THE GERMAN PEOPLE

TESTIMONY

OF

MR. EMIL LUDWIG

BEFORE

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ON

THE GERMAN PEOPLE

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Mr. Ludew, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, this oval table at which I have the honor to sit for the first time has a great symbolic meaning to us in Europe, because we know that over this table was signed the declaration of war at the time of Mr. Wilson's administration, which decided the path of our destiny. And we looked over the 3,000 miles that separate Europe and America, and visualized the mystic place where all this happened and the kind of men who made it happen.

I want to speak about the Germans and German psychology. It is the only thing that I should talk about here, as in all other things you yourselves know better than I do what to consider, but I can speak on this subject, as I was born in Germany, and lived there in my youth, like my ancestors.

Before I begin, let me say that a certain mood of revenge and hatred which is found sometimes in emigrants is not to be found in my spirit. I left Germany when I was 25 years old, without any persecution or necessity for leaving. My family were German Jews; they occupied prominent positions. I did not suffer any injury, but even boyish as I was, I wanted more liberty than I could enjoy in that country. The Nazis did not take anything from me, and as I am a Swiss citizen and have my home in Switzerland, the fall of the Nazis cannot bring any material benefit to me. So I am in a certain sense independent, and can look at the Nazis objectively, as I was speaking in the year 1933.

On the other hand, I returned every year as a visitor to Germany and I have written a series of books on German subjects. Half of them are full of criticism of Bismarck and William II and Hindenburg. Those books have gone all over the world. The other half of the series deal with Goethe, Beethoven, and the great German thinkers, for whom I observed deep reverence. So I have lived in my life and work in the two Germanies about which I wish to speak to you.
I want to tell you and prove to you why the defeat of Germany is nearer than you think, and what to do with the Germans after their defeat.

How is it possible, everyone outside of Germany asks, that the same country and same people that created Goethe and Beethoven and the Germans were terrified defeated, after 4 years of war. It was not a people's revolution in Germany that ended the war, but a revolution conceived by the generals, 2 months before the strike by sailors in the German Navy. General Ludendorff, and with him Hindenburg, declared like a gambler, "My play is lost." I cannot continue. I must have an armistice within 24 hours.

It is of interest to note that the break in German nerves, which is characteristic of the Germans—and you will see this break-down of nerves repeated in a short time—occurred so suddenly and so completely that the Germans suffered their defeat deep in the territory of the enemy. They had in their grasp, together with their allies, nearly as much territory as they hold today. Yet, within 96 hours, the German high command collapsed so completely that it would not even attempt to shift its forces back to Germany before asking for terms. The German generals did not have the courage to go back within the boundaries of Germany, and they evaded the responsibility for doing so.

The Treaty of Versailles contained some strange errors, and it was faulty also in not fixing the figure of Germany's reparations debt. But it did provide for plebiscites, which was a new feature, adopted at the suggestion of the Americans. In any case the Germans remain the only nation who gained some money by the First World War. They paid 4.4 billions of dollars, but they received 6.4 billions as loans, which were never paid back.

The great mistake of France was to try to make the Germans pay much more than the errors. It was a mistake in the psychology of the Germans. The Allies believed that the Germans would become liberal and set up a democratic state overnight, without previous education and without tradition. The Allies took some territory from the Germans, but left them complete freedom. Later they relaxed the rigors of the treaty, and made it more liberal 6 years. The great mistake that was an idealist, failed also in his attempt to understand German psychology. When he gave the Rhineland freedom 5 years before the treaty provided, a so-called liberal said to me, "Now, you see, they are cowards, the French!"

The Germans do not understand anybody who says, "We want to make a gentleman's agreement." The word "gentleman," like the word "fair," is always used in its English form by Germans. They have no equivalent words in their rich language. They love order and uniformity. They are the only people in modern history who have a passion for obedience. Others, like Americans for example, obey when it is necessary, when there is war, but the typical German wants to obey because he loves to be ordered. He loves compliance better than he loves liberty.

Mr. Johnson. Will the gentleman yield for a question?

The Chairman. If you don't mind, Mr. Ludwig would prefer to finish his statement.

Mr. Johnson. I was going to supplement what he said about obeying. A native German, but now an American citizen, once told me the secret of the German character is obedience.
Mr. Lowden. That is what I am saying.
Mr. Johnson. They believe in obedience. I just wanted to supplement what you said.
Mr. Lowden. Absolutely. It was very easy for the United States and the Allies to mistake German character in 1918, because we mistook it, too. I was not a minister nor a Congressman, but I wrote the books which helped form public opinion. Yes; we ourselves made a mistake. We thought the other Germany of the thinkers, the idealists, and the liberals could come into power. It was stated that Germans should not fight for their so-called Republic, but should receive it passively. The German "revolution" consisted of the fact that 29 German princes ran away. There was a hiatus, and then some poor, inexperienced Liberals and Socialists were forced by the cowardice of the Junkers to steer the ship of state. There was no leadership, no color, no enthusiasm. Nobody took command to bark out orders. So the German people felt sorry for themselves. Hitler is quite right when he declared that the German people are not prepared for democracy. They had been educated for 500 years to take orders from military bosses. Their right to equality in voting dated back only to 1867, while Americans had voted for a hundred years and Englishmen more than 200.

The new Republic in Germany was based on humanity and freedom, and the Germans found it terrible dull. They were afraid of responsibility, never having exercised it. They were troubled by the new liberty. They did not understand universal equality. They disliked the Weimar constitution, and boycotted it. Please remember that the first political murders in Germany following the World War were committed 10 years before the Nazis were organized. They were made in 1920 and 1922, when my great friend Rathenau, whose name I have the honor to pronounce at this table, was murdered; and the other Reichsminister, Ebert, and three others were murdered at the beginning of the Republic. These murders were symbolic of hatred of the republican regime. Nobody liked the Republic. Popular feeling was on the side of the murderers. People of culture and education, professors and sometimes whole universities joined in the well-nigh universal hymn of hate and revenge. Some of my old friends, at first liberals, became nationalistic in the patriotic spirit. You will find that in every country, after its defeat, the opposition becomes more and more nationalistic.

So unpopular was the new Republic, so weak and lacking in power to rule the people, that its flag had to be actually covered with linen when brought to a convention on parade, because of the danger of insults from the crowd. The very word "Republic" was hated. The Germans devised the word "Reich" in its place, and "Reich" it is today. There were never any enemy soldiers in Germany during the war, except during the first weeks in a corner of the country; so the people got the idea that Germany was never beaten. "We were not defeated in the war," they said. "We were betrayed, not beaten." The Socialists and Jews stabbed us in the back.

The timidity of the new republican leaders encouraged the anti-republican feeling. It was a farce, when the two generals responsible for the German debacle appeared before the Congress, to see the leaders give them bouquets of flowers, as if to say: "We love you." All the old, reactionary officials remained at their posts, especially those of the nobility; and of course the new liberal ministers, nominally in control, were actually unable to put their will into execution.

The Reichwehr—that was the new German Army—was the national anchor, the only one that evoked patriotic enthusiasm, and it was led by the old-time Junkers, so it always has been. The treaty allowed to Germany 100,000 soldiers, but within a few years these soldiers multiplied like rabbits into a million. They were not called an army, but they were there. Unlike the princes of the royal house of France, who were banned and for a century could not come back, the German crown prince was allowed to come back shortly after his flight to Holland. Because the Republic was pauperly weak and no liberal dared in Germany to stop a prince.

There came the first election. And what did the Germans do, intelligent people as they undoubtedly are? For the first time in their life they were electing their own leader. Whom did they choose? They could have made a selection from many men of brains, experience, and qualities of leadership. But instead, they chose the nearly 80-year-old Field Marshal Hindenburg, who had no other merit than that he had lost a world war. In America, as in Germany, he was greatly overrated. When I was here in 1926, for instance, a very prominent American said to me: "Hindenburg is the pride of the fatherland. We believe he is the best man to heal our government." Just so, only yesterday, they said the same thing of Pétain.
The old marshal declared two things: That he was an aristocrat and that he never read a book except a military one. This made a hit with the German people. "He is our father," they said, "he is our new king. He is a marvelous man with a great mustache and very bright red stripes on his trousers." The old man, the first President elected by the German people, made the statement that he was entitled to be paid back his millions. He also invented the lie that the war was not lost by himself, but by the "stab in the back" by the Socialists and Jews. But the liberals and even the Socialists were as full of the German feeling for revenge and for building up military power that they voted for a new fleet, although for 50 years the Socialists had been opposed to military expansion.

Not in Versailles, gentlemen, but in Berlin the Weimar Republic was lost. It was lost not by the violence of a dictator but by the soul of the German people, who are not educated to become democratic. It is not in their make-up to sense equality. Their conception of the state is a pyramid. Every man is a stone in this pile. He wants to be as high as possible. He hears the weight of the man above him, because he is allowed to put his foot down on the man beneath him. That is why the German is obedient. It is a part of his nature. It explains the excellent organization in Germany. If a German can see the boots of the Kaiser or Fühher at the top of the pyramid he is happy.

In every country the wizard is critical about his own nation. But in no other nation the thinkers spoke so bitterly about their country. The greatest German that ever lived, Goethe, said between many other ironic words:

"Germany is nothing, but the individual German is a great deal, and yet Germans believe exactly the reverse. * * * I have often suffered bitterly at the thought of the German Nation, so worthy of respect individually and so wretched..."
as a whole. A comparison between Germany and other nations aware of painful feelings, which I try to escape as best I can; in science and in art I have found
the wings with which I can lift myself above them.

I came here to make a brief tour and spoke of nothing else than liberal ideas and philosophies. I advocated a European understand-
ing. The German Ambassador gave me something to eat and
gave water—it was during the time of prohibition—and he received a letter from the Foreign Office at Berlin asking why he received a
man who had written that the Germans, among others, were responsible
for the war of 1914. We and my friends were a very small minority, trying to use our intelligence to save what we could, to save
the German Republic in the sense in which it was founded.

Such a situation constitutes an ideal field for a resolute adventurer.
They say in America that unemployment made Hitler. Had you
not the same unemployment? The Germans enjoyed prosperity, the same as the Americans, from 1925 to 1928. You had the same workless
and unemployment period from 1899 to 1931. You had 10,000,000
workless men and Germany had 5,000,000. If unemployment was the reason for Hitler's rise, why did you not have fascism here, as Ger-
mans had?

The answer lies in this: When the visitor arrives in your country
his first sight is the Goddess of Liberty, and when he first visits Berlin
he sees the "Steps-alone"—that is, the 23 Heldenmonument in marble
uniforms, of whom 2 or 3 had some merit and the others none. In
America the first symbol viewed is that of liberty. In Germany it
is that of military force. In America all is allowed that is not ex-
pressly forbidden. In Germany all is forbidden which is not expressly
allowed. When I went this morning to the post office the clerk said
to me, "Fine weather." If you should say "fine weather" to the post-
man in Germany he would reply: "There is no weather. There are
stamps here." This is because every employee in Germany is a military
man. Anyone who has been in Germany knows that this is not an
overstatement.

Once in Berlin I was at a loss as to my direction and asked a police-
man where to go. He said: "First sight, then left where there is a church; then right again, and then you are there." I said
"Thank you." He replied, roughly: "You need not thank me. Repeat
what I said.

In Berlin, even in deep peace, the main street is lined with
military columns, doing the goose step, going through Unter
-den-Linden. Everybody is delighted. Here, to my great astonish-
ment, I saw a real soldier outside this Capitol, which now, in
the midst of a great war, seems to me the nerve center of the world.
Yesterday in front of the White House there was one lonely soldier
coming and going, and there were two secret service men at the door.
I could hear a Strauss waltz coming over their little radio.

This illustrates the difference between Germans and Americans,
difference by their antecedents, their upbringing, and their psychol-
ey. The militaristic, subervient, compliant German is so steeped in
the tradition of blind obedience to authority that you cannot change
him. Here you can laugh with and exchange banter with your Pres-
ident, but you cannot do that with any policeman in Germany.

The uniform is exceptional here, but it is the great ideal in Ger-
many, and has been for 200 years. Every girl had only one dream,
and that was to have a sweetheart in uniform. What a happy day
for the Germans when the small girl, when she found her man, would
fall back to them brass bands, orders, uniforms, goosesteps, a boss with
a voice that ordered. That was what they lived. Here was a man
who brought them even riding boots, although they had no horses
to ride. When you see one man every bank clerk in riding boots
and you ask why this is he replies: "My Fuehrer is today in Nurem-
berg. I come in riding boots. That is the mentality. It is not a
thing that can be rubbed out.

Then Hitler brought them the fresh vision of world domination,
than old mystic phrase which you remember, prevalent throughout
the medieval period of German history and lies deep in German-
mentality. The Germans understand a ruler who uses only one word
of philosophy, also if it is an empty phrase. They like to have their
cannon made of 95 percent steel, copper, and nickel, and 6 percent
philosophy. They must have the music of world domination—Wag-
er. On May 1, 1939, Hitler shouted to 100,000 persons in Tempelhof,
asking for Gehorsam (obedience). He shouted this word three
times altogether, and I heard on the radio the thundering applause
that greeted him. From that moment the Germans began to love their
Fuehrer. So they welcomed him with cheers. Even the Socialists
had failed to fight for the Republic.

When the Kaiser and the princes fled three German officers—I know
their names—fought and died to protect the imperial flag. Yet not
one German workman died for the Republic in 1933 when Von Papen
discreetly the Government of Prussia. Their love of submission to
authority was greater than their love of liberty. The Germans
wanted to die for the fatherland, but not to think for it. It is easy for him
to obey someone else, but it nearly kills him to stand erect as an
individual, or to act on his own initiative. A man with a voice like a cer-
tain American President, whose modulated speech over the radio
appeals to anybody, would be impossible in Germany. There they do
not like persuasion. They love a man that barks. Of him they say,
"That must be a strong man!" I saw in my youth intelligent and
liberal scientists thrilled to hear the Kaiser speaking, with his pele-
trant sergeant's voice.

In a moral and legal sense Hitler is the true symbol of the present
German Nation. He was elected in the most democratic way. No
President ever came to this hill with a better legal claim to his office
than Mr. Hitler when he went into office in January 1933. He was
elected chief of the strongest party, and just as King George desig-
nated Mr. Churchill as head of the British Cabinet, so President
Hindenburg named Hitler as Chancellor. Later Hitler received 99
percent of the votes in several plebiscites. It is clear that there were
also fraudulent ballots, but not 99 percent. He was still the expression
of the will of the nation. This man was more frank than any other
candidate in making known his program. He wrote a big book in
which every German was advised of Hitler's prophecies. In that book
he outlined his idea of world domination, the Great War, the persecu-
tion of the Jews, and the difference between the two classes of citizens.
The whole nation, with the exception of a negligible minority, was
delighted to find finally a new boss.

Where, in those times, was the Germany of Goethe? Our books
were burnt in May 1933. My books were given a special place of honor—I was burned between Haine and Spinosa. These books were burned, not only by the S. S. men but by thousands of students of the universities, who had eagerly sought to be burned. Of course, there are exceptions among the Germans, such as Niemoller. But even a man like Niemoller, who is surely a martyr, even a man like that could say, according to an American who told me what Niemoller said to him just before he became a prisoner: “If there should be a war against France I would go at once.”

Mr. Waterworth. Who was the leader you mentioned?

Mr. Ludewig. Niemoller; you know his name.

The Chairman. To go against France?

Mr. Ludewig. Fighting, as a lieutenant.

The Chairman. With the Germans?

Mr. Ludewig. With the Germans, of course. He is anti-Hitler in matters of conscience, but he said, “If we have a war against France I shall go at once.” The fact that a man is anti-Hitler is by no means a guaranty of his loyalty—even abroad. Niemoller’s case shows how even the best men in Germany are full of rancor.

The barbaric acts of the Nazis were not, of course, approved by all Germans. There were some thousands, perhaps even millions, who were against the acts of barbarism. But who really opposed them? Who were those pilots dive bombing over France, killing fleeing women and children? Who torpedoed hospital ships? Who killed 300 children in the little town of Dubu, in England, knowing the children were the target? Who devastated Lidice, in Czechoslovakia? It was the average German soldier, who is a cross-section of his people, just as your soldiers are a cross-section of the American people.

The interesting point is that it is not a perversion that animates these Germans. The word “sadism” may be rightly applied sometimes to individuals, like Hitler or Heydrich, but no nation is sadistic. It is a perverted idealism that moves these men—the religion of violence. They have been educated in this by German books since before Hegel’s time, for a hundred years. The Attorney General of Nazi Germany hit the nail on the head when he said, “Right is what is good for Germany.” Other peoples have been cruel in their wars, but they did not make a religion of cruelty and barbarity. They did not say, “We are dominators of the world, and whatever is advantageous for us is right.” “The Germans are in love with death,” said Clemenceau; indeed they like all that is tragic. This is the main difference with the American observation.

This is but another example of the philosophy of Germany. They know what they are doing. So, if they are responsible as a nation, they must be punished.

Now I come to my conclusion. Allow me to say something which I cannot prove, but which I know from my analysis of the German character. I feel sure that Mr. Hitler will be assassinated soon, by his own men, probably by the Junkers, because the Junkers have always been traitors to their kings. When a conqueror comes to gain great victories he leaves them at that moment. As Napoleon said once, “A legal king can lose one battle after another; but I am a conqueror. I cannot afford to lose even one.” And when he lost one he lost all.

There are good reasons to foresee at the same time the death of Hitler, and with the same symptoms, the break of nerves which you saw in October 1918. Their strong German Army, with their allies, had taken Jerusalem, Belgium, the Ukraine, and so on, and stood practically where it stands today, yet the break-down took place within 24 hours. A similar break is even more probable today, by reason of stronger influences. They have been incessantly engaged for the last 10 years in war work, and not merely 4 years. There is the question of fatigue. The second point is that they are not defending a dynasty. After all, there was a motive to spur them on until 1918, since the dynasty had existed for 400 years.

The greatest element to force a breakdown, however, is the new weapon employed against them—the air bombardment, which to me is the second front. It is the vertical second front from above. The attempt to draw an analogy between the Germans and the British is all wrong. The English and German characters are entirely different. The English character, as you know, is stubborn. When an Englishman is attacked and bombarded he stiffens his resistance and says, “I will stick here 10 years. I will not run away.” His sense of invincibility, even his inborn irony, strengthen his resolve. He has been educated in that direction, even in his games, where fair play is the basic rule.

In Germany there never was fair play. Prince Bubow gives astonishing examples of this feat in his German memoirs; the German Count Kessler, too. There is discipline and obedience, but no option to deal generously or fairly with an opponent. So every German feels that an opponent will not deal fairly with him, when he is overcome. Bismarck, who knew the Germans, said: “The German has no civic courage.” He is an excellent soldier; but when you find him without a uniform, without a boss, no colonel to direct him, and he stands in Colonel Kessler, where great bombardments threaten him, you see him losing his nerve.

Air bombing, I think, is the deciding factor that will break the Germans. If all production here was concentrated in planes, and all
training in pilots, and we had gasoline enough, there would be a very quick end of the German war. After 20 days and nights of total bombardment they would break down completely. You know, much better than I do, the extent and variety of the technical weapons that you are producing with a miraculous speed. Also for these we emigrants are deeply grateful to America. There is no more doubt about victory. Gentlemen, they are not! They are not one whit better than the Nazis. Everybody agrees that they must be punished; the question is the proposal to send the Germans to the gallows. After victory, the question is, what to do with the German nation.

The second proposal emanating from the United States is this: "Give the poor misguided Germans their own freedom back again. They are innocent. They will make a better republic now." Of course, there is no discussion of the matter of physical punishment for the Nazi leaders. Everybody agrees that they must be punished; not twenty of them, perhaps thousands. But in dealing with a nation of 70,000,000 people, let me remind you that we have had for 100 years, since Beccarini, a new philosophy of penal law. We do not talk any more for revenge. For 100 years we have confined the criminal, first for the security of society; and second, to educate him and thus bring about his reform. This policy must be applied to the German nation, which is responsible for this crime against the world. The security of society will be achieved, of course, by disarmament of the Germans; but this must be much more thorough than before. It must be a disarmament in which even the pistol in the belt of a policeman cannot be preserved.

Now, as to education and government. This education cannot be imparted to the Germans by three or four thousand American teachers, who were sent to the German children just as colorfully as I speak English. Every boy and girl in Germany would laugh. No; the Allied Nations should send several hundred men over to Germany, to all universities and all schools, to supervise the books and lessons, and to root out the perverted instruction that destroyed the character of German youth by instilling ideas of revenge, violence, and aggression into them. When a school director in Baden introduced my book on William II in 1918, he was removed.

It is impossible, moreover, to begin with a new Congress or Reichstag in Germany. There are no liberals in Germany strong enough to lead. It is a human error on the part of many emigrants from Germany, who do not share my ideas, to say: "We shall go back and make a liberal Germany." It was impossible the first time. How can I think after this new outbreak that the Germans can, overnight, become democrats? Is there a democratic lymph which you can inject, and thus immunize the subject against militarism, world domination schemes, and the passion of submission to superior in uniform? Such a serum has not yet been invented.

Here is a deciding difference to Italy. Owing to the numerous republics on Italian soil that existed in their history of 2,000 years, the Italians possess a tradition of democracy. In the nineteenth century they fought for 40 years to conquer their liberty. Whereas the German liberals, at the same time, remained vague idealists who left it to the Junker, Bismarck, to create unity and their "Reich." The Italians gained their liberty through the revolutionary spirit of Mazzini, Garibaldi, and Cavour.

 Mussolini interrupted a centuries-old tradition of democracy. Hitler only an intermezzo of 14 years which had set in after the defeat of 1870. Mussolini found no modern example for his tyranny and had to go back to the Roman Empire for his ideals. Hitler continued a 200-year-old tradition of military autocracy in Prussia. Therefore, today all parties are claimed in Italy to look back to their former liberty and may produce a leader for tomorrow. The Germans have no name or epoch to revive; the Weimar Republic, that never took shape, has left no hope nor contempt in the people. That is why Italy will be able to govern herself after the defeat, Germany not.

These contracts are due to differences of character. The boot-shaped peninsula has lived to see a hundred wars, and yet, after the Roman Empire, no Italian prince or Pope ascended world domination, because it is alien to Italian feelings.

For many centuries Italy has been the object for German mystic world domination. Although the same density of population and poverty beset Germany in raw materials, the Italian people never desired the conquest of France, Switzerland, Serbia, or Greece. The desire to conquer and dominate their neighbors is deep in the warlike souls of the Germans today as it was that of old Julius. The Italians fought wars for trade and freedom, the Germans for conquest. The Italians suffer their present dictator, the Germans adore theirs.
That asleep while robbers went through your st~g! The

Among the emigrants from Germany are noble, sincere men. Others, who undertake now under their well-known names to guarantee a new liberal Germany, wrote the most militaristic of books during the last war, or prepared the "revanche" against France under the mask of rapprochement. Others merely desire their old homes and old jobs, or seek to become ministers. Others hold places in government during the republic, and failed to stop fascism; and now they tell you that it was merely an adventurer who came by chance and overthrow the peaceful German people. A former-labor minister of the Weimar Republic has dared in these days, when thousands of young Americans are being killed, because the German people wanted revenge to declare publicly that the average German lad excels the American. This he declared, although a guest in this country. Between the two possibilities which I see, one is that Germany may become a communist state. That is possible. The 500,000 Hitler boys can change very quickly their arms. They love order, and communism gives order of a certain kind. They like organization, which communism provides.

If you wish to prevent the creation of a communist Germany I foresee that you will be compelled to set up a committee of conservators, or a commission, as you say in this country, composed of representatives of the United Nations. To exclude representatives of the smaller nations, neighbors of Germany, on the ground that they would be revengeful, would be a mistake. It would justify the German idea of races of different values.

A strong army of occupation, formed by command of the United Nations, should hold all provinces in Germany, so that the people would know, for the first time in 150 years, what a foreign authority looks like. Only with foreign faces, foreign uniforms, strange languages, and strange customs could they be brought to understand that they have been defeated. Nobody would be murdered or imprisoned, but they would feel, what they did not feel in 1919, that Poles and Jews, completely despised by the average German, are equal with them, and even their victors. If you send a strong united army into Germany for, say, the first 5 years, together with a commission of conservators of the United Nations, you may then nominate perhaps two dozen Germans from the concentration camps, or Niemoller, and possibly a radical emigrant or two, to share the foreign government. But in no case can you have a new Reichstag, with new liberals and socialists ready to turn into savage nationalism.

I have heard the suggestion that Germany should be disemboweled and broken into 50 to 30 pieces, as it was before Bismarck's time. This would be contrary to the ideas of our time. The nineteenth century witnessed the assembly of tribes in nations, and the German nation was created by Bismarck with the same great logic and the same small errors as we note in the history of Italy, Greece, and other ancient states.

But you can do something. As you know, the evil element of Germany comes from Prussia, and all the culture of Germany comes from the south and west. You can separate Germany, not into 30 pieces, but into 2. You can take away the old northeast Prussia plus the territory of the Junkers in Prussia. Then you would have a fairly free republic in Prussia, with about 35,000,000 inhabitants. Then take the rest of the country and form a federation, together with Austria, making about 60,000,000. I wrote a booklet, published only in French, on these lines, before the war. Some provinces like Saxony could decide by plebiscites to which of the two German republics they wished to belong. It would not be probable, because Prussia was hated in Germany and the Miinnchen people called themselves 'forced Prussians' ("Miss-Prusian").

You would have two advantages in this plan. First, Prussia would be largely Lutheran, but the confederation would be predominantly Catholic. Second, you would have two neighboring friendly republics, just as you have Canada and the United States living as neighbors and friends.

German culture, as you know, always came from the south and west. All the great names, in science, music, poetry, painting, and invention, all real glory of Germany is borne by men born in the south or west. No Prussian name of the first rank is known abroad in the intellectual or poetic world. But there are dozens of great men, from Luthcr, Kepler, and Gutenberg to Kant and Goethe; from Beethoven and Mozart to Schumann and Wagner; from Diesel and Roentgen to Einstein—all these, and many more, came from the south or west, or being Saxon or Jew.

Austria, made up of 6,000,000 German-speaking Austrians, occupying one of the oldest parts of Germany, and forming part of the Reich for a thousand years until separated by Bismarck's Prussian ambition—Austria can never again become an independent republic or kingdom. The "annexation" was the natural program of every German, of every party, and it was delayed only through fear of the victors in Versailles. Any revival of the United Republic regime is impossible as revival of the royal houses in Germany. The reasons? Well, it is against the spirit of our time to recreate, after the style of the Holy Alliance, any kingdoms which were destroyed, not by the Nazis, but in 1918 by the same victors who are to be victors tomorrow. Secondly, because not one of the more than 100 sons and grandchildren of the disdained German princes did anything to assure the sympathy of the German people or to stir the imagination of the world. When young and older men and women became heroes and famous for their contributions to the fatherland, the German and Austrian princes remained in their castles or went abroad on insignificant missions. Only one or two were killed in the present war. The survivors, the pretenders, sat in the chancellories of the European capitals or in the salons of Washington, to win the influence of important people or to marry rich girls. The decadence of these hundred German princes is a symbol that their time is over.

But we can revive some of their clever symbols with which to flatter the German common people. We should recreate titles and decorations, without which, in the Weimar Republic, they could not
live. Call a man who is serveed from the concentration camp a "Freiheitsrat" and give him for his buttonhole a decoration in the shape of a silver-plated piece of barbed wire. He does not need it, but the Germans will look up to him and respect him more.

With such allied conservators and supervising educators in the first years of peace, and stripped of weapons, the German nation can be made a useful member of the European family. The Germans must come within the scope of the Atlantic Charter. They must retain their own German provinces. They are entitled to their own raw materials. They should have and then own the Industries they are or their own industry is their own; they should share in the competition of the world.

Leave to the Germans all that the other nations have. But take away their weapons, supervise their education, and give them political guardianship, because they have shown the world that they are not able to govern themselves. If you do not do that, if you continue to speak, in the puritan sense, of the "poor misled German people," if you persist in trying to distinguish between Germans and Nazis, and write every day about battles against Nazis instead of Germans, then, within 20 years, your sons will sit around this oval table and write another declaration of war against Germany.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Ludwig. Now, we will begin to ask you a few questions.

We have a couple of professors, a couple of real good ones. The gentleman sitting at the end of the table is a distinguished professor, and we have a few more. When you are talking about a job to do over there, maybe we could send them over. Mr. Ludwig, what do you think?

Mr. Ludwig. Everyone around this table is welcome.

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Rogers, I see you had made a few notes there. Mrs. Rogers, Professor Ludwig—

Mrs. Rogers. Mr. Ludwig, I am not a professor. The professors are against me.

Mr. Ludwig. Mr. Ludwig, I think it might interest you to know I made a protest on the floor of Congress against the perambulation of minorities in Germany and the burning of your books, among others, by Hitler.

Mr. Ludwig. In 1933; thank you very much.

Mrs. Rogers. I think it was in 1938.

Mr. Ludwig. On the 10th of May.

Mrs. Rogers. If you would be interested I will send you a copy of my remarks.

Mr. Ludwig. Would you be so kind?

Mrs. Rogers. I have enjoyed very much the information you have given us and I felt from this side of the water undoubtedly what you said was true. You could not separate the Nazis from many persons in the rest of Germany.

Mr. Ludwig. That is right.

Mrs. Rogers. We have a difficult task ahead of us after we win the war.

Mr. Ludwig. Yes.

Mrs. Rogers. If we are to follow your suggestions, Mr. Ludwig. The difficulty always begins after the victory. Just like after the wedding.
were allowed to go home 3 months every year because the king wanted new children, new soldiers. For 100 years most of the East Elbian farmers served virtually 30 years in the army.

Dr. Koesten. In your proposed set-up of two new German countries would they have any freedom of trade? Would there be economic barriers of any kind?

Mr. Ludwig. No; not an economic separation, only a political one. So, in Prussia the old spirit would begin once more to create a new army, it would have no power to force all Germany to join.

The Chairman. Mr. Chipherfield.

Mr. Chipherfield. If the Versailles Treaty was one of the main causes of this war, would you permit the same countries to be formed after this war, like Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Czechoslovakia? Would you have the same geographical boundaries as you had before the last war in Europe?

Mr. Ludovici. That is a European question which depends on the Russian situation.

Mr. Chipherfield. But you would, if I understood you correctly, allow Germany to have the same boundaries as she had before the war?

Mr. Ludovici. More or less the same as before this war. The chief problem is not territorial. The danger is if you give them freedom and liberty to govern themselves, they will make a new army and a new war. That you can prevent.

Mr. Chipherfield. That is all.

The Chairman. Mr. Richards.

Mr. Richards. Mr. Ludwig, I want to ask you a question or two about a few of the personalities in Germany. If Hitler were killed, as you have suggested, or assassinated, whom do you believe would take charge?

Mr. Ludwig. Would it be Goering or Goebbels, or would it be a Junker like Von Papen?

Mr. Ludovici. Who would be stronger at this moment, General Von Beck, or Breuschtrich, or Goering, I do not know, but the difference is not important. One is nearly as bad as the other. It is, excuse me, an American prejudice that a Prussian general could be touched by love of peace. Even the great Field Marshal Von Moltke wrote: "The eternal peace is a dream, and even not a sweet dream."

Mr. Richards. The Jupers would immediately get into a scrap with the Hitler crowd, wouldn't they?

Mr. Ludwig. Well, one of the aristocratic generals, as a prisoner in Russia, made the first statement against Hitler. General Von Thomas, as a prisoner from Africa, betrayed his Führer in the same way by a statement in London, which, thank God, by a mistake came into the press.

Mr. Richards. That is all.

The Chairman. Mr. Vorsay.

Mr. Vorsay. Mr. Ludwig, following this thought, if Hitler were assassinated and some general or generals put up a civilian as a stooge for us—you know what a stooge is?

Mr. Ludovici. Yes, you.

Mr. Vorsay. And made proposals for peace, for an armistice, that would be very plausible, how would we keep going? My concern is that if such a situation happened, you have an American people who would say "Well, all we are going about for is for revenge, and we do not want revenge." What they say shows they have learned their lesson and they want to rule themselves and be an orderly nation. The internal government of a country is no concern of ours. How are you going to make sure that we keep going in a military sense?

Mr. Ludovici. Tell them the story of the Weimar Republic. Tell them Marshal Foch and General Pershing could not march to Berlin because the politicians hindered them. Tell them they went only to the Rhine. The victors left them free. You gave them full ruin to govern themselves, and you saw where they arrived after 14 years.

Mr. Vorsay. There would not be time to tell the American people this story if such a development happened. Wouldn't the answer be, "Well, all right, we will take our armies to Berlin and we will talk with you there." Would that be it?

Mr. Ludwig. With whom?

Mr. Vorsay. I do not know; whoever this new man is.

Mr. Ludovici. There is no such man. There are only old men, the generals, and there are Communists, but there is no other man. There are some professors with good intentions, but without any power or influence. The German laughs at a professor who wants to govern, just as he laughs at a Prussian general who quotes Goethe. No German emigrant enjoys any authority at home, now or at any time. Carl Schurz, when he went back to Germany, was unknown to the masses. So was Bernsteiin. Germany is the only country in the world without a monument of a hero of liberty. There is no German analogy to great cellies like Mazzini, Rossini, or Lenin. There does not exist a liberal German of any influence. That is the thesis which you have permitted me to develop today.

Mr. Vorsay. Would you conceive this, that the Jupers themselves, if Hitler were assassinated, would put up a man like Nienhoffer for the purpose of convincing us and for camouflage?

Mr. Ludovici. They would present you the devil or perhaps St. Paul. The Junker takes everyone he can use and will say, "Here is our Nienhoffer." But he would say, "No, gentlemen, not with you."

Mr. Vorsay. Mr. Richards was asking what percentage of the German people are communistic now. Mr. Ludovici. That is impossible to say.

Mr. Richards. At heart.

Mr. Ludovici. They had, I think, about 6,000,000 votes the last time in 1928. But it is difficult to know what is today in their hearts, because communism changes and extreme nationalism changes. Both come very near together. Mr. Stalin went so much to the right that the minorities go from 3,000 to 70,000 rubles, and Mr. Hitler to the left. He is half a Communist, and nothing is more comic than his cry against communism.

Mrs. Rothes. Will you yield for a question?

Mr. Vorsay. Yes.

Mrs. Rothes. I thought it was the Nazi, or rather the German communist idea that got into Russia, which were responsible for the Russian revolution.

Mr. Ludovici. In 1916 and 1917? I think the history of the Russian revolution shows the contrary. That Marx was a born German is no glory for and no culpability of the Germans. As a Jew he did not belong to the Germans, although he was, like many German Jews, much too patriots.
Mr. Johnson. One question, please. What do you think is the explanation of the long silence of Hitler until recently, when he spoke again? Why is it?

Mr. Ludwig. He is a madman. You cannot know why he is silent; and then he speaks too much. That is a question for a psychiatrist.

Mr. Johnson. Well, doesn't he love to speak so well and hear his voice, and don't you think there might be some reason possibly to have him suppressed for awhile? For quite awhile there we heard nothing from him, until recently, and some seem to doubt now whether he is still alive.

Mr. Ludwig. He is a Wagnerian; and in Wagnerian opera you hear the aria of King Marke in "Tristan" for 15 minutes—and then nothing.

Mr. Richards. That is his intuition.

Mr. Ludwig. That is the so-called intuition. I do not find it very important.

Mr. Johnson. I know it is unimportant, but was wondering what the reason could be.

Mr. Ludwig. He spoke the other day.

Mr. Johnson. Yes. You spoke of the break-up of nerves of the German people. Do you think they are so constituted that they are more likely to break under a nervous strain than the British?

Mr. Ludwig. Much more, because the British were bombarded 1 year and nobody broke down, or at least we did not see or hear of such a thing. The nation stood very strong. But we know that in Germany there is the most terrible anguish in their souls, their minds, and their nerves, because they were promised by Goering that bombs would never fall on them. Now, for 10 years, they have been under the strain and they have had war for 4 years. And for what? What is the Ukraine? The Germans have not the slightest interest in Russia. They never had war with Russia until 1914. The whole idea about the Ukraine is unpopular. The popular feeling in Germany only went to the Rhine and to Paris.

Mr. Johnson. You are looking for a break-down in morale in Germany?

Mr. Ludwig. In 24 hours, when it comes, it will be more sudden than we expect. I do not know when. Nobody knows when. But you will have the reports, the headline; the whole story within a week, and all will be over.

Mr. Johnson. A brainstorm!

Mr. Ludwig. That is my deep conviction, after having studied the German character for 20 years.

The Chairman. Mr. Wadsworth.

Mr. Wadsworth. Mr. Ludwig, I am very much impressed with your description of the German psychology and their devotion to order, their reverence of force, and their willingness to submit to force. Do you think that the wholesale military occupation of Germany, we will say with Allied troops on duty in every German city in possession of the city hall, would tend to bring them to their senses to the extent that they would not be quite so confident that they were the master race?

Mr. Ludwig. If you give them another idea, another thing they can believe in. Communism is one of these other things. The Americans were very popular on the Rhine, as you know; the Frenchmen, no. Frenchmen were never popular in Germany. That is an old story, going back 200 years. Even the Germans thought of the Americans as a child. Then they said, "He is a good boy. You can speak with that man. He says 'Donkeshoin.'" The American was much feared before he came, and it was an agreeable surprise, when he came in 1918, to find him so different from what they had pictured.

Mr. Wadsworth. Would an extended occupation by foreign troops have any noticeable effect upon that German trend of thought?

Mr. Ludwig. Not in 6 years. You have to have 50 years to bring about a real change. But you can have peace and prevent them from beginning another war.

Mr. Wadsworth. You would not advocate a hasty solution of this thing as was attempted at Versailles?

Mr. Ludwig. Was it so hasty at Versailles?

Mr. Wadsworth. There was an attempt at Versailles to recognize the world in 6 months, including the treatment of Germany.

Mr. Ludwig. Oh, yes, that was too hasty.

Mr. Wadsworth. Must we not go through more of a process of evolution?

Mr. Ludwig. Yes. But during the process Germany is there. You must do something with the sick man.

Mr. Wadsworth. Sometimes soldiers of wide experience and long experience have a better vision than civilians at home.

Mr. Ludwig. That is very true.

(Whereupon there was a discussion off the record.)

The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions? Mr. Jonesman.

Mr. Jonesman. Right along the line Senator Wadsworth was speaking about, you began by saying, Mr. Ludwig, that in Germany the military predominated as against the intellectuals or against the bourgeoisie and in America you said just the opposite was true. That is, here the military is subordinated and the bourgeoisie is prominent. Now, isn't that opposite the psychology of the German people and can you ever root it out?

Mr. Ludwig. No.

Mr. Jonesman. You think it can never be rooted out?

Mr. Ludwig. Well, I never say 'never' in history. But you cannot change that within our time. To say "peace for our time" you must be as naive as a certain gentleman with an umbrella.

Mr. Jonesman. Then Mr. Wadsworth's suggestion is that it should have an overwhelming, crushing defeat, something to at least stop it somewhat. If we had done that in 1918 then we might not have had quite the trouble we have had since.

Mr. Ludwig. And yet the gentleman there predicted there would be some move here by those who would say, "Finish the story quickly." That would be the same error which was committed 25 years ago. My message is nothing else than to warn, because I know the German character. Let us not make the same mistakes, about which General Pershing spoke to this gentleman and the side-deck of Foch told me the same thing.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Jonesman. One additional question with reference to what you say, Mr. Ludwig, about the complete collapse of German morale, which, when it occurs, may come in 24 hours. And you also spoke about the bombardment or air attacks being the second front from above.
Mr. Ludowy. Yes.

Mr. Jonesman. Do you think it can be brought about through that bombardment, or will it take an invasion of their territory to bring about the collapse?

Mr. Ludowy. No invasion. A very important man in this country told me yesterday, "I do not believe in an invasion of Germany." He was right; it is not necessary. Germany will break down even when all its territory is free of mines. It did so in 1918. And now they have an enormous invasion from the air, which was not the case in 1918. A frontal invasion would be as difficult as it would be unnecessary, at least from the west. If the German people see an enemy on the Rhine they will perhaps regain their fighting mood. But their enemy can stay in southern France, or Italy, or wherever you like, and yet they will break down, because the nervous tension is stronger. As the German soldier has more courage than imagination, he succumbs more easily to the invisible enemy than to the soldier he would meet in hand-to-hand combat on the Rhine. Napoleon—"I do not want to insult him by comparison with Mr. Hitler—Napoleon, as you know, broke down in the eleventh year, and now this is the eleventh year of Mr. Hitler.

Mr. Chippewa. Mr. Ludowy, bearing on what you are speaking about, we were told at a meeting we had here some time ago by the then American Minister, I think in Luxembourg, that the time when England there was panic in Germany for several days.

Mr. Ludowy. Maybe.

Mr. Chippewa. And that there was a feeling that everything was over. I just mention that because it bears on what you say, that one of these days a break-down is coming and it will come fast when it does come.

Mr. Ludowy. Yes.

The Chairman. May I just ask a question there? Did I understand you to say, Mr. Ludowy, that there should be no invasion of German territory by any of the troops?

Mr. Ludowy. It is not "verboten" to do it. I did not mean that. But if you have Italy in your hands, and that is no longer a long way off, and if you have an enormous bombardment over Germany, with more and more material from America, and the situation as you have it in Africa, you will find the feeling in Germany will be, "The game is lost. Why fight 10 years longer to defend Germany?" They did not defend Germany for even 1 day the last time.

The Chairman. How are we going to get our troops into Germany if there is not an invasion?

Mr. Voora. There would be a collapse, and you would have an army of occupation and not an invasion.

Mr. Ludowy. Occupation.

The Chairman. Oh, I see.

Mr. Eisenhardt. Mr. Ludowy, you expressed, I think, some fear that the people of this country did not recognize the psychology of the German people for what it is worth, and that perhaps opinion here would be so soft when the time came to make a peace. That Government might be too easy in making a peace, and thus permit Germany to build up and have another war?

Mr. Ludowy. This Government in no case, but the people.

Mr. Eisenhardt. What do you think about the European countries in this respect? Do they know better than we know?

Mr. Ludowy. That I do not know. But an eminent Englishman I spoke to the other day, an important member of the embassy, smiled at my suggestion that the English could give in to the generals and Junipers. He said, "We learned something from the first time. In England nobody will make any peace with any military follower of Mr. Hitler."
for that organization to supervise Germany or any other country. That may be for Japan likewise.

Mr. Ludwig. Of course, but you cannot do it at once. You cannot do it in the first year.

Mr. Fulbright. Oh, no, that is a permanent thing. There can be no consistent international policy, we have already found, without an organization to attach that policy to.

Mr. Ludwig. Yes.

Mr. Fulbright. You mentioned Churchill's idea of a European federation. As a matter of fact, don't you think in such a federation Russia will be inclined to control it rather than England, and that we would run a very great danger of permitting the organization of a European federation or some organization other than a world federation? Either we have to go our old road of every nation for itself or a world federation without any in-between organization.

Mr. Ludwig. You have made here today, a European federation or some organization for itself or a world federation without any in-between organization.

Mr. Ludwig. Not only for this reason, but there are twenty other reasons why it would be dangerous.

Mr. Fulbright. That is one very great reason.

Mr. Ludwig. Yes.

Mr. Fulbright. And that it seems to me in the course of time would inevitably lead to the domination by Russia of all of that federation; but it might be controlled if it is part of a world federation in which all of the nations participate. That is the difference.

Mr. Ludwig. Is it your fear that the Russians will carry communism into Germany?

Mr. Fulbright. In the absence of any larger organization to control this, I think so. I think in the absence of that that will inevitably come. Don't you think that is a problem, at least? (Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Fulbright. That is the risk we have to run if we permit that to go along in that way.

Mr. Ludwig. In any case if there is an army of occupation in the beginning you have a much stronger voice in Europe than you would have without soldiers, is that not so?

Mr. Fulbright. I think so.

The CHAIRMAN. Is that all?

Mr. Fulbright. Yes.

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Ludwig, personally I want to thank you for your appearance before our committee, and the very able statement that you have made concerning a subject about which you are so well informed.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ludwig, I want to express the appreciation of the committee for the very interesting and informative statement you have made today. It is indeed a pleasure for us to have heard you speak personally on a subject with which you are so familiar, and the information you have given us is going to prove very helpful to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

(Whereupon the hearing was closed.)

(Not printed at Government expense)
Re: Hearings on February 8 and 9, 1944 before the
Committee on Foreign Affairs concerning House
Resolutions Nos. 418 and 419—78th Congress,
Second Session, relating to the Establishment
of a Jewish National Home in Palestine.

The Resolution

House Resolution No. 418 introduced by Representative
Wright of Pennsylvania reads as follows:

"Whereas the Sixty-seventh Congress of the
United States on June 30, 1922, unanimously re-
olved that the United States of America favors
the establishment in Palestine of a national home
for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood
that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the
civil and religious rights of Christian and all
other non-Jewish communities in Palestine and that
the holy places and religious buildings and sites
in Palestine shall be adequately protected; and

"Whereas the ruthless persecution of the
Jewish people in Europe has clearly demonstrated
the need for a Jewish homeland as a haven for the
large numbers who have become homeless as a result
of this persecution; Therefore be it

"Resolved. That the United States shall use
its good offices and take appropriate measures to
the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened
for free entry of Jews into that country, and that
there shall be full opportunity for colonization,
so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute
Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth."

House Resolution No. 419, introduced by Representative
Compton of Connecticut, is an identical measure.
October 34, 1915—Great Britain recognized and agreed to support the independence of the Arabs in certain specified areas. There is a dispute as to whether or not Palestine was included in this area. 2)

November 2, 1917—Mr. Balfour, Great Britain's principal Secretary of State on Foreign Affairs issued what has since come to be known as "The Balfour Declaration", promising to facilitate the establishment in Palestine of a National home for the Jewish people. 3) Before being sent to Lord Rothschild the Balfour Declaration was submitted to and approved by the British Cabinet. 4)

March 3, 1919, President Wilson stated:

"I am persuaded that the Allied nations, with the fullest concurrence of our Government and our people, are agreed that in Palestine shall be laid the foundations of a Jewish Commonwealth." 5)

June 3, 1922, a copy of the 1923 British Stateament of Policy was sent by the British Colonial Office to the Zionist Organization with the request that the Zionist Organisation accept the policy set forth therein. This Statement of Policy restricted Jewish immigration into Palestine to the limit of the economic absorptive capacity of the country. 6)

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1/ The information contained herein was taken from a pamphlet entitled "The Jewish National Home in Palestine" which was prepared by Chairman Sol Bloom for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. It should be pointed out that this pamphlet is extremely pro-Jewish in its treatment of the Palestinian question. All footnote references will be to page numbers in the above pamphlet.

2/ p. 3 of the pamphlet referred to supra, footnote 1.

3/ The Balfour Declaration reads as follows:

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by the Jews in any other country." 6)

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4/ Id. at p. 5
5/ Id. at p. 43
6/ Id. at p. 98
June 18, 1922—the Zionist Organization accepted the restrictions set forth in the British Statement of Policy. Before confirmation by the League of Nations of the subsequent British Mandate for Palestine, the communications of June 3, 1922 and June 18, 1922 were sent to the League Council for its information.

September 21, 1922—Congress passed a joint resolution, introduced by Senator Lodge and Representative Fish, reading as follows:

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine, and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected."

September 29, 1922—Great Britain assumed the League of Nations' Mandate over Palestine. The preamble of this Mandate places upon the Mandatory responsibility for putting into effect the Balfour Declaration.

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2/ Id. at p. 88
3/ Id. at p. 99
4/ Id. at p. 5

10/ The relative portions of the preamble to the British Mandate over Palestine read as follows:

"Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on the 2nd November, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

"Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and

"Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; * * *

Id. at pp. 10-11
December 3, 1925—a Convention between United States and Great Britain consented to Great Britain's administration of Palestine pursuant to the League of Nations' Mandate of September 29, 1923. 11/ Article 7 of this Convention provides that the United States shall not recognize any modifications of the terms of the Mandate, unless such modification has been consented to by the United States. 12/

1935-1939—Arab terrorism was rampant in Palestine. 13/

May, 1939—the British Parliament approved the British White Paper on Palestine, declaring that it is not the policy of the British Government that Palestine should become a Jewish State, for such a policy would be contrary to the Mandatory obligations to the Arabs under the League of Nations' Mandate. 14/ The British White Paper provides specifically that:

"After the period of five years no further Jewish immigration will be permitted unless the Arabs of Palestine are prepared to acquiesce in it." 8 The Paper provided further:

"His Majesty's Government are satisfied, that when the immigration over five years which is now contemplated has taken place, they will not be justified in facilitating, nor will they under any obligation to facilitate, the further development of the Jewish National Home by immigration regardless of the wishes of the Arab population." 15/

The five year period referred to in the White Paper expires in April, 1944. However, there are still approximately 30,000 Jews admissible into Palestine after that date, as the available quotas are not yet exhausted.

May, 1939—Winston Churchill, 16/ Archibald Sinclair, 17/

11/ Article 1 of the above Convention, quoted on page 18 of the pamphlet referred to supra. footnote 1.

12/ Id. at p. 19
13/ Id. at p. 34
14/ Id. at p. 22
15/ Id. at p. 38
16/ Id. at pp. 78-85
17/ Id. at pp. 72-77
Herbert Morrison, the Archbishop of Canterbury and others in Parliament and the House of Lords expressed opposition to the British White Paper as a renunciation of international obligations and comment solemnly assumed by Great Britain.

Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
February 6, 1944—Morning Session from 10:10 to 12:00.

Chairman Bloom of the House Foreign Affairs Committee announced that a similar measure which had been introduced before the Senate was approved by both the majority and minority leaders of the Senate.

Before any of the witnesses had an opportunity to testify, Mrs. Rogers of Massachusetts, and another member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee inquired of Mr. Bloom whether the Chairman had requested the view of the Department of State concerning the resolution under consideration. Mr. Bloom replied that the Committee requires the view of all interested persons and departments. Upon further questioning, Mr. Bloom answered that he would have no objection to having a State Department representative testify before the Committee concerning the official views of that Department on the resolution under consideration.

Representative Eaton of New Jersey stated that a number of his constituents were interested in knowing the views of the author of the resolution under consideration. Mr. Bloom did not know, but promised to obtain this information. Subsequently, while testifying during the afternoon session, Representative Harter of Massachusetts stated that he had drafted a similar resolution in September 1943 which, however, had not been introduced. Representative Harter expressed the belief that the present resolution was based on his earlier draft.

Representative McCormack of Massachusetts, majority leader of the House, Representative Martin of Massachusetts, minority leader of the House and Representatives Ralph of California, Talbot of Connecticut and Horshander of Pennsylvania, all testified in favor of the resolution.

Representative Geller of New York testified at some length. He asserted that passage of the resolution under consideration would be completely in accord with the spirit of the Presidential directive creating a War Refugees Board. In effect, this resolution, according to Mr. Geller, would be a request to the British Government to abrogate the MacDonald White Paper restricting Jewish immigration into Palestine. In 1937, Representative Geller pointed out, the United States Ambassador to Great Britain asserted that under the terms of the 1926 Convention between the United States and Great Britain no change in the status of

18/ Id. at pp. 67-71
19/ Id. at pp. 34-67
Palestine could take place without the consent of the United States. Inasmuch as the White Paper had never been approved by the United States Government, it violated the terms of the Convention of 1934, according to Representative Celler. Representative Celler added further that then the White Paper was subsequently submitted by the British Government to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations, it was formally rejected. The British Government was prevented by the outbreak of the war from submitting the Paper to the higher authority of the League Council. Thus concluded Representative Celler, the White Paper is illegal and a violation of Great Britain's international obligations.

Mr. Celler ended with a paraphrase of Calio's "cathera delenda est," stating: "The White Paper must be destroyed."

Representative Hamilton Fish affirmed his support for the resolution under consideration by the Foreign Affairs Committee. During his statement Representative Fish caused much mirth by repeatedly expressing his dissatisfaction with the pamphlet referred to above because of its omission to mention that Mr. Fish was co-sponsor of the Congressional Resolution of 1933. Mr. Fish registered his disagreement with Zionist who believe that Palestine is the only possible future haven for the Jews. Mr. Fish adverted to his discussions with Viscount Halifax and the French Foreign Minister in 1939 concerning the possibility of establishing a Jewish homeland in sparsely inhabited parts of French or British territory. At this juncture, a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee pointed out that the Presidential directive establishing the War Refugees Board provides that "havens", not a "haven", shall be established for the Jews.

Mr. Fish, on questioning by Mr. Rogers, stated that he could see no objection to asking for the State Department's views concerning the resolution under consideration. One member of the Committee asserted that he had been advised that Secretary of State Hull had filed a protest with the British Government in 1939 at the time of the issuance of the British White Paper.

Representative Eaton of New Jersey asked Representative Celler of New York what the latter had in mind when he referred to the "right" of the Jews to Palestine. Representative Celler replied that this "right" was based on the Balfour Declaration, which had been approved by the British Cabinet, and later by Congress in its Joint Resolution of 1922. The "right" was further premised on the American-British Convention of 1924 and also on the British Mandate over Palestine which had been approved by 52 member nations of the League of Nations. Mr. Celler pointed out further that the British White Paper was a violation of Article 15 of the British Mandate over Palestine which provides:

"No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole grounds of his religious belief."
Representative Geller asserted his agreement with Prime Minister Churchill's understanding of the British commitment in Palestine that the only restriction on Jewish immigration into the Holy Land was the economic capacity of Palestine to absorb them.

Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the American Zionist Emergency Council, testified before the Committee for approximately an hour concerning the history of the century old movement to restore the Jews to Palestine. Dr. Silver expressed disagreement with Representative Fish's statement that there are other havens for the Jews in addition to Palestine. He stated that there has been much talk about such havens, but nothing has ever been accomplished to establish them. Palestine, Dr. Silver pointed out, has been prepared for that very purpose for the last 20 years and is ready now to absorb many homeless Jews.

February 8, 1944—Afternoon Session from 2:30 to 5:00

Representative Wright of Pennsylvania, co-sponsor of the resolution stated briefly that the White Paper would freeze the Jews into a minority status in a country set aside as their homeland. Representatives Klein and Barry of New York also testified in favor of the resolution.

Dr. Karl Friedrich, a professor at Harvard University, who, though not a Jew, is an expert on the Palestinian question, testified at some length. According to Dr. Friedrich, there are at present approximately 550,000 Jews and 1,100,000 Arabs in Palestine. The Arab population 25 years ago apparently amounted to 40,000.

Dr. Friedrich asserted that too often in the past nothing had been done to implement policies such as that expressed in the resolution under consideration, and that facts, not words, were important. Mrs. Melton of Ohio inquired whether by implementing action Dr. Friedrich referred to military action. The witness replied in the negative, and suggested the following specific lines of action which this Government ought to take in support of the policy expressed in the resolution under consideration: diplomatic pressure directed toward the abolition of present restrictions on Jewish immigration into Palestine and on the purchase of land in Palestine by Jews and directed also toward removal of all restrictions on the movement of goods in and out of Palestine. Dr. Friedrich suggested further that the economic absorptive capacity of Palestine would be much expanded if the Jews were given a freer opportunity to undertake the political and economic development of the Holy Land. The confusion implicit in the British Palestinian policy, British Screivation, etc., is hampering the economic development of the country, according to Dr. Friedrich. Finally Dr. Friedrich suggested that the Palestinian Mandate be enforced, if necessary, by an international police force acting under international authority. The above, according to Dr. Friedrich, would be "appropriate measures" to carry out the policy set forth in the proposed House Resolution.
Representative Vorys of Ohio inquired whether it would be possible to favor the passing of the proposed resolution without agreeing to all of Dr. Friedrich's points. The latter replied in the affirmative, asserting that the proposed resolution was an "opening wedge". Mrs. Bolton of Ohio asked Dr. Friedrich what he meant by an "opening wedge". He replied that he was referring to the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Both Mrs. Bolton and Mr. Vorys appeared satisfied with this answer.

Dr. Israel Goldstein, President of the Zionist Organization of America, stated that the immigration of two million Jews into Palestine would help considerably to alleviate the Jewish problem all over Europe, as two million Jews would amount to more than 40 per cent of those who remaining in Europe. He urged further that the economic expansion of Palestine would be aided considerably if the administration of UNRRA adopted the policy of placing orders for manufactured articles in Palestine instead of importing such articles from abroad.

Mr. Lessing Rosenwald, President of the American Council for Judaism, expressed the agreement of his organization with the first part of the proposed House Resolution, but its disagreement with the part of the Resolution reading as follows:

"so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth."

The term "Jewish", according to Mr. Rosenwald, has a religious, not a national connotation, and the Jews have no desire whatsoever to be a political unit. The creation of a national Jewish State in Palestine, stated Mr. Rosenwald, would be an admission of a philosophy of defeatism. Mr. Rosenwald suggested specifically that the word "Jewish" be omitted from the quoted part of the resolution or alternatively that the second part be deleted altogether. Mr. Rosenwald's testimony obviously aroused much annoyance in the audience, which appeared to be made up in great part of Jews in sympathy with the statements of Drs. Goldstein and Silver.

February 2, 1944—Morning Session, from 10:40 to 12:30

A representative of the American Federation of Labor, Representative Dickstein of New York and Mrs. Epstein, the President of Hadassah, all testified in favor of the resolution.

20/ The Palestinian experts who testified appeared to be in agreement that Palestine could absorb two million more immigrants.
It was obvious from the questions and remarks of the members of the Committee that many of them were sympathetic with the views of Mr. Lessing Rosenwald, who had testified the prior day. This was particularly true of Congressmen Vorys of Ohio, McNair of Wisconsin, Eaton of New York, Baring of North Carolina, Manatt of South Dakota, and Congresswoman Bolton of Ohio. This sympathy was aroused somewhat by the aggressive attitude of Rabbi Silver and Goldstein in their rebuttal of Mr. Rosenwald's testimony in favor of either striking altogether or modifying the second half of the resolution. Rabbi Goldstein hinted that Mr. Rosenwald, a mere layman, had temerity to testify before a Congressional Committee on technical questions of Jewish theology. One of the members of the Committee (I believe it was Representative Hume) remarked that the resolution under consideration related to a political rather than a theological question. He added that most Methodists like himself would not suffer ministers of their church to formulate the political opinions of the members of the church. Mrs. Bolton referred to the antithesis between a democratic state and a theocratic state such as that which seemed to be projected for Palestine by those having the views of Rabbi Goldstein and Silver. She pointed out that the form of government in the United States is premised on the cleavage between church and state. She indicated that before action is taken on the resolution under consideration, further consideration would have to be given by the Committee to this aspect of the question at hand, as minority groups in the United States ought not to demand or receive the support of the Government of the United States in problems affecting these minorities rather than the Government as a whole. Representative Vorys remarked, apparently for the edification of Rabbi Goldstein and Silver, that in the United States one is an American and nothing else. When Dr. Silver in replying to Mr. Rosenwald referred to Mrs. Bolton's "view," she cut his short rather caustically by requesting him not to attribute to her a view which she had not expressed. Representative Eaton asked Dr. Silver with some irony whether he would favor the establishment of a Jewish state in New York City. The Chairman ruled this question out as "dirty.

February 9, 1944—Afternoon Session—2:05 to 5:20

Representatives Sordoff of Wisconsin and Meyers and Weiss of Pennsylvania, Rabbi Gold, representing an orthodox religious branch of the Zionist movement, and the President of the Christian Council on Palestine all testified in favor of the resolution under consideration.

Dr. Walter Lauterwilk, an expert for 20 years in the Department of Agriculture who has had an opportunity to study the problem of erosion in the Near East and many other parts of the world, warmly praised the Jewish agricultural accomplishments on the arid soil of Palestine. Representative Manatt asked Dr. Lauterwilk a number of questions concerning the meaning of the term "economic absorptive capacity".
Dr. Lanternmilk did not restrict the definition of this term to the number of people that a given area of land had the agricultural capacity to feed. In defining the term Dr. Lanternmilk also took into considera-
tion the possibility of industrial and other types of expansion in the
area, other than agricultural. With the foreign exchange earned in
other than agricultural pursuits, he pointed out, the area will be able
to import food for its inhabitants, and thus support many more persons
than it is agriculturally capable of feeding. Representative Nurn-
ted Dr. Lanternmilk's definition of the term "absorptive capacity"
meaningless. Representative Nundt pointed out that under Dr.
Lanternmilk's definition Manhattan Island would have an absorptive
capacity of perhaps ten million. In other words, the "absorptive
capacity" of an area is, under Dr. Lanternmilk's definition, related
not only to the soil, but also to the imagination and creative capacity
of its inhabitants. Dr. Lanternmilk pointed out that under Representative
Nundt's restricted definition, England has the capacity to absorb only
two-thirds of its present population.

Rabbi Wolsey of the American Council of Judaism endorsed the
view of Mr. Roosevelt that Judaism is a religion and nothing more.
The Rabbi recommended the striking out of the second part of the reso-
lation under consideration, reading:

"so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute
Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth."

The members of the Committee manifested interest in Dr. Wolsey's state-
ment. Representative Chipherfield of Illinois seemed to join the ranks
of the committee who in the morning session had appeared to sympathecize
with Mr. Roosevelt. Chairman Bloom, who obviously favored
the Goldstein, Silver viewpoint, pointed out, in order to highlight the
minority view represented by Mr. Roosevelt and Dr. Wolsey, that out of
the thousands of letters which the Committee had received from Jews and
Jewish organizations concerning the resolution under consideration, only
two had expressed opposition. Representative Vorny asked whether it was
more important for Congress in its legislation to be influenced by the
views of the American people as a whole, or by the views of one minority
segment of the American people. In reply to questioning by Representa-
native Nundt, Dr. Wolsey stated categorically that the language of the
Balfour Declaration was not intended to include the establishment of a
Jewish State in Palestine.

Rabbi James C. Heller, a noted member of the American Revolution and
a representative of the reformed group of Rabbis, disagreed with Dr.
Wolsey's interpretation of the Balfour Declaration. He pointed out that
although the Declaration uses the language "national home", persons such
as Lord Cecil, Lloyd George and Winston Churchill construed this to
mean a Jewish State. Dr. Heller's extremely convincing testimony
appeared to seem the support of the Committee away from the views of
Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Waley. Rabbi Heller pointed out that only an
extreme minority of the organized Jewish community has adopted the
views expressed by Dr. Waley and Mr. Roosevelt. He emphasised further
that the question whether Judaism is a race, religion or nationality is an
ideological question which has caused much difference among
Jewish scholars. Such a theoretical question, Dr. Heller emphasised,
has nothing whatsoever to do with the resolution under consideration,
which is an attempt to deal with a tragic fact, not a theory—the
preservation of the Jews from the appalling fate confronting them.
According to Dr. Heller, the setting up of a Jewish State in Palestine
does not mean in any way that Jews in other parts of the world will be
citizens of, or owe fealty to, this Jewish State.

Representative Rampi asked Dr. Heller what in his opinion
was the meaning of the term "appropriate measures" as used in the
resolution. Dr. Heller replied that it certainly did not refer to
the protection of a Palestinian State after its creation by a police
force. Representative Wright, the co-author of the resolution under
consideration, Representative Rampi and Dr. Heller all agreed that
the term "appropriate measures" was redundant and should therefore be
stricken from the resolution.

Dr. Heller closed with the thought that many of the Jews
rescued in Europe by the War Refugee Board will be transferred to
Palestine, and that to this extent the Executive Order establishing
the War Refugee Board and the resolution presently under consideration
were related.

Conclusion

The hearings were generally attended by approximately half of
the Committee membership, many of whom, as has been seen, showed
interest in the testimony. It was my impression that the Committee
members present would probably strike the words "and take appropriate
measures" from the proposed resolution, but other than this slight
modification, they would report the resolution out favorably.