MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

An album which was left at the White House by the wife of Dr. Carlos Cisneros, of Argentina, in which the President has written the following: "For Senor Cisneros - Franklin D. Roosevelt, The White House, Feb. 5, 1943", has been returned to Honorable Sumner Welles, State Dept.

2/6/43
hm
MEMORANDUM FOR GRACE TULLY:

At 12:55 today, you know that Sumner Welles brought over Dr. Carlos Cisneros. Dr. Cisneros's wife came too, and she has this album.

Sumner Welles asks me send this album into you, for the President to write a line and his signature therein.

These other signatures are all those of the current Presidents of Bolivia--Peru--Ecuador--Colombia--Venezuela--and the messages are about the future hope of women of the Americas.

Mr. Welles says he knows the President doesn't write messages along that line, but his signature would be enough, of course.

Dr. and Mrs. Cisneros are leaving Wednesday for Argentina.

Will we please return this album to Sumner Welles personally.

E.M.W.
February 20, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

Yours of February 18th. I did not say to the Pacific War Council that I had discussed with Molotov the possibility of neutralizing a part of the Karelian Isthmus.

I think I said that I had not dared to discuss it with Molotov at the time but that I had talked it over in a purely exploratory way with several other people — not Russians.

F. D. R.
February 18, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

The British Ambassador told me this morning that at a meeting of the Pacific War Council some weeks ago you had mentioned the fact that when Molotov was in Washington you had discussed with him the possibility of a future neutralization of a part of the Karelian Isthmus in order to provide complete security for the city of Leningrad.

Lord Halifax told me that he had reported this to his Government and that he has now received an instruction from his Foreign Office stating that the British Government had not previously been advised of the suggestion you had made to Molotov, and that they would appreciate having any details which you might care to give them, as well as information as to the reactions of Molotov when this suggestion was made to him.

The President,

The White House.
I shall appreciate it if you will let me know what reply you may wish me to make to the British Ambassador. Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 23, 1943.

FILE MEMORANDUM

The President okayed this request by telephone.

GGT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

My dear Mr. President: January 30, 1943

On March 1, 1943, Dr. Juan José Amezaga will be inaugurated as President of Uruguay, and Dr. Alberto Guani, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, has informed the American Embassy at Montevideo that the Uruguayan Government will be glad to receive the appointment of Special Missions for the occasion of the Presidential Inauguration.

As an evidence of the most friendly relations which exist between the United States and Uruguay, I recommend that Mr. Norman Armour, the present American Ambassador to Argentina, be designated as your Special Representative with the rank of Ambassador at the inaugural ceremonies.

If you approve the designation of Mr. Armour as Special Ambassador, and if you will authorize his designation in the capacity indicated, I shall be pleased to notify him of his appointment and I shall inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, which would appear to be all that is necessary in the circumstances.

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.
My dear Mr. President:

I believe you will be interested in the attached censorship document reporting on a communication sent by the wife of Hugh Gibson to the Comte de Paris.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure

The President,
The White House.
Hugh Gibson's dissatisfaction with course of events in U.S.A. hopes for return of House of Orleans to throne of France.

Hugh himself is so taken up with what will happen in the future, and so perturbed about what is happening here. It is often a misfortune to be so intelligent as he is and to foresee what will happen. I can't say anymore on this point, but you will read between the lines. We are also anxious about this enthusiasm for the Bolsheviks. I believe in NOSTRADAMUS who says that Communism will disappear and that you will come back and everything be settled. What a prospect. And as for you I know that you have the staff in you to succeed.

"It is my one consolation to think that I shall see you where you ought to be..."
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

This can file. I spoke with Sumner Welles about this on March fourth.

F. D. R.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

March 3, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I have received today from the British Embassy a copy of a telegram they have received from the British Foreign Office with regard to the visit to Washington of the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr. Lie.

The telegram in question relates specifically to the desire of the Norwegian Government that Crown Prince Olaf be appointed nominal Commander-in-Chief of the Allied forces in the event of an Allied landing in Norway.

Will you let me know if you wish me to express any views on this matter to the British Government.

Believe me

Faithfully yours

The President,
The White House.

(Copy of Mr. Welles' letter filed in Norway folder 1-43)
This document was originally declassified March 9, 1972 and has been stamped incorrectly. EKDO 4-13-73
Telegram received from the Foreign Office
dated February 28th.

Last November the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Ambassador that the King and the Norwegian Government thought it desirable in the event of an Allied landing in Norway Crown Prince Olaf should be appointed nominal Commander-in-Chief of Allied forces. Mr. Lie explained that the Prince would of course undertake not to interfere with the actual conduct of operations.

2. It was considered premature at the time to put this proposal to the Chiefs of Staff since it would be necessary to know more about what it was intended that the Crown Prince should be and do and much would depend on circumstances in which operations would take place and on the extent to which American and other Allied troops might participate. Mr. Lie was accordingly informed that the idea would be sympathetically considered when the time came but that it was as yet impossible to take a decision. He appeared satisfied.

3. Mr. Lie told us before he left this country that he proposed to raise this question during his visit to the United States and in particular with President Roosevelt personally.
4. We do not think matter can be left in suspense much longer. We are about to engage in conversations with the Norwegian Government on administrative and jurisdictional questions which will arise in the event of an Allied landing in Norway and we shall have to try to solve the delicate question of the division of responsibility between the Commander-in-Chief of Allied forces and legitimate Norwegian Government. The course of these discussions will inevitably be much affected by eventual decision about the Crown Prince, e.g. if he were to be the titular Commander-in-Chief it would very probably be much easier to induce the Norwegian Government to agree to the supremacy of Allied military authorities in the matter of civil administration during the initial phase while military operations are proceeding. The question of appointment of the Crown Prince is therefore being studied here by appropriate authorities.

5. As soon as we have reached a considered opinion on the subject we shall inform the United States Government with a view to reaching an agreed policy.
March 8, 1943.

Dear Sumner:-

I think the idea about Glassford going to French West Africa is a good one. However, I think we have to be careful about Giraud and Murphy and I, therefore, think he should be under Murphy so far as anything but naval affairs are concerned, and in this respect he could report direct to the Navy.

I think it would be wise to clear this, however, with Murphy and Eisenhower & King before it is done.

Always sincerely,

[Signature]

Honoroble Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. President:

On his return from Dakar a short time ago, Admiral William A. Glassford, who headed the American Naval Mission to that city, expressed the strong opinion that it would be desirable to assign a high-ranking representative of the United States Government to French West Africa as soon as possible.

Admiral Glassford stated that from both the political and economic point of view French West Africa was in urgent need of guidance in order that the fullest use might be made of its war potentialities. The French, he said, were willing to cooperate in the war effort of the United Nations, but required direction and support from an outside source if the proper degree of productivity were to be obtained. Governor General Boisson had indicated that this outside support should, by preference, be American.

Admiral

The President,

The White House.
Admiral Glassford also stressed the great importance of Dakar from the strategic viewpoint. He recalled your recent remarks to the effect that never again should Dakar constitute a threat to the Western Hemisphere, that it must remain in the hands of people who are friendly to us. With the development of the airplane, the significance of Dakar to the United States and the other American Republics can scarcely be exaggerated.

Under the energetic direction of Lord Swinton, the British Resident Minister at Accra, the British are at present rapidly building up a corps of economic specialists and experts at Dakar, with the obvious design of drawing French West Africa into the British orbit. Admiral Glassford feels that unless we are able to meet the expanding influence of Lord Swinton promptly and adequately, we shall inevitably lose the position which should belong to us at Dakar.

I believe that no better person could be found to represent this Government in French West Africa than Admiral Glassford himself. He enjoyed excellent relations with Governor General Boisson, and it is my impression that he would be doubly welcome were he to return as a counterweight to Lord Swinton at Accra. The fact
that Admiral Glassford is a naval officer would undoubtedly add to his prestige at such an important French naval base as Dakar.

If you concur, Admiral Glassford might be asked to serve in French West Africa in the capacity above indicated and given the title of Personal Representative of the President, with the rank of Minister. May I have an indication of your views in this matter?

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
My dear Mr. President:

You will recall that in my letter of March 5 I suggested the possibility of appointing Admiral William A. Glassford to serve as a high ranking representative of the United States Government at Dakar.

I believe that the early appointment of Admiral Glassford would be a most satisfactory solution of the problem which has arisen with respect to our position in French West Africa. In accordance with your instructions this matter was taken up with General Eisenhower, Mr. Robert Murphy, and Admiral King, the first two of whom expressed unqualified approval of the proposal. Admiral King, however, made the suggestion that Admiral Richard Byrd might be appointed to the post.

For a number of reasons it seems to me that the selection of Admiral Glassford to represent this Government at Dakar could not be improved upon. I believe that he should at least be given the title of High Commissioner, although

The President

The White House.
although he would of course be under the orders of General Eisenhower and Mr. Murphy in Algiers. There is every indication that the return of Admiral Glassford to Dakar in such a capacity would be entirely welcome to the French authorities.

Faithfully yours,

Sumner Welles
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 12, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE
UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE:

See page two of the enclosed excerpt from a German paper. It seems to me it would have a grand effect if this can be published in Mexico to show to what extremes of falsehood the Germans go.

F.D.R.

Cable Harrison Plain from Bern dated March 9, 1943 to Secy. of State 1888 re German press from Zurich -- re using Mexicans as cannon fodder for U.S. of America.
My dear Mr. President:

I have received your memorandum of March 12 suggesting that the articles appearing in the German press alleging that large quantities of Mexican soldiers are being used by us in overseas operations should be published in Mexico.

I fully agree as to the desirability of this and I have asked Messersmith to take it up and to let me have such articles as appear in the Mexican press on this subject. When I receive these articles I will send them to you for your information.

Believe me

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

The President,
The White House.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
March 18, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

With reference to your memorandum to me of March 16 concerning the proposed bill to take away the citizenship of Rene de Chambrun, I fully agree with you that we should give it our blessing. I shall talk with Senator Connally in order to find out what the status of the matter may be and will let him know that it has our approval.

Believe me

Faithfully yours

The President,
The White House.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 16, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

I think there is a bill in Congress to take away the citizenship of Rene de Chambrun. It might not be a bad idea to give it our blessing. What do you think?

F. D. R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 15, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

Miss Grace Tully.

In discussing the daily news a day or so ago the President raised the question as to whether the State Department had taken any action about annulling the American citizenship of Laval's son-in-law, Rene de Chambrun.

Perhaps the President may wish to send a memorandum to Mr. Welles about it.

[Signature]

WILSON BROWN.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
April 6, 1943

Secret and Personal

Dear Marvin:

I am sending you herewith, in accordance with our recent telephone conversation, a memorandum prepared in the Department of State covering some of the cases which you mentioned.

I think this memorandum will give you some of the key cases of the kind you had in mind, but there are others which may be brought to the President's attention if he desires to go into the matter more fully.

Believe me,

Yours very sincerely,

Enc.

Honorable Marvin H. McIntyre,  
Secretary to the President,  
The White House.
Memorandum

April 5, 1943

The following is a record of the activities of twenty-four individuals designated to be sent out on missions of importance by various agencies of the United States Government. Of these, nineteen, being the great majority, were selected by the Office of War Information, the Board of Economic Warfare, and by the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.

All of these individuals are reported to have been actively connected either with the Communist movement, or with organizations for liberal purposes commonly known as "front" organizations, whose impetus came from Communist sources.

It is recognized that mere membership in a "front" organization does not itself prove that the individual was a Communist or under Communist control, since sincere liberals have frequently joined these organizations. But practically every informed investigator has developed the fact that the Communist underground organization in America has made a practice of using these "causes" and "front" organizations as a means of interfiltrating into various positions men who could be counted upon to obey implicitly directives given by the Communist Party officials.
It is further clear that the Communist Party is only secondarily interested in Communism as such, either for the United States or elsewhere. Its primary activity consists in supporting the interests of the Soviet Government, irrespective of whether these interests happen to coincide with the interests of the United States or not. Thus, the directives given do not limit themselves to endeavoring to assure a Russian victory, which is in the interest of the United States, and towards which every possible activity of the Department is directed. They also include a variety of objectives directed at various times against General Sikorski and the Polish Government; General Mikhailovich, in Yugoslavia; the British Government in India; General Franco's Government in Spain; against the possible survival of the Baltic republics; against the possible assimilation of the Social Democrats in Italy; and against the unification of the French under auspices other than those supported by the Communist Party, which happens to be, at the moment, General de Gaulle. They have included a continued and bitter hostility to the Government of General Vargas in Brazil; to the present Peruvian Government; and to a considerable number of officials in the United States Government who are deemed inconvenient.
These activities are stated to be in the interest of the submerged classes in all of the various countries. The reality which emerges, however, is invariably a Party movement, or (as in Croatia), a puppet government, following the orders of Soviet Russia, which not infrequently has led to the complete submergence of the country involved. At various times Soviet policy has not only diverged from, but has directly opposed that of the United States, notably, between 1939 and 1941, when the Soviet Government was supporting and working with the German espionage and the German fifth column activities.

The records of the men involved seem to indicate that should there be a divergence between the policy of the United States and the policy of Soviet Russia, these men, with a large degree of control of the American machinery of war making, would probably follow the line taken by Soviet Russia, rather than the line taken by the United States.

If it is desired to give a distinctly liberal cast to these organizations, it would seem possible to find men who are liberal in the light of their own conviction, and of the American ideal, rather than men who have, for
one reason or another, elected to give expression to their liberalism primarily by joining Communist front organizations, and apparently sacrificing their independence of thought and action to the direction of a distinctly European movement.

It has been the theory of this Department that, outside of Soviet Russia, most of the groups struggling for expression desire freedom and a chance to find their own way, and that they have looked to the United States, rather than to the Russian collectivism, as offering the hope of achieving both social advance and individual freedom. The concern which we have is that the men asked to state, represent and carry out American policy shall be men who both understand that policy, and will be loyal to it, rather than to any outside connection.
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

Passports Issued

Around the world with Wilkie

BARNES, Joseph Fels - born Montclair, New Jersey July 21, 1904; father born New York; mother Australia.

News correspondent in USSR several years. Alleged to have stated that the Soviet Constitution is the best ever written. Supported the left wing of the American Newspaper Guild. It is reliably stated that there has been no crucial point in Russian development, since 1934, when Barnes has not followed the Party line and has not been much more successful than the official spokesman in giving it a form congenial to the American way of expression.

Great Britain


Connected with various Communist front organizations such as Committee to Save Spain and China, National Federation of Constitutional Liberties, the Free Company, etc. This connection continued during period of Soviet Cooperation with Germany.

British Isles

REDEFER, Frederick Lovatt - born Haverstraw, New York February 26, 1905; parents born Pennsylvania and New Jersey.

Reported to have written a diatribe against capitalism and the school systems for the Federated Press, a Communist news agency.
British Isles

SULLIVAN, John Andrew Jr. - born Boston, Massachusetts, April 30, 1917; parents native born.

Employed by PM and followed Communist Party line in his column; had very definite Communist leanings; writing watched by PM as being extremely liberal. PM well satisfied when he resigned.

Passports Not Issued

North Africa

HOUSEMAN, John - formerly Jack Davies Haussman - born Bucharest, Rumania, September 22, 1902; emigrated United States, 1936; naturalized March 1, 1943; father born Paris, France; mother British.

Member of Communist Front organizations including Friends of Abraham Lincoln Brigade. Producer of play "Native Son" considered inflammatory in effect and possibly subversive in intent and un-American. Said to have been responsible for placing Communists in key position in foreign radio sections of OWI. Is reliably reported to be known in newspaper and theatrical circles in New York as a Communist. Military authorities consider should remain United States for the duration.

India

CARSON, Saul - born Russia, June 19, 1895; emigrated to United States 1898; naturalized through father March 26, 1912; father born Russia.

Allegedly member of Communist Party under name Frank Leonard.
India


Did one years volunteer work for the National Advancement for the Colored People. Although he was not in the Army, the Daily Worker reported that he was a white soldier, "a Park Avenue Socialite" who had requested that he be transferred to a Negro regiment and that he would address the National Negro Congress. In his speech he stated that he intended to ask his draft board to let him serve with the Negroes. The National Negro Congress is a Communist Front organization.

BOARD OF ECONOMIC WARFARE
Passports Issued

Brazil


Strongly Communistic in writings and belief; prolific writer on Communism; possessor of much subversive material. Suspected of Communist activity by British as early as 1937.

Cuba

SHIRE, Albert C. - born Atlantic City, New Jersey, August 28, 1896; parents born New York City and Washington, D.C.

Member of Washington Committee for Democratic action and American Peace Mobilization (Communist front organizations). Refused to answer questions re membership in first mentioned organization.

Ecuador
Ecuador


Name appeared on active indices of Washington Committee for Democratic Action and American Peace Mobilization. Wife allegedly radical.

Latin American countries

KISICH, Oliver Michael - born Oakland, California March 13, 1899; father born Yugoslavia.

While employed by the U.S. Navy in Jamaica, he and his wife associated with members of the so called intellectual and liberal groups, some of whom have advocated self-government for that colony and have had connections with American Communist organizations. Kisich is also said to have attended exiled writers and anti-Nazi literary meetings in Mexico City.

Passports not Issued

Venezuela


Formerly member of National Committee of the Students Congress against War. Student agitator while attending Columbia University.

Bolivia

BETTELHEIM, Ralph W. - born New York, New York December 26, 1909; parents born Austria.

COORDINATOR OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

Passports Issued

South America

WELLES, Orson - born Kenosha, Wisconsin May 6, 1915; father born Missouri.

Alleged Communist.

South America


Member of many Communist front organizations. Associated with Communists. Known as a fellow traveler.

South America

FAHEY (or FAHY), Jack Bradley - born Washington, D. C., November 5, 1908; father born Connecticut.

Served in International Brigade of Spanish Army. After return resigned from Socialist Party in letter denouncing Socialist attacks on Communist Party. Wife allegedly Communist. Known to have associated with Communists in New York.

Central America


Associated with Communists. Member of organization in which Communists were active. Denied party membership.

Ecuador
Ecuador

BOKE, Richard Lathrop - born Berkeley, California January 14, 1909; father born California.

Reported to be a close associate of many Communists and Communist sympathizers.

Passports Not Issued

Mexico

HERLING, John - born New York, New York April 14, 1905; parents born Austria.

Formerly member of Socialist party. Has been active in several communist front organizations, including (in September 1939) Keep America Out of War. Allegedly said "I believe in the abolition of the Capitalist system. I believe in the necessity of the destruction of this system of exploitation by the might of the workers' organizations". Was connected with "Revolt" the Intercollegiate Associate Review.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Passports Not Issued

North Africa

DODD, William Edward Jr. - born Ashland, Virginia; August 8, 1905; parents native born.

Holds membership at large card in Communist Party. Takes active part in controversial "front" organization activities, being a leader in a number of movements of Communist strategy. Is personally untrustworthy, having disclosed confidential information in the past. Was generally known in Berlin as a moral pervert and his moral weakness was known to both British and German authorities, who maintained funds to be used to gain information from him in Berlin.

Allegedly Communist. Member of two or more Communist front organizations. Allegedly opposed military training in colleges. Name of wife appears in active indices of Washington Committee for Democratic Action.

WAR DEPARTMENT
Passports Issued

Far East

HAUSER, Ernest Otto - born Germany February 28, 1910; German born parents; came United States 1936; naturalized May 25, 1942.

Actually connected with Communist Party in Germany; had done undercover Communist work in China and "understood to be doing similar work in United States". Associate of Japanese and named on list of members of study group for Geopolitics, Heidelberg. Memo of May 31, 1938, National Socialist German Workers Party, Wilhelmstrasse, Berlin.

OFFICE OF EDUCATION
Passports Not Issued

Haiti
Haiti

HONIG, Edwin - born New York City September 3, 1919; father born Palestine.

Associated with Communists. Reported to have Communist sympathies. In possession of Index Cards containing reference to confidential defense matters and military information which were taken from office where his wife was employed.

RED CROSS

Passports Issued

British Isles

SLAFF, George - born Passaic, New Jersey May 22, 1906; parents born Russia.

Allegedly member of communist front organizations. Now said to be employed by FCC.
I have a rather guilty feeling about Jack White, who is now in Haiti. He is not scintillating and he is handicapped by an ultra British accent. I do not know whether he speaks Spanish but some time in the course of the coming year, we might consider giving him a slightly better post than Haiti.

You might think this over and speak to me about it.

F.D.R.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  

May 7, 1943

My dear Mr. President:

I enclose a copy of a memorandum of a conversation which I had with Señor José W. Agusti, a prominent Argentine newspaper publisher.

Señor Agusti informed me that President Castillo requested him to make certain information available to you on a confidential basis concerning the Argentine political situation. I think you will be interested in the statement that President Castillo, who has given his support to Senator Patron Costas in the coming presidential election in Argentina, has stated that Senator Patron Costas, if elected, would follow a policy of solidarity with the United States and the other United Nations. The presidential election in Argentina is scheduled for September of this year but the incoming President will not take office until February 1944.

Faithfully yours,

Enclosure: Memorandum

The President,  
The White House.
DATE: April 30, 1943

SUBJECT: Policy of the Argentine Government towards the United States.

PARTICIPANTS: Señor José W. Agusti, publisher of "Noticias Graficas", of Buenos Aires; Mr. Welles, Under Secretary.

Señor Agusti, publisher of "Noticias Graficas" of Buenos Aires, and of the leading newspaper in the Province of Cordoba, called to see me this morning.

Señor Agusti reminded me that his newspapers had been outstanding during the past three years in their support of the cause of the United Nations and in their insistence that Argentina abandon its policy of isolation and abide by its inter-American agreements and understandings. He reminded me further that on several occasions his paper had been closed down for two or three days at a time by Argentine censorship authorities as a result of the policy which it had pursued, particularly with regard to its opposition to the infringement by the present Argentine Government of the constitutional and democratic rights of the Argentine people. He concluded by saying that he had been one of the two or three closest friends of the late President Ortiz, had been with him when he died, and believed that his death had been the greatest tragedy that had afflicted Argentina in her modern history.

All of these statements were preliminary to his informing me that he wished to emphasize these facts in view of the peculiar situation in which he found himself. He said that he was the bearer of direct secret messages to this Government from President Castillo and from Senator Patron Costas who undoubtedly would be the next president of Argentina.

Señor Agusti said that 48 hours before he was due to leave Buenos Aires to come to the United States, President Castillo...
Castillo had requested him confidentially to come to his house in Olivos, a suburb of Buenos Aires, in the late evening, and that he had had two and a half hours of conversation alone with President Castillo. This conversation apparently was in great part concerned with domestic political problems in Argentina. Castillo had told him to see me personally for the purpose of communicating the following to President Roosevelt.

President Castillo stated, as he has so often in public and private messages, that he believed that Argentina had complied with its inter-American agreements by recognizing the United States and the other belligerent American republics as non-belligerents and that he felt that the policy of neutrality pursued by Argentina had been in the interest of the Argentine people themselves and not detrimental to the vital interests of the other American republics. He said however that he wished this Government secretly to know that the man in public life in Argentina to whom he was most closely tied by terms of intimate personal friendship as well as by official association was Señor Rothe, a member of his cabinet. Señor Rothe is the son of German parents, outstanding in his nationalistic policies, identified in the most extreme sense with the Argentine policy of neutrality, and convinced, at least until recently, that the Axis powers were inevitably going to win the war. President Castillo wished this Government to know that he himself had believed that Señor Rothe was the desirable and indicated candidate to succeed himself as President of the republic. President Castillo however, after full consideration, had come to the conclusion that the nomination of Rothe for the Argentine presidency would be regarded as a "red flag" by the Government of the United States and Castillo had consequently, without discussing the matter with either Rothe or with Patron Costas, indicated his support of Patron Costas for the presidency. He had done this because he knew that Patron Costas was entirely devoted to the cause of the United Nations and as president of the republic would follow a policy of solidarity with the United States and with the other United Nations. At the conclusion of the interview he had requested Señor Agustini to call upon Senator Patron Costas the following day to confirm the accuracy of what President Castillo had told him and likewise to confirm his own understanding as to the policy which Patron Costas would pursue if president of the republic.
The following day Señor Agusti had had the suggested interview with Senator Patron Costas and had confirmed the accuracy of what President Castillo had told him. He had furthermore been told by Senator Patron Costas that while because of the political support given him by President Castillo he did not see that it was possible for him during the election campaign to indicate that he would modify Argentine foreign policy after he became president, it was nevertheless his intention as soon as he was elected next September to make public the different course which he himself would pursue, and furthermore that he intended to send his closest friend and supporter, Federico Pinedo, to the United States some time in the summer to confer with appropriate members of this Government in order to reach an understanding as to the course which Argentina would pursue in the next presidential administration.

I stated to Señor Agusti that I was of course interested in what he had been kind enough to inform me but that in view of the determination of President Castillo to support the election of a man who he knew would modify his present foreign policy, I was frankly at a loss to understand why President Castillo should retain in office a Foreign Minister who was obviously bound until the last moment of his own tenure of office to pursue a foreign policy which would plunge Argentina more and more into complete isolation and which was destined to wreak the greatest possible damage to the vital interests of the United States and to the other American republics. I said that Señor Agusti had now been for some time in the United States and had been able to see for himself how profound a feeling the course of Argentina had created in the minds of the people of the United States and how full was the realization on their part that the lives of many American citizens had been lost because the Argentine Government had permitted Nazi agents to function with almost untram-melled liberty on Argentine territory.

Señor Agusti said that he would give me two concrete answers to my question. He said that Dr. Ruiz Guinazu had been appointed Foreign Minister by President Castillo upon the strong recommendation of the high authorities of the Catholic Church in Argentina. He said that he did not have to tell me in view of my own familiarity with conditions in Argentina how important a political power the Church was in the republic and that Ruiz Guinazu's identification with the Vatican had been one of the material reasons why the reactionary elements in the Catholic Church had desired his appointment as Foreign Minister.
The other reason, he said, was the insistence of all of the British financial and commercial interests in Argentina that Argentina pursue a policy of neutrality and that whatever superficial appearances might be, the pressure of British interests in the Argentine Republic until the present moment had been for the retention of Ruiz Guinaldu in office and for the continuation of the foreign policy which he had pursued.

I said that this was a startling statement for him to make to me since I knew and I had no doubt that he knew equally well that the British Government on several occasions had officially and in the strongest terms informed the Argentine Government of its earnest hope and desire that Argentina abandon its policy of neutrality, break relations with the Axis, and take its proper place in the family of nations in the Western Hemisphere.

Señor Agusti said that he was well aware of this but that I must also know that whatever might be the words employed by the British Government, the fact remained that the power of British influence in Argentina lay in the British financial, railroad, public utility, and commercial interests which had been dominant in the country for so many generations. He said that all of these interests were persuaded that if the United States succeeded in diverting Argentina from its present course of neutrality, the influence of the United States would immediately become preponderant as it had in all of the American republics that had broken relations or gone to war and that these interests were determined that British hegemony of the commercial and financial spheres should continue to be exercised in this remaining part of South America where for a hundred years they had been predominant.

Señor Agusti referred to Dr. Ruiz Guinaldu as having the brain of a hippopotamus and as being utterly incapable of holding any views other than those laid out for him by the two groups above mentioned, namely, the Catholic Church and the more reactionary financial and commercial interests. He said furthermore that he was obsessed by a fear of communism which had been carefully instilled in him by his wife and by his son and that the combination of these three influences were entirely responsible for the line he had taken.

I inquired what the significance might be in the opinion of Señor Agusti of the agreement reached yesterday by the Radical and Socialist parties in Argentina to present
present a common front in the coming presidential elections. He said it was premature as yet to know with any certainty what line would be taken. He said there were two alternatives: first, a combination ticket with a Radical for president and a Socialist for vice president, in which case Dr. Honorio Pueyrredon would be the presidential candidate. The second and more probable alternative, he thought, was the nomination of a ticket, non-partisan in character, in which event he believed Dr. Saavedra Lamas would be supported by both parties for the presidency. He made it clear however that he was confident that no matter what arrangements or maneuverings might take place in the intervening period, the political control of the present government was so strong as to make the election of Senator Patron Costas inevitable.
THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

August 16, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to submit to you herewith my resignation as Under Secretary of State.

The highest privilege of my life has been the opportunity of serving in your great Administration in various capacities during these past ten years. May I express to you my abiding gratitude for having afforded me that opportunity.

Believe me, always,

Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.
August 16, 1943.

My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing my formal resignation as Under Secretary of State.

Since talking with you the other day it has seemed very clear to me that the present hue and cry in the Press, and elsewhere, will continue unless this step is taken immediately. In talking with Secretary Hull I have gained the very definite impression that that is also his belief and his desire.

I do not have to tell you, I know, that if subsequently there is any way in which you feel I can serve you effectively, I am always at your call. But I am positive that for me to retain temporarily my present position, and undertake the kind of Foreign Mission you suggested, would only make possible a continuation of the existing situation, which inevitably creates embarrassment for you, and confusion with regard to your conduct of Foreign Relations at a very critical moment.

I have been laid up for two days in bed with a bad heart attack, or I would have asked to come in today to see you as you told me I might.

The President,

The White House.
Whatever you think the best course in this situation I will of course loyally follow. But I want you to know that so long as I live I shall never forget the friendship and kindness you showed me in our last talk.

Believe me,

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]

Enclosure.
Owing possibility delay mails I have sent letter suggested by the President direct to you at White House. You should receive it tomorrow kind regards=
Sumner Welles.
Mrs. Dorothy Brady,
The White House.

Dear Mrs. Brady:

Last Sunday the President asked me to send the letters which I enclose herewith to you so that he would receive them promptly.

Will you be so kind as to see that he gets them as soon as possible?

Yours very sincerely,

[Signature]

September 24, 1943.
Dear Sunny:

I have been meaning to write to you, as you well know, for the past several weeks.

First of all, I think you were perfectly right in your decision though I did honestly think it would be best for you and for the country if you could go to this Moscow Conference. However, the final decision has removed the whole matter from the papers and the columnists and, incidentally, the Secretary very suddenly decided that he wished most urgently to go himself — and he has gone.

In view of the fact that he made this decision known to one or two of his friends before I got your letter, I could not very well say that I had asked you to undertake the Moscow trip because it would have been said then that the Secretary, on realizing this, had insisted on going in your place. That would have only added fuel to the fire — which I am confident is now out.

I do hope that when you get back to Washington you will come in to see me. There are many things I want to talk over with you. Thank the Lord you have not retired to innocuous desuetude.

I hope Mathilde is better.
I wish much that I could come to that dinner that is being given for you.

All good luck!

As ever yours,

/S/ Franklin D. Roosevelt

Honorable Sumner Welles,
Oxon Hill,
Maryland.
My dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing herewith the letter you suggested on Sunday.

Since our conversation I have necessarily thought over every detail of the work you have been kind enough to suggest I undertake.

I have very regretfully and reluctantly reached the conclusion that I should not accept the responsibilities involved. The negotiations in Moscow, and any similar negotiations with which I would be entrusted subsequent thereto, involve fundamental questions of Foreign Policy. Even if I were serving as your personal representative in the manner you indicated, my recommendations or reports must necessarily pass through the hands of the Secretary of State, and there should exist such a relationship between the Secretary and your representative as to make possible an identity of views or an opportunity for an exchange of opinions on a reasonable and friendly basis if any divergence existed.

From

The President,

The White House.
From what you have told me, Secretary Hull's feelings with regard to myself — unjustified as they are — would make any such relationship impossible. He would be constantly imagining that I was threatening his legitimate jurisdiction, or undermining his authority, and possibility for the success of what you desire accomplished would be seriously jeopardized. I sincerely believe the results to be sought at this Moscow meeting are altogether too important in the interest of the world to warrant running the risk of having your negotiator encounter any unnecessary obstacles.

It would be difficult for me to tell you how hard it has been to write this letter. I would value tremendously the opportunity of continuing to serve you and there is no negotiation I can think of which to my mind would be of greater significance. But the insight you gave me last Sunday
Sunday concerning Secretary Hull's feelings towards me makes me feel that this decision is the right one. It required many unhappy hours for me to reach it.

Consequently, I hope you will announce the acceptance of my resignation as Under Secretary. I also hope you may feel it possible at that time to let it be known that you had asked me to undertake this further work, but that the condition of my wife's health makes it impossible for me for the time being to leave the country for an extended time. As a matter of fact, I have been worried about Mathilde all summer since the doctors are not able to alleviate her ulcer condition, and her doctors say that the nervous strain she would undergo if I undertook a trip of this kind, on top of the stress of the past seven weeks, would be the worst thing for her.

I thank you again for the delightful day you let me have with you Sunday. It made me very happy to be with you. I hope, perhaps when I come back to Washington, you may let me come in for a few moments "off the record".

Believe me, always,

Faithfully yours,

[Signature]
The Under Secretary of State
Washington

Tuesday
September 21, 1943.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

The President informed me last Sunday that you believed that I had instigated and been responsible for attacks made upon you during the weeks since my resignation by Drew Pearson. He has suggested that I write you this letter.

Although I had hoped from my association with you during these past ten years that you would have known me well enough to realize that I do not stoop to tactics of this character, I assure you that I have not instigated any attacks upon you by Drew Pearson or by any other newspaper writer, nor have I the slightest responsibility for the stories carried in any newspaper concerning your alleged views regarding the Soviet Union or any other country.

The day before my departure from Washington on August 23, Drew Pearson telephoned me to say he and another newspaper writer had just received some very important information concerning me and asked if he could see me about it. (I had not previously seen Drew Pearson more than four times during the preceding two years, and upon each of these occasions other people had been present.)

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State,
Washington, D. C.
I asked him to come to my house that evening. He told me he had received from a reliable and high official of the Government, whose name he gave me, the full story of my resignation. The story was completely accurate. I told him that the story was true, but I also told him that the publication of the story prior to an official announcement by the White House would seriously injure me, and I urged him to prevent publication before that time. He told me that he would attempt to delay the publication of his own column, but he thought the story would unquestionably break through some other newspaper writer. There was no other discussion between us with regard to anything that he would, or would not, write. I had not the faintest knowledge of what he, or his brother, or any other columnist intended to say on the radio, or in print.

During the past ten years of my official life I have talked frequently with many members of the press. There is not one of them who can truthfully say that in any conversation I have ever had with them I have ever referred to you except with the utmost loyalty.

Sincerely yours,
October 15, 1943.

Dear Sumner:

I have talked to Morris Ernst about short books on the Four Freedoms and I would be delighted if you would do one of these books.

Personally, I would use a gentle panning of the opponents of the Four Freedoms -- but in a light vein. For instance, one could make comparisons between them and the nobility of France at the beginning of the French Revolution; with the small, but noisy minority who opposed the Magna Carta; with the rioters of Athens who drove out many wise men; and with the rambunctious children of Israel who made Moses so angry he smashed the Tables of Stone.

As ever yours,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Honorable Sumner Welles,
Oxon Hill,
Maryland.
Hold until
Sumner's letter comes in & then give to the President
SUMNER WELLES

Oxon Hill Manor,
Oxon Hill, Md.

May 6, 1944.

My dear Miss Tully:

I shall be most grateful if you will let the President, if possible, have the enclosed letter. I had intended writing him as soon as I returned to Washington three weeks ago, but I did not do so because of the fact that he was taking his much needed rest. I am happy to know that he is feeling so much better.

My best regards to you and believe me

Yours very sincerely,

Enclosure.

Miss Grace G. Tully,
Personal Secretary to
The President,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.
My dear Mr. President:

May I say, first of all, how deeply worried I have been by the reports that have come to me that you have had such a trying winter, and how very happy I am to know now of the good which your rest has done you? I devoutly hope that you will soon be completely well again. You were never more needed than you will be in the coming future.

Mathilde and I got back from Florida three weeks ago and I am glad to tell you that the winter has done her so much good that she is finally infinitely better than she has been during these past recent years. I have not written you previously because you were away and I did not wish to trouble you while you were resting.

As I told you when I last saw you, I have been spending the winter working on a book on American foreign policy since the close of the last war. In doing this I have had two thoughts uppermost in mind: the first, to do my best to make clear my own conviction that the only way in which the United States can prevent being confronted by a third world war is for this country to assume its full share of responsibility in maintaining world peace; and the second, to emphasize, so far as possible, the quality of your own leadership in foreign policy and the vision and initiative which you have consistently shown during these past eleven years in shaping the policy of this nation during the period of world upheaval.

At the present moment there are developments taking place in the moulding of public opinion which seem to me intrinsically highly dangerous in their potentiality. The first is the continuing effort of a good many German and naturalized German so-called "democrats" now in the United States - however sincere they may be - to persuade the American people that the people of Germany as they now are can be safely trusted to set up a Fourth German Reich provided the new State is created from the outset along "democratic lines."

The President,

The White House.
This propaganda is very similar to that employed at the end of the last war. These efforts are being increasingly supported by many liberal and progressive elements in this country.

The second development that worries me is the effort which is being made, particularly in the Middle West, to persuade many people that you could have kept this country out of war had you employed a different policy towards Germany and towards Japan.

I am anxious in my book to do what I can to contribute towards the eradication of these two delusions. The most effective way, in my judgment, in which I can do this is by telling how you sent me to Europe in 1940 for the purpose of assuring yourself beyond the slightest shadow of a doubt that there was not left even one chance in a thousand for you then as President of the United States to bring about a "just and permanent" peace - which was the only kind of peace in which you were interested. In the same way, by telling what the German and Italian leaders said at that time, it would be my object to make clear that the Axis was intent solely upon one thing and that was a war of conquest, that they would not be deflected from their purpose because of their belief that the war would be a push-war, and that there was not the remotest chance of establishing the foundations for any "just and permanent" peace at that time. Needless to say, I would not think of touching upon any of the conversations which I had in England, or in France, except to mention the leaders whom I saw.

For the reasons I have mentioned, I believe that material of this kind should be available for public opinion here to digest and that in a sense it might have a considerable propaganda value.

I had hoped to talk this over with you personally upon your return, but I know how tremendously rushed you will be as soon as you get back. Case Canfield, of Harper & Brothers, who are publishing the book for me, is very anxious to get it out by the latter part of June, and since I have told him that I could not, of course, authorize the publication of material of this character without your approval, I am sending you these lines to ask if this suggestion would be agreeable to you. I think you know me well enough to know that I would not think of publishing a word which would in the slightest degree be undesirable.

I do hope that as soon as you have a free moment after your return, you will let me know and let me come to see you.

Believe me, always,

Faithfully yours,
THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
June 14, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY

You will recall having sent to me the chapter in Sumner Welles’ book covering his trip abroad in 1940 for review. Mr. Hull wishes to consider the matter, but I am assured now that the whole file can be returned to you tomorrow afternoon.

[Signature]

[Stamp: PSF: Sumner Welles folder]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

Will you read and let me know what you think? Please return as soon as possible.

F.D.R.
My dear Miss Tully:

As I have explained to you and to Mrs. Brady the emergency with which I am confronted regarding the publication of my book is such that I am placed in an increasingly difficult situation unless I can get some word from the President with regard to the publication of the material mentioned in the letter to him which I am enclosing.

I have been hoping ever since you were kind enough to give me his message a month ago when he returned to Washington that he would let me come in for ten minutes to see him. Since I have not, however, had any word from you, there is nothing I can do except ask you to be kind enough to submit this letter to him.

I shall be deeply grateful if you will telephone me what his wishes may be.

With my kindest regards, believe me

Yours very sincerely,

Sumner Welles

Miss Grace G. Tully,
Personal Secretary to the President,
The White House.
My dear Mr. President:

I have been hoping, since Miss Tully gave me your exceedingly kind message after your return a month ago, that I would have the chance of seeing you for a few minutes in order to ask your permission to publish certain material in my forthcoming book. You may remember that I wrote to you telling you that I believed it would be extremely desirable for public opinion in our country to learn two basic facts involved in my trip to Europe in 1940, namely, the persistent search which you had made to find out if there was any possibility at that time for a "just and permanent peace," and secondly, that the Germans had made it everlasting clearly that the only kind of peace which they envisaged was the kind which they themselves would lay down as the result of a total German victory.

I have been hoping that I would have the chance to submit this chapter to you so that I might be assured that it met with your full approval, since, otherwise, of course, it should not be published.

My immediate difficulty is that since the Book-of-the-Month Club has taken the book for its August distribution, manufacturing must start immediately. Harper & Brothers, who are my publishers, tell me that they cannot hold up publication more than a few days more.

I realize, of course, how difficult it is for you to arrange to see me, even for ten minutes, under present conditions, and consequently, due to this particular problem with which I am faced, I am enclosing a copy of the chapter in question with the hope that it may be possible for you to look over the first few pages and let me know whether the facts as I have set them forth meet with your approval and whether I have your permission to let these facts be published.

Needless to say, I will be much happier if I can have the opportunity of obtaining your judgment personally.

Believe me, as always, Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

You asked me to read this chapter of Summer Welles' pending book, and report to you.

This chapter deals with his trip to Europe at your direction in February 1940. He tells about his visits to Rome, Berlin, Paris and London. He recounts conversations with Hitler, Mussolini, Chamberlain, Ribbentrop, Ciano, Hess, Goering, etc. very fully and, of course, they contain a lot of new material which has never been published. The only conversations he omits are those he had with some of the French in Paris; and he gives the reason therefore: the fact that some of them or their relatives are now being held by the Germans and would naturally suffer from revelation of some of these talks.

The chapter says that you asked him to go because it seemed to you (not in quotes) that if the war continued and the all-out offensive by Germany on the Western powers should take place, the results would be unpredictable and there would be greater danger that the United States be involved.

Personally I see no objection to it.

[Signature]
S. I. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR

ROH. SUMNER WELLES

June 18, 1944.

The question arises whether it is a useful thing to repeat the German and Italian statements about their inability to win the war. Mr. Welles describes his conversations with Molotov and Ciano and quotes them extensively. All of which were proclaimed to the world by the German and Italian propaganda machines and which have been beaten down and overcome by our own counter-propaganda efforts.

The following however gives me some concern. Mr. Welles gives extensive quotations of arguments that the various German officials made to him for transmission to the President. All the German officials said practically the same thing: that Germany was a real thing and that Germany had not been destroyed by the war in which they were in. The President himself has said that Germany would be destroyed by the war. But the German officials all said that they could not be destroyed except through complete and total German victory.

I am sorry to be so late in getting this back to you. The only question raised as to this chapter is from Mr. Morgenthau who said something to this effect:

"It is my judgment that publication at this time of these statements will not materially assist the war effort. The peoples of the world are now thoroughly aware that Hitler and Company started the war; they are also aware that the President and the United States did everything he could to preserve the peace and there was no chance of averting the war in the early months of 1940."
Italian cases. Even though Mr. Welles demonstrates that the statements were untruths these would still be believed by many foolish people or seized upon and used by unconscionable people, not to say our enemies, for their own benefit. I believe it safer to wait until the enemy is defeated before giving further publicity to his false propaganda.

I would like to call special attention to the following on bottom of page 2: Mr. Welles, describing his conversation with the President, writes: 'He said that, consequently he had decided to send a personal representative to Germany, England, and France, as well as to Italy, since Italy, although not a belligerent, was an Axis partner. Under the conditions which had existed since the agreement of the previous August between Germany and the Soviet Union, he did not feel that a visit to Moscow would serve any useful purpose, at least for the time being.'

If the article is published this reference to Russia had best be stricken out.

This raises an interesting question which you ought to be the judge of.

F. D. R.
My dear Mr. President:

I have been hoping, since Miss Tully gave me your exceedingly kind message after your return a month ago, that I would have the chance of seeing you for a few minutes in order to ask your permission to publish certain material in my forthcoming book. You may remember that I wrote to you telling you that I believed it would be extremely desirable for public opinion in our country to learn two basic facts involved in my trip to Europe in 1940, namely, the persistent search which you had made to find out if there was any possibility at that time for a "just and permanent peace," and secondly, that the Germans had made it everlastingly clear that the only kind of peace which they envisaged was the kind which they themselves would lay down as the result of a total German victory.

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Needless to say, I will be much happier if I can have the opportunity of obtaining your judgment personally.

Believe me, as always, Faithfully yours,

The President,

The White House.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

June 15, 1944

Mr. Stettinius has told me about the book of former Under Secretary Welles, to which you referred in your memorandum to him of June 9, and there is enclosed here-with a memorandum of comment prepared by Mr. McDermott.
Former Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles is writing a book in which he wishes to have a chapter on his mission to Europe in 1940. He has asked the President for permission to publish certain material. He has pointed out to the President that he thought it would be extremely desirable for public opinion in our country to learn two basic facts involved in his trip to Europe in 1940: (1) the persistent search which the President made to find out if there was any possibility at that time for a "just and permanent peace," and (2) that the Germans had made it everlastingly clear that the only kind of peace which they envisaged was the kind which they themselves would lay down as the result of a total German victory.

Both of the above points Mr. Welles has made clear in his manuscript. He gives full details of his discussions with officials of the Italian, German, French and British Governments.

It is my judgment that publication at this time will not materially assist the war effort. The peoples of the world are now thoroughly aware that Hitler and Company started the war; they are also aware that the President did everything he could to preserve the peace and there was no chance of averting the war in the early months of 1940.

The following however gives me some concern. Mr. Welles gives extensive quotations of arguments that the various German officials made to him for transmission to the President. All the German officials said practically the same thing; they were obviously rehearsed and told what to say. What they said was a recital of the wrongs Germany had suffered -- that Germany wanted peace, but only on condition "that the will on the part of England to destroy Germany is obliterated once and for all," and that they could see no way "in which that can be accomplished except through complete and total German victory."

Mr. Welles
Mr. Welles describes his conversations with Mussolini and Ciano and quotes them extensively. All of the German and Italian statements were the same as those which were proclaimed to the world by the German and Italian propaganda machines and which have been beaten down and overcome by our own counter-propaganda efforts.

The question arises whether it is a useful thing at this stage of the war for any American, much less one who was the President's envoy, to repeat the German and Italian cases. Even though Mr. Welles demonstrates that the statements were untruths these would still not be believed by many foolish people or seized upon and used by unconscionable people, not to say our enemies, for their own benefit. I believe it safer to wait until the enemy is defeated before giving further publicity to his false propaganda.

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If the article is published this reference to Russia had best be stricken out.

[Signature]

M.J. McDermott
The President
The White House.