

● PSF: Subject File

Carter, J. Franklin
June - July 1944

*P57: J.F. Carter file
3-44*

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

June 1, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: CONTINUATION OF THIS ORGANIZATION AND THE "M" PROJECT.

Dear Miss Tully:

Some weeks ago, you may remember that the President suggested taking up with him this month the question of continuing the "M" Project, which is financed out of the Special Funds. There is also the question of continuing this organization, which is also financed out of the Special Funds and which carries part of the burden of "M" Project as well as other projects conducted by Field, Pringle and myself, including the Special Project in Virginia (Putzi Hanfstaengl).

Naturally, we know that unless and until Congress authorizes a renewal of the Special Fund the decision must be postponed. This memo. however is simply meant to point out that there are a number of continuing commitments--rents, employment of personnel, special relationships with Army, Navy, O.S.S., W.P.B. and the State Department--which, if liquidated, would require both time and careful consideration as to future handling of the problems involved.

For our own personal pride and morale in what we are trying to achieve in the war-effort, I would appreciate some informal word as to whether the President would like these activities to be continued.

JFC
J.F.C.

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J. F. C.

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~~SECRET~~

June 1, 1944.

REPORT ON CONVERSATION WITH PUTZI.

Jack Morgan's report to the State Department on a recent talk with Putzi, indicates that he believes Hitler will try to persuade the Pope to leave Rome but that no physical force or pressure will be employed to "kidnap" him.

J. F. C.
J. F. C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 1 1972

PART LII

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 1 1972

~~SECRET~~

May 27, 1944

On May 25 I discussed with Dr. S. the question of whether the Germans would take, or attempt to take, the Pope with them in the event of their withdrawal from Rome.

The Doctor was of the opinion that Hitler would most certainly attempt to convince the Pope that it would be to the advantage of the Church as well as in the interest of his personal safety to leave Rome.

The Doctor believed that the German authorities in Rome would be instructed to stress to the Pope, or at least to Maglione, the danger of Communist violence following the abandonment of the city by German troops, stressing that the strong Communist organization in Rome has been kept in check so far only by the presence of the German forces and that in the confusion of withdrawal the mob might attack even St. Peters.

The Doctor thought that the Germans would not attempt to persuade the Pope to go to Germany itself, but only to Ravenna or some similar place in Italy remote from the battlefield. In this way they could more plausibly pose as protectors of the Pope's personal safety than if he were to be removed to Germany.

The Doctor believed that although the Germans would bring all possible moral pressure on the Pope and those

surrounding him to follow them from Rome, they would not go so far as to compel the Pope to leave Rome should he not yield to their persuasion.

The Doctor was of the opinion that the Pope would certainly remain in Rome in the belief that it was vitally important for the prestige and unity of the Church that the Pope should remain in the symbolic and traditional center of the authority of the Church.

The Doctor thought that the German stress on the Communist danger might even serve to confirm the Pope in the belief that it was vital to stay in Rome in order to be in a position to defend the Church against any Communist manoeuvres or to avoid the risk of possible schism in the event that any one of the Cardinals should take it upon himself in the absence of the Pope to speak or act "on behalf of the Pope" somewhat as Minister Kauffmann has done for the Danish King.

Dr. S. states that German propaganda continues to emphasize the unimportance and the "peripheral" nature of the Italian campaign but he does not believe that this represents actual German military opinion. He believes that the German Army will continue to contest every foot of Italian territory in the belief that the loss of Italy would mean loss of control of the Adriatic and open the road to invasion via the Balkans.

*PS F J.F. Carter folder
3-44*

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"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

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June 3, 1944.

INTERIM REPORT ON "SEAMOBILE".

As a matter of information, you may be interested to know that the "Seamobile" under operation has continued to earn about \$40,000 a month net profit for the first five months of this year. I understand that there is now a chance of her being taken away from the present operators and turned over to someone else. You may also be interested to know that Commander Bryan, who originated the project, though suffering from incurable cancer, is still alive and kicking and eager to help in any way he can.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

2713 DUMBARTON AVENUE
WASHINGTON 7, D. C.

June 3, 1944

Dear Grace,

I enclose two Parts

*
of Report No. 57 in our "M"

Project Series. John Carter is away

this afternoon, so I am forwarding

it to you. greetings —

* R-57
R-58

Henry.

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*PSF
Carter*

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

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June 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: REPORTS FROM BOWMAN-FIELD COMMITTEE.

Dear Miss Tully:

Here are seven reports from the Bowman-Field Committee on Migration
and Settlement ("M" Project), for the President's files.

JFC
J.F.C.

*
No. M-83
M-87
M-89
M-90
M-91
M-96
R-60

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
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"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

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June 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: REPORT FROM THE BOWMAN-FIELD COMMITTEE.

Dear Miss Tully:

Here is a special report ^{*} on "Asia on the Move" from the Bowman-Field
Committee ("M" Project), for the President's file on migration and settlement.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

* R-56

Mr. President:

OK file personal

Could I tell J. F. Carter the
substance of the answers from State &
O.S.S. on his suggestion?

G.

PSF: J. F. Carter folder
3-44

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

June 7, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: "FAKE HITLER" SUGGESTION.

Dear Miss Tully:

I understand that Ned Buxton's answer to the query on the "fake Hitler" idea, believes that the underlying idea has great possibilities but that the policy ought first to be cleared by the President. In my talk with Ed Stettinius, he took the same position.

My suggestion--offered with great diffidence--is that Ned Buxton and the O.S.S. be asked to submit their detailed observations on the underlying idea and their tentative suggestions for its implementations. O.S.S. has already prepared a pretty thorough draft on the subject and the draft would certainly be useful in considering the question of policy. I know this because I have just seen the O.S.S. material.


J.F.C.

~~SECRET~~


THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

June 7, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Proposal for Fake Hitler Propaganda
Speech

We have carefully considered this proposal, the outline of which I return herewith. We feel that even if the scheme were feasible, which we think is doubtful, it would be impossible to convince the Soviet Government that it represented only psychological warfare. We believe that they, and many other people in Europe besides the Germans, would believe the suggested broadcast represented the secret policy of the United States and England. In our opinion, therefore, the proposal should not be considered seriously.



DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By R. H. Parks Date 11-1-72

COPY

REPORT ON SUGGESTED FAKE SPEECH BY HITLER TO AID INVASION.

Repeated talks with a highly intelligent German now in this country leave me convinced that the Germans would be suckers for a psychological warfare move such as this one. It would, of course, have to be checked with the Soviet Government to avoid possible misunderstanding.

The strongest point in Nazi propaganda is the European fear of Communism and of Asia. Berlin broadcasts focus attention on this theme, almost ignoring the U.S.A. and Great Britain.

I assume that somewhere here or in England, we already have a man who can imitate Hitler's voice and style in speech-making. If not, it could be done in some other way.

On the eve of the invasion, let the fake Hitler broadcast over all of our Black radio-stations along these lines: Instruct the German troops, German civilians and citizens of occupied countries to put up only a token resistance to the invasion and to cooperate with Anglo-American forces. Have the fake Hitler state that his first duty is to defend European civilization from Asiatic Bolshevism and that he has reached an understanding with the leaders of England and America for Anglo-American forces to cooperate with Germany in holding back the Jewish hordes of Asiatic Bolsheviks from Europe. Let him state that U.S. bombers will soon establish air-bases in Germany to enable the forces of civilization to reconquer Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad, etc. Let it appear to be a coup of his "intuition" that under the guise of an invasion he is actually getting an enormous reinforcement against the Red Armies. Then our

troops could move in and operate against a background of German bewilderment.

Strange as it seems, this would appear plausible to the Germans and if cleverly planted either via a fake Hitler or through some other official-sounding set-up, it might save lives and time.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

7 June 1944

Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Miss Tully:

Would you be kind enough to place the
attached memorandum before the President?

Sincerely yours,

G. Edward Buxton
G. Edward Buxton,
Acting Director.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of CIA

letter, 2-13-73

By RHA Date FEB 23 1973

~~SECRET~~

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

7 June 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Your memorandum of June 3rd forwarding a suggestion for a black radio program was received by this office on June 6th.

Our comments which you request are respectfully submitted:

A. We consider that the most opportune time for such a broadcast has passed.

B. A black radio program with a fake Hitler could be proven spurious too easily.

C. If the enemy detected its source, he could employ the same basic propaganda against us to exploit an apparent divergence of interest between Russia and U.S./U.K.

Respectfully

G. Edward Buxton
G. Edward Buxton
Acting Director

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of CIA

Letter, 2-13-73

By RMP Date FEB 23 1973

~~SECRET~~

C
O
P
Y

REPORT ON SUGGESTED FAKE SPEECH BY HITLER TO AID INVASION.

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**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

June 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

J. F. Carter is asking whether you approve of their continuing the "M Project". This project is known as the "Bowman-Field Committee on Migration and Settlement" and as you will recall Henry Field has been working on it for sometime.

Do you wish them to continue?

GGT

↓
File Memo Telephoned J.F.C. to take this matter up with the State Dept. 6/12/44

GGT

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*J.F. Carter folder
3-44
PSF*

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

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Metropolitan 4113

June 9, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: CONTINUATION OF THESE PROJECTS.

Dear Miss Tully:

In connection with my previous memo. informally asking whether the President wished this Unit and the "ME Project to be continued after the 30th of June, I thought that I had better tell you that these two related projects employ a total personnel of twenty-five and, in addition to government office space, have three leases which are renewable on a monthly basis. There is also the Putzi set-up in Virginia which would have to be totally unscrambled and handled in a different way after July 1, if this work is not continued.

J. F. Carter
J.F.C.

T-316-

PSF

J. F. Carter folder
3-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 13, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

J. FRANKLIN CARTER:

With regard to lightweight exposure suits, the reports indicate that the Navy and the Coast Guard are conducting experiments to try to discover a suitable lightweight suit. They are not satisfied with the suit the Canadians have adopted nor with any that have been presented so far. It is believed that the inquiry we have made will hasten research and that we may hope for results shortly.

F.D.R.

(No papers accompanied this memorandum)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR:

MISS TULLY.

Subject: Lightweight Exposure Suits.

There are enclosed herewith the statements the President called for from the Navy, the Coast Guard and the War Shipping Administration. The Canadians' report is being prepared but has been delayed owing to the need for sending away for some of the information.

As I understand it, the President is concerned about the alleged delay by the Coast Guard in requiring adequate "lightweight exposure suits" in place of the present unsatisfactory heavy suits. The within reports indicate that the Navy and the Coast Guard are conducting experiments to try to discover a suitable lightweight suit. They are not satisfied with the suit the Canadians have adopted nor with any that have been presented so far. I believe that the President's inquiry will hasten research and that we may hope for results shortly.


WILSON BROWN.

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

May 25, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN

The attached document has been given to me and I wish that you would get the versions of the Navy, Coast Guard and War Shipping Administration in writing as quickly as possible and submit them to me.

I think it might be a good idea also to get the Canadian R.A.F. experience with these suits.

F. D. R.

ADDRESS NAVY DEPARTMENT,
BUREAU OF SHIPS. REFER TO
FILE NO.

Section 848
833-6-(7)(848)

NAVY DEPARTMENT
BUREAU OF SHIPS
WASHINGTON, D. C.

JLG/cm



3 June 1944

MEMORANDUM

To: Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, U.S.N.

Subj: Light Weight Exposure Suits

1. The fact that a person encased in a waterproof covering will survive for a longer period of time, when immersed in cold water, than a person not so protected has been ascertained and accepted by the Navy as far back as 1918. This fact has been further substantiated by recent research projects. However, the problem of designing a practical life saving suit which meets the necessarily stringent requirements as to weight, space, and operating conditions aboard Naval vessels has not yet been satisfactorily solved.

2. The Navy has not approved the heavy weight life saving suits currently being supplied merchant ships and does not require them for Armed Guard personnel. A careful investigation of many types of life saving suits and a review of reports on sinkings of vessels outfitted with this type of suit indicated that some were impractical for Navy use for numerous reasons, such as:

- (a) Their excessive weight and bulk would present a serious stowage problem since weight and space are critical items aboard most Naval vessels.
- (b) Cumbersomeness, making it extremely difficult to effectively carry out the primary duty of Naval personnel; that is to defend the ship by opening and maintaining fire against the enemy as long as the guns are afloat and serviceable.
- (c) The suits do not permit a man to exert himself strenuously for more than a very short period of time, and are not suitable for wear during action due to the combined weight of the suit, life preserver and the ballast.
- (d) Loss of time in providing and putting on the suits when moments count most, such as in opening fire on the enemy.

3 June 1944

- (e) Possibility of puncture during action and confusion of abandoning ship which would result in flooding the suit, thereby nullifying possible benefits.
- (f) Possibility of the suits cracking or splitting due to improper stowage and deterioration over long periods of time. Men have been lost when they have jumped overboard in a cracked or punctured suit, without a life jacket inside the suit. The suit filled with water, pulling the man under. Suits also have filled with water due to leakage in the closures and around the neck band.
- (g) In case of burning oil on the surface of the water it would appear difficult, if not impossible, for the wearer of a rubber suit to submerge or swim under water sufficiently to escape under these conditions.

3. Recently several designs of light weight exposure suits have been developed and examined. They still possess many of the inherent defects of the heavy weight life saving suits. These suits, sufficiently reduced in weight and bulk, may be worn knapsack fashion on a person's back thereby being at hand in case of an emergency but they still require much time to don, still restrict bodily movement somewhat and are even more liable to tear than suits of heavier fabric. However, since a protective suit might increase a wearer's chance of survival in cold water, the Bureau of Ships has purchased an experimental quantity of these suits and distributed them to the forces afloat in an endeavor to ascertain whether or not the subject suits are a practical piece of life saving equipment for either general or limited use aboard Naval vessels.

E. L. Cochran

ADDRESS REPLY TO

Eng. Div.

AND REFER TO

Aer-E-255-NEW

NAVY DEPARTMENT

BUREAU OF AERONAUTICS

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.



5 June, 1944

100884

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL WILSON BROWN

Subject: Life Raft Exposure Suits.

1. The Bureau of Aeronautics recognizing the potential value of light weight exposure suits for use in Naval aircraft operating in northern latitudes initiated tests on this equipment during the latter part of 1943. Since that time several types of light weight suits were subjected to tests. Two of these suits were submitted by B. F. Goodrich Company, all of the suits tested to date failed to pass seepage tests and incorporated other undesirable features which made them unacceptable for use in naval aircraft.
2. Although the above suits failed to pass the necessary tests, sufficient and valuable data was obtained from these tests to warrant further development. It was further decided at that time, and as a result of these preliminary tests, that the inherent advantages offered by a satisfactory exposure suit warranted its inclusion in all multi-engine aircraft operating in northern latitudes.
3. Further effort by the Bureau of Aeronautics resulted in the development of seven new light weight suits manufactured by seven different companies. In addition the bureau obtained a Canadian exposure suit. To date this suit and four others obtained from various manufacturers are currently undergoing test at NAS, Patuxent River. Suits submitted by other manufacturers will be tested as soon as received.
4. As a result of the above development it is anticipated that a satisfactory light weight exposure suit will be made available in the near future and procurement will be initiated promptly on the light weight exposure suit considered best for use in Naval aircraft.

D. C. Ramsey

D. C. RAMSEY
Rear Admiral, U. S. N.
Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics

ADDRESS REPLY TO
THE COMMANDANT (CRA)
REFER TO FILE CG-CRA

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

5 June, 1944

MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL FURER:

Subj: Lightweight exposure suits

1. In considering the matter of "lightweight exposure suits", to avoid confusion it is important to distinguish between the various suits called by their developers by such terms as "lifesaving suit", "sea-suit", "exposure suit", "Ditching suit", etc. Although there are modifications of each type there are two chief types of suits:

- (1) A suit which makes no attempt to attain watertightness and consequently is intended primarily as a protection against cold, wind, spray, etc. on a lifeboat or raft, to be called for the purpose of this memorandum, an "exposure suit." The British Merchant Marine suit described in the file is of that type, being essentially a suit of pajamas with a hood, all of impregnated fabric. There is no attempt at watertightness.
- (2) An impervious coverall with a neck closure designed to be as watertight as practicable. Most of the suits are in this category even though some are called "exposure suits". They are intended to protect against the hazards of immersion in cold water as well as against exposure in a lifeboat or life raft. They will be called "immersion and exposure suits".

There are of course many other ways in which suits may be classified, for instance:

- (1) By weight:
 - (a) Heavy
 - (b) Medium
 - (c) Light
- (2) By use:
 - (a) Merchant marine
 - (b) Combat vessel
 - (c) Aviation - for multiplace aircraft - fighter aircraft

MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL FURER
5 June, 1944
Page 2

(3) By materials of construction:

- (a) Cotton drill or jean cloth and rubber
- (b) Cotton drill or jean cloth and neoprene
- (c) Cotton drill or jean cloth and Buna
- (d) Balloon cloth and neoprene
- (e) Nylon and neoprene

(4) By individual special features of design:

- (a) With drawstring closure
- (b) With or without gloves
- (c) With zipper closure
- (d) With Fry (latex rubber) closure
- (e) With or without weights, or other special features of design.

It is possible to have several models of similar types including many which have only been produced as models and never put in production.

2. The responsibility for this equipment in the services of the United States, is as follows:

Sea-going services:

Navy:- With the Bureau of Ships and Naval Operations if it is to be considered as "emergency" equipment only. With the "Permanent Clothing Board" if it is to be considered as "clothing". No attempt will be made to outline the steps necessary to final adoption.

Army:- Of interest primarily to the Transportation Corps in the operation of transports in which they usually follow merchant marine practice.

Merchant marine:- The Coast Guard is charged with the legal responsibility for prescribing rules and regulations for emergency equipment and approving types and models of equipment. Actual procurement is by operators of vessels, which in wartime for off-shore shipping, is a War Shipping Administration function. Each new item of equipment is tested by experienced personnel and passed by the Merchant Marine Council, which consists almost exclusively of seagoing officers.

Aviation services:

Navy:- Bureau of Aeronautics

Army:- Materiel Command at Wright Field.

MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL FURER

5 June, 1944

Page 3

In each of these services there is a definite procedure for development, recommendation, test and acceptance, usually requiring consecutive action by several sections, boards or committees, which is not indicated in detail.

3. To be specific the lightweight exposure suit used in the British Merchant Marine is not an immersion suit. It is the only suit of type I referred to and is not comparable to any of the other suits referred to in the file or this memorandum which are all type II, "immersion and exposure suits", although occasionally called by other names, as in this file "protective exposure suits".

4. Recommendation No. 3 - This recommendation was adopted at the Third meeting of the Liaison Committee on June 5, 1943, and was printed and widely distributed to field agencies without forwarding letter and apparently without previous official reference to the agencies responsible for the functions of approving this equipment. The suit referred to is a medium weight "immersion and exposure suit" which had been developed by the B. F. Goodrich Company, Model No. I A, for submission for approval to the Coast Guard for prospective use in the Merchant Marine. The suit was not approved for use in the Merchant Marine by the Coast Guard for a number of reasons among which was leaky seams, and certain features of design which did not meet the requirements set up by the Coast Guard. Search of the files has failed to reveal any documentary substantiation of the recommendation other than that contained in the minutes of the meeting. The statement that heavy suits are dangerous was apparently based on ONI reports contained in the file, and possibly by verbal expressions of opinion. The statement that a satisfactory suit was available does not appear to be substantiated by any tests leading to approved acceptance by any test board, but appears to have been based on examination of the suit at the meeting of the Liaison Committee. After rejection of the suit by the Coast Guard there appears to have been no attempt to modify the suit to meet Coast Guard requirements, but there was a continued controversial attack on the heavy suits. No further development of this suit was made.

5. As a result of a National Research Council project at the Naval Medical Research Institute by Dr. L. A. Newburgh to investigate the physiological effects of cold on the human body, a new lightweight suit in a small container was also developed by the B.F. Goodrich Company in the early fall of 1943, designed primarily for use by combat personnel on Naval vessels. This served as a parent type for two separate developments--one leading to models suited to aviation use, which have been made available to development agencies of the air services of Canada and United States. The Canadians have proceeded quickly with their development and have had some in use the past winter. The models developed by the Emergency Rescue Equipment Section were not adopted but served as a basic idea from which the Canadian development results. Trials were held off Halifax about November 15th, testing both types of suits. Canadian suits were ordered produced and placed in service with full realization that development had not been completed but with the greater need under these conditions

MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL FURER

5 June, 1944

Page 4

of flying they accepted that fact. Model suits have been furnished both U. S. Army and Navy air forces and development by both is reported to be underway.

6. The second development resulting from the Newburgh suit was the presentation of this suit to Bureau of Ships in an endorsement on a request for a suit of this type for a combat vessel. The suit was recommended as a possible satisfactory approach to the difficult problem of providing additional protection to combat personnel on vessels in northern waters but as one requiring further development. This development has proceeded. A type of neck closure approved by the Navy in 1918 was added and many minor changes in design such as:

- (a) Changes in container to make it more practical in use,
- (b) Elimination of zipper,
- (c) Provision of cuffs and detachable gloves as a part of the suits,
- (d) Substitution of balloon cloth for nylon,
- (e) Provision of additional impregnating material to insure watertightness of fabric.

All of these developments have been carried on by the Goodrich Company at its own expense with the exception of the latter in which a development contract was entered into by the Bureau of Ships for 40 of the suits; 20 for the Navy for Navy tests and 20 for the Coast Guard tests on Coast Guard vessels manned by enlisted personnel. The recommendation was made October 20, 1943. The Bureau of Ships order was dated 1 February, 1944 with delivery promised about 1 April, 1944. These suits have just been delivered; twenty to various Navy ships for test, sixteen to eight Coast Guard vessels (four in the Greenland area and four in the Aleutian area) and four for local test. These tests will be held in the open sea off some Atlantic Port as soon as arrangements can be made for a vessel.



L. B. OLSON
Captain, USCG

(CMC)
CG-MMC-547
3 June, 1944


Admiral Wilson Brown

Many suits of lighter weight have been presented for approval. They have been rejected for various reasons such as, for example, leaks in the fabric and seams. They are all considered less able to withstand conditions of use on merchant vessels.

A limited number of heavy lifesaving suits were placed on vessels of the Coast Guard on the Greenland Patrol for test purposes. The reports received on them were generally favorable. On several occasions vessels having these suits on board were engaged in rescue operations. Crew members put the suits on, went overboard in near-freezing water, and rescued survivors from torpedoed vessels. With the suits on the rescuers were able to remain in the water for much longer periods of time than had they been without the suits.

At the present time the Coast Guard is conducting Service tests with an experimental light-weight exposure suit, weighing approximately six pounds. It is intended that these tests be exhaustive to determine its efficacy under Service conditions. Preliminary pool tests indicate that modifications in design are desirable. These could be incorporated in the garment as subsequent reports of Service experience prove the desirability of further development.

Sincerely,



R. R. WAESCHE
Vice Admiral, USCG
Commandant

Incl:
Detailed Comment on "Report on
Lightweight Exposure Suits"

ADDRESS REPLY TO
THE COMMANDANT (CMC)
REFER TO FILE: CG-MMC-547

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

3 June, 1944

Admiral Wilson Brown
Naval Aide to the President
The White House

My dear Admiral Brown:

Upon the entry of the United States in the present war, the sinking of merchant vessels as the result of enemy action presented the problem of the adoption of an additional life-saving device for seamen who abandoned ship directly into the water, onto rafts, or into life boats. The two main functions of this device were, first, its usefulness to the user while in the water, and, second, its usefulness to the user while on a raft or in a boat, that is, protection both during immersion and from exposure. This device has been called by such names as, lifesaving suit, immersion suit, and exposure suit, both light and heavy. For the purpose of this memorandum, it will be referred to as a "lifesaving suit". The now standard suit, conforming to Coast Guard specifications is also known as a "heavy suit".

Prior to December 7, 1941 the total number of lifesaving suits on board American merchant vessels was negligible. At that time two such suits, manufactured in the United States, were on the market and were used by vessels of certain foreign nations. On March 21, 1942, as the result of tests conducted, these two suits were approved for use on American merchant vessels, and in the Federal Register of April 18, 1942, regulations were published requiring all vessels, ocean or coastwise, of 1000 gross tons or over, to have on board a lifesaving suit for each member of the crew. In September of the same year, as the result of experience gained, the Coast Guard began the program of improving and standardizing lifesaving suits. On January 1, 1943 tentative specifications were published and distributed to persons interested and affected. In September of 1943 the present standard specifications for lifesaving suits were adopted. The approval of suits now in use has been based on the consistent Coast Guard policy of approving equipment considered to be best adapted for use in the merchant marine.

DETAILED COMMENT ON REPORT ON LIGHTWEIGHT
EXPOSURE SUITS

SUMMARY

1. Paragraph (2). The heavy suit was not designed for use by naval personnel. Their problem, even as members of the armed guard on board a merchant vessel, is of necessity different from that of merchant seamen.

The "removal" recommended here referred to was that contained in the pink handbill listed as attachment "C". No action by the Coast Guard was taken on this so-called recommendation.

The Coast Guard agrees that not only official experiments and tests, but also the experiences of survivors of ship sinkings and plane crashes at sea have shown the value and urgent need for protective clothing.

2. Under "Recommendations" apparently it is conceded that final tests are in order before the immediate procurement and disbursement of "Lightweight Exposure Suits".

LIGHTWEIGHT EXPOSURE SUITS

Page 1

It is doubted that even the proponents of the Lightweight suits would consider the British suit suitable for use on board American merchant vessels. A picture of the suit is attached. It is granted that protective clothing of any sort is of value to survivors on rafts, in lifeboats, or in the water. The "so-called lifesaving suits" referred to in the last paragraph of this page do not, under the present specifications, weigh 14 to 17 pounds; they weigh approximately 11 pounds.

Page 2

Reference to the Naval Memoranda fails to reveal that these directives brand such suits dangerous. The problem of the armed guard crew is entirely different, as indicated by paragraphs (a) of attachments A and B, from that of merchant seamen. Paragraph (e) of attachment B cites cases where men have been lost, but it states the men did not have on life-jackets. It should be pointed out that it was never intended that these suits be worn without such a lifejacket on; all instructions definitely state that the lifejacket shall be worn under the suit. Furthermore, it should be noted that both of these Navy directives refer to "Lifesaving Suits"; no mention is made as to whether they be heavy or light.

Paragraph 3 states that the dangerous qualities of these suits were pointed out in the pink handbill called Recommendation #3. This paper merely states that these suits have proved dangerous, neither giving reasons therefor nor pointing out the dangerous qualities. Further, this so-called Recommendation was published and widely distributed before being brought to the attention of the Coast Guard, the agency of the Government legally responsible for matters of safety in the Merchant Marine.

Page 3 - Paragraph 3.

The Merchant Marine Council of the Coast Guard, which is composed of a substantial majority of officers who have had both wide Coast Guard and Merchant Marine experience at sea, considered the so-called Recommendation #3 on 7 July, 1943, and by letter dated 8 September, 1943, informed the Coordinator of Research and Development that the Coast Guard did not concur. By letter dated September 9, 1943, the Coordinator of Research and Development was invited to send a representative to appear before the Council to present comments and suggestions on proposed specifications for a lifesaving suit. On September 16, 1943, a Mr. Bader and Lieut. Comdr. Hiscock, USCG (TR) appeared before the Council to present the case of the lightweight suit.

Page 4

Page 4 cites extracts from ONI reports. A cursory examination of those on file at Coast Guard Headquarters indicates that out of reports from survivors of some 500 vessels, not more than 25 or 30 contain criticisms of the heavy suits, and of course none on the lightweight suits as they have not been used by any merchant seamen survivors.

Page 5

As to the oscillating motion referred to here, most seamen would agree that waves at sea are generally of such a size that a man would hardly oscillate in the same manner as a buoy. This same argument was presented to the Merchant Marine Council on September 16, 1943.

The third paragraph on this page speaks of the suspension of the suit on the wearer. Query whether the proponents of the lightweight suit have found another place to hang their suit.

Page 6

The second paragraph is simply a reiteration of Recommendation #3, brought up to date.



WAR SHIPPING ADMINISTRATION
INTEROFFICE MEMORANDUM

JUN 5 - 1944

To: Rear Admiral Wilson Brown, USN
Aide to the President

From: E. S. Land, Administrator
War Shipping Administration

Subject:

Complying with your request of today, the following comments are submitted in connection with lifesaving suits:

The types of suits being used at present in ships of the War Shipping Administration are substantially the same as those used earlier in the war, and are without major change. The weight has been reduced considerably. The old type weighs 17-1/2 pounds or more; the new type weighs less than 12 pounds. A part of this weight consists of about 1-1/2 pounds of lead in each boot to insure an upright position when in the water. Thought is being given continuously to lighten the suits.

It is believed that a lightweight suit is desirable for use of Maritime personnel for the following reasons:

- (1) The lightweight suit enables a man to function much easier than one with a heavier suit, both on board ship and in a lifeboat or raft.
- (2) The lightweight suit enables a man to swim more easily with less effort, and enables him to more easily climb into a lifeboat or raft.
- (3) If heavyweight clothing is worn with a lightweight suit, the protection obtained against cold in winter weather is equal to that of a heavy suit. On the other hand, in the tropics the lightweight suit would be comparatively more comfortable.
- (4) In dangerous areas, a person could wear the lighter weight suit on board ship and continue his various duties, whereas a heavy suit would hinder the performance of those duties to a serious degree.

Light suits of 4 or 5 pounds weight, although excellent exposure suits in a lifeboat or raft, may not serve the purpose of a lifesaving suit under conditions of immersion for relatively long periods.


The most desirable suit is one which provides all of the essential qualities, but yet is light enough to permit reasonable freedom of movement and heavy enough to withstand the shock involved in men jumping overboard, which at times is from considerable heights.

Compactness is highly desirable for two reasons: A light suit can be stowed in a crowded lifeboat or raft much more easily than a heavy suit. Also a suit of the lighter type can be carried in package form by personnel on board

Rear Admiral Wilsom Brown

- 2 -

without undue encumbrance, whereas this would not be feasible with the heavy suit. We understand that efforts have been made by various manufacturers of such equipment to improve the present design. The U. S. Coast Guard is also keenly interested in the development of a better and lighter suit, such as would acceptably fill the requirements.



E. S. Land
Administrator

file

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D. C.

*PSF
Carter*

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

June 14, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: SPECIAL REPORT ON FRANCE ("M" PROJECT)

Dear Miss Tully:

Herewith attached please find a report on the Demographic Rehabilitation of France prepared by the Bowman-Field Committee on Migration and Settlement ("M" Project) for the President's files.

No. R-50

JFC
J.F.C.

J.F. Carter folder

3-44

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
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June 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: REPORTS FROM BOWMAN-FIELD COMMITTEE ("M" PROJECT)

Dear Miss Tully:

Herewith attached, please find nine reports from the Bowman-Field Committee on Migration and Settlement ("M" Project), for the President's files.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

No. A-6

T-38

M-92

M-94

M-95

M-98

M-99

R-51

R-59

*grace -
This is crumpled in
my briefcase.
my apologies!
Henry*

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER

(Joy Franklin)

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Metropolitan 4113

June 30, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: "M" PROJECT REPORTS.

Dear Miss Tully:

Here are one reports from the Bowman-Field Committee on Migration and Settlement ("M" Project) for the President's file.

Chicago was wonderfully hot for the Convention and refreshingly cool so far as Republican hopes were concerned.

J.F.C.

* No. R-62

T-322

*PST J.F. Carter folder
3-44*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

J. FRANKLIN CARTER:

In regard to your report on
need for draft deferments for technicians,
this matter should be taken up with
General Hershey.

G.G.T.

Report on Need for Draft Deferments for
Technicians, submitted by J.F. Carter,
6-14-44.

T-318

PSE J. F. Carter folder 3-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 15, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

ADMIRAL BROWN:

TO HANDLE.

F.D.R.

Secret report on Secret Anti-Pillbox Rocket
developed by U.S. Marine Corps, submitted
by J.F. Carter, 6-14-44.

T-324

BF

*J. J. Carter folder
3-44*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 16, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

HON. JAMES F. BYRNES:

To see J. Carter about it.

F.D.R.

Report on disturbing situation in Air Force procurement on clothing. Attached is memo of report on AAF clothing, dated 6-14-44.

PSF: J. F. Carter folder
3-44

file
personal.

June 26, 1944

REPORT NO. LIII BY DR. SEDGWICK

In the temporary absence of Mr. John Carter I
am sending you the attached copy for your files.

Henry Field

Attachment

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 1 1972

~~SECRET~~

PART LIII

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 1 1972

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

June 17, 1944

As pointed out in earlier memoranda, Dr. S. has consistently appeared in the past to accept the official German communiques and broadcasts as entirely reliable statements of the military situation. It was therefore most interesting to find on my visit on June 15 that German propaganda with regard to the beachhead situation was not making its customary impression on the Doctor. He stated on the contrary that the ring of conviction was lacking in present German propoganda, that its tone and manner convinced him that the Germans were being severely beaten.

This led him to his oft-repeated thesis that the opportunity to save thousands of lives was being thrown away by the policy of unconditional surrender; that because of this policy Germany would fight to the last; that by placing such men as Marshal Rundstedt on the proscribed list, the possibility was being lost of bringing about a surrender without having to battle our way across Europe foot by foot at terrific cost. In this connection he highly praised the Pope's speech of June 2, expressing the view that the Pope would return again to this theme, that his words would find a steadily greater acceptance and his international stature increase.

The Doctor also stated that he believed it was now even more desirable than ever to press the war against the Japs with unremitting energy so that we might already have achieved our major aims in Asia prior to the collapse of

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
MAY 1 1972
By W. J. Stewart Date _____

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED

Germany. The Doctor feels that if the United States comes to the European peace table with a long Asiatic campaign still to be fought, it will find itself in a very weak position vis-a-vis the European powers who will take unhesitating advantage of any continued heavy commitments on our part in Asia.

According to the Doctor, after driving ahead to some point sufficiently advanced to ensure the final success of the invasion, we should then endeavor to shift the main burden of the European campaign to the British in order to exert our full weight in the East and appear at the peace table unhampered by the Asiatic War. The Doctor's estimate of the extent and enthusiasm of the assistance we will receive from the European powers, including Russia, in prosecuting the Asiatic War after Hitler's downfall is pessimistic. He considers that the Russians will not consider either a strong China or the restoration of Western European influence in East Asia to be desirable from the Russian point of view. He doubts therefore that it will be found possible to induce the Russians to take more than limited action to strengthen their own position on the mainland and feels that they will be little interested in the situation in the Southwest Pacific.

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~~SECRET~~

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3-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

June 28, 1944.

FILE MEMO:

The President directed me to notify Dr. Henry Field that he did not feel it was worthwhile to continue the Dr. S. Project and therefore it will be terminated as of July 1. He did, however, approve their carrying on the M Project.

GGT

~~SECRET~~
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE SECRETARY

June 24, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Funds for John Franklin Carter

John Franklin Carter called upon Mr. Stettinius on June 13th and stated that he had raised with you the question of continuing his special activities. \$5,000 is being paid to him monthly from your special fund for the activities of Dr. S, and \$4300 monthly for special surveys by Mr. Henry Field and Dr. Isaiah Bowman in connection with migration of population studies.

The Department has not initiated these arrangements in the past, our only participation being as a disbursing agent for the funds and, therefore, is not in a position to appraise the value of the projects with any degree of accuracy. If you will indicate your desires in the matter, we shall, of course, be glad to follow your instructions.

C H

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date 11-1-72

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Hold

June 22, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Mr. Stettinius called me yesterday to say that J. Franklin Carter had taken up with the Department the matter of continuing the "M" Project and the Putzi Project. Ed Stettinius said, very confidentially, that the State Department really did not know what they were doing and that Mr. Carter receives \$10,000 a month and the State Department does not feel that this work is of enough value to warrant spending that amount of money.

I understand that the Department is sending you a memorandum for your approval or disapproval.

GGT

JSF
Carter

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
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July 6, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: REPORTS FROM BOWMAN-FIELD COMMITTEE.

Dear Miss Tully:

* (17)

Here are eighteen reports from the Bowman-Field Committee on Migration and Settlement ("M" Project), for the President's files.

JFC
J.F.C.

- | | |
|-----------------|------------|
| *
No. M - 97 | No. R - 49 |
| 101 | 55 |
| 102 | |
| 103 | No. T - 39 |
| 105 | 40 |
| 106 | 41 |
| 107 | 42 |
| 108 | 43 |
| 109 | 44 |

3278
COPY (B)

PSF; J.F. Carter focus, 3-44

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
1210 National Press Building
Washington, D. C.

" J.F.C.
OK

FDR
returned to
Mr. Carter 7/14/44

July 7, 1944

File
↓

~~SECRET~~

REPORT ON TURNING PUTZI HANFSTAENGL OVER TO THE BRITISH

Miss Tully told me this morning that you had decided to turn Putzi Hanfstaengl back to the British after two years of the "S. Project".

Both Henry Pringle and Henry Field agree that we ought to place on record the following comments on this decision, in order to discharge our responsibility to you:

Putzi has tried to help the American Government to the best of his limited ability. His attitude of cooperation seemed to annoy the British authorities involved. He had previously incurred the enmity of Lord Beaverbrook by winning a libel suit against Beaverbrook in England before the war and there is some evidence of punitive animosity against Hanfstaengl in official British circles. His return to the British under the present circumstances would expose him to reprisals for having tried to help us, partly from official British sources and still more so from Nazi prisoners of war who would be aware of his attempt to help defeat Hitler. His life would almost certainly be in danger. The fact that his son, Egon, is now in the Southwest Pacific, as a loyal American who volunteered ten months before Pearl Harbor, is another factor in the picture. His (Egon's) morale would certainly not improve under this decision affecting his father.

There is also the likelihood that, in future, no German and no representative of the Nazi-occupied countries will care to run risks on behalf of the American Government. They will be inclined to assume that the British Government is in full control of all political contacts between Western Europe and the United Nations and will thereby tend to discount American policy and power, save as adjuncts to British policy.

When I see Sir Ronald Campbell to discuss ways and means to effect Putzi's transfer back to British control I should like your permission to suggest that we strongly believe that special precautions should be taken to protect Putzi against Nazi reprisals in German prison-camps and otherwise to prevent possible persecution of a man who has, in his opinion and that of the Unit, really tried to help our cause.

(signed) J. F. C.

By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 1 1972

PSF 2.7. Carter folder 3-UV

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(Jay Franklin)
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WASHINGTON, D. C.

*file
Personal*

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July 7, 1944

REPORT ON REVISED OPERATIONS OF THIS UNIT

After three and a half years of successful and secret operations, this Unit should now be given a new directive. Its usefulness in the field of intelligence operations to which it was originally assigned seems to be sharply limited as a result of the vastly improved coverage of this field by regular service agencies.

In addition to the "M" Project, which has been authorized to continue, there is another field of public policy where a small and informal group operating under a revised contract could render useful service to the White House.

This is the field of technical and financial policy, which has already been approached by this Unit under its general directive and in which there seems to be a clear need for some yardstick investigations.

Enough has been developed in connection with the Air-Sea Rescue situation alone to justify continuation along these lines: due to official inertia in the armed services and to conflicting claims by rival technicians. The issue of the war will depend on technology and the tendency to substitute quantity for quality is omnipresent and congenial to both the

high command and to war industry.

Very little original thinking is being done along financial lines yet even the restricted investigation of S.W.P.C. conducted by this Unit shows that there is an enormous potential of political disaster and social confusion in our standard financial practices.

The "S" Project is a separate issue. If it is abandoned care should be taken to weigh all the elements in this situation and to liquidate it in an orderly manner.

My specific recommendation is that this Unit be continued for six months at the present rate of monthly payments with authority to employ (former Lt. Commander) Earle Hiscock to organize a technical intelligence service for the Unit and to continue the employment (now temporary) of S.C. Badger to be in charge of financial intelligence for the Unit.


J.F.C.

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July 6, 1944.


MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: REQUEST FOR INSTRUCTIONS ON PROJECTS.

Dear Miss Tully:

In taking up with Mr. Stettinius the question of continuing the various projects, three points were raised: 1) continuation of the original Unit, out of which part of M. Project, all of S. Project and other projects were financed; 2) continuation of the M. Project; and 3) a special inquiry as to whether Hanfstaengl should be paid for his services. When Field told me that the S. Project had been discontinued, I assumed that it meant that No. 3 had been turned down, as S Project itself involves a considerable process of administrative, diplomatic and financial liquidation.

I request clarification on this point as, in submitting estimates for the continuation of the M Project and of other operations of this Unit, expenditures on the S Project are highly pertinent; if, on the other hand, all of this Unit except the M Project is discontinued, that will require an entirely different estimate inasmuch as the Unit's allocation terminated on June 13 and has been supported by me pending decision as to future plans.

Yours,



(3239)

hms

PSF 9.7 Carter folder 3-44

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 11, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

GENERAL MARSHALL:

I know nothing about this. Do you care to have someone comment for you on this confidential memorandum and have it sent to me?

F.D.R.

Confidential Report On Long-Range Missiles, dated 6/29/44.

WASHINGTON
BENNETT WY
1973
WASHINGTON
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

July 7, 1944.

REPORT ON LONG-RANGE MISSILES.

Here are two special reports assembled by this Unit on the development of long-range missiles (e.g. the German rocket-bomb).

The first report, dated June 29, 1944, contains the names of the individuals who are most competent to analyze the German rocket-bombs with a view to developing counter-measures. It is urgently recommended that some of them be sent to England as soon as possible to help the British officials solve the problem.

The second report, dated July 6, 1944, indicates that a complete set of recommendations for developing U.S. long-range missiles, which originated at the time of the Anzio landings, have been neglected from the moment they were formulated last January. If this assertion should prove to be correct, it is recommended that an intensive program of this sort should be promptly initiated by the Army and Navy.

J.F.C.

Dear Grace,

I know Captain Wood will be

interested in this.

Henry

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July 11, 1944.

REPORT FROM PUTZI HANFSTAENGL.

Here is the last report from Putzi Hanfstaengl (S. Project), as a memorandum of a talk prepared by Jack Morgan of the State Department. You will note that Putzi is convinced of the Nazi debacle and his anti-Soviet bias has become complete fatalism as to the future of Europe.

JFC
J.F.C.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 1 1972

PART LIV

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. d. Parks Date MAY 1 1972

~~SECRET~~

July 7, 1944

On my visit of July 6, Doctor S. informed me that the statements made by German radio commentators on the military situation during the past several days convinced him that the Germans were intending to adopt the same policy on the Normandy front as in Italy, i.e., limit the scope of their operations mainly to preventing a break-through, "sell real estate" at as high a cost to the Allies as possible; defend stubbornly but retreat where the cost of continued defense became out of proportion to their resources. The Doctor believes that the reason for this is that the Germans feel that it is necessary to hold at all costs on the eastern front, that they will hold on the West if they can and, if not, so much the worse (as the Doctor puts it "wenn nicht, also nicht") but in the East will throw everything they possibly can into all-out resistance and, if possible, a heavy counter-attack since the Germans as a whole, as well as Hitler in particular, are convinced that the game is up for them and all Western Europe if the Russians break through.

The Doctor feels that in spite of the desperate resistance which may be expected for some time, the situation in Germany is nevertheless rapidly building up to such a breakdown as took place in 1918. He feels that

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State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 1 1972

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

the considerable number of deaths of German generals noted in the last few weeks is due to recklessness in the face of what they believe to be unavoidable disaster, that they are deliberately "immolating" themselves.

The Doctor is very gloomy as to the future of Europe. According to the Doctor, the very name of Europe will have passed away by a year from now and all that will be left will be "Stalin-Asia."

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State Dept. Letter 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date MAY 1 1972

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Secret*

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~~SECRET~~ -

July 18, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: LIQUIDATION OF THE "S. PROJECT".

Dear Miss Tully:

Here is a copy of an Aide Memoire which I have prepared for my talk with Sir Ronald Campbell at the British Embassy today. I thought I had better put it in black and white so as to avoid any possible misinterpretation.

JFC
J.F.C.

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 1 1972

~~SECRET~~

July 12, 1944

AIDE MEMOIRE

I have been directed to advise the British Embassy that the United States Government is holding Dr. Ernst Hanfstaengl at the disposition of the British authorities. Should the Embassy desire to return him to British custody, it is suggested that contact should be made with the appropriate official in the War Department to advise General Lewis, in command of the Washington Military District, of the pertinent arrangements. Pending these arrangements, the War Department will continue as in the past to be directly responsible for Dr. Hanfstaengl's security.

If it is desired to remove Dr. Hanfstaengl in the immediate future, it is requested that the Embassy establish informal liaison with Dr. Henry Field, of the Office of Strategic Services, as I must be absent from Washington on other duties from the 17th to the 24th of July.

The various reports prepared in connection with the utilization of Dr. Hanfstaengl have, of course, been faithfully forwarded to the Embassy. I shall be glad to supplement them in any way desired by the Embassy in advising the

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By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.

By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 1 1972

-2-

British authorities of Dr. Hanfstaengl's current personal attitudes and opinions. Dr. Field and I shall also be glad to facilitate any preliminary interviews which the appropriate British officials may desire with Dr. Hanfstaengl, pending their disposition of the project.

J.F.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 13, 1944

*File
Marshall*

MEMORANDUM FOR
GRACE

To take up with General
Marshall and ask that it be done.

F. D. R.

THE M

PSF: J.F. Carter folder 3-44

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July 12, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: ARMY TO BE NOTIFIED OF LIQUIDATION OF "S. PROTECT"

Dear Miss Tully:

Since I don't know whether I shall be able to reach you today on the telephone, I am sending this over to suggest that General Lewis, in command of the Washington Military District, should be notified by General Marshall's Office to turn Hanfstaengl over to the British authorities when they complete the arrangements for his transfer to British jurisdiction, and otherwise relieved of responsibility for Hanfstaengl's security on British application for his person.

J.F.C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 1 1972

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*file
Confidential*

July 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL MARSHALL:

Dear George:

An occasional correspondent, who sometimes makes sense, sends me the enclosed. He is an engineer of some experience.

I thought I ought to pass his remarks on to you, but I have no personal knowledge.

F.D.R.

PSF 27 Carter folder 3-44

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July 7, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: REPORTS ON DEFICIENCIES ALLEGED IN U.S. ORDNANCE.

Dear Miss Tully:

Here are four brief reports concerning alleged deficiencies in U.S. Ordnance. The source of this information is a responsible Army officer who would certainly be subject to Pentagon reprisals if his connection with these reports should be established. I am not competent to pass on the technical details but believe they were submitted as accurate in good faith by our informant. It is suggested that our invasion forces may in future find themselves at a serious technological disadvantage in fighting the Wehrmacht if current procurement policies are unaltered.

JFC
J.F.C.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

DR. McINTIRE:

Will you get somebody back
home to run this thing down?

F.D.R.

Report from J. F. Carter re: report
on threatened scandal involving the
Calhoun Compress, July 10th.

PSF J.F. Carter folder 3-44

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON 4, D. C.

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

~~SECRET~~

July 10, 1944.

REPORT ON THREATENED "SCANDAL" INVOLVING THE CALHOUN COMPRESS.

The attached report on the Calhoun Compress--a type of bandage which is a substitute for a tourniquet and is already in use in the Coast Guard--is worth considering because there are reports that the Truman Committee is shortly going to release an alleged scandal in connection with the suppression of this device by the Army Medical Corps. The tale is that the Army procurement of bandages is under the control of a Colonel Johnson of Johnson & Johnson, who tried to buy up the rights to the Calhoun Compress. When the owner refused to sell, the Colonel is alleged to have said that he would see that the Army never used it. The Colonel also is said to have blocked its supply to the Soviet Union under Lend-Lease, by refusing to clear Soviet requests for this device. I am not in a position to vouch for the truth of these reports but there is no doubt that something will be made public by the Truman Committee in the near future and that the effect of the publication of the alleged facts may be disturbing.

JFC
J.F.C.

ADDRESS YOUR REPLY TO
BUREAU OF MEDICINE AND SURGERY
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
AND REFER TO NO.



WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

28 August 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

In looking up the matter of the Calhoun Compress,
I find that it has been thoroughly investigated by our people.
The reason this was done was because the Maritime Commission had
asked us to do this to give them a recommendation. There is no
question but what it is a good compress, and we expressed that
opinion to the Maritime Commission. It so happens that we have
compresses that are made for our use that serve equally well, so
there was no particular advantage in the Navy going into procure-
ment of a special compress.

I do not know whether the Maritime Commission purchased
any or not.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Ross T. McIntire".

Ross T. McIntire
Chief of Bureau.

(Copy of this memorandum sent to J.F.C., 9/9/44.)
T-368

*J.F. Carter folder
3-44*



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 17, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR

DR. McINTIRE:

Will you get somebody back
home to run this thing down?

F.D.R.

July 6, 1944-

REPORT ON CALHOUN COMPRESS

This bandage is an emergency wound dressing improved especially by providing automatic hemostatic action. It is particularly recommended for LAY USE in EMERGENCY FIRST AID application pending skilled attention to wound.

Directions.- Apply scored side of circular pad towards, and directly on wound. Wind the gauze tail strips snugly in the same manner as in applying conventional dressing, allowing, if possible, two overlaps of gauze tail strips over the top of the circular pad. After bleeding has stopped, bandage may be loosened if uncomfortable.

Action.- Bandage functions both as a dressing and compress. Its hemostatic action is initiated through the axial expansion of the compressed pad, resulting in local pressure hemostasis.

As the primary bloodshed is absorbed, the expanding pad exerts direct pressure on the wound area and opposite pressure against the overlapping bandage tail wrappings. This produces localized pressure WHERE IT IS REQUIRED WITHOUT INTERFERING WITH ADJACENT CIRCULATION.

Application.- This bandage may be applied to any type of wound where the conventional dressing or compress is

applicable. It may be applied on areas where a tourniquet cannot be used.

Where there is free bleeding in incised, stab or lacerated wound the hemostatic action, of this bandage, will arrest copious bleeding without the application of a tourniquet and its inherent complications.

Package.- The disc form is maintained until placed in contact with the wound. No binder or chemical is used in process of manufacture and the entire bandage, as a unit, is sterilized prior to compression and insertion into a moisture-proof package.

Status in Armed Forces.- On March 3, 1943, in a letter signed by Lt. Colonel B. B. Smythe, Sanitary Corps, Director International Division, addressed to Russian War Relief, 11 East 35 Street, New York City, attention Mr. Weingard, a brief was inserted signed by L. L. Cook, Lt. Colonel Medical Corps, Medical Practice Division. This insertion read as follows: "The Calhoun Compress was carefully examined by the Medical Practice Division and was found to be entirely satisfactory for certain types of wounds. There is no objection to its procurement for Lend-Lease countries by this Division."

The Russians could never effect this procurement due to no allocations of materials.

On 11 October 1943, in a "Memorandum" signed by

H. W. Smith, Rear Admiral (MC) U.S. Navy, the following appears:

1. Specifications of the Calhoun Compress have been examined by me and by the Surgical Staff of the Naval Hospital.
2. It is one of a number of similar design intended to serve as a dressing and means of point controlling hemorrhage free from the objections attaching to an elastic tourniquet.
3. Procurement of the Compress may be approved.

The U.S. Maritime Commission, under date of 17 December 1943, Contract Number MC-44-3886, have purchased this Calhoun Compress for inclusion in their medical chests.

No decision after two years has been reached by the Army or Navy as to whether this Compress has merits for inclusion in the individual soldier's kit or any other medical kit.

No authorized tests have been made by either the Army or Navy even though these tests have been repeatedly asked for.

The Truman Committee are now investigating this entire Calhoun Compress situation and are ready to report on the results of their investigation.

The report will not be flattering to the Medical Divisions of the Armed Services.

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3-44

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JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
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1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
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July 25, 1944.

REPORT ON BRITISH ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE UNITED STATES.

Here is the report of the "look-see" trip to England, undertaken by
Deac Lyman of United Aircraft, in order to get the facts on the attitude of
the British people and leaders towards the United States and our elections.

This report is, in my judgment, so interesting that I shall not try to
summarize it. I recommend that it be read in its entirety. I am convinced
that it is honest, objective and accurate.

J.F.C.

New York, July 24, 1944

Dear John:

You remember I told you that when I returned from England I would get in touch with you and report or at least try to give you a little picture of things there. When I got back I went on a vacation, after recovering from a persistent flu attack. Hence this delay. However, what little I have to tell you is not affected by this delay or else I would have at least 'phoned you.

One of the items that I was interested in checking on was a possible prompted or studied hostility to this country or to those who direct its policies. I wondered from things I have read, especially in the British press, if there was a prompted animus toward the President. You remember we discussed something of this before I went to England.

I spent ten weeks in Great Britain, moving mostly in military circles, of course, covering our own air forces and devoting a busy fortnight to the Fleet Air Arm of the Royal Navy. In between, I talked with many people in many jobs, from cab drivers to heads of big industrial and transport outfits. I spent some time with a leading surgeon in civil life, with a leading railroad man, with a master at Eton, with the public forum artists in Hyde Park, with newspapermen, both British and American, with people from the great manufacturing towns, like Sheffield, and with Scots from Glasgow and the Clyde.

In all circles, both high and low (so-called), I found almost the opposite of what I had led myself to suspect in regard to our present administration. Mr. Roosevelt is regarded by the rank and file, by the conservative and liberal--save the most radical Communists--as the man who saw ahead when Britons did not, as the man who brought America to see the Axis menace, and especially this--from women in all walks of life--as the man who saved Britain by "feeding us and our children". Remember, I was regarded by those who know anything about this country as a typical New England manufacturer and hence conservative and, therefore, Republican. People in industry were not inclined to "butter" me but were more interested in finding out what industry, and especially the air industry, planned when the war is over. They were interested in the coming campaign, but only as it would affect post-war relations. They regard the fourth term as something academic and of little consequence but I think, without exception, feel that for the British Empire's sake Mr. Roosevelt should be re-elected. I did not, of course, talk at any length with the powers but I did talk with people who think like Churchill. I found that Beaverbrook was a lot closer to Churchill than I had suspected. I think that the Beaver alone of the governing group is inclined to regard the United States as an independent and rival nation with the others regarding us as merely a colonial dominion which doesn't happen to belong at the moment in name to the British Commonwealth.

Most of my British friends would deny this attitude but I believe the most of them have it unconsciously. It was summed up for me by a sergeant in the British Army, a most friendly chap, who said, "Arfter hall, y'know you 'mericans are only blarsted colonials." My friends in the British Navy are perplexed when in types of equipment we don't alter our whole industrial policy to meet their needs but they are very good in taking what we have and making use of it and they feel that while we should know better, considering the fact that we haven't all their advantages of background, we do very well indeed.

Naturally, they all think in terms of what is best for the British Empire and Britain and the Empire. It follows without need of mention that we are part of that Empire even though we are not so listed politically.

Hence, it follows further that what is best for the Empire must be best for the United States. Whatever Mr. Churchill himself thinks, those in the governing classes with whom I talked feel that Mr. Roosevelt is a much "safer" man than Willkie or Dewey; that Mr. Roosevelt will be guided by British foreign policy or its makers. Those same people are somewhat perplexed that one who thinks so clearly on international matters should be so "radical" in his domestic policies.

"If I were an American in the same position that I occupy in Britain", said one industrial leader, "I should certainly oppose Mr. Roosevelt, but as a Briton, I am enthusiastically

for Mr. Roosevelt." His wife interposed, "He saved my children with lend-lease food and whether or not he differs with Winston makes no difference to me. After all, lend-lease saved us and permits us to keep our pride also."

The very same thoughts were expressed in much the same words by a retired state school teacher in Sheffield, an educated and socially minded woman, who devotes her attention now to the Red Cross and her church work as editor of a church paper. I was much interested in her opinions because they reflected much of the thinking in the midlands, well away from London and its political minds. She was greatly concerned lest the President be defeated in the coming election by anyone. She said, "Not that another man might not be a great President but here in England the people have come to trust Mr. Roosevelt and might even support his stand on the peace even if he differed from Mr. Churchill."

Only in one group did I find open hostility to Mr. Roosevelt. The Communists there, as they do here, regard him as someone who has slowed up the revolution. Bloody and violent revolution was just around the corner; the masses have been denied their freedom or at least it has been seriously delayed by the "sops that this man Roosevelt throws out to the people".

Mr. Churchill is not simply a Tory to the spokesmen at least of the Communists. He is a "tyrant", who ranks with Hitler and Mussolini and Franco. He is useful until Naziism is overthrown

but only the Communists can keep him and his kind from creating a fascist form of government in England. Mr. Roosevelt is a kindly man but fundamentally thinks the same as Churchill.

This is the general theme song of the Communist speakers who talk to hundreds and sometimes thousands in Hyde Park. I had dinner one night with a bright English girl, an active worker in the Communist party, who got her Communism in Paris. She said the same thing with more detail and still finds kind things to say about us and our government. She and her group, which is growing, consider this war as merely a part of the world revolution that will eventually land England well to the left of Stalin. This young woman is an efficient secretary in the Ministry of Aircraft Production.

In Scotland I found a great deal of talk concerning how Scots are being called upon as Americans are to bail Britain out of a jam into which the "English" had let her slip. From cab drivers to naval officers I found a real if somewhat amusing resentment at the popular song "There'll always be an England". The Nationalist Party in Scotland is showing signs of renewed life but very few believe that a separate Scotland would be a good thing. These same Scots appear to be enthusiastic friends of ours and the admiration for Mr. Roosevelt is universal.

I had often heard that the British were the greatest salesmen in the world. I certainly found that to be so. The American

press works under the handicap of the finest hospitality and the shrewdest anywhere in the world. Under the circumstances, I think our news men and women are keeping their balance with remarkable objectivity. Lord and Lady So and So keep open house every week-end for our press, and it is a wonder to me that the boys and girls keep their balance so well. It was in this field that I expected to find the effect of criticism of our people and our institutions. Being particularly concerned with the air I was especially keen for criticism of our equipment and our methods of using it or its lack of usefulness. I did find something of this but in cases that I could track down it was merely honest opinion rather than any concerted attack on things American. I also found our own leaders thoroughly conscious of the British ability to sell their point of view and found that they were very much on guard against being over-sold, save in one or two instances, and in these the British changed their own point of view charmingly when events proved them to be in error.

As I read over these notes, John, I find them pretty vague and disconnected but you may get something out of them, although I don't see how.

The British, for example, had no real faith in the heavy, tough long range fighter until our Thunderbolt came along. They then set out to imitate it with their Typhoon and Tempest but failed in the matter of range. However, they have ceased comparing the Spitfire to it. They don't admit that they imitate our way of doing things but, at the same time, once won

over, they become enthusiastic in their praise.

While there is a greater willingness to sacrifice and endure for the sake of the war than we display here, at the same time there is far greater activity in postwar matters than we show here. The war is not something to be gotten over with. It is an event to be utilized for the sake of Britain's future. Railroads, steamship companies and airlines are devoting all their energies to the war, while at the same time are planning purposefully for postwar. This sounds like a paradox but it is so. The war to the British leader in industry and in military circles is an episode in a history, which it is the British purpose to control. The British railroads have a well thought out plan for operating all of England's continental airlines while the steamship companies are proposing a similar plan for air routes to South America and elsewhere. In this field, there is a big fight coming with Britain's thought leaning away from the "chosen instrument". Already the railroads' campaign has started in Parliament and the old Imperial Airways group is in for the fight of its life. Moreover, engineers are designing air transports for the future and there is no apparent onus attached to this type of postwar thinking and planning.

On the naval side, I found an interesting and important trend away from the old single air force idea. Britain is moving away from the single air ministry and the RAF or the

three defense branches idea and is following our lead in this. The R.N., I venture to predict, will have an air force in post-war days more powerful and better equipped than the RAF will be. The failure of the Air Ministry and Navy to provide the Fleet Air Arm with anything remotely as efficient as our own two Air Forces is felt profoundly in the Admiralty with the result that today the Admiralty is determined to change things. Of course, there are still the Nelsonians but the younger crowd are coming along and are shocked to find how superior our Corsairs, Hellcats, Wildcats and Avengers are to their own equipment, which, for the most part, is adopted from land planes.

In the light of recent events in Normandy, I was much interested in the British conservation of manpower attitude. All thinking people are acutely conscious of the fact that Britain lost the best of her young men in the last war and they don't propose to do it this time. I received the very clear impression that they look upon our young soldiers as people who can share the dying as well as the fighting. Their willingness to let the Russians do the dying was born of their desperate need to preserve their own young men for England's future. This feeling also helps in the relations with our troops, which I know are far better than they were in 1918. I am referring to the relations, as well as the troops themselves. The British feel that these young Americans going out from England are just so many young men who will not have to be replaced by future Englishmen

should they fail to come back and the conduct of these soldiers of ours in England has been good for relations. Of course, there are incidents but they amount to little. The exception to this-- and now I am talking hearsay not something I actually investigated--are the negro troops, which many feel should never have been sent to England. There are numerous stories concerning a lot of dark colored babies and our own white troops resent the way in which negroes were received by the British, resent white girls going out with them and this resentment has boiled out on one or two occasions. On the other hand, there is the story down Kent way of the farmers meeting at which universal acclaim was accorded the 'mericans, as one old farmer said, "The 'mericans are fine folk only I can't go the white bastards."

* I am rambling all over the map and am going to ramble somewhat further because the story deals with the British and with a region which you formerly knew well--the Near East. I have a sister who heads nursing education at the American University in Beirut, who knows more about the conditions out there than most diplomats. She informed me that the diplomatic job General Royce did when he was there was just about perfect. For a time he held the Middle East Command of our Air Force, but asked for a transfer to the British Theatre where he is doing a grand job today. Now, here is the other side of the picture. I saw Ralph Royce in England and congratulated him on his job out there and he told me that any American had a big jump on other people all the way from Egypt to the eastern limits of Arabia because of

-10-

the extraordinary job the Near East Colleges had been doing and especially the American University under Bayard Dodge. This is a bit of side gossip but I pass it along for what it is worth.

I'll be seeing you soon to answer any questions that this letter may bring up.

Sincerely yours,

Deac

File

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3-44

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July 28, 1944.


REPORT ON PUTZI'S VIEW OF GERMAN DEVELOPMENTS.

While waiting for word from the British Embassy concerning Putzi (who has naturally not been informed of the impending change in his status), I have continued to utilize him as in the past, although the project is due to be liquidated.

Concerning the recent revolt of the Generals, he says that the attempt on Hitler was undoubtedly bona fide, that Hitler would not risk his skin by a fake bomb because it might suggest further attempts on his life. He says that this has completed the cycle of the Nazi Revolution, that the conservative elements in ~~Germany~~ Germany have now been liquidated and that what now exists in the Reich could best be described as "National Communism". He believes that the German Armies will hold out until 1945, under this new desperate leadership, but says that the German goose is cooked. He adds that any settlement along the lines recently suggested by Sumner Welles--division of Germany into three countries--would lead to another Hitler twenty years later.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date MAY 1 1972



CHECK LIST

CHECK FOLLOWING ITEMS BEFORE TAKE-OFFS AND LANDINGS

- | | | | |
|---|---|-------|---|
| 1 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Brakes set for landing, check brake pulleys, splices, delay setting drag, and wrapping on reel (see pages 13, 25). (b) Brake ropes all clear. (c) Landing trolley pulled all the way back, brake rope tight. (d) Take-off trolley in good condition. (e) Take-off trolley at near end within reach for take-off; at far end for landing. (f) Slider returned to far end. (g) Travel release lanyard secure. | 4 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Man lift line down in lower position. (b) Twists out of plane lift lines. (c) Take-off sling on ground ready for attachment to plane. (d) Hooker's seat ready and clear. (e) Landing sling and sling arms tied up out of the way of take-off. |
| 3 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Slider line out of way and tight. No sag. (b) All lines on opposite end from take-off clear and pulled tight. | 5 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Six part lift tackle run out. (b) Lines all clear and free, pulleys oiled. (c) Snubbing posts firm in ground. |
| | | Pilot | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (a) Engine warmed up, plane O.K. |

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PART 3 ERECTION


LAYING OUT THE FIELD


Generally, the site will have been surveyed from the air and plans for laying out the field indicated beforehand. However, final determination of the exact position for the cableway, bridles, masts, anchor rods, and anchor plates must be made by the ground crew after landing.

The approach should be clear of trees for several hundred feet. Top off trees and high branches for 50 feet along each side of the cableway. Trim the branches

of tall trees beyond this limit if they might obstruct the passage of the plane. The top branches, if 10 or more feet above the cableway, may serve as camouflage. Low brush that cannot interfere with the plane serves as excellent camouflage.

The layout below indicates the most desirable arrangement of the field. However, the brake line and the leads on the plane lift and man lift can be transposed to the opposite mast in the same pair if terrain or natural obstructions interfere with easy operation of the lift running tackles when they are stretched across the ground.







PLAN OF RIG

OVERALL LAYOUT: In some of the rigs the lengths of the main cableway and of the bridles may not measure exactly as shown above. If this is the case, the exact length of the cable will be stamped in the end sockets. *Corrections in the layout will have to be made in the field to compensate for any such variation in cable lengths.*

To lay out the field, first establish the ends of the cableway then determine the bridle pathways. Along the bridle pathways stake the mast sites 128 feet from the ends of the runway. *Use a steel tape for measuring all points.*

ELEVATION OF RIG





ANCHOR LAYOUT: Using the steel measuring tape as though it were a radius line considerably shortens the time necessary for spotting all anchor rod eye positions and anchor plate holes.

For marking the mast anchors, first set the base plate at the point M with the brackets parallel to the cableway course and with the bridle cutting diagonally across the plate. Using the center of the bridle plate as a pivot, swing a 25-foot arc and spot the positions for the four anchor rod eyes at the center of each side of the base plate. With an arc 9 feet longer mark the anchor plate holes beyond each anchor rod eye. Slight variation in anchor spotting may be necessary if obstructions to digging are encountered.

For the anchor rod eye positions of the strong masthead backstay, measure 65 feet along the bridle pathway from the same base plate pivot point. Add another 9 feet for the anchor plate hole.

To get the correct positions for the end anchors in the anchor bridle assemblies use the bridle cable socket position as a pivot. Swing a 14½-foot arc 3 feet either side of the projected bridle cable pathway and spot the anchor rod eye positions. In a direct line through the anchor rod eye mark the anchor plate holes 24½ feet from the cable socket position.



INSTALLING THE ANCHORS

The process of installing anchor rods is the same regardless of the size of the anchor. It involves digging a hole, driving the anchor rod to meet the hole, and placing the anchor plate which serves as a deadman over the spear head of the rod so that it permanently locks the rod. An installing bar is provided.

The length of the rod and the angle at which it is driven determine the depth of the hole as well as the distance of the hole from the anchor eye.

For the mast stay anchors both the hole and the rod should enter the ground at a 45° angle, forming a right angle where they meet. A slight deviation from the angle is not serious. If correctly driven the rod will hit the hole when the eye is flush with the ground. These 7-foot rods require 7-foot holes 9 feet from the rods.


Drive the end anchor rods at the angles shown in the diagram. Set the eye of the end anchor rod in the bearing plate while driving it into the ground. Check whether the bearing plate must have a pulling-up eye (see pages 8-9). The anchor rod eye should have about 6 inches clearance above the ground. The end anchors are 9 feet long and require 7-foot holes 10 feet from the rod.



ERECTING THE MAST

BASE


- (a) Center the base of the mast at the indicated point M (see pages 32-34), making certain that the base bracket is parallel to the cableway or main axis of the rig.
- (b) Drive 18-inch iron spikes through each of the corners to anchor the base. Drive two anti-skid stakes at each side of the inner corner.



- (c) Insert the shoe of the mast into the brackets of the base and secure with pin and cotter key.


COUPLING

(d) Couple the remaining sections of the mast together. Make sure that couplings with the eyes start at the top and fall at every other joining. Line up these eyes. The assembled mast will lie parallel to the main cableway.




HEAD CAP

- (e) Shackle the single masthead backstay to the bar fitting at the top.
- (f) Run the main bridle cable through the masthead roller.
- (g) If the mast is to be used for the tackle bridle (see page 32) shackle a double wire rope block to the bar fitting. Fasten triple fairleads along the bridle 15 feet apart and run the tackles through (see page 11). Note the rigging for the slider pull-up rope (see page 17). If the mast is to support the arresting brake do not fasten the single fairleads and brake line pulley to the bridle until the cableway is tight.




STAYS

- (h) Attach the side stays to the mast and anchors and the front stays to the mast. Front refers to the uppermost face of the mast; back, to the bottom when the mast is lying on the ground. Stays are identified by different colors: red the bottom stay, white the second, blue the third, and black the top. The single masthead stay is orange. Do not attach the back stays until the mast has been partially raised as the position of the mast would make this operation awkward.



BOOM

- (i) Assemble the boom and insert the end fitting between the mast shoe plates. Secure with pin and cotter key.
- (j) Attach the front stays of the mast to the boom.
- (k) Shackle the toggle end of the boom guys to the side anchors and the other end of the boom guys to the boom end plate.
- (l) Adjust the stays at the turnbuckles and fasten the triple block at the becket end to the boom end of the assembly.




RAISING THE BOOM

- (m) Raise the boom to vertical position with the block and tackle.
- (n) Fasten and adjust the side stays to the proper anchor rods and chains.

RAISING THE MAST

- (o) Raise the mast a few feet off the ground, fasten the back or bottom stays, adjust the side stays, and raise the mast to a vertical position.
- (p) Remove the front stays from the boom and shackle them to the front anchor rod. *While making this transfer have all hands lay hold of the front stays to support the mast in a vertical position.* In high winds it may be necessary to attach safety ropes to the front mast cluster to prevent the mast from falling over.
- (q) Remove the block and tackle and the boom.
- (r) Anchor the masthead backstay.
- (s) Adjust all stays at the turnbuckles.



RAISING THE CABLEWAY


Before raising the cableway the bridle plates (see pages 10 and 12) and the anchor bridles (see page 9) must be assembled.


When the anchor bridles are assembled connection between the main cable sockets and the turnbuckle jaws can be made at one end of the field only. At the other end of the field the cable sockets will not reach the turnbuckles until all the cables are raised. The cable must be raised from this unattached end.

Before applying any tension to the cables make sure that all turnbuckles screws are run in far enough to catch all the threads of the sleeve. Inspect all cable sockets, turnbuckles, and anchor rod eyes.

At each bridle at this end of the field, hook one end of a block and tackle to the pulling-up eye on the equalizer sheave of the anchor bridle assembly and hook the other end of the block and tackle to the eye of the pulling-up tail stemming from the main bridle cable. Four-man teams at each bridle end pull together so that each bridle shares the load.

When the cable is partially raised tighten the fairleads for the tackle and slider pull-up rope.





ROLLING
HITCH

HAND CAPSTAN

ATTACH MAIN BRIDLE
CABLE EYE TO
TURNBUCKLE JAW

When manpower can no longer move the heavy cables attach a second block and tackle to pull the first. When 4-man teams can no longer move the cable even with the secondary block and tackle, snub the loose end of the secondary block at one of the bridles and transfer all men over to the other bridle. The entire crew pulls on the secondary block and tackle of this bridle until the turnbuckle connection can be made. Then slack off the block and tackle and send all the men to the other bridle where the operation is repeated. A small hand capstan accompanies each set to take up the final few inches of slack.

At this point the entire rigging is in the air. Only final adjustment of turnbuckles to correct the cableway sag (see page 56 for formula), fastening of arresting brake line fairleads and pulley (see page 13), and installation of anchors for tackle of lifting devices (see page 11) and for the travel release holdback line (see page 16) remain to be done before the cableway is ready.

The brake line fairleads must be attached to hang vertically and clamped tight to avoid danger of their being whipped around the cable and fouling the brake line on landing. This operation must be done by a man in the hooker's seat which is attached to a shackle so that he can slide along the bridle cable.

WORK SCHEDULE

Setting up the rig with the hand-operated tools provided is a simple process. A crew of nine men—trained to erect and operate the system—can land, measure the field, assemble the equipment, erect the masts, stretch the cable, and have the cableway ready for use in less than 24 hours after landing. This time estimate assumes soft soil where it is easy to dig and a comparatively clear, level, open field. Heavy undergrowth and large trees, of course, will considerably increase the time necessary for clearing the field and unreeling the cables.

For most efficient use of manpower follow the time and work schedule illustrated in the following pages. Careful study of the diagrams and detailed instructions in pages 32 to 43 will avoid time-consuming errors.

Split the 9-man crew into two teams; **TEAM ONE**—four diggers; **TEAM TWO**—three riggers. The supervisor and assistant measure the field and direct the teams—after which the supervisor works with the riggers and his assistant with the diggers. The riggers assemble all equipment, connect stays, rig tackle, and lend a hand wherever needed. One rigger should be an expert splicer. The diggers install the anchor rods and plates, raise the masts, and clear the field. Use every extra man-minute on the digging as it sets the pace for the entire job.

The schedule illustrated here is flexible. An untrained crew will take longer to prepare the field but will have no technical difficulties. With favorable conditions, suitable terrain, increased manpower, or power-driven tools, erection time can be considerably reduced.

STEP 1 00:0 to 1:15 75 MINUTES

TEAM ONE: ASSISTANT SUPERVISOR AND FOUR DIGGERS
TEAM TWO: SUPERVISOR AND THREE RIGGERS

ENTIRE CREW: 75 Minutes — Land by parachutes and assemble equipment at approximate site of field.




STEP 2

1:15 to 2:15

120 MINUTES

ENTIRE CREW



SUPERVISOR AND ASSISTANT: 120 Minutes
— Stake out cableway points and positions
of first two masts (see pages 32-33).



TEAM ONE: 120 Minutes — Clear field.




TEAM TWO: 120 Minutes — Sort equipment
and carry it to proper locations for ready
use.

STEP 3

2:15 to 3:30

75 MINUTES

ENTIRE CREW




ENTIRE CREW: 75 Minutes — Unreel main cableway and bridle cables along pathways they are to follow.

STEP 4

3:30 to 6:00

150 MINUTES

ENTIRE CREW



SUPERVISOR AND ASSISTANT: 150 Minutes
— Lay out entire field with correct anchor rod and anchor plate positions (see page 34); instruct and assist in all other operations.


STEP 4

3:30 to 6:00 (CONTINUED)

ENTIRE CREW



TEAM ONE: 150 Minutes — Dig holes and install anchor rods and anchor plates for Masts I and II (see page 35).



TEAM TWO: 150 Minutes — Assemble Mast I and boom. Attach bridle cable, stays, pulleys, fairleads, etc., and prepare for raising (see pages 36-39).

STEP 5

6:00 to 8:30

150 MINUTES


ENTIRE CREW



TEAM ONE: 120 Minutes—Dig anchor holes and install anchor rods and anchor plates for Anchor Bridles I and II (see page 35).



TEAM TWO: 150 Minutes — Assemble Mast II and prepare all rigging.




TEAM ONE: 30 Minutes — Raise Mast I (see pages 40-41).

STEP 6


8:30 to 9:00

30 MINUTES

ENTIRE CREW



TEAM ONE: 30 Minutes—Hook up Anchor Bridles I and II and run out turnbuckles (see page 9).




TEAM TWO: 30 Minutes—Raise Mast II.

STEP 7

9:00 to 9:15

15 MINUTES

ENTIRE CREW



ENTIRE CREW: 15 Minutes—Pin cable sockets to bridle plates, taking up slack.

STEP 8

9:15 to 10:15

60 MINUTES

ENTIRE CREW



TEAM ONE: 60 Minutes — Dig holes and install anchor rods and plates for Mast III.



TEAM TWO: 60 Minutes — Assemble Bridle Plate I with derrick, davit, blocks, clamps, etc. (see pages 10,12).

STEP 9


10:15 to 12:15

120 MINUTES

ENTIRE CREW



TEAM ONE 120 Minutes—Dig holes and install anchor rods and plates for Mast IV and Anchor Bridle III.




TEAM TWO: 120 Minutes — Assemble Mast III and prepare all rigging.

STEP 10


12:15 to 14:15

120 MINUTES

ENTIRE CREW




TEAM ONE: 30 Minutes—
Raise Mast III.



TEAM ONE: 60 Minutes—Dig
holes and install anchor rods
and plates for Anchor Bridle
IV.



TEAM ONE: 30 Minutes—Fill
in and tamp holes or catch up
on digging.




TEAM TWO: 120 Minutes—
Assemble Mast IV and pre-
pare all rigging.

STEP 11

14:15 to 14:45

30 MINUTES

ENTIRE CREW



TEAM ONE: 30 Minutes —
Raise Mast IV.




TEAM TWO: 30 Minutes —
Hook up Anchor Bridles III and
IV and run out turnbuckles.

STEP 12

14:45 to 15:00

120 MINUTES

ENTIRE CREW




ENTIRE CREW: 15 Minutes — Pin cable sockets to Bridle Plate II
with all men pulling up slack.

STEP 13


15:00 to 16:00

60 MINUTES

ENTIRE CREW



TEAM ONE: 60 Minutes — Lay out block and tackle for pulling up main cable. Fill in and tamp mast anchor holes, clear field, etc.




TEAM TWO: 60 Minutes — Assemble Bridle Plate II and install spring buffer, sliders, and trolleys (see page 17).

STEP 14


16:00 to 18:00

120 MINUTES

ENTIRE CREW



ENTIRE CREW: 120 Minutes — Pull up main cables and attach bridle cables to main turnbuckles at the anchor bridles.



TEAM ONE: In same period — Recheck all fairleads, pulleys, and lines when cableway is just off the ground.

STEP 15


18:00 to 19:00

60 MINUTES

ENTIRE CREW



TEAM ONE: 60 Minutes — Fill up and tamp remaining holes, clear ground, prepare camouflage, etc.



TEAM TWO: 60 Minutes — Check cableway sag and tighten turnbuckles (see page 56).

STEP 16


19:00 to 21:00

120 MINUTES

ENTIRE CREW



TEAM ONE: 120 Minutes — Clear out plane parking space, clear path for tackle leads, etc.



TEAM TWO: 120 Minutes — Attach arresting brake and fairleads for brake line (see page 13). Make final adjustments.

FORMULA FOR CABLEWAY SAG

To check the cableway for proper tension it is necessary to find the difference between the cableway at the bridle plate assemblies and the sag at the center of the span. This difference should be 3 feet. If the sag is less than this amount an airplane will apply dangerously high stresses to the rig on landing. If the sag is greater it offers flying hazards to the pilot.

The following method of measuring this difference is very simple:

- (a) Set a stake in the ground at each end and at the center of the cableway span.
- (b) Sight across the stakes in a direct horizontal line—leveling off the stakes to the sighting line.
- (c) Attach the steel measuring tape to the landing


trolley and run the trolley to the stakes—measuring at each point the distance from the trolley to the top of the stake.

- (d) Calling the distance from cableway to stake x_1 at the near end, x_2 at the far end, and x_3 at the center check the measurements by the following formula which takes into account any variation at the ends:

$$\frac{x_1 + x_2}{2} = x_3$$

$$x_3 - 3 = x_1$$

Correct the sag by adjusting the turnbuckles at the anchor bridles. When the cable is tight it is easier to adjust the small turnbuckles than the large ones. Therefore, it is advisable to take up the first slack with the large turnbuckles before the stress increases, making the large turnbuckles difficult to turn.



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FORMULA FOR CABLEWAY SAG

56

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON 4, D. C.

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

September 28, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY : "M" PROJECT REPORTS.

Dear Miss Tully:

Herewith please find twenty five reports from the Bowman-Field Committee
on Migration and Settlement ("M" Project) for the President's files.

JFC
J.F.C.

now thirty!

H.F.

PSF J.F. Carter folder 3-44

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON 4, D. C.

file

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

September 28, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MISS TULLY: NOTE FROM O.S.S.

Dear Miss Tully:

After my disappointment in connection with the "S" Project, it is pleasant to get the attached note from the O.S.S., whom I have been trying to help out on psychological warfare in what is humorously known as my "spare time".

I thought that perhaps the President might be interested to have concrete evidence as to the minor utility of some of my activities. Or perhaps it is because praise is so rare in my dealings with the services that I am unduly elated with this trophy.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

Washington, D.C.

September 26, 1944

Mr. John F. Carter

Dear Mr. Carter:

RE: OSS/MO Far East Cable

Thanks very much for the suggestions which you have gotten in the habit of passing along to us for our so-called black cable to the Far East. These suggestions are invaluable to us and we hope you will continue to give us these notes. Some of them get into our cables, but all of them are sent by mail to our outposts in hopes of stimulating their ideas.

For your information, I am attaching a copy of the "cable" which was actually sent by air pouch to most of our outposts today.

Yours very truly,

/s/ THOMAS J. McFADDEN
Lieutenant, USNR

Attachment

*BF J. F. Carter folder
3-44*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 28, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR

J. FRANKLIN CARTER:

In regard to your report on survey of practical capital needs of American industry, it is suggested that you take this matter up with the Director of the Budget.

Grace G. Tully
Private Secretary

JOHN FRANKLIN CARTER
(Jay Franklin)
1210 NATIONAL PRESS BUILDING
WASHINGTON 4, D. C.

"We, the People"
"The Week in Washington"

*Grace J.C.
to tell up with
to take up with
Minister of the Budget*

Metropolitan 4112
Metropolitan 4113

REPORT ON SURVEY OF PRACTICAL CAPITAL NEEDS OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY
("F" PROJECT)

The attached file shows "bureaucratic" mismanagement of a problem which the Chairman of the Credit Policy Committee of the American Bankers Association states in writing to be second only in importance to the winning of the war. Briefly, the proposal was to obtain by inquiry the facts needed to form an estimate of the real needs of American industry for capital.

The result was a piece of "professorial" bungling of the type so often charged by critics of the Administration and so seldom uncovered. The original proposal was cleared through you and then was killed by a statistician in the Budget Bureau, who refused to allow the Department of Commerce to use its duly appropriated funds for this purpose. The original proposal was begun at the proper time--April, 1943--and was entrusted by Wayne Taylor to a practical financier selected by me and approved by Wayne. The purpose of the inquiry was to obtain facts and not statistics; it was a business matter.

The survey was approved by the proper interested parties, both government and business: namely, the Secretary of Commerce, the Federal Reserve Board, the American Bankers Association and the Committee on Economic Development. The attached memorandum

from Dr. Stuart Rice of the Bureau of the Budget shows how it was strangled by the traditional device of creating an unwieldy committee and then preventing it from functioning by the absence of a supposed "key-member" and by loading it with extraneous detail.

This report is submitted in the hope that it may not be too late to get some of the facts and that this Budget Bureau decision may be swiftly reversed. The whole problem of reconversion and business ^{re}organization can be resolved by knowledge of the facts on which credit policies can be based, while statistical analyses (though interesting to professors of business economics) are not very helpful when weeks and days and minutes count. The failure and elimination of 500,000 small business concerns during the war-period was not, according to my information, wholly caused by their relative inefficiency but in large part by the absence of the sort of knowledge which this survey was intended to place at the disposal of the President.

J.F.C.
J.F.C.

September 26, 1944

Dear John:

Enclosed is a letter from Mr. Hugh H. McGee, Chairman of the Credit Policy Committee of the American Bankers Association. You will note the great importance he attaches to the survey which I was commissioned to make. Now, this project was killed by the Bureau of the Budget last March.

The facts are these. The need for such a survey was brought to your attention by me. It was taken up to the White House and approved. I was asked whether the Treasury Department was the agency to work with and I replied that the Department of Commerce was the proper one as the Census Bureau was there and that the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce was specifically charged with "establishing and maintaining the Nation's balance sheets."


Therefore, I was hired by the Undersecretary of Commerce to make the survey in cooperation with the two above mentioned Bureaus. A very careful and intensive check was made with all possible governmental agencies to ascertain whether any similar projects had been made or were contemplated. When it was found that none were, a questionnaire was prepared. This was submitted to the Federal Reserve Board. They suggested several changes and additions. Their recommendations were accepted in toto. The questionnaire was shown to a number of business executives both large and small. They were unanimous in stating that all the questions could be answered without difficulty and with no expense. The American Bankers' Association was also consulted. The Secretary of Commerce signed a covering letter which is attached.

Clearance by the Bureau of the Budget was then applied for. A preliminary meeting was held with the Bureau of Statistical Standards. They decided that all possible government agencies should be consulted and called another meeting at which Dr. Stuart Rice presided. The net result was that the project was killed by a group of academic theorists without consultation with any executives or bankers.

Dr. Rice then formed a committee under his own chairmanship and there the matter stands. The net result is that the country faces the reconversion period without any comprehensive knowledge of what the actual financial condition of industry is or what the condition will be when government war buying stops.

I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum from Dr. Stuart Rice to the members of his committee. This not only shows that the survey has come to a complete standstill, but it also shows that the sub-committee has no conception of the immediacy of the problem or the need for facts rather than statistics. The fact that the American Bankers' Association feels so strongly on the subject certainly proves that this matter should be taken out of the hands of academically trained theoretical statisticians and returned to practical financial experts.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Shreve Cowles Badger". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name.

Shreve Cowles Badger

September 18, 1944.

Hon. Wayne C. Taylor,
Under Secretary of Commerce,
Commer Department,
Washington, D. C.

My dear Wayne:-

Often I recall the visit which I had with you in April, 1943, in the Department of Commerce, together with some of your colleagues, in which I expressed the hope that the then proposed questionnaire which was prepared, as I recall it, jointly by the Department of Commerce, the Committee for Economic Development and the Research Staff of the Federal Reserve Board, to be sent to a country-wide list of business concerns to develop the character and magnitude of the demand for credit during the phases of re-conversion and embarkation by industry of all sizes, particularly in the small and medium sized categories, in the post-war era.

You were good enough to let me, in collaboration with some others who were interested in this subject, ask the questions calculated to develop the credit phase, and at that time I recall that it was hoped that this questionnaire would go out before the end of 1943. It is my further recollection that it would be so keyed by symbols that upon receipt of the returns it could then, by the use of census machines, be broken down, not only by industries, but by localities.

It seems so clear to me, and I think to most people, that second only to the military operations themselves, the most important problem which we face in this country is the economic problem of properly implementing the efforts of industry to get started on their post war efforts on the best basis practicable and thereby provide in the post-war period the maximum amount of employment for our working people of this country, and particularly for those who will return from their splendid service in the Armed Forces and in war production.

There are some 15,000 banks in this country who have the will to do this job in so far as the credit aspect develops, but I submit that it is extraordinarily difficult to make any realistic plans to do any job without some realistic knowledge of the magnitude and the character of the job to be done.

Hon. Wayne C. Taylor

-2-

September 18, 1944.

It is my recollection that further developments of this questionnaire and its distribution to business concerns in the country, especially the smaller ones, has for some reason or another not been carried out.


Obviously this undertaking is one which the Department of Commerce is uniquely qualified to do.

I recall clearly that the attitude of the Department of Commerce was very favorable, but there were other departments of Government involved in this matter.

I want to urge upon you a reconsideration of this whole question, and urge that this matter be undertaken at the earliest possible date.

It would be very unfortunate, I think, if we found ourselves, as well might be the case, suddenly confronted with this problem without having had the foresight to prepare ourselves for it.

Yours very truly,



Chairman,
Credit Policy Commission

HHC:R

c.c. Mr. Shreve C. Badger
cc. Senator James E. Murray

C
O
P
Y

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE
WASHINGTON

Manufacturers in the War Industries:

The Department of Commerce is making a study to find out what financial problems a concern like yours may face in reconverting from war production to peace production. This study is being made in the hope that a constructive and practical program can be prepared, and that the reconversion from war to peace can be made as easy as possible for all manufacturing firms engaged in war production.

The accompanying questions are sent to you in the spirit of a personal letter rather than that of a questionnaire. We have tried to word the questions so that they can be answered without waste of time or expense. Your attention is called to the note next to your name and address, which reads: "If exact figures are not readily available, APPROXIMATIONS will be satisfactory."

Please return your report in the enclosed franked envelope, addressed to the Bureau of the Census. Your returns will be edited and tabulated by the Bureau of the Census and will then be turned over to the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce for study and analysis. The results will then be published in summary form, copies of which will be made available to you upon request. No names will be used in the published list.

Your assistance will be of definite help, and we will appreciate your cooperation and prompt reply.

Sincerely yours,

Jesse H. Jones
Secretary of Commerce

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET

September 18, 1944

MEMORANDUM

To: Members of the Interagency Advisory Committee on Needs for
Financial Data

From: Stuart A. Rice, Chairman

The attached report by Mr. Cooper's subcommittee is for your information. It should receive action by the main committee at an early meeting. However, since Mr. Cooper has now left this Division to take up his new work at the University of Chicago, I propose to defer such a meeting until Mr. Eakens' appointment has been completed, and he has had an opportunity to take over the functions of committee secretary.

Attachment

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
BUREAU OF THE BUDGET
Washington 25, D. C.

September 11, 1944

Mr. Stuart A. Rice, Chairman
Interagency Advisory Committee on
Needs for Financial Data
Bureau of the Budget
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Rice:

We were instructed by the Interagency Advisory Committee on Needs for Financial Data to study further the program for collecting and analyzing financial information for postwar planning and reconversion purposes in order to determine the appropriate base period to be used, and to suggest the means by which the work could be accomplished. For the base period, we recommend that the sample of about 7500 companies for which OPA has matched statements be extended back to cover the years 1939, 1940 and 1941 with data obtained from the BIR transcripts. OPA has investigated its facilities and has found that it will have the necessary staff and funds to perform the work. We, therefore, recommend that OPA be designated as the agency to tabulate and process the data.

The Subcommittee's previous report, which was adopted by the Interagency Advisory Committee, suggested that both OPA and SEC tabulate data in order to obtain a more representative sample. Since there is an overlap between the two sets of data, it is our opinion that OPA should tabulate its data in separate groups, segregating SEC companies (including named subsidiaries) from companies not included in the SEC list. This approach will permit consolidation of the two sets of data. It is our understanding that OPA data will generally be confined to distribution within Government agencies. Publication should be undertaken, if at all, only after consolidation with SEC data. Responsibilities for the work of consolidation, adjustment, and analysis should be given further consideration.

We have made certain preliminary checks of the comparability of OPA and BIR data. While the two series are not comparable in all respects, they are sufficiently comparable in most of the major categories to make it worthwhile to execute our recommendations. As the project goes forward, however, detailed study should be given by OPA to discoverable discrepancies and appropriate adjustment or qualifications made. In

addition, the representative character of the samples should be checked. This can be done by making detailed studies to determine whether the sample should be modified by additional data collections for selected industries in particular years, and by making the OPA reports mandatory in two or three industries in order to discover whether a bias exists in the type of firm reporting on a voluntary basis.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Wm. Cooper

SUBCOMMITTEE ON POSTWAR FINANCIAL STATISTICS

William W. Cooper, Bureau of the Budget,
Secretary
Frederick C. Mirks, Federal Reserve Board
Irwin Friend, Securities & Exchange Commission
Milton Gilbert, Department of Commerce
Raymond Goldsmith, War Production Board
Wesley Lindow, Treasury Department
Rexford Parmelee, Office of Price Administration
Thomas Rhodes, Smaller War Plants Corporation