PSF Subject File: War Shipping Administration

Retired
November 19, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION

I am glad to know from Mr. Douglas that in the Pacific area the military shipping requirements for the month of November have been completely met. This is good news but I want to raise a question which should be discussed by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board.

1. I have heard from a number of sources that some ships from the west coast to Alaska, Hawaii or the Southwest Pacific have gone out with short cargoes – not very short but a matter of 500, 600 or 700 tons short. A part of this trouble at the loading points is probably due to the lack of the actual materials at the time of loading. Please look into this.

2. I also am worried about instances where the Army and Navy supply agencies are not in complete cooperation. For example, if in some item the Navy does not have the goods on hand at the moment, it should immediately ask the Army whether it can fill the item from Army stock on hand. This applies vice versa. There should be a complete interchange of critical items, and bookkeeping red tape should be reduced to a single page memorandum form. No quartermaster or supply officer is going to go to jail for doing the right and practical thing in the war effort – even if he violates fifty-seven regulations in so doing. Please look into this too.

3. We have a large number of relatively small bases which are occupied jointly by the Army and Navy. Examples are Trinidad, Antigua, St. Lucia, Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico and Bermuda. I should like to know if the supply ships going to these places carry Army and Navy supplies or whether each service carries out a separate supply service.
In other words, the whole purpose of this memorandum is to have a re-check made on whether each ship, no matter whether it is run by Army, Navy or War Shipping Administration is used 100% in the most efficient way.

F. D. R.

No papers accompanied the original of this memorandum to the Secretary of War; copies of memorandum sent to the Secretary of the Navy and the War Shipping Administration.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

We wrote you a memorandum on October 27th, giving you the general shipping position and the changes that occurred in the American controlled dry cargo merchant fleet since the first of March, and presenting a statement of the inadequacy of shipping to meet certain military requirements in the Pacific.

Since that date, the situation has clarified, and the military requirements for the month of November have been completely met. This is indicated by the attached copy of my letter of today's date to Admiral Leahy.

Respectfully submitted,

L. W. Douglas,
Deputy Administrator.
WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON

November 17, 1942

Admiral William D. Leahy, U.S.N.,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in
Chief of the Army and Navy,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Admiral Leahy:

You wrote me under date of November 6 concerning the re-
allocation of tonnage for military services in the Pacific during the
month of November.

Reallocations (exclusive of Alaska) contemplated assignment
to the Army of 21 vessels for South Pacific, 8 vessels for Hawaii and
2 vessels for the Canal, a total of 31 vessels.

As of November 17 we had allocated to the Army a total of
32 vessels.

Reallocations (exclusive of Alaska) contemplated the assignment
to the Navy of 30 vessels for South Pacific, 11 for Hawaii and 1 for the
Canal Zone, a total of 42 vessels.

As of November 17 we had allocated to the Navy a total of
52 vessels.

From the foregoing you will note that the situation on the
Pacific Coast has clarified to the extent that we have been able to
meet the military requirements in the various areas.

Sincerely yours,

(s) L. W. Douglas
L. W. Douglas
Deputy Administrator.
In reply refer to

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

November 23, 1942

CONFIDENTIAL

Date - 11 - 13 - 42

Memorandum for the President

signature - (Carl L. Spaatz)

1. In your memorandum of November 19, 1942, to the Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and War Shipping Administration, you inquire regarding (1) ships sailing to Alaska, Hawaii, and Southwest Pacific with short cargoes; (2) lack of complete cooperation between Army and Navy supply agencies; and (3) joint supply of Caribbean bases.

2. As to sailings from San Francisco and Hueneme, there need be no concern as to lack of cargo. As of November 14, 1942, the Twelfth Naval District had a balance of 138,187 weight tons of cargo awaiting shipment to Hawaii and beyond. Additional tonnage was being booked at the rate of 6,425 weight tons per day. In addition about 100,000 tons are on hand at the Advanced Base Depot at Hueneme. Of this Hueneme cargo, 16,133 tons of high priority have been released for shipment and additional amounts can be released to take advantage of any tonnage available. Seattle had 29,104 tons awaiting shipment on November 6, 1942.

3. The naval shipping situation on the West Coast has, within the past month, been the subject of three independent investigations: one by the Inspector General, Rear Admiral Snyder, one by Mr. Walter Franklin, Vice President of the Pennsylvania Railroad in charge of Traffic, and one by Captain R.C. Lee, U.S.N.R., now attached to the Naval Transportation Service, and formerly Vice President of the Moore-McCormack Steamship Company in charge of Operations. Each of these officials spent several days inspecting in San Francisco and Seattle, giving particular attention to the matter of full loading of ships. Each reported independently that the Naval Transportation Service organizations at these ports are efficient and are doing a fine job.

4. It can be categorically stated that Naval Transportation loadings in San Francisco and Seattle are efficient, and that the ships are normally fully loaded. There may be incidents where individual vessels at San Francisco sail 500 or 600 tons short to avoid the ten days' delay which would result from missing a convoy to complete loading. However, our Port Directors, San Francisco, and Seattle, are fully aware of the need for conserving tonnage and are controlling naval sailings to make the most economical use of shipping consistent with efficient support of the war operations.

5. There is complete cooperation with the Army and the Navy supply agencies as will be seen from the statements of the Chiefs of the Bureaus of Ordnance, Supplies and Accounts, and Yards and Docks (Enclosures (A), (B), and (C)).
Memorandum for the President

6. Last June the Army and the Navy made the attached agreement (Enclosure (D) covering the joint supply of food to small bases in the Caribbean, and have since then been operating satisfactorily under it. The general scheme is that the large naval ships leave food at Guantanamo, Porto Rico, St. Thomas, and Trinidad, and small Army ships distribute it to the other islands. The latter also accept Navy cargo and passengers to the extent that space is available. Construction material is delivered by each service independently in full cargo lots, or in space allocated by the War Shipping Administration.

Frank Knox

Frank Knox
Subject: Army-Navy Cooperation

Reference: (a) Excerpt from FDR Memo to SecWar, SecNav, WSA, dated 19 November 1942

1. I am completely at a loss as to how the President's comments are applicable to the relations existing between Army Ordnance and the Bureau. Through joint agreement, the Bureau procures certain items from Army Ordnance and Army Ordnance secures certain items from the Bureau. The only single item which both manufacture is 40mm ammunition. The Bureau has frequently obtained components of ammunition from Army Ordnance, and has also furnished Army Ordnance components from its own manufacture where the component is common to the two of us. Also, the Bureau and Army Ordnance have maintained very close and cordial relations in all matters in which we have a common interest. As an example, the development of steel cartridge cases to replace brass is going forward as a joint venture.

2. The Navy Department's representative on the Munitions Assignment Committee, Captain A. G. Noble, is thoroughly familiar with the availability of materials produced by the War Department's Arms and Services and, as a matter of routine, meets in joint action monthly with representatives of the War Department for allocation of materials required by the material Bureaus of the Navy Department. Noble has as his assistants, members which sit on sub-committees for ordnance, signal equipment, radar equipment, medical supplies and stores, trucks, tractors, tanks and self-propelled mounts, and explosives. Quartermaster material is made available upon demand except for controlled items, for which allocation is secured through Joint Action. I am not aware of any instance in which this Bureau and, through Noble, the Navy Department has not taken advantage of War Department stocks when requirements have been made known.

3. I am informed by Captain Noble that at the last meeting of the Joint Committee, informal proposal was made for the combining of resources furnished in the South Pacific so that the supply problem might be simplified. As this proposal is outside the purview of this Bureau and concerned Army type supplies, weapons, and ammunition in common use by the Army and Marine troops in that area, Noble referred it to Brigadier General K. E. Rockey, Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, and to Colonel W. E. Riley, staff of the Commander in Chief.
NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SUPPLIES AND ACCOUNTS
WASHINGTON, D.C.
23 November 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Memorandum of the President to the Secretary of War, Secretary of the Navy, and the War Shipping Administration dated 19 November 1942.

1. On my tour of observation to the South and Southwest Pacific, I fully investigated relations between the Army and Navy, particularly in connection with interchangeability of supplies. This observation includes the San Francisco area and Pearl Harbor. I found numerous instances of immediate and willing cooperation between the services in supplying critical and other items and an effective unity of action in all supply matters.

2. In the broad field of collaboration and interchange of supplies between the services, the respective off-shore requirements with regard to petroleum products are coordinated by the Army and Navy petroleum board, composed of officers of both services. A pool of petroleum products is maintained by the Navy at the Port of New York to meet demands of the Army, Navy, and the forces of the United Nations.

3. Numerous instances have recently occurred whereby the Navy has released aviation gasoline to meet Army requirements. Diversions of shipments of this commodity have been effected where necessary to meet the needs of the Army. In turn, the Army has similarly turned over to the Navy stocks of aviation gasoline to meet urgent requirements.

4. The procurement of canned fruits and vegetables and canned meats, coffee and tea is effected through War Department contracts for assignment to the Navy. Specifically, to meet local demands the Navy makes extensive use of the Army Marketing Center system of procurement wherever possible. Emergency requirements of provisions by either service are acted upon in willing cooperation whenever occurring.

5. The Navy has procured items of clothing from the Army, notably khaki shirts and trousers and cotton drawers. The Navy has also supplied dungarees and white garments to the Army. The Army has cooperated by releasing contractors on woolen fabrics in order to permit production on fabrics needed by the Navy.

6. In the broad field of wholesale transactions between the services, effected through reference to the respective departments in Washington, and also in the case of local issues wherever the needs arise, transfers of supplies are smoothly and promptly accomplished.
From: Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks.
To: Cinclant
Cinpac
Comsowespac
Comsopac
Comalsec
District Commandants (less 16)
NOBs Iceland, Newfoundland, Bermuda, Guantanamo, Trinidad

Subject: Utilization of materials, equipment, and supplies in overseas theatres of operations.

Reference: (a) Vice Opnav letr Op-10A-MD Serial 19110 SO 101160 of 1 October 1942 to Budocks.

1. Reference (a) is quoted as follows:

"The Joint United States Chiefs of Staff have approved an arrangement whereby any construction materials, equipment, or supplies, which have been procured by either the Army or Navy, and which become surplus at any station in an overseas theatre of operations, will be made available on request for the use of the other Service without transfer of funds. Such material may be utilized in place or transferred to any other station within the jurisdiction of the Commanding General or Admiral of an overseas Theatre of Operations for use of the Service making the request.

"That, arrangements will be made by the Army and Navy for the exchange of construction materials, equipment, and supplies, where surplus, on request, and if needed by the other Service for more urgent demand. In case of conflict, decision will be sought from the Commanding General or Admiral, as the case may be, of the joint force.

"That, arrangements will be made by the two Services under the direction of the Commanding General or Admiral to stock such common items as lumber, nails, hardware, and equipment in a joint stock pile or in joint stocks to prevent accumulation of excess stock piles.

"That, where, in the opinion of the supreme commander, such action is thought desirable, an officer from the Chief of Engineers, or from the Bureau of Yards and Docks, will be appointed Chief Engineer of the Joint Force and be held responsible for all construction activities within the theater."
That, requests may be submitted either to the Army or the Navy for materials to be used jointly by both Services under rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Commanding General or Admiral. Where such action is taken, the aforementioned rules will be drawn so that there will be no duplication of stockages.

Commanders of Overseas Theatres of Operations have been requested to forward directly to the Headquarters of the Services of Supply of the Army and to the Bureau of Yards and Docks of the Navy a copy of such orders as may be issued by them in conformity with these agreements.

The Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks is requested to take such steps as may be necessary to implement the arrangements set forth above.

2. In view of the differing conditions applying to the various localities where work is being conducted, no general instructions will be issued to carry the foregoing into effect. Local arrangements will be made as required.

3. It is understood that the War Department is issuing necessary directives to the Commanding Generals in the various theatres of war.

Copies to: All Bureaus and Offices, Navy Department
Commanding Officers, Advance Base Depots
Superintending Civil Engineers
Directors, Bureau of Yards and Docks
Y&D List "E"
All Officers in Charge of Construction Battalions

[Signature]
AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE TRANSPORTATION OF FOOD TO BERMUDA, THE BAHAMAS, AND OUTLYING BASES IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE ARMY AND THE NAVY.

1. The Navy will transport food to Guantanamo, Puerto Rico Area, St. Thomas and Trinidad for the following as indicated:

(a) Frozen, chilled and dry food for U. S. Atlantic Fleet Units, British Navy Units as required, and Navy and Marine Corps personnel stationed in the Tenth Naval District.

(b) Frozen and chilled food for the U. S. Army stationed within the limits of the Tenth Naval District.

(c) Frozen, chilled and dry food for Navy Contractors' personnel in the Tenth Naval District in emergencies and with the approval of local Naval authorities.

(d) Frozen and chilled food for Army Contractors' personnel within the limits of the Tenth Naval District as desired by the Army.

(e) Frozen, chilled and dry food for Allied Army forces within the limits of the Tenth Naval District as required, if unobtainable from other sources.

(f) Frozen, chilled and dry food as required by merchant ships to enable them to proceed to next provisioning port of scheduled voyage, if unobtainable from other sources.

2. The Navy will transport frozen, chilled and dry food from Norfolk to Bermuda for:

(a) U. S. Navy.

(b) U. S. Army -
   (1) Frozen and chilled food.
   (2) Dry food as requested by the Army.

(c) British Army and Navy as required.

(d) U. S. Navy Contractors' personnel as required.

(e) U. S. Army Contractors' personnel as requested by the Army.

(f) Merchant ships as required to enable them to proceed to next provisioning port of scheduled voyage, if unobtainable from other sources.

(g) Civilians as space and ships permit. (Additional Navy ships will not be furnished to supply the civilian population.)
5. The Navy will transport frozen, chilled and dry food from the Seventh Naval District to Nassau and Great Exuma -

(a) For the U. S. Navy and Navy Contractors' personnel as required.

(b) For the U. S. Army and Army Contractors' personnel as requested by the Army.

4. The food transported by the Navy to Guantanamo, Puerto Rico Area, St. Thomas and Trinidad as provided in paragraph 1, will be distributed as follows:

(a) By the Navy to Jamaica from Guantanamo.

(b) By the Army to St. Croix and Antigua from Puerto Rico Area.

(c) By the Army to St. Lucia, British Guiana, Surinam, Aruba and Curaçao from Trinidad.

Army vessels making this food distribution will also accept other Navy cargo for Antigua, St. Lucia, British Guiana, Aruba and Curaçao to the extent that space is available.

5. The Army will transport food for Army personnel and Army Contractors' personnel except as provided above.

6. This agreement will be executed as soon as practicable. The Director, Naval Transportation Service and the Chief of Transportation Service, Services of Supply, U. S. Army, will by mutual agreement make necessary arrangements for its execution.
The President,  

The White House.  

Dear Mr. President:  

In your memorandum of November 19, reference is made to the sailing of ships from the West Coast which were not fully loaded and down. It is a fact that many ships carrying military supplies from the West Coast have gone out light, although all space was filled, because of the lack of weight cargoes for these destinations. The number of setup motor vehicles sent to Pacific bases is so far out of proportion to the quantity of general cargo that it is inevitable that there is a large percentage of broken stowage. In many instances these ships are destined for active theaters where priority of unloading of weapons and vehicles must take precedence over any other consideration in the utilization of ship space. Aggressive action on the part of those in charge of loading Army ships has resulted in a more satisfactory showing in the loading of transports and cargo vessels for Pacific bases, although during the first nine months of the war more than one thousand airplanes and sixteen thousand vehicles on wheels were transported.

This matter of a more effective use of ships is receiving constant attention and space for filler cargo has been used to lift Navy supplies and Australian Lend-Lease materials on ships for the Southwest Pacific. Similarly, supplies for the civilian population have been combined with the military shipments to Alaska and Honolulu. I am convinced that it is essential that primary consideration be given to facility of discharge at destination even if this results in less efficient utilization of ship space. This is particularly true with regard to shipments destined for Noumea and other island bases where unloading facilities are primitive. Here, many hours or days delay may be occasioned if impediments and equipment is not so placed in the ship that it can be quickly discharged with inadequate gear and inexperienced native labor.

It appears that the cooperation between the supply agencies of this department and the Navy is more complete and effective than some reports indicate. I find that the Army and Navy supply agencies in the field have, on many instances, taken immediate steps to aid the other service in making good shortages. I feel that our supply officers
are by-passing red tape in order to provide critical items of supply to meet the many emergencies.

The supply of small bases in the Caribbean is a joint operation, as the Navy has for some months been handling perishables and other foodstuffs to the main bases, while the Army inter-island transports are distributing these supplies to Army and Navy establishments. There has been a satisfactory exchange of other types of cargo and although both the Army, the Navy and the WSA are operating ships to this area, there is very little duplication of effort or overlapping service. Recently some very definite steps have been taken to provide a more efficient joint use of shipping for the supply of Army and Navy activities. This has been the subject of direct negotiations with the Navy, as well as being studied jointly by the Combined and Joint Military Transportation Committees. This matter will continue to receive careful consideration by the officers of this Department.

Respectfully yours,

Therby H. Stimson

Secretary of War.

I think this letter covers the points in your memo. It was drawn for me by Ted Sorensen well to answer my questions based on your memo. I have had enough personal talk with him on this subject to feel confident that he is personally doing all that a very able man would do; also that things are now going very much better in the Pacific than during that sad time last autumn when Gourley allowed more than 80 thousands to accumulate in Noumea.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1943

SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR
GENERAL SOMERVELL

To read on his return and
let me have a memorandum.

F. D. R.

Secret memorandum for the President from
Rear Admiral E. S. Land, and L. W. Douglas,
War Shipping Administration, 2/10/43, in re
Persian Gulf supply route to Russia.
WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION
WASHINGTON
February 23, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

On Friday, February 19, the Army (through General Somervell) presented us with a request for 25 ships to be placed on berth between March 5th and 10th, to sail on the 19th in special convoy to carry military equipment to the French forces in North Africa. This was called an urgent demand.

In view of just having met a special additional demand for 20 prompt ships for an extraordinary convoy to North Africa (reported to you in Admiral Land’s memorandum of January 30), this demand presented serious difficulties. Without conflicting with the U.K. import program, we have been able to nominate 15 of the 25 ships demanded, to go on berth between the 5th and 10th of March. This seems satisfactory to the Army.

Whether we can make up the 10 additional ships without conflicting with other high priority services—i.e., Russia, U.K. import program, Southwest Pacific—during the second half of the month of March is a question that at the moment we cannot answer. But the possibility at present seems remote, particularly in view of the fact that the Army has also requested that we increase the size of the regular North African convoy (which will be loaded the last half of March) from 42 to 52 cargo ships.

Respectfully submitted,

E. S. Land
Administrator.

L. W. Douglas
Deputy Administrator.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY HOPKINS

FOR YOUR INFORMATION.

F.D.R.

Memo to the Pres. 4/7/43 from Lewis Douglas, War Shipping Admin. re ships to meet requirements for April.

[Declassification markings]
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 13, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY HOPKINS:

TO READ AND RETURN FOR
MY FILES.

F.D.R.

Memorandum to the President, 4-10-43, from Adm. E.S. Land and L.W. Douglas, War Shipping Admin. re decision to discontinue present further convoys to N. Russia and arrangements for discharge in United Kingdom of dry cargo ships and 3 tankers. Also re Persian Gulf-Russian Shipping for March and April.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 13, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY HOPKINS:

TO READ AND RETURN FOR
MY FILES.

F.D.R.

[Signature]
This can be filed
H.R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

The decision having been made to discontinue for the present further convoys to North Russia, we are now arranging discharge in the United Kingdom of the twenty-seven dry cargo ships and three tankers which were loaded in the United States to connect with JW-54, scheduled to sail from the United Kingdom about March 24, 1943. Final disposition of the cargo will be made by representatives of Lend-Lease, the British and the Soviet Government.

The uncertainty of continuous use of the Northern gateway emphasizes again the need for building up the Vladivostok route. With that thought in mind, authority has been given for the transfer of twenty more Liberties to the Russians. Two of these were delivered in March, i.e., the ELIJAH P. LOVEJOY and GRAHAM TAYLOR, at Portland, Oregon, March 27th and 28th respectively; and one so far in April, the HENRY CORBETT, at Portland, Oregon, April 6, 1943. Three more vessels, the ALEXANDER BARCHOFF, LOUIS AGASSIZ and CASS GILBERT, are scheduled for transfer this month and the remainder of the twenty in the following sequence: Six in May, six in June and two in July.

These twenty ships, together with the other thirty-seven which we have previously transferred, if efficiently operated in conjunction with their own fleet should enable the Russians to approximate a target of 200,000 long tons of cargo per month from the West Coast.
Last month twenty-four Russian ships carrying a total of 130,000 short tons cleared from the West Coast ports for Vladivostok. In addition, two more vessels with 7,000 short tons sailed from the East Coast of the United States via the Panama Canal for the same destination. This compares with a total of 141,120 short tons in February.

March sailings to the Persian Gulf show a substantial gain over February. A total of twenty-three ships including four of the Army sailed with cargo aggregating 177,059 tons against seven February sailings with cargo totaling 48,737 tons. (See Exhibit A attached).

During April we expect to sail twenty-one ships exclusive of the Army. (See Exhibit B attached).

We are being posted at frequent intervals by our Basra Representative on the progress made towards stepping up the rate of discharge and clearance in the Persian Gulf. These reports require some further reconciliation to determine the overall picture, but our analysis of the data available indicates a total of 127,000 tons of Russian aid and United States Army cargo was discharged in March. Any change from this figure will be reported in our next memorandum.

A recent report dated April 7, 1943, speaks of heavy rains and flood conditions during the last half of March which have washed out the Khorramshahr-Ahwaz rail and road lines and damaged other terminal property. This will slow up operations for at least two weeks and
adversely affect the April discharge results. All our studies justify the prediction that there will be ample ships and cargo in reserve should the port resume normalcy in June.

Respectfully submitted,

E. S. Land  
Administrator.  

L. W. Douglas  
Deputy Administrator.

cc: Major General J. H. Burns
### Persian Gulf - Russian - March 1943

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<th>Deadweight</th>
<th>Cubic</th>
<th>Loaded</th>
<th>Sailed</th>
<th>From</th>
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<td>500,215</td>
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<td>March 1</td>
<td>Philadelphia</td>
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<td><em>2. THOMAS SIM LEE</em></td>
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<td><em>6. KANSAN</em></td>
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<td>6,603</td>
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<td><em>7. MAHLON PITNEY</em></td>
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<td><em>8. WILLIE JONES</em></td>
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<td>10. ZOEILLA LYKES</td>
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<td>116,100</td>
<td>6,318</td>
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<td><em>11. HENRY KNOX</em></td>
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<td>8,109</td>
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<td>16. SAMUEL CHASE</td>
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<td>17. JOHN GALLUP</td>
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<td>18. MATTHEW P. DEADY</td>
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<td>19. ST. CLAIR</td>
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<td>8,619</td>
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**Grand Totals**

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<th>Loaded</th>
<th>Sailed</th>
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### Army

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<th>Cubic</th>
<th>Loaded</th>
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<th>From</th>
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**Grand Totals**

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*February Assignments*
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Total Deadweight: 215,817
Total Cubic: 10,665,593
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

For your information and
return for my confidential files.

F. D. R.

Enclosures
Secret Memo for the President 6/10/43
signed by Admiral Land, Adm. and
L. W. Douglas, Deputy Adm. War Shipping Adm. re Russia - encloses
Chart of Persian Gulf sailings for May
and for June - Exhibits A and B.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET
June 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. HARRY L. HOPKINS

For your information and return for my confidential files.

F. D. R.

Enclosures

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 11652, Sec. 11

By NARS Date

War Shipping folder
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

RE: RUSSIA.

The opening of the Mediterranean marks another milestone in the war shipping situation. The influence of this development will be world-wide but the effect in the Persian Gulf will be as great as any place else.

Three of our May sailings from the United States for the Persian Gulf were routed through the Mediterranean. If these same ships (Liberty type) had taken the old routing to the Persian Gulf they would have required 82 days transit time. In contrast, the time through the Mediterranean is estimated at 56 days. Present plans contemplate that all Persian Gulf ships will proceed through the Mediterranean; so if this program is followed the savings in ships and in turnarounds will be substantial. Take for example our shipping commitment to the Persian Gulf under the Third Protocol — if we assume the turnaround is reduced from seven months to five months, the total number of ships would be reduced from 126 to 90. If voyages of better than five months can be realized, the savings in ships will be proportionately greater.

The Persian Gulf sailings for May (see Exhibit A attached) and the sailings for June (see Exhibit B attached) have been deliberately held down because of the large backlog of freight still in the Gulf.
or enroute. The estimates of the Persian and Iraq Command have been overly optimistic for months and it was not until May that they tempered their figures and forecasts to conform with actual performance. As matters stand now the easing of shipments during May and notably June will allow time to work off this backlog in the ships and in the dumps around Khorramshahr.

To ease the load on the railroads we have been including in our cargoes for the Russians an increasing number of trucks. Since January 1st through May 31st, for example, we have shipped a total of 26,374. We intend to devote a large part of our June space to trucks also, so in due course the effect of this policy should be reflected in a reduced backlog.

The May results on the Pacific route were highly satisfactory and at the best level since this gateway was utilized. A total of 194,591 long tons was cleared, divided as follows:

- Seattle - 51,082
- Portland - 103,794
- San Francisco - 30,274
- Los Angeles - 9,441

Portland is the pivotal port on the Pacific Coast for this Russian aid to the Far East, so we are doing everything possible to make it an efficient operation. There have been times, and these will recur, where a shortage of labor exists but this is not common.
alone to Portland for the whole Pacific Area is suffering from
the same cause. Progress, however, has been made in recruiting
additional gangs and this effort will be continued.

The news that the Japanese were holding two Russian-Aid ships
was disquieting and put a damper on the whole Pacific operation.
Later information indicated that one of the ships had been released,
but this has not been confirmed either by the Army or the Navy,
our report having come through the Russians. The latter are very
concerned about this development and for a time have held up sail-
ings from Russian ports. This tied up considerable tonnage but
the ships at this writing seem to be moving again.

The North Russia gateway is still inactive. The seven United
States ships which are still in the Archangel area have been im-
imobilized since they arrived on March 1st. They are, however,
loading ore and lumber and the latest cable states they probably
will not get away before July or possibly August, escort permitting.

June will see the completion of our transfer of the second
group of twenty Liberties. Prior to June 1st we had delivered four-
teen and since the first we have turned over an additional three,
and before the month is out the remaining three will be transferred.
In addition to these twenty dry cargo ships, we have given the
Russians four more tankers and are now negotiating for a fifth. With
the completion of the tanker deliveries the grand total of ships
lend-leased to the Russians will equal sixty-two.

Respectfully submitted,

E. S. Land
L. W. Douglas
Administrator
Deputy Administrator
### PERSIAN GULF - RUSSIAN - MAY 1943

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### ARMY

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**Note:**

- E.O. 11162, Sec. 3(a) and 3(b) of (b)
- Commerce Dept. Letter, 11/26/42
- By Rear, Date

**SECRET**

**Dehisced**

MAR 40 1973
(Exhibit E)

PERSIAN GULF - RUSSIAN - JUNE 1943

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<td>4</td>
<td>SAMUEL J. TILDEN</td>
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<td>WILLIAM H. JACKSON</td>
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73,500 3,501,715
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 29, 1943

FILE MEMO:

The President directed me to telephone Mr. Douglas giving an O.K. on the release of the attached letter to Senator Bailey and Congressman Bland, with the last paragraph omitted.

G.G.T.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 26, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Lew Douglas telephoned and I told him that you were sending a cablegram to Averill Harriman approving of the P.M. using whatever phrases and sentences he wished from your letter to him. Mr. Douglas is of the opinion that it is fairly important to release this letter to Bailey and Bland because the press has already printed some stories but in a garbled fashion. Douglas thinks it would be helpful to give them the right information and so again asks if he might release this letter, leaving out the last paragraph. In other words he would not attach a copy of your letter to the P.M.

G.
Mr. Harry L. Hopkins,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Harry:

Attached is a proposed draft of a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee, Senator Bailey, and to the Chairman of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, Congressman Bland, covering the matter that we discussed yesterday.

You will note that it says there is attached hereto a letter from the President to the Prime Minister. I have doubts myself about the advisability of doing this, but Averell cables that the Prime Minister is very anxious to use at least certain phrases and sentences from the President's letter on the floor of the House of Commons.

I expect to be away tomorrow, Friday, and will be back on Saturday morning. Can you let me know then what we ought to do about the letter. It is urgent, I believe, that such a letter be written and released to the press.

Sincerely yours,

L. W. Douglas,
Deputy Administrator.
The size of the American fleet has increased by 250% since Pearl Harbor. It will continue to grow at a rapid rate during the next twelve months. So far, we have been able to man this fleet, but it is clear that we can expect an increased strain on our training facilities during the coming months.

The nature of the problem can best be presented by saying that in 1940 there were approximately 65,000 seamen and licensed personnel required to operate the coastal, intercoastal and overseas American flag merchant fleet. At the end of June 1943, approximately 85,000 were required. We calculate that this number will increase at the rate of about 7,500 each month over the next twelve months, to a total at June 30, 1944, of about 175,000. To meet this demand will stretch the resources of our farflung training program, especially in respect of licensed personnel.

While our fleet has been growing and is expected to grow further, the fleets of some of our maritime allies have been shrinking; indeed, they have dwindled in size by many millions of tons. As a result, each of these nations has a pool of unemployed, experienced seamen and licensed personnel. Because the British losses have far exceeded the losses of our other allies, they have the largest pool. It numbers about 10,000.

It is evident that manpower will be conserved and that we will be provided with a sorely needed insurance against excessive burdens upon our ability to provide an adequate supply of trained men through the employment of these pools of skilled seamen.
Great Britain, by the fall of 1941, had laid out a greatly expanded shipbuilding program. After Pearl Harbor, one of the general arrangements made by the President with the Prime Minister was that we, the United States, would be the merchant shipbuilder for our cause, while the British yards would be devoted largely to the construction of naval vessels. In accordance with this scheme, the British merchant ship program was very substantially reduced. A number of persuasive and compelling considerations dictated this arrangement: first, we had the raw materials; second, we had the manpower; third, we had developed a technique which enabled us to produce in mass and with unbelievable speed a vast tonnage of merchant ships; fourth, the cargo was here in the United States to be moved to the various theatres of war.

Any other arrangement would have meant a costly wastage of ship time, for it would have been necessary to move the raw materials across the Atlantic, there to fabricate them into steel structures and other essentials. There finally, after a great lapse of time because of a slower technique, the finished ships would be dispatched westward in ballast to our shores to pick up the cargo that was waiting for them.

For all these reasons—first, to conserve manpower and to provide us with an insurance against overtaxing our capacity to man our expanding fleet, second to carry out in good faith an advantageous wartime arrangement that had been made during the early weeks of our participation—the President has instructed us to bareboat, for the period of the war only, tonnage to the Norwegians, to the British, and to others of the United Nations. Title in each case will remain in the United States Government.

We have to the Norwegians already barebooted 80,000 deadweight tons, and may bareboot more. These ships will be under the Norwegian flag and will be manned by Norwegian crews. Title will remain in the United States Government. Their employment will be subject to our control. Thus no carrying capacity has been sacrificed; indeed, actual carrying capacity may have been increased as a result.

We are contemplating barebooting to the Dutch Government three vessels on similar terms. Title will remain in the United States Government.

To the British, arrangements have been made to bareboat for the duration of the war only from 15 to 20 ships a month for the next ten months. Five ships have already been barebooted to the British. All these vessels will be manned by the British and will fly the British flag. Title will remain in the United States. Their employment will be subject to the control of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. The great bulk of these ships on their initial voyage will be employed in long turnarounds in lieu
our ships that have been employed in these services. To this extent it will be unnecessary for us in the future to employ American flag vessels in voyages to these distant parts of the world. No carrying capacity will be lost by this arrangement.

To the Greek Government in due course two ships will be handed over, The provisions of the arrangement will be similar to those made with other governments. Title will remain in the United States Government. Attached hereto is a copy of the President's Letter of May 22, 1943, to the Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Very truly yours,

E.S. Land
Administrator.

Attached hereto is a copy of the President's Letter of May 22, 1943, to the Prime Minister of Great Britain.
July 26, 1943.

HON. AVERELL HARRIMAN

LONDON

Please tell the Former Naval Person it is wholly agreeable for him to use whatever phrases and sentences he wishes from my letter to him. I think this is better than putting the whole letter into the record.

ROOSEVELT
October 19, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE HARRY L. HOPKINS:

By the President's direction, I am sending you herewith a copy of his letter of October eighteenth to Admiral Land, and calling attention to the fact that he made certain changes in the original draft—among others, the "month of May" being changed to the "month of January".

M. H. McINTYRE
Secretary to the President

Transmitting copy of letter which the President addressed to the Rear Admiral E. S. Land, War Shipping Administrator, under date of 10/19/43, in re proposal to build 21 million tons of merchant shipping in 1944.
October 19, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL LEARY:

By the President's direction, I am sending you herewith a copy of his letter of October eighteenth to Admiral Land, and calling attention to the fact that he made certain changes in the original draft—among others, the "month of May" being changed to the "month of January".

M. H. McINTYRE
Secretary to the President

Transmitting copy of letter which the President addressed to the Rear Admiral E. S. Land, War Shipping Administrator, under date of 10/18/43, in re proposal to build 21 million tons of merchant shipping in 1944.
Copy of this letter to Admiral Realty

Harry Hopkins calling attention to the fact that the President changed the dates - 30-60
October 18, 1943.

Dear Admiral Land:

I have before me your proposal to build 21 million tons of merchant shipping in 1944. There is also a copy of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicating that they would like further time to examine the necessity for this amount of tonnage.

I believe it is important to continue the merchant ship building program at the present rate for some months, say through the month of January, and, indeed, I think for budgetary purposes we should assume that we will require 21 million tons.

On the other hand, the fluidity of the military situation would seem now to make it unwise to go ahead with the plans over the entire year and, therefore, I should like to review with you the tonnage which should be turned out in 1944. Should we then, in January, decide to decrease the tonnage, there would be ample time to make the cuts during the last several months of the year. This would apply also to types of ships.

In the meantime we will have the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the same time there will be no slowing up of the program during the immediate months ahead.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]

Rear Admiral E. S. Land,
War Shipping Administrator,
Room 4842, Commerce Building,
Washington, D. C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 15th, 1943

Rear Admiral E.C. Land, Administrator,
War Shipping Administration,
21242 Commerce Bldg.,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Admiral Land:

I have before me your proposal to build 21 million tons of merchant shipping in 1944. There is also a copy of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicating that they would like further time to examine the necessity for this amount of tonnage.

I believe it is important to continue the merchant ship building program at the present rate for some months, say through the month of January, and, indeed, I think for budgetary purposes we should assume that we will require 21 million tons.

On the other hand, the fluidity of the military situation would seem now to make it unwise to go ahead with the plans over the entire year and, therefore, I should like to review with you the tonnage which should be turned out in 1944 not later than the first of February. Should we then decide to decrease the tonnage, there would be ample time to make the cuts during the last seven months of the year.

In the meantime we will have the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the same time there will be no slowing up of the program during the immediate months ahead.

Very sincerely yours,

[Signature]
September 25, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR HONORABLE HARRY L. HOPKINS,
THE WHITE HOUSE:

I tried unsuccessfully to contact you for an appointment as I wanted to discuss our 1944 program in general and our steel situation in particular.

The 1944 program and action required are as indicated in the enclosures, which I trust you will be good enough to present to the President and have him O.K. the proposed memorandum to the Maritime Commission.

So far as the steel situation is concerned, I can't help but feel that we are being given a certain amount of run-around instigated primarily from the Navy and the Army. They are always demanding more and more ships and at the same time short-circuiting us on steel, thereby defeating their own objectives.

Examples of our difficulties are outlined in my letter to Mr. Wilson of September 24, 1943, copy enclosed, and my letter to Admiral Leahy of September 25, 1943, copy enclosed.

Enclosures

I haven't had any rest for nearly 3 yrs, off for a week's rest whether I need it or not! I declare I need it!!

Sincerely,

E. S. Land
September 25, 1943

Admiral William D. Leahy, U. S. Navy
Chief of Staff to the
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Washington, D. C.

Dear Admiral Leahy:

We have been advised through the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman of the War Production Board of the decision made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the apportionment of carbon steel plate for the Maritime Commission, Army, and Navy. This communication limits the amount of steel plate available to the Maritime Commission to "approximately sixty per cent" of the total steel plate scheduled for any one month for the Army, Navy, and Maritime Commission.

Since the original letter stated that the supply is insufficient for the fourth quarter of 1943, we assume the above division applies only to the three months of the fourth quarter.

I would like to point out that limiting in this way the amount of steel plate available to the Maritime Commission constitutes a distinct restriction on shipbuilding. The attached table, showing the proportion of plate relatively scheduled for the Maritime Commission, the Army, and the Navy for six months from April through September of 1943, indicates that the sixty per cent figure is a reduction in the Maritime Commission plate as compared to recent months. We are now experiencing a slowing up of our program due to lack of plate in recent months which will be even more accentuated under the proposed apportionment. The Maritime has had as high as sixty-eight per cent of the so-called "military" tonnage (Army, Navy, and Maritime) in some months and an average of sixty-four per cent over the months mentioned. It is our feeling that the apparently arbitrarily chosen figure of sixty per cent did not take into consideration the full effect on the Maritime program.

We also wish to point out that the communication stated the percentage is approximately sixty per cent. For October the Maritime proportion in schedule was slightly over sixty-one per cent and the impression of the Steel Division, War Production Board, was that the Maritime Commission would give up 3,500 tons of their
plate allocations to the Army so as to bring the Maritime proportion to exactly sixty per cent and to raise the Army's proportion to nineteen per cent. The loss of 8,500 tons meant taken out of the 33,000 tons of steel from the Maritime schedule. In view of the fact that the Maritime Commission said approximately sixty per cent and that the data on which the sixty per cent was based could not be any closer to one or two per cent, it was the opinion of the Maritime Commission that the proportion of sixty-one per cent was within the purport of the communication, however the Maritime Commission offered the Army tonnage to the extent of 8,500 tons on certain mills. Many practical difficulties arose due to the lateness of the data, and the Army no doubt did not receive the full advantage of this tonnage.

In the months of November and December we feel that a change in this proportion should be made and the proportion at least set up on more accurate data than has been used for the decision that now stands. We realize the necessity of balancing the military program, but feel that if approximately 51 per cent are used based on approximate data, that the interpretation should be no more accurate than data on which they were based.

Would it be possible to review this decision in view of the above-mentioned limitation on the Maritime Commission program?

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) E. S. Land
E. S. Land
Chairman
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>April</th>
<th>May</th>
<th>June</th>
<th>July</th>
<th>August</th>
<th>September</th>
<th>October</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>18.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>20.95</td>
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<td>56.4</td>
<td>61.3</td>
<td>61.0</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>68.2</td>
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<td></td>
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September 24, 1943

Mr. C. N. Wilson
Executive Vice Chairman
War Production Board
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Wilson:

Some time ago I wrote to you on the question of steel plates for the shipbuilding program and the difficulty which arises due to the heavy carryover at the end of each month. On August 25 you assured us that there was a probability that this carryover would decrease in succeeding months and that it would be liquidated at the end of September.

We feel that there is some misunderstanding of the term carryover and the possibility of liquidating it. Carryover is defined as the amount of scheduled production in accepted orders which is not produced during the month scheduled. Although this is produced in a succeeding month, it necessitates a decrease in new orders on the mills in the succeeding month, and, therefore, is irrevocably lost. This carryover in the last six months has increased to the point where it is seriously slowing down the Maritime Commission's shipbuilding program. We are listing below the carryover for the last six months so that you may see the effect on delivery of plates to the Maritime Commission:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Carryover</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rep</td>
<td>28,464</td>
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<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>30,824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>32,765</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>65,037</td>
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<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>97,461</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>77,762</td>
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</table>

The total of this carryover is 377,000 tons. This plate was required to produce the Maritime Commission program on time and is not available. It can only result in a slowing down of ship deliveries below the scheduled rate.

In summary, of course, lay blame on the steel industry, and we know the problems with which they have been faced; however, I would like to point out that this serious deficiency of plates below the scheduled amount, which again is below our estimated required amount, is resulting in a decrease in keel layoffs and in ship deliveries in the very near future.
We are hopeful that the increased production scheduled to take place about the first of the year will relieve this situation; however, the last quarter will be a very difficult one, and we are hopeful that some relief can be obtained earlier than the advent of the new production.

Sincerely yours,

(Sgd.) E. S. LANO

E. S. Land
Chairman

* Estimated
September 24, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In 1942 and 1943 you set definite tonnage goals for the Maritime Commission to produce merchant ships. This action on your part has been the prime mover which has enabled us to meet the 1942 goal and put us in a proper position to meet the 1943 goal.

In one of your recent radio broadcasts, you set the Maritime Commission's shipbuilding program for 1944 at 21,000,000 deadweight tons. It is my belief that this should not be changed without your approval.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff in their letter to Mr. C. E. Wilson, Executive Vice Chairman, War Production Board, dated August 9, 1943, concluded, as follows:

"Contingent to the understanding that slight changes may be requested, particularly in the field of smaller ships, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorse the No. 20 Maritime Commission program."

This program calls for 21,178,000 deadweight tons, excluding minor types and military types. If these latter types are included, the total is 22,391,000 deadweight tons.

There is enclosed herewith a proposed memorandum for your approval.

E. S. Land
Chairman

Encl.

cc--Hon. Harry L. Hopkins
MEMORANDUM FOR THE MARITIME COMMISSION:

The 1944 construction program of the Maritime Commission is construction of 21,000,000 deadweight tons of shipping and our sights should be set at this goal.

It is fully realized by me that changes in detail will probably be necessary to satisfy strategic military requirements. However, major changes in this program should not be made without my approval.
June 3, 1944

Dear Jerry:

I have just been looking at the figures of ship berthing for the months of April and May.

You and the boys associated with you appear to have done a remarkable job. I have been particularly impressed by the savings you accomplished in loading time and repair work. If we can keep up the excellent record of the last few months, we certainly will have very little to worry about as far as shipping is concerned.

Sincerely,

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

Dear Admiral Maury S. Land
War Shipping Administration
Washington, D.C.
COMPARISON OF ATLANTIC AND GULF MAY BERTHERS WITH MARCH, APRIL, AND MAY ESTIMATES

Number for May Estimated on: Number Berthed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1944</th>
<th>May 6</th>
<th>Apr 14</th>
<th>Apr 25</th>
<th>May 1</th>
<th>May 9</th>
<th>May 16</th>
<th>May 30</th>
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<tr>
<td>Requirement</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>453</td>
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<tr>
<td>Available</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>453</td>
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By RHP Date 28-1973

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WAR SHIP ADMINISTRATION
DIVISION OF STATISTICS AND RESEARCH
USA-GR 179 MAY 11 1944
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: MR. LUBIN

SUBJECT: CURRENT SHIPPING SITUATION

The War Shipping Administration has done a most remarkable job in taking care of shipping requirements during the last two months.

When plans were being made early in March for meeting requirements in the month of May, it appeared that there would be a serious shortage of ships in Atlantic and Gulf ports in May. Estimates made on March 6 showed requirements for the month of May to be 389 sailings. It then looked as if only 277 ships would be available in berth in May, a deficit of 112 ships.

Jerry Land and his assistant, Captain Conway, did a wonderful piece of work in taking care of the situation. They brought ships in from all parts of the world. They cut down on time lost in repair yards. They decreased the number of days in port for loading and discharging cargo. As compared with conditions that had existed earlier in the year they decreased the average time per ship in port by 4½ days. The total savings amounted to more than 2,400 vessel days in April alone. This was the equivalent of more than 33 round trip voyages to Great Britain.

In the meantime, the requirements for berthings in May rose from the March estimate of 389 to 491. As a result of the increased efficiencies, the War Shipping Administration not only eliminated all shortages but actually berthed 491 ships in the Atlantic and Gulf ports during the month of May. In other words, they met all the requirements for military and lend-lease needs. (See attached chart.)

An anticipated large deficit on the Pacific Coast in May was also averted and the requirements for berthings on that coast were met.

At the present moment it looks as if all ships that will be required in June will also be available on the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. There may be a slight shortage of about 10 berthings on the Pacific coast in June.

If you think this is a proper time to give Jerry Land a pat on the back for his excellent accomplishments, the attached letter might be sent to him.