Does the Refugee Have a Future?

An Analysis of the Position of Homeless Jews in the Postwar World.

by

DR. GEORGE STEFANSKY

Preface By

JAMES C. MCDONALD
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Published by

UNITED PALESTINE APPEAL
41 EAST 42ND STREET
NEW YORK 17, N. Y.
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Preface

This is an admirable sociological study which deserves wide attention. Even those of us who have been officially or otherwise concerned with the problem of refugees will find in Dr. Stefansky's succinct analysis a provocative challenge to some of our most cherished misconceptions.

Unlike most other books in this field, this small volume seeks to understand the refugee in relation to his present and prospective environment. It seeks to explain the "deficiencies in the structure of our society" which have made the refugee tragedy possible. Dr. Stefansky finds the ultimate cause in "the seemingly irreconcilable conflict of unlimited state sovereignty versus self-limited international control". He is justifiably skeptical of the efficacies of the several suggested guarantees of the rights of minorities after the war and pleads with eloquence and cogency for the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine. This, he insists, has become imperative because of "universal reorganization of the world on the basis of concerted political action by sovereign states."

No one who dares to face the terrible realities will disagree with Dr. Stefansky's scathing judgment that European Jewry during the past decade or more has been crushed "between two power groups, one of which brought upon them persecution and death while the other withdrew behind agitated declarations and inefficient promises." As a non-Jew and for a period an international official with responsibility for the rescue of refugees, I confess that the author's general indictment is unanswerable: "Of course, there is a wide psychological differ-
ence between the fertile imagination of destruction, of which the totalitarian states showed themselves masters, and the lack of imagination on the part of the anti-totalitarian states in helping the victims. But, in its real effect, that difference shrinks to a minimum. In the history of the Jews it will not matter whether millions of Jews died as a result of brutal aggression by one faction or passiveness and lethargy on the part of the other."

Both Jewish and non-Jewish leaders will profit by a careful reading of this analysis.

JAMES G. MCDONALD.

New York, March 12, 1945.

Introduction*

The tragedy which has befallen the Jewish people since National Socialism in Germany came into power is still unfolding and not yet known in all its appalling details. What we have come to know thus far is that the sufferings and the misery of the Jews in the last twelve years have surpassed anything to which any nation has been subjected in modern times.

As a result of the German plan to annihilate European Jewry, more than one third of a total of sixteen million Jews in the world and approximately three quarters of all the European Jews have died as helpless victims of German brutality. Only a small fraction of about 300,000 Jews have succeeded in escaping from Nazi terror and have settled in various countries of refuge, the relatively greater percentage of them in

* The author wishes to express his appreciation to a number of individuals and organizations for advice and helpful assistance in carrying out this study, particularly to Professor Joseph P. Chamberlin (Columbia University, New York) and Dr. Bernard Joseph, Legal Adviser of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem, for their comments on the legal aspects of the refugee problem; to Mr. John W. Pehle, Executive Director of the War Refugee Board, in Washington, D. C. and to Misses: Abraham H. Feller, General Counsel of UNRRA and Thomas M. Cooley, Acting Director of the Displaced Persons Division of UNRRA in Washington, D. C., for information on foreign relief; to Mrs. Martha H. Richle, American Resident Representative of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees in Washington, D. C. for her interpretation of the operational setup and planning of the Intergovernmental Committee; to Mr. David Staats, who during his visit to the United States discussed with the author the problems of colonization on the basis of his experience in Palestine; to Messrs. Arif Tanshower and Kurt R. Grassmann who made available to the author the proof sheets of their book on "The Jewish Refugee" prior to its publication; and to Miss Sophie A. Udin, Director of the Zionist Archives and Library in New York, for her friendly cooperation.
Palestine. The remaining number of from one to one and a half million Jews (probably much less) who are believed to have survived in Nazi-occupied Europe have been driven from their homes and deported to labor and concentration camps. We do not know how many of them will be able to stand the untold physical and mental tortures inflicted upon them but if there will be, as we hope, Jewish survivors when the curtain rises to reveal the full impact of the European tragedy, then the most urgent question confronting the world will be: What shall be done with the European Jews?

An additional problem will arise from the situation of those Jews who fled from Nazi persecution to neutral countries or who found temporary refuge in countries of the United Nations. As soon as the war is over these people will be expected to leave the countries which had sheltered them during the period of crisis. There are about 60,000 refugees in England, 25,000 in Switzerland, 3,000 in Spain, several thousand overseas—to mention only a few examples—who will have to look for places of final settlement after the war. Where shall they go? They do not yet know. The only thing they are certain of is that they will not be allowed to stay where they are. Perhaps, if they were to be allowed to stay, they might not even be able, for economic and social reasons, to build up a new and decent existence. The same is true of many Jewish refugees who have survived in the liberated countries, such as France, Belgium, the Balkans, etc. They, too, will have to leave. But leave for where?

Should we advise them to go back after the war to the places of their former residence, that is, to Germany, Austria and the other countries of continental Europe? We do not think that anyone who lived through the horrors of Nazi persecution will desire to go back to the place where he had undergone the manifold cruelties of Nazi conception. But even those who might wish to be repatriated—certainly a negligible number of the total of refugees—will not be able to do so for many reasons involved in the postwar situation in Europe. Most of the exiled governments of the occupied countries have already cautioned against Jewish remigration to countries of former residence. Repatriation, at least on a large scale, certainly does not promise a realistic solution.

One might assume that there is ample space in the rest of the world to absorb little more than a million new settlers, intelligent and skillful enough to make a contribution to the economic and social situation of the receiving countries. In a geographical sense, there is ample space in the world. The vast areas of Alaska, of the Latin American countries which are in need of new settlers, of Australia, China, etc., would theoretically provide many opportunities of resettlement for the Jewish refugees. But the world has long since ceased to be a geographical universe. Man has transformed and narrowed it into a world of his political and social will. Accordingly, the solution of the refugee problem cannot be sought in terms of geography only, but in terms of political, social and economic thinking.

Politically and socially, however, the majority of countries is closed to the Jewish refugee including those countries which in an economic sense would profit by Jewish immigration. The forces behind this negative attitude are many. They are, in general, an outgrowth of the tendencies among the nations toward forming biological, social and ideological groups with strong inner coherence. These tendencies are predominant and as such have to be taken into account. They are not to be questioned from a moral or philosophical standpoint. Their importance lies in the fact that they are considered to be the
factors indispensable for organizing our society in the only way in which modern life is supposed to grow, as a society of strong national units. But if that is so, it is logical to wonder why the principles of national group-building are applied to all, even the numerically smallest nations, except one: the Jewish nation. Why against all better knowledge deny the Jews the privilege of incorporating themselves into the society of nations since national incorporation has been realized as the effective means of group survival? The Jews, and particularly the Jewish refugees, have a place where they can settle as equal members among the other nations of the world. The well-established Jewish community of almost 600,000 souls in Palestine is ready to accept them. This community has already demonstrated its political maturity, social growth and economic capacity.

Palestine, and Palestine only, offers the final solution to the refugee problem. To prove that objectively is the purpose of this study.

We will approach the problem of the Jewish refugee on the basis of clearly determined facts and figures. We will review in broad outlines all available material on the Jewish refugee movement in the period between 1933 and 1944, and draw a comparison between the role Palestine and the rest of the countries concerned have played in this movement. However, it is not the history of the movement in which we are primarily interested. Our eyes are turned toward the future of the Jewish nation. For this reason we will try to determine the implications of the Jewish refugee problem. We will try to assess the international situation which has caused a Jewish refugee problem. We will discuss the legal, economic and political aspects of the question. We will follow the governmental and intergovernmental actions through which the non-Jewish world has responded to the Jewish crisis, and we will confront the promises with the acts for the benefit of Jewish refugees by governmental and intergovernmental authorities.

We will examine the various official and semi-official statements regarding the migration and remigration of the Jews in the postwar period. We will survey the plans and consider the effectiveness of the plans for settling Jewish refugees in countries other than Palestine after the war. We will discuss the provisions which have been made by UNRRA and the Intergovernmental Committee to meet the Jewish needs in postwar Europe. Many other questions of similar nature will be touched upon. We do not claim that everything that is said here, will be entirely new to the public. Our primary aim is to impress on the reader a question which has to be asked over and over again: Unless Palestine, what else?
Chapter 1

Deficiencies in the Structure of Our Society

The Legal and Political Protection of the Individual

In approaching the complexity of problems which the refugee situation presents one is faced first with the question as to what factors distinguish the refugee from the normal citizen. Since citizenship is the implementation of interrelated rights and duties of the individual to the state, the distinction evidently lies with the difference of the legal and political status of the individual.

In fact, being a refugee, in the all-inclusive sense of the concept, means being the victim of an essential defect in the legal system of our international life.* The government which normally forms the link between the individual and international law, not only fails to perform that function, in the case of the refugee, but goes out of its way to embarrass him, so that he is actually in need of protection against it. However, he cannot be, or rather is usually not given such protection by

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* Cf. to the following: R. Y. Jennings, Some International Law Aspects of the Refugee Question: British Year Book of International Law, 1939, pp. 58-114; E. Lowenthal, Status of Stateless Persons: Grotius Society, Problems of the War, Papers Read Before the Society, Vol. 27, 1940, pp. 59-104. (Both articles extensively quoted in this chapter.)

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international law, since no written agreement exists among the nations to guarantee to the individual the so-called "Rights of Mankind".* It is actually this lack of protection which is the test of a refugee adopted in all arrangements and conventions.

During the last two decades several attempts were made to bridge this gap in our international jurisdiction by conferring upon the individual refugee, for his protection, a distinct legal status.*** In a juridical sense the measures taken were interim measures of alleviation. The refugee was not converted into a normal citizen but just into another kind of refugee. He merely advanced from one category of refugee to another. But he remained a refugee, that is, he remained an individual who in many respects was excluded from the benefits of a normal legal life. It was, however, from the practical

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* The Rights of Mankind are said to comprise the right to protection of life, liberty, of emigration, etc.—See the "Declaration Concerning the International Rights of Man," adopted by the Institute of International Law: Antwerp, 1929, p. 298.

*** Several experts on International Law maintain that the law of nations guarantees to every individual at home and abroad the Rights of Mankind whether he be a subject or not; a point of particular importance in view of the recent parochial obligations of Germany toward the Jewish refugees (discussed below). Cf. Blumenthal, Le Droit International, 1879, par. 392, p. 221; Martens, Traité de Droit International Public, 1872, Vol. 1, Part 3, p. 757.

An International Conference in Geneva in July, 1921, adopted unanimously a simplified form of Identity Certificate for Stateless Refugees, the so-called "Nansen Passport." The certificate had international validity. The aspects of the legal status of refugees were carefully considered at the time of the Inter-governmental Conference in Geneva in June, 1928. It was recommended there that the representatives of the League of Nations High Commissioners should have quasi-judicial functions. They should be entitled, in agreement with the government concerned, to certify the identity and the civil status of refugees; to determine the regularity and legality of documents of refugees issued in their country of origin; to attest their character, previous records of service and professional and academic qualifications; to recommend them for visas, residence permits, and admission to schools. It was also provided that restrictive regulations concerning foreign labor should not be rigorously applied. The arrangement (according to the "American Journal of International Law," 1938, p. 681) was a model for the later conventions of 1933 and 1938.
points of view, some advancement, because it gave him a chance to live within the limits of a restricted legal existence unmolested by the authorities, and to enjoy certain privileges (which, of course, varied with the various agreements and conventions). The only real danger of the situation, viewed again in a non-judicial sense, was to be seen in a form of political and social inertia among the refugees themselves and among the nationals of most of the other countries. It was the tendency to regard the refugee as a permanent or at least unavoidable incident of modern society. Such an attitude threatened to make the world acquiesce in half-hearted measures for the refugees. It was with regard to the potential dangers of this attitude that Sir Herbert Emerson sounded a note of warning which still holds true: "The legal and political protection of the stateless person is a matter of great importance which will continue to demand international action, but it is only a stage toward the real goal, which is to furnish the stateless person with a home and a nationality."**

**Principles of International Justice**

However, even if the refugee or the stateless refugee, as the case may be, has been furnished eventually with a home and a nationality, a fundamental legal issue is still to be clarified. The person who has been driven from his home, deprived of all his means and possessions, has suffered great material damage, not to speak at this point of the more intangible values he has lost. The country which has received the destitute refugee and helps him to reestablish himself is equally at a great disadvantage because it has to provide the means for his reestablishment out of its own resources. Under these circumstances the question arises whether the country which has created refugees can be held responsible for the damage it has done to the refugee and to the receiving country.

Our moral and humane feelings would make us expect that there is among international lawyers no disagreement as to how to handle such a situation. However, a most formidable obstacle blocks international jurisdiction from approaching the question in a purely moral way. It is the principle of state sovereignty which in this sense presents considerable difficulties. According to it no state is entitled to intervene in the domestic affairs of any other state. The far-reaching consequences of this principle of our international life, borne out by the history of modern state policy, are discussed at a later point. The emphasis here is placed primarily on the legal quality of international justice.

Since the interrelationship between a state and its citizens is a matter of domestic concern, no state in the strict interpretation of the principle of state sovereignty can be held responsible by others for the treatment it has accorded to its own citizens. Therefore, prima facie, neither the refugee nor the country where he has settled can make any claim for compensation on the country of origin.

However, there are two schools of thought which have given this rigid rule a flexible interpretation. One stresses the fact that a certain minimum standard of conduct is to be observed by governments toward those individuals who are under their sway. Also matters of domestic concern come within the ambit of international jurisdiction when the treatment in question offends the principles of the "Rights of Mankind". The other group of international lawyers leans more towards the material implications of the problem. The willful flooding of other states with refugees constitutes not

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*"Foreign Affairs" Vol. 21, No. 2, January, 1943, p. 216.*
only an inequitable act, but an actual illegality.* If the conduct of the state of origin is, in the first place, illegal, it logically follows that the state of origin is under a duty to assist settlement-states in the solution of the problem to which it has given rise.

Both of these ideas are part of a state philosophy which in the last twenty or twenty-five years has crystallized into one of the most important political concepts of modern times—the concept of the minorities treaties.**

** National Minorities

What is a minority, and in what sense is it related to the refugee problem? A minority is a distinct ethnic group with an individual national and cultural character living within a state which is dominated by another nationality, and which is viewed by the latter as a particular expression of its own individuality. The mere existence of a dominating national group and another national group which is given less influence in the political unit of the state proves that the process of unification through state power has not been successful. The potential danger of the situation lies in the uncontrolled power of the state. The tension can, at any time, break out into open conflict, and take the form of violent action on the part of the dominating group against the weaker one, usually the national minority. The persecuted group, in the end, will often resort to emigration for purposes of survival. At this very moment, however, the minority problem, heretofore conceived as a matter of domestic concern, turns into a refugee problem assuming international proportions.

Up to the beginning of this century the opinion prevailed that state power was the only instrument efficient enough to eliminate minority problems before they reach a climax, by forming the various national groups into a uniform political entity. Tsarist Russia and the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy were based on this principle. Then came the First World War, and the doctrine of national pacification through state power proved fallacious. The resistance power of national minorities to the dominating will of the ruling state-majority was in the end stronger than the state itself. Tsarist Russia and the Austrian-Hungarian monarchy disintegrated into the component national elements.

The Minorities Treaties of Versailles

The most obvious success, perhaps, of the Peace Conference at Versailles was to give increased attention to the development of a sounder relationship between state majorities and minorities. It was recognized that it could not be left to the individual state to decide about the fate of its own minorities, and that a more impartial power was needed to control this relationship. This viewpoint finally materialized in the so-called minorities treaties within the framework of international agreements. The society of nations was henceforth called upon to watch over the just treatment of minorities. This was in theory a perfect plan, and yet, in reality, it did not work. Soon after the minorities treaties were signed the individual states began again to follow their own minority policy, often in flagrant violation of the assurances they had given. Still later, characteristically enough, neighboring states concluded bilateral minorities treaties for purposes of expediency only. The

** Cf. Jacob Robinson (and others), Were the Minorities Treaties a Failure?: Institute of Jewish Affairs of the American Jewish Congress and the World Jewish Congress. New York, 1945.
national majority of one country tried to secure through them protection of their own co-nationals who constituted the minority in the other country. The plan of the new minority policy failed, not because the concept of the new world order was wrong but because the organization which was designed to supervise the new order was too weak. In short, it failed because of the impotence of the League of Nations. That was the situation when the Second World War broke out.

Despite the tragic failure of the minorities treaties of Versailles their mere institution is to be considered an unquestionable success. Even if they have existed on paper only, their idea was brought into being, and they still exist. And they can be made again, and with more success, an instrument of international jurisdiction when the time arrives in which the written word will again be a solemn pledge. They may then constitute a historically firm basis on which to build new agreements on behalf of national minorities. Particularly in the case of the Jewish refugee the minorities treaties may prove a strong precedent in the Jewish cause against Germany.

TREATY OBLIGATIONS OF GERMANY AND THE QUESTION OF INDEMNITIES

To be sure, opinion is still divided as to what extent the minorities treaties are binding for Germany. However, the mere fact that the discussion has been opened points to the international importance of the arguments involved. As far as Hitler-Germany is concerned, different views have been expressed on the legal point. James G. McDonald, the former League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany, takes a more reserved position, and believes that Germany, apart from the upper Silesian convention of May, 1922 "does not appear to be expressly bound by a treaty obligation, providing for equal citizenship of racial, religious or linguistic minorities".

But though in disagreement on this particular point, Mr. McDonald has admitted that "the principle of respect for the rights of minorities has been during the last three centuries hardening into an obligation of the public law of Europe."

In the atmosphere of the appeasement policy of the late thirties no attempt was made to enforce this idea on Germany. Two Resolutions, by the League of Nations and by the Evian Conference which convened in 1938, were adopted, but both of them remained cautious in their terms and proposals. In the report of the Committee on International Assistance on Refugees, presented to the Council of the League on June 26, 1936, it was said: "The Committee considers it an international duty for the countries of origin of the refugees at least to alleviate to some extent the burdens imposed by the presence of refugees in the territory of other states". The preamble to the Resolution of the Evian Conference reads: "Considering that, if countries of refuge or settlement are cooperating in
finding an orderly solution of the problem before the Committee, they should have the collaboration of the country of origin, and are, therefore, persuaded that it will make its contribution by enabling involuntary immigrants to take with them their property and possessions and emigrate in an orderly manner." The Intergovernmental Committee later entered into negotiations with the German Government but these negotiations, naturally, were to no avail.

Summarizing, we may say: While under existing international law individual refugees have no legal claim on Germany to be compensated for the property and possessions of which the Nazi Government has deprived them, the countries where the refugees have established themselves or desire to establish themselves are, on the ground of the minority laws, morally entitled to make the claim on behalf of their refugee immigrants. Although the settlement of the Jewish refugees in Palestine is essentially different, particularly in its economic, social and emotional implications, from their settlement in other countries, Palestine will be equally interested in the economic situation of the refugees coming from Germany and the countries overrun by Hitler-Germany. It will be the task of the economists and financial experts entrusted with the organization of postwar reconstruction to determine the ways and means of settling these accounts. The greater part of the compensation will probably have to be made in the form of raw materials and in industrial and agricultural implements. Recently, several Jewish organizations in this country have approached our Government and the representative bodies of the United Nations as to the settlement of questions concerning the restitution of the rights of Jewish refugees after the war. But up to the present time, no final solution has been offered.

Yesterday's Crisis—
Tomorrow's Danger

STATE SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

The European pre-war situation, reduced to the chief legal aspects of the refugee problem, presents two prominent features: on the one hand, the uncontrolled power of the individual states which were walled up in the concept of their sovereignty and without insight into the needs of sound international cooperation; and on the other hand, the League of Nations, too weak an organization to put the idea of international cooperation into practice.

These factors which gave rise to the world crisis are also of fundamental importance to the Jewish question. They both worked together to create the refugee problem, or, more specifically, to make it grow to its present catastrophic proportions. Since the concepts of the sovereignty of the state and of a world-wide international organization of the nations are still adhered to in the plans for the future settlement of peace, it seems necessary to delve deeper into their meanings and their prospective development.

The so-called "weakness" of the League of Nations was its failure to limit effectively the function of the sovereign state. Thus, the deficiency of the former League and the pre-war problem of state sovereignty overlap to a certain extent.
ORGAN AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE IDEA OF SOVEREIGNTY

When the peacemakers at Versailles in 1919 established their principle of state sovereignty, they were the victims of a wrong historical interpretation of the concept. The concept itself is not wrong but without modification it is not applicable to the system of the modern state. What Wilson meant when he said, "Self-determination (co-terminus with sovereignty) . . . is an imperative principle of action"** was taken from the ideology of a period in which any kind of freedom of action was identical with freedom of reasonable (and in this sense, humane) action. Wilson, in his unfortunate attachment to the past, had adopted the principle of sovereignty from the ideology of the French Revolution to which he felt strongly attracted, as has now become evident from his papers. The French Revolution, in fact, created, or rather re-created, the concept of sovereignty (which primarily originated from the state philosophy of Hugo Grotius**). It served to define the right of the free individual irrespective of his social status. It made the bourgeois, the bearer of the new culture, the sovereign in the realm of his private life. Human reason entitled the individual to be vested with the privilege of freedom, that is, to be his own sovereign. This philosophy was the outgrowth of the rational optimism of bourgeois culture. In this meaning, the concept entered the American Constitution and Bill of Rights determining the relationship of the citizen to the Federal Union. During the nineteenth century, with the Napoleonic wars and with political Romanticism in Europe, which, to a great extent, sprang from German sources, the modern concepts of State and Nation—both terms being alter-

** See the definition of the "ius gentium" in his work "De Jure Belli ac Paedis".

nately used for geographical and historical units of people—came into being. At this stage an entirely new meaning pervaded the concept of sovereignty. The individual was no longer himself the sovereign but was such only in so far as he represented his state and nation. With the shifting of sovereignty from the individual to the group, the concept absorbed the attributes by which any group maintains itself, the attributes of power and the right through power. The individual exchanged for the loss of his freedom the guarantee of being protected by his state and nation, the protection more effective as the state or nation was stronger. He was persuaded to believe that any increase in power of his state and nation was to the utmost interest of his own security. Thus he accepted the sacrifices state and nation demanded of him. Only at the peak of a new world crisis did he come to realize that he had become an important element of the power-mechanism of the state over which he had lost all control. This power-mechanism did not tolerate any intervention which was supposed to limit its range, save for an intervention by force.

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AS A LEAGUE OF SOVEREIGN STATES

The international legal code within the system of the League of Nations for the benefit of national minorities as a corollary and corrective to the principle of national self-determination did not work because the new factor of state power had not been taken into account. And that was the ultimate reason why the League in periods of international crisis always failed. The reason in the literal sense of the word was physical "weakness".

This "weakness" proved fatal long before 1933 when the League or rather its affiliated committees were called upon to
stop the refugee movement in Asia Minor and Europe. After 1933, the League actually shrank from its declared responsibilities and left its agencies dealing with refugees in a most undignified position. At that time, the Jews, threatened with total extermination in Germany, had advanced to the category of a full-dledged minority, only to find that there was no international protection whatsoever of minorities in the world. Even outside of the Nazi countries there was practically no help or protection for the German Jews who were anxious to escape the threats of persecution and death by the Nazis. Each state considered the refugee question from the angle of its own expediency or even against its own expediency limitations of authority expressed themselves in determined restrictions on the functions of the League. The League never suggested nor even considered organizing effective measures to be imposed on countries which denied the most elementary rights to minority members. One cannot say that this attitude of the League sprang from the atmosphere of international anxiety which the totalitarian states had created during the thirties. The League acted like that long before that time, obviously guided by its respect for the sovereignty of the state which every member of the League wanted preserved, in the interests of its own power. Thus, in 1922, the Assembly of the League adopted a resolution which expressed hope and hope only that “States not bound by specific legal obligations in the matter of minorities will nevertheless observe in the treatment of their own minorities, at least, as high a standard of justice and toleration as is required by the treaties in question” (which, by the way, proved ineffective also). When in 1933 the persecution of Jews in Germany started, the League did no more than to reaffirm that resolution. There the matter ended.

As far as the limitations on administration and operation were concerned they manifested themselves in the narrowly defined responsibilities of the League on behalf of the refugees. The League accepted the responsibility for political and legal protection of certain classes of refugees only; at no time was official encouragement given to suggestions for the extension of this protection to all classes of refugees.* The League also insisted on limiting its refugee responsibility in terms of time. Almost invariably the decisions of the Council and the Assembly expressly incorporated the idea that the particular responsibility assumed was for a definite period, at the end of which time the League would be free of further obligation. Still another self-imposed limitation of the League was its explicit

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denial of responsibility for either relief or settlement of the refugees. With rare exceptions, and these usually in cases involving very small amounts of money, League funds were used solely for administrative expenses. Almost never in principle and rarely in practice did the League go beyond its rules not to engage in direct operations. In sharp contrast to its acceptance of responsibility for political and juridical protection of certain categories of refugees, the League insisted that its task in the humanitarian field was limited to administrative efforts to stimulate and coordinate governmental and private activities in feeding, clothing, transporting the refugees and finding new homes for them. Though the League firmly refused to vote money for the relief and settlement of refugees (the exceptions have been so rare as to prove the rule), it consistently recognized the necessity of international efforts to achieve these ends. Often the League representatives in the field were embarrassed and hampered by the insistence of Geneva on the principle that all funds for other than administrative purposes must be raised outside the League. Repeated efforts in the Council and the Assembly to change the League policy failed.* There were minor exceptions when the League authorized small sums for relief or settlement but these were usually coupled with a reaffirmation of the rule against such League assistance. As a result, League of Nations High Commissioners were often more occupied in stimulating private charity and appealing for aid from governments than they were in carrying out their assigned tasks of international administration.

It is not necessary to go into the further details of the

* An often cited example of one of several of Dr. Nansen's vain appeals for League funds to aid in relief or settlement is contained in "Report to the Council," C. 1-41 M. 74, 1922, p. 1.

League of Nations' activity on behalf of the refugees. The various refugee agencies used or sponsored by the League, such as the Nansen Organization, the International Labour Office, High Commissioners other than Dr. Nansen, and ad hoc committees or commissioners not only lacked the authority and the means to render real help to the refugees, but moreover proved by their inefficiency that the League itself had no authority and power to check the forces of aggression.

THE CRISIS OF THE UNITED NATIONS

The refugee problem against the background of the League's inefficiency thus revealed itself as the symptom of a most threatening political situation. The problem was no longer a question of whether the conscience of the world would remain indifferent to the plight of helpless victims of brutal force, but whether brutal force would rule the world unopposed. The seemingly irreconcilable conflict of unlimited state sovereignty versus self-limited international control was the cause of the Jewish tragedy as well as of a general political crisis which, in the end, made another world war inevitable.

In view of these facts, which the responsible governments are gradually beginning to realize, efforts are now being made to eliminate the disturbing factors of the past in planning for the future peace. That means, in simple words, that attempts have been initiated to make the nations of the world agree to a voluntary restriction of their sovereign power for the benefit of international collaboration. The goal the world is now striving toward is not the substantial modification of the structure of the sovereign state, but its voluntary subordination under the reorganized power of a society of nations. Any consideration of future problems in the political, economic or social field, in all probability, will have to start from this point.
To approach this new type of world order has been the declared aim of various international conferences which have taken place during the last two or three years, such as the International Food Conference, the Conferences of the UNRRA, the International Monetary Conference, the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the International Aviation Conference, and so forth. The optimists in the world believe that the aim of these conferences could be achieved in the near future. The realists point to the strange fact that at all these conferences agreement was reached up to 90%, but 10% of the subjects in question remained unsettled. One is tempted to ask: Was there always an international agreement with a remaining 10% of dissension? Could it mean that the world still has not reached the stage of establishing a world order from a common central point? Are the United Nations, perhaps, a coalition united only in the aims of war, but less united in the aims of peace, in the organization of a new economic and social order? Is the discrepancy perhaps still too great between the existing systems of political life? No prediction can be made, but this much is clear: the discrepancy is extremely great and only if this difficulty can be solved can a durable world order be established.

THE FUTURE OF THE JEWS IN A WORLD OF SOVEREIGN STATES

Under these circumstances, the Jewish question appears in a new light. Let us suppose the Jews start again from where they left off. There are many who argue that in case the new world order is completely secured, nothing would prevent the Jews who have survived from returning to the places of their former residence. This point of view further says: Discriminatory laws will be revoked; the Jews will be given equal status with the rest of the citizens; they will be compensated for the loss of their jobs and possessions and the past will be reduced to the memory of a bad dream. It may be that the anti-Semitic indoctrination of the population may cause friction in the beginning. There may also be some resentment on the part of the non-Jewish public against the return of the Jews, and their installation in their former positions. After some time, however, things probably will quiet down, if the conditions of economic and social life are definitely consolidated. In twenty or thirty years there may be no difference in the situation of Jews in countries whence they were "temporarily" expelled, and where they had been allowed to continue their life during the critical years.

Suppose this Utopia did materialize; would it be a desirable solution of the Jewish question?

Such a "solution" would perpetuate a most dangerous crisis for the Jews. In fact, nothing would have changed for the Jews, save the pattern of their unfortunate dispersion. In the framework of the new world order they would prove to be a factor which had not been absorbed into the new system of society. The reasons why any attempt of this kind would be doomed, can be summarized as follows:

1) The new world organization is envisaged as a society of strong national units and national minority groups on the basis of restricted state sovereignty. The Jews would be no national unit nor could they claim national minority status;

2) Tolerance of cultural minority groups will still depend on the internal interpretation of state sovereignty. That has been determined beyond any doubt in repeated declarations of United Nations' statesmen emphasizing the need to preserve state sovereignty within the framework of international cooperation. The Jews, as a cultural or religious minority, would be
exposed to any kind of discrimination as long as it would not offend the international code which, in itself, would be a limited protective measure. Since the Jews, in the past, have sufficiently experienced cultural discrimination in democratic countries, they can easily foresee their future if this policy were adapted universally to the postwar world.

3) Under these conditions—and this would be most disastrous—the Jews would remain what they have been since the Middle Ages: a bargaining object of the nations. We must not deceive ourselves: the principle of sovereignty is the principle of power. International coordination of power is just another form of power balance. A shift in the balance of power can easily affect the principles on which the structure of the international order is based. As long as there are power states, there is no guarantee that they will intervene in minority questions with any power which might be strong enough to be better left unopposed in its treatment of minorities. When the enthusiasm of the first postwar period will have ebbed, anti-Semitism may rise again in certain states and the Jews settled there may be thrown back into another tragic crisis. Who will then protect the Jews if protection will mean action against the interests of the international power organization? The society of nations? No. Any single state or nation? No. The Jews themselves? No, because they will not have the national status, the legal authority, the political power to protect themselves. The world will be liberated, but the Jews will have forfeited their claim on living in the free world.

Up to this point we have pictured the problem in a general way. In one of the following chapters we will discuss the more tangible facts which will make impossible the restoration of the status quo ante for the Jews. But if the most optimistic picture of the postwar world demonstrates the fallacy of any attempt to restore the Jewish status quo ante, the reality of the world we are approaching will prove beyond doubt that there is no way back. History does not allow for any anachronism. Individuals, as well as groups, have to live the life of their age. If they don't, they perish. This is not a war from which the soldiers of all victorious nations will return in a parade to resume their business from where they left off when the war broke out. In all likelihood, this war will turn out to be just one phase of a global revolution, the convulsions of which will subside only after many decades, when the flow of political, social and economic changes will have at last found its definite shape. The development is going in the direction of collective concentration, that is, in terms of political thinking, national concentration. If the Jews miss the chance of becoming a part of this process of national concentration, their survival is at stake. If they don't follow the stream of history, they will not survive either as individuals or as a people.

The universal reorganization of the world on the basis of concerted political action by sovereign states calls for the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth under sound social and economic conditions. It is not a matter of good will among the non-Jews, nor a matter of choice in the manner in which the Jews conceive of their survival, but it is the inescapable demand of a changing world, that an autonomous Jewish state should be established. Palestine, on the basis of experience and scientific research, has been recognized as the geographic space in which the new Jewish state can grow. As far as the Jewish refugees are concerned, they may constitute the first mass wave of settlers and colonists in the Holy Land. The reconstruction of the Jewish state will be the end of the Jewish problem and the beginning of a new role the Jews are destined to play as an equal member in the society of nations to come.
POWER OF FREEDOM OR POWER OF INTEREST?

While the Jewish Commonwealth in the future will stand out as one of the symbols of a reorganized society of nations and prove that freedom at last has come into power, it would be a grave mistake to assume that the internal reorganization of the individual states would suffice to eliminate international conflicts and to make peace and freedom permanent in the world. Of course, a revision of the concept of sovereignty is of fundamental importance. Only if sovereignty grows to signify self-determination plus self-limitation, law in the world will become what in effect it is, legally limited force. But this principle will not work under all circumstances. To the same extent to which the power of the state is to be limited from within, it is to be limited from without, for the benefit of international cooperation. The new sovereign states will have to establish clearly defined laws by which their interrelation will be well safeguarded. Law in our future world society must no longer serve to disguise schemes of power and to justify a zoning system based on spheres of influence or interests.

Unfortunately, we are still very far from this goal. At this moment, everything seems to point to a development in the direction of a continued world policy on the part of the strong nations to trade imperialistic interests for sound self-assertion on the part of the weaker nations. We hope, however, that the spectacle of bargaining power will gradually disappear with the progressing process of the world reorganization which is now in the making. What we said before with reference to the concept of sovereignty holds equally true with respect to the power principles of the states in their foreign affairs. Agreement cannot be reached merely by a number of conferences. Mutual understanding among the nations cannot be achieved without new moral concepts applicable to our modern standards of social and economic life. As long as we lack this new moral theory, we will labor under the difficulties which have confronted us for the past half century.

The problem of international power politics which can be indicated here in broad outlines only, is also of vital interest to the Jewish nation. For six crucial years, the instruments of an unyielding policy of power interests have substantially retarded and for some time greatly imperilled the growth and existence of the Jewish National Home. British power interests have prompted the issuance of the "White Paper" and kept it in force; despite and against strong protests in Great Britain and in the rest of the civilized world. In that document, Great Britain has not only denied her solemnly declared guarantees to the Jews concerning their national homeland at the time of the greatest crisis of Jewry, but acted against the basic principles of democratic thinking at the time of the greatest crisis of democracy.

The policy laid down in the White Paper of May, 1939, proposed first, by permitting Jewish immigration after a lapse of five years only if the Arabs of Palestine would acquiesce in it, to relegate the Jews to the position of a permanent minority; secondly, to prohibit Jewish settlement altogether in certain parts of Palestine and to restrict it in other parts; thirdly, to terminate the Mandate and to convert Palestine into an independent state in which the Jewish National Home would be placed under the domination of the Arab majority. As to the question of immigration, strictly speaking, arbitrary limits were prescribed over a period of five years, and thereafter continuation of immigration was made dependent upon Arab goodwill which is equivalent to decreeing its complete stoppage. The reasons which were advanced in justification of this fundamental...
departure from the theory and practice of the Palestine Mandate were the following: (1) The British Government rejected the contention "that the Mandate requires it, for all time and all circumstances, to facilitate the immigration of Jews into Palestine, subject only to considerations of the country's economic absorptive capacity." (2) The British Government further stated that it did not find "anything in the Mandate or in subsequent statements of policy, to support the view that establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine cannot be effected unless immigration is allowed to continue indefinitely."

In the context of this study, it can be seen clearly without further elaboration, in which way the British White Paper has affected the Jewish refugee problem. But there is another aspect of the position of the British Government toward the Jewish cause in Palestine which goes beyond the limits of the Jewish problem. The White Paper was issued a few months before the outbreak of the war in Europe, and thus, in accordance with the traditional pre-war policy of Great Britain. During the war, Great Britain herself has experienced to the full that this policy has endangered rather than protected her. That this was so, has been evidenced by the fact that Great Britain, together with the United States, created and signed the Atlantic Charter. If there was a moral incentive which led to the Atlantic Charter, it was at least overshadowed by the most realistic viewpoint, that democracies in this period of transition and in the time to come, will fare better by denouncing than by furthering power principles. Under the pressure of events, however, Great Britain seems to have deviated lately, to a certain extent, from the ideas expressed in the Atlantic Charter. What does this mean? There is only one interpretation: the latest moves of Great Britain in the international field were either a kind of strategy to improvise a solution of certain intricate questions which for the time being cannot be solved definitely, or Great Britain is on the way to return to her pre-war policy of vested power interests. We understand fully that compromises are often necessary in the political world; the continuation of the old policy of power balance, however, would be a disaster for the world.

It is this point of view which will determine the answer to our question: What is the White Paper—a temporary compromise or political philosophy? The answer will have to be given soon, since the world is moving rapidly. It goes without saying that the answer will be of paramount concern, not only to the Jews, but equally so to Great Britain and the democracy for which she stands.
Chapter 3

The Extent of the Jewish Refugee Problem

The Nature of the Jewish Refugee Problem

We have thus far discussed the Jewish refugee problem from the international angle. We have arrived at the conclusion that the reorganization of the world, which is taking shape, imperatively calls for the establishment of a sovereign Jewish State to liquidate the Jewish refugee problem within the broader confines of a liquidation of the Jewish problem.

We now turn to an analysis of the Jewish refugee problem as such. In the light of the foregoing discussion it may seem an exaggeration to relate the persecution of a comparatively small national group to the issues of world policy. There were other incidents of minority persecution in various countries of Asia and Europe during the last twenty or thirty years which, in their proportions, perhaps exceeded the persecution of Jews, or, at least, did not fall far behind it, particularly in their social and emotional aspects. One also could cite other forced migration movements now in process and likely to develop further under the impact of war which equal in extent and quality the displacement of Jews. And yet, the Jewish refugee problem is unique in its fundamental implications.

It is unique, first, by its geographical extension. The persecution of Jews has uprooted a minority group distributed over a great number of countries rather than a territorial minority. Hence, it is geographically an almost universal problem. Further, it is politically unique. While other minority groups, threatened in their existence and forced to migration, could attach themselves to a unified national stock from which they had descended and on which they could fall back, the Jewish refugees were without an autonomous national center which could automatically absorb them. The organization and status of the Jews in almost every part of the world lacked the national cohesion necessary to assimilate and preserve the uprooted elements of the national total. Moreover, anti-Semitism, at least in latency, was spread all over the world, including the democratic countries, and made the influx of new Jewish immigrants a very problematic enterprise. Wherever under such conditions Jewish refugees succeeded in entering a foreign country, they exposed themselves, in the majority of cases, to a most unsatisfactory situation. Finally—and this probably leads to the central point of the question—any solution of the refugee problem in the direction of resettling in a foreign country, is contradicted by the very nature of the European tragedy of the Jews. What happened to the Jews in Europe was the cruelly painful demonstration that national symbiosis is a pathological phenomenon. It entails, in the long run, national extinction of the smaller group, either by gradually undermining the strength and vitality of the minority, or by forcefully destroying it, or both. "We should have learned at least this lesson from European history: the merging of compact Jewish masses with nationally strange cultures creates a strain which, under whatever conditions, sooner or later is apt to reach a breaking point. Galut is in whatever form a death. And that definitely excludes the Jewish refugee movement from the category of other minor..."
ity persecutions which usually have presented themselves within the limits of the particular conflict from which they have originated.

THE OLD MISCONCEPTION OF TOLERANCE AND THE NEW CONCEPTS OF JEWISH LIFE

If we realize, however, what the inner core of the Jewish refugee problem is, we will not fail in finding the way to reconstruct the Jewish situation. The Jewish refugees who will have survived the European inferno can be saved and, simultaneously, far-fetched concepts which did not exist except in the thinker's vocabulary this concept handed down to them from the illusionism of the French Encyclopedists. That being done they will no longer be Jewish refugees. Without a Jewish homeland the Jewish refugee will be aided in advancing from his unsafe status of refugeedom into normal citizenship. The example of many thousands of refugees who have already settled there, proves that this process goes far beyond humanitarian help. In sharp distinction to other settlement plans, it is much more than a matter of giving assistance to needy individuals. The refugee-immigration into Palestine is designed to strengthen the national Jewish restoration. Vice versa, the national restoration which is taking place is about to create a new Jewish type.

What do we mean by a new Jewish type? We must be clear in our terms if we are to comprehend fully the process of restoration. Does this phrase repudiate the myth of the "urban" type of Jew predominant in the world and particularly so in Europe, which is expected to disappear in rural Palestine? Does the Palestinian approach to the refugee problem involve the elimination of the old concept of the "urbanized" Jew, considered identical with the intellectual type, usually torn by inner conflicts? Is this type now being molded into a different one with a closer relationship to the soil?

The urbanized type of Jew in the discarded sense of the word has never existed. At any time in history the Jew has been able to leave his urban occupation and to change to agricultural employment. Whenever he made this change he proved very well fit for agricultural work. If urbanization did harm to the Jew

*The Jewish refugees have given evidence of their agricultural ability not only in their colonization of Palestine and not only among the younger genera-
tions who are said to have entered into occupations neglected by their fore-
 fathers but also in their agricultural activities in the United States from the earliest periods of Jewish immigration. The Jewish Agricultural and Industrial Aid Society in New York and the Jewish Agricultural Aid Society in Chicago sent 2,009 Jewish immigrants in farm work during the period between 1900-1910. Of this number, 854 were settled in New York, 503 in New Jersey, 461 in Connecticut, 204 in North Dakota, 125 in Massachusetts, etc. These figures are particularly interesting because they refer to the integration of Jewish immi-
igrants into the agricultural process in a period which, for the most part, preceded the time of large scale Jewish immigration into this country.
—which is still to be proved—it did not do more harm to him than to other people. The problem which we have in mind here lies in a different area. The change of the Jewish type concerns his integration into a new form of community organization rather than the social stratification of his life. The new Jewish settler in Palestine participates in and grows with a community, which, in exciting contrast to his previous experience, maintains itself not in resistance to a heterogeneous environment, but by an organic expansion unimpeded from without. Prior to his start in Palestine, the Jew, and most drastically the Jewish refugee, had to accept his community as an enclave within a strange world, as a separation from the rest of the world. That had made the Jew a self-defense type. In Palestine, however, the idea of being a Jew has assumed a different meaning; it no longer means to live in permanent opposition to, but in complete solidarity with, the environment, and that is the source from which the new settler in Palestine derives his inner stability and harmony, which are the fundamental features of the reborn Jewish type of the future.

THE HISTORY OF THE JEWISH REFUGEE MOVEMENT

While the analysis of the inner proportions of the refugee problem has carried us to the bright prospects of a future which we are to build up, the study of the history of the refugee movement which follows, gives us a picture of the extent of destruction the Jewish people have suffered during the last decade.

Speaking of Jewish refugees, we must make a distinction between those who succeeded in escaping Nazi persecution and settled permanently or temporarily in foreign countries, and those who remained behind and fell under the power of Nazi Germany, in Germany itself, or in Nazi-occupied countries. The Jews in the second category or those of them who have survived, are, in a definite sense, refugees too, because all of them (probably without any exception) have been evacuated or deported from their places of former residence. How many of them survived or will be able to survive is another question. They are, in the following, referred to as "deportees." As far as the first category is concerned we have to subdivide it into those who found temporary refuge only and those who, through their own efforts or the efforts of private organizations or through governmental or intergovernmental agreements, found places of permanent settlement.

The movement of the refugees from Nazi-dominated Europe shows a distinct chronological course. In the prewar period, that is, between 1933 and 1939, the total Jewish emigration from Greater Germany amounted to about 550,000.* Of this total, somewhat more than 40% or roughly 150,000, had left Greater Germany by the end of 1937, but only 60% of this number, or about 90,000, succeeded in settling overseas between 1933 and 1937. From the beginning of 1938 the aggressive tendency of the German policy increased rapidly and reached its climax with the outbreak of the war. During this period also the rate of Jewish emigration from Germany increased, but in no proportion to the degree of aggressiveness of Nazi rule. By September, 1939, the percentage of Jewish refugees in overseas countries was nearly the same as two years before, that is, about 35%, or, in figures, approximately 200,000.** The actual increase of Jewish refugees in overseas

* According to Sir Herbert Emerson, International Assistance to Refugees, Supplementary Report Submitted to the 20th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the League of Nations, October 20, 1939: League of Nations Publications, A18 (s.), 1939, the number totaled 329,000. Eugene M. Kulischer, The Displacement of Population in Europe: International Labour Office, 1931, but estimated the number at 500,000-570,000.

** According to E. M. Kulischer.
countries thus amounted to somewhat more than 100,000. Accordingly, 160,000 Jewish refugees from Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, or more than 45% of the total of the Jewish refugees of the prewar period, remained in Europe prior to the outbreak of the war. For the years following the outbreak of the war, we have various annual estimates as to the overseas-migration of Jews based on documentary material covering the period close to 1943. The figures, however, are so contradictory that they are omitted here for reasons of clarity and certainty. The reports, nonetheless, agree in the gross estimate of the final number of refugees, and their distribution by the end of 1943. By that time the total number of Jewish refugees and deportees had grown from the prewar total of 350,000 to almost 3,600,000 while the number of refugees who had been able to find permanent or temporary refuge outside Nazi-dominated Europe, had increased from 200,000 before the war to only slightly more than 800,000. In other words, while the number of refugees and deportees increased at least tenfold, the number of those who were aided in escaping from Nazi-dominated countries increased four times.

The process of the refugee movement according to its chronological development can be illustrated by the following diagram:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THOUSANDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,500</td>
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<td>2,000</td>
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<td>1,000</td>
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<td>600</td>
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<tr>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1933-1937</th>
<th>1938-SEP1939</th>
<th>SEP/1939-1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
The white and shaded areas show the size of the respective groups of refugees and deportees during the three chief periods of the movement. The shaded areas show the size of the groups of European Jews saved through resettlement or temporary refuge. The difference between the total of refugees in the immediate prewar period and during the war is for the most part made up by the group of deportees which thus exceeds the number of "voluntary" refugees almost four times. No deportees were to be included in the first two columns.

The diagram eloquently demonstrates this one fact: At no time between 1933 and 1943 did the help rendered to the Jewish refugees keep pace with their mounting needs. On the contrary, with the progress of time the actual rescue work increasingly lost pace with the size and degree of the process of persecution. That was due to several factors. First, but only with regard to the initial period of the movement, the arresting force of German threats; second, at the time Germany was the only country whose action failed completely after 1938 though it was obvious that the Jews were threatened with total annihilation unless appropriate measures of assistance, on an international basis, were organized; fourth, Palestine remained closed to unrestricted planned immigration by Jews even in the period of their severest persecution irrespective of the fact that no other country in the world would or could make any substantial contribution to their rescue.

The Geographical Distribution of the Jewish Refugees

In order to arrive at a complete picture of the Jewish refugee problem, this chronological survey is to be supplemented by a review of the geographical distribution of the refugee movement. A number of European Jews, though very limited, succeeded in leaving Nazi countries. Where did they go, which countries received them and under what condition, and what were the directing factors of their distribution? The following table gives a summarizing answer to these questions. If lists the receiving countries according to the number and percentage of Jewish refugees who were permitted to immigrate in the period between 1933 and 1944. Because of the inadequacy of the official and semi-official reports as to the distinction between temporary and permanent settlement of refugees, both categories are included in the total figures of refugee-immigrants into the various countries.*

*A striking example of official "inaccuracy" is the testimony of former U. S. Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Breckenridge Long, before the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on November 26, 1943, who stated: "We have taken into the country since the beginning of the Hitler regime and the persecution of the Jews, until today, approximately 380,000 refugees." In his reply to a letter to Mr. James G. McDonald, who raised questions as to the accuracy of this figure, Mr. Breckenridge Long had to admit that the number of visas actually issued amounted only to 364,999, and that it was limited by the authority of the State Department to keep a record of those who had really entered the United States. No specification as to time, however, was given as to the number of visas and regular visas. It may further be assumed that the reduced number of visas as which Mr. Breckenridge Long arrived in his second statement, included persons who were not even to be counted as refugees, such as natives or nationals of Western and Southwestern European countries, or residents in countries of the Western Hemisphere, or persons who were admitted to the United States prior to the time when their countries of origin or of nationality were affected by the war in 1939 and 1940. (Through the courtesy of Mr. McDonald, taken from his letter to Mr. Breckenridge Long.)
The table is instructive in various respects. It shows that the leading countries, as far as the number of Jewish refugees is concerned, are the United States and Palestine. Palestine absorbed only 4.9% less refugees than the United States, therefore, relatively, a greater number by far than the United States. Consequently, Palestine has proved to be the chief country to which the refugees have turned, and where they have found opportunities for settlement. The table further demonstrates that Australia, Canada and South Africa, countries with vast areas for new settlement, rank far behind small and densely populated countries such as Holland, Belgium and Switzerland. All three overseas countries together admitted approximately as many refugees as Switzerland alone. Among the Latin American countries Argentina presents the highest ratio of refugees but still less than, for instance, France. Among the European countries, Spain sheltered the smallest number of refugees, in effect, the smallest number of any of the single countries listed in the table. However, the example of Spain alone points to the margin of error underlying this tabulation. The refugee movement in certain countries did not result in stable aggregations of the refugee population but fluctuated within more or less broad limits. Thus, Spain periodically had a refugee population four times as large as the figure quoted, but the majority of them had left by 1944, many hundreds of them for Palestine. Strictly speaking, the table does not cover the total refugee process but only the final phase of the process by 1944.

Coming back to the ratio of refugees who entered the United States and Palestine, official reports of the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States Department of Justice, and statistics concerning the legal and illegal immigration into Palestine published by the General Federation of Jewish

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TABLE II

COUNTRIES OF REFUGE AND SETTLEMENT 1933-1944*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of Refugees-Immigrants (in thousands)</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Countries</td>
<td>884</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>22.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine**</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>17.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other European Countries</td>
<td>70 (?)</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Latin American Countries</td>
<td>20 (?)</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* This table has been rearranged and revised against a similar one in the book by Avish Tarshish and Kurt R. Gnosmann, The Jewish Refugee, New York, 1944.

** The figure in our table indicating the number of refugees who have come to Palestine pertains only to those persons who between 1933 and 1944 left Germany and the European countries under the impact of Nazi expansion or in anticipation of the events which developed fully after 1938. Our figure, therefore, is limited to those Jewish persons who fled from Nazi-dominated Europe, primarily for reasons of their physical safety. The total number of Jewish immigrants into Palestine, however, is much higher for the given period, and amounts to some 320,000 individuals (including illegal immigrants).

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* See Herald Tribune, January 19, 1944; N. Y. Times, January 24, 1944.
Labor in Palestine, reveal that during the period between 1938 and 1941, when for the first time the needs of European Jews reached an unprecedented peak,* an almost equal number of refugees had settled in each of these countries. While between July, 1938, and June, 1941, a total of 53,769 refugees were admitted to the United States, 50,755 legal and illegal immigrants (the majority of them presumably refugees) arrived in Palestine.** This definitely proves, if further proof were needed, the outstanding role Palestine is designed to assume in the liquidation of the refugee problem. Palestine stood its test in the time of crisis. Its capacity will be still greater under the conditions of a planned and organized immigration at a future time.

** The Economic and Social Aspects of Jewish Refugee-Immigration

A question which is not answered, though impressively suggested by our statistical tabulation, concerns the factors inherent in the unequal distribution of the refugee population in Palestine and the rest of the world. One might wonder whether anti-Judaism alone accounts for the failing aid to the refugees outside Palestine. Perhaps certain economic reasons contributed to the negative attitude toward the refugees. At least one of the main arguments often advanced in support of legislative measures to restrict immigration, is the theory that immigrants take jobs away from those who are already employed or they remain unemployed themselves and thus aggravate the problem of unemployment. The theory has become most popular since 1933 in the majority of countries where Jewish refugees from Germany tried to settle. It is found a great many advocates, particularly in the United States.

Like many other economic theories about immigration, this theory is not based on fact.* The history of employment in the United States shows that in periods of heavy immigration there has been a great increase in the number of available jobs; that in periods of light immigration there has been no increase in the number of jobs, and that a significant decrease in the number of jobs has occurred only when emigration exceeded immigration.

This is easily proved by statistical facts and figures. The Census of Manufacturers, 1935, pages 18-19, shows that in the period from 1899 to 1909 when approximately 7.5 million immigrants entered the United States, the number of wage-paying jobs increased by 40.5%. From 1909 to 1919 about 6.5 million immigrants entered the United States and at the end of that period the numbers of jobs had increased another 40%. When between 1919 and 1929 the total net immigration to the United States sank to about 3,000,000, the employment totals dropped by about 1.5%. In the period 1929-1935 the immigration totals sank below the emigration total by about 65,000 and the decrease in the total number of jobs reached a new high of 17%.

It may be argued that immigration does not create jobs but rather that employment opportunities attract immigration. This is a partial truth, since most social and economic connections run both ways. For example, education brings a higher living standard promotes education, etc. But the fact remains that any addition to the population, whether by birth

* See our diagram on page 43.
** Cf. Tarshis-Grossman, pp. 348-349.

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or immigration, is both a producer and a consumer. With some
good will, it could easily have been made clear to the people
in this country and elsewhere, as far as their fears of economic
competition by the newcomers were concerned, that a hundred
thousand persons added to the population, means a demand for
a hundred thousand suits of clothes, three hundred thousand
meals a day, twenty-five to thirty-thousand houses, etc. In other
words, unemployment does not depend on the size of the popu-
lation, but on the economic system, that is, on the use which a
country makes of its available resources. Similarly fallacious in
terms of sound economic thinking are objections to Jewish im-
migrants on the ground of their lowering the wage scales and
living standards of a country, their opposition to labor union-
ization, their tendencies toward urban occupations and their
lack of ability for agriculture.

However, there is one side of the economic problem which
ought to be taken into serious consideration. It is the approach
to this problem not solely from the standpoint of the countries
receiving immigrants or designed to receive immigrants, but
from the standpoint of the immigrants themselves. When, af-
after 1935, and particularly after November, 1938, panic gripped
the Jewish population of Germany, and hundreds of thousands
of Jews tried to escape the Nazi terror, their only wish was to
flee to any place in the world free from Nazi domination. The
question arises, however, whether it is desirable, in an economic
sense, that Jewish refugees seek to establish themselves in what-
ever country they have an opportunity of being admitted into,
either through their own efforts or those of private organiza-
tions. The answer is in the negative, especially in the light of
permanent settlement of refugees. The more prosperous coun-
tries, with highly developed economic systems which actually
could provide economic security for certain numbers of immi-
grants and simultaneously benefit from immigration themselves,
very often do not qualify for large-scale settlement. It is not the
economic volume of a country but its absorptive capacity which
makes for the essential qualities of an immigration area. It is
evident that the absorptive capacity of a country is the higher,
the less exploited the natural resources and the less developed
the industrial, commercial and agricultural potentialities are.
The economic volume of a country and its absorptive capacity
are in inverse ratio. There are other factors, of course, implied
in the concept: the size of the country, the number of its popu-
lation, its cultivable area, the quantity and quality of its raw ma-
terials, etc. However, the decisive factor, usually disregarded by
economists because of its irrationality, is the dynamic nature of
the concept. It has been proved by experience that the economic
absorptive capacity of a country depends on the static material
elements as much as it depends on the power of human resource-
fulness, devotion and experience, of capital and of the intangible
propulsive forces of the pioneering settlers.

The expanding principle of economic absorptive capacity
has been operative in developing the economic structure of
Palestine since immigration of the Jews started after the First
World War.*

The first official Census of Palestine Industries, taken in
1928, states that industry in its largest sense was practically non-
existent in Palestine before the First World War, and that ma-
chnery was practically unknown. Since 1928, and especially
since 1933, there has been a marked advance, not only in the
output of Palestinian industry, but in its diversification and its

* The following quotations from Abraham Groszisky, Absorptive Capacity
and Development: "Palestine and the Middle East", Economic Magazine, Jan-
euary 1937, p. 15 ff.
technical equipment. Between 1921 and 1937, the personnel in Jewish industry increased six times, the output seventeen times, the capital eighteen times and the machinery and equipment even to a greater degree. The development of agriculture and horticulture paralleled that of industry. According to estimates of the government, the total agricultural population of Palestine in 1935 amounted to 652,600. Of this rural population approximately 56,000 were directly subsisting on agriculture.

Jewish productivity on the land has greatly increased and cooperative methods in Jewish agriculture have developed.

These data taken from reports prior to the period of extended Jewish immigration already prove that more favorable economic conditions existed in Palestine for settling additional large numbers of refugees than in any other country. The pre-war period and the first years of the present war greatly corroborated this fact. The following figures give an over-all picture of the progress of Palestine Jewish economy due to the immigration of European refugees.

Agricultural production

| Increase in value of agricultural production | £P 2,500,000 |
| Number of refugees settled | about 9,000 |
| in new middle class settlements | 1,400 |
| in already existing colonies | 700 |
| in the Moshav Ovdim | 1,000 |
| in the Kvutzot | 3,000 |
| in other types of agricultural settlement | 2,000 |

Industrial production

| Increase in value of industrial output | £P 3,800,000 |
| Capital invested in industry | £P 6,500,000 |
| Number of refugees employed in industry | 18,000 |

Agricultural production absorbed about 12,000 refugees.
Industry absorbed 22,000 refugees.
Building trades absorbed 11,000 refugees.

Summarizing, we may say: The national economy of Palestine stands in striking contrast to the saturated economic systems of the Western World. The Palestinian economy cannot only tolerate but needs an additional number of people. The Western systems allow for intensification of the market rather than for market expansion (under peacetime conditions). This
very nature of the Western economic systems is also responsible for the damaging conflicts within their labor markets including unionized labor. In the area of these conflicts lie the ill-famed methods of keeping the market open for privileged groups by force of employment discrimination.

On the basis of the foregoing paragraphs it is obvious that from an economic point of view the anti-refugee attitude in most countries cannot be described as solely anti-Judaism in the ordinary meaning of the concept, though nobody will underestimate its force. Most of the countries do not qualify for a large-scale absorption of new immigrants as Palestine does.

The sociological approach to the anti-refugee attitude in countries other than Palestine reveals psychological factors which have to be considered in addition to the anti-Semitic opposition to Jewish immigration.

The refugee in the eyes of most of his detractors bears two stigmas: he is Jewish and alien. Anti-Semitism and anti-alienism are different social attitudes which sometimes work together in converging on the same point. The one is directed against Jews only, the other against Jews and non-Jewish minority groups. Anti-alienism, moreover, has the faculty of neutralizing the unpleasant corollary of partisanship and radicalism which is attached to any kind of anti-Semitism, and of uniting under liberal concepts groups of the most different political and philosophical shades. Anti-alienism thus calls for the display of group solidarity, particularly between the minority groups and the national majority of the country. Minority groups are very often eager to display such feelings of solidarity, especially if they had been given reason in the past to doubt the degree of that solidarity, and if they are in real need of protection and security within the total of the national and political setting in their countries. In that way, anti-alienism in this and other countries has often made Jews themselves the opponents of Jewish immigration. It has, in fact, turned Jews with or without their knowledge into anti-Semites and achieved what anti-Semitism in its camouflage wished to achieve: to make the campaign against the Jews, by use of any means, universal.

Under these circumstances, additional social conflicts will threaten the Jewish refugees in any attempt to establish themselves in foreign countries and invariably increase the psychological difficulties of their settlement. However, the refugees will find an entirely different situation when they turn to Palestine. We refer to a report by Dr. Weizmann in "The Minutes of Evidence, Palestine Royal Commission," London, 1937, p. 37: "In the case of the immigrant who comes here his one aim in life is not only to make himself useful but to create opportunities for other people to come. I would submit to the Commission respectfully that if they ask any settler whether in a colony or whether in a factory, if he was happy or if he was satisfied, in ninety cases out of a hundred they would get a satisfactory answer, but the one thing they will ask is: Will other people come after me? and, not only have the immigrants not been a burden to the community, but they have created opportunities for the absorption of ever more people on a larger scale."

**Refugees, Deportees, Survivors**

Our Table II does not differentiate between refugees who have settled permanently in the receiving countries and those who have found only temporary refuge. As far as the second group is concerned, it comprises, strictly speaking, the Jewish refugees who now live in England and who in the majority of cases have not been promised British citizenship, numbers of refugees in the countries of the United Nations, such as France,
Belgium, Holland, etc., the refugees in liberated Italy, those in neutral countries such as Switzerland, Spain, Sweden (not listed in our table), etc., and finally the small group of refugees in the free refugee port in the United States. Although we hope that no pressure will be exerted on all these Jews after the war to leave the countries of their temporary residence, their number has to be added to those for whom final settlement is to be planned.

Incomparably greater than the number of these refugees is the number of deportees who in their overwhelming majority will be homeless, destitute, perhaps physically sick and mentally affected when the war ends. There is practically no single Jew in Europe who has remained in the place of his former settled residence. By far the greatest percentage of the deportees consists of Polish Jews, Jews brought to Poland from Central and Western Europe, Jews from the Baltic States and the Balkan countries, and, finally, the Jews of Soviet Russia removed to the interior of the country. Deportees from Western Europe constitute the relatively smallest group among the deportees. The total number of deportees, excluding the Russian Jewish citizens, has been estimated at 2,700,000. Of these only 1,100,000 (or about 40%) had survived by the end of 1944. The remaining 1,600,000 who died at the hands of the Nazis during their deportation, or at the places of their destination, must be added to the number of about 4,500,000 Jews killed by the Nazis in the various countries of Europe during the war.

The following table gives a survey, according to countries, of the European Jews who, it is estimated, have survived in Nazi-occupied Europe:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Survivors December 1944</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>15,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>215,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>215,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holland</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>440,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yugoslavia</td>
<td>47,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>245,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>52,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Number of Survivors**: 1,094,200

In other words, of the 8,200,000 Jews in Europe in 1933, less than two million have survived. If there is included the number of Jews who succeeded in escaping from Europe to overseas countries. That means a total loss of 75% of the Jewish population of Europe during the period between 1933 and 1944.

We were in doubt originally as to whether this table should be presented in this connection. It is inaccurate in every respect. It is not only inaccurate in its figures which are based on conservative estimates and compared from various sources often conflicting with each other; it is also inaccurate in its statistical language.
Physical survival, even if little harm has been done to the physical and mental health of the individual, will not, in all cases, mean real survival. Reports have leaked out from the liberated countries of Europe that many Jews who at the moment of threatening death and persecution had changed their religion, now wish to remain submerged in the non-Jewish world. They do not want to return to the Jewish community which they feel had brought them to the brink of disaster. Technically, it is not difficult for them to eradicate their origin since all records have been destroyed and no evidence of the past can be established. We do not criticize these persons or pass any judgment on their attempt to escape their own selves. What they have done and wish to do is human, hence it is understandable, though it is tragic.

Much greater is our concern about the rest of the survivors who might have endured the trial period without considerable physical or mental impairment or psychological death through baptism and yet may be lost to the Jewish community. They may be counted among the survivors, on the very day when the war ends, but will they have survived as Jews six months or a year or two years later? Profound changes in the social and political structure of Europe already are looming on the horizon of the old continent. These changes will take place, probably to varying degrees in the various countries, but where they will whether the democracies like it or not. And they will reach out to absorb ideologically as well as under the pressure of the new social and political systems, great numbers of Jews, particularly the younger age groups among them. This development might, and probably will, lead to a further reduction of the number of surviving Jews in Europe. And we will have no power or control to halt the process as soon as it has fully started. But what weighs much heavier is that we will have no right to complain about the outcome of the development unless we have done everything to offer a new national future to the generation which is entitled to and eager to build a new future for itself. Who would dare to tell these people after all their experience to go and knock at the doors of foreign countries which might, at best, open a narrow crack for a few to slip through? Would that be the Jewish future we could make attractive to them? Everybody who has eyes to see will realize—however many of few may have physically survived in Europe—their survival will mean little to the total Jewish community if there is not a Jewish State which will be the ground upon which they can build a secure existence.

From this point of view the question of the National Home in Palestine gains another new aspect. The ultimate survival of the remainder of European Jewry is at stake unless Palestine is opened to the Jews. Some day the problem may be that there will be not too many but too few European Jews to be settled in Palestine. And, moreover: if the immigration laws concerning Palestine are not fundamentally changed in time, it may happen that not the immigration into Palestine, but under the new political and social systems, emigration from Europe will become the paramount problem.

Therefore, there is only one point Table IV demonstrates and demonstrates clearly. The table is not a balance sheet of the graves for those who have died far from Judaism, but a warning to Jews, through facts and figures, to act and to act efficiently and soon. Only then may we feel sure that what the Table is telling us will never happen again.
Chapter 4

Governmental and Intergovernmental Aid

REScue and RECONSTRUCTION

A discussion of the refugee problem in the light of the future Jewish commonwealth in Palestine is apt to create the erroneous impression that the emphasis has been shifted from what constitutes the core of the problem, namely, relief and rehabilitation of refugees, to factors obviously remote from the subject, of re-integrating Jewish nationals into their ancestral land. It might, therefore, be advisable to make the following statements before our analysis is continued:

1. Relief and rehabilitation of the Jewish refugees who have survived in Europe is one of the important tasks we have to face. It is of importance in the sense of time as well as in its degree. The rescue work does not in any way rank behind our concern over the upbuilding of Jewish Palestine.

2. The interrelationship of the refugee problem and the problem of national rebirth lies primarily with the fact that Palestine needs additional immigration and that there are in Europe, at present, comparatively large numbers of human forces ready to be incorporated into the process of normal life. However, therein also lies the difference between the problems. The Jewish refugee can fill the lines of the Palestinian pioneers and settlers only after he has overcome the transition period and has been sufficiently provided with food, clothing, medical aid, etc., to start his new life.

3. On the basis of these facts a sharp line has to be drawn between rescue and reconstruction work. While Jewish reconstruction can only be and has to remain a Jewish concern, the relief and rescue work is primarily a non-Jewish responsibility. That does not exclude the participation of private Jewish organizations in the administration and operation of the international relief system. It certainly will also be necessary for Jewish funds to be contributed to the international relief work for Jewish refugees. But, in view of the financial and physical proportions of the refugee needs in Europe the Jewish contributions can constitute only a part of the total relief work to be done for the Jews.

4. However, it is equally evident from these facts that help has to be extended from the outside sources of international relief to the Jewish refugee as long as he is not able to help himself irrespective of the place where he lives during the transition period from persecution to his new start. There is today, a large number of refugees in Palestine, and their need of immediate help is tremendous. According to the legal resolutions of the international relief organizations, the problem definitely falls under the category of the United Nations relief work. Thus far, nothing has been done in this direction and the Yishuv had to spend a considerable portion of its own limited funds on the care of refugees, despite the unspoken language of the resolutions of the international relief organizations.

All these points lead to the main question of this chapter as to what governmental and intergovernmental aid have done and are supposed to do for the Jewish refugee.
**Political Humanitarianism—a Symptom of Moral Indifference**

A brief historical survey of the governmental and the intergovernmental boards which in the course of the last six or seven years were set up to render help to the refugees, reveals an astonishing fact, well worthwhile examining a little closer.

In the form of conferences or of international bodies with a clearly defined organizational structure, there convened in chronological order (according to the time of their first meetings) the following organizations:

- The Evian Conference, July, 1938
- Intergovernmental Committee, August, 1938
- The Bermuda Conference, April, 1943
- UNRRA, November, 1943
- The War Refugee Board, January, 1944

They all were assigned in one way or another to bring about a satisfactory conclusion to the problem which the League of Nations and its affiliated committees had not been able to deal with. But what was so surprising in the setup of these organizations was the fact that all of them in their work essentially followed the pattern of the League of Nations, although this pattern as obviously proved unsuccessful.

They all were, in principle, based on the idea of cooperation of power states in matters of little or no importance to the power interests of the individual state organism. That means, they conceived of their agenda as a humanitarian task. And they were, in their procedural plans, further bound to a scheme of pseudo-realism in approaching the refugee problem.

As far as the first point is concerned, the plans of the organizations to consider the refugee problem as a humanitarian task were a hopeless undertaking and could not be taken seriously by anybody. Yet all the groups convened, according to the wording of their initiating resolutions, to serve humanitarian purposes. Humanitarianism in political affairs is an unmistakable symptom of indifference. For, humanitarianism upsets and contradicts the principles of power. Exactly the same approach had contributed to the failure of the League of Nations. The League, too, in matters concerning refugees had disregarded the fact that a political organization was not equipped for holy missions.

However, it was no less fallacious to reduce the problem to questions of economic, social or political planning. The refugee problem, from the international angle, never was merely an economic problem. As was mentioned above, no country would have suffered economically from absorbing a proportionate number of refugees. On the contrary, many countries could have profited from additional immigration and from an increase in their material and human resources through the influx of new settlers. Thus, to discuss the problem in terms of national economies was pointless. It was equally meaningless to examine the social and political conditions of the countries as to whether they would allow for receiving new settlers. It was quite clear from the very beginning, and from what everybody knew by historical experience, that large-scale immigration would be resisted by the native population of any country under any conditions. There never was in history a peaceful penetration of a country by foreign elements. The mere arrival of foreign people in relatively large numbers has always created fear, resistance and hostility. The resettlement plans, finally, which were designated to settle through international efforts compact numbers of refugees in vacant areas of certain overseas countries, were doomed to failure unless the psychological
factor was taken into account: that pioneering assumed the presence of strong inner ties of the settlers to the land they were going to cultivate. When the first settlers came to America, they planted the many desires of their hearts into the strange soil by the labor of their hands: desires for riches, adventures, freedom, individual and communal security, etc. Without these desires, the land would have been meaningless to them. In fact, it lost its meaning and value to many of them whose desires died down under the impact of their experience.

No effort was made by the international organizations to attack the Jewish refugee problem at its roots. The problem was not created through a lack of humanitarianism—though the inhumane policy of the Nazi regime had intensified it to tragic proportions. In a similar sense, humanitarianism could not solve the problem. Irrespective of the role humanitarian emotions were called upon to play in the story of the Jewish refugee, the Jews themselves could not accept the humanitarian interpretation of their national tragedy. European Jews had not been merely guests in their countries of former residence who had lost the privilege of hospitality through the lack of decency on the part of their hosts; they had been legally accepted citizens. It is equally true that they did not appeal to the charitable instincts of other countries and did not wish to be given merely asylum—to remain as guests there as long as they were tolerated. They wished to be integrated into the national life of the receiving countries.

If the international organizations genuinely intended to view the problem in its real economic, social and political implications, then the solution was available long before the crisis. While so much effort was spent on exploring possibilities of colonization in Santo Domingo, Madagascar, Uganda, or Alaska and Australia, Palestine had grown economically and socially to a stage where additional immigration into that country would have been for the benefit of Jews as well as of international commerce, trade and social life. If the representatives of the various states had sat together and had considered with the courage of unbiased leaders the reestablishment of Palestine as a Jewish state, the problem would have been solved in no time. However, Palestine was not mentioned. One cannot help doubting whether, under these circumstances, the representatives of the United Nations had any serious intention to take efficient measures except to save their own faces.

Now is the time to discuss these facts freely. We are approaching a point in the course of world development where the refugee problem will become just one part of the overall Jewish question. It will no longer be possible to delay, by interim measures, the solution of the refugee problem while the fundamentals of the Jewish question are overlooked. International help is needed in both directions: first, to make the remaining numbers of Jewish survivors in Europe human beings again by giving them the necessary food, clothing, and medical aid; and, secondly, by establishing a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine where the rescued people can be integrated into the pattern of normal living. However, if there should not be a thorough change in the working policy of the international organizations, the Jewish question, including the Jewish refugee question, will not find the solution which will be adequate to secure world peace.

MANY PLANS AND NO ACTION

How much a thorough change in the international relief and rehabilitation system will be needed in the near future might become clearer from the following survey.
1. The Evian Conference. In March, 1938, President Roosevelt invited thirty-eight American and European countries to consider what steps could be taken to facilitate the settlement in other countries of political refugees from Germany including Austria. The intergovernmental group met at Evian-les-Bains in France. The various countries expressed, through their representatives, their theoretical willingness to aid the refugees, but all of them, virtually without exception, presented insurmountable obstacles which stood in the way of taking action. Most interesting among the answers given by the representatives of the various countries were those of certain South American Republics and that of Lord Winterton, representing Great Britain. The South American countries admitted their need of immigration, but felt that they could not offer any practical proposal because of their own unemployment problems and because of the presence of large German groups among their population and extensive trade agreements with Germany, which would not allow additional Jewish immigration. The answer of Lord Winterton was: "The United Kingdom is not a country of immigration; it is highly industrialized, fully populated and is still faced with the problem of unemployment. For economic and social reasons, the traditional policy of granting asylum can only be applied within narrow limits." Questioned about the possibilities of a large-scale settlement of refugees in Palestine, Lord Winterton gave the discouraging answer (and everybody who knew this phraseology realized how discouraging it was) "that that country was under study". However, Lord Winterton assured the world that Great Britain was examining the possibility of settling Jewish refugees in her Kenya colony.

2. The Intergovernmental Committee. The first Intergovernmental Committee meeting under the Chairmanship of Lord Winterton took place in London on August 3, 1938, and defined its task as "that of substituting an orderly system of departure from countries whence there is involuntary emigration for the existing disorderly exodus of men, women and children who have no definite place to go." In February, 1939, Sir Herbert Emerson, at that time High Commissioner at the League of Nations for Refugees Coming from Germany, was

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made Director of the Intergovernmental Committee and has remained in that position.

Without criticizing the leadership of Sir Herbert Emerson and underestimating the great efforts the Committee made to meet the refugee problem, the achievements of the Committee up to date are, on the whole, disappointing. At first, many precious months were wasted on discussions with the German Government to organize a planned emigration of refugees from Central Europe. Later, the work of the Committee was limited to sporadic relief actions and migration aid on behalf of some few thousand refugees out of the total of many hundreds of thousands. At no time, however, was the problem tackled in its total ambit. This is the more important since the Intergovernmental Committee still constitutes a fundamental factor in the relief and rehabilitation process designed to take place in the postwar period.

In the meantime, the functions of the Intergovernmental Committee have crystallized into two definite plans. Both of them will place the Intergovernmental Committee into a close interrelationship with UNRRA.

It will be the one function of the Intergovernmental Committee "of finding places of settlement for those persons who have been obliged to leave their homes for reasons of race, religion or political belief, and who cannot or do not desire to be repatriated." UNRRA, on the other hand, is understood to assist in the care and repatriation of such of these persons as can, and are willing, to return to their countries of origin or of permanent residence. This division of functions between the Intergovernmental Committee and UNRRA has been defined by Sir Herbert Emerson as the distinction between the care for the so-called short-term refugees, who are to be taken care of by UNRRA, and long-term refugees, whose care will be entrusted to the Intergovernmental Committee.*

The other function of the Intergovernmental Committee will pertain to providing stateless refugees, or refugees who do not, in fact, enjoy the protection of any government, with travel documents. This work will be an additional supplement to the operations by UNRRA in the field of relief and rehabilitation. Judging by our experience after the last World War, this activity of the Intergovernmental Committee will be of great importance. To an incomparably greater degree than after 1918 masses of people will be left in all corners of Europe, where this wait ends, without any identification papers, and without any possibility that identification papers can be furnished for them; since all records of the past have been destroyed.

There is no doubt that these Resolutions adopted by the Intergovernmental Committee cover an integral part of the preparatory work for reconstruction in the coming postwar era. But one cannot help but wonder why the Intergovernmental Committee has restricted its functions to measures in the field of technicalities which, though important, do not even touch the central factors of the settlement process. Passports are certainly important but still more important are the countries to which the bearers of the passports could go. Such countries cannot be found if they are not on the map. We are sure the Intergovernmental Committee has thoroughly searched its

* Sir Herbert Emerson, "Postwar Problems of Refugees," Foreign Affairs (1943), Vol. 21, No. 2 - Criticism has been raised against the differentiation between short- and long-term refugees as an artificial one since the borderline between both categories is fluid. Groups of persons who may today be regarded as short-term refugees may lose their prospects of repatriation tomorrow and may fall into the long-term category, and vice versa. (See Zohar Wachsfog, Relief and Rehabilitation, New York, 1944 p. 152.)
machinery with all · · ,·.;·::' ··
initiative was the meeting held by the representatives of the British and American Governments at Hamilton, in April, 1943. It became known as the Bermuda Conference.

The result of Mr. Eden’s initiative was the meeting held by the representatives of the British and American Governments at Hamilton, in April, 1943. It became known as the Bermuda Conference.

Only after Governmental archives are opened after the war, will we know completely what went on behind the closed doors of the Conference. As a matter of fact, the meetings of the Conference were shrouded in a great deal of secrecy. The press was excluded and even the representatives of Jewish organizations were denied admission, though they might have been admitted at least as legitimate observers, since the Jewish refugees constituted the majority of the refugee population. The conference stressed the confidential nature of the Conference by pointing to the fact that their recommendations and resolutions concerned governments other than those represented in the Bermuda Conference and involved military considerations. In the official bulletin which was issued after the Conference, it was merely stated that “the delegates to the Bermuda Conference agreed on the necessity of building up an efficient machinery of international consultation and collaboration through an intergovernmental committee constituted on the widest basis and with all possible means of action at its disposal. .” The committee should incorporate the Intergovernmental Committee which existed before the war but it was planned on a wider basis and with much greater authority.”

No official document ever issued used more general language and evaporated into such mystic conclusions as that on the Bermuda Conference. Hundreds of thousands of refugees died and many more thousands were exposed to threats of death and persecution while the Conference adjourned in an air of self-satisfaction about its humanitarian ideas. For mere humanitarian ideas remained the resolutions adopted at Hamilton and no action whatsoever was taken. Nonetheless, we do not agree with those who allege that the participants in the
Bermuda Conference convened solely for reasons of expediency. The Conference, in our opinion, remains a pledge to the world by the American and British Governments that the refugee problem will remain a part of the complexity of problems of the future world reconstruction to be dealt with by both Governments. In other words, despite the lack of concrete results—which was so tragic for the Jewish refugees—good will certainly existed at the Conference and is to be taken as part of a binding promise. It is to be hoped that out of the plans of the Bermuda Conference an organization may develop at some future date which will tackle the reconstruction work for the refugees on the wide international basis envisaged at Bermuda. On the agenda of that future organization, Palestine, we assume, will occupy first place.

4. UNRRA. UNRRA differs from the organizations which have been set up to bring about the liquidation of the refugee problem according to its function as it has been defined in the Agreement of November 9, 1943, adopted by the Governments of the forty-four United Nations. From the beginning, and down to the smallest detail of its plans, UNRRA was conceived as an international relief organization designed to bring immediate help to the population of Europe in general, and to the refugees, in particular, as soon as military operations would allow relief action. In principle, UNRRA is a non-political organization concerned with rendering help to the needy masses of the liberated countries by providing food, clothing, medical aid and other necessities of life for them, as the situation after the war might demand. It is political only in the sense that enemy or ex-enemy nationals are supposed to be excluded from receiving its services. But what is most important is that UNRRA is not expected to liquidate the refugee problem. Whatever the interpretation may be, its work is charity and not reconstruction.

The concept of charity, to be sure, has undergone fundamental changes during the last forty or fifty years. The connotation of philanthropic giving, which formerly had been implied in it, has been eliminated and replaced by the more constructive idea of restoring, through social service, to standards of normalcy, the situation of an individual or a group in need. This is not the place to explain what has brought about this new philosophy of social work. We wish to indicate only that in back of this philosophy lies the psychological theory that a needy person cannot make efficient use of material help unless the material help is a means of recreating in him the feeling of security he has lost. The standards of normalcy which social work tries to restore through its services are, therefore, to be understood in psychological terms rather than in terms of economic thinking.

This philosophy was expressed by UNRRA when it declared in one of its first resolutions that it was going to help people to help themselves. That clearly determines the scope and limits of UNRRA’s work. It is limited in the sense that UNRRA cannot be expected to contribute to the liquidation of the needs which will arise in the war-torn world in the near future. Other organizations will have to step in to do that job. However, UNRRA will be the only organization with fully authorized international power to guide the surviving victims of the European situation to a point where they can start their life anew and in a state of more or less complete security.

The services which UNRRA will be called upon to render are of a two-fold character: first, emergency aid with regard to the daily necessities of many millions of people who have been left in utter destitution through the “scorched earth” tactics of the Axis powers in the period when their armies retreated, and through their deliberate policy of weakening by every con-
ceivable means the nations they overran in order to assure their subjugation; second, care for the many millions of displaced persons by providing for them transportation facilities and organizing their movement to places of new settlement. Measures in both categories, according to the principles of UNRRA, will involve agricultural and industrial rehabilitation so that the passive reception of help can gradually be turned into self-help.

In view of the scope and principles of UNRRA's work, the following problems seem to be of special importance:

a) Since UNRRA is an organization of international authority designed to bring help to all people in the liberated countries, and to those in enemy or ex-enemy countries who are members of the United Nations or have been persecuted by the enemy because of their race or religion, any other relief action organized by organizations other than UNRRA can be only of supplementary nature. It would be a duplication of tasks and services if other organizations would step into the field of UNRRA and take over operations clearly defined as the work of the international relief system. That is particularly true with regard to the surviving Jews in Europe. It is a matter of logic that the Jews in the various countries of Europe fall under the category of persons to be helped by UNRRA. Moreover, it would be a grave mistake if Jewish political leadership were to make the Jews an exception in the system of international responsibilities. Why should a Jew in Rumania or in Greece not be entitled to the same amount of material help, and the same degree of personal care, as a non-Jewish person of Rumanian or Greek nationality? It would seem that the Jews themselves would advocate a kind of discrimination against their co-nationals in other countries by putting into operation their own relief and rehabilitation machinery, although the United Nations had justly agreed upon universal relief work without regard to the difference of Jewish or non-Jewish origin of persons in the liberated countries. Of course, that does not mean that the Jews in the world are exempted from contributing to the cause of Jewish need in Europe. To help UNRRA by voluntary work and funds, to develop and broaden their relief activities, will be most desirable. It would be a misapprehension of our analysis of the problem to go to the other extreme and to assume that any Jewish contribution, in terms of money or work, would interfere with UNRRA's plans. Other nations, such as the Poles, the French, the Dutch, the Norwegians, etc., have always received, and probably, will continue to receive, material help from their respective national groups abroad. In a similar sense, Jewish contributions to the European relief work for Jews cannot be questioned. What we wish to say is merely that the Jews should not go beyond sound judgment; which alone can make good will effective.

b) Of course, nobody will deny that the Jewish population of Europe, in comparison with the rest of the European population, will be in a state of greater destitute when the war ends. Although we do not think that this is a reason to place the burden of relief on the shoulders of world Jewry, we definitely think that the problem calls for revisions in the structural setup of UNRRA. UNRRA has excluded from membership in its organization any national unit which has no governmental authority of its own. Consequently, the Jews had not received seats, even as regular observers, at the meetings of the Council. The Jews, therefore, have no way of advising, or effectively influencing the relief policy of UNRRA, nor of interpreting Jewish needs in Europe for UNRRA authorities. This situation is apt to create confusion. Not only are Jewish problems inadequately presented, within the framework of the relief plans of UNRRA, but Jewish hopes for a definite national status in the
postwar world are implicitly ignored. This might constitute a precedent strong enough to affect Jewish plans for independent national status in Palestine. It may be argued that our claims on Palestine have no bearing on United Nations relief policies, and that relief policies do not constitute a political document. Both observations are valid; but it is also true that the creative force behind the agreement of forty-four nations on any question of international life is a definite political will. Moreover, America, as one of the greatest powers among the United Nations, has recognized the Jewish claim to Palestine through her President and both of her major political parties. It would be a grave contradiction if the highest authorities of a nation and the terms of an international agreement in which that nation has a leading part, were in conflict with each other.

c) One of the first Resolutions of UNRRA reads as follows: "All those refugees who are unwilling or unable to return to their countries of origin will be helped to settle in other countries." The Resolution refers to the plans of UNRRA designed to deal with displaced persons. As mentioned above, the responsibility of UNRRA in helping the displaced persons to establish themselves in countries of new settlement, constitutes one of the two chief functions of the organization. Surprisingly enough, whenever UNRRA and other governmental organizations have discussed resettlement plans for displaced persons, no mention has been made of Palestine as one of the most important areas of resettlement for Jewish refugees. Still more surprising, however, is the fact that no step has been taken to encourage the resettlement of Jewish refugees in Palestine, or to support the refugees already in Palestine in their resettlement process. Palestine today has a great number of refugees, relatively more than any other country outside of Europe, the majority of them destitute and in dire need of material help.

One of the most urgent problems concerning the refugees in Palestine is the lack of housing facilities. Hundreds of refugees who have arrived there are forced to sleep in huts and caves, often on the bare ground under the open sky. That is not only true of individuals, but sometimes of whole families, including infants in arms. It seems somewhat paradoxical that Palestine organized a unit for the relief operations of UNRRA in the Balkans, while to date UNRRA has not given much thought to establishing a relief unit for Palestine. We certainly do not overlook the fact that the liberated countries in Europe are in such a desolate state of public organization that they need help from outside in finding their way back to normalcy, and that, on the other hand, Palestine has reached a level of highly perfected inner administration, and is in the process of self-controlled organic growth. But that cannot minimize the fact that it has a refugee problem to tackle, and that this refugee problem falls into the category of international responsibility. This problem has nothing to do with the rebuilding of the national home, and has no connection with political questions. The request for help from UNRRA for the clothing and housing of refugees in Palestine until they can be incorporated into the national economy is not a political question, but a humanitarian one.

* See Palestine, New York, Vol. X, No. 81, June 12, 1944; and elsewhere.

The Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi jointly set up a committee which subsequently assumed the name of "Palestine Jewish Council for Relief Abroad." A number of Palestine Jewish organizations are represented therein. The Chairman is Dr. A. Katzenelson, General Secretary of the Vaad Leumi. The main task of the Council is to mobilize, train, and dispatch units to work within the framework of the Cairo Council of Voluntary Organizations for Relief Abroad. The Palestine Jewish Council was already in existence in the days of MERRA (Middle-Eastern Refugee and Relief Administration). On the initiative of MERRA, the Jewish Agency organized relief units in Palestine from which the present relief organization originated. To date, about sixty volunteers are mobilized for work in the Balkans, particularly in Greece, Albania and Yugoslavia. The training of the volunteers has been financed by the Yishuv. (Quoted from a letter from Leo Hermann to Dr. Joseph Washington, Jerusalem, December 31, 1944.) In the meantime, the free Jewish relief unit has left for Greece.
the productive process of the country, is legally and administratively justified. UNRRA has large stores of building materials and textiles in the Middle East, a part of which could be made available to Palestinian refugees.

d) However, despite the sharp criticism which has recently been employed against UNRRA particularly in the English press, we think that UNRRA as an organization financed and administered by forty-four nations represents a long step forward in planning for the postwar world. It has been said that the cardinal fault of UNRRA lies with the fact that it is powerless and lacks authority. In order to obtain shipping facilities and to deliver its goods to places in liberated countries, it has to clear its movements in every instance with Allied military and political leaders. That has been a great handicap in the relief operations of UNRRA, particularly in the Balkans. We must not forget that the efficiency of UNRRA's relief activities depends not only on its organization and administration, but equally on the conditions under which it has to operate. It has been perhaps less efficient in the Balkans because the Balkans are in a state of political turmoil. What kind of authority and power should UNRRA have in order to supersede conflicts between rival governments, or to overrule orders by highest military authorities? Since UNRRA always will have to work in crisis situations, it will never reach the point of theoretical perfection of which some people may dream in the remoteness of their speculations. In any event, the creation of UNRRA is the first symptom of a world which has made its individual problems a common concern.

5) The War Refugee Board. When by the end of 1943 over two and a half million Jews still had been left in Europe, in a most dangerous situation, the President of the United States took the initiative to set up a new organization "to take action for the immediate rescue from the Nazis of as many as possible of the persecuted minorities of Europe—racial, religious or political—all civilian victims of enemy savagery." The organization was called into being by an Executive Order on January 22, 1944, and has since then become known as the War Refugee Board.

The War Refugee Board is an emergency organization devoted solely to bringing immediate help to those persons in Nazi-dominated Europe who can be reached through agreements with satellite governments or through underground channels secretly established in enemy countries. It is a purely American organization, financed and administered by the American Government. The Board consists of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of War. John W. Pehle of the Treasury Department was appointed Executive Director. Mr. Pehle appointed Mr. Ira Hirschmann, a New York business executive, as the War Refugee Board's representative in Istanbul, and Mr. Robert C. Dexter, former representative of the Unitarian Service Committee, as the Board's agent in Lisbon. Other representatives were assigned to various important observation posts in the neutral countries of Europe.

The functions of the Board are limited by the very nature of the organization. It was conceived as an agency which would eventually contribute to the rescue work of refugees in Europe, rather than replace any of the other international organizations engaged in relief and rehabilitation. However, implied in its operational functions are other tasks, wider in range and more intangible in character. It is now possible for private organizations dealing with refugees abroad to obtain, through the War Refugee Board, licenses from the Treasury Department to employ American Funds in Nazi-occupied territory. Further-
more, and this probably is the chief importance of the Board, it is an instrument of psychological warfare. It has served effectively in warning those in enemy countries who held the power of life and death over prisoners in concentration camps and in stimulating others who were willing to help the Nazi victims.

The rescue activities of the War Refugee Board will not result in high figures in terms of people saved, and will not cover wide areas of operation. Detailed information on its activities is still withheld in order to protect the persons entrusted with the rescue work in enemy countries. But however limited the results may be when complete information is available, the Board will have fulfilled its task by at least giving voice to the attitude of this Government toward the complexity of the refugee problem.

Reviewing all governmental and intergovernmental efforts in behalf of European refugees, we necessarily arrive at the following conclusions: Though many plans have been designed and put into action, and many promises have been given by individual governments and their combined bodies, the problem has remained unsolved. We have the impression that the chief reason for the failure lies with the fact that no agreement could be reached on the central point of liquidating the refugee situation. The obstacle blocking effective and realistic action was not so much the question of how the refugees could be saved from their persecutors, but rather the problem of reintegrating those who have been saved into a new pattern of the postwar world. The governments were not so much at a loss about attacking the problem as they were afraid of solving the problem. The world was closed to the refugee and none of the representatives of the states at the various conferences had the courage to open even a small part of it. The only part of the world which could have been opened was barred from discussion. When a new international organization after this war approaches the problem of the Jewish refugee, the starting point—we hope—will be clear. In view of the international situation, the new life of the Jewish refugee, if it really is to be a new life, can grow nowhere else than in Palestine.
Chapter 5

Plans of Repatriation and Colonization

SOCIETY IN A TRANSITION PERIOD

The actual plans of the governmental and intergovernmental committees which were discussed in the previous chapter have one factor in common: they all represent attempts to build the new Jewish future on the basis of the past. None of the organizations which we mentioned took into account that the past would no longer exist when their plans came into effect. Even if these plans had a chance to materialize fully, through international cooperation (and this is unlikely in view of the lack of international leadership), they would create an anachronism which sooner or later would produce new fundamental difficulties. Everything will have changed in the post-war world; the economic, social and political structure of small and big nations will be completely different from what it was before; a new interrelationship among the nations will develop; new concepts of minorities will be established—only the Jews, according to intergovernmental designs, would remain the petrified remnants of a bygone world. They would remain dispersed among foreign nations without any safeguards against the conflicts which arise from national symbiosis.

However, the chief danger does not lie with theoretical blueprints which have little chance to materialize. The fact that many Jews themselves do not realize the deficiencies of such plans is much more dangerous. There are many Jews in this and other countries who would like to leave the pattern of Jewish community life in the world unchanged. While they are fully aware that the world as a whole is going through a transition period, and have accepted profound changes in their daily lives, they often resist the normal development of the Jewish situation because they are afraid of the changes involved. Such a standpoint is not mere short-sightedness, nor is it lack of group feeling. It would also be unjust to regard such a position as a matter only of expediency or timidity. It is inherent in human nature to resist changes. The powers of traditionalism in their various aspects have played a big role among all nations. They have strengthened national growth by helping to preserve inherited values, but they have also impeded progress and natural expansion. From this point of view, it would be equally unjust to label the difference of opinion among the Jews with regard to the Jewish future as disunity, or perhaps particularly as Jewish disunity. There is no disunity as long as the different groups or individuals share a common concern for Jewish survival. But, whether or not disunity exists, conflicting attitudes on the ground of a common cause are no less threatening.

It is to no avail to let ideologies run against each other, or to expect to overcome the change-resisting forces in the world through propagandistic education. There is one power, and one power alone, which according to our historical experience, has always been strong enough to break down the stronger barriers of resistance: that power is reality. We mean by reality, the constellation of circumstances which results from the total of historic events taking place in a given period.
It might be advisable, in order to present the most adequate information on the subject, to give a picture of the reality of the situation as it exists at this very moment. Therein lies the dominant force which will affect all future developments, whether or not we approve of them. Hence, this chapter will speak in the language of bare facts and confirmed reports, and will leave all interpretation to the reader. The correct interpretation will be a matter of logic and good common sense.

The plans of governmental and intergovernmental committees show two distinct trends in their final aims and purposes, one being the return of refugees to their places of former residence, which is known as repatriation; the other being the establishment of new settlements in foreign countries, other than Palestine, which we might call a process of new colonization. No other alternative has been envisaged by intergovernmental action. Our question is: to what situation would repatriation or colonization, or both, in the case of the Jewish refugee, lead? We do not ask whether these attempts of liquidating the problem are desirable; we are merely interested in whether they will be feasible in the long run.

**Plans of Repatriation**

Repatriation will depend chiefly on the attitude of the peoples in the countries where the Jewish refugees had formerly been citizens by birth or naturalization. It is difficult to anticipate what this attitude will be when the war in Europe is over. But here and there in the liberated countries the population already has expressed its views, and sometimes even manifested its feelings by concrete action. According to these manifestations, we can assume that, in general, the liberated peoples do not favor the mass return of their Jewish fellow citizens. This attitude, however, seems to be in striking contrast with the opinion usually expressed by the so-called Governments-in-Exile. What then does the difference between official and public opinion on the question of repatriation reveal?

The majority of the Governments-in-Exile were the pre-war governments which had fled from their countries when these countries were invaded by the German armies. There was no real contact between the governments and the people at home, save contact through underground channels. Under these circumstances, one might wonder whether the pre-war governments were the true representatives of their peoples, particularly as long as they functioned outside of their countries. For some time they appeared as the mere outgrowth and continuation of pre-war policies at home. The vagueness of their declarations was another proof that they themselves were not sure to what extent they voiced the real opinion of their nations. However, with the progress of the war, the situation changed somewhat. Whether they remained abroad or were allowed to return, they could not survive in office unless they adjusted themselves to the new conditions of political life in Europe. It was not so much the physical liberation of the various countries as it was the inner political reorganization of the continent which decided the question of their survival. Whatever the relationship has been in the past, today these governments, though still interminable, are no longer merely the administrative representatives of their countries, but are supposed to function as the executors of national policy as well.

One more point should be made in connection with the fundamental political changes in Europe before we turn to the official and semi-official statements on the question of repatriation of Jewish refugees. For a period of many years the masses of the European peoples have been indoctrinated with a philosophy...
of the supremacy of the state based on the racial qualifications of the state-nation. According to this philosophy the Jewish nation was considered a race worth eliminating. The impact was somewhat softened by the fact that many non-Jewish nations similarly were placed low on the scale of racial qualifications. But in no event may we assume that a philosophy taught and demonstrated over a period of years has left no imprint. Furthermore, with the recession of Nazi philosophy in most of the European countries new ideologies have begun to spread which in many ways are no less in conflict with our democratic thinking. Though the myth of a racial elite is about to disappear in Europe, the idea of a privileged state elite is going to assume a meaning which eventually may be equally detrimental to the cause of national minorities. Under the influence of this new philosophy a selected group within the state will probably impose its will on the national life and reduce to inferior status all groups and individuals who will not fit into the reorganized state structure.

In other words, what is taking shape in Europe today is a revolutionary change from Western to Eastern ideologies after the interlude of Nazi domination. The concept of the Jewish nation which grew out of the democratic thinking of the West, can hardly be integrated, without sacrifice, into this future system of political life. While the situation is still in a fluid stage and nobody can foresee what the final outcome will be, this much is clear: that pre-war Europe will never rise again, and that the pre-war situation of the Jews in Europe can never be re-established.

This also explains the chasm between the promises and the acts of the governments of the small nations in Europe. They talk in terms of the pre-war philosophy from which they have derived their ideas of leadership, and at the same time they try to bridge the gap between the old and new concepts of political life. Their word, therefore, cannot be taken as the final and conclusive will of their people; nor has any action initiated by them the value of a permanent solution. Only a few of them were farsighted enough to caution the public as to what results might accrue from attempts to restore the Jews to their former status.

It is in the light of these facts that we must read the statements by the representatives of various European Governments. Significant among them are the declarations of the Belgian, Dutch, Polish, Romanian and Czech governments.

Hubert Pierlot, former Prime Minister of the Belgian Government, made this statement in London in April, 1942: "The Constitution of Belgium guarantees freedom of opinion and belief. These are the principles in the shelter of which the Jews in Belgium lived peacefully until the German invasion. These principles are of a permanent character. They are at the very foundation of Belgian legislation, and re-establishment of them and respect for them are among our war aims.*

Pierre S. Gerbrandy, Prime Minister-in-Exile of the Netherlands, made a broadcast in 1943, concerning the deportation of the Jews by the Germans, in which he said: "When the power of German arms is broken with God's help and by the strength of our arms, then, I am convinced the feelings of mutual respect among humans which has grown under oppression will bear rich fruits for a better solution of still existing difficulties of the Jews. Bitter experience has taught us that the existence of a 'Jewish question' in any country of the world may act as a fuel for demagogic agitation ultimately endangering the rest and safety of other countries. The Netherlands, therefore, although it knew no 'Jewish question', and will not know one

after the war, will eagerly collaborate when called upon to help in ending definitely the wanderings of so many hundreds of thousands of people across the earth.

Similarly, in an official statement on November 3, 1940, the former Polish Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, Mr. Stunczyk, emphasized that "in liberated Poland, the Jews as Polish citizens will be equal in duties and rights with the Polish community. They will be able, without hindrance, to develop their culture, religion and customs . . . Fighting in the Polish armed forces, side by side with their Polish comrades-in-arms, the Jewish citizens of Poland will win themselves the undeniable right to peaceful labor, to well-being and happiness in the liberated motherland."

After the liberation of Rumania, the Foreign Minister of that country, Grigore Niculescu-Buzeste declared in a statement to the JTA Correspondent on October 26, 1944, "as a consequence of reinstatement of the old constitution, all racial legislation automatically becomes unconstitutional. Specific decrees abolishing all discriminatory legislation will be issued shortly. The Government is presently drafting legislation to establish machinery for restoring to Jews all property confiscated during the Antonescu Regime. Decrees covering restitution of property will soon be issued."

Obviously deviating from the promising eloquence of those statements is the more sober viewpoint expressed by the Provisional Government of Bohemia. President Beneš assured the public that the Czechoslovakian laws did not and do not make a difference between loyal citizens whatever their origin or religion may be. But he also warned against unrealistic optimism, adding that the Jewish question was "an international one, needing to be resolved internationally after the war." This clearly implies that the liquidation of the Jewish question or, in a more limited sense, the Jewish refugee question, does not depend only on the domestic policy of any single nation but also on decisions of international scope. Beneš is known for his political realism. And realistic it is to recognize that the position of Jews in any country will depend on what their position will be in the world at large.

It is an often applied method in political life that Governments resort to semi-official statements in their national press in order to give a more objective opinion on pending questions than they can give in their official statements. Thus it happened that the same Polish Government which issued bulletins of an almost idealistic humanism with regard to the repatriation of Jews, allowed reports to circulate which allegedly originated from Polish underground sources, and which frankly stated that "the return of the Jews, even in small numbers, to their former employment and shops is utterly unthinkable. The non-Jewish population has occupied the place of the Jews in the towns and cities over a large part of Poland. The Polish population would regard the mass return of the Jews as an invasion against which they will defend themselves even by force." If still more clarity and definiteness of terminology was needed, the semi-official Polish daily, "Gazeta Polska", sounded a note of complete frankness by stating on the question of Jewish repatriation to Poland: "We must take into consideration that even the replacement and return (of the Polish Jews) to society cannot be carried through without strong opposition on the part of the Gentile population. Five years ofpointism could not pass over people even such as fought it relentlessly, without leaving definite traces."**

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* The Day, New York; May 7, 1944; Congress Weekly, May 19, 1944.
** Gazeta Polska, March 3, 1944.
One might think that the stand of the small Central European nations on the question of repatriation is not the true indicator of the situation which will prevail in Europe after the war. The political leadership of several of these nations was reactionary prior to the war. A number of governments did not have to cope with an actual Jewish problem because either the number of Jews in the country was not big enough to make the presence of Jewish nationals a matter of controversy, or the national majority was so secure that the infiltration of minorities did not threaten them. Furthermore, there may be good reason to expect that these small nations embedded in the geographical space between the big powers of the West and East will adjust themselves to the trends of international policy in Europe even if their spontaneous response to one of the pending questions should be different from the international attitude. Therefore, it might be more revealing to determine the position of the big European powers on the question of the repatriation of Jews.

Most important among these powers is France, not only because France was the cradle of democratic philosophy and for the greater part of the past has granted the Jews full freedom in their social, economic and political life, but also because she is one of the countries from which large numbers of Jews have been driven, and to which, if repatriation should be effected, they will try to return. After the liberation of North Africa, the French Committee of National Liberation decided that the Cremieux Law was to be considered in force in Algiers and that the Algerian Jews under this law were to be given complete freedom. Nevertheless, Jewish property in liberated North Africa still has not been restored to the Jewish owners, and the Jews are still somewhat restricted in their liberty, particularly with regard to their cultural and economic situation.

At no time has the French Government tried to conceal these facts. It has fairly declared that the “automatic return of Jews to their industrial, commercial or political positions held before” would irritate the local population.* The French Government has given particular emphasis to this statement, by making it public to the international world through a cable from the French “Commissariat à l’Information,” in Algiers to the United States, released by the French Press Information Service in New York.**

The prospects of the Jewish population in the French homeland are equally unsatisfactory. In November 1944, the French Foreign Minister Georges Bidault in an article in his newspaper “L’Aube” pointed to the difficulties of property restitution to the Jews, and the difficulties of restoring them to their former positions in France. Bidault declared it would not be easy to face the economic and financial consequences of these measures. He made it fully clear that the mere passing of anti-discrimination laws would not really help the Jews. "Regulations prohibiting the practice of medicine and law by Jews can easily be rescinded, but would those concerned be able to resume their professions where they left off?" The question of public and private officials, the paper continued, is even more complicated, and a modus vivendi must be found. The article further emphasized the complex problems of the restitution of businesses and stocks, and the impossibility of recovering transferable securities. The conclusion at which Bidault arrived was that restitution could be achieved only in an atmosphere of good will but be warned the Jews not to insist on compensation by

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* JTA, June 7, 1944.
the state since the public would never understand or tolerate such a demand. Only a few weeks after this article had been published, events took place in France which corroborated Blau's views. According to reliable newspaper reports, groups of French business men, professionals, veterans and others approached the de Gaulle Government in Paris, protesting against any large-scale repatriation of French Jews, and declared that any measures which would be taken by the Government in this direction would lead to a new uprising of fascism. This is the latest news from France, a country which at one time conceived the principles of freedom and liberty.

Can we disregard it?

Of course, closer collaboration between France and Russia was inaugurated some time ago. This might give cause for hope that the attitude toward the Jewish question would eventually change in France through the influence of Russia. There is no doubt that Soviet Russia has never allowed any racial discrimination against her minorities. But discrimination is not always practiced in racial terms. There are other forms of discrimination which may substantially affect the life of minorities. From what we have come to know thus far, we must take into account the fact that Jews in the countries which have been liberated by the Russian armies have not won their complete freedom and their full rights. Russia has shown a certain indifference to the Jewish problem in that she has taken no action to put into practice the theoretical abolition of the anti-Jewish laws in liberated Bulgaria, Rumania or Hungary. It is no less important to know that the Soviet Government is decidedly critical of Zionist policy. Allusion is now fully represented in the Middle East. Russian ministers were recently appointed to Bagdad, Beirut and Damascus, and a Russian Consul General has taken up quarters in Jerusalem.

Though Russia has conceded to the representatives of the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem that Jews from the Balkans would not be restrained from emigrating to Palestine, she does not at present permit her own Jewish citizens to go to the Jewish National Home if they desire to do so. While the latter point can be explained by Russian laws generally prohibiting emigration from territory of the U.S.S.R., her attitude as a whole shows that for the time being she is not willing to consider the Jewish question separately from the national structure of her political system.

The attitude Soviet Russia has taken toward Jewish refugees leaves even less hope that she will participate in liquidating the problem on the basis of international cooperation. At no time in the years past did she offer any plan to contribute to the solution of the problem. Russian spokesmen declared that the capitalistic education of German refugees barred their absorption into Russian economy. The fact that Russia had not been invited to the B viai Conference and that Jewish leaders had never approached the Soviet authorities about admitting Jewish refugees into Russia, was given as another reason for her lack of interest in the problem as well as in its long-range solution.** Soviet officials also stated that, inasmuch as their Government had not taken part in the negotiation of international agreements concerning the refugees, it felt obliged to make a general reservation in regard to them.***

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*New York Times, November 9, 1944.
***League of Nations, International Assistance to Refugees. Report submitted by the Sixth Committee to the Assembly, October 9, 1936.
In adding up these facts, it seems unlikely that Soviet Russia will take an active part in helping the Jewish refugees to be repatriated in their former countries under the old established economic systems. The Jewish refugee as an individual, the economic and social system for which he stands in the opinion of the U.S.S.R., and the economic and social order into which he would desire to be reincorporated are of no interest to Soviet Russia. Yet state interests, as we have repeatedly pointed out in this study, are the only guiding principles of action in modern states.

In this connection, we might also raise the question of whether repatriation of Jewish refugees to Germany, or to her satellite countries, would be possible. It is hardly necessary to elaborate on this point. How could we expect any normal person to return to the country where he himself or his relatives had gone through the cruellest forms of torture and persecution, of humiliation and degradation, where perhaps his closest relatives or friends had been killed or driven to insanity? Furthermore we must not underestimate the physical danger to which any Jewish refugee would expose himself by returning to the country which had expelled him. The hatred against the Jews will not have abated in Germany after the war, particularly if Jews begin to return to their former jobs and positions and are compensated for property previously lost to the people who henceforth will live with them as their neighbors. We think Germany and her satellites are the last countries to which even our most cosmopolitan Jews would advise any of the Jewish refugees to return.

PLANS OF COLONIZATION

Among the plans of the international organizations for the resettlement of Jews in overseas countries other than Palestine, many schemes have been discussed and worked out since the time of the Evian Conference. Though in effect they did not lead to any tangible results, they made one fact clear beyond the shadow of a doubt. They convincingly proved that there is not a single square mile in the whole world outside of Palestine where Jews in large numbers can be settled for their own benefit and for the benefit of future world peace. This is not a subjective interpretation of the agreements made in the international conferences but a simple, sober summary of the work initiated and carried through by the international organizations.

We can be quite brief on this point. Out of the millions of Jews who were living under most critical conditions at the time when the first international organization met at Evian in 1938, exactly 413 persons were resettled on the basis of international cooperation. These 413 persons were brought to Santo Domingo, the only country among those represented at the Evian Conference which had made concrete proposals for receiving Jewish refugees. Between 1938 and the end of 1944, no other Jewish colony "aside from Santo Domingo" was established through the power of international representation.

The plan of the Santo Domingo settlement, though it did not solve the problem, deserves credit in several respects. A small country of some 20,000 square miles and with a population of approximately one and a half million was willing to take the initiative and to make good by immediate action the promises given by other governments representing larger countries and more powerful nations. The President of the Dominican Republic, Generalísimo Trujillo, made available to the prospective Jewish settlers his own estate at Samana, comprising 26,000 acres of land. The financial means for the beginning of the settlement work were supplied by the American Jewish Joint Agricultural Corporation (AGRO-Joint). The Agro-
Joint formed the Dominican Republic Settlement Association, known as DORSA, for supervising and organizing the settlement process. In May 1940, the first and thus far the last settlers arrived at Sosua. The selection of the refugees took place in England under the direction of Sir Herbert Emerson. Selections were made with special regard to fitness for farming life and work in a subtropical climate. After the arrival, each settler was privileged to receive maintenance for one year. This meant he was supposed to receive, throughout the first year, food and lodging, workclothes, medical attention, agricultural training and Spanish instruction plus $3.00 per month in cash.

After the first six months, during which the settlers were expected to remain dependent on the support of Dorsa, plans provided for their distribution to individual homesteads. From that time until the end of the year, the homesteader was to receive free credit amounting to $9.00 a month at the Dorsa store or warehouse, in lieu of the food and lodging heretofore received by him while living in the barracks. In general, it was up to Dorsa and to the Settlers' Council to decide when the individual was ready to go out on his own homestead. Settlers' children at Sosua were to receive maintenance during the first year, including food, lodging, necessary clothing, medical attention and schooling. When established in his homestead, the settler's family was to receive free credit at the Dorsa store or warehouse amounting to $6.00 a month for each child between the ages of one and ten, and $9.00 a month for each child above ten. Mothers of infants under one year old would be credited with $3.00 a month. Dorsa was also prepared to grant short-term credits to individuals and their cooperatives, on projects approved by Dorsa, and to aid settlers to find domestic and foreign markets. Settlers were not required to pay any interest on loans for the first two years. But thereafter they were expected to pay interest at a maximum of 3% per year, which would go into the community funds. The principal was to be gradually repaid over a period of years beginning the third year.

We have gone into the details of this resettlement plan to show the great efforts which were made to settle a handful of people under strange skies. Though colonization experts originally talked of about 100,000 persons who could be settled at Sosua, it was obvious from the very beginning that their statements were theoretical calculations without a firm basis. Under the most favorable conditions, no more than a few thousand people, at the most, could be settled in the new colony. It was the most important. However small, the Santo Domingo plan was a contribution to the work of saving Jewish lives. Because 413 people came to Sosua, there are today 413 Jewish graves less in Europe. That counts.

But beyond all details, one factor remains to be considered. Complicated machinery was put into gear to start a plan at Sosua which under no circumstances could meet even the most fundamental requirements of new colonization. Colonization means pioneer work, and pioneer work demands pioneer spirit. Man and land can be merged together only if the man owns the land in the deepest meaning of the word. Perhaps the Jewish refugees who came to Sosua were happy when they reached the shores of the strange island. They had at least escaped mortal danger and were safe to a certain extent in their new country. But could anybody believe that they would remain happy at a time when the world would return to normal life, when life would no longer be evaluated in terms of physical safety only? Would not the desire then rise in their hearts to live for something, and to see their children live for something that was more than the satisfaction of their mere physical needs? We have grown too much accustomed to the
idea that the refugee is bound to a modesty which any other person would consider unbecoming. Modesty is resignation, and resignation is the end to all happiness in life. We will have done nothing for the refugee unless we have been able to re-awaken his self-respect.

It might be argued that the Sosua settlement and the other colonization plans originated in a period of crisis when it did not matter whether the plans could be developed successfully in the distant future. It is hard to agree with this argument, because a plan does not become a good plan by virtue of having been conceived under difficult circumstances. The circumstances, whatever they are, are made by man and often serve only as an excuse for his unwillingness to see the adequate solution. In any event, the Santo Domingo plan was thought to be part of a permanent solution of the problem. In that lies its real importance and its real failure.

The plans the British Government offered for settling Jewish refugees in certain parts of the British dominions and colonies were miscarriages. The plan for a Jewish colony in Kenya which was given so much public discussion resulted in the settlement through Jewish funds of a few young men on farms in Kenya early in 1939. Another greatly advertised plan for a Jewish colony in British Guiana did not materialize at all. The project for large-scale settlement of Jews in the Kimberley district of Western Australia was definitely rejected by the Australian Government at the end of 1944 because, according to an official statement, the Government was "unable to see its way clear to depart from the long established policy in regard to alien settlements in Australia." *

Strangely enough, a Jewish colony of somewhat more than 20,000 people developed during the late prewar period in Shanghai, in the Far East. For some time it seemed that Asia might absorb a certain number of Jewish settlers who would help the country to develop its many industrial and commercial potentials. The basis of the Shanghai settlement, the largest in the Far East outside of Soviet Russia, was the scheme of a planned society which originated from the efforts of a German-Jewish refugee who had arrived in Shanghai in 1935 (Jacob Berglas, a former industrialist and banker in Germany). This man had the idea of settling 100,000 refugees in a cooperative community in Shanghai.* Although his ambitious plan never grew beyond its first rudimentary stage, many believed in the future prosperity of the Shanghai settlement until it was buried under the ashes of the Far Eastern war.

We do not think it worthwhile to elaborate further this review of frustrated plans and human disappointments. Any road which does not lead the Jewish survivors in Europe to a normal, dignified, productive life will lead them into a blind alley. The ultimate responsibility lies with the Jews of America. Therefore, instead of planning profound changes in the lives of hundreds of thousands of European Jews, such as repatriation or colonization, it may be necessary to change our own pattern of thinking. For the question is not how the unfortunate past of the Jews should be continued, but where a happy future may be initiated.

* Anna Glauberg, Jewish Refugees in Shanghai, Shanghai, December 1949.

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* JTA, November 26, 1944,
Chapter 6

In the Dawn of the Future

We have reached the point in this study where our analysis comes down to a statement Theodor Herzl made half a century ago in defining the chief causes which would lead to the foundation of an autonomous Jewish state in Palestine: “The nations in whose midst Jews live, are all either covertly or openly anti-Semitic.”

What might have appeared in the period of Herzl as a kind of moral judgment and certainly was borne out of the sensitiveness of the European Jew, who had experienced the alarming rise of anti-Jewish attitudes among the European nations, today in the face of the Jewish tragedy in whose midst Jews live, are all either semi-Semites or anti-Semites.

In the Dawn of the Future, Herzl set out the slogan: “The Jewish State, an autonomous Jewish state in Palestine.”

strength to protect themselves efficiently and to offer a strong enough front against attack. To be sure, small nations—and there are many small nations in the world which prove this fact—cannot be prepared to meet the stronger forces of aggression by physical power. However, in the system of international life the power of political representation in effect very often equals physical strength. The Jews are a small nation, and what always made them the scapegoat in world history was the lack of sufficient national representation.

When we speak of the postwar world we have to be aware that it will not become at once a world of organized peace and settled differences. The most violent phase of the world revolution probably will have passed with the war. But for some time to come, the flames of old and new conflicts will smolder throughout the world and disturb its equilibrium. Certain problems may enter into an even more determined phase and stir up conflicts which, during the war, did not come to the fore. The reorientation of Europe to new economic and political concepts will find its echo in other countries. Technological progress will change the surface of the postwar world and cause far-reaching modifications of its inner structure. The reconstruction of the world market from war to peace will create new problems and international difficulties. In the same way that people have to adjust to war they will, psychologically, have to adjust themselves to the return of normal conditions. Particularly the younger generation brought up among the liberties of war will have to find their way to the freedom of peace. Anti-Jewish feeling fostered over more than a decade throughout a whole continent, will flare up in places where Jews and non-Jews previously lived together without obvious friction. In other words, there will be a presumably long transition period after the war. Neither its end nor its final results can be foreseen.

In the dawn of the future, Palestine as a Jewish Commonwealth does not represent merely a haven for Jewish refugees from Europe. Nor is it of concern to the Jews alone. On the contrary, it is of the greatest international importance. If the Jews are left dispersed throughout the world and exposed to any form of antagonism because of their lack of national self-representation, they may be drawn into new conflicts which may be the seeds of even greater disorders in the future. However, if a Jewish Government in Jerusalem is given full authority and power to represent the Jewish nation, in Palestine as well as throughout the world, the Jews will no longer be treated as an uprooted, legally and politically unrecognized, in fact, anonymous group, alien to a nation, and heard only by their outcry of suffering and pain. They will enter the reorganized society of nations as an equal member with the full rights of an autonomous nation, loyal to itself, and therefore, loyal to the other nations with which they will join in building the new world.

This study was completed on February 9, 1945.