

● PGF

Robert E. Sherwood

Subject File

Box 125

PSF: Robt. Sherwood ~~5-4-41~~ 4-41



Dear Mr. President,
The error in the copy was
entirely my fault.

Bob Sherwood

File Personal PSF: Polk. Sherwood ~~4-41~~ 4-41
Oct. 28th, 1991 S

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President,

Looking at the compactness of the opening of the speech confirms what we said last night. The guests at the dinner had hardly adjusted themselves to the fact that they were sitting down in the presence of their Commander in Chief, and listening to a momentous utterance, before the shuffling had started and there were secret maps, etc.

But this certainly did not affect the radio audience.

It has been a lot of fun on this job. Indeed, I've often thought of how in the future I

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would talk broadly to my grandchildren about the days when I had the supreme privilege of doing odd jobs for the President. But I know that what I shall remember most is that it involved innumerable belly laughs.

Yours,

Bob

Text of President's Address

The text of President Roosevelt's address last night follows:

Five months ago tonight I proclaimed to the American people the existence of a state of unlimited emergency.

Since then much has happened. Our Army and Navy are temporarily in Iceland in the defense of the Western Hemisphere.

Hitler has attacked shipping in areas close to the Americas throughout the Atlantic.

Many American-owned merchant ships have been sunk on the high seas. One American destroyer was attacked on September 4. Another destroyer was attacked and hit on October 17. Eleven brave and loyal men of our Navy were killed by the Nazis.

We have wished to avoid shooting. But the shooting has started, and history has recorded who fired the first shot. In the long run, however, all that will matter is who fired the last shot.

Hitler Misjudges American Spirit

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PSF: Sherwood

~~General~~

4-44

*file
Personal*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 6, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Today I ventured to express to Ed Stettinius my opinion that the appointment of Julius Holmes as Assistant Secretary of State would be a mistake.

This opinion is based on personal observation of General Holmes' work in North Africa and the European Theatre.

On June 11th last - just after D-Day - I had a conversation with General Holmes (George Backer and Major Harry Cain were also present) in which he reviewed the various strains and stresses that had existed between ourselves and the French - going back to Darlan and Peyrouton - and placed the blame for them primarily on the President, saying that mistakes had been made and repeated despite his (Holmes') pregnant warnings of the unfortunate results.

These remarks had a particularly hypocritical ring to me since it was my belief -- and the belief of many other observers -- that Holmes had steadily advocated a reactionary policy which seemed thoroughly inconsistent with that of your Administration.

Robert E. Sherwood

PSF: Robert Sherwood folder
4-45

January 20, 1945

My dear Douglas:

This letter will be carried by my old friend, Robert Sherwood, who was largely responsible for the organization of our psychological warfare activities in this war. Although he is no longer associated with the Office of War Information, Mr. Sherwood is doing special work for this Government with a view to bringing home to the American people, and to the peoples of Allied Nations, the vital importance of the continuing operations in the war against Japan.

I hope that you will have time for a talk with him during his visit to the Philippines.

All of us are eternally proud of your great achievements and know there will be many more of them.

Very sincerely yours,

Franklin D. Roosevelt

General Douglas MacArthur
Commander in Chief
Southwest Pacific Area

(copy of this ltr. is filed - Gen. MacArthur folder, 2-45.)

PSF: Sherwood folder 4-45-

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 24, 1945

Personal and ~~Confidential~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

Subject: General MacArthur's Command

It was my observation that:

(1) General MacArthur's intelligence service on the enemy and enemy-held territory is superb, due largely to the Filipino guerilla organization which was organized and directed under his command.

(2) On the other hand, I was shocked by the inaccuracy of the information held by General MacArthur and his immediate entourage about the formulation of high policy in Washington. There are unmistakable evidences of an acute persecution complex at work. To hear some of the staff officers talk, one would think that the War Department, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- and, possibly, even the White House itself-- are under the domination of "Communists and British Imperialists". This strange misapprehension produces an obviously unhealthy state of mind, and also the most unfortunate public relations policy that I have seen in any theatre of war. General MacArthur's own publicity men do him the worst kind of disservice.

(3) From the strictly military point of view, it seems to me that the operations in this theatre have been magnificent. The quality and the morale of the troops in the field are exceptionally high. I could detect no evidences of serious criticism of the coordination and cooperation of land, sea and air forces.

Following is a brief summary of General MacArthur's views on the future handling of Japan which he expressed to me at considerable length and with great positiveness and eloquence:

Tracing the history of Japan, particularly in the past century, the General expressed the conviction that the "Emperor-sanctity" idea is a myth fabricated by the military for their own purposes. Essential to the continuance of this myth, he said, is the legend of invincibility; the Emperor remains a god only as long as the Army and Navy are all-conquering. The total destruction of Japanese military power,

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therefore, can involve (for the Japanese civil population) destruction of the concept of Hirohito's divinity. This will result in a spiritual vacuum and an opportunity for the introduction of new concepts. The Japanese people will have inevitable respect for as well as fear of the instruments of their own defeat. Believing that might makes right, they will conclude that we of the U.S.A. must be right. Furthermore, the prestige throughout Asia that we have established by our Philippine policy and which will be vastly increased by conquest of Japan will make us the greatest influence on the future development of Asia. If we exert that influence in an imperialistic manner, or for the sole purpose of commercial advantage, then we shall lose our golden opportunity; but if our influence and our strength are exerted in terms of essential liberalism we shall have the friendship and the cooperation of the Asiatic peoples far into the future.

It seemed to be General MacArthur's view that the Japanese civil population if treated with stern justice and strength would be more capable of eventual redemption than are the Germans.

RS.

Robert Sherwood