War Refugee Board, Volume 1
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SEE: EXECUTIVE ORDER: ESTABLISHING A WAR REFUGEE BOARD
The President today, by Executive Order, set up a War Refugee Board consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War, to take action for the immediate rescue from the Nazis of as many as possible of the persecuted minorities of Europe — racial, religious or political — all civilian victims of enemy savagery.

The Executive Order declares that "it is the policy of this Government to take all measures within its power to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death and otherwise to afford such victims all possible relief and assistance consistent with the successful prosecution of the war".

The Board is charged with direct responsibility to the President in seeing that the announced policy is carried out. The President indicated that while he would look directly to the Board for the successful execution of this policy, the Board, of course, would cooperate fully with the Intergovernmental Committee, the United-Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and other interested international organizations.

The President stated that he expected to obtain the cooperation of all members of the United Nations and other foreign governments in carrying out this difficult but important task. He stated that the existing facilities of the State, Treasury and War Departments would be applied to aid Axis victims to the fullest extent possible. He stressed that it was urgent that action be taken at once to forestall the plan of the Nazis to exterminate all the Jews and other persecuted minorities in Europe.
It will be the duty of a full-time Executive Director of the Board to arrange for the prompt execution of the plans and programs developed and the measures inaugurated by the Board.

The Executive Order follows:

EXECUTIVE ORDER

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ESTABLISHING A WAR REFUGEE BOARD

WHEREAS it is the policy of this Government to take all measures within its power to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death and otherwise to afford such victims all possible relief and assistance consistent with the successful prosecution of the war;

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, as President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, and in order to effectuate with all possible speed the rescue and relief of such victims of enemy oppression, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. There is established in the Executive Office of the President a War Refugee Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board). The Board shall consist of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War. The Board may request the heads of other agencies or departments to participate in its deliberations whenever matters specially affecting such agencies or departments are under consideration.

2. The Board shall be charged with the responsibility for seeing that the policy of the Government, as stated in the Preamble, is carried out. The functions of the Board shall include without limitation the development of plans and programs and the inauguration of effective measures for (a) the rescue, transportation, maintenance and relief of the victims of enemy oppression, and (b) the establishment of havens of temporary refuge for such victims. To this end the Board, through appropriate channels, shall take the necessary steps to enlist the cooperation of foreign governments and obtain their participation in the execution of such plans and programs.

3. It shall be the duty of the State, Treasury and War Departments, within their respective spheres, to execute at the request of the Board, the plans and programs so developed and the measures so inaugurated. It shall be the duty of the heads of all agencies and departments to supply
or obtain for the Board such information and to extend to the Board such
supplies, shipping and other specified assistance and facilities as the
Board may require in carrying out the provisions of this Order. The
State Department shall appoint special attaches with diplomatic status,
on the recommendation of the Board, to be stationed abroad in places
where it is likely that assistance can be rendered to war refugees, the
carries and responsibilities of such attaches to be defined by the Board
in consultation with the State Department.

4. The Board and the State, Treasury and War Departments are
authorized to accept the services or contributions of any private per-
sons, private organizations, State agencies, or agencies of foreign
governments in carrying out the purposes of this Order. The Board shall
cooperate with all existing and future international organizations con-
cerned with the problem of refugee rescue, maintenance, transportation,
relief, rehabilitation, and resettlement.

5. To the extent possible the Board shall utilize the personnel,
supplies, facilities and services of the State, Treasury and War Depart-
ments. In addition the Board, within the limits of funds which may be
made available, may employ necessary personnel without regard for the
Civil Service laws and regulations and the Classification Act of 1923,
as needed, and make provisions for supplies, facilities and services
necessary to discharge its responsibilities. The Board shall appoint an
Executive Director who shall serve as its principal executive officer.
It shall be the duty of the Executive Director to arrange for the prompt
execution of the plans and programs developed and the measures inaugu-
rated by the Board, to supervise the activities of the special attaches and to
submit frequent reports to the Board on the steps taken for the rescue
and relief of war refugees.

6. The Board shall be directly responsible to the President in
carrying out the policy of this Government, as stated in the Preamble,
and the Board shall report to him at frequent intervals concerning the
steps taken for the rescue and relief of war refugees and shall make
such recommendations as the Board may deem appropriate for further action
to overcome any difficulties encountered in the rescue and relief of war
refugees.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

THE WHITE HOUSE,

January 22, 1944.
President Roosevelt announced today that he had requested Cordell Hull, Secretary of State; Henry Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury; and Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War, to take action for the immediate rescue and relief of the Jews of Europe and other victims of enemy persecution.

The President issued an Executive Order declaring "it is the policy of this Government to take all measures within its power to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death and otherwise to afford such victims all possible relief and assistance consistent with the successful prosecution of the war." The Order establishes special Government machinery for executing this policy. It creates a War Refugee Board consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of War. The President indicated that Secretary Hull had named Under Secretary of State Stettinius to represent him on this Board.

The Board is charged with direct responsibility to the President in seeing that the announced policy is carried out. The President indicated that while he would look directly to the Board for the successful
execution of this policy, the Board, of course, would cooperate fully with the Intergovernmental Committee, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and other interested international organizations.

The President stated that he expected the cooperation of all members of the United Nations and other foreign governments in carrying out this difficult but important task. He stated that the existing facilities of the State, Treasury and War Departments would be employed to furnish aid to Axis victims to the fullest extent possible. He stressed that it was urgent that action be taken to forestall the plot of the Nazis to exterminate the Jews and other persecuted minorities in Europe.

Simultaneously, the White House announced that the Board was appointing John H. Pehle, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, as its Executive Director. It will be the duty of the Executive Director to arrange for the prompt execution of the plans and programs developed and the measures inaugurated by the Board.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

January 20, 1944

I spoke to Hugh Cox, Assistant Solicitor General of the Department of Justice, regarding the proposed Executive Order establishing a War Refugee Board. Mr. Cox is handling the clearance of the Order through the Department of Justice.

He stated that the only legal question in his mind raised by the Order was the general language in section 4 of the Order relating to the acceptance of contributions by the Board or the State, Treasury or War Departments in carrying out the Order. He referred to earlier drafts of the Order (Oscar Cox version) which had spelled out in detail the acceptance of contributions under Title XI of the Second War Powers Act.

I advised him that we had decided against the earlier and more lengthy provision on this point because it seemed to place altogether too much emphasis on the obtaining of private contributions in order to administer the Order, whereas it was our feeling that time was too precious to be wasted on extensive campaigns for contributions. I assured him, however, that in the administration of the Order it was anticipated that we would adhere strictly to the provisions of the Second War Powers Act.

He stated that he appreciated our point and that he was prepared to approve the Order as to legality if I would send him a memorandum confirming our intent to adhere to the provisions of the Second War Powers Act for their files. I assured him we would do this and inquired as to whether he could approve the Order now on my assurance that he would get the confirmation today. He agreed.

Cox stated that he had no other legal point but that some of the policy men at Justice were afraid that the Board had been stacked in favor of State against Treasury by the inclusion of the Secretary of War and that he would have to mention this to the Attorney General. I told him that we would like to come over at once and give him some of the background on that point. He stated that he had to leave for the Capitol at once to attend a hearing at which Hoover was subpoenaed to appear. I then advised him over the telephone that the naming of Secretary Stimson met with the approval of Secretary Morgenthau; it appeared that a "new deal" could be expected on the issue at State since Stettinius was scheduled to handle the matter for State and that in fact the press release would probably state that Hull had designated Stettinius to act for him on the Board.

Cox stated that this information was most reassuring to him and that the Attorney General's approval would be forthcoming.

I mentioned the urgency of the matter and inquired if I could advise Mr. Paul that the Attorney General would approve the matter by noon today. Cox stated that this was agreeable.

Attached is a copy of the letter which Mr. Paul sent to Mr. Cox by special messenger today. A copy of such letter was also transmitted to Judge Rosenman.

AFLcard 1/20/44 CC: Paul, Pehle, DuBois, White, Gaston
January 20, 1944

My dear Mr. Attorney General:

Attention: Mr. Hugh Cox

I refer to the discussion this morning between Mr. Ansel F. Luxford of my office and Mr. Hugh Cox of your Department regarding the proposed executive order establishing a War Refugee Board.

This will confirm Mr. Luxford's statement that Section 4 of the proposed order contemplates that Title XI of the Second War Powers Act will be employed in accepting contributions and that such contributions to the Board or to the State, Treasury or War Departments will be made in strict accordance with all provisions of such Act relating to the acceptance of conditional gifts by the Secretary of the Treasury to further the war program.

Very truly yours,

(signed) Randolph Paul.

General Counsel.

The Honorable,

The Attorney General of the United States.

AFL: 2/20/44
MEMORANDUM TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE

I have been deeply concerned for a long time with the cowardly persecution of the Jews by the Nazis. I fear that as the war approaches the end Hitler will redouble his efforts to exterminate the remaining Jews in Europe. It is imperative, therefore, that we take vigorous action at once. In view of the growing criticisms of our efforts to date, I think it is also important that we let our own people know of our determination to do all that is within our power to save these people.

I have asked that there be prepared for my signature an Executive Order carrying out the proposed course of action outlined in a memorandum which I am enclosing. In order to save time, I have asked Judge Bozena to clear it with you.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET:

I have decided to take the following steps at once:

1. Publicly declare that it is the policy of this Government to take all measures within its power to rescue those victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death and to afford such victims all possible aid and assistance consistent with the successful prosecution of the war.

2. Establish a War Refugee Board consisting of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of War. This Board shall be charged with full responsibility for seeing that this announced policy is carried out with the utmost vigor and directness.

3. Have the Board designate an executive director of capacity, energy, and resourcefulness, known to be sympathetic to War refugees and deeply interested in their rescue and relief.

4. Arrange for the State Department to appoint special attaches with diplomatic status to be selected by the Board and to be stationed at points where they can render the most effective aid to war refugees.

5. Arrange to make available to the Board immediately out of the President's Emergency Fund one million dollars for initial administrative expenses and such further sums out of the President's Emergency Fund and other available appropriations, including Lend-Lease, as the Board may from time to time certify as necessary for its operations.

I want an Executive Order accomplishing these purposes ready for my signature as soon as possible. Judge Rosenman is familiar with what I have in mind. I have asked him to expedite the matter for me.
Dear Mr. Bundy:

Apropos of our discussion the other day about the British attitude on refugee matters, there are enclosed for your information copies of the following documents:

(1) Cable from Winant in London, No. 8717, of December 15, 1943.

(2) Reply from the State Department, cable No. 7969, of December 18, 1943.

(3) Further cable from Winant, No. 139, of January 7, 1944.

(4) Letter from Sir Ronald Campbell of the British Embassy, Washington, to Assistant Secretary of State, Breckinridge Long, of January 8, 1944.

(5) Memorandum prepared by Assistant Secretary of State, Breckinridge Long, of a conversation had by him with Sir Ronald Campbell on January 11, 1944.

Very truly yours,

J. W. Pehle
Acting Executive Director

Mr. Harvey Bundy,
Special Assistant to the Secretary of War,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

JWP:mgt 2/4/44

(Ent Special Message)
Date: January 11, 1944

Subject: The Reigner Plan and operations in consequence of it.

Participants: Sir Ronald Campbell, the British Minister; Mr. Long.

Sir Ronald Campbell came in today at my request. I discussed with him the Reigner Plan on the basis of the letter he addressed to me under date of January 8 and which was received yesterday, as well as on the basis of number 139, January 7, 6 p.m. from London.

The Embassy reported the receipt of and quoted from a letter from Mr. Eden directed to the Ambassador.

Sir Ronald and I engaged in general discussion as to the Reigner Plan and the manner in which it would operate in Rumania and in France, having in mind the results of those operations and the probability that there would be refugees in considerable number who might appear out of France into Spain or out of Rumania into Turkish territory.

I referred to the fact that the letter from Mr. Eden seemed to be more definite in its acceptance of the Plan than did the letter of Sir Ronald, and in commenting upon it I quoted the pertinent texts of each. I further said that I did not see that there should be any embarrassment to either Government as intimated by Mr. Eden. We ought to be able to operate, transport, and to find places for the persons who escaped. I called attention to the Fedhala residence in North Africa and then pointed out the cities in Tripoli and in Cyrenaica which had been deserted by the Arabs and by the Italians - as we understood it - and were standing quite unpopulated. Tripoli itself was quite a large city and could accommodate a lot of people. Benghazi and other places on the shore of the Mediterranean had water supplies and there were buildings standing.
Food could be arranged for them on a rationed basis and they could continue to reside in such places until the end of the war provided the British Government was agreeable. At the end of the war they could return to their former places in Europe under the arrangements which the United Nations were adopting and which the United States Government had proposed at Berne and to which Russia had recently agreed, and which provided that each of the nations would permit to return to their former homes the persons who had been forced to leave because of persecutions of race, religion, or political belief. Terms to that same effect should be imposed upon the enemy and conditions inside Germany should be made to conform to the thought that there should be no more persecutions on any of those accounts.

I further stated that in case England did make such a refuge possible in the former Italian colonies it would take pressure off of England because of Palestine, because as it stood Palestine was the only place in the Mediterranean basin where there was refuge for Jews and England was being blamed for her refusal to admit more of them to Palestine under the White Paper. I explicitly stated that I was not opening up the Palestine question but simply used Palestine to elucidate the thought that it would be very helpful in more ways than one to have these cities in the former Italian colonies opened to temporary residence by refugees.

Sir Ronald inquired as to the "intentions of the United States in regard to these problems" and to the matters referred to in Mr. Eden's letter as "problems of transport and accommodation".

I pointed out that I tried to cover the "accommodation" phase of it and that the Department would approach the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the thought that shipping sufficient to serve in transport might be diverted when sufficient personnel were assembled to use it to transport them from Spain to these places of temporary residence in Tripoli and along that coast. We had not approached the military and naval authorities but we felt that they would view the matter generously and would no doubt adapt themselves to the situation in case the problem
developed to the proportions which it might assume. In the meantime there was the established service between Portugal and North Africa which had carried not less than 35,000 persons out of Spain to the neighborhood of Casablanca and which could be continued after completion of the present program. There were remaining in Spain only about 1500 persons—probably not that many.

I then said that UNRRA would probably find it within its jurisdiction to take care of these people once they were located and that we were now discussing the general jurisdiction of UNRRA and the Intergovernmental Committee would have respectively in the premises. Furthermore, the United States under its laws could also receive immigrants and there was the possibility that some of them might desire to come to the United States. Our quotas were open and under the law persons are admissible to this country.

Sir Ronald said that he would send off a telegram to his Government and present the situation as I had presented it to him. I reminded him that this was not a definite proposal, it was just a conversation between our two Governments with the idea of making some favorable adjustment of a problem which might assume large and possibly urgent proportions.

B.L.
January 8th, 1944.

Ref. 42/7/11.

You will be aware that a discussion took place on 26th
November last between representatives of this Embassy and
of the United States Treasury Department, regarding the
financial aspects of the proposals which have been made by
Mr. Siger of the World Jewish Congress for the evacuation
of Jews from France and Roumania. I am informed that in
view of the wider considerations which are seen to be
involved in these proposals, the matter is now being handled
by your Department, and I am therefore writing to you to
acquaint you with the views of His Majesty's Government.

His Majesty's Government are in the fullest possible
agreement with the desire of the United States Government
to do anything and everything that is possible to help
these unfortunate people. They would not wish to raise
any insurmountable objection to the financial side of the
proposals, though they see certain difficulties, as no doubt
the United States Government does also. The United States
Government will realize that when the financial question is
settled, the important problems of transport and destination
will at once arise. His Majesty's Government have no doubt
that the United States Government have considered these
proposals, and they would like to know what the intentions
of the United States Government are in regard to these
problems.

(Sgd.) R. I. Campbell

The Honourable
Breckinridge Long,
Assistant Secretary of State
of the United States,
Washington, D.C.
Department of State

Referring to my 8826 dated December 19 I held further discussion personally with Mr. Eden relevant to the problem of issuing licenses covering the financial transactions involved in the evacuation from France and Rumania of certain Jews referred to in Department's 7506 of November 27 and 7969 of December 18 and Mr. Eden has just addressed a letter to me in this connection. The Foreign Office, he advises, has contacted its Embassy in Washington regarding this topic and Lord Halifax has received instructions which, in his conversations with Mr. Morgenthau, indicate the lines which he is to follow.

The following is a quotation from Mr. Eden's letter which I offer for the purposes of the record:

"Briefly stated this Government finds itself in agreement with the United States Government insofar as the financial aspects of the question are concerned. It is our feeling nevertheless that resulting from the proposed financial measures transportation and accommodation problems may develop which might be embarrassing not only to this Government but to your own. Subject to this reservation and to the indicated safeguards this Government is prepared to agree with the financial proposals. It is my presumption that no further detail in this connection is required at this time in view of the fact that the question will now be directly discussed by Mr. Morgenthau and our Embassy and it is my hope that the results of such discussions will be to our mutual satisfaction."

You are requested to inform Secretary Morgenthau.

WINANT
TO: London
From: Secretary of State
Date: December 18, 1943
No. 7969

This refers to your telegram no. 8717, December 15.

Your telegram under reference has been read with
astonishment and the Department is unable to agree with the
point of view which is expressed. The Department will com-
municate with you very shortly regarding the difference
between this situation and others which may be related to
the prevention of the enemy from obtaining foreign exchange.
It is the Department's desire to advise you immediately
of the fact that the philosophy of their telegram is not
reconcilable with the policy of the United States Government
and the policy of the British Government, as understood by
us, which they previously expressed.
SECRETARY OF STATE

Washington
US URGENT
8717, Fifteenth

Reference your 7506, November 27 for Winant.

MHW has addressed following letter to Embassy dated December 15 respecting plan for evacuation of Jews from France and Rumania: "We have now received the views of the Foreign Office on the proposal of the United States Treasury to license the remittance to Switzerland of $25,000 as a preliminary installment to be expended on the rescue of Jews from France and Rumania. The Foreign Office are concerned with the difficulties of disposing of any considerable number of Jews should they be rescued from enemy occupied territory. Certain schemes with a similar object in which both the Foreign Office and the State Department are interested are greatly hampered by the difficulties of transportation, particularly shipping, and of finding accommodation in the countries of the Near East for any but a very small number of Jewish refugees. They foresee that it is likely to prove almost if not quite impossible to deal with anything like the number of 70,000 refugees whose rescue is envisaged by the Rieger plan. For this reason they are reluctant to agree to any approval being expressed even of the preliminary financial arrangements. We understand that they are telegraphing to this effect to Washington, asking them to place these considerations before the State Department.

As a result of this expression of views by the Foreign Office we have telegraphed to Washington stating the terms on which we should have been prepared to agree to the license proposed, i.e., (A) for the time being the currency to be procured only by purchase from unobjectionable Swiss owners of French francs or Rumanian lei acquired in an unobjectionable manner, (B) both Legations in Bern to be responsible for checking the Swiss owners and the origin of the currency they propose to sell, (C) no further transfer to be licensed until a report is received which should include information as to the amounts procurable on these terms and as to the general progress."

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-73
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 12 1972
of the scheme. But we have added that the Foreign Office see grave objections in general and are telegraphing separately about these."

PLEASE INFORM TREASURY.

WINANT
Mr. Luxford

Mr. Brenner

January 28, 1944.

Dr. Nachum Goldarn of the World Jewish Congress has proposed a plan for the provision of food, clothing and medicine to remnant groups of surviving Jews located in central Europe. The proposal calls for the raising of $40 million, which will be made available to the International Red Cross for the purchase in Europe of medicines and concentrated foods. The plan contemplates a contribution of $2 million from private sources, $4 million from the British Government, and $4 million from the United States Government. There is some indication that the Plan also includes the evacuation of Jews from central Europe.

Mr. Harry Shulman of New York discussed this matter with Assistant Secretary of State Breckinridge Long. Long advised Shulman that the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees had approved certain specific projects to be undertaken as a part of the Goldman Plan, but that no government funds were available for this purpose at the present time. Mr. Shulman discussed the financing problem with Congressman Bloom and, as a result, is of the opinion that the execution of the Plan should not be put off until such time as new appropriations might be obtained.

An examination of the applicable appropriation acts indicates that there are two possible sources from which funds might be obtained immediately for this purpose although neither source is clear and unambiguous. State's cablegrams to the London Embassy, dated September 29, 1943, indicate that the Goldman Plan envisages purchases in Europe. If the necessary supplies could be purchased in the United States, funds would probably be available under the appropriation for foreign war relief. If, on the other hand, it is essential that the goods be purchased in Europe and evacuation of refugees is contemplated, it will be necessary to resort to the President's emergency fund or the appropriations made to carry out the purposes of the Lend-Lease Act.

I. Foreign War Relief

Congress first appropriated money for foreign war relief in 1941, when section 80 of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act (54 Stat. 627) was enacted. $30 million was appropriated and the President was authorized through such agency as he might designate "to purchase exclusively in the United States and to transport, and to distribute as hereinafter provided, agricultural, medical, and other supplies for the relief of refugee men, women, and children, who have been driven from their homes or otherwise rendered destitute by hostilities or invasion. When so purchased, such materials and supplies are hereby authorized to be distributed by the President through the American Red Cross or such governmental or other
agencies as he may designate." A similar appropriation was made in the Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942 (55 Stat. 817) which read in part:

"To enable the President through such agency or agencies as he may designate to purchase exclusively in the United States and to transport, and to distribute as hereinafter provided, medical, agricultural, and other supplies for the relief of men, women, and children, who have been rendered sick or destitute, as a result of hostilities or invasion, fiscal year 1942, $35,000,000 including the cost of such purchases, the transportation to point of distribution, and distribution, administrative and other costs, but not including any administrative expenses incurred by any non-governmental agency: Provided, That when so purchased, such materials and supplies are hereby authorized to be distributed by the President through the American Red Cross or such governmental or other agencies as he may designate: Provided further, that any governmental agency so designated to aid in the purchase, transportation, or distribution of any such materials and supplies may expend any sums allocated to it for such designated purposes without regard to the provisions of any other Act; * * *"

(Underlining supplied.)

On July 2, 1942 these two appropriations were consolidated and made one fund (56 Stat. 593) and on July 12, 1943, the appropriation was continued available until June 30, 1944 (Public Law 132, 78th Cong.).

Although $3,907,000 remains in this fund and has not been allocated, it seems clear that the Goldman Plan would have to be modified if it is to be financed in part out of the foreign war relief appropriation, since it is specifically provided that the money shall be used exclusively for purchases in the United States.

III. President's Emergency Fund.

On November 30, 1943, the President's emergency fund contained an unallocated balance slightly in excess of $83 million (today the approximate figure is $60 million) which had been appropriated under a number of acts beginning with the Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1942 (55 Stat. 94), which provides in part:

"To enable the President, through appropriate agencies of the Government, to provide for emergencies affecting the national security and defense and for each and every purpose connected therewith, and to make all necessary expenditures incident thereto for any purpose for which the Congress has previously made appropriation or authorization and without regard to the provisions of law regulating the expenditure of Government funds or the deployment of persons in the Government service, such as section 3709 of the
Revised Statutes and the civil service and classification laws; and any waiver hereunder of the provisions of any law regulating such expenditure or such employment shall not be exercised by any agency unless the allocation to such agency or subsequent action of the President in connection therewith permits any such waiver to be availed of; $100,000,000; * * *.

Further appropriations replenishing this fund have been couched in similar language.

The following proviso is contained in the Third Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1942 (55 Stat. 818) which appropriated money for the President's emergency fund:

"That in a total amount of not exceeding $10,000,000 and within the purposes provided for in this paragraph, the President may authorize the expenditure of sums from this appropriation for objects of a confidential nature and in any such case a certificate of the expending agency as to the amount of the expenditure and that it is deemed advisable to specify the nature thereof shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the sum therein expressed to have been expended * * *.

To date $87,500,000 has been authorized to be spent for confidential purposes and $51,200,000 has been so expended. Of the remaining $36,300,000 approximately $6,500,000 is being reserved for an allocation which has been decided upon but not yet made. This leaves an unallocated and available balance of $29,800,000 which may be spent for confidential purposes. This is a part of the $80,000,70 balance and not an additional amount.

When Congress considered the establishment of the President's emergency fund there was considerable discussion about the difference between the proposed fund and similar emergency appropriations which had been placed in the Army and Navy Appropriation Acts of the previous year. The words underscored above—"for any purpose for which the Congress has previously made appropriation or authorization"—were not in the bill when it was introduced, nor were they included in the version passed by the House. In the Senate there was a long discussion about the possibility of using this fund to start building the Florida Ship Canal or the St. Lawrence Waterway. In the course of the argument, it was made clear that the President, under the bill as introduced, would be able to use the fund for any purpose in connection with national security and defense, but that the early provisions in the Army and Navy Acts had limited him to those purposes for which appropriations had been made for the Army and Navy.

Senator Danaher proposed the amendment which incorporated the underscored language in the appropriation. When Senator Byrnes indicated that important and commendable objectives might not be within the scope of the language if so amended, Senator Danaher said:
Although this limitation might make it difficult to use the President's emergency fund for the proposed purpose, it could well be argued that the specific uses of the fund need only be within the general scope of prior legislation and need not necessarily be such as would fit specifically within the technical terms of such acts. On the basis of this construction, the proposed expenditure would be justified by the prior appropriation for foreign war relief, since Congress has indicated its intention of providing this type of assistance by appropriating funds for the sending of supplies to destitute persons abroad. This view is supported by the examples, discussed below, of allocations from the President's emergency fund.

It can also be argued that the original limitation is no longer in effect. The Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, 1943, enacted on July 12, 1943 (Public Law 132, 78th Cong.) contained the following provision under the heading "Emergency fund for the President":

"The appropriation 'Emergency fund for the President,' contained in the First Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1943, as supplemented by the Second Supplemental National Defense Appropriation Act, 1943, is hereby continued available until June 30, 1944, and the limitation on the amount which may be expended for objects of a confidential nature is hereby increased by $25,000,000. Provided, That no part of such fund shall be available after June 30, 1944, for allocation to finance a function or project for which function or project a budget estimate of appropriation was transmitted pursuant to law during the Seventy-eighth Congress and such appropriation denied after consideration thereof by the Senate and House of Representatives or by the Committees on Appropriations of both bodies."

The developments which led to the renewal of the emergency fund with the above proviso are quite complicated. The bill, as introduced in the House of Representatives, did not contain any proviso whatever, but merely extended until June 30, 1944, the unexpended balance in the fund and increased the amount which could be spent for confidential purposes by $25,000,000.
The original debate in the House resulted in the addition of a prohibition on the use of the fund for making any allocations to the National Resources Planning Board and the Farm Security Administration. This amendment was struck out by the Senate and, in lieu thereof, a proviso was added which would have prohibited allocations of the emergency fund for any purpose for which Congress had made appropriations or for any purpose for which an appropriation had been requested and had been denied by Congress, except that such proviso would not operate against allocations for the War and Navy Departments.

In the House debates concerning the amendment substituted by the Senate it was indicated that the result of adopting the Senate amendment would be that no agency other than the War and Navy Departments would be able to use the fund and that those departments were least likely to need it since they had contingent funds of their own. In an effort to overcome this difficulty, the House adopted the Senate amendment, but added to the agencies excepted from the provisions of the prohibition the State Department and the Office of Strategic Services. The Senate agreed to this modification, but added a further exception for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

During the time in which this amendment passed back and forth between the House and Senate, provisions were inserted in other appropriations prohibiting the supplementation from any other source of funds appropriated for the National Resources Planning Board and the Farm Security Administration. In view of this fact the original House amendment became unnecessary and the next proposal made by the Conference Committee was that all the amendments should be omitted. This would have left the appropriation in the form in which it had been introduced in the House of Representatives.

The same bill contained the prohibition against the payment of salaries of Senators, Dodd, Watson, and Lovett on which the House and Senate agreed. Accordingly, there were a number of conferences and the provision regarding the President's emergency fund was used as a lever to obtain agreement of the two houses on the question of paying the salaries of these three men. The next step taken was that the Conference Committee recommended the adoption of the original Senate amendment (prohibiting the use of the fund to allocate money to any agency for which appropriations were made or denied) with exceptions in favor of the War, Navy, and State Departments, the Office of Strategic Services and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. When agreement on this provision failed, the next conference proposed the language which was ultimately adopted.

The discussion of the final proposal was very brief. In the Senate Senator Voeller explained it as follows:
"Mr. President, the conferees believed that no one could reasonably object to this provision. If a budget was sent in and denied either by both Committees on Appropriations, or by the Congress itself, surely no money otherwise appropriated by the Congress should be used for this purpose. I am quite sure the President himself would not use his fund for any such purpose anyway after the Congress had turned a bill down which had been submitted by the Budget Director, and I urge Senators to vote for this report. It seems that many Senators whether friendly to the President or unfriendly to him could vote for this limitation or restriction.

"After very careful consideration the conferees unanimously adopted the provision. In my judgment, it does not injuriously affect the appropriation, except to a limited extent. Let us take, for instance, the National Resources Planning Board, for which a budget estimate was sent to Congress and rejected by both Houses; none of the money could be used for that Board. Let us take almost any case in which an appropriation has been asked, and the Congress has refused it. Under the provision, money would not be available, and should not be available, for such a purpose. I do not believe the President himself would think it should be made available when an appropriation has been made to the Congress for the money, and the Congress has refused it, or the Committees on Appropriations of the two Houses have declined to grant it. I am sure that under such circumstances the President would not want to use the fund for a purpose for which the Congress had already denied an appropriation."

(Cong. Rec. 11, July 6, 1943, p. 7077.)

The ensuing debate involved only the question of whether the amendment could be so interpreted as to prohibit the use of the fund for a purpose for which the Appropriations Committees had refused to recommend appropriations, but for which Congress ultimately appropriated funds. Senator Barkley believed that this would make the Appropriations Committees superior to Congress.

In the House debate on this provision the only statement made was that by Representative Cannon, who said:

"There are only two points of variance: One relates to control of the President's fund. Under the limitations imposed by the two Houses in the original draft of the bill, the fund would have been, to all practical intents and purposes, practically inoperable. Now it goes without saying that an emergency fund at the disposal of the Commander in Chief, from which allocations can be made in emergencies or in secret war operations, is indispensable in modern warfare. No war has been fought in modern times by any country without such provision. It follows, then, that limitations hampering the use of the fund are to that extent inimical to the successful prosecution of the war, and the committee of conference report back a provision under which restrictions on the use of the fund are limited to objects for which estimates by the Bureau of the Budget have been denied by the two Houses of the respective Committees on Appropriations theretofore." (Cong. Rec., B1, July 3, 1943, p. 7201.)
It should be noted that nowhere in the debates of either House on any of the various amendments proposed was there any discussion of whether the proviso were intended in substitution for the limitation contained in the original language creating the emergency fund. Accordingly, it is necessary to construe the proviso without the benefit of any statements made by the Congress in the course of its adoption, except those which deal exclusively with the language of the proviso ultimately adopted. In this connection the statements in the Senate are of no assistance, but Mr. Cannon's statement in the House is helpful. He indicated that the only restriction on the use of the fund is that it may not be used for objects for which estimates by the Bureau of the Budget have been denied by the two Houses of Congress or their respective committees on appropriations. If this is so, then the proviso must have been intended as a substitute for the original limitation that the fund should be used only for purposes for which Congress has previously made appropriations or authorizations.

An examination of the uses which have been made of the President's emergency fund leads to the conclusion that the proposed expenditure is proper. The following allocations indicate that the use of the funds as proposed has been considered by the Budget Bureau and the President to be within the scope of the appropriation language:

1. Allocation for continuing in operation the Committee on War Relief Agencies ($80,000, July 1, 1942)
2. For a study by the Committee on War Relief Agencies of the methods of raising private relief funds in the United States ($10,000, April 2, 1941; $12,500, August 1, 1941)
3. For reconstruction and rehabilitation of territories occupied by the armed forces of the United Nations ($500,000, December 3, 1942)
4. For organizing and holding the First Session of the Council of the United Nations Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Administration ($225,000, October 25, 1943)
5. For relief, reconstruction, and rehabilitation in territories liberated from Axis occupation by the armed forces of the United Nations and for relief abroad of refugees from territories occupied or controlled by the Axis ($270,000, May 12, 1943; $300,000, July 12, 1943).

The fifth example noted above seems to be clearly consistent with the proposed use of the President's emergency fund. Since the allocations for this purpose were made both before and after the adoption of the new proviso in the Act of July 12, 1943, it would appear that the President and the Budget Bureau considered such uses proper under the original appropriation setting up the fund as well as under the language adopted when the fund was extended on July 12, 1943.
III. The Lend-Lease Act.

It could be argued, as a technical legal proposition, that the appropriations made for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the Lend-Lease Act (Act of March 11, 1941) are available for the execution of the Goldmann Plan. However, it would require that foreign currency be construed as a commodity and that expenditures be channeled through foreign governments by means of a special Lend-Lease agreement. Accordingly, considerations of policy weigh heavily against such a determination and it would appear to be preferable to use only money from the President’s emergency fund for the general purposes of the Plan.

It should be noted, however, that the Lend-Lease Appropriations can be used for certain specific projects and thus can supplement the money available from the President’s emergency fund. For example, camps may be established in Allied areas for the relief of rescued refugees and this type of expenditure could properly be made out of Lend-Lease funds. In fact, such expenditures have already been made by Lend-Lease in North Africa.
Convention Relating to the International
Status of Refugees
Geneva, October 28, 1933
(C. 690. H. 311. 1933)

Chapter II - Administrative Measures

Article 2

Reservations

(1) Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to issue Hansen certificates, valid for not less than one year, to refugees residing regularly in its territory.

(2) The text of the said certificates shall include a formula authorizing exit and return. Owners of Hansen certificates which have not expired shall be free to leave the country which has issued these documents and return to it without requiring any authorization on exit or visa from the consulate of that country on their return.

(3) The respective consul of the Contracting Parties shall be qualified to extend these certificates for a period not exceeding six months.

(4) The cost of visas for Hansen certificates shall, subject to their issue free of charge to indigent persons, be established according to the lowest tariff applied to the visas of foreign passports.

Pars. 2 & 3 - Bulgaria. The departure from the country of refugees possessing Hansen certificates shall be governed by the general regulations in force in this respect. Bulgarian consuls will be empowered in case of 'force majeur' to extend Hansen certificates issued in Bulgaria for a period of three months.

Pars. 3 - Belgium. Not accepted.

Pars. 4 - Bulgaria. The cost of visas for Hansen certificates shall be fixed in accordance with the tariff applicable to the nationals of the country to which the certificate was issued.
Chapter II - Travel Document

Article 7

Travel Document

(a) The High Contracting Parties

shall allow, in exchange for travel documents, to refugees coming from Germany, and requiring protection in their territory, to issue the present Convention

and the corresponding travel documents to be issued to the refugees in the event of a

travel document not being available, or being damaged, or expired, to

the refugee in such a document.

(b) The High Contracting Parties...

(c) The travel document shall

be subject to the following conditions:

(1) It shall be issued in accordance with the

instructions of the High Contracting Party

issuing the travel document, and shall be

conformable with the provisions of

this Convention in full.

(2) The travel document shall be valid for

a period of three months;

(3) The decision on the extension of the

validity shall be taken at the

time of the issue, and shall be made

in accordance with the provisions of

this Convention;

(4) The travel document shall be

annexed to the travel document,

and shall be valid for a period of

three months from the date of its

issue;

(5) The travel document shall be

useful for the travel document

and travel document validity;

(6) The travel document shall be

useful for travel document validity;

(7) The travel document shall be

useful for travel document validity;

(8) The travel document shall be

useful for travel document validity;

(9) The travel document shall be

useful for travel document validity;

(10) The travel document shall be

useful for travel document validity;

(11) The travel document shall be

useful for travel document validity;

(12) The travel document shall be

useful for travel document validity;

(13) The travel document shall be

useful for travel document validity;

(14) The travel document shall be

useful for travel document validity;

(15) The travel document shall be

useful for travel document validity;
CHAPTER III - TRAVEL DOCUMENT - Cont.

For the validity of a travel document, as a rule, shall not exceed six months;

(e) the travel document shall be issued in the language of the issuing authority, and also in French;

(f) children under the age of four shall be entered on the travel document issued to their parents or guardians;

(g) the fees charged for the issue of travel documents shall not exceed the lowest fees for charges for national passports. It is recommended that, in cases of urgent persons, travel documents should be issued free of charge.

Article 4.

(a) The travel document shall enable the holder to leave the territory where it has been issued and to return thence during the period of validity of the travel document.

(b) The non-contraband carrying of arms, in exceptional cases, is allowed for persons during which the refugee may return such arms into the travel document.

(c) The competent authorities of the territory on which the refugee desired to cross shall, if they are requested to do so, allow the crossing of the travel document if the said territory does not possess a transit visa.

(d) The authorities of the territories shall issue transit visas to refugees who have obtained visas for the territory of transit designation.

(e) The fees for the issue of entrance or transit visas shall not exceed the lowest fees for charges for visas on foreign passports. It is recommended that, in cases of urgent persons, visas shall be issued free of charge.
The House Committee on Foreign Affairs has released a statement by the Honorable Breckinridge Long, Assistant Secretary of State, detailing steps that have been taken to rescue the Jewish people from Hitler-Europe. It is the first official report since the Bermuda Conference. It can be read only with mixed feelings in which bewilderment and regret predominate over satisfaction.

We are moved to the following conclusions:

1. The country has been given an exaggerated impression of the number of Jewish refugees admitted into the United States.

2. The State Department is continuing to restrict immigration to a figure far below that permitted by law, adhering to policies and procedures which cannot be defended.

3. Officials of the State Department, Mr. Long among them, still purport, publicly at least, that the plight of the Jews in Hitler-occupied Europe is indistinguishable from the plight of all other peoples, notwithstanding Hitler's ruthless determination to exterminate all the Jews within his grasp.

4. Despite this state of mind, there are encouraging indications that certain extraordinary measures which were demanded by Jewish agencies at Bermuda and which seemed to be then rejected, are now being undertaken. However, confusion still exists as to the powers of the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees. This requires early clarification.

In presenting statistics on the number of refugees admitted into the United States, Mr. Long gave the State Department's total - 580,000 in a ten year period - of visas issued, quota, non-quota and even transit.

To whom were these visas issued? Mr. Long's testimony tended to create the erroneous impression that all 580,000 were Jews. Of the 580,000 visas issued, only 476,930 were used by immigrants. Of the latter, about 250,000 were refugees from Hitlerism, and not all of them were Jews. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that during the same period, 87,634 aliens were deported from this country, thus reducing further the total number of immigrants accrued in the ten years under consideration.

The official figures of the Immigration and Naturalization Service reveal that between January 1, 1933 and June 30, 1943 the number of Jews who came in under national quotas totaled 165,843. The total number of Jews admitted on emergency visas was 43,083, but some of these were included in the 165,843, since they later re-entered under the national quotas. These totals include Jewish immigrants from all over the world, some of whom were not refugees from Hitler.
The restrictions on immigration imposed by the State Department are a definite hindrance to the rescue program. In the past year, only 5.9 percent of the immigrants permitted under the quota law were admitted. This is due, in part, to the elaborate "screening" process established by the State Department. We agree that every precaution must be taken in the interest of security to prevent the admission of enemy agents, but existing procedures are needlessly cumbersome. In other countries, refugees are admitted, interned, and released after complete investigation. A hasty and unjustifiable rule of the visa division weighs very heavily against the admission of persons with near relatives in Axis-Europe. This serves to bar admission to many people in need of a haven.

Dr. Long has declared that "the demands for a wider opening of the United States to refugees) cannot be justified for the time being because there just is not any transportation." One may question this argument, for the Spanish and Portuguese vessels to which he referred are not the only ones that might be used. But even these vessels are not used to capacity, as they can accommodate five or six times the 2,000 immigrants arriving monthly.

The major problem with respect to the rescue of Europe's Jews is the need of extraordinary steps which must be taken in order to liberate those still within Hitler territory. Speaking for the American Jewish Community, the American Jewish Conference has urged such measures because the Jews have been singled out for destruction. Every day's delay adds to the ever mounting death toll.

Dr. Long's position on this issue is extremely disturbing. He quotes the following excerpts from his statement: "We have been interested in refugees; and I think there has been some ill-reason on the part of some officers to accept the thought that the American government ought to specialize and make it particularly direct that we are interested only in Jews. We have felt from the start that we could not exclude other persons from governmental and official activities." Later, in his testimony, Dr. Long declared: "...the situation has come to a state of publicity today where I think the Jewish interests have emphasized the fate of the Jews as such: ...the State Department's policy, I think must be that we cannot exclude persons from our sympathy and sympathetic attention if they are not Jews. I think we must treat all persons, irrespective of their race, religion or political beliefs, in the same way....

We deeply regret that our position has been so grossly misunderstood by one in a position to know the facts. Our attitude has been more clear to the State Department.

The resolution adopted by the American Jewish Conference on September 2nd, 1943 declared: "The Conference recognizes that all victims of Nazi oppression, irrespective of race or faith are entitled to aid and succor from the United Nations, but the situation of the Jews in Europe is unique in its tragedy. They have not only been more deeply wounded than any other people; but alone among all the subject communities they have been doomed to total destruction by an act of State. For every one of them - men, women and children - the alternative to rescue is deportation and death."
It is difficult to understand Mr. Long's repeated implication that specific aid to Jews excludes help to other people, or that there is no distinction between the problem of rescuing Jews from Hitler Europe and aiding refugees in general. It should be pointed out that Mr. Long himself stated that the situation has arrived today ... where something definite ought to be said concerning the Jews. Yet, he studiously avoided making his or his department's position clear on this matter.

Mr. Long has released the text of the mandate of the Intergovernmental Committee, and declared that according to this mandate, the Committee was given "plenipotentiary authority to do whatever they can within and without Germany and the occupied territories." This statement has been widely interpreted to mean that the Committee is empowered to deal with all phases of the problem of rescue, including direct negotiations with Germany for the release of Jews and other persecuted people.

But Mr. Long's interpretation has now been termed "absolutely incorrect" by the headquarters of the Intergovernmental Committee in London, according to cable dispatches. Patrick Malin, American vice-director of the Intergovernmental Committee, denied that the Committee mandate can be interpreted to mean, as Mr. Long said, that the Intergovernmental Committee has been given "the authority to do whatever it can within and without Germany and the occupied territories." Mr. Malin pointed out that the mandate was extended specifically with respect to persons and not countries.

In view of these contradictory interpretations, we urge immediate clarification of the situation. Confusion and conflict of opinion at this late date are inexcusable.

The failure to rescue Jews from the Balkan countries was not attributable entirely to the opposition of the Nazis, as Mr. Long's testimony has indicated. It is known that red tape and delay on the part of the British authorities were responsible for the fact that full advantage was not taken of all the opportunities presented.

From Mr. Long's testimony, however, it is now evident that some progress is being made. For example, we welcome the approval of a project in which the United States and Great Britain would make $10,000,000 available to the International Red Cross for its use in connection with such measures for assisting surviving groups of Jews in enemy occupied territory as are approved by the Intergovernmental Committee.
The rescue program submitted by the American Jewish Conference includes among other proposals, the following major plans:

1) Efforts to evacuate Jews still entrapped in Nazi-dominated countries by negotiation through neutral countries and other intermediaries with the Axis and satellite governments and by the maximum use of underground movements;

2) Efforts to feed endangered people and provide necessary medical supplies;

3) Efforts to alleviate their position by warning of retribution.

The Intergovernmental Committee, according to Mr. Long's testimony, has made certain attempts along these lines. We urge an acceleration and intensification of these efforts. We are in the conviction that as Germany suffers military reverses, the possibilities of effective rescue work are enhanced. This calls for positive and decisive action.

12/27/43
78TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

H. RES. 350

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NOVEMBER 9, 1943

Mr. Baldwin of New York submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

RESOLUTION

Whereas the Congress of the United States, by concurrent resolution adopted on March 15 of this year, expressed its condemnation of Nazi Germany's "mass murder of Jewish men, women, and children", a mass crime which has already exterminated close to two million human beings, about 30 per centum of the total Jewish population of Europe, and which is growing in intensity as Germany approaches defeat; and

Whereas the American tradition of justice and humanity dictates that all possible means be employed to save from this fate the surviving Jews of Europe, some four million souls who have been rendered homeless and destitute by the Nazis:

Therefore be it

1. Resolved, That the House of Representatives recommends and urges the creation by the President of a commission of diplomatic, economic, and military experts to formulate and effectuate a plan of immediate action designed to save the surviving Jewish people of Europe from extinction at the hands of Nazi Germany.
H. RES. 350

RESOLUTION

Providing for the establishment by the Executive of a commission to effectuate the rescue of the Jewish people of Europe.

By Mr. Baldwin of New York

November 9, 1943

Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
RESOLUTION

Whereas the Congress of the United States, by concurrent resolution adopted on March 15 of this year, expressed its condemnation of Nazi Germany's "mass murder of Jewish men, women, and children," a mass crime which has already exterminated close to two million human beings, about 30 per centum of the total Jewish population of Europe, and which is growing in intensity as Germany approaches defeat; and

Whereas the American tradition of justice and humanity dictates that all possible means be employed to save from this fate the surviving Jews of Europe, some four million souls who have been rendered homeless and destitute by the Nazis:

Therefore be it

Resolved, That the House of Representatives recommends and urges the creation by the President of a commission of diplomatic, economic, and military experts to formulate and effectuate a plan of immediate action designed to save the surviving Jewish people of Europe from extinction at the hands of Nazi Germany.
H. RES. 352

RESOLUTION

Providing for the establishment by the Executive of a commission to effectuate the rescue of the Jewish people of Europe.

By Mr. Reuss of California

November 9, 1943

Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

May 14, 1943  

MEMORANDUM FOR  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  

In regard to your letter of May seventh, following the Bermuda Conference, I suggest on page #1 -- Paragraph #1, that we do not give unlimited promises but that we undertake with Britain to share the cost of financing from time to time any specific cases.  

As to Paragraph #2, I do not think we can do other than comply strictly with the present immigration laws.  

I agree that North Africa may be used as a depot for those refugees but not a permanent residence without full approval of all authorities. I know, in fact, that there is plenty of room for them in North Africa but I raise the question of sending large numbers of Jews there. That would be extremely unwise.  

On Page #6 -- Paragraph #2, I think we should defray a part of the cost of moving. Can this come out of Lehman's funds?  

As to Paragraph #3, I agree with you that we cannot open the question of our immigration laws.  

I agree with you as to bringing in temporary visitors. We have already brought in a large number.  

I have okayed the telegram, which I return herewith.  

F.D.R.  

(COPY: D.Y.)
My dear Mr. President:

The American and British Delegates to the recent Bermuda Conference on Refugees have unanimously recommended a program of positive action involving a number of specific steps which should be taken in an effort to alleviate the plight of European refugees. I am enclosing a copy of a summary or outline of the recommendations for your information.

You will note that the recommendations fall within two general and distinct categories; (a) those requiring action by the American and British Governments, and (b) those requiring action by all governments through the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, which was organized at Evian, France in 1938. With reference to the first category, the most urgent and important of the items recommended at Bermuda concerns the evacuation of some 5,000 persons from Bulgaria via Turkey to Palestine. This recommendation has been approved with the understanding that the Government of the United States would contribute half of the necessary expenses, the payment of which has been arranged in the amount of several hundred thousand dollars.

Another important recommendation requiring action by the Government of the United States, as well as by the British Government, relates to the movement of some 20,000 refugees from Spain to North Africa, not only to relieve the Spanish authorities of the present burden, but also in order to make it possible for Spain to receive more and more refugees who in turn may be evacuated to North Africa. This raises at once a question of major policy. Temporary refuge in North Africa is not approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The opinion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff has therefore been requested. General Giraud, after discussing the matter with General Eisenhower, has agreed that after the completion of the movement to North Africa of some 14,000 of these refugees, who are French, the remainder, which consists of the so-called stateless Central Europeans, may be welcome to North Africa where many of them may be able to contribute something to the common military effort.

With reference to the second category of recommendations of the Bermuda Conference, namely, those requiring action by the Intergovernmental Committee which was organized at Evian, France in 1938, I attach a draft of a suggested cablegram to be sent to our Embassy at London proposing that the British Chairman of the

(The President okayed this telegram and it was sent as #3428 of May 15, 1943 to London) (Preceding appeared as marginal note)
Intergovernmental Committee call a meeting thereof in Washington in the near future in order that the program recommended at Bermuda may be put into effect as soon as possible.

Mr. Myron C. Taylor, who is the American member of the Intergovernmental Committee and of its Executive Committee, and who is no doubt desirable to you as the person to continue the work with which he has been identified, has raised certain questions of purpose and authority to the effect that a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee, or the Executive Committee thereof, would be futile unless the American and British Governments are prepared to lead the way for the other governments and to make definite commitments regarding the assumption of our share of the cost of evacuation, transportation, maintenance, and eventual repatriation of a large number of persons, which may run into millions of dollars. We would also be obligated to find not only temporary places of refuge but permanent places of settlement for refugees.

These questions require decisions of high policy, about which I must consult you.

1. The unknown cost of moving an undetermined number of persons from an undisclosed place to an unknown destination, a scheme advocated by certain pressure groups, is, of course, out of the question. However, as a practical matter it may be possible for the Government of the United States to undertake its share of cost in financing from time to time the movement of a specific number of persons from a particular place to a designated destination, as determined upon by the Intergovernmental Committee.

2. The immigration quotas of the United States are sufficient to accommodate a large number of Central European refugees who are able to qualify individually under the immigration laws. Any attempt to bring refugees into the country without compliance with the immigration laws, or in excess of quota limitations, would be likely to result in throwing the whole refugee question into Congress, where there is a prevailing sentiment for even more drastic curtailment of immigration into this country in time of war when our own citizens are going abroad to lay down their lives, if necessary, for their country.

3. So far as the United States is concerned, admission under the quota includes the privilege of permanent residence. However, it is not believed that places of permanent settlement in other countries would be as readily offered as temporary asylum or refuge. This question was explored and discussed at great length at Bermuda and the conclusion was reached that the desire of refugees...
to settle permanently must be subordinated to the wishes of the country of asylum if any appreciable number of them are to be saved.

The following questions are therefore posed with respect to the first phase of the implementation of the program drafted at Bermuda:

1. Do you agree that North Africa may be used as a depot for those refugees who can be evacuated from Spain without interference with military operations and with the full approval of the military commanders in that area?

This would approve the recommendations of the Bermuda Conference to save as many as quickly as possible, providing them with temporary asylum in Africa and obtaining commitments for their post-war return to their home countries.

2. Should we undertake to defray a part of the cost of moving these and other particular groups from one place to another from time to time, and if so, what funds will be available for that purpose?

3. I cannot recommend that we open the question of relaxing the provisions of our immigration laws and run the risk of a prolonged and bitter controversy in Congress on the immigration question - considering the generous quantity of refugees we have already received.

4. I cannot recommend that we bring in refugees as temporary visitors and thus lay ourselves open to possible charges of nullifications or evasion of the national origins principle embodied in the quota laws.

The above-indicated course would obviate either of these last two possibilities.

May I have your directives for determination of the recommendations of the refugee program formulated at Bermuda.

Faithfully yours,

Signed--Cordell Hull

Enclosures:

1. Summary of recommendations.
2. Telegram to London.
HUMORANDUM ON HUROUDA CONFERENCE
ON THE REFUGEE PROBLEM
HELD APRIL 19, TO APRIL 29, 1945

BACKGROUND

Until late in 1943 the Department of State followed the policy of withholding atrocity stories received by it from Europe on the theory that confirmation of such stories was lacking. But on September 29, 1943, Rabbi Wise made public a communication received from one Belgium in Europe transmitted through the State Department and which Wise, either mistakenly or deliberately, stated had official State Department sanction.

This resulted in a flood of mail to the President and the State Department aimed at procuring: (1) a joint declaration by the United States and the United Kingdom condemning barbarism and promising retribution; (2) opening Palestine to the Jews; (3) removing all barriers to the immigration of Jewish Children and (4) exchanging Jews in occupied Europe for interned Axis nationals.

The last point was emphatically disapproved by the State Department on several grounds. In the first place there are not enough Axis internes to make such a project possible. But most important, the exile governments could be expected to object to this favoring of Jews over non-Jewish nationals. This latter point could also be used by the Germans for propaganda claim that the war is being fought for the Jews. (Report of December 16, 1943 for State Department files).

On January 9, 1943 a study of United States Jewish organizations covering 36 pages was submitted for the files. This study shows primarily the diversity of aims of such organizations.

The American Jewish Congress looks toward action by the Jews as a race including the sending of delegates to supprees conference following the war. They also seek to establish Palestine as an independent nation and to maintain a separate Jewish Army during the present conflict.

The Committee for Jewish Army, organized by Van Patten, in 1941, is neither well-planned nor supported by the Jewish populace as a whole, although it has at least nominal backing by several well-known persons.

The communist organizations appear to be making use of the Jewish sentiment to further general communist rather than Jewish ends.
American Council for Judaism sponsored by Joseph
tutis, prefer to limit its activities to religious rather than
political questions.

The B'nai Brith favors a united front and proposes a con-
ference of all Jewish organizations other than Van Hessen's
committee and the Communist organization, both of which it re-
fuses to recognize.

On January 20, 1943, in response to a rising tide of senti-
ment in England, the refugee question was discussed at some length
in Parliament. The Government stated that the declaration of
"December 14" concerning the extermination of Jews, was intended as
a deterrent. However, the Government recognizes the danger of
favoring Jews unduly and is particularly aware of the danger of
inviting the Germans to dump the Jews on the Allies. Because of
shipping and other difficulties the neutral countries must be
encouraged to accept refugees, but it is felt that the limit is
being reached. The Government is not prepared to accept any great
number of adult adults in Palestine for security reasons, but will
accept some women and children. The United Kingdom itself cannot
take any more refugees than it now has, except possibly on the Isle
of Man, where they would be held under detention. It was not known
whether the colonies have more room. The Government also states
that it did not favor a formal international conference because of
the ensuing publicity, but it would be agreeable to arrange a conference to
get proposals.

Concerning the United States the British Government
would like to know whether we feel that combined action by the
United Nations is now called for; whether the United States will
take more adult refugees and if so how many; how many more refugees
(stmtatives can take); what shipping is available; whether the United
States is agreeable to a private conference on the question; and
whether the neutral countries should be assured that the refugee
problem will be included in any rehabilitation plans as a part of
peace terms.

The Government concludes by giving the number of refugees
already received by Great Britain and the Colonies.

By telegram, dated February 20, 1943, England proposes that
the United States and Great Britain call a conference in London of the
Allied Nations on the refugee question at which an agreement should
be reached on the number of special visas to be issued to refugees,
and what guarantees of post-war relief should be made to the neutral
countries.
On February 25, Secretary Hull replied, outlining the steps already taken by this country, citing the number of internes in the United States, with the results lessening of the burden in Europe and the increased load upon this country. He proposed the use of the Intergovernmental Committee to explore the refugee problem, but warned that such an investigation should not be limited to the Jews; that as many refugees as possible should be kept in Europe to save shipping space and loss of life in transit as well as aiding in returning such refugees to their homes lands after the war; to provide maintenance for Refugees given asylum by the neutral countries; to assure the neutrals that refugees would be repatriated after the war, and to investigate the possibility of temporary asylum in non-neutral countries.

In connection with preparation of the foregoing reply a memorandum was sent by Wallace Murray to Brandt urging pointed and emphatic reference to the number of Italians already foisted on the United States by England. He suggested that public sentiment in this country be rallied to provide support for the Government in resisting a deluge of refugees which, added to the number of internes now being supported, would aggravate the already critical food situation.

On February 26, the London Embassy sent a despatch indicating public opinion in England on the refugee problem. The Manchester Guardian particularly criticized the British Government for barring refugees who will not aid the war effort. It alleges that this is contrary to the sentiment of the people of England. The Guardian argues that united action with the United States be taken, but it expresses the opinion that the United States appears to be hanging back.

On March 9, the Manchester Guardian expresses itself strongly on the proposed conference, and criticizes the United States' plan for temporary asylum on the ground that many refugees may not wish to remain here after the war, and that the neutral countries may not be able to take any more than they now have. It attacks the long delays in solving the refugee problem, and the reluctance of both England and the United States to take immigrants.

A further dispatch was received from the London Embassy dealing with public sentiment in England, in which attention is called to the statement before Commons on the Polish declaration concerning repatriation. It also records an unofficial conference at Oxford which urged the Government to release immigration restrictions, open Palestine, and call an immediate conference to find refugees.
On March 10, a reply was received from England to Secretary Hull's proposal of February 28. The British doubt that the Intergovernmental Committee is a suitable agency and urge looking into the possibility of setting up other machinery.

On March 10, a conference was had between the State Department and the English Foreign Office in which the latter suggested London as a site for the proposed conference and hinted that ex-Governor Lehman would make a fine representative for this country at such a conference. The State Department gave no encouragement to either of the suggestions.

With a view to examining the suitability of the Intergovernmental Committee as an agency for carrying out the anticipated proposals of the proposed conference, a memorandum was prepared on March 15. It was suggested that the mandate of the committee would have to be expanded to include persons of any race or faith. It would probably also be advisable to invite participation by the USSR, Poland, Greece, Yugoslavia, and perhaps China. It was considered doubtful that Spain or Portugal would be in a position to join even if invited, since France is incommunicado and it may be necessary to bar countries not members of the United Nations, with particular reference to Argentina. The question was raised whether such countries should be represented by substitutes.

It was urged that members of the Executive Committee should be available for frequent meetings, and accordingly that they be appointed by name, and that they reside in England.

It was suggested that the ruling adopted by the Allied Conference that neutral countries should not assume any obligations for refugees, should be revoked, but the United Nations would guarantee advance. It was also felt that contributions by important nations cannot continue on a voluntary basis and that the size of the present staff must be increased for enlarged operations, including the establishment of Foreign agencies at strategic points to observe and report to the committee.
On March 18 Secretary Hull informed the British, in reply to their note of March 10, that the United States still favors the Intergovernmental Committee but is willing to discuss other machinery. He also indicated his willingness to discuss the availability of food etc., to enable the refugees to be kept in neutral countries.

On March 24 a resolution was introduced in the House of Lords pledging the utmost aid compatible with security and the needs of the army. In the discussion from the floor it was suggested that England approach Germany with an offer to accept a certain number of refugees each month, to get children into exile, to appoint a high commissioner for England, or for the United Nations if they are ready to act together.

The Government was urged not to delay any longer and to reach an actual decision at the proposed conference rather than just conduct an investigation into the problem. It was felt that this matter requires emergency action, without regard for peacetime rules and disregarding as far as possible the burden on England.

The Government stated that it was sympathetic, but presented statistics concerning the number already being supported, raised the feeling of the Arabs concerning Palestine and stated that the neutrals must be promised that the refugees would be moved out quickly. It definitely turned down the suggestion of making an offer to Germany, on the grounds that if the Germans accepted and the Allies could not perform their part, the entire movement would suffer a serious set-back.

On March 28, the Joint Emergency Committee on European Jewish Affairs for the Rescue of Jews in Nazi occupied territories submitted a memorandum proposing:

1. A request to Germany to release Jews.

2. The establishment of sanctuaries with a promise to the neutrals to drain off the surplus in order to encourage further cooperation.

3. Revision of the United States' quota system, including by-passing the long delays arising out of the necessity for approval of immigrants, by letting organizations guarantee applicants.
4. Urging England to take in more refugees, using the argument that their war effort would benefit by an increased supply of workers.

5. Exploring the possibility of increasing the number for the colonies.

6. Urging Latin America to relax immigration laws temporarily, following an example to be set by the United States.

7. Opening Palestine, discarding the old pre-war political arguments which are now out-weighted.

8. Guaranteeing to neutrals maintenance, and eventual evacuation.

9. Feeding Nazi victims who cannot get out of occupied territory, under the supervision of the Red Cross.

10. Either reorganize Inter government Committee or create a new agency.

11. Establish credentials for stateless persons.


To this memorandum was annexed a set of proposals made by Rosenholz, including an appeal to the German General Staff as opposed to the Nazi Government; transfer of Jews from Romania to Abyssinia; exchange religious leaders for German internees; induce Slovaks and Italians to cancel their deportation plans, acting through the Vatican; and feed the Poles through the Red Cross.

On March 24, Sir Ronald Campbell and Brookings Long had a conversation in which Campbell urged the immediate evacuation of all refugees in Spain to an internment camp in North Africa. Long disagreed with this on the ground that we have no jurisdiction over French North Africa which is a political entity. He outlined the plans already under way for the evacuation of some 10,000 refugees, 7,500 of whom are French. He insisted that the rest could
be cared for and that while their condition was serious it was not
critical.

He further informed Campbell that United States was ready to
confer with the British ten days after receiving notice of the place
of meeting. Bermuda was mentioned.

Sir Hubert Vemover submitted a note on March 25 concerning
proposals made with regard to the refugee problem. He stated that
the most urgent thing was to end the war as soon as possible,
since more victims of the Nazi die every day that the war con-
tinues than can ever be evacuated; accordingly the primary test of
every plan must be whether it will delay the war effort.

Any proposed deal with Germany can be taken only after the
Allies have received firm promises of places of asylum. Since
technically all frontiers are closed, pressure must be kept upon
the neutrals and promises made to siphon off refugees as fast as
possible, to maintain those left and to evacuate all after the war.

He urged the establishment of emergency camps in North
Africa or elsewhere, subject to military considerations, in case
the Spanish demand immediate evacuation of considerable numbers.

On March 26, it was rumored that Spain had closed its
borders, and United States requested assurance that refugees would
not be turned over to the enemy. On March 29, Spain had still not
determined what action it would take but was apparently alarmed
by a threat of organized and large scale invasion. It accused
United States Embassy of participating in the movement. We
denied such participation and sought to strengthen our denial by
pointing out that no help was needed in North Africa any longer
and that United States would prefer able-bodied French to remain in
France to aid the proposed Allied invasion of that country.

On March 26, the British agreed to Bermuda as the place
for the proposed conference, but up to April 5 the State Depart-
ment had declined to fix a date for the conference on the grounds that
it was awaiting orders from the President.

On April 13 our delegates, Mr. Harold Dodds of Princeton
University, Congressman Del Bello, and Senator Luana, were furn-
ished with a confidential, detailed statement of the views of
this Government on matters to be discussed at the conference. All
other matters would be subject to communication with the State
Department before any action was taken.
This memorandum covered 16 points:

1. The discussion should not be restricted to Jewish refugees and care should be taken to avoid furnishing the Axis with propaganda material.

2. In raising funds, all questions of faith and race must be avoided, both in addressing appeals for public support and in presenting the use of such funds.

3. No commitments should be made regarding shipping space since the evacuation of United States wounded and Axis prisoners must go first, and their needs are uncertain.

4. Naval escorts are available and safe conduct is out of the question. Further, there can be no delay in our shipping program such as would be caused by having homeward bound transports stop to pick up refugees. Consequently, transatlantic shipments are out of the question if any territory in Europe or adjacent countries is available. Repatriation across the ocean after the war is also undesirable since it would require shipping which would be scarce, large expenditures of money, and in many cases the use of force to evacuate reluctant refugees.

5. The United States Government do not wish to be accused of admitting large numbers of refugees to fill the gap caused by American boys dying abroad, since this might cause serious domestic disunity.

6. Neutral countries to be used as axis may be bribed with the assurance of funds for the support of refugees, and evacuation of surplus to near by countries, and eventually, repatriation.

7. A definite pledge of funds is impossible, since that rests with Congress and the President, but the chance of favorable reaction to any request will be better if funds are to be collected on a pre-rate basis.
8. The consent of Governments in Exile is to repatriation is important. Conquered enemy nations can be forced by treaty terms. It was pointed out that the neutral countries will rely on any promise along this line only if they are convinced of an Allied victory.

9. The Government is not interested in any problems arising in Europe and Africa except where interference with war might result.

10. The recommendations of the conference should be implemented by existing agencies as far as possible. This Government approves the use of the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee.

11. A prompt meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee is urged.

12. The Intergovernmental Committee should be requested to contact all members immediately and to raise funds.

13. It should be borne in mind that the United States immigration laws are fixed by Congress and are extremely liberal as they now stand.

14. Congress is very unlikely to consider a change in the immigration laws at this time.

15. Always bear in mind the needs of our own war effort and civilian population for food and money.
In opening the conference, Law, the chief British delegate, stated firmly that his Government would not consider any direct appeal to the German government, the exchange of prisoners for refugees or the lifting of the blockade of Europe. The only problems to be discussed in the eyes of the British were: The fifteen or twenty thousand refugees in Spain, one half of whom are Jews; children in the Balkans; refugees in Persia, and Greeks on the Island of Cyprus; and the question of refugees entering Sweden, Switzerland, and Spain.

The English prefer not to deal with Hitler because he would undoubtedly demand excessive favors in return. The danger of having large numbers of refugees dumped upon the Allies was a matter of considerable concern, and letting in large numbers of refugees without some preliminary investigation might endanger the security of England through the admission of Axis sympathizers posing as refugees.

Congressman Bloom argued at considerable length on this question, maintaining that the least we could do would be to try. The British retaliated by citing the breakdown of the British-German attempts to exchange military prisoners as evidence of the bad faith of the German Government, and when Bloom persisted in his position, Hodds finally dismissed him by calling his attention to the definite statement of this Government's policy which was supposed to govern the American delegates. Kennan, who was present at the conference stated that the State Department was frankly opposed to any policy of negotiations with the German Government. On Bl o "s insistence, the matter was left open.

The question of exchanging prisoners was dismissed without discussion, and it was agreed that the blockade was a matter beyond the scope of this conference.

The conference was advised by specialists furnished by the two Governments that no Allied shipping could be counted upon for at least a year or a year and a half. The following shipping was described as possibly available:

20 Spanish passenger ships
15 Portuguese " "
A few Turkish ships for near eastern ports.

Three or four Swedish ships, provided the Germans granted special permission to remove them from the Baltic sea trade.
Of all these the only possibility really worth considering was four Portuguese ships which might be had if the indemnity was sufficiently high and some guarantee of safe conduct forthcoming. It was considered by the shipping experts that the most practical use of these vessels would be to transport refugees to Angola, and they should be capable of carrying 15,000 over a comparatively short period of time. Definite statements, however, were very difficult to obtain.

On the question of destination, North Africa was strongly opposed by the American delegation on the theory that the remotest danger of impeding the Army could not be considered and no commitments as to the time or place could be made. At this point the conference became very much interested in Angola, until Reams suggested that the Portuguese might not want any refugees in Angola. He suggested that Portugal might be more responsive to a request by the Intergovernmental Committee. In the question of procuring the Portuguese ships, the suggestion was made that the negotiations be carried out through the State Department, but Dodds recommended that this too be handled by the Intergovernmental Committee.

Various possibilities for locating refugees, and the problems connected with each were discussed at some length, but without any definite conclusion being reached. Some were found favorable, others simply dropped, and still others left to the uncertain fate of further discussion which apparently never took place.

The Palestine question was explored with Congressman Bloom pressing the British rather strongly until Professor Dodds prevailed upon them to drop the discussion.

The question of finance was discussed briefly, and the American delegation stated that it would make no commitments on this point but recommended an appropriation.

There is an apparent disagreement on the position to be taken in connection with repatriation but there was some conflict as to what sort of a statement should be issued. Reams argued strongly for a statement by the Intergovernmental Committee, and was supported by Bloom, but Dodds preferred one by the United Nations and Britain seemed partial either to such a statement or to a joint statement by the British and the United States Government. Reams also wanted matters of food and finance handled by the Intergovernmental Committee. It was apparently decided that the latter should be handled by each Government separately.
The reorganization of the Inter-Governmental Committee to permit an expansion of its activities pursuant to the recommendation of the conference was discussed.

The British and United States immigration policies and laws were explained and contrasted, and the British appeared to be favorably impressed with the liberality of our policy.

A special conference was held by the American Delegation for the purpose of permitting certain specialists and interested parties to discuss matters in their particular fields. One Beker, who apparently represented one or more Jewish organizations, argued at great length for transferring a substantial number of refugees from Spain to Cuba without delay, and to speed up the quota system to permit larger numbers to proceed to the United States. Some argued strongly against any such step because of the security angle, and claimed that if even one Nazi spy or saboteur entered this country as a result of such a policy, the ensuing publicity might very well result in barring all refugees in the future. Beker's reply to this was that the number being admitted at the present time and under the present policy was so small that a complete stoppage would not make very much difference.

During the conference Dr. Dodd sent a telegram to the State Department which set forth the British proposals substantially as follows:

The British delegation feel that Spain is the only effective channel of escape remaining in Eastern Europe for refugees of all nationalities. It is of supreme importance that this channel not be blocked as the consequences would be:

(One) That the admission of further refugees would be prevented by the Spanish Government.

(Two) The Allies would be deprived of useful personnel.

(Three) Public opinion throughout the world would come to the conclusion that the Allies were not making any serious endeavor to deal with the refugee problem.

It is understood that the refugees in Spain amount to approximately 21,000, of whom 14,000 are French nationals, chiefly of military age, for whose removal administrative arrangements are already completed. Approximately 6000, mainly Poles and Czechs of military age, can be removed under similar arrangements to join the Allied forces. The remaining four-fifteen thousand are largely Jewish and of enemy nationality or stateless. If all or part of these could be removed to a temporary home, the conference would have led to some definite practical result, and moreover, the clearing of the channel in Spain would enable the Spanish authorities to
permit a further inflow of refugees and thereby give an opportunity of ascertaining whether the Axis powers would permit any potential refugees in countries now under their control to escape. If they took steps to prevent further emigration, it would be clear to the advocates of relief measures, (such as a direct approach to Hitler to release refugees) that their proposals were useless.

The main difficulty in removing refugees from Spain and Portugal is one of transport. One of the United States proposals for the conference was that destinations should be sought as near as possible to the present location of the refugees. Any shipping that may be available will be very limited in passenger capacity, and if the refugees are to be removed from Spain within any measurable distance of time, the length of the voyage becomes a governing factor.

The British propose that a temporary rest camp under their administration be formed at some point in North Africa to be selected by the American authorities as far as possible from the scene of military operations and remote from the lines of communication. Possibly the existing internment camps which have been, it was understood, used only for male internees, would be unsuitable for the purpose of a mixed body of men, women and children. The British authorities referred to in my note have had previous experience of conducting camps of a similar character for male internees in the Isle of Man. A similarly suitable site could be found in North Africa, the British authorities would be prepared to supply the necessary staff for the administration. It is suggested that the cost might be equally shared for the time being between U.S. and British Governments. Such security arrangements as were satisfactory to the U.S. military administration would be complied with. Such a rest camp might accommodate — say 5,000 persons and could be used for transfer of refugees pending arrangements for their transfer when shipping is available to more distant places of refuge. It is understood that certificates of admission for Palestine for approximately 1000 families, or say 5000 persons, are available at the present time, but that existing transport arrangements do not permit of them proceeding beyond Portugal and Southeast Africa. As regards supplies of foodstuffs, etc., as far as the requirements could not be met by local purchase, the necessary arrangements would have to be worked out as part of the problem of supplying the Allied Forces in North Africa.

The British delegation feel strongly that world opinion will be bitterly disappointed by the results of the conference if all future action is relegated to the Inter-Governmental Commission. They would therefore like to obtain the views of the United States Government upon this new proposal.
The reply received from the State Department summarizes its position with regard to North Africa in the following language:

In view of the active military operations proceeding in North Africa, the opinions of the War Department are necessarily involved. This means in the Government have to be consulted. In addition, it must be understood that the United States does not exercise any political jurisdiction in North Africa. That has been the basis of our whole policy there. Our forces are not an occupying army. They are there in collaboration with the local authorities. Consequently, it is necessary to obtain the opinion and consent of General Giraud through the intercession of Eisenhower. No response has yet been received. Department is unable to reply to you until an answer is received from North Africa. Department has requested Eisenhower to urge General Giraud to give his consent but until that consent is either given or refused Department is unable to respond definitely to your telegram.

For your own information we would like to differentiate between Cyrenaica and North Africa. The former is not the scene of active military operations. It is under control of an army of occupation. The Italian citizens have been removed from that area and practically all the native population have departed. There is no present indication that it will again become an area of military activity.

The latter is an area of very active military operations and the American line of communications with its forces presently opened with the enemy lie directly across the whole territory. You can easily understand the attitude of the military authorities toward any proposal which would detract from the security of their line of communications or even constitute a threat.

Very little definite information concerning the conference was released either to the press or to the Governments of other countries, either during or following the conference, on the ground that any undue publicity might result in opposition by the Axis.

The reaction of the press was for the most part unenthusiastic although the Manchester Guardian, as always outspoken on the refugee question, declared that the Allied Nations are not treating the refugees the way they dashed back 500,000 war prisoners suddenly upon them in North Africa; that the difficulties in the latter situation did not prove unsurmountable.

The files contain two letters from State Department to the American Delegation intended to keep them informed as to the results of the conference. The first, not dated and apparently
never mailed, states that Myron J. Taylor and Lord Halifax have outlined a plan in which Britain and the United States agree: (1) upon a place of temporary refuge, (2) the bearing of expenses, (3) a meeting of the IGC Executive Committee to appoint a full time Vice Director and Secretary, (4) that UNRRA will maintain the refugees after they reach the temporary refuge provided and until they return home or go elsewhere after the war, and (5) that both the British and American embassies in the countries concerned would arrange for transit and reception of refugees. The IGC was to contact all its member countries to secure offers to accept refugees and to contribute funds for administrative purposes and for care of refugees.

On July 29, 1945 Travers wrote to Dr. Dodd informing him that work was about to begin on a camp to handle the refugees from Spain, construction to be financed by the British and ourselves. Five hundred thousand dollars had been set aside by the United States to commence the project, and the Army and Navy have been asked to cooperate. The British are to arrange shipping between Portugal and North Africa.

He reports the nomination of Patrick Salin from this country as Vice Director and states that we have suggested that the secretary be of Dutch nationality.

A copy of the agenda for the conference and chapter 7, Summary of Recommendations, from the official report of the conference are annexed to this memorandum.

Memorandum obtained from the Files of the Refugee Division of the State Department
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

CHAPTER VII

1. That no approach be made to Hitler for the release of potential refugees in Germany or German-occupied territory, but that the question be borne in mind by the Intergovernmental Committee in case conditions alter at a later date. (Chapter I)

2. That the United States and United Kingdom Governments consult together with a view to immediate action to obtain the use of neutral shipping for the transport of refugees; this duty to be assumed by the Intergovernmental Committee after revision of its Mandate.

3. That the British authorities consider the question of admitting refugees into Cyrenaica. (Chapter III.B)

4. That the United States and United Kingdom Governments continue their negotiations with the Spanish Government for the release from Spain of the French refugees and of the Allied Nationals accepted for service in the armed forces. If this should be unsuccessful both categories to be referred to the Intergovernmental Committee. (Chapter III.C)

5. That the United Kingdom and United States Governments consider proposals in regard to refugees in Spain not covered by the preceding recommendation, including:

   (a) admission of part of the group into the United States subject to statutory and security requirements;

   (b) grant of certificates of admission to Palestine (selection to be undertaken by a representative of the Jewish Agency, or if he is not admitted to Spain, by the representative there of the American Joint Distribution Board);

   (c) removal to temporary residence in North Africa, subject to military considerations;

   (d) Admission of a limited group into Jamaica;

   (e) further limited admissions to the United Kingdom (Chapter III.C)

6. That the United States and United Kingdom Governments make an approach to the French National Committee in order to secure favorable consideration of the proposal to admit refugees to Madagascar.
7. That the United States and United Kingdom Governments adopt, and urge adoption by the European Allied Governments of, a joint declaration on the return of refugees to their homes after the war. (Chapter III.F)

8. That the intergovernmental Committee be invited to revise its Mandate. (Chapter V (a))

9. That the membership of the intergovernmental Committee be broadened. (Chapter V (b))

10. That provision be made for the procurement of public and private funds adequate for the work of the intergovernmental Committee. (Chapter V (a))

11. That the staff of the Intergovernmental Committee be increased and a Management Committee created. (Chapter V (d))

12. That the United States and United Kingdom Governments take immediate steps to implement recommendations 9-II. Chapter V)

13. That the following points be referred to the intergovernmental Committee for its urgent consideration immediately subsequent to the revision of its Mandate.

A. The possibility of finding countries of asylum for Polish refugees in Persia for whom no destination has hitherto been allotted. (Chapter III. A)

B. The re-opening of the question of Jewish refugee children in France through the intermediary of neutral Governments. (Chapter III. E)

C. An approach to Canada, to the Portuguese Government with reference to Angola and to Latin American countries with a view to the admission of refugees in Spain mentioned in recommendation no. 5. (Chapter III.C)

D. The provision of food and finance for refugees in neutral countries. (Chapter III.F)

E. Possibilities of the reception of refugees in various overseas countries. (Chapter IV. E)
**War Refugee Unit To Be Abolished**

The War Refugee Board, which conducted refugee rescue work behind enemy lines during the European war, is slated to be abolished shortly by presidential order, it was learned yesterday.
Memorandum of a Conference held in Mr. Lesser's Office, Wednesday, March 22, 1944, 10:30 a.m. There were present Mr. Lesser, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Akzin; Dr. Perlzweig and Dr. Kubowitzky of the World Jewish Congress.

Dr. Perlzweig and Dr. Kubowitzky raised the following points:

1. In view of the central position of Hungary with respect to the rescue of Jews and others in Nazi-occupied territory, would it be possible for a representative of the War Refugee Board with a seat in Switzerland to be appointed to watch and deal with the Hungarian angles?

2. Could such a representative dealing with Hungary and the Balkans, be also sent to Istanbul?

3. The Turkish Government has consented to the transit of some children through Turkish territory, but according to all the reports remains adamant on the admission or transit facilities in the case of adults. Could something be done to change their attitude?

4. According to their information, no boats have yet been made available in Turkey for the rescue of refugees from Romania. Since the Red Cross has acquired seven boats for various humanitarian purposes, couldn't one of them or an additional boat to be acquired by the Red Cross, be diverted to this purpose?

5. According to their information, gathered from the Red Cross publication "Prisoners of War Bulletin", March 1944, page 2, there are food parcels in large quantities stocked in Switzerland. In a conversation with them, Mr. Zollinger of the Red Cross has
confirmed this information and has explained that the Red
Cross may not use this food for Jews and others in detention
camps, since the blockading authorities oppose its dispatch
to any but "civilian internees". Could not something be done
about it?

6. Swiss authorities, while relatively cooperative as
regards the admission of children, refuse to admit persons
over 16. Is there any possibility of inducing them to change
their attitude?

7. In view of the vigorous action taken by the Swiss
authorities in connection with the issuance of Latin American
passports to various persons by consuls residing in Switzerland,
the issuance of new passports of this kind has stopped. This
works a tremendous hardship for many people in France and else-
where whose only hope to escape deportation was in getting such
passports.

8. Some Latin American passports already issued were seized
by Swiss authorities, and various persons are being persecuted
before the Swiss courts in this connection. Since the Germans
require the presentation of the original passports, the release
of the seized documents is highly desirable.

9. In this and other matters, it is important to realize
that cantonal authorities in Switzerland have a jurisdiction of
their own, distinct from the Federal authorities of Switzerland.
It is highly desirable that a way be found to induce the Cantons,
as well as the Federation, to cooperate in the humanitarian task.
10. While in the case of most Latin American countries whose passports are involved, Switzerland is not directly concerned beyond the fact that the passports were issued on its soil, in the case of Nicaragua and San Salvador, Switzerland is the protecting power and therefore is in a position to make various representations to the Germans.

11. From the point of view of psychological warfare, it would be essential that the OWI and the BBC be asked to broadcast appeals to the Hungarian people requesting them to refuse any cooperation with the Nazis and any puppet Regime in persecuting Jews. Instead, they should be requested to help the Jews to hide. Perhaps such appeals could be made over the radio by or on behalf of prominent Hungarians in this country and in Great Britain. The appeals could emphasize that Hungarians taking this attitude could be resisting German encroachment on their independence. A broadcast on similar lines made by Badoglio to Northern Italy was quite successful.

12. The suggestion has been made within the World Jewish Congress that broadcasts should be made to the Jews of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, warning them from continuing optimism regarding relative freedom from persecution and deportation and advising them to hide while they have a chance. Experience has shown that Jews in many Nazi-occupied areas are still over-optimistic and that for instance Dutch Jews, instead of attempting to hide, submitted to continuing deportations to Poland in the belief that they are taken there for purposes of forced labor or residence.
In reservation camps,

At the same time, many persons within the World Jewish Congress thought that such a broadcast might be harmful; since it could warn the Germans to speed up the internment and deportation of Jews in those countries, before they had a chance to hide. Therefore, the suggestion is forwarded to the War Refugee Board simply as material for consideration.

13. Mr. Powers of the Department of State wrote to the World Jewish Congress saying that the War Refugee Board will give them information concerning developments on the Island of Bob. They wanted to know what the position is.
March 2, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

There was a conference today in Mr. Stettinius' office at which the following were present:

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>IGO</th>
<th>War Refugee Board</th>
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<tr>
<td>Edward B. Stettinius</td>
<td>Byron C. Taylor</td>
<td>John W. Pehle</td>
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<td>(part of the time)</td>
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<td>Breckinridge Long</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adolph Berle</td>
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<td>Charles Taft (part of the time)</td>
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<td>George Warren</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hayden Haynor (Assistant to Stettinius)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Robert Pell</td>
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Byron Taylor started the conference by referring to the various agencies which are now in existence dealing with the refugee problem. He referred first to the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees. He then discussed the background of the Intergovernmental Committee. He called attention to the fact that at the suggestion of President Roosevelt an intergovernmental conference on the refugee problem was held at Evian in July 1938. Following this the original Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees was set up. An executive committee was formed consisting of Lord Winerton, the United Kingdom delegate as Chairman and Byron Taylor as United States delegate. Extensive negotiations were entered into with Germany and with other governments which were virtually stopped after the outbreak of the war. There followed the Bermuda Conference in 1943 after which the functions of the Intergovernmental Committee were broadened, etc. Mr. Taylor then referred to UNRRA and the fact that it had been given certain jurisdiction in this field. He also stated that the IGC had indicated its willingness to turn over its functions to UNRRA at the time of the UNRRA meeting in 1943. He then referred to the fact that the War Refugee Board had now been set up, resulting in one war agency dealing with these problems. He emphasized the point of overlapping jurisdiction and the need for coordination. He also stressed the fact that the IGC had been a creature of the President.
He also mentioned the fact that the British had wanted to abolish the IGC at the time of the war and stated that the British and other governments concerned would gladly turn over this whole burden to the United States. He stressed the fact that it was important not to make the other governments sore if we wanted to get any cooperation from the IGC. He said that we needed the cooperation of the British if we were going to get anywhere in this field and that we would not get their cooperation if we appeared to be acting unilaterally. He also referred to the fact that he had wanted several times to resign from the IGC.

When Mr. Taylor had finished his speech, Mr. Taft broke in stating that there was also an overlapping of jurisdiction between the War Refugee Board and the War Relief Control Board. He stated that the War Relief Control Board was taking up with the President the question as to whether private agencies contributing to the program of the War Refugee Board needed to get the consent of the War Relief Control Board.

Mr. Pehle made very clear to Mr. Taft that he did not understand why this matter could not have been discussed with us and ironed out between the two agencies; and that he could not understand why the matter was being referred to the President.

At this point, Mr. Stettinius indicated that he had to leave the meeting to keep an appointment on the Hill. Mr. Pehle indicated that he desired to talk further with Mr. Taylor. This was agreeable and after Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Taft had left Mr. Pehle began giving our side of the story.

Pehle started by explaining some of the things which we have done to date. He discussed first the whole question of putting pressure on the satellite countries. He then began a discussion of our program through the O.W.I. designed to bring home to the persons in German-controlled Europe the seriousness with which we view this matter and our determination to do what we can to save the Jews and other persecuted minorities from death.
At this point, Mr. Pell raised strong objections to any such propaganda program. He stated that State had cleared the O.W.I. directive which had been issued with "no comment" and at the present time the matter was at a standstill. There followed a brief discussion as to the desirability of this type of program. Mr. Pell took the point of view that the effect of such a propaganda program would be that the Germans would kill the Jews off faster rather than that the Germans would desist from their program of extermination. He stated that when he was in Germany he had talked with some of the Jewish leaders who had stressed the fact that we should not give any publicity to Germany's persecution of the Jews. Mr. Pehle indicated that he was in thorough disagreement with this point of view. There followed some further discussion during which Pehle and DuBois opposed Pell's point of view. Mr. Berle took the position that there was some merit to both points of view but it was a subject which we had to consider very carefully. It was agreed that this was not a matter which could be decided at this meeting and that it should be discussed further at a separate meeting.

Mr. Pehle then explained what we are trying to do in Spain. At this point Mr. Taylor raised the question as to the extent to which our Spanish program overlapped with what the IGC had been trying to do in Spain. He indicated that Malin had been scheduled to go to Spain. At this point Long interrupted and stated that the whole program of evacuation of refugees through Spain to North Africa had been undertaken outside of the IGC as a separate project. He also stated that Malin had never gone to Spain. There followed a brief debate between Mr. Taylor and Mr. Long as to what the IGC had done if anything in connection with the evacuation of refugees to and from Spain.

Pehle and DuBois stressed that the War Refugee Board was anxious to see the job done and was not anxious to take on any job that the IGC was in a better position to do. We stated that the Board is prepared to support the IGC in the execution of any projects which it has undertaken or proposes to undertake for the speedy evacuation of refugees and has no intention of interfering in the execution of such projects by the IGC. We stressed however that time is of the essence and that necessarily because of the way the IGC had been set up and was organized, it could not operate as speedily and effectively in many cases as the
By way of example, DuBois compared the handling of two particular cases, one by the War Refugee Board and one by the IGC. It was pointed out that the Board's representative in Turkey had cabled that it was possible to charter a Turkish ship provided that the Government could guarantee to the Turkish Government that this Government would replace the ship if lost. Within twenty-four hours the War Refugee Board had obtained the commitment of this Government to replace the ship. On the other side, there was a case in which in August of last year a cable was received from Tittman in Rome indicating that the Italian Government was ready to supply ships to evacuate 30,000 Jews from the Rome area and requested immediate advice. After several weeks this matter was referred to the IGC on September 7. September 9 a cable was received from Winant stating that "having made an unsuccessful effort to convene a meeting of the Executive Committee (which apparently cannot meet before September 30) the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees called an informal meeting in his office this afternoon at which the Embassy and Foreign Office were represented and the Director and Vice Director attended."

It was pointed out that this case was not cited to indicate that anything could necessarily have been done but to indicate that even in such an important matter as this it had been impossible to get even prompt consideration of the matter by the Executive Committee.

DuBois also stated that according to the State Department's own files the British delegation to the Bermuda Conference had felt strongly that world opinion would be bitterly disappointed by the results of the conference if all future actions were relegated to the IGC. DuBois also read a memorandum which Mr. Taylor had addressed on April 20, 1943 to Mr. Welles, Mr. Long and Mr. Hull relating to a proposed meeting of the IGC after the Bermuda Conference. The text of the memorandum was as follows:

"Before any meeting is called the position of our own Government with respect to the refugee situation must be clearly developed. The Bermuda Conference was wholly effective, as I view it, and we knew it would be. What the IGC may be able to do, of course, is open to question, but
with respect to anything that it may be able to do, it will require a commitment and large financial obligation if the plight of the refugees generally is to be relieved. The commitment also obligates this Government, if made, to find not only temporary places of refuge, but permanent places of settlement. It is my opinion, as it was before the Bermuda Conference, that the position of our Government and of the British Government must be thoroughly clarified and clearly understood in advance and if nothing constructive can be assured, such a meeting will only be another failure."

Mr. Taylor stated that the objections which he had been raising had since been taken care of. In this connection it was pointed out that the Executive Director of the IGC now had full authority to act without clearance with the Executive Committee.

In connection with this whole matter Mr. Taylor raised the point as to where we intend to put refugees who have been evacuated. We asked Mr. Taylor what had been done about the suggestion made at the Bermuda Conference that the IGC take up with the British the possibility of using Tripolitania and Cyrenaica as havens of refuge. Mr. Taylor obviously did not know anything about this and referred the question to Mr. Long. Mr. Long replied that he had recently mentioned this matter to Sir Ronald Campbell but that nothing as yet had been done about it.

Mr. Berle then raised the point that the British had been protesting that in certain of the licenses which had been issued by the Treasury there were provisions for the purchase of food in violation of the blockade. It was made clear to Mr. Berle that our licenses had been issued with the approval of State.

Mr. Pell then argued strongly that all approaches to other governments should be made through the IGC. Mr. Pehle said we would keep the IGC advised as to our activities. Mr. Taylor replied that keeping the IGC advised was not enough and that they should be consulted before acting.

The meeting concluded with the general understanding that the War Refugee Board would get together with State on the O.W.I. program and that Mr. Pehle and Mr. Pell would get together on the question of the relationship of the War Refugee Board to the IGC.
MEMORANDUM

February 23, 1944

Rabbi Miller and Mr. Schulman were in this morning and discussed a number of matters:

1. **New representation in Turkey.** Apparently they were asked some time ago for any suggestions they might have with respect to a person qualified for appointment as the Board's representative at Ankara. On the assumption that Mr. Hirschmann's tenure was to be temporary, because of his commitments to his business associates in New York, Rabbi Miller and Mr. Schulman suggested the name of Louis E. Steyn, a New York lawyer. Mr. Steyn, it is said, has spent some time in Turkey and knows his way about in the Turkish Government. Mr. Steyn's stay in Turkey was in connection with the sale of the former Krüger Match Monopoly Properties in Turkey to the Turkish Government. Mr. Steyn is about 45 years old and is known to Mr. Hirschmann. Mr. Steyn is presently in Bermuda on business but he is expected to return to the United States shortly.

2. **Coordination in Switzerland.** It was suggested that we might ask our representative in Switzerland to call in the representatives of all the American relief and rescue agencies in the country and discuss ways and means of coordinating their work and facilitating and expediting the relief and rescue of oppressed persons.

3. **Use of the Underground.** Reference was made by Rabbi Miller and Mr. Schulman to Mr. Mermischi's letter to Mr. Fehe, dated February 17, 1944. In this connection, it was said that Rabbi Brickner of Cleveland had just returned to this country from various foreign points. While in England, Rabbi Brickner talked to Nahum Golanski and the latter indicated that there were a number of persons available for this type of work. Rabbi Miller and Mr. Schulman are going to get full details from Rabbi Brickner on Thursday and will communicate them to us next week.

4. **Pressure on Satellites.** Reference was made to the Jewish Telegraphic Agency News Bulletin of February 21, 1944 reporting the treatment accorded to Jews by the Romanians in Transnistria. Reference was also made to a cable dated February 13, 1944 from Bernard Joseph, counsel to the Jewish Agency, and a cable dated February 13, 1944 from Isaac Grunbaum of the United Rescue Committee at Jerusalem, copies of both of which are attached. Rabbi Miller and Mr. Schulman both urged very strongly that immediate steps be taken to bring pressure to bear on the satelites. They suggested that both diplomatic pressure through the neutrals and public pressure by public statements should
be used. They said that such pressures, in their opinion, would help if it were stated that they emanated from the President. Both Rabbi Miller and Mr. Schulman thought that the diplomatic representations should contain promises of leniency if the satellites resisted German pressure and that the public statement should contain threats of retribution for the guilty. They also thought that it would be extremely helpful if immediate public action were taken to set up the machinery that will be required if the "war atrocity trial" pledge of the Moscow declaration is to be kept.

5. Public Funds v. Private Funds. Rabbi Miller and Mr. Schulman both said that the rumor had gone abroad that public funds were not going to be used for the relief and rescue work of the Board and that this had caused considerable concern to a large number of people. They said that they had gotten a somewhat similar feeling when they were asked whether they were prepared to supply funds for the rescue of refugees on the Island of Rob. They emphasized that if any such feeling became really wide-spread, the work of the Board and its creation would be considered with cynicism. I replied that it was my understanding that private funds were to be used whenever available but that the Board would not allow any worthwhile project to be abandoned because private funds were either not available or could not, for any reason, be used. I also pointed out to Rabbi Miller and Mr. Schulman that to my mind it was important that private funds bear a large part of the burden and that the impression not be given that the work of the War Refugee Board was principally government financed. I made it clear, however, that I was not prepared to express Mr. Peble's point of view on this subject since I wasn't quite sure as to the extent to which he shared my view.

6. Fund Raising. Rabbi Miller and Mr. Schulman indicated that they were fully familiar with the conversations had with Mr. Leavitt and Mr. Montor concerning the possible issuance of a statement by the War Refugee Board with regard to the United Jewish appeal. Rabbi Miller and Mr. Schulman stated that they understood that Mr. Leavitt and Mr. Montor were to see Mr. Peble in connection with such a statement on Thursday, February 26 and expressed the hope that no commitment would be made until they had had the opportunity of discussing with Mr. Peble the nature and details of any understanding under consideration. In this connection, they stated that they represented a large segment of the Jewish population of the United States and that while they did not want to go into competition with the United Jewish appeal, they felt that there was $50,000,000 available in this country for relief.
and rescue work. They indicated that they were not too happy with the way funds were being distributed. They said that the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem needs £20,000 pounds a month to finance its underground rescue work and that it receives but £40,000 a month from the JLC. Further, in this connection, Rabbi Miller and Mr. Schulman asked whether the Board was going to solicit gifts. I replied that it was my understanding that the Board was not going to solicit gifts. They then asked what would happen if men like Marshall Field and John D. Rockefeller made substantial gifts to the Board. I answered by stating that the Board had accepted the ORT gift of $103,000, as well as the $10,000 gift from a poor refugee in Ohio. Rabbi Miller and Mr. Schulman then asked what would happen if somebody acted on his own behalf and were to make suggestions in this regard to men like Marshall Field and John D. Rockefeller. I replied that free speech still prevailed in this country but that I was sure that the Board would want to have no part, direct or indirect, in any such suggestions.

7. Miscellaneous. Rabbi Miller and Mr. Schulman asked whether anything was being done or could be done to exchange Jews from Hitler's Europe for Germans in the United Nations. I replied that I didn't know of anything that was being done in this connection and that offhand I didn't know whether anything could be done. I pointed to the time it took to arrange for the repatriation of American diplomats. They also asked whether anything was being done about feeding persons in enemy-occupied areas such as Transnistria and Theresienstadt. I replied that I had the impression that certain measures had been taken to get food and food packages to persons in concentration camps and that the whole problem was being thoroughly explored.

Lawrence S. Lesser

CC: Messrs. Pehle, Luxford, DuBois and Friedsam and Miss Hodel
February 13, 1944

Arthur Lurie
342 Madison Avenue NY

SUGGEST URGE PRESIDENT NEW REFUGEE COMMITTEE APPOINT IMMEDIATELY
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES ISTANBUL GENEVA DEAL NUMEROUS URGENT REFUGEE
PROBLEMS CONSTANTLY ARISING THERE. SECOND SHOULD ARRANGE FOR PROTECTING
POWERS OR INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS NOMINATE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVES BALKAN
COUNTRIES AND HUNGARY TO ASSIST ALL JEWISH PROBLEMS.

BERNARD JOSEPH
American Zionist Emergency Council
342 Madison Avenue, New York City

WESTERN UNION
NL 275 274 CPR-CD JERUSALEM FEB 6/1650 WIL

MR DR. STEPHEN RISE
242 MADISON AVE. N.YC

Most gratified appointment government committee European refugees confident
your doing utmost ensure committee achieve real results by contrast former
committees stop among Polish Jews arrived here recently one left Poland
last may stop they report uninterrupted extermination only hundreds
thousands remaining of millions Polish Jews and others killed to Poland
stop survivors in labour camps or hiding both categories under constant
threat extermination stop in camps weak or sick being killed same fate
awaits hiders caught Gestapo offering rewards stop as front approaches
Balkans danger German domination Hungary Romania Bulgaria where over
million Jews stop governments three countries officially forbid Jewish
emigration but in practice don't interfere stop difficulties are first
transport second involved procedure securing immigration permits third
fear Turkish government grant Jews transit visas lest they unable continue
journey stop essential simplify procedure also convince Turkey no Jews
intransit remain stop necessary officials dealing Jewish refugees be
instructed expedite facilities not create formal difficulties stop above
allurgent extraordinary steps be taken including threat retaliation view
forcing Germans cease slaughter stop at least for some categories such
as children veterans public workers essential arrange exchange against
interned Germans Allied countries stop if Roosevelt committee tackling
work seriously must first provide places refuge American only then prospect
OTHER ALLIED NEUTRAL COUNTRIES ACTING LIKewise STOP UNDER WHITE PAPER ONLY 21,000 SHALL BE ADMISSABLE PALESTINE STOP PLEASE DO UTMOST IMPRESS AMERICAN JEWRY AND ROOSEVELT COMMITTEE DAYS NUMBERED STOP ABSOLUTELY VITAL THIS HOUR SUPREME TRAGEDY ALL INTERNAL DIFFERENCES BE OVERCOME AS WAS DONE HERE ALL AMERICAN JEWS UNITING VIEW SAVING LAST REMNANTS EUROPEAN JEWRY STOP CABLE

ISAAC GRUNBAUM UNITED RESCUE COMMITTEE
Mr. Fehle advised the meeting that on February 17, Mr. Hayter of the British Embassy called and discussed with members of the staff the British position in respect to the issuance of Palestine certificates. Mr. Hayter was asked whether Palestine entry permits were available through British consuls in Spain and Turkey. A letter was furnished to the Board which had been written last September by the British to Secretary Hull setting forth their position on the matter of Palestine certificates. The letter stated that such certificates were available to any Jew reaching Turkey since the closing of the Bulgarian-Turkish border after a preliminary security check in Turkey. A further security check would be made on their arrival in Palestine where they would be placed in camps and if found satisfactory they would be released as legal immigrants into Palestine against the current immigration quotas. With respect to Jews escaping to other neutral countries, it was stated to be British policy not to issue Palestine entry permits to them, if they are safe in such countries. A copy of this letter is being forwarded to Kischmann in Ankara as it should be useful to him in his negotiations with the Turkish Government.

The proposed declaration on Jewish atrocities has been shown to Mr. Statman whose reaction was favorable. The proposed declaration has also been cleared with Messrs. McClay and Bundy of the War Department. The latter have suggested some slight changes in language. This declaration if issued by the President would be of great importance in the Board's psychological warfare campaign.

It was reported to the meeting that representatives of the Board had conferred with representatives of O.W.I. and that O.W.I. is prepared to cooperate with the Board in a program to bring home to the people in Germany and of the satellite countries that this Government means business in its announced policy to save the Jews and other persecuted people of Europe. O.W.I. asked us to submit to them a draft of a policy directive on the forestalling of the Nazi program to exterminate the Jews and other persecuted minorities. This has been done and it is understood that O.W.I. will have this directive cleared with the State Department and the military authorities. It has not hitherto been the policy of O.W.I. to refer specifically to persecutions of the Jews but rather to refer generally to minority groups which have suffered at the hands of the Nazis. The proposed directive if put into effect would mark a change in that policy.

Mr. Fehle announced that Miss Anne Loughlin formerly of N.Y.A. has been added to the Board's staff.
It was reported to the rest of the meeting that a cable has been dispatched to Steinhardt and Hirschmann in Turkey, laying down the general lines. Hirschmann should follow in seeking the cooperation of the Turkish Government to speed up the entrance of refugees into Turkey. The cable is similar in many respects to that recently sent to our Mission and representative in Spain. It requests that the Turks be approached on the matter of relaxing their border controls so that refugees may enter the country, and that they be asked to make a public announcement to the effect that the admission of refugees is permitted. Hirschmann was also told to make clear this Government's determination to carry out its declared policy with respect to refugees; that he should indicate to the Turkish authorities that the Board is prepared to take all measures financial and otherwise to evacuate refugees to Turkey, to maintain then while there, and, if necessary, to take action to move refugees to Turkey to other areas if found desirable. Hirschmann was further requested to do everything possible looking toward the evacuation of refugees from Transcaucasia to Turkey. With respect to shipping which is one of the bottlenecks in the evacuation of refugees to Turkey, Hirschmann was asked to advise of any measures which he believes can be taken by this Government so that necessary shipping, neutral or otherwise, may be made available.

Last night, Mr. Fehle stated, a cable was received from Hirschmann stating that a Turkish ship owner was willing to charter his vessel for the purpose of evacuating 1,000 refugees, mainly children, from Constanza to Turkey; that the International Red Cross had agreed to obtain safe conduct from all belligerents, but that the Turkish Government was unwilling to consent to the use of the vessel for this purpose because of the danger of its loss despite assurances of safe conduct. Hirschmann suggested that this Government guaranty to the Turkish Government that the vessel would be replaced if lost. Mr. Stettinius was in agreement with the staff that this matter should immediately be taken up with Admiral Land of the N.S.A. After confering with Admiral Land, a letter was obtained from the War Shipping Administration committing this Government to replace the Turkish ship if lost, subject to clearance from Lend Lease. The matter was cleared immediately with Lend Lease, and a cable is ready to be dispatched to Hirschmann stating that he could give the Turkish Government this assurance. We have also asked Hirschmann to advise us as to the possibility of obtaining other Turkish vessels if similar guarantees are given to replace the vessels.

Hirschmann also suggested in his cable that the possibility be canvassed of using for evacuation purposes in the Black Sea area the Swedish ships which are at present carrying food from Canada to Greece. This matter, Mr. Fehle said, would be discussed immediately with the Swedish Minister here.

It appears to those working on the matter, that the shipping problem will not be as formidable as was originally thought. The problem seems to be one of offering to replace tonnage or actually replacing it, if necessary, and a precedent has now been established in the Turkish case for this Government to guarantee to Turkish replacements. With our increased
production of ships and our relatively few losses in recent months, it would not appear to be too difficult to obtain the necessary tonnage or guarantee of replacement of tonnage, for evacuating refugees.

The approach to the satellites, proposed by the Board is still pending at the State Department. It has not been cleared, as yet because of certain political aspects.

Mr. Pohle stated that consideration should be given by the staff to the question of what interest, if any, the W.R.F. has in the drafting of peace terms.

Mr. Lesser stated that it appeared that the Board may be able to obtain from the National War Fund, funds for war refugee purposes, when we so desire. The W.R.F. has been invited to send a representative to attend a meeting of the Presidential War Relief Control Board on February 25th at which time the 1944 budgets of the member agencies of the National War Fund will be considered. A number of these budgets include projects for refugee relief, and it was determined that this Board should make known at said meeting its position that anything spent on refugee projects should be approved by the W.R.F. and that we are also interested in seeing that available funds are spent intelligently. It was decided that a letter be written to the War Relief Control Board advising them of our interest in allocations of funds from the National War Fund and of our intention to ask for monies from that fund.

It was reported to the meeting that a cable has been dispatched to Blokenstaff, the Board's representative in Spain, to be repeated to Ackerman in Algiers, impressing upon him the urgency of making arrangements to move refugees from Spain to North Africa on a compulsory basis if necessary. We were unsuccessful in getting W.H.A. to send a similar cable to Beckelman, their representative in Spain, because of the involuntary aspect of our cable.

It has been reported that the Germans will no longer recognise the passports issued by certain South American countries to Polish Jews now interned at Vittel in France and will deport the holders to Poland. It is also reported that the Swiss Government may take action against those who procured such passports for the internes. A cable has been prepared to be sent to Bern, asking our Minister to attempt to induce the Swiss to take active steps to avoid the seizure or other non-recognition by the Germans of these Latin American passports and to get the Swiss Government to assist in prosecuting those who assisted in the obtaining of the passports. This proposed cable is pending at the State Department.

It was announced to the meeting that a cable has been dispatched appointing Leonard Ackerman as Special Representative of the War Refugees Board in North Africa. Ackerman who has been acting as one of the Treasury representatives in North Africa, has been instructed to work on the Camp loyalty matter.
It was reported to the meeting that Hirschmann is taking up with the Turkish authorities the matter of restoring Turkish citizenship to certain Jews in France, who recently lost their Turkish citizenship and consequently are liable to deportation to Poland by the Nazis. Hirschmann has also advised the Board that he would also discuss with the Russian Ambassador to Turkey, the reasons for Bulgaria closing its frontier and preventing refugees from leaving.

It was decided that the various news reports put out by Jewish newspapers should be obtained and assumed for items of interest to the Board.

It is reported that a number of Jewish refugees who attempted to get into Palestine illegally and have been placed by the British on the Island of Mauritius in the Indian Ocean are in danger of death through starvation and disease. It was decided that the facts of this case should be investigated before any proposal is made by the Board.

It was stated that arrangements have been made to have all censorship intercepts on refugee matters referred to the Board. Arrangements are also being made to obtain C.I.S. reports on refugee matters.

The matter of approaching the German Government through the International Red Cross and requesting that it permit persecuted minority groups to depart from Nazi and satellite territory was again discussed. It was considered that such a plea if refused by the Germans might conceivably have an adverse effect on the program Hirschmann is trying to initiate in Turkey. It was considered desirable to send a cable to Hirschmann asking him whether in his opinion such an approach to the Germans would interfere with his efforts.

The meeting gave consideration to a proposed letter to Hirschmann interpreting the British statement of policy with respect to the issuance of Palestine certificates for refugees escaping from Nazi Europe to Turkey and other neutral areas. It was decided that a copy of the letter containing this statement of British policy should be cabled to Hirschmann, but that in view of its ambiguity we should attempt to obtain a clarification thereof from the British before sending out an interpretation of it.

The request of the Intergovernmental Committee for 50,000 pounds was again discussed. It was decided that the State Department should be advised that the Board would make these funds available to the I.G.C., and that State could so advise the I.G.C., making it known to such Committee that the Board assumes that the committee will clear all projects referred to it with the Board.
Mr. Pehle advised the meeting that he had conferred that morning with Col. Thompson and Messrs. Kuhn and Frederiksen of O.W.I. They suggested that the Board should transmit to O.W.I. a draft of a policy directive on the forestalling of the Nazi plans to exterminate the Jews and other persecuted minorities. Such a draft is now being prepared.

Mr. Pehle stated that Mrs. Mannen of the Treasury was temporarily lending her assistance on public relations matters, but that it would be necessary for the Board to obtain the full time services of a public relations expert.

Mr. DuBois advised the meeting that it appeared that not many of the projects now pending at State Department would be fruitful; in many of these cases, if action had been taken earlier the prospect of rescuing refugees would have been good.

The matter of obtaining Russian cooperation was discussed. It was agreed that a cable should be sent to the Russian Government, explaining what the Board is trying to do and how Russia can be helpful. It is believed that Russia can be particularly helpful in bringing pressure to bear on the satellites, in aiding in solving the Black Sea shipping problem, and in issuing a declaration of governmental policy similar to the policy announced by this Government at the time of the creation of the U.N.

The meeting agreed that the possibility of establishing refugee camps in Cyrenaica and Tripoli should be thoroughly explored.

In connection with the evacuation of French children into Switzerland, the Swiss Government asked for a guaranty that they would not remain in Switzerland after the war. It was decided, after discussion, that a cable should be prepared for Bern authorizing our Minister to advise the Swiss that this Government has authorized the issuance and renewal of 5,000 visas for children entering Switzerland after January 1, 1944, and four months thereafter.

It was also determined that the Board should recommend that there be included in the Trade Agreement with Switzerland provision for raising the food and clothing allocations to that country proportionally as more refugees are accepted by that country.

Mr. Pehle indicated that in view of the importance of the shipping problem it would be necessary for the Board to have an expert in this field on its staff. Furthermore, it is necessary that close cooperation with the War Shipping Administration be worked out.
It was the sense of the meeting that a strong cable should be dispatched to Blickenstein giving his our viewpoint as to the urgency of moving refugees from Spain to North Africa, and that a similar cable be sent by UNRRA to Buchenwald, its representative in Spain.

Consideration was given to the matter of approaching the German Government through the International Red Cross or a neutral government and requesting that the Jews and other persecuted groups be permitted to leave Nazi territory. In this connection it was pointed out that even if there was a refusal by the German government, some psychological advantage might inure from publicizing that fact. It was mentioned that there was precedent for such a move in that the State Department had on one occasion asked the Swedes to make such a plea and had stated that if such plea to Germany to allow refugees children to leave Nazi territory was rejected by Germany the State Department would announce that fact to the world.

It was determined that 2,000 sovereigns should be placed at the disposal of the Board representatives in Turkey and that other gold coins should be furnished the Board's representative in Spain for financing necessary underground operations.

A report has been received that Jews in Finland are being persecuted. It was agreed that a cable should be dispatched to our Mission in Finland to ascertain whether the report has any basis in fact and generally to obtain information as to Finland's attitude on refugee problems.

The meeting gave further consideration to the request of the Inter-governmental Committee for 50,000 pounds, but the matter was not resolved. Mr. Stewart advised the meeting that the Bureau of the Budget had stated that the President did not wish his Emergency Fund to be used for this purpose, that he wanted such payments placed on an appropriation basis. However, since it was too late to get an appropriation for the first payment, it was stated that there would be no objection to using monies obtained from the President's Fund for that payment.

HRPollakia 2/26/44.
Conference held at the office of Mr. Pehle on February 26, 1944, at 2:15 p.m., attended by Messrs. Pehle, Luxford, DuBois, Lessar, Stewart, Friedman, E.M. Bernstein, Fiske, and Miss Hodel. Mr. Pollak acted as reporter.

The following matters were reported to the meeting:

1. Mr. Pehle announced that the Board was endeavoring to obtain the services of Mr. Abranson who is now with O.P.S. He had also tried to obtain the consent of the War Department to releasing William O'Dwyer, former District Attorney of Kings County, New York, in order that he might join the Board's staff. A letter has been received from the War Department indicating that they feel they cannot dispense with Mr. O'Dwyer's services, at this time.

2. At the instance of the Board, Mr. Warren of the State Department has drafted a strong letter to the Apostolic Delegate asking the Vatican to communicate with Dr. Tiso, Catholic President of Slovakia, in an effort to induce him not to permit the deportation of Jews from that country to Poland.

3. The proposed warning to the satellites on their participation in Hitler's program to exterminate the Jews is still pending at the State Department.

4. A letter has been sent to Mr. Stettinius with a proposed cable to Steinhardt asking that he approach the Turkish Government and attempt to obtain effective cooperation in getting more war refugees from the Balkans into Turkey. A message has been received from Steinhardt indicating his pleasure at the appointment of Hirschmann as Special Representative of the Board.

5. Mr. Pehle stated that Morris Ernst gave a dinner on February 17th attended by Mrs. Ogden Reid, Russell Leffingwell, Bruce Bliven, Shaw of Newsweek, Samuel Graffen, Sam Shore of U.S.W.U., Quincy Howe, George Ficching Eliot, Mr. Pehle and others. Later Mr. Pehle and Mr. Ernst saw Dorothy Thompson. The program of the Board was outlined to the group and some of those present suggested possible lines of approach for the Board to take. The Board's program received a favorable reception.

Mr. Pehle stated that he had also discussed with Louis Dollivet of the Free World Association French cooperation on refugee problems.

It was generally agreed that the entire problem of the admittance of refugees to the United States, particularly our quota and visa system, should be thoroughly explored at once with the view of ascertaining how the present system functions and what can be done within the quota system to facilitate the entrance of refugees. The possibility of bringing refugees into this country on visitors' visas and placing them in camps was also to be investigated.

MRPollakria 2/26/44
Memorandum of Conference with Rabbi Miller and Mr. Herman Schulman of the American Jewish Conference

The conference was attended by Marcus, Bulkin, Lasser, and Friedman, under whose terms the following terms of discussion were made: An American Jewish Committee, under specific programs for the relief and evacuation of Jews in enemy-occupied Europe.

Rabbi Miller stated that there were two things that could be done for these people, namely, feeding and clothing. He then discussed specific possibilities for carrying out these two programs.

1) Evacuation of Jews from Poland into Hungary.

2) The statements that Poland is completely inaccessible today and that the International Red Cross is not even allowed to enter the country. However, it is believed that, since the Cuban government has a direct understanding with the government of Hungary, (with which it is not at war) that Hungary will receive refugees from Poland. Steps could be taken to assist in the evacuation of Jews from Poland into Hungary. There is a well-organized committee in Hungary assisting in this work, and there is a well-organized Jewish community of about 1,000,000 people in that country. It is believed that the Jews in Hungary are safe now and will remain safe unless there is a German invasion of Hungary. In any event, it is felt desirable and extremely worthwhile to attempt to rescue Jews in Poland, where they are doomed to death, into Hungary where their lives are safe. Since the International Red Cross is unable to get into Poland, all efforts with respect to the Jews in Poland should be concentrated on evacuation rather than on relief and feeding until the Jews are rescued into Hungary. Two things are needed in order to get this program under way:

1. Funds to finance the bringing of border officials and to sustain the lives of the refugees for a short time after they are rescued until they can be absorbed into the Hungarian economy.

2. Proper authority to communicate with the necessary people in Hungary, to instruct them to mobilize the small efforts now in existence and to work out the details of the financial aspects of the rescue program. It was stated that, if Hungary in Switzerland were authorized to organize a staff and to communicate with people in Hungary, great strides could be made. It was also suggested that friendly people in Hungary might be communicated with through the Vatican or that certain Hungarian Social Democrats here might be given permission
to communicate with their countrymen who are regularly travelling back and forth from Switzerland to Hungary.

Rabbi Miller stated that he had received an offer of $100,000 from the Agudath Youth Council of Israel for the specific purpose of rescuing Jews from Poland into Hungary. He will write a letter to the Department authorizing the money to be put into effect the program for evacuating Jews from Poland to Hungary. Rabbi Miller and Schulsen were unable to explain the financial aspects of the program; they do not know whether or not Hungarian currency could be acquired in Hungary against blocked accounts. This point could, of course, be raised with Germany who, if properly authorized, could get the details from certain Hungarians. It was stated that the agencies that might assist on this program are the World Jewish Congress and the IJO. No accurate information is known as to how many Jews could be evacuated from Poland into Hungary, though it is believed there are considerable numbers. Schulsen stated that such a program would greatly assist by a strong statement made by the President to the satellite governments on the question of receiving refugees.

(b) Romanian Transnistrian Evacuation Program.

There are at present about 250,000 Jews in Romania and about 15,000 in Transnistria. The latter group are mainly non-Bulgarian nationals and are located in a large concentration camp in Transnistria. Since they are in the path of the retreating Germans, they have imminent extermination unless they can be rescued before the Germans arrive. In spite of the fact that a program of repatriating Jews from Transnistria to Russia appears to have been frustrated by German interference, it is the feeling of the American Jewish Congress that, if funds are made available for the necessary lashing, thousands of Jews may yet be saved from Transnistria. Of course, it was pointed out that, even though they may be brought into Russia, there will be the further necessity of evacuating the non-Bulgarian nationals from Romania. This could be done by ships across the Black Sea to Turkey. It was strongly pointed out that the two most urgent programs are the Polish-Hungarian one and the Transnistrian-Hungarian one.

(c) Bulgarian-Turkish Program.

It is felt that, while the Bulgarian Government has shown no inclination of softening up on its strict non-exit policy with respect to Jews, if money could be obtained, officials could be bribed so that Jews could be brought across the border into Turkey. It was recognized that serious difficulties would be encountered on the Turkish borders, where the Germans have large military forces. However, it might be possible to evacuate Jews from Bulgaria across the Black Sea.
(d) Yugoslavia.

It was stated that there were no Jews left in Yugoslavia except a few on the islands off the coast. About 7,000 have escaped to Italy.

(e) Greece.

There is no problem here, since the Jewish community here has been wiped out.

(f) Spain.

There are about 2,000 stateless Jews presently in Spain who are unable to be evacuated because they have not yet visas. If it were possible to move these 2,000 stateless people out of Spain, then more Jewish refugees from France and occupied Europe might be able to enter Spain. However, in order to arrange for the evacuation of the stateless Jews from Spain, extraordinary measures will have to be taken because of their stateless status.

(g) Czechoslovakia.

There are about 90,000 Jews presently located in the concentration camp at Theresienstadt. The International Red Cross can operate in this camp and has been handling food and medical supplies in the area. The lives of the people in this camp apparently are safe and it is felt that the best assistance that can be brought to them at the moment is more food so that their lives may be sustained. The question here again is that of money with which food may be bought.

(h) France.

There are about 100,000 to 150,000 Jews left in France. A good proportion of them, however, are French nationals whom the Vichy Government will not permit to be deported. Non-French national Jews, however, are subject to deportation which means ultimate death. Several thousand children of non-French national Jews face deportation and death and it is urgent that some help be brought to them at once.

(i) Slovakia and Croatia.

Apparently as the result of certain bribery operations, deportations have stopped from these areas. Therefore, it is believed that the lives of the Jews here are safe for the time being and that the greatest help to them would be relief in the form of food and medical supplies. Since the International Red Cross can operate in these areas, such supplies could be distributed through that organization.

(j) Intergovernmental Committee.

It was stated that the Intergovernmental Committee is presently giving financial aid to refugees in Switzerland and that efforts are presently being made by the Committee to evacuate refugees from
Spain to North Africa. It was stated that about 600 to 700 had already been in North Africa. The Interdivisional Committee also is supposed to have assisted in the evacuation of French refugees to North Africa for entrance in the French army.

It was pointed out that, in spite of Buckingham's statement, the Interdivisional Committee is ineffectual because it cannot deal with the satellite governments upon whom pressure must be brought to act. The Interdivisional Committee is tied up with a great deal of red tape and any request they might undertake would create a good deal of delay and expense. In addition, the Committee is hampered in that it must obtain agreement from Great Britain on any project it might support.

Rabbi Miller and Schuken agreed that it would be worthwhile to concentrate at first on expecting children because there have been some indications that the situation might be softer with respect to children because of the great humanitarian appeal. However, it was felt that efforts should not be limited to evacuating children.

There was some discussion with respect to the Russian situation and it was stated that there are between 250,000 and 100,000 Jews in Russia, mainly in Siberia and Turkestan, along the Caspian Sea. At one time, there are believed to have been 1,000,000 refugees in Russia, but hundreds of thousands have died. Many of the refugees came from Poland and the revolutionary Russian armies which had been ordered to assist the Jews against the Germans had issued special orders. Very little is known of the situation of the Jews in Russia and very little outside help has been given to them. Russia has permitted food packages to be sent into certain areas at great cost to the private organizations making the shipments because of the Russian postal duties. The International Red Cross is unable to operate in Russia and it is very difficult to obtain reliable information concerning the situation there. Rabbi Miller stated that it was his view that Russia could not aid in the evacuation of Jews from German-controlled Europe to Russia and that the reason why the Russians had been willing to accept the Polish Jews was because they came from the area that Russia had taken over in 1939.

With respect to the $10,000,000 program involving the feeding of Jews in occupied Europe, Rabbi Miller and Mr. Schuken were questioned concerning the difference between their program and the Hoover Program. It was pointed out that their program does not involve the feeding of whole populations but only the Jewish groups which are a special and distinct problem in that Jews are presently receiving much smaller quantities of food than the regular populations of Europe. In addition, it was pointed out that only a few of the Jews are able to acquire the status of civilian internment; they are simply Jews. The International Red Cross is able to be of great assistance to civilian internment in the occupied area, but, because of the special status of the Jews, they can not help in so far as using shipments that may come from this country. It was pointed out that a request was made to the Bermuda Conference to consider negotiating with the German Government through a neutral
government to recognize the Jews in occupied areas as civilian internees. This effort, however, was of no avail.

It was finally pointed out that with the changing military situation in Europe we face an accelerated tempo in the extermination program of the Germans. For this reason, time in of the essence and efforts must be made at once with no red tape if any lives are to be saved.

Mr. Schuman stated that efforts should be made to bring Mr. Zolinger, the International Red Cross man in charge of the Jewish refugee problem, to the United States. He is presently in London.

P. Hodel