

● P.S.F. Subject File

Carter, John Franklin - Jan. ~~1943~~^{April} 1943

Box 123

1/4/43

MEMO FOR THE FILES

CONFIRMED VERBALLY TO DR. BUSH'S SECY
THE FACT THAT THE PRESIDENT SUGGESTED TO MR.
CARTER THAT HE TAKES THIS MATTER UP WITH DR.
BUSH.

G. G. T.

*PSF Jack Carter folder
B-43*

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
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WASHINGTON, D. C.

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
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January 2, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: INSTRUCTION RE. DR. BUSH.

Dear Miss Tully:

Regarding your verbal instruction to take up the subject of the so-called Myers engine with Dr. Vannavar Bush, I submit the enclosed letter from Dr. Bush, indicating a remarkable degree of elasticity on his part. I am writing him to request that he get in touch with you.

Yours sincerely,

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

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January 4, 1943

REPORT ON PROPOSED NEWS-RELEASE RELATING TO DR. HANFSTAENGL.

As authorized by your verbal instructions, on discovering that "Cosmopolitan" Magazine had possession of the facts relating to Lutzi's presence in this country and was in a position to spill a front-page story in the Hearst newspapers, I made a quick deal with the editor of "Cosmopolitan".

They are withholding publication of their Hanfstaengl article until February 1. We are to make an announcement on January 28. Sumner Welles approves, and I propose to get Elmer Davis to fit the Hanfstaengl project into O.W.I.'s extensive propaganda-plans relating to the 10th anniversary of Hitler's accession on January 30th.

I attach a draft of a news-release which I have submitted to Sumner Welles for his judgment as to form and contents. This draft meets with the suggestions of G-2 as to manner of handling the information. All details of this operation are now working smoothly and Lutzi's work is proving of definite interest and value to the war-effort.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

Not to be published or divulged in any way prior to midnight, January 27-28, 1943

DEPARTMENT OF STATE. OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY

Dr. E.S.H., who for fifteen years helped the rise of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi regime in Germany, is now working for the overthrow of Adolf Hitler and the victory of the United Nations, under the authority of the United States Government.

Dr. H. is half-American, his mother having been a member of the well-known New England Sedgwick family, and graduated from Harvard College before the last war. His former wife and his son are also native-born American citizens, his son having left Harvard College, ten months before Pearl Harbor, to enlist in the U.S. Army Air Corps.

Some time ago, the appropriate American authorities were advised that Dr. H., who had escaped to England from Germany in 1937 and had been interned as an enemy alien by the British authorities in September, 1939, desired to aid the United States. Subsequently, by special executive arrangement with the British Government, Dr. H. was transferred from Canadian to American jurisdiction and has been actively cooperating with American intelligence representatives concerning certain aspects of the Hitler regime and the Nazi movement.

The information thus obtained from Dr. H. has proved of definite interest to the common cause and, subject to proper supervision and control, he is currently consulted by the appropriate branches of the United States Government as a specialist on matters concerning the rise of the Hitler movement and the personalities of the Nazi leaders. All information from this source is, of course, promptly communicated to the British authorities. In recognition of Dr. H.'s original status as a British civilian internee transferred to Canada, an appropriate regime has been established to assure the secrecy and security of this enterprise.

It would not be compatible with the public interest at this time to disclose details of his present location or the precise nature of his services to this Government. Further statements concerning Dr. H. will be made by the Director of the Office of War Information, from time to time, as circumstances may warrant.

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January 6, 1943.

REPORT ON GERMAN STRATEGIC MOVES.

Here is a copy of the latest report prepared by Putzi, in interpretation of Hitler's current strategy. He asked me to convey to you his conviction that the replacement of Prince zu Wied by Hans Thomsen as Ambassador to Sweden marked the liquidation of Goering's "gentleman's agreement" to keep Sweden out of the war, apparently in memory of his dead wife, Karin. Putzi believes that Hitler is now setting the stage for a Nazi occupation of Sweden, both to hold the wavering Finns in line and to buttress the Nazi occupation forces in Norway. All interested Government agencies, as well as the British Embassy, have been informed.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

PART XVIII

January 5, 1943

January 4, 1943

THE GERMAN SITUATION AT THE BEGINNING OF 1943

Field-Marshal Rommel in Libya and General von Bock before Stalingrad have been in retreat since November 8, 1942. This has certainly not affected German morale and German prestige favorably.

As Napoleon says: "However skillful the maneuvers in a retreat, it will always weaken morale of an army, because in losing the chances of success, these last are transferred to the enemy. Besides, retreats always cost more men and materiel than the most bloody engagements; with this difference, that in a battle, the enemy's loss is nearly equal to your own - whereas in a retreat the loss is on your side only." (cf. "Maxims of War" - Maxim VI).

That German prestige has begun to suffer, simultaneously with home-morale, becomes manifest through Hitler's sudden recall of his Ambassadors and Ministers to Spain, Japan, and Sweden. Hitler and Ribbentrop are evidently not satisfied with the sterile, procrastinating course affairs appear to have taken in Madrid and Tokyo. Therefore, high-pressure Ambassador Hans Adolf von Moltke of Warsaw-fame is sent to step up the Spaniards; while Ribbentrop's blindly devoted, suave Heinrich Georg Stahmer, formerly of the Ribbentrop Bureau on the Wilhelmstrasse is bound for Tokyo with similar instructions.

Of special significance appears to be the recall of Goering's bosom-friend Prince Victor zu Wied, who has been Minister to Stockholm for nine years. To be sure, Prince Wied's health never was of the best - but his successor, Dr. Hans Thomsen is no Goering-man, which would indicate that Goering's influence with Hitler in Swedish matters (Karin!) is not in the ascendancy.

The recent replacement of German diplomats points unmistakably to the fact that Hitler, conscious of the supreme danger Germany faces at present, is clearing the decks for action: younger men are being called upon.

What is Hitler going to decide? - It was a saying of Marshal Villars, often quoted by Napoleon, "that the boldest and most extended plans are generally the wisest, and the most successful." Hitler's plans for 1943 will therefore include the whole picture: Spain - Tunis - Egypt - Turkey - the Caucasus - Finland. In this Hitler will follow Carnot's, Napoleon's, and Suvorov's tactics, and steadfastly adhere to the principle of attack - of attack based on the choice of that point at which a reverse would be critical to the enemy.

- - - - -

From their latest speeches it can be seen that Hitler, Goebbels, and Goering have realized the desperate possibilities of a fourth year of War. One of the most potent dangers lurks in the natural tendency of the German people to draw fatal comparisons between World War I and the present conflict. These comparisons suggest themselves easily enough - especially to those who lived through the first World War, and can recall not merely the succession of political and military events, but above all the vicissitudes of morale, the ever-increasing hunger and fatigue which finally culminated in the great collapse of nerves: the November revolution, 1918.

To forestall a repetition of November, 1918, Hitler, Goebbels, and Goering seek to direct the German mind along new channels toward more wholesome comparisons.

This they hope to achieve by reminding the people of the Seven Years War, and of Frederick the Great.

It is no doubt hoped that, by dint of this new historical vista, the German people will turn away from the defeatist contemplation of the course and conclusion of World War I in the light of an inescapable omen.

The repeated allusions to the Seven Years War in the speeches of the Nazi leaders constitute an obvious attempt on their part to accustom the masses to the idea of thinking in terms of seven, rather than four years - of distant victory rather than imminent defeat.

It was Hitler himself who (in his speech in the Lowwenbraeukeller on November 8, 1942) drew the first parallel between the Seven Years War and World War II. Here he pointed out that Frederick the Great "in his most critical time" faced with only 3.9 millions a coalition of 54 millions. Apart from the falsification of figures - Prussia's population was more nearly five million than 3.9 million - Hitler ventured on to exceedingly thin ice by arguing that if it was possible for Frederick II to emerge victorious from a war that was fought for seven years against such tremendous odds, it should be comparatively easy for him (Hitler) to carry the present War to a successful conclusion. For, if a comparison between Frederick II and Hitler is at all to be embarked upon, the following salient points will automatically assert themselves: Frederick the Great was a legitimate sovereign, enjoying all the advantages of internal stability that go with a traditionally established monarchy. Hitler, on the other hand, is a usurper who is constrained to buttress his Government by oppressive quasi-police institutions. - Frederick practised tolerance in matters of religion: "Jeder soll nach eigenen Façon seelig werden." (Which signifies: everyone to his own taste in matters of religion). Hitler had Pfarrer Niemoeller and Pater Rupert Meyer thrown into concentration camps. - Frederick never attempted to dictate in the realm of the arts.

With Hitler even Rembrandt is classified as "decadent". - Frederick is anecdotically famous for unimpeachable, legitimate justice. (cf. the case of the Mueller von Sans-Souci) Hitler is notorious for anonymous terror. (No examples needed here!) -.

Frederick stood for progress of thought: long before the Seven Years War he had invited to his court Voltaire, Diderot, d'Alembert, Maupertuis and other leading thinkers of his age. Hitler consciously avoids the great scholars, and spends the bulk of his private time in the company of intellectual chauffeurs. Or would Immanuel Kant have dedicated his "Natural History of the Heavens" (1755) to Hitler, as he did to Frederick the Great? -

With special reference to War:

Frederick pursued only limited objectives: in fighting for the consolidation of gains made during the Silesian Wars, he was in effect working for a clearly definable geographic and ethnic entity. Hitler's projected empire is a geographic and ethnic monstrosity. Frederick, in the last analysis, defended Prussian soil, and thereby safeguarded the future of new Germany. Hitler's wanton invasions make such an argument in his favor impossible. In fact, Hitler's "New Europe", with its precarious conglomeration of conflicting elements, bears an ominous resemblance to the former polyglot domain

of the Hapsburgs, the "Ramshackle Empire".

While Frederick succeeded in gaining the goodwill of Silesia after the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), Hitler and his system on the contrary have become increasingly hated since 1940 wherever German troops occupy non-German territory.

Lastly, Frederick enjoyed England's alliance during the first three years of the Seven Years War, and subsequently at least her neutrality. Even so, Frederick would have foundered, had he not been saved by a 'miracle': the death of Elizabeth of Russia (January 5, 1762). Her successor, Peter III, was an admirer of Frederick's to the extent of publicly kissing Frederick's bust and kneeling before his portrait. It would be hard to find any Russian today, who would act similarly toward Hitler. The fact is, that not Kalinin's death, not Stalin's death even would stop Russia; and there will be no such 'miracle' to save Hitler. - Had Frederick, instead of fighting for the Oder, fought for the Volga, even Peter III would have turned to combat him.

NB: As the above elaborations do by no means exceed the knowledge of the average German (who is perhaps more familiar with the genesis of the Prussian State under the Great Elector, Frederick William I, and Frederick the Great, than with any other phase of German history) our informant suggests their immediate use for propaganda purposes.

OUTLOOK:

The hour of decision is rapidly approaching. If German retreats should continue through the next six weeks or so, that it is to say, if it becomes clear that Hitler has to raise the siege of Stalingrad, lift the blockage of the Volga, evacuate the oil-fields in the Caucasus, abandon cities like Rostov, Kharkov, Kursk, Orel, Smolensk, withdraw from the Leningrad sector, and, finally, lose his grip on the North African littoral - then the hour has come where almost anything can be expected: externally and internally.

When the end shall come in Germany, it will come considerably faster than it did in 1918: for this is the first great War, fought with universal use of radio. What then took days, can now be accomplished in hours. - It will then truly prove an advantage, in fact a universal blessing, to have given some previous thought to plans for a sound Peace.

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~~SECRET~~

January 6, 1943.

REPORT ON STATUS OF NEW AIRPLANE ENGINE DEVELOPMENTS.

This report is marked "Secret" because Dr. Vannevar Bush impressed on me the fact that its contents are extremely "hot".

He tells me that the British have already perfected a propellerless plane and that we will have a still better one ready for final testing within a month or six weeks. This uses a sort of "rocket-type" of "jet-propulsion". Its advantage is for use in assisted take-off; great acceleration of value for interceptor planes and also emergency bursts of speed. The limiting factors at present are high rate of fuel-consumption which renders it unsuitable for long range operations and the fact that time must elapse before experience shows whether it is wise to plunge heavily on its manufacture.

The advantage, other than tactical, is that they have secured high cooperation from highly competitive industries, have beaten the problem of a metal which will stand up under 2000 degrees of heat, and the result is simple and economical to manufacture and operate.

Dr. Bush said he'd be delighted to send you a summary report if you were interested. Will you let me know whether ^{or to him} to submit the facts, which are extremely encouraging?

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

PSF J.F. Carter folder 3-43
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 8, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

In regard to your Report on American "Tourists" in Latin America, I suggest you talk with Nelson Rockefeller about this.

F. D. R.

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"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

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December 30, 1942.

REPORT ON AMERICAN "TOURISTS" IN LATIN AMERICA.

I have given considerable thought to the various plans suggested for the use of "tourists" in South America, as a means both of gaining good-will and of serving as informal intelligence.

The following represents a means of achieving both purposes at little cost and without violation of any body of ethics:

My plan is to follow the pattern already established by those peripatetic "finishing school" groups of girls who used to criss-cross Europe in the 1920's under adequate chaperonage.

Here I would despatch similar groups to various Latin American educational centers and capitals. I would select as chaperones, Army or Navy wives and widows, who would be in the confidence of G-2 or O.N.I. and who would be informally approved by the State Department. Perhaps ladies who had previously accompanied their husbands on ^{various official} missions would be available, as knowing the country and the language.

The girls themselves could be recruited through the schools and colleges--nice, clean, attractive, eager, intelligent. The Treasury might allow some reasonable deduction from income-tax liability for the expense incurred by their parents. The chaperones should not inform the girls as to any intelligence-character of the enterprise, should simply encourage them to talk about things and people as observed. If the girls study at the Universities of Latin America they will be in direct contact with the most politically conscious groups of Latin America and could not fail to pick up and observe many useful things. The chaperonage would protect them from adverse Latin cynicism.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

January 8, 1943.

REPORT ON MYERS "PROPELLORLESS" AIRPLANE-MOTOR.

With respect to the claims made concerning the Myers Motor, it would now seem to rest in the competence of Office of Production Research and Development in the W.P.B. to obtain a priority for an oscillograph by which to enable the Baldwin Locomotive Company to make conclusive tests of the power generated by this device.

The total cost of completing these tests is said to be about \$5,000; the priority is the present obstacle.

The inventor, Mr. Elman B. Myers, ^{allegedly} originated the fugite which is the super-explosive of the British "block-busters". He uses an explosive mixutre of two fluids--comparable in cost to gasoline--for his energy. The claim is made that the engine is subject to flexible control and the present model, which has been operated over a period of two years, is said to have been run for 8 hours at a time without deterioration.

This device, if tested, would appear to have advantages not inherent in Vannevar Bush's "jet-propulsion" engine, which has a high rate of fuel consumption.

Have I your permission to take this up with Donald Nelson?

J.F.C.

Mrs. J.F.C.

*PST 2-7 Carter folder
3-43
full personal
telephoned message*

SOME ADDITIONAL FACTS ON THE MYERS MOTOR

The Myers motor, developed by the inventor of the super-bomb or "block buster" used by the British, uses as its fuel a minor variety of explosive. Hence, the power it develops is far greater than that developed by ordinary combustion engines. Explosives which are detonated provide a different kick and volume of pressure than chemicals which are burned at a slower rate in normal combustion. No one has fully measured all the power which an explosion produces because the order of power is ordinarily beyond that of any common measuring devices except fragmentation and velocity of gases released.

No one up to this time in the history of man has been able to take an explosive and detonate it in its true volume and still maintain intact the chamber in which the detonation takes place. Myers has spent many years developing the form and shape of the chamber in which he can detonate explosives and still not ruin the chamber. Myers has detonated his explosive as many as 1,000 times a minute in his present chamber and has altogether solved the problem of the type of chamber in which explosives can be discharged without any possible damage to the chamber.

The main thing in explosives, however, is not merely to explode the material inside the chamber, but to make use of the tremendous rush of gases which escape from the chamber when detonation takes place. The Bureau of Mines as far back as 1911 had discovered that if one places a bit of wet sand or clay over dynamite which is placed at an opening that the power and thrust of the dynamite is increased at least 90%. This is a process known familiarly in mining as "tamping". The important thing to recognize about the Myers motor is that in its test at Wright Field, either due to ignorance or deliberate intent, the measurement of the thrust of the engine was based on operation of the explosive without any "tamping" whatsoever. Tamping in the case of the Myers motor is accomplished by a series of pipes which entrain the escaping gases and extend the time period over which the gas is made useful from, roughly, nearly a thousandth of a second to well over one second.

This is of great importance in determining the fuel economy of an engine because ~~if~~ instead of allowing the tremendous volume of gases to escape into thin air, it forces it to follow a different course and to do different work. The amount of work it can do is understandable when one recognizes that the Picketinny Arsenal tests on the fuel show that the fuel used by Myers develops 50,000 pounds of pressure at a rate of 8,000 feet a second. This is equivalent to 25 tons, or say 12 automobiles weighing two tons each, hurtling through the air at a rate of a mile a second -- 12 heavy cars at a mile a second, not a mile a minute. Yet, and this is the important part of the whole matter, the Army tests were conducted without any system of making use of this tremendous pressure of escaping gases. In other words, the real apparatus of the motor, which is a set of simple pipes which makes use of these gases, was not permitted to be installed at this test. We will say for the sake of argument that the Army officials

did not know that the placing of some such slowing down or "tamping" mechanism increases the recoverability power of the explosive when it detonates. It is, of course, possible that as internal combustion men they knew very little of the art developed in the Bureau of Mines and elsewhere for increasing the power of an explosive through the device of "putting something at the back of it" so that you increase its forward kick. Hence, and this is of crucial importance, the Wright Field test was conducted without the true apparatus of the motor except for the chamber (which is a valuable contribution) and the thousands of pounds of pressure developed by the fuel was allowed to escape out into thin air. Even at that, the amount of forward thrust developed under these circumstances was measured by the Army Air Corps to be 4,800 pounds, or greater than that of a Pratt-Whitney 2,000 H.P. engine by some considerable amount.

Wright Field, thus, only measured a fraction of the power of this engine and yet in their own report, Wright Field had to call this engine, "an attractive means for assisted take off". Dean Alexander Klemm of the Guggenheim Aeronautical School, New York University, has stated that this engine will add 200 to 300 miles an hour to the speed of a fighter plane and enable bombers and cargo ships to take off with a 25% or more increase in carrying load and with a take off run of 25% less. All these calculations and statements by these recognized authorities concerning the engine are made on the basis of the official Army test, and this test, as pointed out above, measured but a small fraction of the power of this engine. Verification of this fact is available to any person who will take even sufficient time to study the art of tamping as developed by the Bureau of Mines as long ago as 1911 because it is unquestionably known that even extremely crude tamping processes add 90% or more to the effective thrust of explosives. The logic and simplicity of this fact is so astounding and so important in its implication for the true power of the unit developed that we feel most strongly that a proper government test of the engine with the tamping apparatus attached should be forthcoming immediately. Private demonstration has proven that such tamping spreads the time curve out to over one second and thus gives far greater thrust and fuel economy than gasoline. With tamping, and we cannot express too strongly its importance, this motor is far, far, more effective than gasoline.

We are willing to stand on the truth of these statements and have only asked at all times for some means to provide an official government test. The cost would be in any case no more than \$5,000.

Even if the engine only performed as fully as present wholly inadequate tests provide, it would add 200 miles or more to the speed of a fighter plane and this in itself in ^{dog} fights in critical situations would provide unquestioned air superiority for us. Every authority agrees that this motor should be tested and we think it is a crying shame that no patriotic American or quick-acting agency, despite the recognized importance of this device and unquestionable competence of the inventor, has had the guts and push to see to it that this invention is tested immediately and we mean immediately. This thing has been hanging fire considered the number one item for development by the War Production Board for months and months and still no action.

Any assistance will be naturally appreciated. The information above given is extremely confidential and only to be disclosed if you deem it advisable in the hope of getting action. You have the names of all the authorities whom you can consult on this matter and their opinion almost strangely is completely unanimous on the tremendous importance of immediate test.

Let us hope that there is at least one patriotic American who can give us action which we and our country needs on this important device.

PSF: Jack Carter folder
3-43

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January 31, 1943

MEMORANDUM ON THE HANFSTAENGL CASE

On January 27, after irrevocable arrangements had been completed for releasing on the 28th the news of Putzi's presence in this country according to our agreement with "Cosmopolitan" magazine, the British Embassy sent Mr. Welles a communication demanding the immediate return of Dr. Hanfstaengl to British custody. This demand appears to represent a pre-arranged British effort to create an Anglo-American issue over Hanfstaengl: The article in "Cosmopolitan" was written by Putzi in Canadian prison-camp under British auspices; British official sources leaked the Putzi story to "Cosmopolitan" in such detail as to enable them to bring pressure on us for a news-release; it was known only to you, the Editor of "Cosmopolitan", Mr. Welles, Mr. Berle, G-2 and myself that the agreed-on release date was January 28; the British demand, which cited the "Cosmopolitan" article among the reasons for Putzi's return, was timed almost to a second to put us on notice of their refusal to coöperate further in this matter.

The release of the news was well-handled and well-received. I shall make a separate report on this aspect of the case, since it offers a prospect of better public relations on similar issues of political policy in the future.

There are good reasons, in my judgment, for a quiet, temperate and good-humored refusal to submit to what seems to be a rather arbitrary demand. In other words, if the British

Government wishes to build up the Putzi case into an issue of prestige we ought to recognize their motives without allowing ourselves to become excited into a correspondingly arbitrary attitude.

The attached correspondence between Sir Ronald Campbell and myself is submitted to you, at his specific request, for reasons which will be discussed later on in the memorandum. Since the British protest is based on this correspondence, it is worth your while to consider it carefully.

Among the terms for Putzi's accomodation here was the provision that "no material change" should be made in his residence or status without prior consultation and approval by the British Embassy. Last September, it was the judgment of all those concerned with the case, that the conditions at Fort Belvoir did not comply with the terms of our agreement and that they would be met by a shift of residence. The new arrangements were supervised and approved by G-2, in detail, were approved by you and, under your authority, were executed by Mr. Welles and myself. We can, therefore, argue that they constitute no "material change". That, in fact, was the substance of our argument to the British Embassy. Nevertheless, prior to the change we advised the Embassy of the contemplated arrangements, requested urgent action and outlined the reasons for urgency. The Embassy promptly telegraphed London to this effect. The move was not made for nearly three weeks thereafter, and no reply from London

was received. Six weeks later, I received a rather offensively worded letter from Sir Ronald Campbell, stating that the Home Office absolutely refused to consent to the new arrangements which were already in effect and working well. I was directed by Mr. Welles to inform Sir Ronald that the arrangements met with your approval and that he suggested that the British Government should not pursue the subject any further. Incidentally, the arrangements in Putzi's case are identical with those outlined to me by David Bowes-Lyon in the presence of Dr. Field, as being the way in which the British Government accommodated similar political prisoners who were being utilized. It is also important to note that the arrangements conform with what Sir Ronald Campbell stated to be the "essence" of our agreement with them: namely, Putzi is being held under armed guard and is "incommunicado" as to correspondence, telephone and visitors, except on pass.

Sir Ronald Campbell admitted to me that the British Government did not propose to make any use of Putzi, simply desired to deprive us of his services and to liquidate the entire project. He declared that Putzi's reports were of no particular value. (Mr. Anthony Moore of the British Intelligence not long ago congratulated me on the reports supplied by Putzi, which he said were quite informative and of considerable value. Moore's chief also recently requested a complete copy of all Putzi's reports for transmission to British Intelligence Headquarters at London.)

In my own judgment, Putzi's reports are useful rather than important. His services are being utilized intermittently by the FCC, OWI, State Department, Military and Naval Intelligence, OSS¹ and are, of course, currently communicated to the British Embassy. Incidentally, Putzi has considerable strategic insight: he greatly disturbed G-2 on his arrival at Fort Belvoir on July 2, by pointing to Casablanca on the map and saying that of course that was where we should strike. He is also useful to us as a ready reference on Nazi personalities and Party tendencies. At an early stage, I also reported to Mr. Welles that possession of Putzi would enable us to measure the willingness of the British Government to coöperate with us on a fair and friendly basis in matters of political warfare. Since he is virtually devoid of political or diplomatic significance in terms of German political life, none of the issues involved in North Africa can arise in his connection. He will never be the leader of a "Free German" movement or involve any considerations of strategy. In this way, he has served us as a useful barometer in testing the British political attitude towards our war-policies.

1. The newly organized Psychological Warfare Section of the OSS is making a psychological analysis of Hitler and have asked for Putzi's reports, especially the Hitler material and the key-Nazis; ~~also~~ the special report on key-Nazis being prepared by my organization also will require the use of Putzi's past and future reports. Putzi's report on the Goering speech of January 30 was extremely useful to the FCC and was delivered in time for their confidential analysis.

Putzi has lived up to his end of the bargain, in good faith and to the best of his ability. The quality of his work has improved and his usefulness should increase, particularly when the Reich begins to crack. It would be unjust and inhumane to subject him to reprisals for what amounts to the offense of having tried to help us. His life would be endangered if he were returned to a British concentration-camp, where Nazi terror-gangs police the prisoners, and even if the British provided him with separate living-quarters his incarceration would, in itself, constitute British reprisals against him.

To a considerable degree, which I am able only to suggest, our attitude to the British may affect our entire world-position. If we yield Putzi, the Canadian Government may conclude that we lack stability and determination in our war-policies. About six weeks ago, the Canadian Undersecretary of State Coleman kindly tipped off Pierrepont Moffat that the British proposed to demand his return. At this time, with Mr. Welles' approval, Pierrepont was asked to tell Coleman that he considered it unlikely that we would agree to such a demand, since we did not feel that Putzi would be equally coöperative under other circumstances. If we yield Putzi up to the British, other Axis personalities may naturally conclude that they cannot trust us and will make their terms with London rather than with Washington, especially if they see Putzi punished for having helped us. My "agents" report Allied intelligence representatives in Washington watch-

ing this case very closely. Hence surrender of Putzi would promptly be communicated to the United Nations--and perhaps to Axis intelligence services--and might lead to the conclusion that we have decided to allow the British to run our political warfare. If the public--or indeed only our officials--learned of our surrender on this point, it might intensify an anti-British, isolationist attitude which would probably express itself in a wave of imperialism that would impede the war-effort and discourage national and inter-allied unity.

In short, there are considerable factors of prestige now potentially involved in the Putzi picture. My original impulse was to assume that the reason for the arbitrary British attitude involved merely the personal prestige of the Home Office official who had originally refused to exploit Putzi's willingness to help overthrow the Nazis. As, however, it has now been built up to involve the prestige of the Home Office, and of the Foreign Office, it is also possible that the British Government itself may feel that British prestige requires that London shall monopolize all political information and contacts with Europe and the Near East and that they desire to repossess Putzi in order to supply an object-lesson of their de facto supremacy in this field. Since the United Kingdom must continue to live next door to Europe, it is natural that they should take such a position, but it is hard to justify to our own people the converse of the British policy, namely that we are to do or die but not to reason why.

At this point, I would like to make it abundantly clear

that I have not the slightest trace of anti-British sentiment. My wife is British, I have two English step-daughters, one of whom has enlisted in the Canadian R.A.F., Women's Division, and throughout this entire Hanfstaengl negotiation I have maintained pleasant and friendly personal relations with the British Embassy, for whose officials--particularly Lord Halifax and Sir Ronald Campbell--I have great respect. The same also applies to Henry Field, who has carried most of the burden of detail on this project. In other words, issues of personality and bias do not enter into our handling of the case. Nevertheless, I have long observed and tested the fact that the British, both as individuals and as a government, respect only those individuals and governments who know how to stand up for their own rights and who are proof against the traditional British device of the "leg-pull" which is designed to entrap the unwary into emotional stupidities of a kind which enables shrewd negotiators to confuse issues. Truculence or hysteria on the part of others simply facilitates their task. Subservience does not win their respect.

Therefore, I strongly recommend that you do not accede to the British peremptory demand for the immediate return of Dr. Hanfstaengl.

On the other hand, if you should decide to yield for reasons of policy apart from anything within my knowledge, I have laid the basis for a relatively painless disavowal of my handling of the issue. I left Sir Ronald Campbell under the im-

pression that I might, by inadvertence, have failed to inform you as to the details of the agreement embodied in the exchange of letters between him and myself, copies of which are herewith attached. The original letter from me to Campbell was written according to your and Mr. Welles' instructions and a copy is on file in Mr. Welles' office. It would, however, be possible to take the position that you had not been fully informed of all details during this long negotiation, especially as you ordered me at one time not to refer the matter to you any further, and that you recognize the justice of the British argument that, due to a misunderstanding on our part, we failed to live up to the letter of our agreement with them. Since Lord Macaulay holds in his political writings that it is the duty of subordinates to take the rap, I wished to handle things in such a manner as to make it easy and natural for you to take such a course if anyone is to take the rap.

If, on the other hand, you decide not to surrender Putzi, I suggest that you tell Mr. Welles to reply to the British communication and authorize me to take our answer to the British Ambassador, in order to explain in detailed and friendly manner the reasons for your decision. Naturally, I would be equally anxious to be allowed to assist in handling any other reply which you might make in this matter, in order to retain as much usefulness as possible in future relations with the Embassy.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

C O P Y
JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

May 26, 1942

Sir Gerald Campbell
The British Embassy
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir Gerald:

In accordance with our telephone conversation of this morning, this letter will constitute an informal memorandum of the arrangements and the understanding for the temporary transfer of Dr. Ernst Hanfstaengl from the Internment Camp at Fort Henry, Kingston, Ontario, to the custody of the U. S. Government.

1) By prior arrangement between the American Legation at Ottawa and the Canadian authorities, Hanfstaengl will be flown down to Washington, D. C. He will be accompanied on this journey by a reliable agent of the American Government and turned over to a reliable agent of the American Government at the flying field.

2) Hanfstaengl will be housed in the military reservation at one of the forts near Washington, where he will go under the name of Ernest Sedgwick and have the status of an enemy officer on parole, inside the reservation. He will not be permitted to leave the reservation except on pass duly applied for by the agents of the American Government who are responsible for his utilization. He will not be permitted to receive visitors except on similar authorization.

3) If Hanfstaengl proves to be without value or is considered detrimental to the cause of the United Nations he will be returned to the custody of the British authorities in Canada.

4) All information obtained from Hanfstaengl will be made currently available to the British authorities in Washington through the C.O.I. or such other agency as is charged with responsibility for Hanfstaengl.

5) No material change shall be made in Hanfstaengl's status or residence without prior consultation and approval on the part of the British Embassy at Washington.

6) All financial charges in this connection shall be borne by the U. S. Government.

7) For the present, at least, I am the individual charged with responsibility for the Hanfstaengl arrangement. Official jurisdiction, however, shall be under the C.O.I., unless the State Department should desire to handle the matter.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd.) J. F. Carter

C O P Y

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Dear Mr. Carter:

As Rumbold has already told you, the Foreign Office have telegraphed to say the British authorities are ready to agree to the suggestion that Hanfstaengl should be transferred from custody in Canada to custody in the United States. I must tell you frankly that the British authorities view the proposal to make use of Hanfstaengl with considerable misgiving. I enclose for your personal and confidential information and that of any other persons who may be connected with or interested in the scheme a copy of a memorandum drawn up a little time ago in London going with some detail into our own experience with Hanfstaengl and showing why this misgiving exists. I understand that a copy of this document has already been communicated to the United States authorities.

The High Commissioner for the United Kingdom at Ottawa has been kept informed and we have been asked to arrange details of the transfer with him. I understand that you have spoken to Rumbold about this aspect of the matter and that the necessary arrangements are being set in train.

May I recall once more the very great importance which the British authorities attach to the conditions upon which their consent of the transfer of Hanfstaengl is given. They are particularly anxious that Hanfstaengl should not be allowed to leave the camp except with special permission and under surveillance and that similar conditions should apply to his reception of visitors. They would I am sure object strongly to his being made in any sense a focus of attention on the part of any persons other than those who may be professionally interested in trying to get something out of him for psychological warfare purposes. I think we all agree about the danger of confusing anybody's mind at this time into the belief that there are good and bad ex-Nazis:

The Ambassador is sending a copy of this letter to Mr. Sumner Welles because of his personal interest in the scheme.

(Sgd.) R. Campbell

Jr. John Franklin Carter,
1210 National Press Building
Washington, D. C.

C O P Y

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 14, 1943

Dear Mr. Carter,

Thank you for your letters of January 6th
and 9th attaching copies, each numbered 1, of the
Sedgwick Report, Parts XVIII and XIX.

Yours sincerely,

(sgd) R . I. Campbell

Mr. J. Franklin Carter,

1210 National Press Building

Washington, D. C.

C O P Y

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

January 28, 1943

Dear Mr. Carter,

At our conversation this morning you told me that you had not kept any record of the correspondence which passed between us last summer regarding the conditions on which the British Government had agreed to the transfer of Hanfstaengl to this country, and that you were not sure whether you had brought them to the attention of your principal in this matter. To enable you now to do so I hasten to send you, in accordance with your request, copies of that correspondence. You will notice that in the copy of my letter to you of June 23rd, there is an indication of the omission of certain words. If you would find it convenient to call, I would be very glad to tell you orally what the words omitted were and my reason for omitting them.

Please accept my thanks for the information you were good enough to give me of the course of events connected with the prospective appearance of articles about Hanfstaengl in the "Cosmopolitan" magazine, and of the decision taken last December that an announcement of Hanfstaengl's presence in this country should be made at the end of this month. You will, I am sure, understand the embarrassment we feel owing to the fact that no intimation of this decision was given to us until this morning after the appearance of articles in the press.

I have just read with interest your article in the "Evening Star".

Yours very sincerely,

(sgd.) R. I. Campbell

Mr. J. F. Carter,
1210 National Press Building,
Washington, D. C.

C O P Y

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

(Jay Franklin)

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

January 30, 1943

Sir Ronald Campbell
British Embassy
Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir Ronald:

I hasten to acknowledge receipt of your letter of January 28, with its enclosures. The omission noted in the copy of your letter to me of June 23rd is entirely agreeable. I believe that there is one more letter which you addressed to me, about a month later, in which you referred to certain conditions which, you stated, the British Government regarded as the essence of the understanding. Could you send me a copy of that letter? The originals and copies of the correspondence on my end have been stored in a highly confidential government file and I anticipate delay in gaining access to them for swift reference.

I do not think you should be under the impression that my principal is unaware of the facts as to the agreement, inasmuch as its terms were fully discussed with him prior to my letter of May 26 under reference. My hesitancy on that point was based on the human assumption that my principal might not have subsequently consulted the file or have recollected the precise details as to Hanfstaengl's status while in this country.

Yours very sincerely,

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

(Jay Franklin)

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January 31, 1943

REPORT ON THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S REQUEST FOR THE
RETURN OF DR. HANFSTAENGL

The British Government has demanded the immediate return of Putzi to British custody.

In my judgment, we ought not to comply with this demand, for the following reasons:

1) The reasons advanced by the British are purely technical arguments that we have not abided by the terms of our agreement. The technicalities favor our position, but the substance of the case is so clearly with us that the British reasons are revealed as pretexts.

2) Sir Ronald Campbell freely admits that they propose to make no use of Putzi themselves, merely wish to deprive us of his services.

3) Putzi has honorably lived up to his agreement with us, 100%. His services are useful, rather than important, but have the additional value of enabling us to gauge the British willingness to cooperate with us.

4) It would not be humane to subject Putzi to reprisals, either at British hands or from the Nazi terror-gangs which rule the British internment-camps, for the crime of having tried to help this country.

5) Compliance with the British demand would be taken as

a warning by Canada, which tipped us off some time ago that the British intended to demand his return, that we could be bluffed out of our considered position. Compliance would also be discouraging to other Nazi or Axis personalities who might wish to come over to our side. Compliance would also be interpreted by all intelligence services, including those of the "free" movements, that the British are running our political warfare. Compliance might help feed American isolationist sentiment.

6) The British, in general, respect only those who know how to stand up for their rights without truculence, hysteria or other emotions which entrap the unwary.

Nevertheless, if you decide to yield to this demand, I have so arranged things that I can be disavowed without much damage or difficulty.

In justice to Mr. Welles and myself, who have tried to follow your orders in this matter, I think it would be wise if you read the attached memorandum, of which this is a digest. Whichever your decision, I would also appreciate it if you would allow me to convey it directly to the British Embassy at the same time when Mr. Welles answers the British note.

John Franklin Carter
J.F.C.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
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*filed J. F. Carter folder
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February 1, 1943.

REPORT ON PUBLIC RELATIONS; LESSONS OF THE HANFSTAENGL CASE.

In my general report on the handling of the Hanfstaengl case, I stated that I was preparing a separate report on the public-relations aspects of this case. These aspects offer the reasonable hope that in future, hostile attacks and interpretations on various aspects of our political policy can be held to a minimum. I am prepared to undertake such a job, if authorized by you and agreeable to Mr. Welles, with whom I have already discussed the general idea.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

(Joy Franklin)

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February 1, 1943.

REPORT ON PUBLIC-RELATIONS TECHNIQUE IN THE HANFSTAENGL NEWS-RELEASE.

In the course of my efforts to give effect to the commitment to release the news of Hanfstaengl's presence in the United States on January 28, I worked out a pattern of public-relations which might usefully be continued by the State Department in other delicate issues of public policy.

The basis of this technique was my conviction that certain carefully selected members of the press were at least my equal, if not my superior, in patriotism, intelligence and discretion. This conviction was fully justified by both the wide circulation given to my version of the Hanfstaengl project and by the absence of hostile criticisms or interpretation.

The method adopted by me was to see the key-individuals of the potential opposition in advance, tell them as much of the facts--in each case--as they needed to understand the situation, assure them that nobody was trying to pre-determine their attitude but that it seemed only fair not to require them to comment or interpret the incident without knowledge. They were also asked, when they understood the situation, to pass word on to other reliable people in their line of journalism. It is also a matter of record that not one member of the 200 papers of the North American Newspaper Alliance broke faith in premature release or inquiry at Washington. When inquiry was made, late on January 27, it was after the day's press-conferences had failed to issue the news-release which they had been told would be forthcoming.

In this particular case, the people whom I used to discount possible

opposition and criticism included; Dorothy Thompson and through her a large group of radio-commentators; Walter Millis, foreign editor of "The New York Herald-Tribune", and through him other foreign editors in New York; Thomas W. Lamont and through him Wendell L. Willkie and others of the "loyal opposition"; Ken Crawford of "P.M."; Harry Luce and the Life-Time-Fortune publications; Considine of I.N.S. and the State Department correspondents of the A.P. and the U.P.; and Raymond Clapper of United Features Syndicate, as well as the North American Newspaper Alliance.

I am also assured that, in any future development which may grow out of this experiment, the top-flight industrial public-relations men in New York City will also be glad to cooperate. I believe that this method, if honestly pursued, will be honorably supported by the key-individuals who are intermediate between the government and the general, shot-gun press-release method. I am now working to promote a general campaign along these lines for renewal of the Trade Agreements Act.

Unless it is decided to offer me up on the horns of the altar on account of the Hanfstaengl case--I would naturally prefer that Jehovah should be appeased by some stray ram caught in a thicket--I would like general authority to proceed along these lines, in an effort to reinvigorate the Government's public relations which, as distinguished from publicity, have necessarily been neglected since the outbreak of the war.

In my opinion, a large part of the adverse domestic criticism of our North African political arrangements is due to lack of such a system. Patriotic individuals whose profession requires them to comment ~~on~~ and to interpret are suddenly confronted with facts for which they are not prepared and on which they are necessarily expected to comment. In such a position, they naturally tend to fall for sinister or propagandist interpretations which, in too many cases, are the only "inside" facts

available to them before their individual deadlines. In New York City, in particular, these people are literally deluged with "Free French" and British interpretations of current political moves. Washington, where other facts could be obtained, is remote and is not the "reservoir of talent" in matters of public presentation. O.W.I., particularly the Overseas Branch, is authoritarian rather than cooperative in its public relations with this group and, in any case, the members of this group are not only intelligent people with their own background but are usually superior in training to the O.W.I. and other government publicity representatives with whom they are required to deal. Everywhere I went among the professionals whose job it is to set the tone of our public opinion, I found great bewilderment as to the State Department's general position and considerable resentment at what they considered the State Department's refusal to take them into its confidence. They would all be agreeable to allowing me to act as an informal liaison-man in these matters and would, I am confident, work loyally with the government instead of working inadvertently against it.

Certainly, since the elections, public morale has weakened and public opinion has been confused to a point where the Administration is losing the support of the "liberals". I know, by bitter experience, that the "liberals" run out on you when you need them most but I also know that they can be kept in line if they are told enough about what is going on, soon enough to enable them to set their own course. Much of their uneasiness is due to the fact that they are neither consulted nor taken into official confidence on matters in which their help would be extremely useful. There is, for example, no political fury like that of a "liberal" who has been allowed to make a fool of himself; the trouble with this situation is that it encourages our allies as well as our enemies to discount our firmness of purpose and the reliability of our national commitments. I want to help combat this.

J.F.C.

Feb. 2.

*file
personal*

Dear Miss Tully:

In addition to these memos., I am anxious to see the President about the Hanfstaengl business which I reported to him yesterday. Will you let me know if he can give me any time?

*Appx next
week after
Paris*

J.F.C.

*PSF J. F. Carter folder
3-43*

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February 2, 1943.

REPORT ON SEAMOBILE DEVELOPMENTS.

Emboldened by advice and consent of the Senate Sub-Committee on Naval Affairs, and encouraged by me, the Cargoes, Inc., people have gone ahead and are lining up and preparing light-Diesel capacity and seven assembly-areas for swift construction when, as and if the tests of the "Seamobile" light-tanker are successful. They estimate that the capital investment per yard is \$200,000, which will enable such a yard to produce one "Seamobile" a week at a cost of about \$450,000 per unit.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

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February 2, 1943.

REPORT ON "TOURISTS".

As authorized, I took up the plan for "tourists" in Latin America with Nelson Rockefeller and his specialists. They approved the idea and are ready to proceed, in either Mexico or Colombia. I told them I had better advise you first and learn whether you had any further suggestions or modifications.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

pgp J.F. Carter folder
3-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 5, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

On the matter of the Sea-
mobile, I will have to wait until
they have had a trial run.

F. D. R.

Dear Miss Tully:

If the President approves this suggestion, a White House "chit" with the three initials will do the trick.

J.F.C.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

(Jay Franklin)

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January 11, 1943.

REPORT ON SEAMOBILE.

I should like your approval for Cargoes, Inc.--which is in charge of the Seamobile (Sea Otter) for Lease-Land--to get started now in preparing at least five assembly-points for a possible Seamobile program. By spending \$1,000,000 now--not all of which would represent a dead loss if the program were not executed--Cargoes, Inc. could save two and a half months of 1943. ~~These~~ Each assembly-point can build one Seamobile a week; five could turn out 7,500 tons of tanker cargo-capacity a week.

Since the decision to build the first Seamobile unit as a tanker, and in view of the loss of the nine tankers in Mid-Atlantic, this seems worth doing now. Incidentally, Jerry Land called up Cargoes, Inc. and asked them how rapidly they could start building small ships with Diesel power! If he has come around to the Seamobile idea, everything ought to be set.

The original directive by which you authorized the Seamobile contained authority for preparing assembly-points, but I understand that the Board of Cargoes, Inc.--being inter-Department and hence timid--would need specific encouragement on this matter. In my judgment, this is entirely justified by the progress made to date and by the needs of the situation.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

PSE J. F. Carter folder 3-58

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*File
personal*

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February 8, 1943.

REPORT ON SEAMOBILE.

On receipt of your instruction of February 5, I promptly checked with Cargoes, Inc., and made sure that they would not make any commitment or disbursement of funds for an expanded Seamobile program until after the completion of the tests of the unit now under construction.

What they are actually doing is to make a thorough survey, as authorized by the original directive, to ascertain the location and suitability of various assembly-facilities and to locate engine-capacity.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

(598)

hm

PSF

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3-43
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1943

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JAMES F. BYRNES

The enclosures are self-explanatory.

F. D. R.

Enclosures

Memo for the P. 2/15/43 from John Franklin Carter re plan to finance small war-plants - enclosures let addressed to him from L. C. Baeger re this.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
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OK J.F. Carter folders
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get phoned
re this file
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February 17, 1943.

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REPORT ON TALK WITH GENERAL STRONG REGARDING SERGEANT HANFSTAENGL.

This is funny.

I saw Harvey Bundy and General Strong of G-2 about Putzi's son and delivered your message. Both said that there would be no difficulty in having him assigned to combat-duty in the Southwest Pacific.

But in relation to writing up his account of the Hitler Youth movement for O.W.I., I struck the most fantastic piece of this whole comedy of errors. Gen. Strong told me that he had refused Army permission to let young Hanfstaengl give his experiences to O.W.I. on the representations of the British Military Mission that this would be a "violation" of our agreement with the British Embassy regarding the boy's father. Not only did the agreement have no reference to the son but made absolutely no reference on either side to the publication of any Hanfstaengl material, which was, perhaps, natural, since the British themselves were letting the old man write for "Cosmopolitan".

The fact is that the British have sold Strong a pup and now he's all tangled up, sore at O.W.I. and war-publicity, sore that the British have played him for a sucker, in inducing him to execute their political orders ^(in vendetta) inside our own Army, and is writing a "strong" memo to Harry Stimson, who may bring it up at next Cabinet meeting (Friday). By the way, in spite of Strong's alleged fear that the son would make revelations which might complicate psychological warfare, he had never thought of getting young Hanfstaengl to give his information to G-2. My own belief is that, in view of the origin of this fantastic order, we ought to go ahead and let O.W.I. bring out young Hanfstaengl's book, anonymously, subject to Army censorship, including possibly British censorship.

J.F.C.

REF: J.F. Carter

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library

RECORDED

5200.9 (9/27/58)

February 20, 1943.

Date- 5-17-70

Signature- J.F. Carter

~~CONFIDENTIAL.~~

Dear Mr. President:

I understand that you are familiar with the case of a Sergeant in the Army of the United States named Egon Hanfstaengl, who is the son of the well known Dr. Hanfstaengl. The Sergeant was recently detailed to this vicinity in order to be near his father in the belief that he might assist in obtaining certain information from his father for our Government and that of Great Britain.

I am informed that Mr. Elmer Davis' office considered that the Sergeant might be able to write an article on the Hitler Youth Movement, in which he had a part in Germany, and that such an article might be of value for domestic propaganda.

This proposal was presented to the Army and after careful consideration, Major General Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff, Military Intelligence, decided not to authorize such activity by the Sergeant, partly because the Sergeant's information could not well be divorced from information given to him by his father, with whom he has been in such recent intimate contact, and information from his father, in the General's opinion, should not be published except after careful consideration of its effect by the military authorities of this country and probably also those of Great Britain, by whom Dr. Hanfstaengl was delivered to this country. A further reason for General Strong's decision was a general objection under our Army Regulations against any soldier talking for publication about matters which might have direct or indirect military implications or effects.

-2-

My office has recently been advised by Mr. John Franklin Carter that you think it advisable that Sergeant Hanfstaengl should write such an article anonymously.

I want to be sure that your wishes are carried out promptly and also that you have before you the views of our General Staff.

If under the circumstances you wish Sergeant Hanfstaengl to be permitted to write such an article, the contents of which I assume would be subject to clearance by the War Department's Bureau of Public Relations, I will give the necessary instructions at once.

Faithfully yours,



Secretary of War.

The President,
The White House.

Roosevelt Library

5200.9 (9/27/58)

Date- 5-17-70

Signature- JWR

PSF: Carter

file personal

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February 22, 1943.

REPORT ON GENERAL STRONG AND THE CASE OF YOUNG HANFSTAENGL.

As I telephoned Miss Tully on Friday, Mr. Bundy of the War Department called up to say that General Strong had not said what I heard him say and that the British Military Mission had made no representations against allowing young Hanfstaengl to prepare an account of his experience as a Hitler Youth Leader for the use of O.W.I. and other interested Government agencies.

I accept this denial with some reserve. It may well be literally true but, in addition to the remarks on the subject of the British attitude towards allowing young Hanfstaengl to write for O.W.I., subject to censorship, which were made to me by both General Strong and Mr. Bundy, there is evidence showing that David Bowes-Lyons interested himself in shutting off Hanfstaengl, Jr. Among other things, General Strong intervened after G-2 had already formally cleared young Hanfstaengl's cooperation with O.W.I., and cancelled his Washington assignment thirty days ahead of time, without consulting Mr. Welles or advising me of this change in the arrangements which had already been made by G-2. Today, at the British Embassy, Sir Ronald Campbell confirmed the fact that they would not consider it a violation of the agreement and said that he had been in touch with the War Department on the subject.

Late this afternoon, Bundy told me that he understood that Mr. Stimson would take it up with you. I still am of the opinion that young Hanfstaengl, before going to combat-duty in the Pacific, ought to set down for our use all he knows of Hitler Youth, and that O.W.I. publication, anonymous and under censorship, is advisable. J.F.C.

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March 8, 1943.

REPORT ON PRESENT STATUS OF YOUNG HANFSTAENGL.

At the end of this week, the original period for which Staff-Sergeant Egon Hanfstaengl ("Young Putzi") was assigned to special duty at Washington will come to an end. The last six weeks of his assignment have not been directly productive, as a result of General Strong's veto of any writing, etc. However, since my talk with you on the subject last February 23, he has been working steadily on the book which you outlined. His manuscript should be completed in another three or four weeks, when he will be available for re-transfer to the Army Air Corps for which he originally volunteered and for assignment to active service in the Southwest Pacific.

In order to prevent his possible ^{premature} transfer at the end of this week, I should like your authority to see General Strong again and request that the necessary arrangements be made to complete ~~the~~ ^{Young} Putzi's assignment along the lines already discussed.

J.F.C.

*file
personal*

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~~MOOST SECRET~~

February 23, 1943.

REPORT ON NEW RADIO TRANSMITTER.

Henry Field and I have been working for some time to promote the development of a remarkable new type of radio transmitter--see attached report. The engineers are most anxious to keep this out of the hands of the Army Signal Corps, whose record is not encouraging in such matters. Would you authorize Field to see the Army ~~and~~ Air Force and the Naval Bureau of Aeronautics about this. If it is anywhere near as good as it seems to be, it would be invaluable. It would take the Germans about six months to duplicate it if they got hold of a set or obtained the blue-prints.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

PSF J. F. Carter folder
3-43

*file
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JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

February 23, 1943.

REPORT ON DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-SHARK DEVICE.

Here again is a piece of good news which requires no further administrative decision at this time. The attached report from Henry Field submits the fact that, after considerable research and field-tests, they have found a cheap and plentiful substance which acts as a powerful repellent of sharks, and promises also to be effective with barracuda.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

February 22, 1943

THIRD REPORT ON SHARK REPELLENT

We are pleased to be able to report that a shark repellent has been found after eight months of research.

The following cable has been received from the members of the Expedition off Ecuador:

"Total sixty-eight tests conducted under excellent field conditions gulf Guayaquil. Todds double barrelled substance completely effective answer to problem. Twenty-six effective tests conducted at diffusion rates as low as one tenth pounds per hour. No test ineffective. Experimental animals Carcharhinus aethalrus and Azureus and probably Sphyrna corona large and small sizes. We are certain data will survive all criticism. Diffusion studies this substance show maximum concentration six and nine foot levels which is ideal. Is also effective against teleosts."

X-Substance costs twenty-six cents per pound and is readily available in quantity. The next steps are:

1. To determine amount necessary per unit through diffusion tests.
2. To develop special plastic container.
3. To conduct tests with X-Substance on barracuda off Florida.
4. To conduct tests with X-Substance on pirana.

These proposals and a request for financial support will be put up to the Committee on Medical Research of the Office of Scientific Research and Development, sponsors of the project.

Great credit is due to Douglas Burden, who has directed project, Stuart Springer, Arthur McBride and Arthur Schmidt, field investigators, Dr. David Todd, Chemist, and Michael Lerner, adviser on Expedition.

February 20, 1943

REPORT ON PROBLEM OF PROVIDING PROTECTION
AGAINST PREDATORY FISH FOR MEN ADRIFT IN LIFE-BELTS

(Initiated by Dr. Henry Field and
Mr. Harold Coolidge, O.S.S.)

Contract No. OEM-CMR 184. Between Government and Marine Studios
IMC.

Report on Credits by W. Douglas Burden, Responsible Investigator.

SCIENTISTS

1. Mr. Stuart Springer, Senior Investigator
2. Mr. Arthur McBride, Junior Investigator
3. Mr. Arthur Schmidt, Assistant Investigator
4. Dr. David Todd, Chemist
5. Dr. A. P. Black, Consulting Chemist
6. Dr. French, Consulting Chemist
7. Dr. C. M. Breder, Consulting Investigator
8. Mr. Michael Lerner, Adviser on Expedition

CO-OPERATING INSTITUTIONS

1. Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute, Woods Hole, Massachusetts
2. Scripps Institute of Oceanography, La Jolla, California
3. University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida
4. American Museum of Natural History, New York City
5. New York Zoological Society, New York City

CREDITS

A solution to this problem was obtained by Mr. Springer, Mr. McBride,
and Dr. Todd, each of whom contributed an essential part:

1. Mr. Springer discovered that decomposing shark meat inhibited the feeding response of Mustelus (dog shark) in laboratory tanks at Woods Hole.
2. Later Mr. McBride discovered that copper sulphate had an even more powerful repellent effect than the extract of decomposing shark meat. He also discovered that copper sulphate inhibited the feeding response of certain small species of telosts.

3. Dr. David Todd was able to isolate the unknown factor in the decomposing shark meat. He concluded that it was acetic acid, a hitherto unreported substance in this meat. This discovery led him to suggest that copper acetate might give a double-barrelled repellency, a suggestion confirmed recently by field tests.
4. Mr. Michael Lerner was instrumental in obtaining a boat to conduct field experiments off the coast of Ecuador.
5. Through the generosity of the New York Zoological Society the services of Dr. C. M. Breder were made available to the Expedition as consultant.
6. Mr. McBride and Mr. Schmidt carried out the field work and after several months they were able to report that copper acetate was a complete answer to the shark problem, and that it was effective also against teleosts, indicating that it should afford protection against barracuda. He reported also that copper sulphate is effective in larger concentrations, but that the extract of decomposing shark meat alone is not effective under field conditions.

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February 24, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN F. CARTER:

You should see General Strong and Mr. Bundy and show them this written confirmation of my previous verbal instructions regarding Sergeant Hanfstaengl. I want him to remain here while you supervise the completion of his book about the Hitler youth for general publication and propaganda purposes, and will approve the manuscript along the lines discussed with you yesterday. Then I want the Army to return young Hanfstaengl to the Air Corps and assign him to active service in the Southwest Pacific.

F.D.R.

PSF 970 folder 3-43

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 5, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

JOHN F. CARTER:

Talk it over with General
Osborne.

F.D.R.

Report on Morale on Troopships, submitted
by J.F. Carter, Mar. 4, 1943; attached is
memo, 3-3-43 on Troopship journey to Ceylon.

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March 8, 1943.

REPORT ON HITLER'S PROBABLE "EXIT" FROM THIS WORLD.

You may be interested in the attached excerpt from Putzi's latest report, concerning the "probable mode of exit of Adolph Hitler from the stage of history."

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

THOUGHTS ON THE PROBABLE MODE OF HITLER'S EXIT

In view of the extensive speculations on Hitler's Death, the coming German Revolution, the intended Reichwehr-Generals-Putsch, etc. etc. - one thing must be remembered: The presupposition for any and all revolutions in Germany is the elimination of Hitler by imprisonment¹ or death. The fact that there is no revolution in Germany proves therefore, inferentially, that Adolf Hitler must be alive. It would be impossible to keep Hitler's imprisonment or death a secret for any length of time.²

-
1. As far as imprisonment is concerned, Dr. S. knows that, in the early days certainly, Hitler used to carry poison on his person for precisely this eventuality.
 2. Hitler's imprisonment in November, 1923, was the signal for what at that time was referred to in Party-circles as the "Wars of the Diadochi" (cf. The long and complicated contests among the principal lieutenants of Alexander the Great, that lasted from 323 to 276 B.C.)

In this connection, it would perhaps be helpful to compile a rough list of the main possibilities and forms of Hitler's elimination:

A: NATURAL

This would include Hitler's death by disease, his death by any bona fide accident at the Front or elsewhere. - It could be said to include also - in a certain sense - Hitler's voluntary suicide. Hitler is familiar enough with ancient history to know that especially the Romans, affected by Stoic doctrine, recognized many legitimate reasons for suicide, and punished with confiscation of property only suicides committed to escape retribution for grave crime (*suicidium crinosum*). The idea of suicide per se is therefore not reprehensible to Hitler; but he himself would commit suicide only when he felt that he had "legitimate" reasons to show. What these reasons may consist of, became clear to Dr. S. in the course of 1923 when Hitler, speaking about suicide in general, said that he would not hesitate to commit suicide if, having lost his freedom of action, he should begin to feel that his opponents were exploiting that fact for the purpose of political blackmail and extortion. "In such a case I would not hesitate a moment to make an end of it."

While Hitler thus limited suicide to the exigency of his loss of liberty, subsequent weeks and months were to show that he quite frequently employed the threat of his suicide for purposes of political blackmail with his collaborators.

He would force them into unwilling assent by assuring them that, if his will were not heeded, he would take his life. Whether, however, Hitler would commit suicide without "legitimate" reasons, is a moot point.

There are even people - including noted psychologists - in Germany who regard Adolf Hitler as the type of man, who, constantly threatening suicide, never commit it.

B: UNNATURAL

In a discussion of Hitler's unnatural death, i.e. his death by murder, it will be advisable to project oneself into the position of the potential perpetrators. Any and all such plotters - with the exception of Herostratic types¹ - would be primarily motivated by positive, chiefly political considerations. In case of a leftist murder, the aim of the conspirators would have to be the destruction of Hitler and the entire structure of the Nazi Party. The fact would probably be jubilantly publicized under the caption: "We killed him like a mad dog!" -- In case of

1. Herostratus, as is remembered, destroyed by fire the temple of Artemis at Ephesus in 356 B.C. only for reasons of self-immortalization. It goes without saying that Hitler's murderer would be assured a place in history. Hitler has for a long time been conscious of the danger from maniacs, of both sexes, afflicted with a Herostratus-complex. It is this category of unpredictable assassins, incidentally, which constitutes one of Heinrich Himmler's thorniest problems.

a rightist murder, the basis and aims of the undertaking would needs be totally different.

Leaving aside the multiplicity of technical patterns according to which Hitler's elimination might be achieved, one factor of motivation will remain supreme throughout: The assumption of Hitler's heritage. Because of this, Hitler's personal prestige must remain strictly inviolate. Only thus can the tremendous organization, known as the Nazi-Party, be kept intact, and kept in motion.

Like Hitler's own seizure of power in 1933, this change of Government would have to bear the stamp of legitimacy. Since this cannot be, if Hitler's successors appear in the rôle of open murderers, the method of Hitler's liquidation would have to avoid scrupulously anything which might be interpreted as a common murder. -- In case assassination by a designated person should after all be decided upon, a second Van der Lubbe trigicomy would surely be enacted.

The ideal solution for Hitler's exit, however, would be his "heroic death at the Front" ("Heldentod an der Front"). By engineering such a fictitious accident, the conspirators would have secured not only an unimpeachable façade of legitimacy, but additionally exalt the system through the APOTHEOSIS OF THE FUEHRER.

At this focal point, curiously enough, the secret interests of the conspirators would almost completely coincide

with Hitler's own sub-specie-aeternitatis-intentions.

In discussing the political exit of Wilhelm II in 1918, Hitler said to Dr. S. in 1923: "Wilhelm II should never have absconded to Holland. By doing that he has become the sexton of the Hohenzollern Dynasty. If Wilhelm II had found his end at the head of his guard-regiments, the Hohenzollern Dynasty would still rule over Germany."

Hitler knows that in case of defeat there can be no Saint Helena - no Castle Doorn for him. Concerned as he is with his ultimate historical stature, it is virtually a foregone conclusion that he will seek the "Heldentod" at the front, in emulation of Totila and Teja, the last Ostrogoths, who fell fighting against Narses.

The question is: Will Hitler do it - or will it be done to him?

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March 10, 1943.

REPORT ON GARDINER COWLES, JR. IMPENDING RESIGNATION.

"Mike" Cowles told Miss Blackburn in the O.W.I. that he intended to resign on or about June 1 to undertake the management of publicity for the Willkie campaign.

~
J.F.C.
J.F.C.

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March 11, 1943.

REPORT ON WILLKIE-REPUBLICAN STRATEGY FOR 1944 CAMPAIGN.

On the basis of Clare Luce's recent remarks at a Press Club Lunch, here is the Willkie-Republican strategy for 1944:

The Democrats (you) are specialists in and preoccupied with European affairs; the Republicans (Willkie, Luce & Co.) are specialists in Pacific and Asiatic affairs; therefore, in 1944, with the defeat of Hitler imminent, it will be sound policy to switch from the war-administration of the European-minded Democrats to a war-administration of Asiatic-minded Republicans. In other words, the argument will be that, since the streams themselves are being switched it is wise policy to change horses.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

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"The Week in Washington"

March 16, 1943.

REPORT ON TALK WITH GENERAL STRONG RE YOUNG HANFSTAENGL.

I saw General Strong late yesterday afternoon and discussed the question of young Hanfstaengl writing up his Hitler Youth experiences for the O.W.I. The General was both fair and friendly. I assured him that G-2 could censor young Hanfstaengl's manuscript and the issue of censorship seems to have been the real trouble, as he had the impression that O.W.I. intended to use the material without reference to Army censorship.

Young Hanfstaengl's manuscript is progressing and it is first-rate stuff. As soon as I get a fair-sized bunch of it together, I shall send you a copy. I know that you will find it interesting and see its value for propaganda use not only abroad but here at home.

J.F.C.

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April 14, 1943.

REPORT ON RUMORED REJECTION OF CURRIE AS ENVOY TO CHINA.

I heard today a pretty circumstantial report to the effect that we had asked Chung-king's agreement to the appointment of Laughlin Currie as ambassador to Free China ^{and that China rejected his selection.} This report alleges that the rejection was made on the advice of T.V. Soong who consulted Edgar Mowrer on the subject. Mowrer is said to have told Mr. Soong that Currie was too inexperienced and impressionable for the job.

JFC
J.F.C.

PSF J.F. Carter folder

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April 25, 1943.

REPORT ON PERSISTANCE OF SOCIAL OPPOSITION TO THE NEW DEAL.

You may be amused by the following illustration of the persistence of social opposition to the New Deal:

Some months ago, when Elmer Davis proposed my name for membership in the Century Club of New York City, I am informed by reliable friends that the Admissions Committee was fairly deluged with protests. Black-balls were like caviar from all the elderly gentlemen who belong to the Century, excepting my father and my uncle, few if any of whom were personally acquainted with me. My friends attribute it to the social obscurantism of the metropolitan community rather than to my own personality. Needless to say, Elmer withdrew my name with my hearty consent: the fact remains that New Dealers are still being ostracized in New York's artistic as well as financial quarters.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
plus mail*

April 26, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

O.K. ON HENRY PRINGLE.

F. D. R.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE BEST
AVAILABLE. EVERY TECHNICAL
EFFORT HAS BEEN TAKEN TO
INSURE LEGIBILITY.

J. F. Carter for the

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

PSF

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April 20, 1943.

REPORT ON HENRY PRINGLE.

Following a talk with Sumner Welles, who approved the suggestion, I asked Henry Pringle (whose recent resignation from the O.W.I. has made him available) to join this unit. He would simply share my office, do free-lance magazine work, and utilize his many acquaintances in and out of the government to continue a useful personal relationship to the prosecution of the war. Pringle agreed to come, provided you did not object. I do not think that there would be any resentment on the part of Elmer Davis, who remains on warm and friendly terms with Pringle and who simply backed up "Mike" Cowles in a show-down as to policy. Pringle himself does not wish any further issue to develop out of his O.W.I. difficulties. He has a 30-day assignment in the War Department to advise General Searles on matters of Army publicity and then will be available to work with me. Unless otherwise instructed, I shall expect Pringle to join me some time towards the end of May.

In this connection, I should like to state that I have known Henry Pringle for ten years and have the greatest of respect for his objectivity and ability, as well as his patriotism. He is a level-headed, well-balanced man, who knows the world and does not carry the torch for any particularism or ideology; he has more common-sense in his little finger than "Mike" Cowles has in his entire body, including his family. I believe he can be extremely useful in working with me and am reporting his inclusion in my outfit, chiefly because he specifically asked me to do so.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

J. F. Carter
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"The Week in Washington"

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Metropolitan 4113

April 28, 1943.

REPORT ON HANFSTAENGL MEMORANDUM ON POLISH-RUSSIAN AFFAIRS.

Herewith is Putzi's latest comment on the Polish-Russian dispute.

He expects one of the Sikorski group to turn up in Berlin prepared to act as a Polish Quisling or Laval for Hitler.

He also says that the Nazis lack the magnanimity to make a generous "Boer War" settlement with the Poles (Hitler will not appoint a Polish "Botha" or "Smuts") and the Germans regard the Poles as an inferior people, so he expects the present pro-Polish move by Berlin to boomerang in time.

J.F.C.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

(Jay Franklin)

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Wedn. Apr. 28-1943.

"QUO VADIS, POLONIA?--QUO VADIS, EUROPA?"

One hundred and thirteen years ago, in 1830 to be exact, the Polish Revolution led to the establishment of two separate camps: the conservative-aristocratic on one side, and the revolutionary-democratic on the other. The so-called White Wing of the Polish emigrants in France were thus led by the venerable old Prince CZARTORYSKI, who was trying to bring about the re-establishment of the former, the old Poland. The so-called Red Wing of the Polish emigration decided however to join the European revolutionary movements in Germany, Hungary and Italy. The struggle for Polish independence was thus carried on by two separate camps for more than three generations. It was brought to a successful end in November 1918 by the joint efforts of the conservative-aristocratic Paderewski and the revolutionary-activistic Pilsudski.

There is no doubt that the above described pattern is about to repeat itself. Poland today is split again into two factions, a red and a white. All the efforts to gloss over this fact will not change it. Realistically considered--in view of Russia's present military importance among the United Nations--the allies would appear to have no choice but to espouse the cause of the Red Wing for the time being. This, however, may in Europe be interpreted as the implicit admission that the original allied pledges to Poland given in the summer of 1939 have become void. That this consequence is propagandistically detrimental will become clear when one reflects what would have happened if the Allies in 1916 or '17 had decided to abandon the Belgian cause--which in 1914 had served as a casus belli. In view of the present awkward situation it will be both advisable and historically justifiable to maintain separate relationships with the two factions among the Polish People.

J. F. Carter folder

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PSF

April 30, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER:

In regard to your report on
"Tourists" in Latin America, the
President agrees with your suggestion
that it be delayed until later.

F.D.R.

No papers accompanied the original of this
memorandum to Mr. Carter.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

(Jay Franklin)

1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

April 26, 1943.

REPORT ON "TOURISTS" IN LATIN AMERICA.

I attach a letter from Mr. Robbins, of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs office, concerning the plan for personally-conducted "tourists" in Latin America. Mr. Robbins feels that the plan would be self-defeating at the moment, in that to waive the State Department's current rulings on travel and students would spot-light the first enterprise, which is tentatively scheduled for ~~XXXXXX~~ Bogota, Colombia. He suggests waiting for a few months, until manpower and transportation shortages have been adjusted. I suggest that this project could be usefully revived about the first of next September.

JFC
J.F.C.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
COORDINATOR OF INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS

COMMERCE DEPARTMENT BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 24, 1943

Mr. John Carter
1210 National Press Building
Washington, D. C.


Dear Mr. Carter:

Following our recent telephone conversation, I am confirming to you that it is the feeling of the various people with whom I have discussed your project, that it should not be undertaken at this time. Due to the manpower and transportation shortage, the State Department has adopted a policy of not making grants to U. S. citizens for study in Latin America until further notice. This seems a reasonable position to us and, worthwhile as we all believe the project is, we feel that it should be postponed until a somewhat later date when the manpower and transportation shortages will be somewhat alleviated.

We are in accord with your desire to get this program started as soon as feasible and will be glad to let you know as soon as we feel that time has arrived.

Best regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "J. Stanton Robbins". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the printed name.

J. Stanton Robbins