States State Department.

— • —

## MORE ON TOP KICK

On August 22 we urged that U. S. Military Intelligence conduct an immediate investigation of Top Kick, a new "comic" magazine intended for nationwide distribution among members of the armed forces. We revealed that this publication, while purporting to be of a humorous character, was in reality spreading propaganda which could have the sole effect of undermining confidence in the army leadership, stirring up misgivings about the U. S. Government and fostering doubts and suspicions against Great Britain and Russia.

In Top Kick, the editor's name appeared as "Jack Dinsmore." A Cleveland investigator for The Hour informed us that "Dinsmore"'s real name was Charles Rothman (President of Charles Publishing Company, 1102 Carnegie Hall, Cleveland, Ohio), and we included this information in our story on Top Kick. We have since learned that Rothman is the publisher, not the editor, of the fascistic pseudo-comic magazine. The editor is a man by the name of David Gordon.

### Gordon's Career

A former Cleveland newspaperman, David Gordon has had a shoddy record as an editor and publisher of obscene publications. One of his magazines, which was called Hot Dog, was suppressed because of its pornographic content. A similar Gordon publication was Secrets. The magazine Top Kick, as we previously reported, combined pornography with fascist propaganda.

Several months ago, Gordon -- who was converted to Catholicism in 1936 -- began issuing a publication called Catholic International, "a magazine of Christian decency for the Christian home." Permeated with anti-Semitic innuendo, the Catholic International campaigned vigorously against all inter-faith activities. In other of his "religious" writings in the Catholic Mirror of Springfield, Ohio, Gordon referred to Charles Chaplin as a "non-Christian," slandered Albert Einstein and offered apologies for Hitler's persecution of the Jews. The November 1940 issue of the Catholic Mirror carried an article by Gordon entitled "A Christian at the Movies," in which this publisher of pornographic literature inveighed with righteous indignation against "sex-drenched novels" and "perverted" moving pictures.

### Gordon Interviewed

A short time after The Hour's disclosures about Top Kick, a reporter from the Cleveland Press interviewed David Gordon. Mentioning the fact that Gordon claims to be a member of the Legion of Decency, the reporter asked Gordon what he thought of his new magazine. The editor answered, "I am ashamed of it. We went too far with the obscenity. I will have to tone it down."

During the course of the interview, Gordon stated that he was a former member of the Christian Front, the pro-Axis organization which was headed by Nazi propagandist Father Charles E. Coughlin.

(More)

Shortly after the above interview, Gordon notified the reporter from the Cleveland Press that he had decided to discontinue the publication of Top Kick (the first issue of which, incidentally, remains on newsstands throughout the country). Gordon was not very explicit in the reasons he gave for liquidating the magazine. Whether or not David Gordon stops publishing Top Kick, we recommend that Federal authorities investigate this shady editor and his latest publishing venture. Gordon should be asked where he obtained the obviously Nazi propaganda material which fills the pages of Top Kick.

\* \* \* \* \*

#### FACTS ABOUT STRASSBURGER

A report reaches The Hour that the New York State Chamber of Commerce has elected Ralph Beaver Strassburger to its Board of Directors. There are certain facts about Mr. Strassburger's record as a public figure that his associates on the Chamber of Commerce should know.

Ralph Beaver Strassburger has for many years been the owner and publisher of the isolationist, anti-Administration newspaper, the Norristown, Pa., Times Herald. In addition to his activities as a publisher, Mr. Strassburger was formerly one of the chief sponsors of the so-called American Committee for the German Relief Fund, Inc., and an honorary member of the "German Society." Mr. Strassburger's wife, May Bourne Strassburger (daughter of the late Frederick G. Bourne, who amassed many millions from Singer Sewing Machine and other concerns) was a behind-the-scenes financial supporter of Women United, the subversive unofficial ladies auxiliary of the America First Committee. In March of last year Mr. Strassburger set up what was described as a one-man "relief" organization for Marshal Petain, and was reported to have donated \$500,000 to send supplies to Vichy. He was one of the very few private subscribers to Transocean News, chief official Nazi propaganda outlet in the United States.

When Government investigators raided the Transocean News offices of the Nazi agent Manfred Zapp in 1940, they found evidence that Mr. Strassburger and the Nazi agent had been in close contact. On April 25, 1940, Zapp wrote the following letter to Mr. Strassburger:

"I want to thank you especially for the interesting interview I got and I will certainly take you at your word and take the liberty of calling on you next week. I am sending you, as I promised, the full text of the third German White Book containing documents found in Warsaw regarding American foreign policy."

The German White Book was an official Nazi propaganda publication based on forged documents aimed at discrediting the foreign policy of the United States Government. As a result of Zapp's "interviews" with Mr. Strassburger, the publication of this Nazi material was made possible in this country. Mr. Strassburger personally put up the sum of \$4,250 to finance the distribution of 17,000 copies of this German White Book.

#### NOTE

With the current issue of The Hour Michael Sayers, who has been a frequent contributor to this newsletter and who wrote the book Sabotage! in collaboration with the editor of The Hour, joins our editorial staff. The current issue was prepared in collaboration with Mr. Sayers.

October 6, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I am returning to you herewith the September 26 number of "The Hour" which you sent me with your memorandum of October 3.

You asked me to read the first two pages of this number which have to do with the visit to Washington of Tracy Phillips.

I had never heard of Mr. Phillips before. Upon inquiry I find that Tracy Phillips is a member of the British Foreign Office staff. The British lent him to the Canadian Government as consultant in connection with questions on foreign nationality problems and handling the foreign language press. Phillips is a specialist on the Ukraine and speaks Ukrainian. The Ukrainians constitute the largest foreign nationality group in Canada.

I learn that about three weeks ago Phillips was in Washington. He talked with Cannon, an officer of the European Division in the Department of State. He asked how we were organized to deal with foreign nationality

The President,

The White House.

problems and the foreign language press; and he was told what work we do in the State Department and of the appropriate section in the Office of War Information. He said they were expanding the Canadian organization and wanted to get what guidance they could from us. He stayed about four days and then went home. He seems to have been regarded as a rather insignificant elderly man of no particular importance.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

Summer Welles

Enclosure:  
"The Hour".

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

October 7, 1942

S. W.

O. K.

F. D. R.

~~SECRET~~

*file*  
My dear Mr. President:

I received this morning your secret letter of October 6.

In view of the facts contained in your letter, I am arranging to see the Swedish Minister. I shall tell him that for reasons which are sufficient for this Government, Captain Curt Wennberg of his Legation is no longer persona grata and that unless the Swedish Government takes steps immediately to remove him from the United States, this Government will be forced officially to inform the Swedish Minister that Captain Wennberg is persona non grata and must be recalled.

I shall likewise take steps to see that every precaution is taken to prevent the Swedish Legation from transmitting information of the kind mentioned in your letter.

The President,

The White House.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By J. Schaubie Date MAR 7 1972


With regard to the Assistant Air Attaché of the French Embassy, I wish to raise for your consideration the possibility that if this Government should now declare him to be persona non grata, the French Government would be afforded the opportunity to retaliate and such retaliation might take the form of declaring Murphy or some official of ours of key importance in North Africa to be likewise persona non grata. Under present conditions, I believe it would be desirable to guard against this possibility. If Lieutenant Dorance is now prevented from using his Swedish contacts, his potential danger will be limited.

If you agree, I would suggest that the matter of the Assistant Air Attaché of the French Embassy be held in suspense with the understanding that a request will be made for his recall at the first convenient opportunity or in the event that we have reason to believe that he is still able to operate in such a way as to be an immediate source of danger to us.

Will you let me have your decision?

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "A. Murphy". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, prominent initial "A" and a long, sweeping underline.

~~SECRET~~  
October 6, 1942

Dear Sumner:

It has come to my attention that Lieutenant Michel Dorance, Assistant Air Attache of the French Embassy, did, on September 3, 1942, deliver to Captain Curt Wennberg of the Swedish Legation a memorandum containing data regarding the status of the air force personnel of our Army and Navy, together with the number of airplanes being used by these forces.

I do not know what laws there may be to control a thing of this sort but one thing seems certain to me, that the Assistant Air Attache of the French Embassy is undoubtedly making this information available to the Swedes for no good purpose. I wish you would let me know what steps we can take to stop this sort of thing. If there is no other way to get Lieutenant Dorance out of the country I would think the thing would be to notify the French Embassy that he is no longer persona grata in this country.

The same Captain Wennberg of the Swedish Legation is alleged to have prepared a report known as the "Ship Report" in which he has collected information on all of our naval ships, showing the shipyard in which they were built, the date they were put to sea and the size. I have not examined this as yet for accuracy.

I hope you will be sure to see that no member of the Swedish Legation is permitted to take information like this out of the country or to send such information through their codes to Sweden.

Sincerely yours,

The Honorable  
Sumner Welles,  
Under Secretary of State,  
State Department.

DECLASSIFIED  
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72  
By J. Schauble Date MAR 7 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you arrange for me to see Mr. Philip on November fifth or sixth, and will you come in and see me first?

You might prepare a memorandum of reply to de Gaulle although I doubt that it is wise to do much more than make a polite acknowledgment of the statement and say that the matter will be discussed a little later.

F. D. R.

Let to FDR from Sumner Welles 10/27/42 - copy attached together with let to the President from Gen. deGaulle 10/6/42 and translation of same.

PSF:Welles folder  
1-42  
State

October 27, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

Monsieur André Philip, who recently fled from France to become a member of General de Gaulle's National Committee in London, has recently arrived in Washington.

Monsieur Philip tells me that he has had the opportunity of talking with you in past years and, if that is correct, you know his background.

He was brought to see me by Monsieur Adrien Tixier, representative in this country of General de Gaulle, and I have had two long and interesting conversations with him.

He has handed me a letter addressed to you by General de Gaulle which I am transmitting to you herewith, together with a copy of a translation made for the files of the Department.

Monsieur Philip has asked if you will receive him, and I have told him that I would transmit his request

The President,

The White House.

-2-

to you. Will you let me know what your wishes may be?

If you decide to see him, may I have an opportunity of talking with you before you receive Monsieur Philip?

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

SUMNER WELLES

Enc.

*PSF Welles file  
2-42*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

October 29, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

For preparation of reply for  
my signature.

F. D. R.

Enclosure

State Dept. cable to Secy State fpr  
the President from Morris L. Cooke  
#4386, October 24 from Rio de Janeiro  
signed Caffery - charge to Board of  
Economic Warfare - report of progress.

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

PSK Welles folder  
1-42  
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
October 30, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

With regard to the Tom Armstrong matter, I believe you will wish to see an excerpt which I attach herewith of a letter sent to me by Ambassador Messersmith under date of October 26.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enclosure:

Excerpt of letter  
from Ambassador  
Messersmith.

The President,

The White House.

Excerpt of letter from Ambassador Messersmith, October 26

Mr. Sollenberger, who as you know is the local representative of the Standard Oil, told me last week that Tom Armstrong, who has been with the Legal Division of the Standard in New York for many years, had become a member of the Foreign Requirements Liaison Branch of the War Production Board, and that he had heard some very strong reactions from within the Mexican Government here with regard to this. I asked him to give me the article on which he based his information, and he sent me a clipping from the OIL AND GAS JOURNAL of October 8, 1942, entitled Experience Recruited. In the enclosure to this letter I am quoting the article, which is featured with a picture of Tom Armstrong.

I thanked Sollenberger for giving me the information and told him that for his purely personal and confidential information I could say that I was rather sorry that Tom Armstrong had been brought into the picture in this way, as I was sure that it would cause some concern in Mexico and in some of the other American countries where the Standard has important interests. Mr. Sollenberger himself referred to the unfavorable repercussions which had already come to him from certain sources here.

COPY

From the OIL AND GAS JOURNAL, October 8, 1942

Experience Recruited

Thomas R. Armstrong, a veteran of 23 years' training and experience in the foreign producing division of Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), last week became chief of the Foreign Requirements Liaison Branch of the War Production Board. The WPB branch which Mr. Armstrong now heads has just been created in the Foreign Coordination Division. The division was established earlier last week to recommend an integrated over-all national program to WPB's vice chairman on program determination.

Mr. Armstrong, who started his Washington war assignment immediately, will maintain liaison with the Board of Economic Warfare, Lend-Lease Administration, and all other agencies concerned with foreign purchases or requirements. In addition, he will review all other purchases by, or on behalf of all foreign governments, following and expediting the preparation and presentation of their requirements estimates to meet the specifications and time schedule of the program coordination division.

Mr. Armstrong has been one of the key executives in most all foreign producing subsidiaries of Standard of New Jersey. He is a vice president and director of

Creole

Creole Petroleum Corp., Lago Petroleum Corp., which operate in Venezuela; European Gas & Electric Co., which developed a substantial producing property in southwestern Hungary and of other subsidiaries previously operating in Mexico.

He was born 50 years ago in Corpus Christi, Tex., the son of a Texas Ranger captain and was reared on a cattle ranch in Southwest Texas. He was graduated from Princeton University in 1913 and 3 years later he took his law degree from Harvard law school. During World War I, Mr. Armstrong served as a major of field artillery.

After being discharged from the Army in 1919, Mr. Armstrong joined Standard of New Jersey, to take charge of an expedition to explore for oil in Colombia and Venezuela. Later, he established operating subsidiaries for Standard in Venezuela, Bolivia and the Argentine.

Welles folder  
1-42

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON



October 31, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

PLEASE READ AND RETURN.

MAYBE SOME OF JIMMY GERARD'S  
HAPPY THOUGHTS ARE WORTH  
PURSUING.

F. D. R.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAR 7 1972

PSF Walker folder 1-42  
file  
Personal State

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

November 16, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

You sent me some papers, which are returned herewith, with regard to the increasing tension in Peru between the Peruvian Government and the Aprista Party, of which Haya de la Torre is the leader.

As these papers state, the Aprista Party has been outlawed by the Peruvian Government as a legitimate organization for approximately a decade. During this period there has been a running feud which has occasionally erupted in armed clashes costing the lives of many people. The Aprista Party, which started out as anti-imperialistic and particularly anti - United States, has over the years changed its attitude toward this country, first on account of the Good Neighbor Policy and later on account of our determination to defeat the Axis powers. It has maintained, however, its original demands for sweeping internal reforms in large part revolving around the breaking up of the feudal privileges of the Peruvian landowners which have, naturally, met with violent opposition by the conservative elements which control the Peruvian Government.

In this struggle for power our Government has naturally taken no position. In fact, in a situation which is continually shifting, the one constant of which both the Government and the Aprista Party are aware has been the lack of any meddling or interference by this Government. The Aprista Party and its sympathizers in this country would, of course, like this Government to intervene in favor of the Aprista Party. This not only would be entirely contrary to the fundamental tenet of the Good Neighbor Policy but in view of the particularly close and cordial relations between the Government of President Prado and ourselves would create very natural

resentment

The President,


The White House.

resentment in the minds of President Prado and his associates. It is appropriate to recall that despite many circumstances counseling caution such as a large Italian colony closely integrated into the social and economic structure of Peru and a Japanese colony of around 25,000 to 30,000 people President Prado acted immediately after the Rio Conference to sever diplomatic relations with the Axis. This forthright action is in sharp contrast to the indecision of Chile. For these reasons I think that it would be highly unfortunate for this Government to make any suggestion to the Government of Peru with regard to the Peruvian internal political situation.

With respect to the suggestion that the leader of the Aprista Party, Haya de la Torre, be brought to the United States in order to escape persecution in Peru I do not think that this Government should take any action. My own belief is that even though the opportunity were afforded, Haya de la Torre would not leave Peru, first, because he knows that the Government of Peru would not dare to take his life, and second, because his departure might well mean the beginning of the breakup of the Aprista Party.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "R. H. Hays". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large initial "R" and a distinct "H" and "Hays" following.

132

CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM ON HAYA DE LA TORRE

Haya de la Torre is the most outstanding leader of Peru and is known to have the thorough backing of the Peruvian people. At the present moment ~~is in actual danger~~ his life is in actual danger because of an order issued by Mr. Lapuente, Minister of the Interior. This order states that de la Torre must be taken dead or alive.

Any misfortune to de la Torre at the hands of the Peruvian government might well be disastrous to the cause of American solidarity for the following reasons:

1. De la Torre is recognized throughout all of Latin America as one of the foremost democratic leaders of the world.

2. The Peruvian government has unofficially let it be known that their persecution of de la Torre is done ~~with~~ with the full knowledge and consent of the State Department of the U.S. which has conveyed this information through its ambassador, Mr. Norweb.

3. The death of de la Torre would endanger the whole cause of American solidarity because it would at once be seized upon by Nazi propagandists as convincing proof of insincerity on fundamental principles of democracy on the part of the U. S.

The immediate background of this unhappy situation is as follows. On Sept. 2, 50 members of the Aprista party were imprisoned because of their activities in connection with a strike. They were charged with inciting to strike and thus slowing down Peruvian war production and also with being fifth columnists. There is strong reason to believe that this strike was actually engineered by Nazis operating in Peru.

On Sept. 13th 30 of the 50 were still in prison. Among them were several lawyers, doctors, and the elder brother of de la Torre.

On Oct. 1st the Younger brother of de la Torre was arrested and the order against de la Torre himself was issued.

A man of great courage and ingenuity with the support of the Peruvian people, de la Torre has nevertheless felt himself so much in danger that he is sending frantic messages for help to his friends in the U.S.

In 1921 de la Torre was exiled by the Peruvian dictator Juan B. Leguia. For ten years he studied in Great Britain, France, and the U.S. In 1931 he returned to his own country and ran for president. He at once became the incarnation of the spirit of the people of Peru who elected him. However General Sanchez Cerro led a successful revolt and took possession of the government. Ever since that event de la Torre has been outlawed together with his party, the Aprista, and has suffered from persecution and imprisonment. At the present time he is in hiding.

In spite of everything de la Torre has never <sup>ONA</sup>comprised his democratic principles. He has categorically stated his belief in the United Nations cause and has offered President Prado his support of a government of national unity which would stamp out Nazi and Japanese fifth columnists which are numerous in Peru.

CONCRETE PROPSALS

L. That the American Ambassador to Peru be instructed by the State Department to suggest ~~in~~ to the Peruvian government that the continued imprisonment or the death of de la Torre would have such serious repercussions as to affect the whole pattern of relationships between Peru and the majority of American Republics.

2. That in order to avoid any danger of complications, the U.S. government arrange unofficially, through some <sup>such</sup> private institution as the New School ~~of~~ Social Research, to have de la Torre brought to the U.S.

In conclusion it should be clearly understood that many influential Americans are greatly concerned for the safety of de la Torre. ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~

Several proposals for ~~a~~ public demonstrations of one kind or another have been made already. It is of the utmost importance that the State Department act quickly and quietly so that no appeal to public sentiment be made by people who do not realize the ~~delicacy of~~ delicacies of Latin American diplomacy. Any such demonstrations would certainly be resented by the Peruvian government which could only regard them as insults. It is quite possible that such occurrences would seriously endanger the existing good relationship between this country and Peru.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*B.F.*  
*State*

November 10, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

x20

I do not know where I got this.

Is there anything in it?

F. D. R.

Enclosure

Confidential Memorandum on Haya De La Torre,  
the most outstanding leader of Peru and known  
to have the thorough backing of the Peruvian  
people. At the present moment his life is in  
actual danger because of an order issued by  
Mr. Lapuente, Minister of the Interior. This  
order states that de la Torre must be taken  
dead or alive. x

x287

x287-A

1-42

*file  
personal*

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON


November 16, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

John Carter brought in to me today the attached memorandum from Sedgwick which I think you will find of particular interest at this moment. I have communicated it to General Strong.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,



Enc.

The President,  
The White House.

COPY

~~SECRET~~

November 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WELLES: SEDGWICK COMMENT ON HITLER'S  
BEERHALL SPEECH

Sedgwick desires to call urgent attention to the following passage from Hitler's beerhall speech of November 8, 1942:

"Indisputable fact! At any rate, the Russians are not at the Pyrenees or before Seville; that, you see, is the same distance as for us to be in Stalingrad today, or the Terek, let us say; but we are there; that can really not be disputed. That is a fact, after all."

Sedgwick thinks this is a direct tip-off of Hitler's intention to invade Spain and get Seville and Gibraltar. He recalls many conversations in which Hitler pointed out that from Berlin to the Volga was the same distance as from Berlin to Gibraltar and that Germany needed to secure both intervening areas to be unassailable in Europe. Sedgwick also said that Hitler's favorite technique is to mention such facts, casually, in advance of his actions, so as to be in a position later to remind the Germans that he gave them advance knowledge of his intentions. Sedgwick believes that, after this otherwise obscure reference to Seville, there can be little doubt that Hitler plans to counter our North African campaign by striking through Spain for the Straits of Gibraltar.

Presumably, the German Armies in Tripoli and Tunis--  
under this interpretation--would fight containing actions  
in order to suck Allied military strength into the Central  
Mediterranean and then the Axis would strike through  
Spain and, perhaps, through Turkey as well, in a pincers  
movement designed to capture both ends of the Mediterranean.

J.F.C.

(234)

*hm*

*PSF*

*Welles folder*

*Stat 2-42*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 3, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

This is a matter which  
should be taken up with Basil  
O'Connor of the National Founda-  
tion for Infantile Paralysis.

F. D. R.

Enclosure  
State Dept. dispatch #2419 dated  
12/1/42 for the Under Secy from Buenos  
Aires from Armour re serious epidemic  
of infantile paralysis in Argentina

(270)

hm

PSF Welles folder  
2-42

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 7, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Will you be good enough  
to reply to the enclosed letter  
from Mr. Charles W. Carson?

F. D. R.

Letter from Charles W. Carson, Carson Place,  
Tappan, New York, 12/4/42, to the President,  
suggesting that our former Ambassador to  
Japan, Mr. Grew, be placed where his knowledge  
of that "hot spot" might be brought to bear  
on the Asiatic campaign.

*file  
Personal* PSF Welles folder


DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
December 19, 1942

My dear Mr. President:

I enclose herewith the signed original of a letter addressed to you by Nuri-as-Said, Prime Minister of Iraq, regarding the American-British operations in French North Africa. As you will recall, the text of this letter was cabled by the American Legation at Baghdad on November 18, and reply was sent by cable on November 23. For your convenient reference I am enclosing a copy of the reply.

The American Minister Resident at Baghdad is being instructed to acknowledge receipt of the letter on your behalf.

Faithfully yours,



Enclosures:

1. From Prime Minister of Iraq.
2. Telegram sent to Baghdad, no. 229, November 23, 1942.

The President,  
The White House.

Department of State

BUREAU  
DIVISION

NE

ENCLOSURE

TO

Letter drafted

ADDRESSED TO

The President

Baghdad

18th November 1942

Dear President Roosevelt,

The news of the Anglo American Landings in Morocco and Algiers certainly came as a tremendous surprise to all of us in Iraq and in the great exultation which overwhelmed us we did not realise the magnitude of the operations involved. It is only now when the full details have been revealed that we can appreciate it to the full.

In 1917 when great American Forces were landed in France they entered a friendly country; all port facilities were available to them and there was no land or air opposition. Far different was the case when you sent your expedition to North Africa. Great risk not only had to be faced in the long sea journey, but from all the resources of the Axis powers in the air and on the sea. Nor was it certain what would be the attitude of the French Forces in North Africa. Although it was known that French feeling was always in favour of the Allies, yet the possibility of active opposition by the professional elements in the French forces had to be taken into consideration.

Mr. Churchill has told us that the plan originated in your brain, Mr. President. We are accustomed to expect great things from you, the originator of the New Deal and the man who converted the U.S.A. into one gigantic arsenal for democracy. But the planning that was necessary for the equipment and embarkation of this great force involving 500 transports and 350 escorting warships, and all this in absolute secrecy, was a magnificent achievement in itself, for which General Eisenhower and Admiral Cunningham and their staff deserve the highest praise.

This lightning blow to Axis pretensions in the Mediterranean now constitutes a threat to the weakest link in the Axis chain and, when Tunisia is occupied, Italy will have to be heavily reinforced by Germany if the death throes of the Axis are to be postponed.

-2-

As a soldier I have been impressed with this stupendous undertaking and I am still amazed at the daring of the conception the perfection of the organisation and the magnitude of the achievement.

Your Generals working in close co-operation with their British colleagues have proved their ability to make great and elaborate plans and to carry them into execution with the mechanical efficiency, associated in our mind with your great country. The whole Mediterranean scene has been changed in a few days and all the friends of the United Nations and particularly the Arab races of North Africa and the Near East are full of rejoicing and grateful to you personally as the originator of this great action.

Yours Sincerely.

*Nasir Said*

TELEGRAM SENT

GRAY  
November 23, 1942  
10 p.m.

AMERICAN LEGATION

BAGHDAD

229

Your 276, November 18.

Please transmit following message from the President to the Prime Minister:

QUOTE The American Minister at Baghdad has advised me by telegraph of the text of your letter of November 18 regarding the American-British military operations in North Africa, and I hasten to express my deep appreciation of your message and the praise you have been good enough to bestow upon the American and British commanders and upon me. I have been especially happy to receive your assurance that the Arab peoples of the Near East, as well as those of North Africa, rejoice at the success of the United Nations arms. You may be sure that America, together with the other United Nations, will not rest until the Arab world has been relieved of every vestige of the threat of Axis aggression which has so long hung over it. In this great undertaking, which we shall prosecute with ever-increasing power, we are proud to feel that we have the sympathy and cooperation of Iraq and of all the Arab peoples.

Please accept my best wishes for your personal welfare and that of the people of Iraq. Franklin D. Roosevelt.  
UNQUOTE

HULL

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Welles folder  
2-42

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

December 28, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

In enclosed No. 2203 from Bowers, Santiago, December 19th, a FORTUNE article is mentioned.

In regard to all articles in FORTUNE or TIME or LIFE, which in any way hurt the Good Neighbor policy with Latin America or tend to promote disunity among any of the United Nations, the State Department should, from now on, file a formal protest with Mr. Luce, covering each article on the ground of the protest. In other words, it is time to build up a complete case.

F. D. R.