Subject File

PSF: Quebec Conference

Box 176
My dear Friend,

Would you let me have your views on the following suggested time-table:

Wednesday, 13th - Plenary Meeting with Chiefs of Staff.
Thursday, 14th, and Friday, 15th - their further discussions.
They should report to us the evening of Friday, 15th, enabling a final Plenary to take place on Saturday, 16th.

It would probably be in conformity with your wishes to return to Hyde Park on Saturday. If agreeable to you I would follow by Air with Clemmie early on Monday, 18th, and stay with you Monday and Tuesday. We could then have anyone necessary to wind up outstanding points. I must depart on Wednesday, 20th.

I have asked Eden to come over if possible tomorrow, so he should be here on Thursday or Friday. There are several important things to discuss with him including recognition of the French Provisional Government, as to which I am by no means convinced. I do not know whether you would require to have Hull or Stettinius for Friday, 15th.
One of the most important things I have to discuss with you is Stage II. Would Thursday, 14th, do for that? in which case I hope you could have Morgenthau present. This matter is considered of extreme and vital importance by the British Government, for reasons which are only too painfully apparent.

The President of the United States of America.
Personal

The President of the United States of America

from
The Prime Minister
My dear Friend,

1. Would it be agreeable to you to discuss with me sometime today our Italian policy? I must fill up the Chairmanship of the Allied Control Commission, and I feel the great need of a competent politician and Minister there, like Macmillan, rather than a General. I was distressed and disquieted by the tales I heard of serious food shortages in some parts of Rome and other great towns. Unemployment looms big in Italy. We may also soon have the populous North flowing on to our hands. I was hoping we might together make up an agreeable programme for Italy, which could be announced, comprising resumption of their export trade, interchange of diplomatic representatives a la Russe, and bringing them into the area of U.N.N.R.A. as co-belligerents if that can be managed. If not, some other scheme of effective relief. You spoke of La Guardia having a Mission. This also I should like to discuss with you.

2. The Staffs are forming their contacts this morning and browsing over the Agenda on general lines. But would it not be
well to have a plenary session tomorrow where you and I can put forward the fundamentals of our future war policy. This will enable them to go ahead much more rapidly and easily.

3. A small point. Leathers is longing for Admiral Lands. You said you were keeping him handy; but if he could come up soon, these two would be together working out their complicated affairs, while we are busy with other things, and have results ready for us at each stage.

4. Some of the BONIFACE I sent you this morning appeared to me to be of profound significance. Alexander's battle is a hard one, but now that Clark has crashed into the centre I am hopeful of speedy results.

Yours sincerely,

The President of the United States of America.
The President of the United States of America.
My dear Friend,

The office of Chief Commissioner of the Allied Control Commission, formerly held by General Macfarlane, is vacant. This is a British appointment. In order to have more political knowledge and experience in this post, so full of economic and political issues and so important for the welfare of the Italian people, I propose to appoint Mr. Harold Macmillan. The Supreme Allied Commander is ex-officio President of the Allied Control Commission. He would in practice delegate his functions to Mr. Macmillan.

I propose to leave Mr. Macmillan his present duties as British Resident Minister at A.F.H.Q., and British Political Adviser to the Supreme Allied Commander. This is a simplification and reduction of British Staff.

It is proposed also that the day to day management of the Control Commission, apart from general political guidance (Macmillan), should be in the hands of the Deputy Chief Commissioner of the Commission, the United States.
representative, Mr. Stone, in whom we have great confidence. He would, if necessary, have a Lieutenant-General under him to assist in the administration and in carrying out effectively the policy. This would widen his scope and power.

I hope that these arrangements will be agreeable to you, as I should not like to make an appointment, even where it falls to me to do so, that does not work into the scheme of our close Anglo-American cooperation.

I should like to discuss with Anthony a suggestion that came up yesterday, namely, that Mayor La Guardia should pay a visit to Italy as your representative, and that while there he should be invited to attend the meetings of the Allied Control Commission. Thus he would have a chance to see that the machinery was working in the manner most beneficial to the Italians. I have a series of other proposals helpful to the Italians, on which I hope we shall be in full agreement. I would run through these with you, perhaps to-morrow, when Anthony will be here.

It is urgent to appoint Macmillan, because the post
of Chief Commissioner has been vacant for two months, and I am becoming blameworthy in the matter, especially if any food shortage or needless unemployment should arise.

Yours always,

The President of the United States of America.
The

President of the United States

From

The Peace Minister
My dear Friend,

I understand that we are meeting at 11.30 about Stage 2. Dick Law arrived here late last night, and I wonder whether I might bring him at 11 o'clock with or without Anthony, to discuss the application of U.N.N.R.A. to Italy. He tells me that a compromise proposal would get through whereby 50 million dollars & U.N.N.R.A. would be available for Italy. I consider this should be an essential part of our friendly gesture to Italy.

If agreeable then, I will turn up at 11.
The President of the United States of America.

The Prime Minister.
THIS WAS NOT SENT. IT WAS ONE
OF MANY DRAFTS.

F.D.R.

(QUEBEC CONFERENCE FILE)
The President kept original of this to show to Mr. Churchill.
Dear Mr. President:

We visited Caserta yesterday and I had a conversation with Ambassador Murphy and, pursuant to an arrangement made with him, with General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson and later with General Bakers with whom we spent a very interesting time. Ambassador Murphy may express some of our mutual reactions to you as he is shortly returning to Washington.

I reviewed particularly with General Wilson the question of the distribution of relief in Italy, having in mind that in view of the Allied position with respect to Italy which the very nature of our occupation must, as General Wilson emphasized, continue for an indefinite period, certainly for more than a year in one form or another. This occupation must be of a substantial enough character to meet the various emergencies which may arise in the transition from a Fascist Government to a more democratic government. The responsibility for relief activities and their success for the procurement of adequate food, clothing and housing depend upon Allied provision and I can confirm again the feeling in most quarters that, based upon present evidence, there is no assurance that in these categories the relief will be adequate to the need. Our effort to fit American Relief for Italy into the over-all picture without creating any disturbance with other existing agencies and to help spur the Italian Government to activity and responsibility on its part is my objective. General Wilson was most practical-minded, cooperative and frank. I feel there should be no difficulty in adjusting relationships with him and through him with all other services under his control. I indicated that it seemed essential that some single agency should be in control of the whole field of relief, simplifying procedures and accomplishing objectives with a minimum

The President,
The White House,Washington.
of overlapping. He whole-heartedly agreed with this theory.

In the general field he seemed to be quite concerned by the constant changing of personnel, especially by our Government. He specifically mentioned the economic side, the retirement of Mr. Grady and the prospective retirement of General William O'Dwyer. He felt that this was demoralizing. He felt that the Vice President of the Allied Control Commission in charge of economic affairs should be a very experienced business executive who, with a staff of business-trained men on a permanent basis, would be most effective. In order to gain information I asked him why this vice president of the economic section should always be an American to which he replied that the whole scheme of the organization was one of balance and that the different agencies were set up in a balanced fashion as between the British and ourselves. It has been my impression since arriving here that in effecting this so-called balance some of our appointees have been put in the most difficult and, I would say, dangerous positions. That applies both to the field in which Colonel Zipoli has been giving such heroic service and the field in which Mr. Grady and General O'Dwyer have been making such tremendous efforts. I do not see that the British are occupying posts subject to the same amount of public criticism. Unless there be some advantage in the handling of the economic section by our representative, the natural question arises whether it will not be advisable to let an outstanding British executive assume the post. General Wilson said that British personnel was spread out too thin at the present time and they did not have the same number of people to call upon as we.

I have just seen a statement prepared by the Food Sub-Commission of the Allied Control Commission which indicates a substantial reduction in the tonnages now proposed to import against the requirements for the period October through December, 1944.

I was considerably disturbed at the statement made by General Wilson that General O'Dwyer was soon to retire. I asked General O'Dwyer to call and he has just left me after an extended interview, the result of which moved me to send a telegram through the Vatican radio suggesting that I considered it very important that you should have a frank talk with him about conditions here before you meet the Prime Minister. That meeting has been announced in all the papers here although the date and place of the meeting is not generally known. In my opinion General O'Dwyer has gained a very realistic opinion of
the situation here and its dangerous possibilities especially during the winter to come. From my own knowledge in years past this country has been, beginning with the Ethiopian campaign, living under continual decreased rations to an extent that the needs of the Italian Army and the food production which has been constantly and increasingly taken away from the country to Germany has resulted in a very definite lowering of vitality of the whole population that recently reached its lowest point with the invasion by the Allies. That invasion has accentuated these conditions because of the interruption of transport, the destruction of property and a definite reduction in production. General Wilson and General O'Dwyer are of the same opinion that the crisis in this situation will come about December or January of this winter and if it is not then relieved the fate of large numbers of this undernourished and weakened population will be, as they express it, tragic. General O'Dwyer is the first one with whom I have talked who seems to comprehend the whole picture especially in respect to the liberated portions of Italy not primarily under Army jurisdiction. But as the lines move farther north and the burden of supply falls upon the economic agencies rather than the Army the problem becomes increasingly difficult.

In my own opinion this is the first of the conquered countries in which our professions of helpfulness to the civil population are undergoing a severe test. General Wilson and General O'Dwyer and I are of one mind, that we cannot afford to make a failure of this Italian enterprise. Assuming that you will arrange to have General O'Dwyer recalled for consultation for a few days before returning here where he is very much needed, I believe you will be put in the position of having a dependable impression of this situation. I am brought into this situation because of my association with American relief for Italy and because of my regard for yourself and for our country. I believe that there are too many agencies between the War Department and the ultimate beneficiary of relief to operate with the greatest efficiency. My own opinion is that the Army should become increasingly active in this field because the supplies in a large sense have to move through its hands and facilities, that it should associate with itself the local agencies which I have been instrumental in bringing together with respect to American relief for Italy, namely the Italian Government, the Italian Red Cross, the Catholic Church and a representative of the central labor party in Italy, but the Army with its
facilities, its adequate personnel and its power should be the determining authority.

With assurances of highest regard, believe me,

Sincerely yours,

Myron C. Taylor
MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

For your information and please return for my files.

F.D.R.
ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN

I am sending for your records copies of minutes about the Agreement reached by the President and the Prime Minister yesterday on two points, namely, Treatment of War Criminals and the status of the French Committee of National Liberation.

J. R. Colville

September 16, 1944.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
THE SECRETARY OF STATE

For your information and please return for my files.

F.D.R.

Covering memo for J.M. Brown, 8-16-44 from J.F. Philby (?), with 2 attached agreements reached Sept. 15th, 1944 by the President and the Prime Minister - 1. Agreement to invite Marshal Stalin and Simon's proposals for dealing with major war criminals 2. Agreement regarding the status of the French Committee of National Liberation. Both agreements are initialed "FDR".
It was agreed between the President and the Prime Minister today that the time had not yet come to recognise formally the F.C.N.L. as the Provisional Government of France, but the matter should be kept constantly under review.

W.S.C.

16.9.

15th September, 1944.
The President and Prime Minister have agreed to put to Marshal Stalin Lord Simon's proposals for dealing with the major war criminals, and to concert with him a list of names.

15th September, 1944.
The Italian people, freed of their Fascist and Nazi overlordship, have in these last twelve months demonstrated their will to be free, to fight on the side of the democracies, and to take a place among the United Nations devoted to principles of peace and justice.

We believe we should give encouragement to those Italians who are standing for a political rebirth in Italy, and are completing the destruction of the evil Fascist system. We wish to afford the Italians a greater opportunity to aid in the defeat of our enemies.

Italy has made real progress these last twelve months. We believe the United States and Great Britain should give Italy political greater/recognition, and we propose to invite the Italian government to send its own direct representatives to Washington and London, and on our part we will give our representatives at Rome the status of ambassadors.

First and immediate considerations in Italy are the relief of hunger and sickness and fear. To this end we have instructed our representatives at the pending conference of UNRRA to declare and other essential supplies for the sending of food and clothing and medical aids to Italy. Along with the same time, should following this is the need for first steps to be taken toward the reconstruction of an Italian economy— an economy 
under the years of the misrule of Mussolini, and ravished by the German policy of vengeful destruction.

These steps should be taken primarily as military aims to put the full resources of Italy and the Italian people into the struggle to defeat Germany and Japan. We should assist the Italians in the restoration of their power systems, their railways, motor transport, roads and other communications, and send our engineers, technicians and industrial experts into Italy to speed the work of rehabilitation.

The Italian prisoners of war should be given opportunity to volunteer their full efforts in the fight against the enemy, to carry the flag of Italy into battle against Germany and Japan.

We should all look toward that day when the last vestiges of Fascism in Italy will have been wiped out, when the last German will have left Italian soil, and when there will be no need of any Allied troops to remain—the day when free elections can be held throughout Italy, and when Italy can begin to take her own high place in the great family of democratic nations.
ADMIRAL LEAHY

I send you herewith a draft which I suggest we might send to the President and Prime Minister on the idea that General Marshall put forward at the Combined Chiefs of Staff Meeting this morning.

2. Will you let me know if you approve and I will send a copy to the Prime Minister at once: but naturally I should be grateful for any amendments or improvements that you think necessary.

15th September, 1944.
DRAFT MINUTE TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRIME MINISTER

The Combined Chiefs of Staff desire to place on record that the main difficulty with which the Quebec Conference has been confronted has been to find room and opportunity for the deployment against Japan of the massive forces which each and all of the nations concerned are ardent to engage against the enemy. In colloquial language, it was a case of "standing room only", even before the curtain rang up on the Conference.

2. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have not included any recommendation on this subject in their Final Report, but they submit that it would have an excellent effect on world opinion in general, and a correspondingly depressing effect on Japan, if the above ideas, clothed in your own language, were included in a communiqué about the Conference (if one is issued), and, also, at the Press Conference which will be held on its conclusion.

15.9.44.
The President and the Prime Minister, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff, held a series of meetings during which they discussed all aspects of the war against Germany and Japan. In a very short space of time they reached decisions on all points both with regard to the completion of the war in Europe, now approaching its final stages, and the destruction of the barbarians of the Pacific.

The most serious difficulty with which the Quebec Conference has been confronted has been to find room and opportunity for marshalling against Japan the massive forces which each and all of the nations concerned are urgent to engage against the enemy.
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The most serious difficulty with which the Quebec Conference has been confronted has been to find room and opportunity for marshalling against Japan the massive forces which each and all of the nations concerned are ardently to engage against the enemy.
MR. PRESIDENT,

I return the Memorandum you gave me about Italian Colonies.

The Foreign Office would like to treat this as an official communication if you would allow us to keep a copy of it.

It seems that the usual broad and substantial measure of agreement exists between us, but we should like to look into the details more closely.

16.9.44

[Handwritten note: 16 Sept. 1944]