MEMORANDUM

On July 17 and again on July 20 I discussed with Ambassador Hayes the refugee situation in Spain. In the course of my second conversation, the Ambassador handed me a ten-page memorandum dealing with the refugee activities of the American Embassy in Spain.

This memorandum concerns itself principally with the refugee problem as it existed in Spain prior to 1944. After elaborating in some detail the efforts of the Embassy to facilitate the passage of Frenchmen through Spain to French North Africa where they could join the French military forces there, the memorandum attempts to justify Ambassador Hayes' failure to cooperate with the War Refugee Board.

Aside from his apparent general unwillingness to cooperate with the War Refugee Board, the Board takes exception to the following aspects of Ambassador Hayes' conduct of refugee activities in Spain:

(a) Ambassador Hayes' insistence on restricting refugee activities in Spain to relief and his refusal to give favorable consideration to projects relating to the rescue of refugees from enemy territory;

(b) Ambassador Hayes' refusal to permit a War Refugee Board representative to operate inside Spain; and

(c) Ambassador Hayes' refusal even to make the American Government's refugee policy known to the Spanish Government.

1. The memorandum handed to me by Ambassador Hayes states that although a critical refugee problem did exist in Spain during most of 1943, this had been reduced by the beginning of 1944 to relatively minor

WAR REFUGEE BOARD RECORDS
proportions by virtue of the large numbers of persons evacuated... and the reduced rate at which refugees of all categories were then entering Spain. This statement points in a nutshell the fallacy in the Ambassador's entire approach to the refugee problem, which he considers as primarily one of relief. Apparently Ambassador Hayes' objective, insofar as refugee activities in Spain are concerned, is limited to the evacuation of refugees from Spain as rapidly as possible. The Ambassador apparently overlooks the significance of the President's language in Executive Order No. 9417, which calls upon the Secretaries of State, War and the Treasury "to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death". (Under-scoring supplied). Although admittedly relief activities are being conducted in Spain, rescue activity in Spain is at a minimum. It is primarily the rescue of refugees which the Board has been attempting to encourage in its various instructions to the Embassy which are curtly dismissed in Ambassador Hayes' memorandum as giving "evidence of little understanding".

2. The memorandum handed to me by Ambassador Hayes complains of the Board's unwillingness "to take advantage of the experience already gained by those actively engaged in the work of refugee relief in Spain". The record indicates quite the contrary. Far from refusing to take advantage of such experience, the War Refugee Board proposed to appoint as its representative in Spain a person well known to Ambassador Hayes, Mr. David Blickenstaff, who administers for the Embassy the Representation in Spain of American Relief Organizations. It was only after Ambassador Hayes' refusal to permit Mr. Blickenstaff to devote his full time to War Refugees Board activities that the Board proposed to appoint someone else as its representative.
The statement in the memorandum that the methods of carrying out the objectives of the War Refugee Board in Spain "cannot be determined without reference to conditions as they are known to exist in this country", is somewhat surprising, in view of the fact that until a few weeks ago, Ambassador Hayes has consistently refused to permit a War Refugee Board representative to operate in Spain. In all other neutral European countries the War Refugee Board has had the advantage of having its personal representative on the spot to give a firsthand account of local conditions to the Board. Spain was the lone exception.

3. Ambassador Hayes attempts to justify his failure to carry out the War Refugee Board instructions to the Embassy on the ground that these instructions have given evidence of little understanding of the refugee situation in Spain and "even less understanding of the implications of American policy in Spain in fields more closely related to the war effort". Unlike our other Ambassadors and Ministers who have without exception cooperated with the War Refugee Board in carrying out similar and sometimes identical instructions, Ambassador Hayes appears to persist in his belief that Executive Order No. 9417 does not mean what it says when it declares that it is "the policy of this Government to take all measures within its power to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death * * *". So convinced is the Ambassador that Executive Order No. 9417 was not a major policy of the United States Government that he adamantly refuses even now to make known to the Spanish Government the President's declared policy! Nor was his attitude altered by the President's declaration of March 24 concerning the Nazi plan to annihilate the Jews.
which declaration was conveyed to the Spanish Government with a mere note of transmittal. Thus it was not surprising that in sharp contrast to the effective play given this declaration in other neutral countries, the President's declaration received almost no mention in the Spanish press and radio.

As an example of the Board's "lack of comprehension of the implications involved" in the implementation of its instructions, the Ambassador's memorandum cites the War Refugee Board suggestion that the Embassy request the Spanish Government to relax its border controls against refugees. The memorandum mentions that aside from the consideration that no refugees were being prevented from entering Spain by the Spanish border control, the maintenance of such control by the Spanish authorities along a border adjacent to German-held territory was in our interest, particularly in connection with our efforts to reduce the number of German agents in Spain and to prevent the smuggling out of Spain of wolfram and other commodities which we were attempting to keep from the enemy. First let the record be clear that refugees have been prevented from entering Spain by the Spanish border control according to information received by the Board from the Belgian Government in Exile and Mr. Miles W. Bond, Third Secretary of the Embassy in Madrid. Secondly, in view of the large diplomatic and non-diplomatic Nazi representation in Spain and the unlimited facility of communication and transportation between Spain and German occupied territory, the Ambassador's reference to the Spanish border control keeping out German agents appears somewhat humorous. Furthermore, it is not at all clear to the Board that the relaxation of the border control against refugees is necessarily inconsistent with the maintenance of a strict control for purposes
of preventing the smuggling out of Spain of products such as wolfram.

4. The memorandum handed to me by Ambassador Hayes also makes numerous other unfounded accusations against the War Refugee Board, which unfortunately appear indicative of the Ambassador’s whole general attitude on this subject. Illustrative of the Board’s failure to comprehend the realities of present conditions in Spain, according to the memorandum, is the War Refugee Board’s cablegram of May 26 which requested the Embassy to urge the Spanish Government to increase its representation in Hungary, although just a short time before instructions had been received from the State Department requesting the Embassy to discourage relations between the Spanish Government and the Hungarian puppet regime. The cable referred to by Ambassador Hayes had been cleared, as usual, through the Department of State. If the Board’s instructions were inconsistent with previous instructions transmitted by the Department of State, the Board should have been so advised at the time that its cable was being cleared, for the Board cannot be expected to have intuitive knowledge of State Department instructions to its missions.
The War Refugee Board submits the following plan of its proposed operations in Spain for your consideration, advice and comment:

The Special Attache to your Embassy would supervise under you all the Board's operations in Spain, including the establishment and maintenance of refugee camps. He will have assigned to him a small staff which might include Transportation, Supply and Finance Officers. It is planned that the Attache and his immediate staff base their operations in Madrid. In addition to the Madrid staff, should the volume of refugees so warrant, it is proposed that three reception centers be established along the Franco-Spanish frontier. Each of these centers would have an Administrator possessing experience in refugee work. Each administrator would likewise have a small staff. At least one Medical Officer and possibly a small nursing staff would also serve at each of the centers. An important member of the staff of the centers would be a Security Officer who would be obtained from either the Military Intelligence Service or the Office of Strategic Services. These Security Officers would, of course, be assigned to the reception centers as refugee welfare workers rather than to the Office of the Military Attache in the Embassy. They would have the dual responsibility of screening refugees in search of possible enemy agents and obtaining possible military information from the bona fide refugees. It is tentatively proposed that reception centers be established at Figueras, Murillo and Tolosa (or such other localities as may be agreed upon) as points readily accessible to all who cross the Pyrenees. The Board considers it desirable that
these centers should be in frontier zones rather than in the interior of Spain for the following reasons:

1. The nearness of the centers to the border would reduce to a minimum the time during which the refugees would be on the hands of the Spanish authorities.

2. Most of the refugees will have been in hiding in France and subjected to the rigors of strenuous travel on foot over mountain trails and will require, once they have crossed the Spanish frontier, immediate assistance with regard to food, medical attention and clothing. The refugees would be kept as far as possible out of the principal population centers, particularly Madrid. It is felt that the remoteness of the proposed centers would minimize attention to the presence of the refugees in Spain.

3. The location of the centers near to the frontier would permit close cooperation between their staffs and Spanish frontier officials. The refugees would remain in the reception centers only so long as is necessary to assure medical officers that they were in physical condition to travel, to permit preliminary security screening and to provide refugees with the necessary travel documents.

As the fundamental plan is to move as rapidly as possible to North Africa those refugees who may enter Spain from enemy-occupied territory, it is hoped that the French authorities will assign to their Delegation in Madrid, for special detail to the reception centers, officers qualified to screen refugees for security and to affix the necessary visa to their travel documents. In this connection, it is indeed possible and probably that enemy agents may attempt to disguise themselves as refugees and enter Spain. It is
eminentl.y desirable, therefore, that, should the Security Officers identify enemy agents, such identification not be disclosed in Spain but that the agents be passed along to North Africa for apprehension there. This has been the policy toward enemy agents in the past; it is obviously preferable that they be in custody in United Nations' territory rather than at liberty in neutral country.

Do you perceive any objections which the Spanish Government might raise to the establishment of these centers in the manner suggested above or to their being financed through the Board? The funds for their operation will probably come from private sources in the United States. This plan, you will note, involves a minimum of handling of the refugees by the Spanish authorities. The Board would appreciate your recommendation whether it would be more practicable for the personnel of the centers to be known to the Spanish Government as official employees of the United States Government or as employees of private American welfare services.

For your information, it appears that the American Red Cross would be reluctant, at this time, to participate officially in its own name in the proposed operations.

In your 623 of February 28, 6 p.m. (Section 1), you request a clarification of the meaning of "involuntary" removal of refugees from Spain. It is appreciated that many of the refugees will desire, once they have escaped from enemy territory, to proceed to areas of the world other than North Africa. The Board feels, however, that it is undesirable that these refugees remain in Spain and that it is desirable that they proceed to North Africa where they may undertake preparations for further travel with considerably greater security for themselves and with complete avoidance of any embarrassment to the Spanish Government because
of their presence in Spain. It is proposed that border officials and police authorities in the frontier zones direct the refugees to the reception centers and provide them with a safe conduct pass valid only for travel from the point of apprehension by those authorities to the nearest reception center. At the time of issuance of these safe conduct, it is hoped that the Spanish officials will advise the refugees that their presence in Spain will be tolerated only so long as they remain in that country pursuant to this program. On arrival at the reception centers, the officers there would explain to the refugees that the Spanish authorities have released the refugees to their care. Every effort would be made to impress upon the refugees that the continued passage through Spain of other refugees is dependent upon their own rapid departure from that country. Further explanation would be given the refugees that while they are proceeding to North Africa they are under the auspices of the UNRRA rather than under the direct control of the French authorities. It is believed that such a policy, if intelligently executed by the Board's representatives, will assure the ready and voluntary departure from Spain for North Africa of all those refugees who may cross the Spanish frontier.

The War Refugee Board hopes that you will give its proposal your prompt personal attention and consideration and submit your criticisms and suggestions as soon as possible.

The Department and the War Department have approved this general program.
Mrs. Gusta Wandel to Jacques.

My dear Jacques:

You cannot imagine the pleasure dear Leon expressed in every letter that you are in Madrid. I hope that we shall all be able to see each other again soon. We should thank God every day that we were allowed to reach Spain.

No doubt Leon will have written you about everything. With just the indispensable - I rucksack - we left France, and everything else we had was stored in Toulouse - but that I don't mind. God helped us in 1942 during those terrible raids by the police in Nice. After that we were interned in Vence by the Italians. After their departure the Germans immediately occupied Nice. What happened there since 1943 would be impossible for me to describe. Fortunately we had a good hiding place where we stayed 7 months, and neither Leon nor I ever went out of the house. Besides all this, my doctor was unable to continue my treatment and I did not dare to go to his clinic because the Gestapo came there every day to see whether there were any Jews. Leon and I were losing our nerves and anything badly seemed to matter. Only the thought of our children kept us alive, and it is terrible to think how they suffered on account of us. When we realized that the war would not be over soon and that we could not go on living in that way, we determined - in spite of my illness - to go to Spain. My doctor was very much against such a fatigue, but my love for my husband and children prompted me to undertake the voyage at the peril of my life. We left Toulouse, but could not immediately leave for Spain, as it was much too cold. So we stayed in Spain in hiding for two months and from there we went to Pau where we were another two weeks in hiding. Then we were able to make arrangements to come to Spain. We were obliged to leave alone for Lourde where we were to meet others. We were to be 12 in all. I can't tell you how lucky we were during the voyage from Pau to Lourde. In case anything was to happen to us, I wanted the children at least to be safe, so we were separated in the train. Imagine my fright when all of a sudden I saw three Gestapo get into the train to control all papers! Fortunately I had seen them, they were at about 5 compartments away from us and you can imagine how anxious the children were for us. I at once told Leon that we must get out of the train, and fortunately we were at a station. But the door could not be opened from inside. A Frenchman, who immediately realized our situation, got out of the window and opened the door for us, we hurried out and then Leon pushed me into a wagon which had already been controlled. Once more our lives were saved. The children were already looking for us and great was our joy when we found each other.
Then came the voyage to Spain which I really cannot describe. Many times Leon fell down, and what the children and I managed, up to our knees in the snow, was almost above human force. Besides we had nothing to eat as we had been told we would get everything we need. Many days and nights we wandered about, living on water and snow. But that also we overcame. After having gone through all that we were sent to prison and now we are in different camps.

I am rather unlucky with my stay here. Food is very bad, especially for me and I suffer very much. The doctor ordered a diet which is impossible to be kept here. The landlady here has neither interest nor feelings toward sick people. But as I am not living here at my own expense, I have no right to claim. I cannot afford to go to a clinic, so I must get along as well as I can. With the 35 pesetas which I receive per week from Mr. Bickenstaff I buy some milk and fruit every day and I live on that. But I am afraid that I will not be able to go on like that for a long time. I received a very nice letter from Mr. Bickenstaff in which he asks me to send him a certificate from the doctor. As there is no good doctor here I do not wish to make unnecessary expenses. My doctor in France had given me all instructions before I left.

This week I went to Vitoria to see a dentist. That also with a very bad result. He is a very good doctor and he told me that my treatment could only be obtained in a big town. I feel quite discouraged with all this. He has sent a certificate to Mr. Bickenstaff, and I hope that if I could come to Madrid, a good doctor can be found who can cure me, before it will be too late. But I don't want to write about that any more, I pass all my days in tears. I am here all alone and this week I had a very bad attack. Whom can I tell that here? So I am trying to bear it all patiently. Who would have thought that one day we should be obliged to live on charity? If only I could receive a visa for Palestine or America. I only hope that my dear father and my sisters and brothers will do their utmost to hurry my immigration. I have been informed by Lisbon that I may expect a visa either for Palestine or America, and this letter I have also forwarded to Mr. Bickenstaff.

I should like to get to Madrid as soon as possible as I am all alone here and do not speak a word of Spanish. Please go and see Mr. Bickenstaff personally. I have not written to Leon about this, he would only be worried and could not help.

How are you, dear Jacques, and the girls? Have you heard from your dear mother? I forgot to mention that Mr. Bickenstaff has proofs that we wish to emigrate as soon as we receive our visas, but that I must undergo a treatment before leaving. And I don't want you to send me any parcels, I will not accept them.

With fond love .......

Gusta Wandel
Monseigneur Boyer-Mas
French Red Cross
Madrid

Monseigneur,

Having been informed of your generous intention to accept a group of 73 Sephardic Jews for evacuation to North Africa with the next French convoy, I take pleasure in sending you herewith a brief statement regarding the antecedents of this group, mentioning a few of the problems connected with the evacuation.

In March of this year I was informed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Spanish Government was willing to authorize the entry into Spain of certain Jewish groups of Spanish origin if I would guarantee their evacuation from Spain immediately after their arrival here. It is of course obvious that I could not give such a guaranty. I did assure the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, that the services of this office would be extended to these people in assisting them in their emigration from Spain. These people were represented to me as being of different nationalities, largely French, Belgian and Dutch to some of which Spanish documents might be granted to facilitate their exit from occupied territory.

On August 11 the first group of these Sephardic Jews, numbering 73, arrived in Spain.

Many difficulties have been found in the problem of this group's evacuation and the following, discovered after the arrival of this group in Spain, will be of interest to you:

1.- Every person in this group possesses a valid Spanish passport.

2.- With the exception of children and wives who have acquired Spanish nationality through marriage, every person in this group possesses an "Acta de Inscripción de Ciudadania" in which is indicated the number and date of the Ministerial Order (Decreto Real) "por la que se reconoce la calidad de ciudadano español". Such an order, you will remember, was issued nominatively in favour of Spanish proteges living abroad who fulfilled between 1925 and 1930 the requirements of Spanish nationality according to the laws formulated by Primo de Rivera.
3. Persons of this group possess a Spanish nationality certificate issued by a Spanish Consular authority abroad.

4. Entry into Spain in this convoy was refused to Sephardic Jews recognized abroad as Spaniards who did not possess the Decreto Real and other formal requirements.

5. With the exception of a few children, not one person of this group was born in France.

6. Before the arrival of this group on August 11, 1943, Sephardic Jews of Spanish nationality had for years past been arriving individually in Spain with valid Spanish documents. Some of these returning Spaniards were recognized as members of the Falangist party. Members of the same family, some arriving before August 11, others with the convoy of August 11, are now being separated, those arriving before that date having the right of residence in Spain with all the rights of Spanish citizens.

7. Men of military age arriving in Spain with the convoy of August 11 were arrested at the Spanish frontier, spent several weeks in prison in Madrid to be subsequently released with the obligation of presenting themselves with their class for military service in Spain. They have not been included in the group scheduled for evacuation from Malaga.

The above facts in my opinion throw considerable light on the true nature of this group of 73 people. In addition to the many other important issues involved in their expulsion from Spain, the order to evacuate them as a group creates many difficult problems. A few examples will show you that some of these problems are:

1. **Alberto Cattergo**: aged 19, is a member of the group. His father, Samuel Cattergo, with his mother, succeeded in entering Spain a few months previously. Alberto is forced to leave Spain with the group. His parents are obliged to remain in Spain.

2. **Hanen Jessua** and his son Hector came to Spain in January 1942. Here they were able to arrange the entry of Mrs. Dora Jessua and the two remaining children, Susana and Jaime, arrived with the convoy of 73 on August 11.
Dora Jessua and the two children, Susana and Jaime, are obliged to leave Spain with the group while the father and elder son Hector must remain in Spain.

3.- In the convoy of August 11 the Hassid family composed of René Hassid, his wife Ana, Pedro aged 5 and Colette aged 3, arrived in Spain. René Hassid is obliged to remain in Spain for his military service. All appeals to have his wife and children remain with him or to have him accompany them to North Africa have till now been fruitless. The wife and children are expelled, he must remain for military service.

4.- José Hassid, a relative of René Hassid, is obliged to remain while his wife is expelled with the rest of the group.

5.- Ascher Rafael Benveniste and his wife Esther arrived in Spain with the convoy of August 11. Their daughter Juanita Benveniste, aged 20, had arrived in Spain a few months previously. The parents must leave from Malaga with the group, the daughter must remain in Spain. The mother, Esther Benveniste, is very sick and several doctors have stated that it will be dangerous for her to make the trip. It appears that the police might have allowed her to remain behind upon the advise of the doctor, but the husband nevertheless will be obliged to leave.

6.- The Benosiglio family composed of Isaac Benosiglio, his wife, two daughters and son Raul, arrived in Spain with the convoy of August 11. The family is expelled with the rest of the group except for Raul who must remain behind to do his military service with the class of 1945.

7.- There are several cases of persons whose state of health is such that they are unable to undertake a long trip. In most cases these persons have nevertheless been obliged to leave their sick beds to go to Malaga for evacuation.

I leave these facts in your hands feeling that you will take whatever actions seem appropriate. In conclusion let me state briefly what my interest is in this
whole affair.

1.- I hope that everything possible will be done to save from Polish concentration camps the groups of Sephardic Jews remaining in occupied Europe who may have the possibility of entering Spain as this first group of 73 has done.

2.- Any tendency on the part of Spanish authorities to adopt an attitude of anti-semitism should be discouraged.

3.- If mass evacuations of Sephardic Jews from Spain must nevertheless take place, the conditions of such evacuations should be humane and just.

Respectfully yours,

David Blickenstaff
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

At Ambassador Hayes' request I saw him again today. He said that there were two matters which he wished to talk to me about as follows:

1. Hayes said he had had a press conference recently at which there were fifteen or twenty members of the press present. He said several members of the press had asked him about the refugee situation and had indicated that they understood he had not been cooperating with the War Refugee Board and that several representatives of the War Refugee Board had advised them to that effect. Hayes said he could not understand how anyone could get the impression he was not cooperating with the War Refugee Board.

I told Hayes there were two fundamental reasons why we had been disappointed in the Embassy's reaction to our program. In the first place we still did not have a representative in Spain, and that I was not at all satisfied with the alternative suggested by Hayes: To have a non-accredited representative of the Board come to Spain on a temporary basis to see what there is to be done in Spain. I pointed out that we had accredited representatives stationed in Ankara, Lisbon, Stockholm and Bern, and that Winant had indicated his willingness to have a representative of the Board in London, and it was difficult to understand why we could not have an accredited representative in Spain.

The only reasons Hayes could give for his attitude were that he did not quite see what a representative could do that was not already being done, and also that the Embassy was very large and the appointment of a special attache on refugee matters might interfere with the appointment of some other attache for purposes more directly related to the war effort. I pointed out to Hayes the importance with which the refugee work was regarded in Washington, and of the interest of the President in the matter. With regard to what our representative could do in Spain I told him it was difficult from the United States to chart out how such representative would spend his time but we had found that our representatives in other neutral capitals have advanced the objectives of the Board a great deal.
I outlined to him the type of activities which Hirschmann, McClelland and Olsen, particularly, were engaging in. Hayes tried to argue that the only thing which had happened with relation to the Board's appointing a representative was that he had indicated he was willing to have Blickenstaff appointed and that he had heard no more about an appointment until Mann's arrival. I pointed out to Hayes the true facts, that after we had agreed to the appointment of Blickenstaff he was unwilling to release Blickenstaff for full time work as the Board's representative, and that when we had tried to appoint Saxon he had been unwilling to go along.

I made it very clear to Hayes that I was dissatisfied with the present arrangements as proposed by him.

I then advised Hayes that the second cause for our disappointment was the failure of the Embassy to take up with the Spanish Government many of the Board's proposals, basing its refusal on arguments which were not convincing to us, such as the argument that other negotiations were being conducted with Spain and this matter interfered.

I told Hayes it appeared to me that the Spanish Government would want to take advantage of the refugee situation in an attempt to mitigate in some small part the reputation it had in the democratic world. Hayes finally admitted that the Spanish Government could have done more than it had and said the failure to get the refugees out of Spain promptly had been partially to blame for our not securing better cooperation from the Spanish Government, particularly in pressing the German Government to allow various groups of refugees to leave in addition to the Seghard group.

I told Hayes that we were conducting rescue operations in Switzerland, Sweden and Turkey and we could not understand why such operations could not be conducted by private agencies in Spain. Hayes had no objection to operations being conducted but he wanted to know whether the pesetas were being acquired in the black market and indicated it was undesirable to put money in an un-American citizen such as Sequerra.
2. The second point Hayes wanted to talk to me about was my remark to him at my previous conference that the private agencies were not too satisfied with Blickenstaff. Hayes said he had talked to Clarence Pickett during which he had mentioned Blickenstaff. Pickett apparently had no objection to Blickenstaff but indicated that he, Pickett, had had a talk with Cardenas, the Spanish Ambassador to the United States, and that Cardenas had indicated he had been advised Blickenstaff was not regarded as satisfactory. Pickett is alleged to have told Hayes that he gathered that the War Refugee Board had indicated to Cardenas that Blickenstaff was unsatisfactory. I told Hayes this was not the case and that anything we wanted to take up with regard to Blickenstaff would be taken up with him.

I then mentioned to Hayes that it was now being suggested that Camp Lyautey at Fedhala be discontinued. Hayes said that he felt very strongly that this would be an unwise move at this time. I asked him to pass his views on to Warren and told him I thought we could prevent any such action from being taken at this time.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

I had an hour's conference today with Ambassador Hayes.

Hayes described briefly the refugee picture in Spain. He pointed out particularly the following facts:

A. That the Spanish Government had been very helpful in permitting around 25,000 Frenchmen, mostly of military age, to escape from France through French North Africa to Spain.

B. That the Spanish Government had been helpful in getting Sephardic Jews out of occupied areas.

C. That the difficulty in moving stateless refugees out of Spain had largely been a problem with the French authorities in Africa.

D. That to his knowledge there had been only two incidents where refugees had been turned back at the border. Both of these incidents had involved merely two or three persons and had been caused by local officials along the border failing to follow instructions.

E. That there was a problem in connection with refugees attaching themselves to parties of military escapees coming over from France. Hayes said there was a limited number of guides available and that refugees had paid high sums to come out with such parties. He did not ascribe the blame for such difficulties to private agencies.

Hayes said that Blickenstaff had handled very well the problems involving refugees in Spain. He said Mann had pressed him very hard for permission to have Saxon come in as the Board's representative in Spain and he had indicated his willingness to have Saxon come in for two or three months but was unwilling at this time to have Saxon designated as
an attache of the Embassy and recognized by the Spanish Government as such. He said that the reason for this was that our Embassy was already the largest in Madrid, even larger than the German Embassy, and that while the Spanish Government might be willing to have an attache appointed, it is likely that the Spanish Government would refuse to appoint some other person needed by this government in connection with the military efforts. I told the Ambassador that I did not know that Saxon would be available but that I might have Mann go back to Spain, or send some other suitable person. I told him I felt it very difficult for such a person to operate without a diplomatic passport but Hayes disagreed. He did finally agree, however, that whoever went in could have a special passport, although he was very reluctant to go even this far. I told him I would not let anyone go into Spain unless he were to report directly to the Ambassador and not be subservient to Blickenstaff, and also that he must have the free right to communicate with me. Hayes was agreeable to both of these conditions.

Hayes took the position that there was very little to be accomplished by a War Refugee Board representative in Spain; that while he anticipated there would be fewer and fewer refugees coming over the border, this was because of the German controls.

I told Hayes I did not think that the private agencies were satisfied with Blickenstaff as their representative. He said he could not understand this and that it was the first word he had heard of such dissatisfaction. Hayes said that Blickenstaff was selected by Schwartz and someone from the Unitarian organization and that the various private agencies could have anyone on whom they could agree as the top representative in Spain and could put additional persons in Spain, but such persons would have to report to the top man.

I asked the Ambassador whether Spain would be helpful in negotiating with the Germans for the legal exodus of refugees from occupied territories. Hayes did not think the Spanish Government had any particular influence at this
point with the German Government. Moreover, he said that the commercial shipments which Portugal had been making by sealed trains through Spain had been held up for sometime because the transportation system in France was so disorganized due to Allied bombings. He did not think the transportation system would enable any large numbers of refugees to come out of France now.

The Ambassador handed me a memorandum (copy attached) prepared in the Embassy with relation to refugee matters. He said he had read over the memorandum just before he left and, unfortunately, it dealt mostly with the situation through 1943, but that the situation in 1944 was largely a continuation of the same circumstances.

At the close of the conference Hayes said that occasionally he got very angry over refugee developments and mentioned particularly the attack on him by Congressman Celler. Hayes said that he was no judge as to whether he ought to be recalled but that to say that he had no interest in refugee matters was laughable, because he had spent a great deal of time and energy on these matters.

He reiterated his position that a War Refugee Board representative in Spain could not accomplish anything. I mentioned to him what Olsen had been able to accomplish in Sweden and said I was not satisfied that more could not be accomplished in Spain; that the only way to find out was for the Board to have a representative in Spain which could report directly to it.
Secretary of State,

Washington,

July 9, 11 p.m.

Embassy has been informed by Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs that subsequent to receipt of our note 2410 of May 11 Ministry instructed Spanish Ministry in Berlin and Vichy to endeavor to obtain return to Italy persons reported to have been transferred to unknown German prison but no positive results have as yet been reported. Department's 1609, July 4, 3 p.m.

High official of Ministry has also stated that all Spanish diplomatic and consular representatives in areas under German occupation or control including Hungary have been instructed to render all possible assistance to Jews and other persons in imminent danger of death or persecution regardless of nationality and that their efforts have been responsible for the saving of an unknown number of lives.

Spanish Government has already been instrumental in saving from imminent deportation to Poland approximately 60 Sephardic Jews who have been allowed to leave German concentration camps and proceed to Spain on strength of documentation provided by Spanish diplomatic and consular representatives. Majority of these persons have been transferred to Yedaya center and Spanish Government is now negotiating with German authorities for similar release of additional 160 Sephardic Jews together with group consisting of approximately 50 Jewish children and their families. It is also cooperating with representatives of Jewish organizations in Tangier in effort to bring 50 Jewish children out of Hungary to temporary haven in Spanish Morocco.

Embassy has throughout encouraged to keep Spanish Government fully informed on attitude of United States Government in these matters as set forth in numerous telegrams from Department and War Refugee Board and can report that Spanish Government itself appears to be seriously concerned over fascist persecution of innocent persons and disposed to cooperate in their rescue.
LPG-737
Distribution of true
reading only by special
arrangement. (Deleted)

Lisbon

Dated July 8, 1944

Rec'd 2:06 p.m.

Secretary of State, Washington.

2110, July 8, 11 a.m., (SECTION ONE)

THIS MESSAGE FOR HELE FROM HANN

During my visit to Spain the Embassy received

your message should not undertake trip and suggested

that I take up with the Ambassador problems which

MacDonald was to have discussed.

Among other things matter of board's sending

special attaché for refugee problems to Spain was discussed.

At length, Ambassador Hayes stated that he was not

convinced that there was any necessity for such a

representative since refugee matters there had been

adequately handled by the Embassy and Bickenstaff Organization.

Furthermore, he mentioned that many agencies desired

to have representatives in Spain and that in such cases

he had to determine which should be represented on the

basis of necessity and their contribution to the war

effort since he could not approach Spanish for all who

decided to come as attaches. It is clear to me that

there is

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By R. H. Parks Dato SEP 12 1972
-2- #2110, July 8, 11 a.m., (SECTION ONE), from Lisbon

there is a necessity for a board representative and
I gave the Ambassador my reasons for the appointment
of such a person. However, my reasons did not convince
him and he stated that he was not prepared to agree
that there was such a necessity.

In our conversation I suggested Saxon as a
possible representative but stated that I was not
certain that he was available and that board might
have other plans. I took the liberty of suggesting
Saxon as an acting representative because (1) my
observations indicated that he possessed the operating
qualities necessary to do the job, (2) his experience
in the field, (3) he is familiar with certain difficulties
in North Africa which thus far have affected the
Spanish evacuation program, (4) I considered it
important that we have a representative in Spain
immediately. Saxon is near and I could talk with him
without necessitating too great delay in his arrival.

NORTH

USB MPL
Secretary of State
Washington

2110. July 8, 11 a.m. (SECTION TWO)

After some discussion the Ambassador stated he could not agree to accrediting him to the Spanish Government but would welcome Saxon's coming to Spain to make a thorough study of the situation not to exceed two months and if at that time Saxon could convince the Ambassador that a WNB representative in Spain could perform functions not being performed and that the performance of such served a useful purpose, the Ambassador would ask to have him accredited to the Spanish Government as Attache of Embassy. If he did not convince the Ambassador he would leave at that time. While Saxon was mentioned it is my belief that the Ambassador would accept any qualified representative on the same conditions.

My lack of knowledge of present board plans makes it difficult for me to comment fully on the above proposal. However, I do emphasize the importance of a board representative going to Spain soon if one is to go.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 11-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 12 1972
to go there.

At present fewer refugees are entering Spain than at previous times. Some doubt are waiting to see progress of invasion. French resistance is said to have cut rail communications with southern border. Also rescue operations do not appear as active as might be expected. It seems likely that if invasion moves slowly and Germans increase persecutions as in Hungary, the Pyrenees will erupt with refugees attempting to escape. The new problems with which we may be confronted there makes it imperative in my opinion that we have a representative in the area.

Pursuant to the practice the two Embassies, copy of this being sent Ma' a.

(END OF MESSAGE)
Some figures on relief work done by this office during the month of June 1944

### General

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visits received at this office</td>
<td>1118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Payments made cash, check and money-orders</td>
<td>1583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail received (letters, telegrams)</td>
<td>1492</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mail despatched</td>
<td>1458</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full maintenance paid to refugees in Madrid</td>
<td>235 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; provinces</td>
<td>94 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refugees served with articles of clothing</td>
<td>64 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Prison, Camp, Forced Residence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hot meals served in Madrid prisons</td>
<td>725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; Parcels of food and clothing delivered in Madrid</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; sent out to provinces</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weekly money assistance sent to internees in provinces</td>
<td>205 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visited in Madrid prisons</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberated for evacuation from Miranda camp</td>
<td>36 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Mendoles camp</td>
<td>19 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; prisons</td>
<td>12 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; Forced residences</td>
<td>5 &quot;</td>
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### Medical Care

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Visits received by our refugee doctor at office</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of these 128: 73 direct advice to general practitioners</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 to specialists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 to dentists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 to oculists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prescriptions for medicines issued</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visits made by our refugee doctor</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Migration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left from Madrid for Argentina</td>
<td>9 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left from Barcelona for United States</td>
<td>1 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evacuated to Federla camp with special convoy June 21</td>
<td>773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applications for entering Federla camp examined</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Screened applications received from British, French and American authorities</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine applications handled</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Money Transfers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transfers authorized for 1942 for</td>
<td>16 persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07/3T</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
MEMORANDUM ON REFUGEE RELIEF ACTIVITIES OF
AMERICAN EMBASSY IN MADRID, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO PROPOSED PARTICIPATION OF WAR
REFUGEE BOARD

The problem of refugee relief in Spain is one with
which the American Embassy in Madrid was squarely faced
in November, 1942 following the German occupation of
the formerly Unoccupied Zone of France and the consequent
exodus of refugees across the Pyrenees frontier, and is
one which since that time, as the Department is aware,
has occupied the attention and efforts of the Embassy
and certain of the American consular offices in Spain
to an extent which at times has severely taxed their
facilities.

As has been previously reported in extenso to the
Department (see Embassy's confidential despatch No. 960
of May 31, 1943) the Embassy undertook late in December,
1942, in accordance with a division of labor agreed upon
with the British Embassy, to assume responsibility for
the care of all French and American refugees arriving
in Spain and began at once, with the aid of funds made
available by the American Red Cross and the Department,
to organize a program of relief designed to provide
desperately-needed material assistance to the thousands
of such persons who, despite the rigors of winter, were
beginning to make their way across the snowbound
Pyrenees in search of refuge.

In undertaking responsibility for the care of French
as well as American refugees, the Embassy was prompted by

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more
more than purely humanitarian motives, for it was strongly felt that, at a time when we were committed to the struggle to free French North Africa from Axis military control, and at a time when we were seeking the cooperation of the best elements among the French people and their leaders in the hope of establishing in North Africa the basis for a free and democratic French State, the abandonment by the American Government in Spain of thousands of French refugees who had fled from France in the expectation of our help might have a lastingly injurious effect upon their faith in us and consequently upon our efforts in North Africa and our future relations with France.

There was, moreover, the more immediate consideration that within this group of refugees were included some of France's finest military leadership and thousands of her best fighting men, whose presence in North Africa was considered by the military authorities there to be of the greatest importance in connection with the reconstitution of French military strength, and for this reason, as well as in order to clear the way for additional numbers of refugees, the immediately initiated representations to the Spanish Government looking toward the rapid evacuation of these persons from Spain to North Africa. As a consequence of these representations the Spanish Government in March, 1943 authorized the departure of French refugees by way of Portugal, a cumbersome route at best, and in September of that year, in spite of strong German
German pressure aimed at preventing it, finally agreed to their direct evacuation by sea to North Africa from Spanish ports, a decision which was largely responsible for the fact that more than 16,000 French refugees were evacuated from Spain during 1943.

Concurrent with the Embassy's policy of caring for French refugees during this period when they had no one else to whom to turn for assistance were its efforts to foster and strengthen French North African representation in Spain to a point where it could itself assume that responsibility, and as a result of those efforts, and the consequent acceptance by the Spanish Government of such representation on an informal basis, the French Mission in Madrid, the outgrowth of a single French Liaison Officer attached to the American Embassy, was enabled during the course of 1943 to take over from the Embassy the bulk of the work and financial responsibility involved in the care and evacuation of its refugees.

At the same time, over 25,000 French refugees were evacuated.

What might otherwise have been a serious gap in the Allied program of refugee relief in Spain was filled at the beginning of 1943 by the agreement of several interested private American charitable organizations to cooperate in the task of caring for stateless and unprotected refugees, persons who either could not or would not claim aid and protection as nationals of any of the countries maintaining diplomatic and consular representation in Spain. In accordance
accordance with the belief that the thoroughly effective participation of these organizations could be assured only by means of a unification of their operations through a single directive agency, there was established in Madrid early in that year, with the approval of the Spanish Government, the so-called "Representation in Spain of American Relief Organizations" (embracing representation of the American Friends Service Committee, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, the Unitarian Service Committee and subsequently the War Relief Services of the National Catholic Welfare Conference) which, by virtue of the constant support which it has received from the Embassy and the extremely able manner in which it has discharged its duties, has since come to be recognized by the Spanish Government as the agency principally concerned with the welfare of stateless and otherwise unprotected refugees in Spain (see Embassy's despatch No. 1932 of January 24, 1944).

Whereas the refugee problem in Spain at the beginning of 1943 was a rapidly-growing problem the ultimate extent of which could only be surmised, by the end of that year it had been reduced to relatively minor proportions by virtue of the large numbers of persons evacuated during that period and the reduced rate at which refugees of all categories were then entering Spain. In addition to the evacuations
of French refugees to which reference has been made, more than 4,500 refugees of other categories, principally Allied and stateless, were evacuated by their respective Missions and agencies in Spain. This number, which included approximately 427 American military refugees, 200 declared American civilian refugees and 250 stateless persons, brought to an estimated 20,700 the total number of refugees evacuated from Spain during 1943, out of an estimated total of less than 23,000 who had entered the country (see Embassy's strictly confidential despatch No. 1967 of January 31, 1944), the residue being made up principally of French and stateless refugees, the majority of whom have been included among the estimated 3,500 persons who have been evacuated during the first six months of 1944.

It should not be overlooked, in appraising the refugee situation in Spain, that the substantial accomplishments of the past 18 months would have been impossible without the cooperation of the Spanish Government, cooperation which has been maintained in the face of constant opposition on the part of Axis representatives in Spain and pro-Axis elements within the Government itself. Not only has the latter during that period permitted the transit through Spain and consequent escape from German hands of more than 24,000 persons, the vast majority of whom have been fleeing their shackled homelands in order to be free once again to take up arms against the enemy, but it has also used its influence with the German Government to rescue from imminent deportation to Poland approximately 500 Sephardic Jews who, through its efforts, have been brought to Spain for transfer to havens of safety in French
French North Africa. The Spanish Government is, moreover, at the present time understood to be negotiating for the release of an additional 160 Sephardic Jews and of a group of Jewish rabbis and their families believed to total about 200 persons.

As the Embassy has previously pointed out, however, the willingness of the Spanish Government to cooperate with the Embassy and the Representation in Spain of American Relief Organizations in the rescue and relief of stateless refugees bears a direct relationship to the rate at which such refugees can be evacuated from Spain, and, although approximately 1,400 stateless refugees have been evacuated through the efforts of the abovementioned agency during the past year, there are estimated to be nearly 1,000 still on Spanish soil, most of whom are unable to proceed further for lack of an assured destination, a considerable number of them having already been refused admission to the North African Refugee Center at Fedhala by the French North African authorities.

In January, 1944 the Embassy was informed, in the Department's telegram No. 207 of January 25, midnight, of the creation, under the President's Executive Order of January 22, 1944, of the War Refugee Board, and received the first of a series of telegraphic instructions intended to carry out the Board's avowed policy of effecting the immediate
immediate rescue and relief of Jews and other victims of enemy persecution in Europe. Although the Department has been kept fully informed concerning the more important developments in the refugee situation in Spain and concerning the Embassy's part in those developments, the Board's instructions from the beginning gave evidence of little understanding of that situation and of even less understanding of the implications of American policy in Spain in fields more closely related to the war effort.

It was apparently not well understood by the Board, for example, that although a critical refugee problem existed in Spain during most of 1943, it had, through the efforts of the Embassy and other Allied Missions and the cooperation of the Spanish Government, been reduced by the beginning of 1944 to a minor problem easily capable of being handled by existing facilities. Neither does the Board appear to have clearly understood the extent to which the Embassy and the Representation in Spain of American Relief Organizations have, throughout the past 18 months, interested themselves in the welfare of stateless and unprotected refugees, or the extent to which the Spanish Government, as outlined above, has cooperated in their rescue and relief, and the Embassy's suggestion, made in its confidential telegram No. 683 of February 28, 1944, 6 p.m., that the Spanish Government might best contribute to the rescue of refugees from German-controlled areas of Europe by negotiating with the German Government for further releases similar to those already mentioned elicited no comment from the Board.
Despite its eagerness to do everything possible to assist the Board in accomplishing its high purpose, the Embassy has been hindered in carrying out its instructions by the apparent reluctance of the Board to take advantage of the experience already gained by those actively engaged in the work of refugee relief in Spain and to shape its efforts to fit the conditions which that experience has shown to exist. The instructions of the Board have, moreover, at least with respect to Spain, revealed an unrealistic lack of comprehension of the implications involved in their implementation, with the result that the Embassy has more than once been obliged to report that it must refrain from carrying out such instructions in order to avoid the danger of compromising other important objectives.

In the Department's confidential telegram No. 463 of February 18, 1944, midnight, for example, the Board proposed that, in order to facilitate the entry of refugees into Spain, the Embassy request the Spanish Government to relax its border controls, when, in fact, aside from the consideration that no refugees were being prevented from entering Spain by the Spanish border control, the maintenance of such control by the Spanish authorities along a border adjacent to German-held territory was in our interest, particularly in connection with our efforts to reduce the number of German agents in Spain and to prevent the smuggling out of Spain of wolfram and other commodities which we were attempting to keep from the enemy by means of preemptive purchase and quota control, both of which constituted
constituted objectives of the greatest and most immediate importance to the war effort.

In the Department's confidential telegram No. 1515 of May 26, 1944, midnight, as another example, the Board, in connection with the reported campaign of extermination of Jews in Hungary, requested the Embassy to urge the Spanish Government to increase the number of its diplomatic and consular representatives in that country, apparently unaware that the Embassy had been instructed by the Department only a short time before to endeavor to discourage relations between the Spanish Government and the puppet Budapest regime. The difficulties with which the Embassy is confronted in trying to carry out the instructions of the Board under such circumstances are obvious.

The Embassy, in numerous communications to the Department, has endeavored to make it clear that it is fully in sympathy with the purpose of the War Refugee Board, with which there can be no quarrel, but it would like once more to record its conviction that the means by which such purpose can best be served in Spain cannot be determined without reference to conditions as they are known to exist in this country or in disregard of the settled objectives of American policy in Spain.

The Embassy is confident, moreover, that the work which the Board can profitably do in Spain toward the accomplishment of its purpose can not only best be determined
determined by those familiar with such conditions and such objectives, but can also, at least under present conditions, be adequately and effectively handled by the Embassy and the Representation in Spain of American Relief Organizations with the proven facilities now existing.

Madrid, July 7, 1944.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dispatch No.</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Subject</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1391</td>
<td>August 5, 1943</td>
<td>Transmitting report on evacuation of Allied refugees from Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>365</td>
<td>October 1, 1943</td>
<td>Transmitting exchange of notes concerning direct evacuation of French refugees from Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1209</td>
<td>June 10, 1943</td>
<td>Transmitting copy and translation of Circular No. 78 issued by Direction General de Seguridad concerning treatment of foreign refugees in Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602</td>
<td>January 31, 1944</td>
<td>Transmitting report on evacuation of Allied refugees during 1943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>960</td>
<td>January 24, 1944</td>
<td>Report on activities of Representation in Spain of American Relief Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>648</td>
<td>February 16, 1944</td>
<td>Transmitting report on evacuation of Allied refugees from Spain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165</td>
<td>August 16, 1943</td>
<td>Transmitting report on French diplomatic and consular representation in Spain</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LIST OF DISPATCHES FROM AMBASSADOR RELATING TO REFUGEES IN SPAIN
**LIST OF TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED WITH DEPARTMENT RELATIVE TO ACTIVITIES OF WAR REFUGEE BOARD**

**Received:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Time</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>January 25, 1944</td>
<td>midnight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>463</td>
<td>February 18, 1944</td>
<td>midnight</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>530</td>
<td>February 25, 1944</td>
<td>10 p.m.</td>
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<tr>
<td>726</td>
<td>March 16, 1944</td>
<td>7 p.m.</td>
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<tr>
<td>752</td>
<td>March 18, 1944</td>
<td>4 p.m.</td>
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<tr>
<td>799</td>
<td>March 23, 1944</td>
<td>5 p.m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>992</td>
<td>April 10, 1944</td>
<td>10 p.m.</td>
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**Sent:**

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<th>No.</th>
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<tr>
<td>683</td>
<td>February 28, 1944</td>
<td>6 p.m.</td>
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<tr>
<td>738</td>
<td>March 3, 1944</td>
<td>11 p.m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>974</td>
<td>March 20, 1944</td>
<td>6 p.m.</td>
</tr>
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<td>997</td>
<td>March 22, 1944</td>
<td>6 p.m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1195</td>
<td>April 6, 1944</td>
<td>9 a.m.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1397</td>
<td>April 21, 1944</td>
<td>6 p.m.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>June 26, 1944</td>
<td>9 p.m.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
For Immediate Release
Wednesday, June 21, 1944

REPORTS TO AID REFUGEES COMPLETELY STUDIED
IN SPAIN BY OUR AMBASSADOR HAYES

GELLER DEMANDS RECALL

STATEMENT BY CONGRESSMAN EMANUEL GELLER,
REPRESENTATIVE TENTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT, NEW YORK

The War Refugee Board was established by Presidential Directive in January. Under the able direction of John W. Peble, many refugees have already been saved.

Because of the work of the War Refugee Board, successful cooperation has been gained in a number of our American embassies and legations, notably in Bern, Lisbon, Stockholm, Ankara, as well as in capitals of Latin American countries. But like a lonely island in a great sea, Madrid is the exception. Absolutely no cooperation has been accorded by our Ambassador to Spain, Carlton Hayes. This is most reprehensible and passing strange.

The President has set up a free port or a haven at Port Ontario, New York for these unfortunate refugees. Following his example, England has granted several thousand certificates of entrance to Palestine to these refugees who are to be taken out of Southern Italy, having come there through the underground. The military will have to relieve the necessity for supporting and feeding them. Again, following the President's example, England has liked so established a free port for refugees. Spain, too, might follow in establishing such havens if Ambassador Hayes would so much as approach the Spanish Government to place the suggestion before it.

Because of the cruel recalcitrance of Mr. Hayes, money for the relief and escape of refugees was sent to Portugal and several hundred were saved. Mr. Hayes resented this; his pride had been injured because his inaction had been circumvented, Mr. Hayes complained. It is noteworthy that had Mr. Hayes been willing to cooperate, thousands could have been saved through Spain instead of hundreds through Portugal. Our Minister in Lisbon, Mr. Norweb, has been most humane and actively sympathetic in his attitude and stands ready to do more if aid were forthcoming from Carlton Hayes.

What are the motives and reasons behind Ambassador Hayes' attitude? The burden is upon him.

It is common knowledge that Ambassador Hayes has not even tried to obtain the cooperation of the Spanish Government in carrying out the policy of the President as announced in the directive setting up the War Refugee Board. It is hard to believe that the Spanish Government, if approached on humanitarian grounds, would not be willing to help in this great cause.

Ambassador Hayes has the hardihood to balk not only the War Refugee Board and the Treasury Department but the State Department as well. The Treasury Department with the approval of the State Department has issued a license to an American relief organization in Spain to carry on relief and evacuation work therein. Ambassador Hayes has actually refused to transmit to the American relief organization this license approved by such high authority. It is exactly on par with a like license issued to relief organizations in Switzerland. In the case of Switzerland, the issuance of such a license, together with the cooperation of the Legation at Bern, has resulted in greatly furthering the relief and evacuation program.

It is the studied policy of the War Refugee Board in seeking cooperation of various countries to relieve the governments of all burdens, since the Board guarantees maintenance and rapid evacuation of all refugees. The cost has been borne by private agencies and at no expense to the American Government. Nonetheless, there has been consistent refusal on the part of Hayes to present to the Spanish Government for its consideration any plan to facilitate the evacuation of refugees into and through Spain, despite the fact there would be no responsibility of
maintenance attached to the Spanish Government. In other words, the Ambassador has been reluctant, for reasons best known to himself, to ask the Spanish Government to take any action. It would cost Spain nothing and yet gain for her world good will.

It is difficult to understand the position taken by Ambassador Hayes. Can he arrogate unto himself the authority to defeat the President's declared policy? Does he not appreciate that his adamantine and cold-blooded attitude has tied the hands of the War Refugee Board? Has Ambassador Hayes grown so inhuman as to fail to realize that human lives are at stake?

The War Refugee Board is concrete proof that where there is a will to achieve coupled with humanitarian purposes, and where the organization is not bogged down with red tape and diplomatic niceties, work can be accomplished which the weak and hesitant failed to do. For example, take the case of Turkey. Before the establishment of the War Refugee Board, we had in Turkey an Ambassador who was ready and willing to render all possible aid, but who lacked the official backing of Washington. But with the promulgation of the War Refugee Board, Ambassador Steinhardt has been the means of initiating, together with Ira Hirschmann, official representative of the War Refugee Board in Turkey, a program that has already saved many lives. And there were those who said previously it could not be done. How much more shabby and ill-considered then is the attitude of Ambassador Hayes?

It would indeed be tragic if the efforts of the War Refugee Board were thwarted by Hayes persistent refusal to permit a full time representatives of the War Refugee Board to be stationed in Spain, for so he has done, despite the fact that other countries have raised no such objection.

Will Ambassador Hayes be permitted to make policy in contradiction to the stated policy of our President?

The time has come to put the screws upon the Francophile. Hayes should be recalled.
I called Mr. Leavitt of the JDC and discussed with him the standing in Spain of Dr. Sequerra and the relationship of Dr. Sequerra to Mr. Blickenstaff.

Mr. Leavitt stated that when the refugee problem first became acute in Spain in 1937, the JDC had tried to obtain permission to have an American representative of their organization go to Spain to operate on their behalf. When it became clear that it was impossible to send an American to Spain, the JDC arranged for Dr. Sequerra to go instead. Dr. Sequerra was able to enter Spain immediately and was associated with the Portuguese Red Cross. Dr. Sequerra operated primarily out of Barcelona, and he and his staff were the sole representatives of the JDC up to the time that Blickenstaff entered Spain. At that time, the Blickenstaff were in Spain, or shortly thereafter, he became the head of the "joint representation." In this capacity, he represented primarily the Sequerra and the JDC. Subsequently, other organizations have been included in the group that he represents.

In the beginning, there was some confusion with respect to the various jurisdictions to be exercised by Blickenstaff and by Sequerra. However, inasmuch as Sequerra was concerned primarily with the Barcelona area and Blickenstaff with the Madrid area, their difficulties were soon ironed out and they now work together without friction.

It appears from what Mr. Leavitt said that most of Sequerra's action is taken independently; that occasionally he refers matters to Blickenstaff in Madrid but that Dr. Schwanta in Lisbon is regarded by the JDC as being in charge of the activities of both insofar as the JDC is concerned.

All funds sent by the JDC to Spain have been sent to Sequerra. A budget has been worked out whereby Sequerra allocates something in the neighborhood of 30% of available funds to Blickenstaff and retains the rest for his operations. This allocation is on the basis of the need for funds in the two areas; the need in the Barcelona area apparently being much greater than in the Madrid sector. As far as the JDC is concerned, Sequerra has had complete responsibility for distribution of the funds, and is accountable for allocations and expenditures. Mr. Leavitt stated that the JDC had not considered sending funds directly to Blickenstaff because Blickenstaff is not regarded by them as their employee. Mr. Leavitt did state, however, that the JDC bore approximately 2/3 of the expenses involved in running Blickenstaff's office in Madrid.
Mr. Leavitt stated that he did not know Dr. Seguerra personally but that all reports received about him had been very favorable. He said that he was sure that Dr. Schwartz would not have allowed Seguerra to operate for three years on behalf of the JDC if he had any doubts as to Seguerra's loyalty or honesty. Mr. Leavitt stated that the JDC is again trying to get an American representative into Spain.
MEMORANDUM

1. Justly or unjustly, a fairly widespread impression has arisen in this country that Ambassador Hayes is not wholeheartedly sympathetic with this Government’s efforts to rescue refugees, particularly the Jews, and that opportunities to save lives are being lost as a result of this attitude.

2. While Hayes may have been guided in his action in refugee matters by many considerations which could not be reported in his cables, the Board itself is confused as to Hayes’ real attitude in the matter. Very frankly, the reasons stated by Hayes for not taking certain action requested of him by the Board have, in many cases, not been convincing. The Board is most anxious to ascertain the real facts of the case for its own information and guidance and, insofar as possible, for the purpose of clearing up any misunderstanding in the matter which may exist in the minds of the public, press and private agencies.

3. It is particularly important to answer the following points which remain without satisfactory explanation upon the basis of the record to date:

(a) Hayes has consistently been unwilling to explain to the Spanish Government the importance and significance of this Government’s new refugee policy. The very fact that the President deemed it essential to establish the War Refugee Board with its broad specific powers and authorizations was an important indication that this Government was determined to leave no stone unturned in its efforts to rescue refugees. This policy was explained in detail to Hayes on various occasions and he was requested from the outset to bring it to the attention of the Spanish Government. As far as the Board knows he has not yet done so. Even if Hayes deemed it wise to make any concrete requests of the Spanish Government, it was and is extremely important fully to inform that Government of the policy. Realizing the significance of the matter and the importance we attach to it, the Spanish Government for reasons of its own, might well have offered to assist either generally or in specific instances.

What seems to be a glaring example of Hayes’ disinclination even to let the Spanish Government know of the importance we attach to the saving of refugees is the apparently perfunctory manner in which he brought to the attention of that Government the President’s Statement of March 24. The President’s Statement was transmitted to the Spanish Government by the Embassy with a mere note of transmittal, and the use which was made of the statement in Spain
when compared with the play given to it by our other diplomatic missions was ridiculously limited and ineffective. It would seem that a person fully cognizant of the Government's policy and sympathetic with it, would have realized the great significance of the statement and would have made a much greater effort to bring home its significance to the Spanish Government and the Spanish people. This was effectively done in other neutral countries by other ambassadors.

The only justification of Hayes non-action in this regard seems to stem from his opinion that our other dealings with Spain would have been prejudiced by mentioning refugee matters. It seems to the Board that in no event would a frank explanation of our humanitarian policy have interfered with other dealings with the Spanish Government. In any event this justification, if it ever existed, certainly did not always have the same potency, and there must have been occasions when a presentation of U. S. policy on refugees would have been appropriate and effective.

Mr. Hayes apparently does not take the position that the Spanish Government has done everything possible to encourage the entry of refugees into Spain, although he does state that as far as he knows no steps have been taken actually to keep people from crossing the border. As a matter of fact, there are many indications that the Spanish Government, far from being cooperative, has been most uncooperative in refugee matters. (We must exclude the question of French refugees which involved other considerations). For example, the detailed report of representatives of the Friends who visited Spain makes it clear that the Spanish Government has continually done many things to make the lives of refugees in Spain unbearable. Moreover, there is a report from a reliable source (the Belgian Government in Exile) that the Spanish Government has actually impeded the entry of refugees into Spain. It seems perfectly clear that a more favorable attitude on the part of the Spanish Government would have improved and still would improve the refugee situation in Spain. It is not clear to the Board that an effort by Hayes to induce such a more favorable attitude as suggested in many cables by the Board would in any way have complicated or impaired our relations with Spain since our request would have been based purely on humanitarian grounds.

(b) Apparently Hayes is completely disinclined to take any steps to increase the number of refugees entering Spain. Although Hayes attributes the fact to the attitude of the Germans and not the Spaniards, he does recognize that only a mere trickle of refugees has been entering Spain from France in the past six months. Yet he has apparently failed either fully to explore the reasons for this fact or to cooperate in the only available measures for increasing the flow.
One obvious way to increase the number entering Spain is to do everything possible to facilitate clandestine entry from France to Spain. This the Board has attempted to encourage through the licensing of reputable private refugee organizations. Hayes has actively opposed this effort. Many of the reasons stated for his opposition appear rather nebulous. For example, the suggestion that the increase of refugee traffic would permit the Germans to set more agents into Spain appears somewhat ridiculous in view of the large diplomatic and non-diplomatic German group in Spain and the relative facilities of communication and transportation between Spain and German-occupied territory.

The most compelling argument of Hayes, at least on its face, is the suggestion that increased refugee traffic might impede the rescue of allied military personnel. If true, this is a serious matter and the Board has consistently indicated that under no circumstances should refugee rescue operations be permitted which have this effect. Hayes tells the Board that it is impossible to carry on any such refugee evacuations without interfering with military rescues. The Board has not received from Hayes or from other sources an explanation of why this is necessary so and why the refugee traffic cannot be separated from the military traffic. In any event, so far as the Board has been informed, Hayes has made no effort to determine whether ways and means can be found for so organizing refugee traffic. In view of this Government's refugee policy, it seems indispensable that before closing this channel of saving refugees a careful examination be made of all possibilities. The project certainly should not lightly be dismissed upon the assumption that refugee traffic will automatically and under all circumstances interfere with military traffic. A clear understanding of and sympathy with the President's policy would seem to dictate something more than automatic opposition to operations which have been facilitated by the Board in an effort to keep open one of the very few remaining channels for saving the lives of innocent people.

Another possible means of increasing the flow of refugees from France into Spain, suggested by Hayes himself as early as February 23, apparently has not been carried forward. Hayes suggested that the Spanish Government could best expedite the release of refugees by directly approaching the German Government itself with an offer to grant transit visas to such refugees. So far as the Board knows, Hayes has taken no action along this line, although the Board has repeatedly made it clear to him that he can advise the Spanish Government that refugees entering Spain will be taken elsewhere and that the Board will make financial arrangements for the care of refugee children in Spain. Generally a desire was understood and one
Hayes' insistence on the air-tight centralization of all refugee activities under Blickenstaff and his apparent unwillingness to have private refugee organizations operate actively in Spain also seems to indicate either lack of understanding or lack of sympathy. Hayes may seek to justify this limitation of refugee rescue and activity on the grounds of a desire to coordinate and thereby facilitate operations and also because of a supposed objection by the Spanish Government to the admittance of other representatives. However, the obvious fact that no sizeable refugee operations are now being carried on in Spain offers some basis for inferring that Hayes does not desire to have all possibilities explored and exploited. This possibility is lent some support by the rather intemperate attacks made by Hayes upon Sequerra and Schwartz. In the case of Sequerra, Hayes' comments are not only undocumented and tenuous, but are inconsistent with other accounts from reliable sources including the Friends. Upon the basis of these facts it is difficult to avoid the inference that Hayes' main interest is to keep refugee operations as small and tightly controlled as possible rather than to exploit the full possibilities of Spain as a transit point for saving the lives of refugees now in enemy territory.

(c) Upon the basis of the record to date Hayes is apparently unwilling to permit a full exploration of the possibilities of expanding refugee traffic through Spain. He has repeatedly indicated that nothing more is needed in Spain than the small relief staff now operating under the supervision of Blickenstaff. This ignores completely the question of rescue. Hayes' unwillingness to have Blickenstaff act as full-time representative of the Board indicates either a lack of understanding of the problem or an unwillingness to have it opened up.

Hayes' insistence on the air-tight centralization of all refugee activities under Blickenstaff and his apparent unwillingness to have private refugee organizations operate actively in Spain also seems to indicate either lack of understanding or lack of sympathy. Hayes may seek to justify this limitation of refugee rescue and activity on the grounds of a desire to coordinate and thereby facilitate operations and also because of a supposed objection by the Spanish Government to the admittance of other representatives. However, the obvious fact that no sizeable refugee operations are now being carried on in Spain offers some basis for inferring that Hayes does not desire to have all possibilities explored and exploited. This possibility is lent some support by the rather intemperate attacks made by Hayes upon Sequerra and Schwartz. In the case of Sequerra, Hayes' comments are not only undocumented and tenuous, but are inconsistent with other accounts from reliable sources including the Friends. Upon the basis of these facts it is difficult to avoid the inference that Hayes' main interest is to keep refugee operations as small and tightly controlled as possible rather than to exploit the full possibilities of Spain as a transit point for saving the lives of refugees now in enemy territory.
(d) The difficulty of understanding Hayes' attitude and the reasons advanced by him is increased when the operations of the Board through American diplomatic representatives in other neutral countries is examined. Our ambassadors and ministers in Turkey, Sweden, Switzerland and Portugal have certainly faced many political and economic problems as difficult as those faced by Ambassador Hayes, and yet they have not only clearly understood this Government's refugee policy but have made it clear to the Governments to which they are accredited. They have in certain cases requested and obtained from the Governments to which they are accredited action more onerous and burdensome than that which Hayes has been asked to obtain from the Spanish Government. Some of these Governments incidentally would, it should be assumed, be less motivated by humanitarian consideration than the Christian Government of Spain. Our diplomatic representatives in these countries have on their own account, and in certain cases without receiving detailed suggestions from this Government, such as were given to Hayes, explored fully all possibilities in their area for saving the lives of refugees in enemy territory. They have cooperated most fully with private organizations and they have facilitated clandestine operations which have resulted in the saving of lives. Without incurring the displeasure of the neutral governments to which they are accredited they have done many things which Hayes has refused to do.
At the present moment, Spain is practically the only country through which Jews and other similar groups in danger of death in German occupied territory can be brought to safety. This fact offers the Spanish Government an unparalleled opportunity to perform an outstanding humanitarian service. Action by the Spanish Government to encourage the transit of such refugees through Spain would certainly produce the most favorable reaction everywhere, and particularly in the United States where the Government itself is actively using its powers and resources to rescue these unfortunate people.

Although the exact reasons for the situation are not entirely clear, it is known that the flow of refugees from France to Spain is now no more than a mere trickle. The Spanish Government can, it is believed, take certain measures to change this situation and make possible the rescue of many persons whose lives are now in danger. For example:

1. To the extent that the entry of refugees lacking proper documentation is now being impeded by the Spanish border controls, the escape of refugees to safety in Spain could be greatly facilitated by appropriate administrative action by the Spanish Government. If the liberal attitude of the Spanish Government in this regard were then to be made known to refugees in occupied France, many more might attempt to brave the physical hardships involved in crossing the border.

2. To the extent that the small number of refugees now entering Spain may be due to the attitude of the German or French authorities, the Spanish Government might, by appropriate representations to such authorities, secure the release of Jews and similar groups. In this connection, it may be noted that the successful humanitarian efforts of the Spanish Government to obtain the release of Sephardic Jews from France are well and favorably known in the United States. It may be that efforts to obtain from the German and French authorities permission for other Jewish and similar groups, and particularly children, to leave France for Spain would now have an excellent chance of success.

It is realized that if the number of refugees entering Spain were greatly increased as a result of action along the lines indicated certain problems of care and maintenance in Spain would exist for temporary periods preceding removal of the refugees to other countries. Fortunately, however, in the present circumstances the Spanish Government could, if it so desired, receive all necessary assistance in meeting these problems from private and governmental organizations in the United States.

It is the publicly announced policy of the Government of the United States to take all measures within its power to effect the rescue and relief of Jews and other similar persons in danger of death in German occupied territory. In order to carry out the policy without delay, President Roosevelt in January of this year, established a War Refugee Board, composed of the
Secretaries of State, Treasury and War, and conferred upon it extremely broad powers. The Board was made directly responsible to the President and was ordered in clear and unequivocal terms to leave no stone unturned in its efforts to save the lives of refugees. Since its establishment the War Refugee Board, acting through an Executive Director and with a full-time professional staff, has taken vigorous measures to carry out the President's mandate. The Board has not only given full support and assistance to private American organizations engaged in refugee work, but has manifested its desire to cooperate with governmental and private groups in other countries for this purpose. The Board has clearly indicated that it fully recognizes the problems which have to be faced by neutral countries which admit refugees, and has manifested its willingness to lend all aid to such countries in meeting these problems.

The Board is prepared to lend financial assistance in the care of refugees whose entry is encouraged into neutral countries, and, if the neutral countries involved so desire, in willing to assume responsibility for removing such refugees rapidly from the neutral transit country to havens of refuge elsewhere. The Board is presently considering the establishment of temporary havens of refuge in the United States to which refugees entering neutral countries can be brought. As the result of the Board's efforts, assurances have already been given to the Government of Switzerland that children entering Switzerland will be given visas enabling them to come to the United States. Similar action is being taken in the case of children entering Spain. The Board is actively interesting itself in facilitating the removal of stateless refugees from Spain to a camp in North Africa, in order that the Spanish Government will be relieved of this additional burden. It is important to note that the Board has not limited its guarantee to remove refugees from neutral countries merely to the capacity of one camp in North Africa, but is willing to assume responsibility for removing from Spain, for example, all refugees, whatever the master, who may be permitted to enter in the future.

If the Spanish Government were to take the action suggested above, it might be desirable to establish reception centers near the Spanish-French frontier to which all of such refugees could be taken immediately upon their entry. Here the refugees could be given medical care and be kept with a minimum of interference with the Spanish economy until they were taken to some other country. This would minimize the problems of the Spanish Government. If the Spanish Government desired to take this step and wished assistance from the United States there is no doubt that the War Refugee Board would be willing to make financial arrangements for the establishment and maintenance of the camps, and would also be willing to assume the responsibility of removing promptly from Spain all refugees entering such camps. Moreover, technical personnel to run such camps, if desired by the Spanish Government, could, without question, be furnished by the War Refugee
Board or by private American charitable organizations such as, for example, the Friends Service Committee and the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee.

In view of the urgent humanitarian considerations involved in the present situation of Jewish and similar groups in France, the Spanish Government may well wish to consider whether it would be prepared to take action of the nature indicated.
CABLE TO AMBASSADOR HAYES, MADRID.

Please refer to your No. 683 of February 28, with respect to War Refugee Board. Your comments and suggestions are appreciated.

War Refugee Board wishes to make clear to you that Camp Lysante will not be the only haven of refuge to which refugees can be removed from Spain. The Board is currently carrying on negotiations for other havens, and you should assume and may advise the Spanish Government that refugees will be found for all entering Spain from occupied areas.

The Board is delighted to learn that the Spanish Government is not putting obstacles in the way of stateless and other refugees attempting to enter Spain from France with or without proper documentation, and is hopeful that that Government will in the future follow a generous policy in this regard.

The Board is aware of the fact that at present the number of stateless refugees entering Spain from occupied territory is extremely small. The Board however wishes to inform you that it is presently taking vigorous steps vis-à-vis Germany and its satellites which it is hoped will have the effect of stimulating the flow of refugees from occupied territories into neutral countries including Spain. The Board will continue to take all possible action to this end.

In any event the flow of refugees into Spain is certain to increase in the approaching months when the snow melts in the passes of the Pyrenees.

The Board believes that as a result of the pressure which is now being brought to bear upon the Axis, and as a result of the coming of Spring, Spain is very likely to receive substantial numbers of refugees in the near future. The Board is most anxious to relieve the Spanish Government of as many as possible of the problems, including finance, supply and supervision, which will necessarily be involved in connection with this influx. Accordingly, the War Refugee Board submits the following plan of proposed operations in Spain for your consideration, advice, and comment, and such action as may be necessary.

The Special Attaché to your Embassy would supervise under you all the Board's operations in Spain, including the establishment and maintenance of refugee camps. He will have assigned to him a small staff which might include Transportation, Supply and Finance Officers. It is planned that
the Attaché and his immediate staff base their operations in Madrid. In addition to the Madrid staff, should the volume of refugees so warrant, it is proposed that up to three reception centers be established along the Franco-Spanish frontier. Each of these centers would have a supervisor possessing experience in refugee work. Each supervisor would likewise have a small staff. At least one Medical Officer and possibly a small nursing staff would also serve at each of the centers. An important member of the staff of the centers would be a qualified Security Officer approved by the War Department. These Security Officers would, of course, be assigned to the reception centers as refugee welfare workers rather than to the Office of the Military Attaché in the Embassy. They would have the dual responsibility of screening refugees in search of possible enemy agents and obtaining possible military information from the bona fide refugees. It is tentatively proposed that reception centers be established at Figueras, Tortosa, and Tarragona (or such other localities as may be agreed upon) as points readily accessible to all who cross the Pyrenees. The Board considers it desirable that these centers should be in frontier zones rather than in the interior of Spain for the following reasons:

(1) The nearness of the centers to the border would reduce to a minimum the time during which the refugees would be on the hands of the Spanish authorities.

(2) Most of the refugees will have been in hiding in France and subjected to the rigors of strenuous travel on foot over mountain trails and will require, once they have crossed the Spanish frontier, immediate assistance with regard to food, medical attention and clothing. The refugees would be kept as far as possible out of the principal population centers, particularly Madrid. It is felt that the remoteness of the proposed centers would minimize attention to the presence of the refugees in Spain.

(3) The location of the centers near to the frontier would permit close cooperation between their staffs and Spanish frontier officials. The refugees would remain in the reception centers only so long as is necessary to assure medical officers that they were in physical condition to travel, to permit preliminary security screening and to provide refugees with the necessary travel documents.

As the fundamental plan is to move as rapidly as possible to North Africa those refugees who may enter Spain from enemy-occupied territory, it is hoped that the French authorities will assign to their Delegation in Madrid, for special detail to the reception centers, officers qualified to screen refugees for security and to affix the necessary visa to their travel documents.
In this connection, it is indeed possible and probable that enemy agents may attempt to disguise themselves as refugees and enter Spain. It is evidently desirable, therefore, that, should the Security Officers identify such identification not be disclosed in Spain but that the agents be passed along to North Africa for apprehension there. This has been the policy toward enemy agents in the past; it is obviously preferable that they be in custody in United Nations’ territory rather than at liberty in neutral country.

Do you perceive any objections which the Spanish Government might raise to the establishment of these centers in the manner suggested above or to their being financed through the Board? The funds for their operation will probably come from private sources in the United States. This plan, you will note, involves a minimum of handling of the refugees by the Spanish authorities. The Board would appreciate your recommendation whether it would be more practicable for the personal of the centers to be known to the Spanish Government or official employees of the United States Government or any employees of private American welfare services. For your information, it appears that the American Red Cross would be reluctant, at this time, to participate officially in its own name in the proposed operations.

In your 683 of February 28, 6 p.m. (Section 1), you request a clarification of the meaning of “involuntary” removal of refugees from Spain. It is appreciated that many of the refugees will desire, once they have escaped from enemy territory, to proceed to areas of the world other than North Africa. The Board feels, however, that it is undesirable that these refugees remain in Spain and that it is desirable that they proceed to North Africa where they may undertake preparations for further travel with considerably greater security for themselves and with complete avoidance of any embarrassment to the Spanish Government because of their presence in Spain. It is proposed that border officials and police authorities in the Frontier Zone direct the refugees to the reception centers and provide them with a safe conduct pass valid only for travel from the point of apprehension by these authorities to the nearest reception center. At the time of issuance of these safe conduct, it is hoped that the Spanish officials will advise the refugees that their presence in Spain will be tolerated only so long as they remain in that country pursuant to this program. On arrival at the reception center, the officers there would explain to the refugees that the Spanish authorities have released the refugees to their care. Every effort would be made to impress upon the refugees that the continued passage through Spain of other refugees is dependent upon their own rapid departure from that country. Further explanation would be given the refugees that while they are proceeding
to North Africa they are under the auspices of the UNRRA rather than under the direct control of the French authorities. It is believed that such a policy, if intelligently executed by the Board's representatives, will assure the ready and voluntary departure from Spain for North Africa of all those refugees who may cross the Spanish frontier.

The War Refugee Board hopes that you will give its proposal your prompt personal attention and consideration and submit your criticisms and suggestions as soon as possible.
February 26, 1944

As: Plan to evacuate 1000 children from France into Spain for re-emigration to Argentina

Information taken from the censorship files of the Visa Division in the State Department.

As of September 20, 1943, there was a plan afoot for the evacuation of 1000 children from France into Spain for eventual re-emigration to Argentina. The Argentine Minister in France is negotiating this transfer with the Vichy Government. The Minister has made two approaches to the Vichy Government, one before the recent revolution in Argentina and one since. (Letter of September 20, 1943 from Dr. James Bernstein of Lisbon to HIAS-ICA Immigration Association of New York City--Censorship No. EEB, 13016/43.) The Minister has apparently been instructed by his Government to grant Argentine visas to these children and to arrange for the securing of French and German exit permits into Spain. (GL No. 235-NO-FIN 1951-43.)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

February 26, 1944

The following extract was taken from a letter from the representative of the American Joint Distribution Committee in Lisbon to the American Joint Distribution Committee in New York:

"Almost no stateless refugee has any valid document on which he can receive a visa or Spanish exit permit. When such a person is ready to receive a visa for the United States or some British territory, the American and British Consulates issue affidavits in lieu of passports. Latin American consular authorities do not issue such documents and the refugee for whom a visa authorization has arrived must produce a passport or valid travel document. Formerly the Spanish authorities issued a sort of special stateless passport but discontinued this because they felt that they had not enough evidence of identity to justify these documents. As many of the refugees, for fear of being caught during the trip across the mountains when they entered Spain, destroyed their papers, they have been unable to make use of the visas that their friends in South America had obtained for them. It has now been arranged, however, that if I make out a certificate of identify, giving convincing reasons for my belief in the identity of the individual together with proof that upon presentation of a travel document the person will receive a destination visa, a travel document will be issued by the Spanish authorities."
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES
February 26, 1944

Re: Difficulties of Stateless Refugees in Spain
(Information taken from the censorship files
of the Visa Division in the State Department)

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MEMORANDUM

February 24, 1944

The attached draft of cable was sent to Miss Flexner of UNRRA on February 23, 1944 with the request that it be cleared with Governor Lehman and other people with the view to sending it out to Beckelman as soon as possible. After receiving and reading the cable, Miss Flexner called to say that it was entirely impossible for UNRRA to send a cable of the kind suggested since, as an international organization, it cannot say anything about the American Government's policy. She stated that it was so out of the question that she preferred not even to discuss the matter with Governor Lehman. I asked her to prepare the strongest kind of cable that she felt that UNRRA could send and to give me a copy of the same. Later in the day Miss Flexner dictated the following draft of cable, stating that it represents the strongest cable which UNRRA is prepared to send to Beckelman; that it had been cleared with everyone and would be sent out by UNRRA promptly:

"American Embassy, Madrid, Spain
From Lehman and Mennikov to Hayse and Beckelman

"Please cooperate to the fullest with War Refugee Board's proposals relative to evacuation of refugees as outlined in 463 to Madrid February 18 in so far as it refers to refugees now in Spain. We desire to facilitate this program within the limitations of our competence. War Refugee Board has made known to us their urgent desire to encourage voluntary migration of refugees from Spain as speedily as possible particularly in order to clear way for the early admission of additional stateless and enemy national refugees into Spain from occupied areas. Board states that further delay in transporting refugees to North Africa will impede arrival of new refugees into Spain."

I questioned Miss Flexner with respect to the words "within the limitations of our competence", asking her particularly what significance this would have for Beckelman. She said that it was necessary to put this in to protect UNRRA's position as an international organization and that Beckelman will understand that he is to cooperate with the Board as fully as possible within the limitations placed by the fact that UNRRA is "international". I objected to the use of the words "voluntary migration" on the grounds that they were completely unnecessary since we do not speak of "involuntary" action, and that I was afraid that Beckelman would understand that he is to continue his practice of not advising refugees whether they should go to North Africa. Miss Flexner finally agreed to try to have the word "voluntary" deleted from the cable. I told Miss Flexner that in my opinion the proposed cable was much too weak, even if the word "voluntary" was omitted. She stated that in her opinion this is the farthest that UNRRA can go in the matter.

[Signature]
MEMORANDUM TO GOVERNOR LEHMAN, UHRA.

As you know, the cable which we discussed with your office regarding the evacuation of refugees from Spain to North Africa has been sent by the State Department. It is No. 463 of February 18.

At the time of our discussion you agreed that once the cable had been sent to Ambassador Hayes, UHRA would send a cable to Mr. Beckelman in Spain making clear to him our new policy, and emphasizing the necessity of evacuating refugees to the camp in North Africa as rapidly as possible. Attached is a draft of cable the contents of which I feel should be included in the instructions which you wish to send to Beckelman.

In my opinion the prompt evacuation of refugees from Spain to the camp in North Africa is of greatest importance to our Government's program. Accordingly, I would greatly appreciate your instructing Beckelman at the earliest possible moment.

For your information the War Refugee Board has appointed Mr. David Bickelstaff as its special representative in Spain. He will be instructed to lend all possible assistance to Beckelman and other UHRA representatives in facilitating the evacuation.

If you have any objections to the attached cable I should like to discuss them with you as soon as possible.

JBFee 2/22/44
Please refer to Department's No. 463 of February 16, 1944 which dealt with the necessity for expediting the transportation of stateless and enemy national refugees from Spain to North Africa and to our No. 207 of January 25, 1944 with reference to the War Refugee Board. The Board has examined your report of January 25, 1944 from Spain and, in the light of the background and development of the project for transporting stateless and enemy national refugees now in Spain to French North Africa, it has requested us to convey to you the following observations with which we concur:

1. The evacuation of all stateless and enemy national refugees from Spain to French North Africa is a matter of the highest urgency in order that the way may be cleared for effectuating the further objectives outlined in No. 463 to Madrid, and particularly with respect to the clearing of the way for the facile and speedy admission of more of such refugees into Spain from occupied areas.

2. The existence of facilities in North Africa which are presently ready for handling all of the stateless and enemy national refugees currently in Spain makes any further delay in transporting such refugees to North Africa increasingly embarrassing to us in our efforts to further the policy of this Government and to approach the Spanish Government on the basis of its announcing its willingness to accept further refugees from occupied areas. In this regard we have kept in mind the report contained in Madrid's No. 3106 of October 25, 1943 to the Department which indicated that the Spanish Government was annoyed with the long continued presence within its borders of these stateless and enemy national refugees.

3. Regardless of the conditions which may be imposed upon stateless and enemy national refugees presently in Spain upon their arrival in North Africa, it should be borne in mind that their immediate evacuation from Spain to Camp Marshal Lyautey is a matter of high policy, based upon humanitarian considerations, the most important of which is to obtain the release of further refugees in occupied territories and to do all in our power to clear the way so that countries of temporary or permanent asylum will receive them. The facts that some of the stateless or enemy national refugees presently in Spain may prefer to remain there because they feel that they may have somewhat less liberty in French North Africa or that some of them prefer to remain either through purely personal preference or predilections of obtaining entry elsewhere, are considerations of a strictly secondary
nature when viewed in the light that their continued stay in Spain may not only prejudice their own future, as indicated in Madrid's No. 3106, but will and does prejudice the lives and safety of similar persons now in occupied areas who are living under constant threat of deportation and probably death.

b. While the conditions which have been imposed by the French upon the refugees who are to be received at Camp Marshal Lyautey are more stringent than we would have desired, it should be borne in mind that this camp will be administered by representatives of the American and British Governments who will do everything within their power to facilitate normal communal life. Furthermore, this Government is prepared, if the need arises, to approach the French Committee of National Liberation with a view to securing more lenient treatment for such of these refugees as may arrive in French North Africa. At any rate, it seems quite clear that the important consideration is not the personal comfort of the individual refugee in his haven of refuge but the overriding necessity for taking whatever measures may possibly result in relieving the conditions of such of these persons as are presently within Axis territories.

It is felt that these considerations are of paramount importance and should be borne in mind by you at all times and in particular when discussing the matter of the camp with refugees who are seeking advice on the desirability of availing themselves of these facilities.
On November 20, 1942, the State Department communicated with the Madrid Embassy that it had reports that Spanish Republican leaders in unoccupied France were being turned to the Spanish, presumably for execution. While the State Department cannot take an official position because it fears to irritate Spain, the Embassy is requested to let the Spanish Government know that public opinion in this country would be aroused by such executions.

On February 9, 1943, the State Department informed the British Embassy here that it would be inadvisable to permit refugees to go from Spain to North Africa at this time. State proposes to suggest to Spain that it let several members of the American Joint Distribution Committee go to Spain to assist in evacuating refugees, especially children under 16. We intend to take as many refugees as possible, but not to Africa.

On March 25, Sir Ronald Campbell and Sir Lon had a conference at which Campbell stated that his Government wished to evacuate all refugees in Spain to an internment camp to be established in North Africa immediately. The State Department declared that this was neither practical nor political, that French North Africa is a political entity. Lon informed Campbell that the British Government had proposed to furnish shipping for 1,400 on March 28 and April 2, a fact which Campbell apparently did not know. He further informed him that a considerable amount of money had been made available for stateless refugees and that General Eisenhower had been selecting personnel for North Africa and that the British had proposed to take 1,000 to Palestine.

Lon stated that on March 24, there were supposed to be 10,000 refugees in Spain including 7,500 French, and that all but a few thousand would be covered by the foregoing plans; that the position of the others was urgent but not critical; that the whole thing could be handled by the Intergovernmental Committee. On May 29, 1943, Ambassador Winant reported to the State Department concerning the passage of refugees from Spain.

The priority policy formerly practiced was the result of the fact that Spain agreed more readily to release British nationals, including many allied nationals registering as British, and Dutch and Belgian refugees presumably going overseas to territory under the sovereignty of those nations, and for those with definite destinations, for example those going into the allied armed forces. A few were permitted to pass through Gibraltar, but this was limited by conditions in Gibraltar itself.

Since the action in North Africa began and the Germans occupied all of France, most of the refugees in Spain are French, or Jews, either stateless or enemy. The French who registered as Canadians are permitted to pass through, although Spain formerly held many French refugees due to their fear of German action. This reluctance has now been overcome. Rumors to the contrary notwithstanding, de Gaulle and Garand worked together well on the refugee problem.
A problem still remains as to those refugees not eligible for the
army, nor welcome in England, United States, and other allied territory.
This includes allied nationals, stateless persons and Jews. The English
are anxious for the establishment of the North African refugee camp and
our State Department apparently agrees, but the army both here and in
North Africa will not consent.

The French stand ready to make one or two ships available to take
French refugees from Portugal to North Africa. It is hoped that we will
furnish escort. Everything appears to be set if Spain and Portugal continue
to cooperate, and the army will O.K. the establishment of the camp in North
Africa.
February 18, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

Re: Dutch Refugees in Spain

On 9 June 1943, the Netherlands Embassy presented a memorandum to the State Department which, after acknowledging its familiarity with the proposed refugee center in North Africa, requested details on the matter. Mr. Rams, in a memorandum dated 9 June 1943, noted that he had advised the person presenting the memorandum that he was not in a position to furnish details as the matter was under consideration.

On 29 September 1943, the Netherlands Consul at Casablanca made informal inquiry of Mr. Fryer concerning the use of the Marechal Lyautey refugee center to house 1500 Dutch refugees for a period of 30 days. It seems that these refugees were at that time in Spain and, under the proposal of the Dutch, would be held in Casablanca for 30 days, pending arrangements for transporting them elsewhere. This proposal was favorably received by Mr. Fryer, who indicated it could be handled prior to the arrival of the other refugees from Spain.

From this point on the matter was handled in Washington. A note was presented by the Netherlands Ambassador, who called attention to the existence in Spanish internment camps of a number of Dutch refugees and expressed the wish that they be given a temporary haven in North Africa. The State Department discussed the matter with OHRDO getting the latter's conditional agreement, provided the refugees would stay only 30 days, be out before the other refugees arrived, be fed by the United States Army, and further provided that the expenses were borne by the Netherlands Government. Mr. Travers discussed the matter with Baron von Boetzelner of the Netherlands Embassy, expressing a desire to cooperate, but requesting certain specific details.

Unless otherwise indicated, all material under this title was obtained from a file entitled "Refugee Groups - Dutch Refugees in Spain", found in the Visa Division of the Department of State.

1/ Cable No. 1662, 29 September 1943, 11 p.m. from Algiers to Department.
2/ See Cable No. 2042, 22 November 1943, 1 a.m. from Algiers to Department.
3/ Memorandum from Mr. Crowe, Visa Division to Mr. Travers, Chief, Visa Division, 29 November 1943.
4/ Memorandum of conference dated 3 December 1943.
When the requested details were furnished the matter of sending Dutch
refugees from Spain to North Africa was dropped. It appeared about 200
refugees were involved, of which it was felt that H3 should leave at once by
reason of the crowded conditions in the Spanish camp. Most of the refugees
were to come from Spain, their final destination being England, and their
transportation being handled by the Dutch. The matter had been cleared with
the French. The Netherlands representative was told, on 17 December 1943,
that "the refugee center was not ready to receive refugees" and that it was
"doubted very much if it would be in time to receive the Dutch whom he desired
to move from Spain before the end of the year." It was suggested that the
group be moved to England via Gibraltar instead of North Africa, in view
of the limited numbers involved. Algiers was so advised on 21 December
1943.

[Signature]

Joseph H. Murphy

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5/ Memorandum of 15 December 1943, presented to the State Department in a
letter of the same date from the Netherlands Embassy.

7/ Memorandum of conference, from Mr. Travers to Dean Ribble, both of the
Visa Division, 17 December 1943.

8/ Cable No. 237, 21 December 1943, to Algiers from Department.
MEMORANDUM

Discussion of Proposed Cable to Ambassador Hayes

February 14, 1944

A conference was held in the office of Under Secretary of State Stettinius, February 14, 1944 at 3:30 p.m.

Present for State Department:

Under Secretary Stettinius
Assistant Secretary O. Howland Shaw
Philip W. Bonsal
James O. Dunn

Wallace S. Murray
Stanley E. Hornebeck
Hayden Raynor
George Warren

Present for War Refugee Board and Treasury:

Neal E. Pehle, Luxford, Dubois and Friedman

Mr. Stettinius opened the meeting by saying that he had called the group together in order that there might be a full and frank discussion of the question of cooperation between the State Department and the War Refugee Board. He indicated that the proposed cable to Ambassador Hayes, which the Board had sent over had called forth certain objections from the political people, and he felt that this offered a good opportunity to bring out in the open any differences of opinion that might exist between the State Department and the War Refugee Board.

Stettinius asked Pehle to outline his general ideas concerning the question of cooperation by State. Pehle indicated briefly that he felt it to be the job of the Board to take prompt action in rescuing refugees, and that from time to time it would be necessary to call upon the State Department, not only to use its facilities, but to take a definite stand in support of the Board's action. Pehle stated that up to the present he had been receiving cooperation. Pehle then asked for a statement of the objections which the political people had in connection with the Spanish cable. Mr. Stettinius called upon Mr. Dunn to state his point of view in the matter. Mr. Dunn first addressed himself to the question of whether the cable should be sent out simply as a cable of the War Refugee Board or as a State Department cable. He indicated that there would be no trouble at all in sending the cable out as a War Refugee Board cable, and that in such event it would be unnecessary for the political people to express any opinion as to the merits of the proposed action. He apparently took the position that this would be true even if the Board's proposed action conflicted with general government policy in the country involved. Pehle and Luxford at once made it clear that the Board was not simply interested.
in sending out cables; that they had been advised by State Department people themselves that a cable from the Department generally produces much more effective action on the part of our Ministers and Ambassadors than does a cable from one of the other Government agencies; that the program suggested in the proposed cable goes to the very heart of the Board's effort because unless we are successful in moving refugees from Spain in order to get more refugees into that country the Board may as well stop its operations right now, and that it is necessary to have State Department's full approval and support of the project. Dunn stated that he did not know that the Board wanted the State Department to consider the policy aspects of this matter since we had not specifically said so. Felle made it clear that in sending to State a proposed cable of this nature we obviously wanted State to consider the matter carefully to avoid possible policy conflicts and if possible to support fully the Board's position. It was emphasized that in matters of this kind which involve dealings between governments it is useless to undertake a project unless the State Department is in full accord with the Board's proposal.

Mr. Stattonius stated that in the future it should be clearly understood in cases of this kind that the War Refugee Board wants the State Department's full concurrence and that all such cables will be so studied by State. He indicated that this would, of course, delay somewhat the sending out of cables. This pronouncement was generally agreed to by State Department representatives. It was also agreed that from time to time the Board will wish to send out cablegrams directly which will not need State Department study.

Mr. Dunn was then asked to state his further objections to the proposed cable in question. They were as follows:

1. That we are presently engaged in negotiations with Spain to have that Government prohibit the export of wolfram; that in this connection the Spanish Government has asked us to make a public statement practically apologizing for putting on the oil embargo. According to Mr. Dunn we have refused to make any such statement, and in his view our asking Spain to make a statement with respect to refugees at this time would be completely without results and perhaps would interfere with our wolfram negotiations.

2. Dunn wanted to know how we could possibly make the commitment in our cable that we would remove refugees from Spain when we knew that under the agreement with the French the facilities in the North African camp are extremely limited.

Mr. Dunn, when pressed for a statement of further objections, said that he was not prepared to make other comments on the cable since he had
not previously known that policy matters were to be gone into, and it would
be necessary for him to consult all of the interested people in his division.

There was only a very brief discussion of the points raised by Dunn.
As to the question of assuring ourselves of facilities for refugees before
taking measures of this kind to get them out of Axis occupied territory, it
was plainly stated by Fehle that if the Board were to adopt such a policy
months would go by without effective rescue measures being taken; that as
long as there presently exist facilities for a fairly substantial number of
refugees, the first task of the Board must be to fill up such existing refugee
centers, dealing with the question of additional facilities when this comes
to be a real practical problem.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he thought the most practical way of resolving
these questions was for us to get together with the political people and agree
on a cable. He stated that he had appointed Mr. George Warren to the staff of
Charles P. Taft with the responsibility of clearing through the State Depart-
ment as rapidly as possible all matters emanating from the War Refugee Board.
He asked Mr. Warren to take this cable at once and as soon as possible clear
it with everyone concerned. He indicated that Mr. Warren would be freely
accessible to him (Mr. Stettinius) in all these matters and made it clear that
he expected State to take action promptly.

After the adjournment of the meeting, Messrs. Fehle and Luxford had a
brief conversation with Mr. Dunn. Dunn made the point that if the State
Department is to be called upon to approve projects such as that involved in
the proposed cable to Spain, it will be necessary for State to study fully
the proposal in the light of all existing relationships and dealings between
the United States and the government involved; that this study frequently
will require some time, it being impossible to clear cables of this kind in
a few hours. He emphasized that if the Board desires its action to be 100%
effective instead of 25% effective the political people will need time in
order to be able to advise the Board what in view of the existing situation
with respect to the country involved, should be the proper timing of proposed
action, etc.

Luxford pointed out to Dunn that our proposed negotiations with Spain
in regard to refugees is on an entirely different level than the political
and economic negotiations which we have with that country. In other words,
it was indicated that our suggested appeal to Spain is a humanitarian appeal
in which all we are asking of Spain is that it be humane at our expense.
The comparison was made with the negotiations which we carry on through the
Red Cross even with Germany with respect to the exchange of war prisoners, etc.,
the point being made that humanitarian negotiations of this class are presently
being carried on without reference to our economic and political attitude toward the people with whom we are dealing. Accordingly, there is no ground for holding up the present cable on the basis of some supposed interference with our other negotiations with Spain.

Pehle, Luxford, DoBois and Friedman also discussed with Warren the cable in question. Warren agreed to push the matter at once and it was understood that he would call us tomorrow afternoon to see what progress has been made. Warren was also advised that if objections arise at any point he should call us for explanation.
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001 Wears, Fehle, Luxford, DuBois, Lesser, Miss Hodel

JFR-WX - 2/15/44
MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Pehle
FROM: Mr. Friedman

Res: Support of Refugees in Spain

Mr. McCormick of the Red Cross, as you know, suggested that we are presently making financial contribution, together with the French and British, to the support of refugees in Spain who are outside of camps. McCormick stated that Miss Flexner knew more about this matter than anyone else. I called Miss Flexner, who gave me the following information:

1. Before the French started to take care of their own people in Spain (about 6 months ago) the United States Government sent to the American Ambassador in Spain the sum of $200,000 to be used only in the care of French and American refugees. $100,000 was sent about January, 1943 and the additional $100,000 was sent some time later. The funds originally came from OFFEO and the expenditure was later reimbursed from the President's Emergency Fund. The money was to be used for food and shelter of the French and American refugees in Spain.

2. The United States Government has never made any financial contribution to the support of stateless refugees in Spain who are outside of camps. The JDC has always supported such refugees, contributing $3.00 a day per person.

3. The Red Cross at one time sent food to Spain for the purpose of supplementing the diets of all refugees in camps, and the French at one time contributed clothes for about 1500 stateless refugees.

In order to get the real details it will be necessary to examine Flexner's files on Spain which I will do at the first possible opportunity. Miss Flexner insists that we are not presently making any financial contribution for the support of refugees in Spain and that the only contribution made at any time is the one indicated in point 1 above.
March 24, 1943. A memorandum of conversation between
Sir Ronald Campbell and Mr. Long:

Sir Ronald Campbell wanted to take immediate steps to
evacuate all the refugees out of Spain into an internment
camp to be established in North Africa. Mr. Long stated that
such a suggestion was not practical either from the point of
view of feasibility or politics. He stated further that the
American Government had no jurisdiction of such a nature
over French North Africa.

Sir Ronald pressed for immediate intergovernmental
action. He was then told of the active steps which are being
taken to meet the problem, none of which he seemed to be
familiar with except that the British Government, through her
Embassy in Madrid was exercising her good offices and making
expenditures.

Mr. Long outlined the evacuation plans for 1,400 people
for the British Government was furnishing ships; of the actual
transfer of 150; the fact that other vessels were due to begin
movements on March 23 and April 2; the removal of internees
from Miranda; the making available of considerable sums of
money and also the contributions from private individuals
for stateless persons. He further told of the activities of
General Eisenhower in weeding out persons he would take to
North Africa and stated that the British Government had agreed
to
to receive 1,000 of them in Palestine. He further stated that the total number of refugees in Spain was about 10,000 of which 7,500 were French. After the evacuation referred to there would remain only a few thousands who would not be in immediate danger. These remaining refugees could be taken care of in some way and their welfare could be considered, possibly at the preliminary conference of the Bermuda Conference and finally decided at the Intergovernmental Conference.

April 26, 1943. Memorandum of conversation between Mr. Long and the Spanish ambassador:

Mr. Long took up the subject of refugees who were finding their way into Spain and expressed the hope of this Government that the Spanish Government would refrain from returning them to Germany and would place no obstacle in the path of those escaping from Germany.

The Ambassador replied that his Government was giving these people refuge and was not returning them to Germany. He has been in contact with Jewish organizations concerning the care of these people and has telegraphed his Government to support the proposal that shipments be made from the Argentine to provide supplemental food for the refugees so that they would not be a further drain on the resources of Spain. He stated that he was very sympathetic toward them.
and that when he returned to Spain the week following this conversation he would orally urge his Government to continue rendering every possible assistance to these refugees.

May 14, 1943. Memorandum of conversation between Mr. Long, Mr. Hayter and Mr. Law:

The conversation concerned the refugees in several countries and with reference to Spain Mr. Long stated that vessels had been assigned to evacuate refugees out of Spain to North Africa. One of these vessels had left as early as April 30 and although it was only an overnight run to Casablanca the vessels had not returned to Spain. Mr. Long also said that while the vessels were probably of French flag, they were under the control of the British Admiralty in those waters and he asked whether Mr. Hayter or Mr. Law knew why the vessels had not returned to Spain. They stated that they did not know but that they would telegraph their Government about these ships. (Reference is made to No. 1267 of May 13, 1943, from MADRID although the information contained in it was not disclosed by Mr. Long.)
Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

[Date]
Special for the account of the agency of the Red Cross.

Your immediate mobilization and at least three medium sized trucks for use in distribution as well as a generous supply of needed medical supplies should also be shipped by

I shall request the United Government for permission for this work to be undertaken.

If the troops are not able to receive supplies of medicines, motor vehicles, and food should be sent to any area and very promptly.

Subject to later repayment, the USCG has agreed to supply at once in the amounts needed, first aid kits, dressing, and medical supplies. A requisition in requested for such supplies.

The purpose for which these articles are requested is useful to our war effort and will, in my opinion, be of great assistance.

It is requested that, although of no military use to all our comrades as well as

the Executive of the Netherlands Civil Department of Internment and Present from European

the Dutch General has proposed the publicly owned automobiles. This situation

measures be respected immediately.

The most urgent and serious consideration is required for above recommendations.

It is not to do everything we can for these refugees of allied countries who have no one

who to look to for help, it would be even to criticize not only serious but serious.

To the Chairman,
Mr. Pilot
Mr. Mitchell
Mr. Wyman

RA/EO

GAR/EO
Letter L2-399 to AFSO Lisbon
From David Blinkenstaff

DE: General refugee problem

In anticipation of plans now being developed for the evacuation of stateless refugees from Spain, we examined 500 individual dossiers to compile the enclosed statistics marked "Stateless Refugees in Spain." I think it can be taken as representative of the total 1600 or 1800 refugees in the "stateless" group in Spain.

This is confirmed by comparison with the attached report on refugees of the MADRID area taken separately.

PL
DB/GL

enclosures
Please send on to Philadelphia

(received, Jan. 17, 1944)
**Stateless** refugees in SPAIN

<table>
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<th>AGE LIMITS</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
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<tr>
<td>0 - 15 years</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>41 - 50</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
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<tr>
<td>over 50</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>74.8%</strong></td>
<td><strong>25.2%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NATIONALITIES**

- Austrians: 10.2%
- Baltic countries: 1.4%
- Germans: 26.0%
- Hungarians: 4.2%
- Miscellaneous: 8.2%
- Poles: 27.6%
- Romanians: 6.3%
- Russians: 5.2%
- South Americans: 4.8%
-Spanish: 3.4%
- Turks: 0.2%

**Total**: 100.4%

**PROFESSIONS**

- Without profession or profession unknown: 35.6%
- Children and students: 14.2%
- Skilled trades and professions:
  - Mechanics, technicians, electricians, car drivers, carpenters, metal workers, photographers, watch makers, farmers, sailors, fishermen: 12.4%
  - Bakers, butchers, cooks: 2.8%
  - Tailors, dressmakers, furriers, shoe makers, hat makers: 6.2%
  - Physicians, dentists, nurses, pharmaceutical chemists, chemists: 4.4%
  - Manufacturers, textile and leather chemists: 4.8%
  - Liberal professions: Architects, sculptors, lawyers, muscians, journalists, teachers, writers, artists: 7.3%
  - Merchants, bankers, agents, travel: 9.8%
  - Clerks, employees, accountants: 3.1%

**Total**: 100.8%

**RELIGION**

- Jews: total 90.3% men 66.2% women 24.1%
- Non-Jews: 9.7% men 7.4% women 2.3%

**Total**: 100.0% men 75.6% women 24.4%