INTERIM REPORT ON THE MYERS ENGINE.

I think I should report a tremendously interesting development from the Myers Engine. The fuel—a mixture of two liquids—forms a gas which is more explosive than T.N.T. Rapid development work is now under contemplation for a rocket-projectile which will saturate any target with this gas, which is inert and heavier than air. The gas can then be ignited by a tracer bullet. This work is being conducted by Mr. John Bader with the Marine Corps at Quantico. I advised him to rush it ahead in the quickest possible way rather than expose it to the delays and cross-purposes believed to hamper the work of the Army Ordnance at Aberdeen. As soon as performance data is available I will advise. Its possible uses are startling—including launching gas clouds in the path of airplanes or saturating a battleship, as well as causing enemy pill-boxes to blow themselves up.
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: MISCELLANEOUS REPORTS FROM BOWMAN-FIELD COMMITTEE.

Dear Miss Tully:

Hereewith are twelve miscellaneous reports and memoranda from the Bowman-Field Committee on Migration and Settlement ("M" Project).

A-4
m-60
m-62
m-63
m-65
m-66
m-67
m-68
R-12
R-39
R-41
R-42
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: REPORTS FROM THE BOWMAN-FIELD COMMITTEE.

Dear Miss Tully:

Herewith, please find four reports from the Bowman-Field Committee on Migration and Settlement ("M" Project).

J.F.C.

No. T-33
T-34
R-47
R-18
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: REPORTS FROM BOWMAN-FIELD COMMITTEE.

Dear Miss Tully:

Hereewith attached, please find 5 reports from the Bowman-Field Committee on Migration and Settlement ("M" Project).

J F C

Secret Report on British Guiana (Part III, Section 4)

No. M-71
   M-70
   M-61
   M-57
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: REPORTS FROM BOWMAN-FIELD COMMITTEE.

May 6th, 1944.

Dear Miss Tully:

Hereewith please find 3 copies of current reports from the Bowman-Field Committee on Migration and Settlement ("M" Project).

M-64
R-45
R-46
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: "M" PROJECT REPORTS.

Dear Miss Tully:

Herewith, please find some copies of miscellaneous reports from the Bowman-Field Committee on Migration and Settlement ("M" Project).

Incidentally, Judge Rosenman tells me that you call him "Judgie" only when you have had one old-fashioned cocktail, and since I heard you do so on Tuesday last at the Press Conference, I can only draw my own conclusions about the fate of that out-sized bottle of special whiskey consigned to the President which I admired the last time I was in your office.

J.F.C.

No. R-43
M-75
M-72
M-77
M-79
M-78
M-76
M-73
M-69
T-35
T-36

May 12, 1944.
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: LIST OF "M" PROJECT REPORTS DURING 18 MONTH PERIOD.

Dear Miss Tully:

For the record and in view of the President's order to take up the continuation of the Bowman-Yield Committee on Migration and Settlement ("M" Project) early in June, I enclose a summary report listing the reports, translations and memoranda distributed by this Committee during the eighteen-month period, November 1, 1943--April 30, 1944. These reports etc. include, of course, the various translations and other memoranda which are distributed to interested departments as well as the confidential reports prepared for the President, according to his directive to the Committee.

No. M-74
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: REPORTS FROM BOWMAN-FIELD COMMITTEE.

May 26, 1944.

Dear Miss Tully:

Herewith attached, please find reports from the Bowman-Field Committee on Migration and Settlement ("M" Project) for the President’s files.

J.F.C.
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: REPORTS FROM THE BOWMAN-FIELD COMMITTEE.

Dear Miss Tully:

Herewith are submitted the report of the Bowman-Field Committee on Migration and Settlement ("M" Project) on East Africa, Parts 1 to 6. This report covers one of the subjects on which the President wished to be specifically informed when he originated the project.

J.F.C.

R-29
R-30
R-31
R-32
R-33
R-34
REPORT ON PUTZI’S COMMENTS ON OIL DEVELOPMENTS, ET C.

You might be interested in Putzi’s interpretation of both the Russo-Japanese deal on Sakhalin and Russian interest alleged to exist in the Trans-Arabian Pipeline. This was prepared by Jack Morgan of the State Department.
PART L
after the War and stated that this implied the continued existence of a Japanese Government free from foreign control and pointedly left out of consideration any ideas the Allies might have with regard to such post-War supplies to Japan.

The Doctor is of the opinion that Russia is essentially Asia-minded and that in the long run Russia, while not averse to seeing Japan weakened by Allied attacks, would prefer to prevent the collapse of Japan to a point which would enable Great Britain and the United States to reassert their influence on the mainland of Asia.

Further stressing the idea that Russia is essentially Asia-minded, the Doctor declared that Secretary Ickes might turn out to be Hitler's best ally if allowed to continue with his schemes for the tapping of Near Eastern oil supplies. Mr. Ickes, says the Doctor, declares that this oil is vital to the military effort of the United States but it does not seem to have occurred to him that that oil is very probably even more essential to Russia and that it is in an area hitherto not considered of primary concern to the United States but traditionally of the highest interest to Russia.

Stalin, says the Doctor, may have been preoccupied for the moment with other affairs but it might yet occur
to him that driving farther westward than his 1941
Frontiers might not bring him anything more valuable
than a few more thousands of hungry Germans while in
the meanwhile his Allies entrenched themselves in an
area of great economic interest to Russia. In these
circumstances he might well be inclined to slacken his
efforts in the West in order to look after Russia's
interests in the Near East.

With regard to the German-Russian front, the
Doctor reports the German propaganda line as still
being entirely confident that the Russians can finally
be held.

According to the Doctor the Germans are praying
for an early attempt at a second front as they seem
confident that it can be beaten back with such losses
as to dishearten the British and American peoples and
make possible, if not a German victory, at least a
stalemate.
MEMORANDUM TO MISS TULLY: LETTER TO GENERAL LEWIS

Dear Miss Tully:

I attach a letter which I am sending to General Lewis with reference to Putzi. Perhaps General Watson and Major Davenport, as well as the President, would like to see this.

J.F.C.

April 14, 1944
April 13, 1944

Major General John T. Lewis
Military District of Washington
War Department
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Lewis:

This is to express my admiration and thanks for the skill and tact with which the Counter-Intelligence Corps has handled the entire Sedgwick Project since assuming responsibility for secrecy and security on this project. I am sure that I fairly represent the attitude of my principal in conveying to you appreciation for this service.

Colonel Casteel, Lieutenant Colonel Brennbecke and Captain Neumann of the C.I.C. have shown a complete understanding of the many delicate issues involved in this project and have handled them with great firmness and discretion.

The men actually assigned to the project—Garanthro, Gardner, Davenport and Auers—have been energetic, adaptable and completely cooperative.

In this connection, I should like to express the highest appreciation for the services performed by Special Agent Garanthro. He took charge of the project at the most difficult moment and carried on with an energy, good humor and complete willingness which are beyond praise. If there is any possibility of Army recognition of his services, I wish to endorse them. In any case, I should like to have it stated on his record that his performance under exceptionally difficult conditions has been of a consistently high order of intelligent devotion to duty.

Yours very sincerely,

John F. Carter

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date NOV 1 1972
REPORT ON PUTZI'S VIEW ON CURRENT POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS IN EUROPE.

You may be interested in a glance at Jack Morgan's report on Putzi's latest comments on European political developments.

J.F.C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 1, 1972
PART LI
April 21, 1944

On my visit of April 20, Dr. S. referred to recent press reports that the Allies contemplate a prolonged period of joint supervision of German affairs and took the occasion to warn against over-optimistic belief that, under such supervision it will be possible to set up an enduring new régime along pre-Hitler democratic lines.

The liquidation of the Nazi governmental machine will be easy, he says, and the liquidation of Nazi officialdom will undoubtedly go forward amid general enthusiasm, but, in his opinion, those who think that once this is accomplished it will be easy to set up a liberal régime, as understood in Western Europe before the War, seriously misjudge the situation. The Social Democrats and the moderate liberals had their opportunity before the War, he says, and in the judgment of the German masses failed miserably. Would-be leaders from these groups will find no acceptance among the people, who have long since passed to a more radical point of view.

The present fighting generation and the youth of the country may well abandon Nazism as a failure, but their swing will not be to the right but still farther to the left. In his opinion the only possible government will be a labor government strongly inclined toward radical and very probably totalitarian solutions.
He states that under the exceedingly complex economic and social conditions which will prevail after the War, an army of occupation which endeavors to set up a liberal democratic régime in Germany will find that its program makes no appeal to the German masses. As long as our Armies remain, such a government may stagger along, but once the foreign support is removed, as in the long run it must be, then the liberal régime will fall of its own weight.

The Doctor feels that the foregoing would be the probable result if Germany were occupied only by the British, American, or French. In such case the eventual labor government might represent some new form of leftist organization.

If, however, there is joint occupation with the Russians the future German Government can take only one form—it will inescapably follow the Russian formula. The Russians would be the only occupying power whose governmental forms and ideology would fit naturally and easily into the circumstances which will prevail in Germany at the end of the War. The only effective and aggressive party organization which will appear at that time, and which will already have its underground in all zones, will be the Communist. The youth of Germany will be in a receptive mood and it will not be necessary for Russia to take any steps contrary to agreements which it might have
with its Allies as to the form of the German Government. The Communist régime will appear as a spontaneous German movement.

With regard to the prospective invasion, the Doctor states that German propaganda still takes a definitely optimistic line. The German view, he says, is undoubtedly that if the elections are unfavorable to Roosevelt the future conduct of the War will develop along lines more favorable to Germany and if the invasion fails the elections will inevitably be unfavorable to Roosevelt and this in turn will weaken Churchill's position.

The Doctor believes that in the event the invasion should, from the German point of view, make unexpected progress, the Germans, in view of the implications of our unconditional surrender policy, will continue to fight with the same determination as in Italy. The Doctor states that German propaganda still maintains a note of absolute confidence that the Russians will be stopped without serious penetration beyond their old borders.
REPORT ON PUTZI'S COMMENT ON MRS. CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S VISIT TO MOSCOW.

Putzi believes that the purpose of Mrs. Chiang Kai-Shek's visit to Moscow is not confined to making terms between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party but is aimed at securing Soviet good offices in arranging terms of peace between China and Japan. He points out that the Japanese have been making prolonged overtures for peace with Chungking and that, with Soviet support, the terms—if any—might be better. He also asserts that the mental processes of Asia describe a parabola rather than move in a straight line. He thinks that China is, in any case, practically out of the war and that we ought to make our strategic plans to allow for this contingency.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
S.I.R.

Will you tell Maury Maverick
about this and then close the file?
F.D.R.

Report from John Franklin Carter, 5-11-44,
on Over-Lending in connection with financing
war contracts.
May 18, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. ELMER DAVIS:

What do you think of this idea?

F.D.R.
REPORT ON SUGGESTED FAKE SPEECH BY HITLER TO AID INVASION.

Repeated talks with [Putzi] leave me convinced that the Germans would be suckers for a psychological warfare move such as this one. It would, of course, have to be checked with the Soviet Government to avoid possible misunderstanding.

The strongest point in Nazi propaganda is the European fear of Communism and of Asia. Berlin broadcasts focus attention on this theme, almost ignoring the U.S.A. and Great Britain.

I assume that somewhere here or in England, we already have a man who can imitate Hitler's voice and style in speech-making. If not, it could be done in some other way.

On the eve of the invasion, let the fake Hitler broadcast over all of our Black radio-stations along these lines: Instruct the German troops, German civilians and citizens of occupied countries to put up only a token resistance to the invasion and to cooperate with Anglo-American forces. Have the fake Hitler state that his first duty is to defend European civilization from Asiatic Bolshevism and that he has reached an understanding with the leaders of England and America for Anglo-American forces to cooperate with Germany in holding back the Jewish hordes of Asiatic Bolshevists from Europe. Let him state that U.S. bombers will soon establish air-bases in Germany to enable the forces of civilization to reconquer Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad etc. Let it appear to be a coup of his "intuition" that under the guise of an invasion he is actually getting an enormous reinforcement against the Red Armies. Then our troops could move in and operate against a background of German bewilderment.

Strange as it seems, this would appear plausible to the Germans and if cleverly planted either via a fake Hitler or through some other official-sounding set-up, it might save lives and time.
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: BLOW-UP WITH THE ARMY.

Dear Miss Tully:

About ten days ago I sent Gen. Watson an informal report and file concerning a Selective Service Case that seemed to be important. He had previously suggested that details should, as much as possible, be spared the President and this particular case simply involved an application of Draft Board policy rather than policy itself. It involved a request for six months deferment for a man allegedly engaged in electronic work on a secret device for the Navy.

In General Watson's absence, it was not touted to Admiral Brown or General Hershey, but was sent by Major Davenport to the War Department.

Since then, so far as I can gather, the War Department has engaged in a sweeping investigation, punitive in spirit, against the source of my information, against the company involved, and in part against me. In the meantime, I do not believe that any decision has been taken on the facts themselves.

I regret this incident, especially because it suggests that, in future, any attempt to spare the President detailed decisions will be ineffective and dangerous to those who desire to accelerate and improve the war-effort. I suggest that you ask General Watson if there is not any way in which this bust-up can be stopped and the case under reference decided on its merits. I hasten to add that the individual involved is not known to me personally and that I have no contact with or interest in his company, past, present or future.

J.F.C.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 23, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

DR. McINTIRE

What do I do about this?

F. D. R.

Memorandum from John Franklin Carter, 5/19/44,
in re Report on New Orientation Program for
Wounded Soldiers, together with a memorandum
which Mr. Carter received from Henry F. Pringle,
5/19/44, on this subject.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

J. Franklin Carter said that O.S.S. had the proper facilities for this kind of thing -- not O.W.I. Therefore, he suggests that it be sent to OSS and Mr. Stettinius for their views.

Are the attached memos all right to send out?

G.
May 24, 1944

The President
The White House

Dear Mr. President:

The suggestion herein contained is technically feasible, but in my opinion it would get us into far more trouble than it would avert. For a matter of two or three hours it might cause considerable confusion in Germany; but the success of the invasion is not likely to depend on any two or three hours, and the consequences when the truth is made known might backfire on us very badly. Confidence in our credibility would be gravely shaken and much of the effect of our propaganda would be permanently undone. This quite aside from the effect on the occupied nations of the original fake broadcast, which might cost us a great deal of underground support.

Since we have no black radio stations and would have to depend on those of the British for any such enterprise, we ventured to discuss the idea with their chief representative here, who took the same view of it.

Very respectfully,

Elmer Davis
Director
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR J. FRANKLIN CARTER:

There is nothing new on the seamobile matter.

In regard to the other three suggestions the President asks that you take numbers one and two up with Mr. Stettinius and number three we referred to OWI and attached is a reply.

GOT
MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY:

Dear Miss Tully:

There are three related questions which I wished to take up with the President, and also I wished to ask whether the Seemobile project has been entirely abandoned or whether there is anything he wishes me to do in this connection. The last time I mentioned the Seemobile to him, some weeks ago, the President indicated that there might be a program and that he might let me help to activate it.

The other matters are more urgent. They involved: 1) A request from C.S.S. to get British permission to let Putzi do some broadcasting for them; 2) an expression from Ed Stettinius to the effect that it would be most helpful if somebody could assure the "decent Germans" that they weren't going to be killed to a man; 3) my recent suggestion to the President for a "fake Hitler" to make a speech over C.S.S. radio telling the Germans to welcome the invasion as a "reinforcement" for the defense of Europe. In this connection, I have already got myself established as a part-time "technical consultant", serving without pay, in C.S.S. for psychological warfare and begin to see the possibility of making some effective use of Putzi, as well as devising means to confuse and befuddle the Nazis. Since the last suggestion was made for using Putzi on the radio, there may have been a modification of the British attitude and, by having the Army accept responsibility for his security, one of the initial British objections to the provisional regime which we set up for handling him has been removed. It is possible that a new approach, through London, might be better received than any overture through the British Embassy here.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By V. J. Stewart Date 11-1-22
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 3, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR
HON. E. R. STETTINIUS, JR.

What do you think of this idea?

F.D.R.
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 5, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BUXTON, O.S.B.

What do you think of this idea?

F.D.R.

Enclosure.
REPORT ON SUGGESTED FAKE SPEECH BY HITLER TO AID INVASION.

Repeated talks with a highly intelligent German now in this country leave me convinced that the Germans would be suckers for a psychological warfare move such as this one. It would, of course, have to be checked with the Soviet Government to avoid possible misunderstanding.

The strongest point in Nazi propaganda is the European fear of Communism and of Asia. Berlin broadcasts focus attention on this theme, almost ignoring the U.S.A. and Great Britain.

I assume that somewhere here or in England, we already have a man who can imitate Hitler's voice and style in speech-making. If not, it could be done in some other way.

On the eve of the invasion, let the fake Hitler broadcast over all of our Black radio-stations along these lines: Instruct the German troops, German civilians and citizens of occupied countries to put up only a token resistance to the invasion and to cooperate with Anglo-American forces. Have the fake Hitler state that his first duty is to defend European civilization from Asiatic Bolshevism and that he has reached an understanding with the leaders of England and America for Anglo-American forces to cooperate with Germany in holding back the Jewish hordes of Asiatic Bolshevists from Europe. Let him state that U.S. bombers will soon establish air-bases in Germany to enable the forces of civilization to reconquer Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, etc. Let it appear to be a coup of his "intuition" that under the guise of an invasion he is actually getting an enormous reinforcement against the Red Armies. Then our
troops could move in and operate against a background of German bewilderment.

Strange as it seems, this would appear plausible to the Germans and if cleverly planted either via a fake Hitler or through some other official-sounding set-up, it might save lives and time.
May 25, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT.

I have read the attached carefully and recommend that it be sent (without Mr. Carter's memorandum) to Admiral Wilson Brown to investigate and have the Navy, Coast Guard, and War Shipping Administration submit a memorandum of their side of the case.

Carter also tells me that the Canadians have had some experience with these suits.

I have prepared the attached memorandum to Wilson Brown in case you decide to do it.

S. I. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR

ADmiral brown

The attached document has been given to me and I wish that you would get the versions of the Navy, Coast Guard and War Shipping Administration in writing as quickly as possible and submit them to me.

I think it might be a good idea also to get the Canadian R.A.F. experience with these suits.

F. D. R.

Enclosed document "Report on Lightweight Exposure Suits".
REPORT ON POSSIBLE SCANDAL IN CONNECTION WITH EXPOSURE SUITS.

Here is a complete report and dossier on the history of the gargantuan runaround given to an attempt to substitute a lightweight and safe exposure suit for the old type, with weighted soles, which tends to drown the wearer, consumes lots of rubber, and exposes wearers to having their guts blown out by underwater explosions such as accompany the torpedoing of a vessel.

Henry Field and I have been working on this one for months, since we feel that it is wrong and wasteful of lives and skilled experience to employ antiquated and dangerous rescue equipment.

The failure to adopt safer, lighter equipment is shared by the Army Transport Service, the Army Air Forces, the Navy and the Coast Guard. Orders and recommendations from inter-service committees have been ignored, and it is believed that the news will reach the public in the near future.

My own opinion is that the Emergency Rescue Equipment Committee should be revitalized with authoritative directives and with a staff which will include at least a few men who are more interested in saving lives than in conforming to the assumed attitudes and commitments of their superiors.

In this and similar cases, it seems that the real trouble is inertia, complacency and routine rather than anything in the nature of deliberate negligence or corruption.
SECRET REPORT ON COL. RISTINE'S INTERFERENCE WITH SELECTIVE SERVICE OPERATIONS.

On May 29, I received word that Mr. Ahrens (of the Lawrence Aeronautical Corp.) had been notified to appear for induction at 7:30 A.M. on May 31. This notification did not give this man the customary time which is usually granted to inductees, to straighten out his personal affairs.

On further check it was learned that Col. Carl L. Ristine, Republic 6700, Ext. 77185, Room 807, Building 2145 C, N.W., of the Inspector General's Office, had personally appeared at the State Selective Service Headquarters in Trenton, N.J., and had suggested or "insinuated" that Mr. Ahrens be inducted as soon as possible because "he" had attempted to use "political pressure" and "influence" in Washington to have a deferment granted. The Army naturally will not tolerate anything like that, although this on a contract man was working for the Navy Department.

A further statement was made in Trenton, that after reviewing the conditions as presented by the Lawrence Aero Corp., it seemed to point toward the possible temporary deferment of this man but since receiving the suggestions from a representative of the Inspector General's Office in Washington, the only thing left to do was to draft the man immediately. This was done at day-break today and Mr. Ahrens, understandably, expressed a preference to serve with the Navy.

This condition now exists. Mr. Ahrens is acceptable to the Navy as an inductee and has so been accepted. One of the secret projects on which he was working has stopped and the Navy will now be billed but will receive no value. A delay will now be inevitable until some one or some other company can be found to take over the project but that seems impossible at this time. The Lawrence Corp. has asked to be relieved of the contract, having lost its key-employee.

The question seems to be: Is the man or the project of the most importance?
CONFIDENTIAL

May 31, 1944.

REPORT ON NEED FOR BETTER SYSTEM OF HANDLING TECHNOLOGICAL DEFERMENTS.

In an effort to report a matter of apparent importance, without burdening you with details, I recently forwarded a file to General Watson on a case involving technological deferment under the Selective Service Act. This had been brought to my attention by a responsible War Department official, although the case involved a technician employed by the Lawrence Aeronautical Corp. of New Jersey on a secret Navy device. The Navy's request for deferment had been turned down by Draft Board and Appeal Board and the company had been told to conduct its own final appeal. The head of the company had been refused an opportunity to present the reasons for requesting deferment to the final appeal board. Since the device was secret and the individual "irreplaceable," the head of the company made inquiry of his Army contacts as to how prompt consideration could be given to this matter. It was informally brought to my attention and I forwarded it to General Watson.

In the General's absence, it was mistakenly referred to the War Department which, not unnaturally, leaped to the conclusion that this was a matter calling for disciplinary action if not an attempt to subvert the Selective Service system. Eventually, the file was returned to me and I turned it over to Admiral Brown, since it was a Navy matter.

In the meantime, Colonel Carl Histine of the Inspector-General's Office personally appeared before the Trenton Selective Service authorities and urged the immediate induction of the technician involved on the ground that he had attempted to use "political pressure" and "influence" in Washington to have a deferment granted. To the best of my knowledge and belief, the individual did nothing of the sort, the action having been taken by his company at the Navy's direction.
In this connection, the action of Col. Ristine—as detailed in the attached secret report from one of my organization—could be construed as interference with the operation of the Selective Service system and one which has, among other things, resulted in the stoppage of a Navy contract and the loss of money to the Navy, as well as loss of special equipment useful to the war effort.

In this particular case, I recommend that the selectee involved be temporarily assigned by the Navy to complete his work for the Lawrence Aeronautical Corp. or that there be a review of the Draft Board action to assess the propriety of the conduct of all concerned in this fantastic affair.

Since this case is only one of several which have been brought to my attention, I also recommend that consideration be given to the establishment of a special panel or advisory committee under General Hershey. This panel should include representatives of O.S.R.D., War Production Research and Development, Army, Navy, Maritime Commission and O.S.S. technical services. Where any of the services has requested deferment for any individual alleged to be "indispensable" to any secret or special war-contract, the Selective Service Administration could urge local and appeal Draft Board's to appoint themselves of the Committee in order, under terms of complete security, to evaluate the importance of the project and the indispensability of the individual concerned. Otherwise we may have a situation in which coal-miners, farm-workers, war plant workers are deferred while, as in this case, a man who is apparently indispensable to a secret Navy project is inducted without even the customary ten-days notice at the insistence of the Army.

In this connection, it seems that everybody has acted in good faith, and that the most that can be charged against any individual is poor judgment or excess of zeal, but the end result is costly to the war-effort, unfair to the individual involved and administratively difficult to defend.