MEMORANDUM

February 22, 1944

Memorandum of Myron C. Taylor
Bermuda Conference and the IGC.
(Material obtained from file in
Visa Division, State Department)

Myron C. Taylor addressed a memorandum on April 30, 1943, to Welles, Long, and Hull. The occasion was a wire from the Department to London requesting a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee after the Bermuda Conference. A note in the file states that Mr. Taylor initialed the wire only on condition that his memorandum be presented to Mr. Long and the Secretary.

The text of the memorandum follows:

"Before any meeting is called the position of our own Government with respect to the refugee situation must be clearly developed. The Bermuda Conference was wholly ineffective, as I view it, and we knew it would be. What the IGC may be able to do, of course, is open to question, but with respect to anything that it may be able to do, it will require a commitment and large financial obligation if the plight of the refugees generally is to be relieved. The commitment also obligates this Government, if made, to find not only temporary places of refuge, but permanent places of settlement. It is my opinion, as it was before the Bermuda Conference, that the position of our Government and of the British Government must be thoroughly clarified and clearly understood in advance and if nothing constructive can be assured, such a meeting will only be another failure.

Myron C. Taylor"

The following penciled notation appears at the bottom: "Mr. concours with Mr. Taylor's memorandum. T.B.C.", and below this notation were several initials which could not be deciphered. Opposite Mr. Long's name at the top were the words, in ink, "I agree".
Attached to Mr. Taylor's memorandum was the following pencilled note:

"VISA DIVISION

May 21, 1943

Mr. Reams:

"Please note Mr. Taylor's memorandum of April 30. As the views expressed therein are so contrary to the facts and the defeatist or over-emotional attitude on the refugee problem is so much at variance with our recent letters to and from the President, you can look out for more of this kind of stuff! Do we now know who inspired the people Senator Lucas spoke about? I think we do.

R.O.H."

The letters to and from the President were not found in the file.

E. Huntington
BACKGROUND

Until late in 1942 the Department of State followed the policy of withholding atrocity stories received by it from Europe on the theory that confirmation of such stories was lacking. But on September 28, 1942, Rabbi Wise made public a communication received from one Reigner in Europe transmitted through the State Department and which Wise, either mistakenly or deliberately, stated had official State Department sanction.

This resulted in a flood of mail to the President and the State Department aimed at procuring: (1) a joint declaration by the United States and the United Kingdom censoring barbarities and promising retribution; (2) opening Palestine to the Jews; (3) removing all barriers to the immigration of Jewish Children and (4) exchanging Jews in occupied Europe for interned Axis nationals.

The last point was emphatically disapproved by the State Department on several grounds. In the first place there are not enough Axis Internes to make such a project possible. But most important, the exile governments could be expected to object to this favoring of Jews over non-Jewish nationals. This latter point could also be used by the Germans for propaganda's claim that the war is being fought for the Jews. (Report of December 15, 1942 for State Department files).

On January 9, 1943 a study of United States Jewish organizations covering 39 pages was submitted for the files. This study shows primarily the diversity of aims of such organizations.

The American Jewish Congress looks toward action by the Jews as a race including the sending of delegates to any-peace conference following the war. They also seek to establish Palestine as an independent nation and to maintain a separate Jewish Army during the present conflict.

The Committee for Jewish Army, organized by Van Hassen, in 1941, is neither well-planned nor supported by the Jewish populace as a whole, although it has at least nominal backing by several well-known persons.

The communist organizations appear to be making use of the Jewish sentiment to further general communist rather than Jewish ends.
American Council for Judaism-sponsored by Jewish Rabbis, prefers to limit its activities to religious rather than political questions.

The B'hai B'rith favors a united front and proposes a conference of all Jewish organizations other than Van Paman's committee and the Communist organization, both of which it refuses to recognize.

On January 20, 1943, in response to a rising tide of sentiment in England, the refugee question was discussed at some length in Parliament. The Government stated that the Declaration of December 15, concerning the extermination of Jews, was intended as a deterrent. However, the Government recognizes the danger of favoring Jews unduly and is particularly aware of the danger of inviting the Germans to dump the Jews on the Allies. Because of shipping and other difficulties the neutral countries must be encouraged to absorb refugees, but it is felt that the limit is being reached. The Government is not prepared to accept any great number of adult refugees in Palestine for security reasons, but will accept some women and children. The United Kingdom itself cannot take any more refugees than it now has, except possibly on the Isle of Man, where they would be held under detention. It was not known whether the colonies have more room. The Government also states that it did not favor a formal international conference because of the ensuing publicity, but it would be agreeable to a private conference to get proposals.

Concerning the United States the British Government would like to know whether we feel that combined action by the United Nations is now called for; whether the United States will take more adult refugees and if so how many; how many more refugees Sandesina can take; what shipping is available; whether the United States is agreeable to a private conference on the question; and whether the neutral countries should be assured that the refugee problem will be included in any rehabilitation plans as a part of peace terms.

The Government concludes by giving the number of refugees already received by Great Britain and the Colonies.

By telegram, dated February 20, 1943, England proposes that United States and Great Britain call a conference in London of the Allied Nations on the refugee question at which an agreement should be reached on the number of special visas to be issued to refugees, and that guarantees of post-war relief should be made to the neutral countries.
On February 25, Secretary Hull replied, outlining the steps already taken by this country, citing the number of internees in the United States, with the resulting lessening of the burden in Europe and the increased load upon this country. He proposed the use of the Intergovernmental Committee to explore the refugee problem, but warned that such an investigation should not be limited to the Jews; that as many refugees as possible should be kept in Europe to save shipping space and loss of life in transit as well as aiding in returning such refugees to their home lands after the war; to provide maintenance for refugees given asylum by the neutral countries; to assure the neutrals that refugees would be repatriated after the war, and to investigate the possibility of temporary asylum in non-neutral countries.

In connection with preparation of the foregoing reply a memorandum was sent by Wallace Murray to Brandt urging pointed and emphatic reference to the number of Italians already foisted on the United States by England. He suggested that public sentiment in this country be rallied to provide support for the Government in resisting a deluge of refugees which, added to the number of internees now being supported, would aggravate the already critical food situation.

On February 26, the London Embassy sent a despatch indicating public opinion in England on the refugee problem. The Manchester Guardian particularly criticized the British Government for barring refugees who will not aid the war effort. It alleges that this is contrary to the sentiment of the people of England. The Guardian urges that united action with the United States be taken, but it expresses the opinion that the United States appears to be hanging back.

On March 9, the Manchester Guardian expresses itself strongly on the proposed conference, and criticizes the United States' plan for temporary asylum on the grounds that many refugees may not wish to return home after the war, and that the neutral countries may not be able to take any more than they now have. It attacks the long delays in solving the refugee problem, and the reluctance of both England and the United States to take ins.ignants.

A further despatch was received from the London Embassy dealing with public sentiment in England, in which attention is called to the statement before Congress on the Polish declaration concerning repatriation. It also records an unofficial conference at Cairo which urged the Government to release immigration restrictions, upon Palestine, and call an immediate conference to find refugees.
On March 10, a reply was received from England to Secretary Hull's proposal of February 25. The British doubt that the Intergovernmental Committee is a suitable agency and urge looking into the possibility of setting up other machinery.

On March 15, a conference was had between the State Department and the English Foreign Office in which the latter suggested London as a site for the proposed conference and hinted that ex-Governor Lehman would make a fine representative for this country at such a conference. The State Department gave no encouragement to either of the suggestions.

With a view to examining the suitability of the Intergovernmental Committee as an agency for carrying out the anticipated proposals of the proposed conference, a memorandum was prepared on March 16. It was suggested that the mandate of the committee would have to be expanded to include persons of any race or faith. It would probably also be advisable to invite participation by the USSR, Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, and perhaps China. It was considered doubtful that Spain or Portugal would be in a position to join even if invited, since France is incomunicado and it may be necessary to bar countries not members of the United Nations, with particular reference to Argentina. The question was raised whether such countries should be represented by substitutes.

It was urged that members of the Executive Committee should be available for frequent meetings, and accordingly that they be appointed by name, and that they reside in England.

It was suggested that the ruling adopted by the Evian Conference that neutral countries should not assume any obligations for refugees should be revoked, but the United Nations would guarantee advance. It was also felt that contributions by important nations cannot continue on a voluntary basis and that the size of the present staff must be increased for enlarged operations, including the establishment of Foreign agencies at strategic points to observe and report to the committee.
On March 18 Secretary Hull informed the British, in reply to their note of March 10, that the United States still favors the Intergovernmental Committee but is willing to discuss other machinery. He also indicated his willingness to discuss the availability of food etc., to enable the refugees to be kept in neutral countries.

On March 24 a resolution was introduced in the House of Lords pledging the utmost aid compatible with security and the needs of the army. In the discussion from the floor it was suggested that England approach Germany with an offer to accept a certain number of refugees each month, to get children into Palestine, to appoint a high commissioner for England, or for the United Nations if they are ready to act together.

The Government was urged not to delay any longer and to reach an actual decision at the proposed conference rather than just conduct an investigation into the problem. It was felt that this matter requires emergency action, without regard for peacetime rules and disregarding as far as possible the burden on England.

The Government stated that it was sympathetic, but presented statistics concerning the number already being supported, recited the feeling of the Arabs concerning Palestine and stated that the neutrals must be promised that the refugees would be moved out quickly. It definitely turned down the suggestion of making an offer to Germany on the grounds that if the Germans accepted and the Allies could not perform their part, the entire movement would suffer a serious set-back.

On March 22, the Joint Emergency Committee on European Jewish Affairs for the Rescue of Jews in Nazi occupied territories submitted a memorandum proposing:

1. A request to Germany to release Jews.

2. The establishment of sanctuaries with a promise to the neutrals to drain off the surplus in order to encourage further cooperation.

3. Revision of the United States' quota system, including by-passing the long delays arising out of the necessity for approval of immigrants, by letting organizations guarantee applicants.
4. Urging England to take in more refugees, using 
the argument that their war effort would benefit by an 
increased supply of workers.

5. Exploring the possibility of increasing the number 
for the colonies.

6. Urging Latin America to relax immigration laws
(temporarily, following an example to be set by the 
United States.

7. Opening Palestine, discarding the old pro-war 
political arguments which are now out-weighed.

8. Guaranteeing to neutrals maintenance, and eventual 
evacuation.

9. Feeding Nazi victims who cannot get out of occupied 
territory, under the supervision of the Red Cross.

10. Either reorganize Intergovernmental Committee 
or create a new agency.

11. Establish credentials for stateless persons.

12. Provision of all necessary financial credentials 
by the United Nations.

To this memorandum was annexed a set of proposals made by
Rosenheim, including an appeal to the German General Staff as
opposed to the Nazi Government; transfer of Jews from Rumania to
Abyssinia; exchange religious leaders for German internees;
induce Slovaks and Italians to cancel their deportation plans,
acting through the Vatican; and feed the Poles through the Red Cross.

On March 24, Sir Ronald Campbell and Breckenridge Long had
a conversation at which Campbell urged the immediate evacuation of
all refugees in Spain to an internment camp in North Africa.
Long disagreed with this on the ground that we have no jurisdiction
over French North Africa which is a political entity. He outlined
the plans already under way for the evacuation of some 10,000
refugees, 7,500 of whom are French. He insisted that the rest could
be cared for and that while their condition was serious it was not
critical.

He further informed Campbell that United States was ready to
confer with the British ten days after receiving notice of the place
of meeting. Bermuda was mentioned.

Sir Hubert Emerson submitted a note on March 25 concerning
proposals made with regard to the refugee problem. He stated that
the most urgent thing was to end the war as soon as possible,
since more victims of the Nazi die every day that the war con-
tinues than can ever be evacuated; accordingly the primary test of
every plan must be whether it will delay the war effort.

Any proposed deal with Germany can be taken only after the
Allies have received firm promises of places of asylum. Since
technically all frontiers are closed, pressure must be kept upon
the neutrals and promises made to siphon off refugees as fast as
possible, to maintain those left and to evacuate all after the war.

He urged the establishment of emergency camps in North
Africa or elsewhere, subject to military considerations, in case
the Spanish demand immediate evacuation of considerable numbers.

On March 25, it was rumored that Spain had closed its
borders, and United States requested assurance that refugees would
not be turned over to the enemy. On March 29, Spain had still not
determined what action it would take but was apparently alarmed
by a threat of organized and large scale invasion. It accused
United States Embassy of participating in the movement. We
denied such participation and sought to strengthen our denial by
pointing out that no help was needed in North Africa any longer
and that United States would prefer able-bodied French to remain in
France to aid the proposed Allied invasion of that country.

On March 24, the British agreed to Bermuda as the place
for the proposed conference, but up to April 5 the State Department
had declined to fix a date for the conference on the grounds that
it was waiting orders from the President.

On April 13 our delegates, Dr. Harold Dodds of Princeton
University, Congressman John E. Glenn, and Senator Lucas, were fur-
ished with a confidential, detailed statement of the views of
this Government on matters to be discussed at the conference. All
other matters would be subject to communication with the State
Department before any action was taken.
This memorandum covered 15 points:

1. The discussion should not be restricted to Jewish refugees and care should be taken to avoid furnishing the Axis with propaganda material.

2. In raising funds, all questions of faith and race must be avoided, both in addressing appeals for public support and in promising the use of such funds.

3. No commitments should be made regarding shipping space since the evacuation of United States wounded and Axis prisoners must come first, and their needs are uncertain.

4. No naval escorts are available and safe conduct is out of the question. Further, there can be no delay in our shipping program such as would be caused by having homeward bound transports stop to pick up refugees. Consequently, Transatlantic shipments are out of the question if any territory in Europe or adjacent countries is available. Repatriation across the ocean after the war is also undesirable since it would require shipping which would be scarce, large expenditures of money, and in many cases the use of force to evacuate reluctant refugees.

5. The United States Government do not wish to be accused of admitting large numbers of refugees to fill the gap caused by American boys dying abroad, since this might cause serious domestic disunity.

6. Neutral countries to be used as exits may be bribed with the assurance of funds for the support of refugees, and evacuation of surplus to near by countries, and eventually, repatriation.

7. A definite pledge of funds is impossible, since that rests with Congress and the President, but the chance of favorable reaction to any request will be better if funds are to be collected on a pro-rata basis.
8. The consent of Governments in Exile as to repatriation is important. Conquered enemy nations can be forced by treaty terms. It was pointed out that the neutral countries will rely on any promise along this line only if they are convinced of an Allied victory.

9. This Government is not interested in any problems arising in Europe and Africa except where interference with war might result.

10. The recommendations of the conference should be implemented by existing agencies as far as possible. This Government approves the use of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee.

11. A prompt meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee is urged.

12. The Intergovernmental Committee should be requested to contact all members immediately and to raise funds.

13. It should be borne in mind that the United States immigration laws are fixed by Congress and are extremely liberal as they now stand.

14. Congress is very unlikely to consider a change in the immigration laws at this time.

15. Always bear in mind the needs of our own war effort and civilian population for food and money.
In opening the conference, Law, the chief British delegate stated flatly that his Government could not consider any direct appeal to the German Government, the exchange of prisoners for refugees or the lifting of the blockade of Europe. The only problems to be discussed in the eyes of the British were: The fifteen or twenty thousand refugees in Spain, one half of whom are Jews; children in the Balkans; refugees in Persia, and Greeks on the Island of Cyprus; and the question of refugees entering Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain.

The English prefer not to deal with Hitler because he would undoubtedly demand excessive favours in return. The danger of having large numbers of refugees dumped upon the Allies was a matter of considerable concern, and letting in large numbers of refugees without some preliminary investigation might endanger the security of England through the admission of Axis sympathizers posing as refugees.

Congressman Bloo argued at considerable length on this question, maintaining that the least we could do would be to try. The British retaliated by citing the break-down of the British-German attempts to exchange military prisoners as evidence of the bad faith of the German Government, and then Bloo persisted in his position. Dodds finally silenced him by calling his attention to the definite statement of this Government's policy which was supposed to govern the American delegation. Requa, who was present at the conference, stated that the State Department was frankly opposed to any policy of negotiations with the German Government. On Bloo's insistence, the matter was left open.

The question of exchanging prisoners was dismissed without discussion, and it was agreed that the blockade was a matter beyond the scope of this conference.

The conference was advised by specialists furnished by the two Governments that no Allied shipping could be counted upon for at least a year or a year and a half. The following shipping was described as possibly available:

- 25 Spanish passenger ships
- 15 Portuguese
- A few Turkish ships for near eastern ports.

Three or four Swedish ships, provided the Germans granted special permission to remove them from the Baltic sea trade.
Of all these the only possibility really worth considering was four Portuguese ships which might be had if the inducement was sufficiently high and some guarantee of safe conduct forthcoming. It was considered by the shipping experts that the most practical use of these vessels would be to transport refugees to Angola, and they should be capable of carrying 15,000 over a comparatively short period of time. Definite statements, however, were very difficult to obtain.

On the question of destination, North Africa was strongly opposed by the American delegation on the theory that the remotest danger of invading the Army could not be considered and no commitments as to the time or place could be made. At this point the conference became very much interested in Angola, until Reuss suggested that the Portuguese might not want any refugees in Angola. He suggested that Portugal might be more responsive to a request by the Intergovernmental Committee. On the question of procuring the Portuguese ships, the suggestion was made that the negotiations be carried out through the State Department, but Dodds recommended that this too be handled by the Intergovernmental Committee.

Various possibilities for locating refugees, and the problems connected with each were discussed at some length, but without any definite conclusion being reached. Some were found favorable, others simply dropped, and still others left to the uncertain fate of further discussion which apparently never took place.

The Palestine question was explored with Congressman Bloom pressing the British rather strongly until Professor Dodds prevailed upon them to drop the discussion.

The question of finance was discussed briefly, and the American delegation stated that it could make no commitments on this point but recommended an appropriation.

There is no apparent disagreement on the position to be taken in connection with repatriation but there was some conflict as to what sort of a statement should be issued. Reuss argued strongly for a statement by the Intergovernmental Committee, and was supported by Bloom, but Dodds opposed and by the United Nations and Britain wanted partial either to such a statement or to a joint statement by the British and the United States Government. He also wanted matters of food and finance handled by the Intergovernmental Committee. It was apparently decided that the latter should be handled by each government separately.
The reorganization of the Inter-Governmental Committee to permit an expansion of its activities pursuant to the recommendation of the conference was discussed.

The British and United States immigration policies and laws were explained and contrasted, and the British appeared to be favorably impressed with the liberality of our policy.

A special conference was held by the American Delegation for the purpose of permitting certain specialists and interested parties to discuss matters in their particular fields. One Becker, who apparently represented one or more Jewish organizations, argued at great length for transferring a substantial number of refugees from Spain to Cuba without delay, and to speed up the quota system to permit larger numbers to proceed to the United States. He was aroused strongly against any such step because of the security angle, and claimed that if even one Nazi spy or saboteur entered this country as a result of such a policy, the ensuing publicity might very well result in barring all refugees in the future. Becker's reply to this was that the number being admitted at the present time and under the present policy was so small that a complete stoppage would not make very much difference.

During the conference Dr. Fields sent a telegram to the State Department which set forth the British proposals substantially as follows:

The British delegation feel that Spain is the only effective channel of escape remaining in Western Europe for refugees of all nationalities. It is of supreme importance that this channel not be blocked as the consequences would be:

(One) That the admission of further refugees would be prevented by the Spanish Government.

(Two) The Allies would be deprived of useful personnel.

(Three) Public opinion throughout the world would come to the conclusion that the Allies were not making any serious endeavor to deal with the refugee problem.

It is understood that the refugees in Spain amount to approximately 21,000, of whom 14,000 are French nationals mainly of military age, for whose removal administrative arrangements are already completed. Approximately 3000, mainly Poles and Czechs of military age, can be removed under similar arrangements to join the Allied forces. The remaining four-five thousand are largely Jewish and of enemy nationalities or stateless. If all or part of these could be removed to a temporary base, the conference would have led to some definite practical result, and moreover, the clearing of the channel in Spain would enable the Spanish authorities to
permit a further inflow of refugees and thereby give an opportunity of ascertaining whether the Axis powers would permit any potential refugees in countries now under their control to escape. If they took steps to prevent further emigration, it would be clear to the advocates of relief measures (such as a direct approach to Hitler to release refugees) that their proposals were useless.

The main difficulty in removing refugees from Spain and Portugal is one of transport. One of the United States proposals for the conference was that destinations should be sought as near as possible to the present location of the refugees. Any shipping that may be available will be very limited in passenger capacity and if the refugees are to be removed from Spain within any measurable distance of time, the length of the voyage becomes a governing factor.

The British propose that a temporary rest camp under their administration be formed at some point in North Africa to be selected by the American authorities as far as possible from the scene of military operations and removed from the lines of communication. Possibly the existing internment camps which have been, it was understood, used only for male internees, would be unsuitable for the purpose of a mixed body of men, women and children. The British authorities referred to in my note have had experience of conducting camps of a mixed character for male internees in the Isle of Man. If a similarly suitable site could be found in North Africa the British authorities would be prepared to supply the necessary staff for the administration. It is suggested that the cost might be equally shared for the time being between U.S. and British Governments. Such security arrangements as were satisfactory to the U.S. military administration would be complied with. Such a rest camp might accommodate—say 3,000 persons and could be made use of to house refugees pending arrangements which could be considered by the Inter-Governmental Committee for their transfer when shipping is available to more distant places of refuge. It is understood that certificates of admission for Palestine for approximately 1,500 families, or say 2,500 persons, are available at the present time, but that existing transport arrangements do not permit of them proceeding beyond Portuguese Southwest Africa. As regards supplies of foodstuffs, clothing, etc., as far as the requirements could not be met by local purchase, the necessary arrangements would have to be worked out as part of the problems of supplying the Allied Forces in North Africa.

The British delegation feel strongly that world opinion will be bitterly disappointed by the results of the conference if all future action is relegated to the Inter-Governmental Committee. They would therefore like to obtain the views of the United States Government upon this new proposal.
The reply received from the State Department summarizes its position with regard to North Africa in the following language:

In view of the active military operations proceeding in North Africa, the opinions of the War Department are necessarily involved. Other agencies of the Government have to be consulted. In addition, it must be understood that the United States does not exercise any political jurisdiction in North Africa. That has been the basis of our whole policy there. Our forces are not an occupying army. They are there in collaboration with the local authorities. Consequently, it becomes necessary to obtain the opinion and consent of General Giraud through the intervention of Eisenhower. No response has yet been received. Department is unable to reply to you until an answer is received from North Africa. Department has requested Eisenhower to urge General Giraud to give his consent but until that consent is either given or refused Department is unable to respond definitely to your telegram.

For your own information we would like to differentiate between Cyrenaica and North Africa. The former is not the scene of active military operations. It is under control of an army of occupation. The Italian citizens have been removed from that area and practically all the native population have departed. There is no present indication that it will again become an area of military activity.

The latter is an area of very active military operations and the American line of communications with its forces presently engaged with the enemy lie directly across the whole territory. You can easily understand the attitude of the military authorities toward any proposal which would detract from the security of their line of communications or even constitute a threat.

Very little definite information concerning the conference was released either to the press or to the Governments of other countries, either during or following the conference, on the ground that any undue publicity might result in operation by the Axis.

The reaction of the press was for the most part non-committal although the Manchester Guardian, always outspoken on the refugee question, declared that the Allied nations are not treating the refugees the way they did the 200,000 war prisoners suddenly thrust upon them in North Africa; that the difficulties in the latter situation did not prove unsolvable.

The files contained two letters from State Department to the American Delegates intended to keep the informed as to the results of the conference. The first, not dated and apparently
never mailed, states that Byron J. Taylor and Lord Halifax have outlined a plan in which Britain and the United States agree: (1) upon a place of temporary refuge; (2) the bearing of expenses; (3) a meeting of the IGO Executive Committee to appoint a full-time Vice Director and Secretary; (4) that UNRRA will maintain the refugees after they reach the temporary refuge provided and until they return home or go elsewhere after the war, and (5) that both the British and American Embassies in the countries concerned would arrange for transit and reception of refugees. The IGO was to contact all its member countries to secure offers to accept refugees and to contribute funds for administrative purposes and for care of refugees.

On July 29, 1943 Travers wrote to Dr. Dodds informing him that work was about to begin on a camp to handle the refugees from Spain, construction to be financed by the British and ourselves. Five hundred thousand dollars had been set aside by the United States to advance the project, and the Army and Navy have been asked to cooperate. The British are to arrange shipping between Portugal and North Africa.

He reports the nomination of Patrick Malin from this country as Vice Director and states that we have suggested that the secretary be of Dutch nationality.

A copy of the agenda for the conference and chapter 7, Summary of Recommendations, from the official report of the conference are annexed to this memorandum.
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER VII

1. That no approach be made to Hitler for the release of potential refugees in Germany or German-occupied territory, but that the question be borne in mind by the Intergovernmental Committee in case conditions alter at a later date. (Chapter I)

2. That the United States and United Kingdom Governments consult together with a view to immediate action to obtain the use of neutral shipping for the transport of refugees; this duty to be assumed by the Intergovernmental Committee after revision of its mandate.

3. That the British authorities consider the question of admitting refugees into Cyrenaica. (Chapter III.B)

4. That the United States and United Kingdom Governments continue their negotiations with the Spanish Government for the release from Spain of the French refugees and of the Allied Nationals accepted for service in the armed forces. If this should be unsuccessful both categories to be referred to the Intergovernmental Committee. (Chapter III.C)

5. That the United Kingdom and United States Governments consider proposals in regard to refugees in Spain not covered by the preceding recommendation, including:

   (a) admission of part of the group into the United States subject to statutory and security requirements;

   (b) grant of certificates of admission to Palestine (selection to be undertaken by a representative of the Jewish Agency, or if he is not admitted to Spain, by the representative there of the American Joint Distribution Board);

   (c) removal to temporary residence in North Africa, subject to military considerations;

   (d) admission of a limited group into Genoa;

   (e) further limited admissions to the United Kingdom (Chapter III.C)

6. That the United States and United Kingdom Governments take an approach to the French National Committee in order to secure considerable expansion of the proposal to admit refugees to Madagascar;
7. That the United States and United Kingdom Governments adopt, and urge adoption by the European Allied Governments of, a joint declaration on the return of refugees to their homes after the war. (Chapter III.f)

8. That the Intergovernmental Committee be invited to revise its mandate. (Chapter V (a))

9. That the membership of the Intergovernmental Committee be broadened. (Chapter V (b))

10. That provision be made for the procurement of public and private funds adequate for the work of the Intergovernmental Committee. (Chapter V (c))

11. That the staff of the Intergovernmental Committee be increased and a management committee created. (Chapter V (d))

12. That the United States and United Kingdom Governments take immediate steps to implement recommendations 8-11. Chapter V)

13. That the following points be referred to the Intergovernmental Committee for its urgent consideration immediately subsequent to the revision of its mandate.

A. The possibility of finding countries of asylum for Jewish refugees in Persia for whom no destination has hitherto been allotted. (Chapter III. A)

B. The re-opening of the question of Jewish refugee children in France through the intermediary of neutral Governments. (Chapter III. B)

C. An approach to Canada, to the Portuguese Government with reference to Angola and to Latin American countries with a view to the admission of refugees in Spain mentioned in recommendation no. 5. (Chapter III.C)

D. The provision of food and finance for refugees in neutral countries. (Chapter III.D)

E. Possibilities of the reception of refugees in various overseas countries. (Chapter IV. E)
AGENDA FOR THE BERMUDA CONFERENCE

(A) The refugee problem should not be considered as being confined to persons of any particular race or faith. Nazi measures against minorities have caused the flight of persons of various races and faiths, as well as of other persons because of their political beliefs.

(B) Wherever practicable, intergovernmental collaboration should be sought in these times of transportation difficulty, shipping shortage, and submarine menace, to the end that arrangements may be determined for temporary asylum for refugees as near as possible to the areas in which those people find themselves at the present time and from which they may be returned to their homelands with the greatest expediency on the termination of hostilities.

(C) There should accordingly be considered plans for the maintenance in neutral countries in Europe of those refugees for whose removal provision may not be made. Their maintenance in neutral countries may involve the giving of assurances for their support until they can be repatriated, which support will necessarily come from the United Nations augmented by funds from private sources. It may also involve the giving of assurances in all possible cases by their Governments in exile for
their prompt return to their native countries upon the termination of hostilities.

(D) The possibilities for the temporary asylum of the refugees, with a view to their repatriation upon the termination of hostilities, in countries other than neutral, and their dependencies, should be explored, together with the question of the availability of shipping to effect their movement from Europe, and the availability of food and accommodation.

(E) Examination of the precise method of organizing concerted action and providing the necessary executive machinery.

The Government of the United States awaits the further communication promised by the British Embassy's Note regarding the venue of the meeting.

Department of State,
Washington,