

PSF

War Manpower Commission

Subject File

Box 190

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ment of Agriculture. This is because the War Manpower Commission has completely turned over to the Department of Agriculture all its power and duties and responsibilities with respect to the recruitment and placement and movement of farm workers. Whether or not the War Manpower Commission was correct in doing this, it is now too late to shift them back again. To do so would cause considerable confusion and misunderstanding; and it would be impossible, within the limitations of time, for the War Manpower Commission and the United States Employment Service to set up all the offices and personnel equipped to do the work of farm recruiting and placement, which theoretically is now to be done by the Extension Service and the Farm Security Administration and the other local agencies of the Department of Agriculture.

3. As to the War Manpower Commission, its work has been inefficient up to recently. However, we were all impressed by the testimony given to us by Mr. Appley, the new Executive Director of the War Manpower Commission, who has been in office only two months, and by Mr. Haber, who has recently become the head of its Bureau of Planning and Program, and we believe that they now have a definite and efficient plan which they are carrying out. The plan is based, of course, on voluntary rather than compulsory action. The chief difficulty with the War Manpower Commission, however, seems to be on Capitol Hill. The Congress is still refusing a much needed appropriation for the United States

Employment Service, which has suffered considerably by loss of personnel which must be replaced, and, indeed, greatly extended. Furthermore, the Congress has enacted a provision that every employee of the War Manpower Commission receiving more than \$4500 per year must be approved by the Senate. This provision has resulted in holding up many employees now badly needed by the Employment Service all over the United States, and is still holding up 31 men.

We recommend, therefore, that the set-up in the War Manpower Commission be continued and given a chance to carry out their program, but that help be given to them especially to obtain the necessary Congressional action to give them funds and personnel. If it is finally determined that under no circumstances will Congress give the money and personnel to the existing set-up, further consideration should be given to the question of changing the Chairman of the Manpower Commission.

4. With respect to the Department of Agriculture, we believe that its administration of the farm manpower situation has been, is, and will continue to be grossly inefficient. The man in charge of the recruitment and placement of labor, Mr. Darrow, made a very bad impression upon us. He has had no background, training, or prestige to equip him for this job.

The House Appropriations Committee, after hearing the three representatives of the Department, voted this week to reduce the

budget estimated for the mobile farm force from \$75,000,000 to \$26,000,000 and provided that it should be controlled by the Extension Service rather than by the Secretary of Agriculture.

We do not believe that the men involved have any realistic plans to furnish the necessary farm labor -- either permanent labor or seasonal temporary labor. We believe that there can be only one solution for this -- a new Secretary of Agriculture and new assistants, with the push, drive, ingenuity and standing to do this most difficult of all the manpower jobs.

As far as possible the local draft boards should be encouraged and exhorted to carry out the spirit of the Tydings Amendment to the Selective Service Act and defer through 1943 harvest time all experienced farm workers.

5. In addition to the program now being carried out by the War Manpower Commission and any program which the Department of Agriculture might adopt, we recommend the following things which will require independent action to be taken by special direction of the President:

(1) Direct the Army to furlough complete Army units as a body, at necessary planting and harvesting times in different parts of the country, to help on the farms. This will not break up the units but will delay their training for three months.

(2) Direct the Army to furlough immediately all individual

trained dairy farmers who are still within the continental limits of the United States and not in combat units soon to go overseas, in order to return to dairy farming. Do the same with the enlisted personnel in the Navy who are still on shore duty or in the Naval Training Stations. Neither the Army nor Navy will approve this, but it will help relieve the most acute need today. Gen. Edwards has estimated that there are 375,000 farmers in the Army within the continental limits, of whom he estimates there are 13,000 trained dairy workers. We think this latter estimate is very low.

(3) Direct the State Department to facilitate in every way the importation of farm labor from Mexico, Central America, and the Bahamas. In this connection, on our own responsibility, we have asked Mr. Zelmurray, the President of the United Fruit Company, if he would take charge of this program. We have notified Mr. Wickard of this action and he is agreeable. Mr. Zelmurray is reporting here on Monday, March 15th.

(4) Impress upon the W. P. B. and the Army and Navy and all other procurement agencies that, except in very exceptional circumstances, they should not award contracts or expand plant facilities in any of the areas in which there is a stringent labor shortage, if the production can possibly be made in any other area.

(5) Although the figures are very tight as shown in the

beginning of this report, we do not believe it is necessary at the present time to pass national service legislation. None of the witnesses appearing before us stated that, in his opinion, national service legislation is necessary, although nearly all of them believe that we are heading inevitably in that direction. We all believe, however, that, in theory, national service legislation not only is inevitable eventually, but that, even apart from statistics, in a total war such as this, no person should be allowed to decide for himself whether or not he is to take part in the war effort and at what time or what place or in what manner.

Theoretically every man, woman and child should be subject to the same instructions and compulsions from the Government as to their part in this war as are the men selected for military and naval service. Similarly, it is important that the power to draft labor should not be exercised unless there is coupled with it the power to draft all resources, such as money, business, and, above all, housing in which to place the workers when they are moved from locality to locality.

If, therefore, you should decide to discuss the subject of universal service, either in a message to the Congress or over the air, we believe these other concepts should be tied in with such discussion. Before there is any possibility of action along these lines by the Congress, the American people will have to be educated and conditioned, and a radio speech by you would be a splendid beginning for this process

of education.

In such a speech, we recommend that you make several specific appeals to the American people which should thereafter be continually repeated through OWI, such as, "do not hire waiters or waitresses between certain age limits" or "do not hire elevator men or women, or domestics, or chauffeurs, or taxi-drivers between certain ages," etc. — and an urgent appeal to women not now working to join the labor force.

EXHIBIT I

1. The figure of 360,000 for net attrition is computed as follows: It is estimated by the Army that 6% of its men are normally discharged each year for health, casualty or other reasons. This year this will be increased by battle casualties. Most of these men get back into civilian work and are therefore added to the labor force. Some do not. The Army (Gen. Edwards) estimates that from December 1942 to December 1943 there will be a total discharge and casualty list of 865,000, of whom it estimates 546,000 will return to civilian work, leaving a net attrition of 319,000 for the Army. The comparable figure for the Navy (Adm. Jacobs) is total loss 185,000, of which 140,000 will return to civilian work, leaving a net attrition of 45,000. Total net attrition of Army and Navy 364,000.

2. The 17,000,000 figure for essential war work consists of the following: (Figures estimated by Donald Nelson and Charles E. Wilson)

Munitions (including arsenals and Navy Yards)	8,900,000
Metal and chemical raw materials for munitions	1,300,000
Transportation, fuel, power and utilities	4,830,000
Federal war agencies	<u>1,970,000</u>
Total	17,000,000

EXHIBIT I - Page 2

3. The 8,900,000 of agriculture would have to be increased temporarily by 3,100,000 during the peak months of June, July, August and September. These figures furnished by Secretary Wickard.

4. The 21,300,000 figure (estimated by Donald M. Nelson and Charles E. Wilson) consists of the following industries: Food processing; textiles; clothing; leather; building materials and construction; other manufacturing (furniture, paper, printing, tobacco, etc.); trade (wholesale and retail); finance, service; miscellaneous; other federal and state and municipal government employees. It represents a reduction of about 3,000,000 persons from the comparable figure of December 1942; these persons, it is assumed will be transferred to more essential war work.

5. The figure of 3,500,000, which includes shop-owners, individual business men, newsstand dealers, bootblacks, garage owners, etc. etc., represents a deduction of 600,000 from the number of those similarly engaged in December 1942.

EXHIBIT 2

(Census figures adjusted by Bureau of Labor Statistics)

Female homemakers and students fell into the following groups

in December 1942:

HOMEMAKERS

1. <u>Farm</u> : Without children under 16		
a. <u>Under</u> 45	1,520,000	
b. <u>Over</u> 45	<u>2,310,000</u>	
Total without children under 16	3,830,000	
2. <u>Farm</u> : With children under 16		
a. <u>Under</u> 45	2,570,000	
b. <u>Over</u> 45	<u>500,000</u>	
Total with children under 16	3,070,000	
<u>Total Farm Homemakers</u>		6,900,000
3. <u>Non-Farm</u> : Without children under 16		
a. <u>Under</u> 45	4,100,000	
b. <u>Over</u> 45	<u>7,670,000</u>	
Total without children under 16	11,770,000	
4. <u>Non-Farm</u> : With children under 16		
a. <u>Under</u> 45	8,510,000	
b. <u>Over</u> 45	<u>1,520,000</u>	
Total with children under 16	10,030,000	
<u>Total Non-Farm Homemakers</u>		21,800,000
TOTAL HOMEMAKERS		28,700,000
5. <u>Students</u>		
a. Age 14-17	3,500,000	
b. " 18-19	400,000	
c. " 20 and over	<u>100,000</u>	
<u>Total Students</u>		4,000,000
TOTAL FEMALES NOT WORKING FOR WAGES OR SALARIES 14 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER		32,700,000

It is estimated that from this 32,700,000 we can reasonably expect to get 2,680,000 additional workers as follows:

From Class 1 and 2, which includes all homemakers on farms --

None. These women already work on farms or should be expected to.

From Class 3a (Women in cities and towns under 45 without children under 16) 20%..... 820,000

In December 1942, there were 2,000,000 women in this class working for wages or salaries. This was 32% of the total membership of this class (6,100,000). This proposed increase of 20% of the 4,100,000 not now working would raise the total of workers in this class to 2,820,000, or 45% of the entire membership.

From Class 3b (Women in cities and towns over 45 without children under 16) 12½%..... 960,000

In December 1942, there were 730,000 women in this class working for wages or salaries. This was 9% of the total membership of this class (8,400,000). This proposed increase of 12½% of the 7,670,000 not now working would raise the total of workers in this class to 1,690,000, or 20% of the entire membership.

From Class 4a (Women in cities and towns under 45 with children under 16) 2½%..... 212,000

In December 1942, there were 1,120,000 women in this class working for wages or salaries. This was 12% of the total membership of this class (9,630,000). This proposed increase of 2½% of the 8,510,000 not now working would raise the total of workers in this class to 1,332,000, or 14% of the entire membership.

From Class 4b (Women in cities and towns over 45 with children under 16) 2½%..... 38,000

In December 1942, there were 150,000 women in this class working for wages or salaries. This was 9% of the total membership of this class (1,670,000). This proposed increase of 2½% of the 1,520,000 not now working would raise the total of workers in this class to 1,68,000, or 10% of the entire membership.

2,030,000

*Personal  
Confidential*

*PSF: War Manpower Comm.*

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under  
manpower*

March 14, 1943

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT:

We have held six meetings and there have appeared before us to give us their views and to answer questions the following persons representing the following agencies:

War Manpower Commission:

Chairman McNutt  
Mr. Appley, Executive Director of the War  
Manpower Commission  
Mr. Haber, Chief of Planning and Program  
Bureau in the War Manpower Commission

Department of Agriculture:

Secretary Wickard  
Mr. Townsend, Director of Production, Department  
of Agriculture  
Mr. Darrow, in charge of recruiting farm labor,  
Department of Agriculture

Army:

Major General Edwards, in charge of planning  
and programming

U. S. Employment Service:

Mr. Brockway, a Department Director of the Service  
Mr. Bond, formerly one of the State Directors of  
the Service

Selective Service System:

General Hershey

War Production Board:

Mr. Nelson  
Mr. Charles E. Wilson

TOTAL HOMEMAKERS AVAILABLE FOR WORK ..... 2,030,000

It should be emphasized that this estimate makes absolutely no allowance for any homemakers now on the farm as being available for employment, although experience proves that many of them do go to work for others for wages.

The following table summarizes the foregoing:-

	Homemakers	Working For Wages Or Salary Dec., 1942	Estimated Increase In Women Working For Wages Or Salary By Dec., 1943	Estimated Total Employed By Dec., 1943	Total Employed Estimated As Per Cent Of Total Married Women, Dec., 1943
<b>NON-FARM WOMEN WITHOUT CHILDREN</b>					
	<u>Col. 1</u>	<u>Col. 2</u>	<u>Col. 3</u>	<u>Col. 4 (Cols 2 plus 3)</u>	
<u>Under</u> 45	4,100,000	2,000,000	820,000 (20%)	2,820,000	45
<u>Over</u> 45	7,670,000	730,000	960,000 (12½%)	1,690,000	20
<b>NON-FARM WOMEN WITH CHILDREN</b>					
<u>Under</u> 45	8,510,000	1,120,000	212,000 (2½%)	1,332,000	14
<u>Over</u> 45	1,520,000	150,000	38,000 (2½%)	188,000	10

The following is estimated as the increase of workers voluntarily obtainable from the female student groups which total 4,000,000:

From Class 5a (Female students ages 14 to 17 inclusive) 15%.....	525,000
From Class 5b and 5c (Female students 18 years and over) 25%.....	<u>125,000</u>
From Total estimated female students available for work.....	650,000

This estimate of 650,000 available female students is conservative.

The British experience shows that 70% of the girls in the 14-17 age group are actually employed. In the United States the number of females, aged 14 to 17, employed in December 1942 was 700,000, or 14% of the total population in that age group. The proposed increase of 15% of the 3,500,000 not now working would raise the total of workers in this group to 1,225,000, or 29% of the entire membership. It should be remembered that students in this age group have never been subject to the Essential Works Order in the United Kingdom which authorized the Ministry of Labor to direct people to certain employment.

Therefore, the total number of women (2,030,000 homemakers and 650,000 students) estimated for addition to the labor force is 2,680,000.

EXHIBIT III

(Census figures adjusted by Bureau of Labor Statistics)

The males able to work but not working for wages or salaries or seeking employment as of December 1942, fall into the following groups:

1. Age 45-64	300,000	
2. Age 65 and over	<u>600,000</u>	
Total over 45		900,000
3. STUDENTS		
a. Age 14-17	3,200,000	
b. Age 18-19	400,000	
c. Age 20 and over	<u>200,000</u>	
Total Students		<u>3,800,000</u>
TOTAL MALE LABOR RESERVE 14 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER		4,700,000

Class 1 (45 to 64) should all go to work 300,000

Class 2 (65 and over) Since 50% of this age group are now employed it is safe to estimate  $33\frac{1}{3}$  of those not now working can be made available 200,000

Class 3a (Male students 14-17) 20% 640,000

In December 1942, there were 1,700,000 boys in this age group working for wages. This was 34% of the total number of boys in this age group. The balance were at school. In the United Kingdom, 77% of the boys in this age group are in the labor force although students in the group are not compelled to work by the English statute. After the proposed increase of 20%, there will be 2,340,000 boys in this age group, or 48%, working in the United States.

Class 3b and 3c (Male students 18 and over) 75% 450,000

Total males available for labor force 1,590,000

EXHIBIT III - Page 2

We have taken into consideration the number of boys over 18 who will be placed in colleges. The number of the Army men as of December 1943 is 150,000 according to Gen. Edwards; and the number of men of the Navy, according to Admiral Jacobs, is 81,000. These 230,000 men, however, are already included in the 11,160,000 men of the armed forces. In addition, however, we are informed by Col. Keesling of the Selective Service that about 50,000 - 75,000 (a rough estimate) civilians have been deferred in Universities. These 50,000 are included in the 25% of class 3b and 3c who have been deducted to remain in school.

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War Manpower folder  
2-43

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McREYNOLDS:

I understand that Edward Hamilton has been appointed in New Jersey as War Manpower Director for New Jersey. However, in checking this up I learned that the Civil Service has taken over these appointments and requested that an open competitive examination be given in each case and that the Civil Service has not announced a date for the examination.

Can Mr. Hamilton be put in on a temporary basis until Civil Service acts?

F.D.R.

RECEIVED  
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION  
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF WAR  
WASHINGTON, D.C.  
JUL 21 1943

TELEPHONE CONVERSATION

Taken by Ladana Williams

Date July 21, 1943

John Malone in Mayor Hague's office, <sup>Jersey City</sup> New Jersey, called Mr. O'Connell and requested that he get in touch with Paul McNutt's office and see what is holding up Edward Hamilton's appointment in New Jersey as War Manpower Director for New Jersey under McNamee who is Regional Director. McNamee has approved Hamilton, but has to wait until he gets clearance from McNutt's office. Mr. O'Connell stated he would get in touch with McNutt's office about this matter.

Mr. O'Connell called Jim Penman in War Manpower, Mr. McNutt's office, and requested information about Edward Hamilton's appointment as War Manpower Director of New Jersey under McNamee. Mr. Penman stated that Civil Service had taken these appointments over and had requested that an open competitive examination be given in each case such as this. As yet Civil Service has not announced a date for the examination. Mr. Penman stated a rough draft ~~of~~ was being drawn up about Civil Service taking over these appointments and he will bring it over to show Mr. O'Connell in the morning.

*Mc Reynolds*

*Can he be put in on temporary leave till Civil Service acts?*

*J.R.*

Action to be taken:

T-129

*PSF War Manpower folder 2-43*

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 30, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. PAUL V. McNUTT

To speak to me about on  
my return.

F. D. R.

Enclosures

7013 101 1042  
WASHINGTON  
THE WHITE HOUSE

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 29, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I have talked to Paul McMutt about the proposed temporary appointment of Edward Hamilton as New Jersey War Manpower Director pending the holding of a Civil Service open competitive examination for the selection of candidates for that position. Paul expressed the wish to discuss the Hamilton case with you before the making of such an appointment, which of course could be accomplished on a purely temporary basis. Paul has interviewed and is definitely opposed to his selection for reasons which he would like to discuss with you before any action is taken on this case.

The regular procedure established by the Civil Service Commission for the selection of regional directors of Manpower is to announce local examinations within the districts involved and complete the rating of papers and certification within a minimum of three weeks from the date when the examination is requested by the Manpower Commission. So far the Civil Service has been able to meet this schedule with satisfactory results.



Wm. H. McReynolds

197A 30 1849

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 27, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McREYNOLDS:

I understand that Edward Hamilton has been appointed in New Jersey as War Manpower Director for New Jersey. However, in checking this up I learned that the Civil Service has taken over these appointments and requested that an open competitive examination be given in each case and that the Civil Service has not announced a date for the examination.

Can Mr. Hamilton be put in on a temporary basis until Civil Service acts?

F.D.R.

*Mr. Manpower Com. folder*  
*2-43*

*PSF*

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REDUCTION IN PRODUCTION OF NON-FERROUS METALS

I.

Already in 1943 there has been a substantial reduction in the production of essential non-ferrous metals.

(1) Domestic production of copper has dropped 5,000 tons per month and by the end of 1944, the monthly loss will be 10,000 tons or 12% of domestic production.

(2) Zinc requirements for 1943 are 1,314,000 tons against estimated supply of 1,362,000 tons. Production goals are not being met and development work essential to maintain production is falling.

(3) Domestic production of tungsten in 1943 was expected to provide 15,000,000 pounds against estimated requirements of 25,200,000 pounds. Domestic production in the first five months of 1942 was at an annual rate of somewhat less than 10,000,000 pounds.

(4) Molybdenum requirements for 1943 are estimated at 70,757,000 pounds against estimated supply of 64,530,000 pounds, 90% of which must be mined domestically. Climax Molybdenum (which accounts for three-quarters of the domestic production) averaged in April 16,000 tons of ore per day as against its capacity of 20,000 tons per day.

II.

This reduction in production has been caused by the shortage of manpower. The employment in the western non-ferrous metal mines on January 1, 1943 was 48,350. On May 1, 1943, it had dropped to 45,580 and W.M.C. expects the report on June 1, 1943, to show a further decline of 2000-2500. As of May 21, 1943, W.M.C. held orders for 6,000 additional workers in the western non-ferrous metal mines. W.P.B. estimates the need for additional workers in this field at 8,000.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

1. *See Dept Letter 11-20-72*

By RT NARS Date MAY 21 1973

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

**American Federation of Labor:**

Mr. William Green

**C. I. O.:**

Mr. Carey, Secretary of the C. I. O.

Van A. Bittner, Assistant President United Steel  
Workers.

← Mr. Isador Lubin

From all the evidence produced before us, our conclusion is that it will be practically impossible to obtain the required number of men and women to furnish the armed forces, the necessary munition workers, the farm workers, and workers for the less essential industries as of December 1943, under existing programs without more efficient management.

The terms "workers," "labor force," and "manpower" include men and women. Unless otherwise specified all figures are furnished by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

The best estimates of distribution of manpower we can obtain as of December 1943 are as follows:

A. Army, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard and Women's Auxiliaries (including 360,000 net attrition)	11,160,000
B. (1) Necessary War industries workers	17,000,000
(2) Agricultural	8,900,000
(3) Less essential industry workers	21,300,000
(4) Persons in business for themselves in occupations deemed necessary for our civilian economy	<u>3,500,000</u>
(5) TOTAL	61,860,000

III.

SUGGESTED PROPOSALS FOR INCREASING EMPLOYMENT

(1) Furlough from Army:

W.M.C. and W.P.B. recommend that soldiers with hard-rock mining experience be furloughed for work in the mines. Army objects that it is not "sound national policy to release troops, selected and trained for combat, in order to supply manpower to a private industry whose problems primarily result from out-migrations of civilian labor."

(2) Selective Service Deferment:

W.M.C., W.P.B. and Army recommend that Selective Service deferments of non-ferrous metal mining employees be made as liberal as those of agricultural employees. Both Army and W.M.C. report a loss from the industry to agriculture because of the more favorable consideration under selective service given agricultural workers.

(3) Concentration of Employment and Recruiting Activities In More Efficient Mines:

Army and W.M.C. recommend this. Apparently, W.P.B. has already aided W.M.C. in designating such more efficient mines.

(4) Importation of Mexican Workers:

W.P.B. and W.M.C. recommend the importation of Mexican workers. W.M.C. suggests that their employment be restricted to areas where they are not subjected to any discrimination in types of employment or wages.

(5) War Prisoners:

W.M.C. recommends employment of war prisoners in non-ferrous metals activities. It is questionable that the proscription of the Geneva Convention of 1939 against the use of prisoners of war in hazardous occupations would permit this suggestion.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Labor Dept Letter, 11-20-72

By RT NARS ~~MAY 31 1979~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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(6) Increases in Wages or Incentive Payments:

W.M.C. and Army suggest the use of wage increases and incentive payments as a means of increasing net employment.

(7) General Recruitment Program:

W.M.C. suggests a general recruitment program with particular emphasis on those former employees who have transferred to other occupations.

(8) National Service Legislation:

Army recommends the prompt enactment of national service legislation as the only real, permanent solution for the manpower problem.

(9) Salvage Campaigns:

Army suggests a vigorous salvage campaign to supplement our copper and brass supplies.

DECLASSIFIED

E. O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 5(D) or (E)

Labor Dept Letter, 11-20-72

By BT NARS Date MAY 21 1973

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OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT  
**WAR MANPOWER COMMISSION**  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 25

Chairman  
**PAUL V. McNUTT**  
FEDERAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATOR

November 10, 1943

Dear Mr. President:

Mr. Monroe Douglas Robinson, of New York, has conveyed to me your request that I make a report to you concerning an idea that Mr. Robinson and I have discussed. This idea revolves around the problem of how to impress upon the men and women workers of this country that their jobs, whatever and wherever they may be, are vitally linked to the jobs of the men on the fighting fronts.

It is freely admitted by the War Manpower Commission and War Production Board that the full utilization of our labor pool, and their necessary inspiration, is one of our major problems.

A year and a half ago, when I was Associate State Administrator for the Treasury Department in New York State, I had the pleasure of getting Mr. Robinson to come to the Treasury Department as a speaker for the sale of war bonds. Mr. Robinson, a personal friend of long standing, has made an outstanding success, and has done a job that has not been excelled by anyone in the United States. Since he joined the Treasury Department, Mr. Robinson has been made a Deputy Manager of the War Finance Committee of New York State. During that time he has addressed over five hundred meetings, almost entirely employee meetings, which I feel gives him full qualification to be considered an expert in audience reaction and group psychology.

Mr. Robinson has outlined a plan to me that I believe worthy of your deepest consideration. He feels that it is vital to activate a truer knowledge of war conditions on the battlefronts to the workers in factories and war plants in the United States. To help accomplish this mission, Mr. Robinson has suggested that a dozen men be selected, each one of whom is a dynamic speaker, six from unions and six from management, and preferably men with an outstanding record in the last war. One half of this group should be sent to the European Theatre, and the other half to the South Pacific to get a first-hand knowledge of war as it is today. Upon their return, these men would be used full time to speak before employee groups, Rotary Clubs, Chambers of Commerce, etc., to bring home to our people here what our fighting



Mr. President

November 10, 1943


men are up against, and to drive home to the minds and hearts of the workers in the United States the necessity for every man and woman going all out on his or her job.

Some of the servicemen who have been invalided home have already done some excellent speaking, particularly in connection with the war loans and Community War Fund campaigns; others who are now being rehabilitated will soon re-enter industry, and obviously these men, if properly chosen with a view to their speaking ability, could carry a tremendous story, particularly in their own communities.

Mr. Robinson is farther convinced that there are many veterans of the last war who could be counted upon to form a nucleus amongst the employee groups throughout the Nation to supplement the work of the men just returned from the battlefronts. As an example of what can be accomplished by these veteran groups, I should like to quote one example known to me from my work with the Treasury Department in New York. The Arma Corporation of Brooklyn has a veterans' group, to which Mr. Nelson, Vice President of Arma, attributes in a large degree the success of the Arma Corporation, not only in their manufacturing achievements, but also in their labor relations, bond drives, and everything pertaining to their high personnel morale.

May I suggest if this plan appeals to you that you direct action be taken immediately to put it in operation.

Respectfully yours,



Bruce D. Smith  
Special Assistant  
to the Chairman

The President  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

The foregoing figures are broken down and explained in Exhibit 1 attached hereto.

This total of 61,860,000 people is about 3,760,000 more than were engaged in these activities in December 1942. At that time, out of a total non-institutional population between the ages of 14 and 75 of 51,100,000 males and 51,700,000 females, there were in actual employment or in the armed forces: 43,200,000 males and 14,900,000 females, making a total of 58,100,000 workers. The figure of 58,100,000 as of December 1942 subtracted from the 61,860,000 required as of December 1943, gives the required net increase of 3,760,000.

However as shown in Exhibit 1, the figure of 8,900,000 farm workers is only the normal regular farm force through the year. During the peak months of July - October of each year there are required 3,100,000 temporary seasonal farm workers. Therefore in addition to the above increase of 3,760,000 people, there must also be found these 3,100,000 seasonal temporary workers.

Where are these increases coming from?

They can come only from that group of males and females aged 14 to 75, who were not, in December 1942, in the armed forces or actually working for wages or salaries.

That group is divided as follows by sex and age:

Age	<u>MALE</u>	<u>FEMALE</u>
14-17	3,200,000	4,200,000
18-64	1,600,000	27,700,000
65 and over	<u>2,200,000</u>	<u>4,300,000</u>
Total	7,000,000	36,200,000

The source of new workers is therefore from the 7,000,000 males and the 36,200,000 females not now working for wages or salaries.

The females are composed of:

Students	4,000,000
Homemakers (women who run a household)	28,700,000
Others (who because of health, age or personal factors cannot be considered as available for work)	<u>3,500,000</u>
	36,200,000

We believe that from this figure, it will be possible to obtain voluntarily a total of 2,680,000, as explained and detailed in Exhibit 2, attached.

The males (able to work), not now working for wages or salaries or in the armed forces, are composed of:

1. Age 45-64	300,000
2. Age 65 and over	600,000
3. Students	
a. Aged 14-17	3,200,000
b. Aged 18-19	400,000
c. Aged 20 and over	<u>200,000</u>
Total	4,700,000

We believe that from this figure, it will be possible to obtain voluntarily a total of 1,590,000, as explained and detailed in Exhibit 3, attached.

The total increase of males and females therefore available for industry and the armed forces is therefore 4,270,000.

For purpose of simplification, we have not included in the above figures those people who were in December 1942 temporarily unemployed but were looking for employment or were moving from one job to another. As a matter of long experience, the Bureau of Labor Statistics recognizes that there is always a number of such people on any date. Similarly we have not included such group in our estimated requirements for December 1943 although we know they will be present. The Bureau of Labor Statistics does always include them in their term "labor supply". We have not so included them. There were 1,500,000 of these in December 1942; it is estimated that 500,000 of them will be absorbed in 1943. Therefore we should increase the above figure of 4,270,000 by 500,000 giving a grand total of estimated increase of 4,770,000 new workers.

This total is to be applied to meet the requirement of 3,760,000, leaving a surplus of about 1,000,000.

However, there still remains the necessity of meeting the additional seasonal requirement of 3,100,000 for agriculture. This can probably be met by good forceful administration, *from among the following:*

1. The above surplus of 1,000,000
2. More than 1,000,000 of the armed forces which have been estimated as of December 1943 will not yet be in the army in August 1943.
3. About 500,000 of the munitions industries <sup>workers</sup> which have been estimated as of December 1943 will not yet be there in August 1943.
4. Women, boys and girls, and foreign workers (Mexicans, etc.) not included in the above figures.

It must be remembered, in going out to get additional labor, that the Army, Navy and Women's Auxiliaries have already taken the most physically efficient. Therefore, the new additions to the labor force will be less efficient from a physical standpoint. Nelson and Wilson state that they have taken this factor into consideration, as well as the increased efficiency of the more experienced hands, in giving us their estimates.

Unquestionably, the estimate of civilian activities, including the 21,000,000 must be cut even farther, unless there is an improvement in absenteeism, a continued cessation of strikes and, above all, a decided improvement in the flow of raw materials to the workers. Absenteeism and lack of production have not always been the fault of the workers. It has often been the result of faulty

planning of production and of inefficient scheduling of raw materials. Better planning would see to it that the contracts and the plants, so far as possible, are placed in areas where there is sufficient labor force. Better scheduling of raw materials would prevent cessation of work where manpower is sufficient. There must be better coordination and administration of each one of the government agencies.

We believe that the present administration under the voluntary system of our manpower supply, on the farms, in munitions industries and in the less essential civilian industries, can be vastly improved. But even with a 100% perfect administration, the job can just about be done on a voluntary basis on the figures before us. The problem is to move and house people from areas which have manpower to spare, to the areas which are deficient in manpower. There are 32 critical areas (mostly cities) where there is a tight squeeze in manpower according to the War Manpower Commission.

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

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Our conclusions are as follows:

1. Under no circumstances should the figure now set for the armed forces (11,100,000 including net attrition) be changed. From figures furnished by the Joint Staff, we are convinced that there will be adequate shipment facilities to transport the men as needed under existing plans, and continually to ship them necessary equipment and supplies.

2. We believe that the administration of the manpower problem has been inefficient and that the various Federal agencies and procurement officers have not sufficiently cooperated to see that (1) contracts and plants have not been heretofore planned to meet the supply of labor, and (2) that raw materials have not been heretofore scheduled efficiently to provide the maximum use of the manpower we have available.

For example, the production of agricultural products this year will be affected seriously by the failure to allocate sufficient steel and other materials for farm machinery and parts. The economy of the country has not yet been mobilized to meet the demands being made upon it for total war.

In connection with the actual recruitment and placement of additional labor and the transfer of manpower from less essential to more essential industries, we must give primary attention to (1) the activities of the War Manpower Commission and (2) those of the Depart-