

● P.S. Subject File

Carter, John F. Nov. - Dec. 1941

Box 122

*file
personal*

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

J.F.C.

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

November 4, 1941.

MEMORANDUM CONCERNING TRIALS OF "SEA OTTER NO. 2"

"Sea Otter No. 2" is now at Charleston, S.C., having completed her trial cruise from Texas. Attached is a personal letter from Commander Bryan. The salient passages are :

- 1) Vessel demonstrated seaworthiness, power, reliability, speed, livability and simplicity--deck dry in a 23 degree roll.
- 2) Much bad workmanship, including life-boat equipment, dangerous steering and anchoring gear.
- 3) Excessive cost, due to lack of adequate labor supervision--men laid off in middle of week to work Saturday and Sunday for overtime pay--inadequate and changeable engineering control. Total cost about \$450,000 of which \$200,000 is not necessary.
- 4) Ships, Inc. has made no effort to get any of the experience acquired in constructing this unit.
- 5) "Sea Otter No. 2" was required to go to sea one hour after the builder had left her.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

U I Y

SEA OTTER NO. 2

in

U.S. Naval Service

At Sea, Sat. Nov. 1, 1941

Dear John:

We are now off Charleston after a most successful cruise from Texas.

The ship behaved beautifully in quite a seaway and her power plant demonstrated all we could hope for. There was a lot of very poor workmanship, we were left in a filthy mess by the builder whose men got off an hour before we left, and a lot of things are not right but -

She has demonstrated seaworthiness, power reliability, speed, livability and simplicity -- all we wanted to prove.

Yesterday we bucked into quite a sea rolling up to 23° and pitching very easily with an absolutely dry deck.

I wish you could spare the time to come to Charlestown and see her. She may come to Washington, however, I hear the President is going to order her up there as soon as her trials are over.

Our friend Powell has apparently tried to lure Burgess to join Ships, Inc. -- at least so Mr. Eads Johnson said -- Johnson is the man Powell picked to supervise the construction of this ship.

He supervised her so poorly that she cost over \$450,000. He was rarely on hand, knew nothing of what was going on, would frequently order radical changes and then order the radical change changed back.

The labor groups worked his absence to a fare you well -- about 60-70 would work by day and leave the night shift of about 50 to finish up jobs.

Night shifts never worked at all perhaps 20%. Then when Saturday p.m. and Sunday came, over 80 would be put on -- double time.

The list is full of names of men who earned in one day \$43.50, \$37.25, \$41.00. They let men work up to 17 straight hours -- all out for overtime. I am sure that an investigation would prove that not less than \$200,000 was wasted through bad administration and lack of proper supervision.

How is the job -- your job? I sent Bill Donovan a map all marked. Don't know if it was what he wanted but I carried out your suggestions.

It seems ages since I left Washington. Been up to my neck in this ship -- While I was not supposed to do else than walk aboard and sail her away, I actually had to ^{burn}~~burn~~ the ear of Builders and Foreman to prevent so many many ill considered schemes of Mr. Eads Johnson from taking fruit -- all planned to get his trade mark on. *I slipped on many, however, and we have the most cork eyed life boats equipment and very dangerous steering & an clanking gear. The ship is fundamentally right however and I am devoutly glad.*

All this dope on criticisms - cost, etc., I would like to talk over with you. As I think the cost run up could be used against the idea, I want to lay low for the time being until we see their cards.

The Norwegians are organizing a group -- seriously considering ordering this type of ship so that with Norwegian crews they can operate the Atlantic to England and reduce the British demands for their tonnage now very lucrative in South America.

I told Mr. Robert Smith, Shipbuilder of whom I spoke to you, to ask you to be his Washington representative.

I think that Smith will be in a position to build ships. He got all his start in this project through me -- his rapid construction program is the result of ideas I gave him and he will play ball.

Eventually only a civilian enterprise can put over this new type of ship commercially.

It amazes me that Ships, Inc. appear to be going ahead to reproduce this ship like a Chinaman copies a suit of clothes -- patches and all. No one from

Ships, Inc. has tried to get any dope on what we found during the construction nor do I believe they will do more than rely on their own brains.

Give my love to Sheila.

Yours,

HAM

P. S. If you see the President, it would not be amiss to tell him the Sea Otter is at Charleston. These birds may have got wind of his statement that he is going to order her up -- that would not suit them, I think.

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

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JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*PS F
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Metropolitan 4112
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November 5, 1941.

MEMORANDUM ON BRITISH TECHNIQUE IN PRESERVING CURRENT BUSINESS RECORDS AND DOING BUSINESS DURING BLITZ.

The attached report indicates that British banks and business houses have worked out a satisfactory technique for preserving their current business records and continuing to do business, despite air-raids. The four following methods have so far proved effective for this purpose:

- 1) Duplication of all records, by photostat and motion pictures;
- 2) Reinforcement of all bank vaults with steel, concrete, sand-bags, etc.;
- 3) Establishment of depositaries at two places in the country near London, in charge of skeleton bank crews;
- 4) Training of bank personnel in London to carry all documents, securities, moneys, etc. to bomb-shelters during air-raids.

It is thought that this information may be of interest to the Civilian Defense organization.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

Records
Walker

November 4, 1941.

This is a report covering the general steps taken by banks and business houses doing a large volume of daily business in meeting the problems of constant blitz bombings and carrying on their work without serious interruption. It was provided by Daniel Grant, vice president of the Guaranty Trust Company of New York who was European Manager of all of the company's branch banking houses.

Outstanding points in the interview were;

1. The duplication of all records. By photostat and motion picture.
2. Reinforcement of all vaults with heavy steel and concrete and the addition of many layers of sand bags on the tops of the vaults as an added buffer against bomb explosions.
3. Establishment of depositaries at two places in the English countryside near London where skeleton bank crews conversant with the different operations of banking and safe custody departments *were in charge.*
4. Training of personnel in the London bank to be responsible for all of the documents, securities, monies etc., on his or her desk, which were gathered up and carried to the personnel bomb shelter in the vaults during airraids.

In the duplication of records, all checks were photographed as received and several times during each day current balances, ledger entries and the like were photostated and sent by messenger to the duplicate offices in the country. At night all balances and checks on hand, as well as the serial numbers of all currency on hand were likewise photographed with the originals being locked in the vaults and the duplicates being sent to the country.

This tremendous volume of extra work was done in overtime by bank employees and officers alike and a dummy banking business was done in the country branches with the duplicates. In this connection it was found necessary to send between 15 and 20 per cent of the London personnel to the country branches.

Messengers were employed constantly in carrying the duplicate records out of the city for the London bank--after the heavy bombings started never was able to secure more than three telephone truck lines. These were stretched over roof-tops much in the fashion of Army field lines and were constantly under repair.

Records 2.
Walker

Foresight and discipline in the case of this bank and its workers allowed for the meeting of all demands for check and draft payments and the settlement of all balances at the opening of banking hours less than seven and a half hours after the Lombard Street banking quarters had been completely bombed out the night before.

Four banking rooms were secured across Lombard Street in Barclay's Bank, Ltd., and the Guaranty Trust Company London Office carried on a normal day's business a few hours after their own offices had been wrecked.

Mr. Grant expressed the opinion that steel construction as utilized **expensively** in the business and banking buildings of the United States will withstand even the heaviest bombings from directly overhead but that street level hits and the subsequent explosive power may have to be guarded against.

He explained that it was found feasible to separate the duplicate records into two general groups i.e., Trust and bookkeeping and banking.

He added that as far as he could ascertain the extensive Nazi bombings had left all of London's bridges intact and not a single public utility had been damaged by direct hits although sewers, water mains, gas and electric conduits and telegraph and telephone lines had been disrupted by the indiscriminate bombings.

Due to the early precautions of reinforcement of the vaults and ample layers of sandbags above them the main vaults of the bank were uninjured and opened at the allotted time the morning after the direct and indirect hits had wrecked the banking building.

He was inclined to deprecate the duplications and the training of employees as merely a matter of common sense and American ~~practicality~~ practicality but he was exceedingly proud of his ability to carry on a full banking business the following morning and without any delay.

The plans for duplication were completed right after the ~~Munich~~ Munich Conference and the training of personnel came in the succeeding six or seven months, although the final training during daylight raids came only when the Nazi planes really began to drop their eggs in large volume.

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Jay Carter Folder
5-41

MEMORANDUM ON THE NEAR EAST

November 10, 1941

MEMORANDUM ON NEAR EAST

INTRODUCTION

Our informant is Dr. M. Don Clawson, Chief Dental Officer of the Iraq Petroleum Co. with Headquarters in Haifa.

Dr. Clawson has had eleven years experience travelling in his mobile dental clinic in Syria, Iraq and Palestine and Trans-Jordan. The following information was obtained from Dr. and Mrs. Clawson with the assistance of Miss Anne Fuller.

Henry Field

I

SYRIA

General Political Sentiments.-The majority of Christians within Syria are pro-British. But the Moslems are about 85% anti-British. This does not mean, however, that this majority is definitely pro-Axis. Rather have they lost faith in British promises and British policies.

During the past two years there has been a strong undercurrent of feeling that the European forces will fight to a finish in the Near East and at that time the Moslem Arabs will rise and slay the remnants. They will then begin the formation of a Great Pan-Arab Empire which will be planned and directed by Arabs and financed with money from the large oil reservoirs.

Pan-Arab sentiment is understood to be fostered by Hitler. Certainly exterior forces are helping diffuse and kindle the sentiment. If Hitler were victorious in the Near East he no doubt would form some sort of Arab Federation, and thus gain favour with the Moslems by fulfilling their political aims.

Nazi Agents.-Nazi agents in Syria are comprised of both Persians and Germans. The former had been educated in Germany, and enter the country on their own nation's passports and largely as rug dealers.

Many of the Germans used as agents had been in the country for some years. In Beirut the Hotel Métropole was the rendez-vous of the Nazis and their colleagues. Unger who had connections with the hotel was an influential agent.

Our informant had a German assistant named Schmidt who came to Syria in 1934. It has been said he was seen in a German uniform in Mosul during the Iraq coup. This is one of the many examples of Germans within the country who have become connected with Nazi activity.

Syrian Cabinet.-The present Syrian Cabinet established under the Allied aegis is definitely weak. There is not an outstanding man and real leader within it.

Taj Eddin Al-Hasani, the President, has never been popular. He has played with French, and is distrusted by the Nationalists.

Faiz bey Khouri, Minister of Foreign Affairs is not particularly strong. But he has always managed to keep his hand in politics.

Hassan bey Hakim, Prime Minister and Minister of Finance is clever. He, too, has kept his hand in politics which signifies that he has a following.

Faiz bey Atassi, Minister of Education, comes from a fine family with ramifications in Homs. He is respected by Moslems and Christians alike.

Druze.-The Druze are split into factions. The Arslan family, notoriously pro-Nazi, have a fairly large following among the Druze of the Lebanon mountains. Many of the wealthier Druze are followers of the Arslans.

The Atrash family, on the other hand, are pro-British; and as is signified by Abdul Ghaffar Pasha Atrash being made Minister of Defense. The Druze of Djebel Druze are among their followers.

The Izzedin family is largely pro-British. It is to be remembered that the Izzedins have family members holding governmental posts Saudi Arabia and Yemen.

The Almadin family are pro-British. Nejib Almadin is now secretary to the Trans-Jordanian government and is in Amman.

Christians.-The Christians as a whole are pro-British; or rather anti-Moslem. Arida, the Maronite Patriarch has been pro-French, and very pro-Italian. After the fall of France, for instance, and no doubt in connection with his sympathies, the Maronites in the Valley of Kadeisha demonstrated for an Italian Mandate. But Arida now knows it is best to keep in with the British. He is to be counted a strong man.

The Archbishop Barsum of the Syriac church situated in Homs is pro-British. His influence extends eastward to the Christians of Iraq. His brother is Director of Health in Iraq.

Various Pro-British Sympathizers.-Atta bey al Ayoubi, former Prime Minister of Syria, is sincerely pro-British. Djemil Bey Mardin, former Syrian Premier, is a very strong man and has a large following. It is thought that he is pro-British.

Various Pro-Axis Sympathizers.-Amin Ruweikhi who participated in the Palestine uprisings of 1936 is definitely a pro-Nazi. He has been in close connection with Fauvsi Kaukji.

Raschid Imman has close connections with Germany, and has been in affiliation with German agents.

Our informant knows Fauvsi Kaukji personally. He is primarily a revolutionist and a soldier of fortune. He is Kurdish and was born near Tripoli. He received his first military training in a Turkish Academy. Later he became a favorite with the French and has had French military training. He turned against the French in 1925, and the time of the Druze Rebellion, and instigated a revolt in Homs. He then fled to Iraq. Here he became instructor of cavalry. He is a famed and expert horseman. Later he became interested in the Grand Mufti and espoused his cause. Fauvsi is anti-anything. He gave our informant a picture of himself taken outside the Government Buildings of Haifa at the time a price was set on his head. He takes pleasure in outwitting any established order.

Armenians.-Mainly pro-Allied because they are pro-Russian, not because they are pro-British. There is an underlying current of fear that "all Christians in the Near East will be destroyed."

Anti-Semitism.-Our informant suggests that the word anti-Semitism should never be used again because the Arabs resent this strongly since they form part of the Semitic-speaking group.

Prediction.-Our informant believes that within the next six months the Allied troops in the Near East will have to defend the Northern Sectors from German invasion. For these reasons every effort must be made to rush materiel and supplies to this part of the world.

TROOPS

The following are believed to have been in the Near East including Egypt during June, 1941.

- 1. 200,000 Australian shock troops
- 2. 200,000 South Africans who can be used for defense
- 3. 200,000 Indians who can be used as scouts
- 4. 400,000 British and miscellaneous units.

ROADS

French kept roads in good repair throughout country.

1. New Damas-Alep completed. Partly asphalt. This road is in excellent condition and it takes about 4½ hours from Damas to Alep.

2. Alep to Deir ez-Zor long under construction is almost completed. A short distance remains unfinished.

SUPPLIES

They are very short of material. The most desired are planes, armored cars, tanks and particularly Geepes which would have great fighting power throughout the desert region. They are also short of medical supplies and dental supplies.

Medical.-Plenty available throughout country in May, 1941.

Kerosene.-Kerosene was rationed at one litre per month per family of four.

Gasolene.-Only four gallons of gasolene per month were allowed for each private automobile.

FOOD

If none of the Syrian agricultural products were exported to Palestine an army of 10,000 men could be supported and fed by the country. There is sufficient grain, milk products, vegetables and fruits. There are plenty of milling establishments for making flour. Good cheses are also now being made in the country. There is plenty of mutton and goat. Beef would have to be imported. Sugar, coffee, tea and fats would also have to be imported. Some sugar is being made from cane growing on the coast. But sugar was one of the commodities that was rationed previous to the Allied invasion. No doubt the Syrian fisheries could be improved; but not without a subsidy. The Syrian harvest was fairly good this year.

General Prices.-Increased only slightly during latter part of 1940 and first part of 1941. Main exception was sudden rise of bread during strikes.

Sugar.-A family of four was allowed one kilo. of sugar per month. This was imported from India.

Rice.-For a short period of time rice was also rationed. Two kilos per family of four per month.

Flour.-A shortage of supply from March to May 1941 because the bakers went on strike to keep French from shipping wheat out of the country although plenty was available locally.

Tea and Coffee.-Supply is limited but not rationed. Reported that Arabs bought relatively large supplies for storage.

Butter.-Plenty in local supply which comes from Deir-ez-Zor, Alep, Damas, and Beirut. The usual supply from New Zealand and Australia is discontinued.

Milk.-Abundance of supply. There is no sign of shortage. The only pasteurization plant in Syria is owned by Najib Dumit and is located in Beirut.

Cheese.-Abundant local supply.

Meat.-Rationed to some extent. Purchases of beef and mutton are not allowed on Monday and Tuesday. Only Wednesday only mutton can be purchased. During the remainder of the week there is no rationing of any kind.

Canned Food.-Plenty available. Canning factories in Damas and Beirut, working full time since local fruit crops were heavy and there is no possibility of export.

CONDITIONS IN IRAQ

Political Sentiments.--Anti-British feeling runs higher in Iraq than in Syria. About 95% of the Moslems are anti-British. One of the leading causes for anti-British sentiment throughout the entire Near East is the Zionist question. The whole problem of the Jewish National Home demands some satisfactory answer.

Pan-Arab sentiment exists in Iraq as well as in Syria. However, as yet this sentiment has taken no definite form. There is no well-established consensus of opinion as to which of the Arab countries shall be part of an Arab Federation or of how political responsibilities are to be delegated.

Since Sir Kinahan Cornwallis has come to Baghdad, Iraq is in able and strong British hands. Stuckey, of the Iraq Petroleum Company, has as much influence as any one in the area. The British have practically given him a free hand.

Food Situation.--Iraq cannot support armed forces without bringing in practically all supplies. Wheat, mutton, and wool are the only sufficient products. There are not sufficient facilities for milling flour as in Syria.

CONDITIONS IN PALESTINE

Political Sentiment.-The majority of the Arabic-speaking population are anti-British. This includes many Christians as well as Moslems. The Zionist question is the chief cause of anti-British sentiment.

Food Situation.-The citrus crop is being utilized in every way. Alcohol and sugar are being distilled from oranges. The orange crop would provide sufficient Vitamin C for armed forces. Vegetable farming could be improved. Contrary to propaganda reports home produced food has been plentiful in Syria but not in Palestine due to larger urban population of Palestine.

Industries.-The factories are capable of a fairly good output in steel, iron, leather and woolen goods. However, their ability to operate, especially with metals, depends on imports of raw material.

There are a limited number of factories making surgical instruments. This industry is also dependent on the importation of raw materials. Pharmaceutical and dental factories are in existence. In general, there are sufficient medical supplies. There has been some hoarding of supplies by both Arab and Jewish dealers in order to make profits.

PST Jay Carter Folder
5-41

November 11, 1941.

Dear Jack:-

This is a thing which you should take up directly with Donovan and, in conjunction with Donovan, also take up with Edgar Hoover, in view of the fact that immediate arrests may be advisable.

In regard to the protection of Pacific bridges, I suppose you should take it up with the Army. Ask Donovan about this.

Always sincerely,

John Franklin Carter, Esq.,
1210 National Press Building,
Washington, D. C.

Memo on West Coast Japanese (Supplementary)
from Jay Carter to FDR 11/10 returned to Carter
with this letter.

*Sub
Confidential*

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*PSF
Carter*

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

November 12, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL MEMO. ON BRAZILIAN ATTITUDE RELATIVE TO U.S. AND AXIS.

The source of this information, Heman Greenwood, Latin America Manager for U.S.Steel, specifically requested that his name be kept confidential in this and future reports. Among other things, he reports that:

1) A Brazilian officer named Vasconcelos is hampering the ferrying of planes from Brazil to Africa; elsewhere petty restrictions delay construction of airports.

2) It is doubtful that Brazil would admit U.S.troops to prevent a Nazi invasion.

3) Vargas is badly-informed on international affairs and seems to assume that Hitler has already won the war, Britain is defeated.

4) Reuters despatches from Washington, distributed gratis to Brazilian papers, are cutting into AP and UP services and are working against "Good Neighbor" policy, because of their propagandist flavor.

5) Brazilian good-will to U.S. is measured by easy credit, and Brazilian businessmen are reluctant to take a position which might offend Hitler.

6) It is suggested that U.S. buy into Brazilian press by proxy, in order to combat Brazilian censorship of the sort which prevented Rio newspapers from publishing the President's Navy Day Address.

J.F.C.

Brazil

November 10, 1941.

Walker

This report is based on an interview with Heman Greenwood, Latin America Manager of the USSECo who has just returned from a trip to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. He has been with the USSECo for several years and prior to that was South American manager for General Electric.

Outstanding points made in the conversation follow;

1. Graft is rampant among governmental officials and, in South American countries when graft becomes as open and flagrant as in the present case, it is usually a forerunner of a change in government regime. (In this connection Greenwood called attention to the fact that ex-President Washington Luis and Armando Salles-- Vargas refused to let Salles run as his political oponent in the last Brazilian elections -- along with several other prominent Brazilians are congregating in New York.) He says that there may be considerable significance to this foregathering but also said that he was unable to find any other ~~evidence~~ evidence of political change.

2. A Brazilian officer one Vasconcelos by name has been hampering the ferrying of planes from Brazil to Africa for the European Allies and while good progress has been made in the construction of airports along the northeastern seacoast of Brazil, Brazilian officers ~~are~~ are usigg all kinds of petty rules to hamper that work.

3. Greenwood expressed strong doubt that Brazil will allow American troops to enter her borders to establish first line defenses against a possibl Nazi invasion and said frankly that he expects the lid to blow off in the airport area at any time.

4. Vargas, who he knows and talks with frequently, he says, apparently has no reliable means of obtaining information about what is happening internationally, and seems luke warm about possible danger of Nazi aggression.

5. There is a general business boom in Brazil with coffee and cotton -- chief exports-- rising in price and in heavy demand while real estate is increasing in value and there is a speculative boom in realty.

6. The average Brazilian business man feels that the US Good Neighbor policy is fine for just so long as easy loans are available but the general conviction is that Germany is winning the War and he refuses to go out on a limb in full support of the United States. He feels that if Germany is victorious the fact that he did not go out on that limb will count heavily in his favor.

7. Reuters news agency reports datelined Washington, D.C., in Greenwood's opinion, are undoing much of the goodwill efforts of many American groups because the news stories are interpretations following a definite Reuter's trend and are predominantly pro-British. This service is free to Brazilian newspapers and it is causing a great drop

Brazil 2.

in the volume of factual news copy produced and distributed in Brazil by the Associated Press and the United Press Associations.

Greenwood, in amplifying his statement that Vargas suffers from lack of international reports, quoted Vargas as saying that the British had the courage of tigers, as the result of a conversation covering the after the war meetings held in London some time ago. Greenwood said the inference was that Vargas believes that the British have been beaten by the Germans.

He deplored the condition of the Brazilian Press generally and suggested that a possible foil for the extreme censorship maintained by the Vargas regime -- President Roosevelt's Navy Day Address was not printed in any Rio de Janeiro newspaper; only brief Reuters' interpretations appearing -- would be for America to buy quietly into the Brazilian Press by proxy. Proxy will be necessary because the Brazilian law prevents ownership of a newspaper except by Brazilian Nationals. He said that it was done successfully in World War Number One and might be done again.

He also suggested that factual short wave radio programs could be helpful in letting others than those in the political clique know what is going on in the outside world.

American motion pictures do have some effect in Brazil but all of the American newsreels are slashed ruthlessly by the censors who pay strict attention to the deletion of any shots that might touch the sensitiveness of the Nazis.

Summing up the present situation in Brazil Greenwood expressed the belief that all of the goodwill building efforts of the United States taken as a whole have to a small degree made the average Brazilian more conscious of our desire for the growth of honest Pan-Americanism. But at the same time he decried the bungling efforts of those who have gone to Brazil from the US and adopted a patronizing air.

Greenwood was reluctant to talk freely until assured that if any use was made of the material he furnished it would be completely divorced from him as the source. As he put it " I have to live with them and the slightest hint that I was talking would result in their freezing up completely.

When your reporter emphasized the fact that none of the ~~material~~ material furnished would be identified with him even remotely, he offered to keep us supplied with South American news as he receives it.

In your reporter's opinion he is an excellent contact and should never be connected with the facts he gives to us.

#####

PSF Jan Carter Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 12, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

I suggest you take this up
with the Secretary of War and Bill
Donovan.

F. D. R.

Memo from J. F. C., dated Nov. 11,
1941, enclosing report prepared by
Warren Irwin re "Possibility of Anti-
Japanese Riots in Los Angeles".

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"The Week in Washington"

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November 12, 1941.

MEMORANDUM ON SITUATION IN IRAN.

The attached memo. on conditions in Iran is based on correspondence recently received from Teheran.

The majority of the Nazi "tourists" are still in Persia; they refrained from general sabotage because they expect Hitler to roll through the Caucasus and Persia and do not wish to impede his advance.

Friction is observed between Soviet and British forces with the Soviet authorities apparently suspicious of the British intentions in the Middle East. Persian opinion tends to support the British and to try to play them off against the Soviets.

JFC
J.F.C.

Iran
Walker

November 10, 1941.

The following report is based on a conversation with Leon Brasseur, French Iranian, previously reported upon, who has just received a letter from his father, resident in Teheran. Important points contained in the letter as translated to your reporter by Brasseur follow;

1. Persians are grateful to the British for lifting the yoke of the Shah from their necks and are rapidly becoming pro-British as English officers and soldiers continue to fraternize with them and spend money in their cafes, bazarrs and night clubs. This is almost a complete reversal of their former leanings when they believed that the British were behind the Shah in everything that he did.

2. Soviet officers and men are refusing to fraternize and are looked upon with suspicion by Persians although they are well behaved.

3. The letter intimated that the Soviets have turned down a British offer of men and machinery in the Caucasus and the writer of the letter interpreted this to mean that the Russians do not trust the British and remember vividly the difficulty they had in ousting British interests from the oil fields in that district several years ago

4. The letter said that the German "tourists" used as the basis for the British-Russo invasion have left Iren only in hundreds while between 3,000 and 5,000 remain. (Brasseur interpreted this to mean that the Nazis in Persia did not sabotage telephone systems and other public utilities when the invasion came as they believed it would be only a short while before Germany would overrun the Crimea and the oil fields and start a drive towards the Suez Canal through Persia.)

5. Persians are paying more attention to the position of the United States in the war situation and welcome all short wave broadcasts as a relief from the short wave propaganda efforts of the Nazis.

6. Officers and men in the Iranian army resent the invaders but are beginning to like the British more and more as they realize that the ruthlessness of the former Shah's regime is done with.

The letter stated that comparatively little actual damage was done by either the British or Russian forces although the latter raided several towns and cities from the air with most of their bombs turning out to be duds.

Persian landholders and business men are beginning to welcome the invasion as they realize that the end has come to the former Shah's confiscation of all kinds of privately owned property.

Brasseur, after reading the letter to your reporter, expressed the opinion that German tourists are still a menace.

###

PSE Jack Carter

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 14, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK CARTER:

I suggest you show the enclosed
to Bill Donovan.

F.D.R.

Memo on Japanese in Imperial Valley and
Utah from J.C.C. to FDR Nov. 10, 1941.

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personal*

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November 17, 1941.

REGARDING WAR DEPARTMENT REPORT ON WEST COAST JAPANESE.

As instructed, I took up with Bill Donovan and the War Dept. the various reports hitherto submitted on the West Coast Japanese situation.

The War Department is preparing a confidential report for you as per your instructions to them. Secretary McCloy was slightly confused by the Donovan angle, believing that perhaps you intended the report to be submitted to you via the C.O.I. I told McCloy that I assumed that you desired him to submit the report direct to you, but that I would advise you promptly and that ~~in order to inform~~ I thought he had better submit the Army report directly unless he was advised to the contrary. That is as it now stands. I am also advising Bill Donovan.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

*file
personal*

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November 17, 1941.

REPORT ON DEVELOPMENTS AT C.I.O. CONVENTION, DETROIT (as of Nov. 16)

Herewith attached is a report on developments at the C.I.O. convention, supplied by Jim Gillan of this office.

It reports that Murray is on top of the situation but that he and his associates must back up the Miners.

Lewis people are militant and defiant. District 50 (headed by Ora Casaway and Katherine Lewis) of the Mine Workers, is going after I.W.W. type of "one big union" in chemicals and all other products related to coal, gas and coke--raiding the C.I.O. and the Steel Workers.

Considerable bitterness against Lewis reported, particularly among the Shipbuilders.

Gillan subsequently wired this morning: "K Lewis turned down on Foreign Relations resolution in Committee."

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

Detroit, Michigan
November 16, 1941

JFC

The picture here is of course wound around the situation in Washington at this time.

I have the story that at nine o'clock last night, John Green of the Shipbuilders union talked with Davis of the Mediation Board and was assured his union would get their demands at the Kearney shipyards of Federal Ships. This is, of course, important because it will show this faction of organized labor that the Mediation Board is not set against them. Watch for this story to break there tomorrow.

When Murray saw the President, the President proposed that the mine workers in the captive mines would have the "maintenance of membership" clause they would also have as new members all men who now go to work for the operators, and the President would sign a personal letter to the five percent, not now in the union, and request them to join in the interest of national defense.

Lewis said no.

This morning Murray as much as said it looked bad for Lewis. His only chance -- since Roosevelt is stiffing his back -- is for the operators to give in to him. Murray did not believe they would do this.

This, in effect, leaves Lewis far out on the limb. It could even be construed and probably will among the public that Lewis simply does not care to go along with National defense.

It is all Murray here. Everyone realizes the hope for the movement is in him. They simply must support the liners. It was stated to me that if your wife does something wrong you can't let her down. It looks like we said before that

either way the CIO loses.

The day the House voted on the Senate bill on Neutrality James B. Carey, CIO Secretary, wired all House members that the CIO was for the Senate amendments. So from that standpoint the convention is behind the Administration.

Lewis people are militant and defiant with everyone. Here is a strange quirk. District 50 -- gas, coke, etc., -- headed off by Ora Casaway and Katherine Lewis has been passing out jobs for some time. They have taken from the CIO proper and from the Steel Workers. But in the Mine Workers constitution there is a clause against the formation of the "one big union". However District 50 is after everything at this time -- cosmetics and all related chemical products to coal, gas, coke, etc. Ray Thomason, director of District 50 opened the affair by knocking down Anthony Wayne Smith in the lobby of the hotel Thursday night. Smith had called him a "Lewis Stooge" or something to that effect.

The board meeting this morning went on record as supporting the United Mine Workers. This afternoon Murray referred all questions to Lewis in Washington.

I have a long explanation about both the economic and political reasons for Lewis's stand now and during the pre-election period of last year. It comes from his side and close to him. I will send it on later.

There is some bitter feeling about Lewis. A member of the Shipbuilders said to me that if anything happened to a certain local -- meaning his own -- he was going to pull some eye brows -- one by one until they were all out. And he meant the lushest pair in the nation.

The shipbuilders are proud of the fact that their union, according to John Green, president, operates with only two paid executives. Even the national vice-president works on the line. From this you can catch the meaning. They hit at labor leaders themselves.

Hillman left here Saturday night. He did some work while here and his men are busy.

In general things are okay. The press is large. Interest is fine. Only the coal situation leaves everyone vague. They do not know what is coming.

I will get off a lot more in the morning. Want you to have this right away.

I certainly appreciate this trip and know we will benefit by it. They are going after the Star again.

Mike Widman will give us some exclusives on the Ford campaign. He put it on -- and he will give all the color. I will get this after I get back.

Jim.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

(Jay Franklin)

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November 18, 1941.

MEMORANDUM ON C.I.O. CONVENTION AT DETROIT.

The attached copy of a telephoned report from ~~H~~ Jim Gillan, of this office, as to the C.I.O. attitude at Detroit, indicates overwhelming support for you as against Lewis on basic defense and foreign policies. C.I.O. is supporting Mine Workers, reluctantly, and solely as an issue of union organization. Lewis conferring with Harry Bridges.

J.F.C.

November 18, 1941

Mr. C: ' /

The following message to you from Jim over long distance at 12:50 today:

"This whole convention is Roosevelt and his policy. Yesterday at the only time after three speakers that the name of John L. Lewis was mentioned there was only ordinary and small applause. On the other hand the mention of the President brought the noisiest applause even in the face of Philip Murray. Philip Murray and the C.I.O. leaders are all behind Roosevelt and not behind Lewis. This convention has to support the mine workers because of labor issues and not political issues. There is no Lewis support in Detroit."

He had a six hour dinner with Larry Bridges Monday nite.

AB

*file
personal*

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(Jay Franklin)
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*ASF
Carter*

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November 18, 1941.

REPORT ON WEST COAST JAPANESE SITUATION. (ACTION AT WASHINGTON)

After conferring, as directed, with Bill Donovan, War Dept. and Edgar Hoover, I have to report progress as follows:

1) The matter of arrests of suspects on the West Coast is now in charge of F.B.I. and similar agencies of War and Navy, with prompt, concerted action ready on notification.

2) Bill Donovan has undertaken to coordinate publicity program designed to reassure loyal Japanese-Americans and to allay white suspicion of their Japanese-American fellow-citizens. This has already started.

3) Donovan, G-2, Naval Intelligence, Hoover and myself are on control of sabotage. planning to meet and outline a program. This program will be started immediately unless it calls for a) additional authority from you or b) additional funds. Selection of a coordinator of West Coast Defense ~~regions~~ Areas will also be taken up and recommendations made for his designation and other actions appropriate to the assigned task.

J.F.C.

PSF: Jack Carter
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November 21, 1941.



MEMORANDUM ON POLES IN U.S.S.R.

The source of this information, named Drohojowski, ~~was~~ has been named Counselor of the Polish Embassy effective December 1. He particularly desires that this information be not transmitted to the State Department, as there is considerable jealousy on the part of the Polish Ambassador against Drohojowski's special contacts with the Polish Government in Exile at London. Drohojowski is serving as special intermediary in messages which Mikolajczyk does not wish to be seen by the Ambassador here or by anyone who might inform the Ambassador of his activities. Tony Biddle knows about this phase of Drohojowski's work for the Polish Government in Exile.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 29 1973

November 21, 1941

MEMORANDUM ON POLES IN U.S.S.R.

In a dispatch from Kuibyshev dated November 20 the following highly confidential information appeared.

Many thousands of Polish prisoners of war, particularly officers, have not yet been released. The officers have been transferred from special camps at Starobielsk, Kozielsk and Fostaszkov eastward to the Kola Peninsula, Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land.

Soviet authorities deny the existence of these prisoners.

This also applies to groups of judges, prosecuting attorneys and police officials still held in camps and prisons. The impression is that subaltern authorities are hostile to Poles and therefore conceal existence of those detained. Many prominent Jews are being detained, especially all military rabbis such as Rabbi Sternberg. Politicians such as Senator Schnorr, and lawyers Sommerstern and Liser are also being held prisoner. So far it is impossible to locate famous Rabbis Roksce from Belz and Balberstamm from Bobowa.

Until now there has been no census in view of the migration, probably eastward, of those released. The number of Polish Jews is estimated at from not less than 200,000 to 500,000. The Polish Embassy will treat all citizens alike. When relief arrives only delegates from the Embassy will be in charge of distribution. Many Jews have been appointed for this task.

U.S. Red Cross help needed urgently as mortality rate among Polish refugees is distressing. Request for facilities should be made to Soviet Embassy, Washington.

From a less reliable source it is reported that the Soviet officials do not wish Polish Army to expand beyond existing two divisions because they are afraid to have in their midst a "White Polish Army". For this reason many able-bodied men are being sent to labor battalions in Central Asia.

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personal*

PSF: J. F. Carter *[Signature]*
A-3-41

November 24, 1941

TO: Mr. John F. Carter.
FROM: Arch A. Mercey *[Signature]*
SUBJECT: Arthur Menken.

Arthur Menken is one of Paramount Newsreel's crack foreign cameramen. By "foreign" I mean his most distinguished service has been in the foreign field. He is not a staff man, but an independent operator who is employed in a special deal by Paramount. His most recent work includes photography in the Far East -- from Hawaii eastward to Australia, China, Philippines, etc. He is now making a nation-wide tour with a special show on footage in the Far East.

Menken is regarded as a very daring cameraman. He has had narrow escapes in all parts of the world in the various wars he has covered, including Finland and I think, Spain and Ethiopia.

*He is the son of Stanwood Menken
of New York.*

*file
Confidential*

*Jack Carter
Folder*

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November 24, 1941.

REPORT ON BRITISH SHIPPING IN INDIAN OCEAN.

Capt. Shanahan of Isthmian liner, Knoxville City, in New York from voyage to Red Sea, Indian Ocean and East Indies, reports among other things that the British are using their best merchant-ships to maintain commercial services in the Australian, New Zealand and East Indies trade, despite an apparent shortage of bottoms in the Indian Ocean for the transportation of rice and other foodstuffs between India and Signapore. He also reports that the East Indies Dutch are busy making as much money as possible pending the expected war with Japan.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

Far East

Walker

November 22, 1941.

This report is based on a conversation with Capt. Shanahan of the Isthmian freighter Knoxville City berthed in New York after a voyage to the Red Sea, Indian Ocean and East Indies. Outstanding points made were;

1. The British are doing an amazing job of continuing their foreign trade connections in the face of the war. This is particularly true, Capt. Shanahan said, of trade relations with Australia, New Zealand and the Dutch East Indies where he reports that the ships they are using in maintaining the trade are the best afloat.
2. In Mombassa, ^{Kerachi(?)} Currachi and Penang food supplies appeared ample although there was a noticeable shortage in good tobacco, cigarettes and cigars and some of the luxuries.
3. In the Dutch East Indies (Batavia especially) he reported that uniformed men were much less in number than they had been on a previous voyage some six months ago.
4. The East Indies Dutch are hoping that the United States will help them repel any Japanese invasion but they are losing no time in their trading and general money making while preparing for what they believe will ultimately come (War).
5. In India Capt. Shanahan reported that all British he contacted were asking "When will the United States enter the War", and, contrary to Churchill, the India-English expect a large A.E.F. to enter the fight before the Axis can or will be beaten.
6. He reported a great deal of glumness as to the outcome of the German thrust into the Crimea with an undercurrent of belief that ultimately the German Armies will thrust southward to the Suez Canal.

Capt. Shanahan not only looked Irish but talked with a decided br@gue and it may be that his Irish sympathies helped to color his statements about antagonism of the British to American development of foreign trade in lanes where the British have been supreme for many years.

He made a quite definite point of the fact that the ships being used by the British in the Australian, New Zealand and East Indies trade, are excellent vessels despite an apparent shortage of bottoms in the Indian Ocean for the transportation of rice and other foodstuffs between India and Singapore.

#####

file
Confidential

November 26, 1941

Dear Miss Tully,

John Carter has

asked me to forward this to you

for the President. Please keep

the information confidential.

I will send you the replies to these

cables as soon as they are

received by Mr. Drohozowski.

Best wishes — Henry Field

November 26, 1941

*Jack Carter
Folder*

MEMORANDUM ON POLES IN U.S.S.R.

The following confidential information received from Kuibyshev supplements two previous Memoranda on this subject:

1. General Sikorski is expected at Kuibyshev within the next two weeks.
2. Ambassador Kot, who visited Stalin last week, reports that even after his personal request for information regarding Poles in the U.S.S.R. there still appears to be difficulty in locating many prominent Polish scholars.
3. The following cables were sent November 22.

Ambassador Kot
Polish Embassy
Kuibyshev, (USSR)

Americans Polish extraction most anxious you take necessary steps to locate and liberate following Polish professors and scientists well known to United States public opinion Reverend Panas, Wladyslaw Zaremba, Kazimierz Baginski, Wille-Master of Arts, Professors Spittal, Piotrowski, Arthur Hausner, Bronislaw Skalak, Wrobel-Machinist, Przewlocki, Moszoro, Jarosiewicz from Boryslaw, Professor Stanislaw Glabinski, Engineer, Uszkiewicz, Presidents Ostrowski, Malinowski, Professors Aleksandrowicz from Lwow, Zielinski from Poznan, Pienkowski, Jakowicki, Glodlowski from Wilno, Geobel, Kruszynski, Kalicinski, Zuberbier, Lerczowski, Soltysik, Lewittour, Mozolowski, Stefanowski, Mogilnicki, Wieczorek, Welie, Maciaga, Rogozinski Wolfman, Zajaczkowski, Zalewski.

Will be grateful for answer through Drohojowski Washington.

Polish National Alliance of Brooklyn
Jozef A. Glowacki, Secretary General

Womens Auxiliary
Czeslawa Durska, Vice-President

Czas Publishing Company
Marian Woznicki, Editor

Night Letter
Charge to: - Polish National Alliance
Evergreen 8-3560

Honorable Norman H. Davis, President
American Red Cross
Washington, D. C.

According to reliable private information no help is yet forthcoming from America to one and a half million Polish citizens of all races and creeds in Soviet Union. Many of them particularly people prominent social intellectual leaders remain unaccounted for. Large groups of Polish Army Officers have not been released in spite of Polish-Russian agreement and have been deported to Anartic regions. We urge the American Red Cross to use all their influence in order to have relief actually distributed to Poles in Russia and reach also those who have not as yet been released from prisons concentration and labor camps

Polish National Alliance of Brooklyn

Jozef A. Glowacki
Secretary General

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December 1, 1941.

MEMORANDUM ON MEXICAN BORDER SITUATION (EASTERN PORTION)

The attached report from Jack Denison, of this project, indicates that there are no serious apprehensions felt as to conditions along the eastern portion of the Mexican border, so far as Japanese are concerned. There is said to be an important center of Nazi activities in Torreon.

Copies to State Department, M.I.D. and Col. Donovan.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

Galveston

Only two or three Japanese in Galveston, and they have been there for years.

No fishing boats. Fishing fleet almost entirely Italian.

Japanese importing firm in Houston has taken on two new men in the past six weeks.

Corpus Christi

No Japanese in Corpus Christi, or near it.

Brownsville

Japanese population from a recent army survey.

Brownsville	7
Mercedes	1
Progreso	3
Grangeville	2
San Benito	9
Heslaco	<u>1</u>
	23

Fort Brown area of Tamaulipas, Mexico - 43.

Japanese here agricultural, came about 20 years ago from Southern California, some from Mexico. The farms are scattered around, employ Mexican labor.

Practically no traffic back and forth, two in the last two months, except by air and they are traveling on diplomatic passports. Consul General of New Orleans continually passing back and forth. Last time through made a survey of the Japanese population around here.

Japanese have recently established a button factory at Tampico.

There was a movement of Japanese to the south around the oil fields on the isthmus of Tehuantepec, but that was due to Mr. Davis. At the time of the oil expropriations in 1938, he was trying to sell oil for the Mexicans and he moved Japanese labor down there.

The State of Tamaulipas, south of Brownsville, is very barren with few towns and poor roads. Population very small. Mexicans have to go up to Brownsville across to Laredo and then back into Mexico as the southern and east-west roads are so bad.

Present general in charge at Matamoros is extremely pro-American and very cooperative.

Laredo

No Japanese in Laredo. In fact there are no Japanese north of the border from Mission, 140 miles east of Laredo to El Paso. There are two Japanese in Nuevo Laredo. Both have been here a long time. There has been a considerable movement of Japanese tourists up to Nuevo Laredo but that has died down in the last two months.

Largest group of Japanese in Tamaulipas at Hidalgo, consists of seven or eight families.

Only two Japanese have crossed the border in the past year.

Eagle Pass

Between thirty and forty Japanese families in the area around Piedras Negras. No passing back and forth across the border. Area south of Eagle Pass cut off from rest of Mexico, entirely dependent on U. S. for trade and supplies. Feeling very pro-American.

Other Parts of Mexico

Torreon, Coahuila, seems to be the hot bed of pro-Axis activity.

Mexican government threw 200 Japanese out of Guaymas this year.

Altar, Sonora, Japanese built a hangar and landing field. Has been investigated by Naval O & I.

General

Everything very quiet along border. No activity known of. Impossible here to get information concerning Japanese in Mexico. Most reports are hearsay and can't be checked on, even by other individuals and are consequently of little or no value.

There seems to be more anti-Japanese prejudice in Texas than in California, also more suspicion.

*File
Confidential*

*PSF Jack Carter
Folder
5-41*

3018 DUMBARTON AVENUE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

December 1, 1941

Dear Miss Tully,

John Carter asked me to forward the attached memorandum for the President. Mr. Drohojowski plans to continue to keep us informed on news from Kuibyshev. Best wishes -

Hewry Field

November 30, 1941

MEMORANDUM ON POLES IN U.S.S.R.

The following confidential cable was received at Polish Embassy by John Drohojowski from Ambassador Kot in Kuibyshev.

Many high school students, dressed in torn clothes and worn shoes, are working in concentration camps. They are granted only six hours rest out of every twenty-four. Moral and physical torture are often inflicted by guards and remain unpunished. Those individuals either exhausted, sick or maimed are given forced labor by prison authorities. A prisoner is admitted to hospital only when overcome by complete physical exhaustion.

In view of this distressing situation among Polish citizens in prisons and in camps in the name of humanity we beg for energetic and effective intervention in order that those detained may be released immediately.

Among those detained are high school and college students of both sexes.

In addition, 6,000 officers and many non-commissioned officers as well as judges, lawyers and police are still imprisoned.

There are thousands of our people on Franz Josef Land and at work in the mines of Novaya Zemlya.

December 6, 1941

*Jack Carter
Folder
file*

MEMORANDUM ON POLES IN U.S.S.R.

The following confidential cable from Kuibyshev dated November 27 was decoded by John Drohojowski at the Polish Embassy yesterday.

This information supplements four previous Memoranda on the same subject.

On November 14 two trustworthy Poles deposited at the Polish Embassy in Kuibyshev the following information regarding Polish citizens in camps and prisons on Soviet territory.

During 1939-1940 Soviet authorities arrested and deported us to Pbebtroj, Dresfaczuchotka and Buohtavachodka on the Kola Peninsula. Here we found about 30,000 Poles. On November 2, 1941 355 Polish citizens were freed in three groups. During our enforced stay in these places 9,640 Poles died.

At the date of our departure there were still about 20,000 Poles engaged in forced labor under terrible conditions, especially in mud. Few prisoners can fill their daily quota. As penalties food rations are reduced to 300 grams of bread and 200 grams of thin soup every twenty-four hours and imprisonment in cold, wet dungeons.

file personal

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December 5, 1941.

REPORT ON TALK WITH VINCENT ASTOR.

Yesterday morning I had about an hour's talk with Mr. Astor and straightened out all misunderstandings arising from recent incidents in the New York area. We also agreed as to future lines of cooperation and I arranged immediately to establish contact between him and the man who really heads my work in his area.

After my discussion, I was impressed with various wide discrepancies between various reports as to information operations in his area. These variances involved both the method and the substance of the reports of the different units. For that reason, both Mr. Astor and I are of the opinion that the general survey of operating methods now under way would be helpful to him. He also feels the need, on his own account, of wider formal authority from you, in which opinion I concur.

CONFIDENTIAL--The name of my head-man in New York, is T.R. Coward, President of the Yale Club and head of the Coward-McCann publishing company. Timmy Coward is one of my oldest friends and worked very close with Frank Polk on political intelligence in the last war.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

*Jack Carter
Folder*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 9, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

CAPTAIN BEARDALL:

To read and return for our
files.

F.D.R.

Miss Tully

*Read with interest
file.*

JPB

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
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*PSF
Carter*

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December 8, 1941.

MEMORANDUM ON JAPANESE PROBLEM (WEST COAST, MEXICAN BORDER)

Attached herewith are the following reports:

- 1) Japanese problem in Honolulu, prepared by C.B.Munson;
- 2) Japanese problem on Mexican Border (western sector)x, prepared by Warren Irwin.

Copies have been distributed to Undersecretary of State,
Coordinator of Information and M.I.D.

JFC
J.F.C.

REPORT ON HAWAIIAN ISLANDS by Curtis B. Munson

Your reporter, after a four weeks' survey of the Japanese problem on the Pacific Coast, sailed for Honolulu, where he spent nine days. There he received the full cooperation of Army and Navy Intelligence Services and the F.B.I. He also contacted British Intelligence based on Singapore. In the civilian field he had many personal interviews with first and second generation Japanese, police chiefs, school teachers, businessmen, contractors, rural officials, etc. The F.B.I. seem to hold the leading place in Honolulu, due to the fact that they have been set up longer on the Japanese question and also due to the personality of Mr. Shivers, their Agent in Charge. He has gone far to develop the confidence of the Japanese and others in himself and his organization there. The Army got going next, and as they have to live with the Japanese on land while the Navy sails the seas, they have earnestly thrown themselves into the task under an able Reserve officer who brings experience in intelligence service in the last war and decided business acumen to bear upon his assignment. The Naval Intelligence, though a late starter, is silently and ably developing an organization whose real power will not reach its peak for four or five months yet. There is the same cooperation between the Services that is evident on the mainland.

The consensus of opinion is that there will be no racial uprising of the Japanese in Honolulu. The first generation, as on the Coast, are ideologically and culturally closest to Japan. Though many of them speak no English, or at best only pigeon-English, it is considered that the big bulk of them will be loyal. This is especially so, for in Hawaii the first generation is largely on the land and devoted to it. It may be as well to state here in a general way that everyone in Hawaii, especially in the dark-skinned laboring classes, places loyalty to Hawaii first, and the United States second. This is not meant to impugn their loyalty - but they love the Islands. The second generation is estimated as approximately ninety-eight percent loyal. However, with the large Japanese population in the Hawaiian Islands, giving this the best interpretation possible, it would mean that fifteen hundred were disloyal. However, the F.B.I. state that there are about four hundred suspects, and the F.B.I.'s private estimate is that only fifty or sixty of these are sinister. (In all figures given on suspects only aliens are considered. Should it be possible to pick up citizens, this figure would have to be materially increased.) There are also a few Germans and Italians in the Islands who should be picked up. We do not at the moment remember the exact number, whether it was seven or seventeen. The Army Intelligence showed this reporter a secret map with pins of different

colors to denote first generation, second generation, and other nationalities who are suspect, and their distribution in the Islands. Each one of these men's address is known and they showed me that it would be a comparatively easy job to pick them up almost in a few hours, should the necessity arise. There is not the same danger as in Continental United States that if they escaped the first grab that they will completely escape, as of course they have nowhere to go but the Pacific Ocean. There will be, undoubtedly, planted Japanese and agents who are there for the purpose of sabotage. Though sabotage may be expected, it is a self-evident fact that the main things to sabotage in the Islands are the Army and Navy installations, and these are under the protection and complete control of the two services. However, materials are sometimes lacking to build, say protecting guard fences. Outside of the services' installations there are only two things open to sabotage: the commercial waterfront (this does not include Pearl Harbor), and the power stations and power lines. However, these power lines are especially important, for if one transformer is damaged in the Islands there are no replacements, and it would be a considerable time before a replacement could be secured from the mainland. Hawaii is particularly fortunate as regards water supply, possesses a large artesian flow along with numerous reservoirs. Fortunately, in the Islands there would be no "White" sabotage

which could be purchased by the Japanese, as there is on the Coast, outside of the imported white defense workers. There are very few whites who would be anything except loyal.

The danger of espionage is considerable. This is especially the case as many Navy wives are over-garrulous with regard to their husbands' departures and where they are going. We believe that the Naval Intelligence Service is looking to put a curb on this, and we are sure they can be trusted to police their own family. However, facts can be easily compiled from mail piling up, milk and grocery orders cancelled, along with knowledge of what officer is on what ship and other private information, which might indicate the length of the ship's visit and where headed. This is almost unavoidable in such a compact and small community, though the services bear this in mind. The bottleneck in the Japanese espionage would not be in the gathering of data but how to transmit it to Japan. This was easy when Japanese vessels were touching at the Hawaiian Islands. Now it is very far from easy. It has been suggested that fishing boats might drop oilskin packages at sea to be picked up by Japanese Naval vessels. This has more the elements of rumor, especially as no such parcels have ever been picked up at sea by the numerous American vessels. It is suggested that the transmittal may be going East instead of West, probably to Mexico or some such likely point. From there it

would be an easier task to forward it to Japan. In this connection there is also some suggestion that rumors with sufficient basis in fact to cause the Naval Intelligence to look into it, emanate from Mexico City to the Islands. A sample of this was the story pointing to Mexico City as a source that the Japanese were running submarines off the shore of a certain Island, the crew submerging them and going ashore. With them they brought an end of an electric wire on shore. On M day they would press a button which would set the submarine mechanism to work so it would again come to the surface. The grain of truth which made the rumor interesting was the fact that the shores of the Hawaiian Islands are notoriously deep, rocky, and unsuited for this purpose. The one spot in all the Islands which the chart showed was suitable was the small spot indicated by the rumor. Investigation by the Navy proved there were no submarines sunk on this one sandy-bottom shoal. However, it wasted a good deal of their time, as did some other rumors of this nature. All these rumors had one basic local fact which was true and all seemed to start from Mexico City.

One important difference between the situation in Hawaii and the mainland is that if all the Japanese on the mainland were actively disloyal they could be corraled or destroyed within a very short time. In the Hawaiian Islands, though there are sufficient American troops and Navy present to overwhelm the Japanese population, it would simply mean that the Islands would lose their vital

labor supply by so doing, and in addition to that we would have to feed them, as well as import many thousands of laborers to take their place. Since a large part of the vital and essential work of the Islands is ably carried on by the Japanese population, it is essential that they should be kept loyal, - at least to the extent of staying at their tasks. If Imperial Japan were wise, she would devote all her energies in the Hawaiian Islands to trying to induce a spirit of mind which would cause a universal Japanese sit-down strike. She evidently has not thought of this as there is no sign of this type of propaganda. Propaganda, by Japan, is practically non-existent on the Islands.

No report on Honolulu should start anywhere but with the "Big Five". The "Howies" or white people at the head of Island affairs centralize in the Big Five. The native whites who own the Islands are in a general way descendants of white missionaries and traders. Due to these two facts, they had an interest in their labor - Japanese, Philippine, Hawaiian and Portuguese - and treated them well. Though they paid low wages and made money out of the Islands, there was hardly ever any absentee management. They sent their sons to Yale, Harvard and Princeton, and these sons returned to carry on the work of the Islands. There was never the abuse of labor in the Islands by rich, low white trash which made Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, or the bull pens of Idaho famous and contributed so

to the rise of the 'isms'. You never see today a pair of patched pants in any of the Islands, and a short stroll through the streets of Honolulu - if one eliminates the defense workers imported from the mainland - convinces one that the faces are the fairly contented faces of people who have been, on the whole, not badly treated.

The Islands are really a huge monopoly, centralized under the ownership of five families and an independent or two. These five families are called the "Big Five". The "Howies" include the sons, the management and less fortunate whites of long residence - in a word, all those who go to make up the directing business force of the Islands. These whites, especially the "Big Five", are intelligent and see the handwriting on the wall. They know that this last oasis of paternalistic capitalism is doomed. Naturally they are determined to hold onto it 'til the last ditch. Due to the fact that the Japanese have always voted either as Democrats or Republicans, the whites control the Islands politically. If the Japanese ever voted on racial lines, it is they who would control politically. However, it must be said to their credit and the credit of the white owner class that they have never done this. The politics are really controlled in a last analysis by the "Big Five". The people of these Islands have become accustomed to being controlled thus, and as a result it must not be overlooked as a factor of safety in the control of the Japanese 'Problem' in the

Islands. The "Big Five" see in the ascending power of the Army and the Navy, due to war, a factor which is sure to hasten the end of this "last oasis of paternalistic capitalism" previously referred to. Thus we have in the Islands the development of three lines of thought. One is exemplified in the sea-going branch of the Navy. This leans to a slight lack of regard for the civilian life on the Islands, or possibly is best expressed by saying that it regards the Islands as a Naval Base and wants them to be a darn good base, regardless. Of course, this point of view is wholly unofficial, but it exists in unthinking elements of the Navy. The second thought exemplified is the thought of the extreme element of paternalistic capitalism which desires to keep control in their own hands to the 'nth' hour as far as safety of the Navy or the Army forces is concerned. The heads of the F.B.I. and, we believe, the Intelligence Services generally, as well as most responsible service people, take the well-balanced middle view. This view is the one which we desire to make apparent in our report. The well established and really kindly paternalism of the Islands has a definite contribution to make and deserves credit as a considerable factor in the safety of the Islands.

The general background and characteristics of the Japanese are the same in the Islands as they are on the mainland. However, certain differences in the situation have tended to ameliorate these

in some particulars. We believe that the best over-all method of expressing this is by the following observation: This reporter believes there is this fundamental difference between the Japanese "Problem" on the Coast and the Japanese "Problem" in the Hawaiian Islands. On the Coast, the Japanese are discriminated against on a racial basis. In Hawaii it is really only on a social and economic basis. This is peculiarly American. In our materialistic civilization one fits in socially largely on an income basis, provided he is willing to wash his neck and give up eating with his knife. In Hawaii the Japanese fit in thus among the bulk of the inhabitants because the bulk are dark-skinned of one kind or another. The whites generally are on a higher economic plane than they are on the mainland. The few Japanese who reach a position economically where they can mix with the whites are not numerous enough to make much impression even if they do resent not being asked to tea. The bulk of the whites in Hawaii would not mix socially anyway with stevedores or dock laborers, black or white. On the mainland there are plenty of "Okies" to call the Japanese a "Yellow-belly", when economically and by education the Japanese may be not only their equal but their superior.

The result of this is that the Hawaiian Japanese does not suffer from the same inferiority complex or feel the same mistrust of the whites that he does on the mainland. While it is

seldom on the mainland that you find even a college-educated Japanese-American citizen who talks to you wholly openly until you have gained his confidence, this is far from the case in Hawaii. Many young Japanese there are fully as open and frank and at ease with a white as white boys are. In a word, Hawaii is more of a melting pot because there are more brown skins to melt - Japanese, Hawaiian, Chinese and Filipinos. It is interesting to note that there has been absolutely no bad feeling between the Japanese and the Chinese in the Islands due to the Japanese Chinese war. Why should they be any worse toward us?

The extreme Japanese "lover" in Hawaii is probably motivated frequently by self-interest. This is because he knows that the economic status quo is built largely on the fine industry of the Japanese labor, and he wishes to keep control of this as long as possible and is very loath to suggest to the Army or Navy that there is any danger from the Japanese. Any extreme anti-Japanese thought in Hawaii is probably due either to an unthinking element of the Navy which wants its base to be secure and of good service regardless of other consequences, or it is extremely anti-"Big-Five" thought.

Imperial Japan has attempted to do the same things in Hawaii that she has attempted to do on the mainland. Anyone interested in the Imperial Japanese picture visualized on paper should

refer to secret documents in the office of the F.B.I. in Washington entitled "Japanese Charts of Hawaiian Office". This will show the same network of Reserve officers, Shinto and Buddhist priests, language schools, prefectural clubs and associations, etc., as will be found in the Navy Department in Washington in secret charts entitled "Japanese Organizations and Activities in the Eleventh Naval District". This reporter did not visit any other Island than that of Oahu, in which is found the city of Honolulu. The Service theory is that this is the only good harbor and so all the defenses have been concentrated on this Island. In order to attack this Island Japan would first have to seize one of the other Islands and then be strong enough to seize, from there, Oahu. If she were strong enough to do this she would be strong enough to seize one of the other Islands first anyhow. Therefore there has been no spreading of defenses thin over the whole group. There is only one other harbor at Hilo, on the Island of Hawaii, and this is a poor one. Of course, surveillance and small garrisons are maintained on the other Islands of the group. This reporter was advised that he would be more or less wasting time to visit these other Islands. There is possibly only one that he was negligent in not visiting, though advised that it was unnecessary. That was the Island of Kauai. The Japanese Communists are more strongly organized on this Island than on any of the others. We believe Japanese

Communism is purely economic and on this Island it is not considered a really serious factor. However, this is the Island that Japan would be most likely to seize in case she felt herself strong enough to have a base for an assault on Oahu.

The best consensus of opinion seemed to agree that martial law should be proclaimed now in Hawaii. We believe that under appointment from the President the Governor of Hawaii is empowered to declare martial law when he feels the need. Many people in Hawaii felt that the Governor was fairly spineless and would not do anything soon enough. However, the Army Intelligence Head told your reporter confidentially that the Governor would be pretty well guided by what General Short (Commanding General, Army Forces, Hawaii" told him to do. In other words, he said the Governor was under General Short's thumb. If this is the case, your reporter sees no need to worry on this score, and in line with this, read in the newspapers since leaving Hawaii that the Governor had made some official move which envisaged the posting of guards at all vulnerable points. Your reporter is not in a position to say definitely one way or the other whether the Governor is spineless, whether is a man of determination or whether "which would be ideal) he is under the thumb of General Short.

There is some danger in Hawaii of race riots. This is largely due to four elements. The Filipinos are intensely anti-

Japanese and if they were attacked on the Philippine Islands they have threatened they would kill every Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands. The Intelligence Services, however, have made particular note of this and in conjunction with the sugar plantations, by whom most of the Filipinos are employed and controlled, have lectured the Filipinos kindly but firmly on this point. They have pointed out that if there is to be interference with any of the inhabitants of the Islands it must be by the properly authorized officials of the American Government. The Filipinos seem to have appreciated this and considerably toned down their patriotism. There is a type of Japanese who may be termed the "bright young thing", a bit loud, and liable to be openly resentful of insult. He is the prototype of his brother on the mainland. He has broken away from the fine character and parental control of his Japanese background while becoming too Americanized without fully comprehending what Americanization means. Fortunately, he represents a small group in the second-generation Japanese and contributes most of the juvenile delinquency which is found in this race. He gets drunk and frequents pool halls. There is danger that drunk sailors may push him off the street or call him a "Yellow-belly", especially if they have just returned from some Naval battle with the Japanese. Where the other Japanese would take this in silent anger, this bright young thing might hit back and start some racial trouble.

However, it must be said that the Army and Navy have this fully in mind and are very efficiently policing their own families. The sailors are extremely well behaved and it is a matter of common comment and approval. The real danger of racial trouble comes from the defense workers who have been imported from the mainland. Most of these come from the Pacific Coast and contain the dregs of the waterfront element. If they have been able to secure a job on the mainland they would not have gone to Hawaii. They include many of the "Okie" class and to them any brown-skin is "Nigger". They do not like the Islands and are only there because they could not get a job on the mainland. They already have insulted many Kanakas by call them "Negores" and treating them as such. To them every Japanese is a "Yellow Peril" and to be treated accordingly. There is fear in the native white element in the Islands that these people will create a problem after the emergency or war is over. The controlling plantation and business class would prefer to bring in Filipino labor to take care of the shortage of labor on the plantations caused by the former plantation workers going into defense work. In fact, they feel that all labor for the Islands should be imported from the Philippines. Of course, the reasons are pretty selfish as the Filipinos are more docile and easily handled and create no problem for the future. Besides, the construction labor recruited from the Coast is additional

handwriting on the wall pointing to the final destruction of paternalistic capitalism. Your reporter is not in a position to state, nor is he able to make up his own mind, as to what is the best course to pursue. Those who desire Filipino labor will say there is absolutely no danger from the Japanese, and, in the next breath, argue that the importation of Filipino labor would offset the Japanese danger, as the Filipinos are so anti-Japanese. In our mind this is not an argument, however, as soldiers stationed in the Island of Oahu are more than sufficient to take care of the Japanese population if it all were disloyal, without the aid of any Filipinos. Still, we must confess we see the danger of the imported coastal riff-raff and do not find ourselves any too partial toward them. Besides, a Social Security number entitles a man to work while he may change his name twenty times and no information may be secured from Social Security. Many men with very bad records are hiding under this. The Intelligence have uncovered many men with very bad records among these workers. On second thought your reporter casts his vote for the Filipinos.

Due to the preponderance of Japanese in the population of the Islands, a much greater proportion of Japanese have been called to the draft than on the mainland. As on the mainland they are inclined to enlist before being drafted. The Army is extremely high in its praise of them as recruits. The Japanese

seem to be chiefly afraid that their boys will not be given the same chance at promotion as the whites. Frankly, at first this discrimination existed. A Japanese still has to be better than a white to gain promotion. The Army is gradually eliminating even this discrimination. They have been giving them a chance at becoming officers. Recently they picked out a few of the very best of these and put them in charge of white troops. The Army officers confessed that they held their breath. Much to their surprise and relief there was absolutely no reaction from the white troops and they liked these officers very well. Of course, these were especially good officers, but the Army is going to try more. This has been a great thing in strengthening the loyalty of the Japanese in the Islands. They are beginning to feel that they are going to get a square deal and some of them are really almost pathetically exuberant.

In summarizing, we cannot say how loyal the Japanese in the Hawaiian group would be if there were an American Naval disaster and the Japanese fleet appeared off the Hawaiian Islands. Doubtless great numbers of them would then forget their American loyalties and shout "Banzai" from the shore. Under those circumstances if this reporter were there he is not sure that he might not do it also to save his own skin, if not his face. Due to the fact that there are

more than enough soldiers in the Islands to take care of any Japanese, even if not so inclined, the Japanese will doubtless remain quietly at their tasks. However, in fairness to them it is only right to say that we believe the big majority anyhow would be neutral or even actively loyal.

*File
Personal*

JCF Jack Carter Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 11, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

John Carter called me this morning to say that one of his men in New York reports that Vincent Astor is still very confused and suspicious about the whole problem of investigation in the New York district. According to my man's report, Vincent Astor claims he does not know what I am supposed to be doing. There seems to be some confusion about the method. The F. B. I. says there is a great deal of duplication of effort and Astor says there is not.

Mr. Carter also reports that Mr. Munson's man in Los Angeles is getting some very important information. The question now comes up about credentials for Carter and the men working for him in various parts of the country.

G. G. T.

Tell him to keep his New York operations in a different sphere from that of Vincent Astor or F.B.I. I think it is better for him to give his man credentials.

*file
press mail*

PSF: Jack Carter 5-41

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

December 11, 1941.

MEMORANDUM ON PROPOSED LABOR-INDUSTRY CONFERENCE.

Phil Murray is very anxious for the success of the suggested conference between labor, industry and government. He specifically feels that if the Government is represented by personalities like Miss Perkins or Hillman there is a possibility of old feuds and mistrusts ~~from~~ arising to confuse and delay the issues. He feels that it would be preferable to have the Government--or more properly speaking, the public--represented by somebody of the calibre of Marshall Field or Wendell Willkie.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

*file
personal*

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PSK Jack Carter Folder

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

December 16, 1941.

MEMORANDUM ON SUMMARY OF WEST COAST AND HONOLULU REPORTS BY MUNSON ETC.

The reports submitted by this unit prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor emphasized the following:

- 1) No substantial danger of Fifth Column activities by Japanese. (Despite Secretary Knox's contrary statement, his report shows he was referring to close physical espionage at Honolulu directed by the Japanese Consulate General).
- 2) Considerable danger of sabotage to strategic points left unguarded.
- 3) Need to arrest all suspects without regard to citizenship (This has been done only for alien suspects).
- 4) Need to reassure loyal Japanese and Japanese-Americans. (This is doubly necessary following the Knox "Fifth Columnist" statement).
- 5) Army Intelligence poor or non-existent on West Coast; F.B.I. pretty good; Navy Intelligence also good.
- 6) Navy Intelligence poor at Honolulu; F.B.I. excellent; Army Intelligence pretty good.
- 7) Good cooperation between services along Mexican Border. Need for coordination and change of methods or attitude at Washington.
- 8) Munson continues to work at Los Angeles; Irwin is completing his "tour" of Northwest Mexico to Mazatlan and back. Irwin has already reported an Axis "underground railway" into Mexico leading out of Phoenix or Tucson. (This has been reported to the F.B.I.)

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

12/20/41

File Memo:

I telephoned John Franklin Carter, at the President's request, and suggested that he take the matter up at once with J. Edgar Hoover and the Attorney General.

G.G.T.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

file
psf
John Carter
Folder

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

December 19, 1941.

SUMMARY OF REPORT ON PROGRAM FOR LOYAL WEST COAST JAPANESE.

Curtis Munson reports from Los Angeles that already five L.A. Japanese-Americans have committed suicide because their honor could not stand suspicion of their loyalty. He is rushing to Washington a program, which is based largely on the O.N.I. (Commander Ringle) proposals for maintaining the loyalty of Japanese-Americans and establishing wholesome race-relations. Its essence is to utilize Japanese filial piety as hostage for good behavior.

The chief points of this program are as follows:

- 1) Encourage the Nisei (American-born Japanese) by a statement from high authority;
- 2) Accept offers of patriotic cooperation from the Nisei through such agencies as a) Civilian Defense, b) Red Cross, c) United Service organizations;
- 3) Appoint an Alien Property Custodian to supervise Isei (Japanese-born residents ineligible for citizenship, under instructions to encourage the Nisei (U.S.Citizens of Japanese blood) to take over Isei property;
- 4) Accept INVESTIGATED Nisei as workers in defense industries such as ship-building plants, aircraft plants, etc.
- 5) Put responsibility for the behavior of the Isei and Nisei on the leaders of Nisei groups such as the Japanese-American Citizens League;
- 6) Put responsibility for the production of food (fish, vegetables) on the Nisei leaders mentioned above. (Japanese produce is frozen by Treasury orders; Japanese fishing-boats are beached by the Navy; result is threat of starvation to loyal Japanese families and food shortage in Los Angeles).

J.F.C.

*file
plus*

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PSF John Carter Folder

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

December 22, 1941.

FULL REPORT ON PROGRAM FOR DEALING WITH WEST COAST JAPANESE PROBLEM.

Attached herewith is Curtis Munson's final report with recommendations for a program to clean up the West Coast Japanese problem.

Copies of this report are being submitted also to the Attorney-General, the State Department, the C.O.I. and the Army.

Munson arrives at Washington December 25rd and will proceed to follow instructions for implementing the recommendations by action from the appropriate Departments.

J.F.C.
JFC

REPORT AND SUGGESTIONS
REGARDING HANDLING JAPANESE QUESTION
ON THE COAST
Los Angeles, Calif.
December 20, 1941
(C. B. MUNSON)

This report should be read in conjunction with your observers' pre-war report on the "Japanese on the West Coast," and his report entitled "Report on Hawaiian Islands." Our report on "Hawaiian Islands" should be attached to and become part of our report on "Japanese on the West Coast." We did not repeat many basic statements originally embodied in the first report ("Japanese on the West Coast") in the later report ("Report on the Hawaiian Islands") as these statements had already been made and held good in both cases.

We desire respectfully to call attention to a statement of the Secretary of the Navy evidently made to some reporter on his return to Washington after the Pearl Harbor attack as printed in the Los Angeles Times of December 15th and the Los Angeles Herald and Express of December 16th, (marked in red, clipping enclosed.) This release was a U.P. and A.P. release.

We quote, "I think the most effective Fifth Column work of the entire war was done in Hawaii with the possible exception of Norway," Secretary of the Navy Knox said. We suggest that this paragraph creates the wrong impression in that it uses the term "Fifth Column." This term is loose and has been widely abused. Should not the term "complete physical espionage" have been used instead? "Physical espionage" is supplied unwittingly by the gabble of Navy wives, by the gabble of loyal second generation Japanese, by the gabble of the postman and the milkman and classified by definite agents of a foreign government. To this may be added years of photographing, sounding and "look seeing" by disloyal and paid agents of this same foreign government due to the abject laxity of the

American people for the last twenty years. Fifth Column activities, such as in Norway, impinge the loyalty of a certain large proportion of a population. Your observer still doubts that this was the case in Honolulu. He doubts, for instance, that outside of sabotage, organized and paid for by the Imperial Japanese Government beforehand (i.e. professional work), that there was any large disloyal element of the Japanese population which went into action as a Fifth Column, running around and intentionally disrupting things on their own hook. We draw attention to the remark in the Secretary's report that people of Japanese ancestry employed at Pearl Harbor burnt their hands on machine gun barrels firing at Japanese planes.

What makes this physical espionage so effective and dangerous on the West Coast and in Honolulu, as we printed in our first report, is simply that there are a lot of Japanese in these districts and have been for years. For instance, we are given to understand that the best maps on the Alutian Islands were and still are Japanese.

Some reaction of an undesirable nature is already apparent on the West Coast due to this statement of the Secretary's. In Honolulu your observer noted that the seagoing Navy was inclined to consider everybody with slants eyes, bad. This thought stems from two sources; self-interest, largely in the economic field, and in the Navy usually from pure lack of knowledge and the good old "eat 'em up alive" school. It is not the measured judgement of 98% of the intelligence services or the knowing citizenry either on the mainland or in Honolulu. An observer can only report what he observes. Your observer must note without fear or favor that 99% of the most intelligent views on the Japanese, by military, official and civil contacts in Honolulu and the mainland, was best crystalized by two Intelligence men before the outbreak of the war. These two men are Lieutenant Commander K. D. Ringle of the 11th Naval District in Los Angeles and ~~Mr. Shivers~~ in Honolulu of the F.B.I. Mr.

Shivers in Honolulu, since the attack on Pearl Harbor, should know whether he was right or wrong, and we believe he is big and loyal enough to be only interested in finding out in what regards he was wrong and immediately notifying his superiors. In our first report we quoted Alice in Wonderland,

"If seven maids with seven mops
Swept it for half a year,
Do you suppose, the Walrus said,
That they could get it clear?"

The best measured judgment on the local Japanese may be wrong. Mr. Shivers in Honolulu holds the key. An attack is the proof of the pudding. His hindsight should be of inestimable value in shaping policy toward these people on the mainland where an attack has not yet occurred. Your observer guesses by mental telepathy that Mr. Shivers has not changed his point of view. Your observer suspects that Secretary Knox's comparison to the Fifth Column in Norway stems from either of two things: First, a very busy man being caught by the coattails by a reporter; and second, from the unknowing "eat 'em up alive" element amongst whom of necessity he was largely exposed in his hurried visit to determine responsibility.

Your reporter, fully believing that his original reports are still good after the attack, makes the following observations anent handling the Japanese "problem" on the West Coast.

If Shivers says he was wrong, your observer is wrong too, and this report should be thrown in the ashcan and something much tougher substituted.

SUGGESTIONS

- A. The loyal Japanese citizens should be encouraged by a statement from high government authority and public attitude toward them outlined.
- B. Their offers of assistance should be accepted through such agencies as:
 1. Civilian Defense
 2. Red Cross
 3. U.S.C., etc., etc.

C. An alien property custodian should be appointed to supervise Issei (first generation-alien) businesses, but encouraging Nisei (second generation-American citizen) to take over.

D. Accept investigated Nisei as workers in defense industries such as shipbuilding plants, aircraft plants, etc.

E. Put responsibility for behavior of Issei and Nisei on the leaders of Nisei groups such as the Japanese American Citizens League.

F. Put the responsibility for production of food (vegetables, fish, etc.) on Nisei leaders.

Enlargement of Foregoing Suggestions

A. "High Government Authority," i.e. President or Vice-President, or at least almost as high.

C. Memorandum Concerning Farm Food Production and Distribution Situation in the Los Angeles Area following December 7, 1941

The immediate results at the revocation of all licenses authorizing Japanese Nationals to engage in business was a sharp curtailment of the movement of vegetable produce into the Los Angeles market. This was due to the closing of a number of houses in the local produce market owned or controlled by Japanese Nationals and to a fear on the part of the Japanese Nationals on the farms that their produce would not be received or handled if they brought it in; also due to the immediate blocking of all bank accounts of Japanese Nationals.

It was at once obvious that some provisions must quickly be made to relieve the stoppage of food production and distribution. Under the assumption that they would be asked for advice for a plan of reopening the several closed Issei produce houses under Federal control, a plan was discussed and tentatively

C. Memorandum Concerning Farm Food Production, etc. (cont.)

drawn up by a group of local produce dealers.

In anticipation of a lessening of these restrictions a press release was issued on December 11th calling upon Japanese farmers to bring their products to market as evidence of their loyalty to the United States and assuring them that these products would be received by American firms for marketing. Issuance of the General License No. 77 under Executive Order No. 8389, April 10, 1940 as amended and Regulations issued pursuant thereto relating to transactions in foreign exchange, etc. issued by the Secretary of the United States Treasury under date of December 11, 1941, granted a general license under strict banking control for certain Japanese Nationals to engage in the production, marketing and distribution of food products in Continental United States.

As a result of the press release and the issuance of General License above referred to, the local produce market which on December 11th had a total volume of only 30 per cent of normal, received 75 per cent of normal on December 12th and was virtually normal on December 13th. In spite of the apparent severity of the banking controls set up by this General License, it was generally accepted by all concerned as a necessary thing and discussions were immediately undertaken as to the most effective means of operating under its terms without severe dislocation of the food production program.

Since the new license No. 77 immediately allowed the Issei produce houses to open under their former management in a manner more lenient than had been expected, it was still believed that these houses would be promptly taken over directly or indirectly by the Federal Government so as to transfer their operations to the control of American citizens. This was particularly expected because of the belief that operation of

C. Memorandum Concerning Farm Food Production, etc. (cont.)

these houses had been strongly influenced and directed previously by the Japanese Government.

"As discussions were proceeding looking to the setting up of a successful program for gradually taking over these essential businesses by American citizens and as clarification of a few points in the General License above mentioned were being requested, these discussions running over into Monday, December 15th, we were suddenly surprised to receive copies of General License No. 68a under Executive Order No. 8389, April 10, 1940, as amended and regulations issued pursuant thereto, relating to transactions in foreign exchange, etc., issued by the Secretary of the United States Treasury under date of December 15, 1941. We assume that this order may have been issued as a result of the wave of query and protest that may have arisen immediately following the realization of the total freezing situation which occurred immediately after the outbreak of hostilities. At any rate, the effect of General License No. 68a which appears to open wide the doors so far as Continental transactions are concerned, and puts a great number of Japanese Nationals back in control, rather than the loyal American citizens of Japanese parentage, many of whom we had expected would be put in control of these essential businesses.

"It has been and is our belief that the objectionable features of the old control system have operated by virtue of control over consignments of merchandise and credits exercised by the Issei produce houses against the Japanese on the farms. Of prime necessity then is the complete elimination of Japanese National control of the produce houses. How far into the farms the

C. Memorandum Concerning Farm Food Production, etc. (cont.)

elimination of Japanese National control should extend depends upon the individual circumstances. In some cases on the farm, control has already passed--in some cases perhaps several years back--into the hands of the American citizen children of Japanese parents. It is believed that in many other cases there are on the farms Nisei children capable of assuming complete control and who would have assumed that control very promptly if it had not been for the issuance of License No. 68a previously referred to.

"There are unquestionably a number of Japanese National farmers eager to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States. Some of these have minor children who are not yet capable of taking over the control of the farm. There are also unquestionably instances of Japanese Aliens on farms whose capable sons of American birth are in the United States Army and hence not available for control or operation of the farm. These are some of the reasons why the matter must be approached from the point of view of consideration of the individual cases.

"The statement is made by authoritative sources that Japanese National firms have in the past appropriated for their own use funds that were due Japanese National farmers in one locality in order to extend credit to Japanese National farmers in other localities so that American citizen farmers competing with them could be driven out of business, and in turn this second group having been established would be used as a source of funds to repeat the operation in another locality.

C. Memorandum Concerning Farm Food Production, etc. (cont.)

"Although there are California statutes providing ample redress for any farmer who believes he has not received proper returns from the commission house, it is reported that Japanese National farmers never make a complaint nor will they allow their names to be used to enable the California officials to properly enforce these statutes. It is extremely doubtful if this condition would exist in relations between Japanese American citizens if they are found ready to avail themselves of the protection and the machinery set up by American laws for preventing such abuses in business transactions.

"The fact that some of the Japanese Aliens are operating as commission merchants without proper license and bond in violation of these California statutes are some of the reasons for placing emphasis on the necessity for proceeding as promptly as possible toward elimination of the alien controlled distributor houses and in this field there are a great number of loyal American citizens of Japanese parentage capable of taking over with or without immediate control and governmental direction of the operation of these houses."

Fishing Industry

Fishing and produce are the two major industries of the Japanese. Shopkeeping comes third, but is much smaller than the other two. There are many little industries such as sign painting. It is our belief, however, that if the two major industries are re-organized to function properly in safe hands that the other minor industries will either be satisfactorily adjusted to the change along the same line or can be taken up later.

C. Fishing Industry (cont.)

There are distinct differences between produce and fishing. Fishing provides an opportunity for direct contact with the enemy and transmission of information, probably to submarines, although transmission of information to surface vessels is not an improbability. The general practice is that the Nisei do not own or captain fish boats. Japanese and those of Japanese descent own the nets and tools for fishing and organize into gangs while the fish boat operators hire the gangs with their nets. We consider it very dangerous to send all Japanese or all Nisei crews to sea. The real danger in this lies in the fact that all Japanese crews in the intense competition of following the fish might get into battles with Scandanavian, Czechoslovakian and Italian crews. The fishing people would like to use part Nisei crews--i.e. mixed crews. For this purpose a clearing house of loyal Nisei should be established (Japanese American Citizens League) to guarantee and give clearance to those who fish. Incidentally, the fuel might be limited to the amount necessary for the trip. Of course this is equally true of all Italians and other nationalities who are fishing. Unlike the produce industry less than 25% of the fishing is in Japanese hands. There has been issued from Washington an order which keeps all Japanese from fishing. This is palpably hysteria as they are not much more of a danger than the Italians who are still quite freely fishing.

E. & E. In case we have not made it apparent, the aim of this report is that all Japanese Nationals in the continental United States and property owned and operated by them within this country be immediately placed under absolute Federal control.


The ~~aim~~^{aim} of this will be to squeeze control from the hands of

E. & F. the Japanese Nationals into the hands of the loyal Nisei who are American citizens. As there may be a small percentage of these Nisei who are not loyal, it is also the intention that those Nisei who are put in positions of trust will be passed upon by the unquestionably loyal Nisei who focus in some organization such as the Japanese American Citizens League. It is the aim that the Nisei should police themselves, and as a result police their parents. Whatever organization (Japanese American Citizens League ?) wields this influence, it in turn must be rigidly approved by and under the thumb of our government or some group which fully understands the Japanese on the Coast and is appointed by our government. THIS BODY SHOULD BE ON THE PACIFIC COAST, FULLY CONVERSANT AND IN TOUCH WITH LOCAL PROBLEMS AND PREFERABLY OF A MILITARY OR NAVAL INTELLIGENCE TEXTURE.

Director B. Munson

December 20, 1941
Los Angeles, California

The attached "County of Los Angeles - Agricultural Commissioner - Los Angeles, California - 'Use of Insecticides on Vegetable Crops'" -- was gotten out here largely to assure the public that their vegetables were not being poisoned by the Japanese farmers. Of course this is just a baloney story that has been circulating for years and so has gotten fastened in the mind of the public. It is up to the Pure Foods and Drugs people to take care of this purity of vegetables in the same way as they take care of the purity of patent medicines. As far as your observer knows their work has all been well and efficiently done. For years, however, the Agricultural Commissioner has endeavored to stop the use of arsenical and other sprays which at times may be dangerous. There are many equally good and harmless insecticides on the market. Many farmers, white or yellow, are too dumb to realize it. Especially the poor old Japanese is probably ignorant of it, because he has done it for years and cannot speak the language. There was always danger that some amateur self-appointed food and drugs expert would analyze some vegetable and start a hue and cry of an attempted arsenical poisoning by the Japanese. The authorities have had no fear of this and this bulletin is not gotten out on that account, but to allay the public mind.



HAROLD J. RYAN
COMMISSIONER
KENNETH L. WOLFF
CHIEF DEPUTY

PHONE MUTUAL 9211

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES
AGRICULTURAL COMMISSIONER
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

524 North Spring St.

USE OF INSECTICIDES ON VEGETABLE CROPS

DO NOT USE LEAD ARSENATE OR PARIS GREEN ON ANY VEGETABLE CROP AT ANY TIME.

DO NOT USE CALCIUM ARSENATE OR CRYOLITE OR OTHER FLUORINE COMPOUNDS AS A SPRAY.

DO NOT USE CALCIUM ARSENATE OR CRYOLITE OR OTHER FLUORINE COMPOUNDS ON ANY LEAF VEGETABLES, SUCH AS SPINACH, CELERY, CHARD, ROMAINE, MUSTARD, PARSLEY, CHICORY, OR ENDIVE. NOR ON CABBAGE, LETTUCE OR CAULIFLOWER AFTER THEY START TO HEAD.

PYRETHRUM AND ROTENONE COMPOUNDS MAY BE USED WHENEVER NEEDED.

Rotenone compounds (Derris, Cube, Barbasco) should have at least one-half of 1 per cent rotenone content. Most mixtures are now being made with three-fourths of 1 per cent rotenone content and are preferable to those mixtures having less of the active material. Rotenone sprays should be used according to the manufacturer's directions.

Pyrethrum may be used as a dust at the rate of 1 part of pyrethrum powder to 4 parts of suitable carrier where the concentrate material is not less than 1 per cent total pyrethrins. Pyrethrum sprays should be used according to the manufacturer's directions.

Cryolite (sodium aluminum fluoride) may be used at a mixture of 1 part of cryolite to 1 or 2 parts of suitable carrier for crops other than leaf vegetables, when applied in sufficient time before harvesting so that no visible residue will remain at the time of marketing, or where it is intended to remove all visible residue at marketing time.

Do not use lime or any other highly alkaline carrier with rotenone, pyrethrum or cryolite mixtures.

Calcium arsenate may be used straight or at dilutions of not less than 50 per cent with suitable carrier if used in the same manner as described for cryolite.

Calcium arsenate or cryolite or any mixture containing an arsenical or fluoride should not be used in any instance later than six weeks before harvest unless it is planned to remove any visible residue before marketing.

Produce sent to the markets showing any visible spray or dust residue of any kind, will be subject to seizure and quarantine until an analysis of the residue can be made.

Make several careful applications during the early growth of the plant in an attempt to avoid any necessity of a treatment near harvest time. A dusting should be applied to such vegetables as cauliflower and cabbage soon after transplanting and a second application made two or three weeks later.

If arsenical baits are used for cutworms they are to be applied around the borders of the field and between rows, or around the base of the plants, and not directly on the plants. Use approximately 10 lbs. of bait to the acre.

All dusts and sprays should be applied thoroughly and uniformly to cover all of the foliage. It is recommended that materials be purchased already mixed in order to avoid the common mistake of getting incorrect proportions or poor mixtures.

Old fields should be plowed under immediately after harvest to assist in controlling insects and diseases.

Celery:

For worms use pyrethrum or rotenone dusts or sprays according to manufacturers' directions. Repeat applications at about 5 day intervals until infestations are under control. Thorough application is especially necessary with these materials as they must contact the insects.

Cabbage, cauliflower, broccoli, etc.:

Calcium arsenate dust undiluted or at dilutions of not less than 50%, or cryolite dust at 50% strength, may be used on young plants. Do not use these materials after the plants start to head. If it is necessary to control worms after the heads start to form use pyrethrum or rotenone dusts or sprays.

Tomatoes:

For tomato pinworms use 50% cryolite dust. Make three or more applications at about 10 day intervals before harvest commences. For especially heavy infestations it will be necessary to make one or more applications during harvest. Any visible residue must be removed before marketing.

For tomato fruitworms use either undiluted calcium arsenate dust or 50% cryolite dust. Three applications at 10 day or 2 week intervals should be made with the final application not less than 3 weeks before harvest.

For specific information regarding the use of materials,
call:

U. S. Bureau of Entomology, 1208 E. Main St.,
Alhambra. Telephone, Atlantic 2-1056.

County Agricultural Commissioner, 524 No. Spring St.,
Los Angeles, Telephone MUTual 9211

County Farm Advisor, 524 No. Spring St.,
Los Angeles, Telephone MUTual 3383

Bureau of Chemistry, State Department of
Agriculture, State Building, 1st and Spring,
Los Angeles. Telephone MADison 1271.

HAROLD J. RYAN
County Agricultural Commissioner

RF: Jack Carter Folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 23, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK CARTER:

In regard to your reply of
December 18th, "Summary of Preliminary
Report on Intelligence Problems in New
York Area", I suggest you work it out
with the Army, Navy and F.B.I.

F.D.R.

PSF: Jack Carter

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
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Confidential*

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

December 18, 1941.

SUMMARY OF PRELIMINARY REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS IN NEW YORK AREA.

1) Technique of intelligence interviews is well thought out; opportunity to study actual operations requires written or oral authorization to Commander Astor.

2) A single office or individual at Washington would be helpful in referring united intelligence recommendations for executive decision. For the present, if approved, my office could serve as that point.

3) Army and Navy regulations prevent O.N.I. and M.I.D. in the New York area from commissioning needed additional personnel from abundant supplies of patriotic and able individuals now debarred by reasons of age, formal education, etc.

4) Civil Service regulations create another serious personnel bottle-neck in selecting and checking the emergency staffs required by rapid expansion of functions and responsibilities.

5) All Intelligence Services in New York appear to be harmonious and disposed to cut corners (of jurisdiction) to get the job done. No lack of funds and facilities. The individuals in charge seem to be able, intelligent and know what they are doing. Some easier method of administrative operation or decentralization seems desirable.

Since O.N.I. and M.I.D. representatives are reporting to their respective headquarters on this informal discussion of their problems, I am submitting only this copy of my report.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

(Jay Franklin)

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December 18, 1941.

PRELIMINARY REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS IN THE NEW YORK AREA.

After a preliminary study of intelligence problems in the New York area, I had a long conference with Commander Astor, Lt. Col. F.D.Sharp (M.I.D.) and Lieut. J.M.Reynolds (O.N.I.). The following facts and recommendations resulted:

1) The frame-work of the system of intelligence interviews is excellent. I shall require written authority to have a member of this unit permitted to be present at ship and air-port interviews, in order to study the actual operations. All services were most cooperative but said that they needed orders, which are hereby requested, before they could comply with existing regulations.

2) Commander Astor said that his work as Controller of Intelligence would be expedited if there was one single individual or office here in Washington to which he could refer recommendations by the whole intelligence group for executive decision. At present, their common decisions are referred piece-meal to their respective Washington headquarters and action is delayed and confused. If you approve, this office could serve as such a link between the New York Intelligence ~~office~~ committee and executive division at Washington. The C.O.I. would be equally logical but there are transitory reasons why the Coordinator's Office might not be the swiftest channel for action.

3) Both Col. Sharp and Lieut. Reynolds were emphatic in their views that efficiency of their operations would be stepped up if the Army and Navy regulations could be waived in the matter of issuance of reserve commissions. There are many able men, who were emergency

officers in the last war and are now in their early forties and hence outside the age-limit prescribed in the regulations. There are other requirements as to college education, etc. which they feel prevent hiring additional men. There is an especially serious bottle-neck of this type in O.N.I. Reynolds says he needs 15 more officers; O.N.I. takes a minimum of four months to approve a recommendation and six months is needed to get a man commissioned. Similar conditions seem to prevail in M.I.D., except that the need for additional men is not so urgent.

4) There was also unanimity in the desire of the intelligence services to find some practical way around Civil Service delays in qualifying civilian personnel of all kinds, especially typists and stenographers. Col. Sharp said it took Governor's Island a minimum of a week to check on the loyalty, etc. of civilian personnel; after which a minimum of another week was required by Civil Service and the tendency was naturally to insist on people from the lists rather than from cadres whose loyalty and abilities for special intelligence purposes were demonstrated to the satisfaction of the Army. In this case, I should assume that some formula similar to that applied to Emergency Employees in the early days of the New Deal would satisfy the problem of recruiting personnel swiftly at a time when rapid expansion is required. For the problem of commissioning loyal citizens of ability and patriotism, as mentioned in paragraph 2), the appropriate decision must be taken by the Army and Navy respectively.

5) There seemed to be essential harmony and practical cooperation between all services in the New York area, and they stated that there was no lack of funds or facilities for their work. My impression on the total operation is that there may be greater need of back-stopping the system of interviews and of perfecting organization at the Washington end, as suggested in paragraph 2) but that the personnel problems

could be solved by an intelligent relaxation of red tape, especially at a moment when rapid expansion of functions and activities is essential.

J.F.C.

file personal

PSF

*Jack Carter
Golden*

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December 23, 1941.

PROGRESS REPORT ON WEST COAST JAPANESE SITUATION.

As directed, I took up the main points of Munson's report with Edgar Hoover and Francis Biddle. I have also sent them the full report. Both were enthusiastic and offered full cooperation. Since some of the steps involved require action by other Departments, they approved my suggestion that Munson return to Washington and assist in organizing departmental actions along the lines recommended.

JFC
J.F.C.

P.S. I also conferred with Donovan's man, Col. Buxton, just returned from the West Coast and found that he agreed with Munson.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

(Jay Franklin)

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December 23, 1941.

REPORT ON ULRIC BELL.

Ulric Bell has returned from New York and is preparing to work with Arch MacLeish in the O.F.F. Ulric has very definite ideas of how the propaganda work should be organized and I think that Archie should be told to give him a green light on methods, personnel and policy. I also think that before Ulric starts work, you ought to see him for two or three minutes, if only in recognition of the hard, uphill and useful fight he waged in the Fight for Freedom.

J.F.C.

*file
personal*

*PSF Jack Carter
Folder*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 24, 1941

MEMORANDUM FOR GRACE:

Jay Franklin Carter called to say that in the memorandum sent him the other day the President asks him to take the matter up with various departments. He would like to be able to explain to the heads of these departments his authority, etc. to avoid embarrassment. He says he has not been allowed heretofore to explain his authority.

*dj JFC
PK
FDR*

file personal

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December 24, 1941.

REPORT ON SAN PEDRO "DEFENSE AREA" PROPOSALS.

The attached memo. by Curtis Munson, with map, represents the views of the operating naval and military personnel for a manageable defense area around San Pedro. If action is taken, the specific request is made by Munson that their names be not mentioned in this connection in order to avoid possible difficulties with their superiors.

Also attached is a memo. in long hand, quoting the Port Captain in ecstatic approval of the executive order setting up the Los Angeles-Long Beach Harbor Naval Defensive Sea Area, under date of November 27, 1941.

In addition to the outlined defense area (land), Munson says that the operating officers should be allowed to remove all aliens from the zone.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

MEMO FROM C.V.MUNSON

Enclosed automobile map shows zone which Captain ~~Huffman~~ ^{Coffman} of San Pedro harbor and Colonel Hicks of the Harbor Defenses would like to have declared a fortified area. This has been carefully studied by them and has been so outlined as to include all the major points of importance which should go into this zone and which may be included with the least number of men for its protection. These two able commanders on the ground should be protected from any suggestion that they are short-circuiting. It is requested that the entire responsibility for this suggestion lie on the shoulders of your observer and he hereby declares that this suggestion is a composite of the best advise he could secure on the ground.

Attached also is executive order establishing "Los Angeles-Long Beach Harbor Naval Defense ~~ive~~ Sea Area" which has been a life saver to these men actually in charge of the defense of this valuable port.

It is your observers opinion that if the outlying fortified area is also declared that it will fully meet with the approval of these men on the ground and will be as much of a God send to them as far as the security of the harbor is concerned as the executive order with regard to the defensive sea area has been.

Curtis B. Munson

Destroy please

It might be of interest to know that a good old
tough sea captain in charge of San Pedro Harbor
(Captain ^{Coffman} ~~Hanff~~) treats the Executive Order "Establishing
Los Angeles - Long Beach Naval Defensive Sea Area"
as his most prized tool of defense.

He said to your observer

"God damn it, Munson, the fellow
that wrote that knew what he was doing"
and added with tears in his eyes ~~and added~~
"I don't know if it is the President or who the hell
it is but thank God for the man who had the
knowledge and foresight to give us that ~~at least~~."

CSM

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JFK

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JFK Carter

Metropolitan 4112
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December 26, 1941.

Dear Miss Tully:

In working out a system of satisfactory credentials for my unit, it would be very helpful if the President would sign a letter addressed to me, along the lines of the enclosed. One of the strengths of my unit has been the fact that it has not been identified with any single Govt. Bureau or Department and hence has not become entangled with issues of jurisdiction or authority.

Yours sincerely,

J.F. Carter

P.S. It would be my intention to show this letter to the heads of the other Intelligence Units, to be photostated for their confidential files, and then to put it in my safe deposit box.

J.F.C.

Dear Jack:

In order to facilitate ~~XXXX~~ the execution of your assigned duties and to assure to you and your representatives ^{friendly} ~~of~~ the cooperation of the other Government services, you should establish ~~XXXX~~ personal contacts with the heads of Federal Bureaus, Departments and Agencies and with the other Intelligence Services, ~~XXXX~~ ~~XXXX~~ ~~XXXX~~ within your discretion as may seem necessary from time to time.

For this purpose, you are authorized to communicate the contents of this letter to the ^{officials} individuals involved and to supply the Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation with a complete list of your operating personnel ^{for purposes of identification.}

Yours, F.D.R.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 29, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR

JACK CARTER

Referring to your "Progress
Report on Intelligence Problems in
the New York Area", I suggest you
take up No. 1 with William H.
McReynolds, and No. 2 with Vincent
Astor.

F. D. R.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

(Jay Franklin)

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Jack Carter 5-41

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December 27, 1941.

PROGRESS REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS IN THE NEW YORK AREA.

After discussions with F.B.I., O.N.I. and M.I.D., I am convinced that there are two important matters where improvement is possible:

1) Civil Service should be asked to waive or modify some of its rules on recruiting civilian personnel for intelligence services. The expansion period should be over in another six weeks, after which C.S. could check back and make sure of the qualifications and salary-ratings of civilian employes of O.N.I. and M.I.D. recruited on an emergency basis. If authorized I could take this up direct with Civil Service. This problem is general to the entire country.

2) There is need for greater pooling of intelligence reports and services in the New York area at least. For example, M.I.D. specializes there in contacts with business firms; so does Donovan's man--Ned Buxton --but Buxton's reports are not shared with the Intelligence Committee: they go direct to Washington, and there is some feeling in other services that it is Buxton's or Donovan's policy to share nothing and get everything. It also might be feasible to work out an inter-service pool of preliminary interviewers for arrivals at New York (clipper, ships, etc.), since the preliminary interview is designed simply to ascertain whether the individual interviewed has any information worth having, and is followed up by subsequent and specialized interviews. In this connection, expense items should be generously interpreted. At present, if an intelligence officer makes contact, buys his prospect a drink, etc. he pays for it out of his own pocket. Caution could be exercised in allowances on this score. This is merely offered as a suggestion.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

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December 31, 1941.

SECOND PROGRESS REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE PROBLEMS IN THE NEW YORK AREA.

I took up with McReynolds the Civil Service problems of recruiting civilian personnel for Army and Navy Intelligence. He advised me that Executive Order No. 8564 allowed the Army and Navy to hire civilian personnel outside of Civil Service. Civil Service Superintendent in New York City has been instructed to cooperate; McReynolds promises full and prompt cooperation at Washington. I have advised O.N.I. and M.I.D. here and have also informed Commander Astor in New York. I am going to New York next week to make sure that the whole thing is cleared up and functioning without delays. At that time I shall also take up with Commander Astor the second point mentioned, i.e. the possibility of pooling certain Intelligence functions in the New York Area. Judging by Bill Donovan's reaction to my suggestion that Buxton might make his reports currently available to the New York Intelligence Committee, I am doubtful that any of the services will be cooperative.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

1

file

PSF

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

(Jay Franklin)

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[REDACTED]

MEMORANDUM ON JOHN L. LEWIS AND THE LABOR SITUATION.

The attached report by Jim Gillan, of this office, on the C.I.O. Convention at Detroit, indicates the sincere belief that Lewis and his gang want to seize supreme power in the United States.

Gillan himself was threatened with assassination at Detroit by one of Lewis's "ace-killers" from the West Coast and he reports that there was a general and terrifying attitude of resolution and willingness to use force up to and including murder by the Lewis adherents. Gillan himself is an old C.I.O. man and used to work under Brophy at Washington headquarters. He is personally friendly to the Murray faction; his father was a mine-worker in Montana and he knows the background well. Gillan says that Lewis has long since lost faith in democratic practices and procedures, especially in his own union.

In this connection, A.F. Whitney of the Trainmen reminded me last night of the time Judge Dickerson in Chicago issued an injunction against the Mine Workers (in 1919) and order^g Lewis to withdraw his strike-order. Lewis promptly withdrew the order, but as a result of a "whispering campaign", the miners did not go back to work and boasted: "You can't mine coal with injunctions!" Whitney was afraid that any direct pressure on Lewis would be countered by a similar whispering of orders to his henchmen to keep up the strike.

J.F.C.

DECLASSIFIED

By Deputy *[illegible]* of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date JAN 29 1973

JFC

CIO Convention

The attitude of the people around John L. Lewis, A. D. Lewis, Ora Gasoway, new head of District 50; Ray Thomason, director of District 50 (all in all the United Mine Workers and their associated unions -- district 50 -- and the United Construction Workers Organizing Committee) at the just completed convention in Detroit was the most startling thing.

From the first days of last week the attitude was one of fight and no cooperation with anyone. When the convention opened on Monday Phil Murray came out with a fighting speech after August Scholle, CIO Michigan President and Tracy Doll of the Wayne County Industrial union council had spoken and both had failed to mention either Mr. Roosevelt or John L. Lewis. They both had high praise for the CIO, of course, and they both praised Phil Murray. Murray brought the first floor mention of the President and immediately the delegates warmed up to the job and what they could see was their job.

The forces then tightened. A. D. Lewis and Gasoway and Ray Thomason went into the old and well established terroristic tactics employed in the miner's machine. Thomason was in fights. The first fight started after Thomason had asked some CIO girls to go into the lounge and then proceeded with persistent questioning of Bernice Welch, neice and secretary to John Brophy. Miss Welch later in the evening told Stanley Rutenberg, a Murray man who did research in steel and is now in the National CIO office and Rutenberg called Thomason. He did not care about fighting but Anthony Wayne Smith assistant council of CIO, jumped into it and was knocked down and kicked.

Tuesday evening I went in to eat with a Mr. Wilging, of the British War Relief Society, Dickson of the London Express and Harry Bridges of the West Coast firing line.

Shortly after dinner I was accosted in the lobby of the hotel by Richard Francis, Seattle head of the Mine Workers, and Regional Director for the CIO there. He simply told me he was going to kill me. I asked why and he said because "I was a rat". At the time he must have been waiting for a chance to talk with me and was standing with William Dalrymple, Regional Director for the CIO in Oregon. These two men have always been bitter against Harry Bridges. I asked Francis what his main trouble was with me and he immediately mentioned my eating with Bridges. I finally got that straightened and he shook hands and gave up the project. However, I saw him again several times and he was very cool. Friday evening in the train station I spoke to him and he growled back "Yeah".

Over this little episode I did not become so alarmed until I understood the attitude of the miners better. When I was in CIO along with Walter Smethurst[†] who was then executive assistant to Mr. Lewis; Dick Francis and Dalrymple were our best friends. I told Smethurst about the threat and he said he could do nothing -- might get shot himself. These fellows are of the old hard school in the mine workers union and Francis did tell me that he was about the ace killer of all. This might sound like an alarmist talking until people realize that the miners are really tough and the machine is well paid, old, loyal and dependent. There are places like District 4 in Pennsylvania of the Miners, where it took the lives of five miners to get one president out of office.

I have never wanted to believe that a union in this nation could be built or supported on that basis. And it was never really until this convention that I realized that power would be maintained at any or all costs.

Phil Murray knew what he had on his hands and the first moment the convention went into a demonstration for him, he was ready and then swung into his challenging position. A. D. Lewis and all the rest sat still during the demonstration over the Administration's foreign policy while Murray glared at them.

After the first day of the convention it then became apparent that a fellow even on neither side dependently had to be careful to whom he was seen talking. Because I had been there for some three years and because they knew I was on the column here and the column had attacked Lewis and because there was never any position other than that of supporting this Administration on my part while in organized labor, they were extremely cautious. However, I knew this before going out because I had never been with the Communists in their many shifts and was never dependent upon anyone for my job except Walter Smethurst.

The attitude on the strike is one of fighting support for John Lewis -- within the machine. He recently raised Presidents' salaries to \$10,000 for the most part. Through District 50 and the Construction Workers they have been able to give many jobs of all through the nation -- to mine workers again for the most part.

Here is one explanation that couldn't seem right for the whole position of Lewis. It comes from his former executive assistant and a man who has been around for about 20 years. In his union and labor policies, when you don't get the things asked for you strike against the employer; the same is true in politics. Now, an Administration was in power -- for eight years. Nothing much more could be asked for and red^{ie}ved -- from this point of view. So, the best thing to do was to try and get a chance and bargain there. However, much central power is obviously needed in these matters for it was pointed out that when Mr. Lewis appeared before the Republican National Committee and said I represent so many millions -- they knew at the time that many councils and many unions had already endorsed the President for a thire term. He even had to fight his last two miners' conventions in keeping away an endorsement and then tried to wring Wheeler in at the last one. So he had lost his bargaining power before he could use it last time. Now that reasoning comes from a union man who tries to justify everything Mr. Lewis does.

Now from the head of the Labor Non-Partisan League in Illinois comes this thought which for my part only expresses the ideas of a supreme egoist. Here this is -- if John L. Lewis wants to offer himself to the American people -- then he must break away from organized labor to some extent. And yet he needs powerful help and organizations. This official is a close friend to a Lewis friend. Lewis is simply playing loose and fast with his own ambitions.

While this report on a very complex situation is behind many of the press stories there are certain conclusions that must be self-evident. The first is that John L. Lewis' opinion of himself and abilities knows absolutely no bounds. This is known-- he is idolized by his family and close followers. Then comes the conclusion, of some years standing, that John L. Lewis says little of democracy or does nothing in a democratic way, whether it is the operation of his union, the CIO or his personal life. The miners, in his viewpoint and in the viewpoint of his men -- appointed presidents -- is that when the union was a democracy it failed. Dishonest handling of union funds in States, too much regard for the humanities with union funds -- this issue is a constant fight within the organization at every convention. The answer is always the same. If autonomy is to be given the great districts -- Van Bitner is even appointed in West Virginia, and this is always a fight -- then all must be strong, which is right if the head man is not thinking in terms of personal strength. Actually, John L. Lewis has despaired of democracy -- he has said so. He would offer himself to the American people for any purpose under any circumstances, either as president or as the forced ruler.