Evacuation from Spain to Lydiatey

Folder 1

With Respect to Relief and
Evacuation to and
Spain and Portugal
PROGRAMS WITH RESPECT TO RELIEF & BUZZ OF REFUGEES: EVACUATION TO & RETURN TO SPAIN (AND PORTUGAL) (EVACUATIONS FROM SPAIN TO LYON) OR ATHENS

1. GENERAL
2. REFUGEE POPULATIONS IN SPAIN
3. MATERIAL TAKEN FROM 40th ARMOR DIVISION FILE "FIC: FILE"
CROSS-REFERENCE

(Name of Applicant)

(Application Number)

For correspondence with Ackermann concerning Pedhala.

SEE: ACKERMANN, LEONARD M.
In accordance with agreement between the Comité and the British and American Governments refugees of stateless and enemy nationality were authorized to be brought to Camp Lyautay so long as the number in the camp at any one time does not exceed 2,000. Admission to the camp was not restricted to refugees actually in Spain at the time the agreement was entered into, but included refugees subsequently entering Spain from German-occupied areas. In fact, one of the main purposes of the agreement was to encourage the entry of refugees from enemy territory into Spain by taking these refugees off the hands of the Spanish Government. It is understood that arrangements are presently being worked out for the removal from Spain to the camp of somewhat less than a thousand refugees and that appropriate security checks have been made in this connection. Included in the group are a number of Sephardic Jews who have entered Spain during the last year as a result of negotiations carried on with the Germans by the Spanish Government.

It is understood that no objection to the admission into the camp of Sephardic Jews now in Spain have been made by the local Moroccan officials. However, these officials have now stated that other groups of Sephardic Jews who arrive in Spain after March 1 of this year will not be accepted into the camp. This ruling appears to be completely at variance with the original agreement since the number of refugees now available for the camp is much less than 2,000. It is known that other groups of Sephardic Jews are now in France ready to enter Spain. They cannot, however, enter Spain unless the Spanish Government is assured that they will be taken to Camp Lyautay shortly after their arrival in Spain. Accordingly, the
Moroccan officials should be advised that under the terms of the agreement between the Comité and the British and American Governments all Sephardic Jews and other stateless refugees or refugees of enemy nationality entering Spain at any time should, subject to the usual security check, be permitted to enter Camp Leynatey so long as the total number of refugees in the camp does not at any time exceed 2,000.
Camp Iyauty, Fedamal, Morocco (Near Casablanca)

Negotiations with French

1) French did not want camp established at all
   (a) Because they want camp for themselves
   (b) Because they were anti-refugees
   (c) Because they felt the Moroccan economy would suffer bad effects

2) After months of applying intensive pressure the French conceded establishment of camp on following conditions:
   (a) Shelters, maintenance and transport responsibility of U.S. and U.S.
   (b) U.S. Army to make Camp Marshal Iyauty available
   (c) Intergovernmental Refugee Committee responsible for eventual removal of refugees. (Miss Flexner says that I.G.C. has not been in on the matter and reference is actually formal.)
   (d) Maxmum number 2000 at any time. (This is arbitrary figure picked out of the hat by the French. Also apparently represents number of permanent accommodations. By use of tents camp could hold about 15,000)
   (g) Original status of refugees of enemy nationality: internment. On this point States insisted that refugees should not be subjected to internment or concentration camp conditions and French agreed upon examination of each case to grant permission to work for those who can do so without disadvantage to the local economy. Those not given work permits can leave camp if they maintain permanent residence there. (It is important to note that the project is still proceeding on a voluntary basis as far as removal from Spain is concerned and UNRRA apparently is opposed to forced removal. Their man Beekman who is in Spain now is to explain to refugees conditions under which they will go and ask them if they want to. Flexner seems to have some doubt that they can get enough to run the camp.)
   (f) Possibility of transfer of refugees to other locality
   (g) Use of Service de Securite to police camp

(In discussion French subsequently mentioned 3 points to be considered in refugee selection - (1) Establishment of identity; (2) employability; (3) general health; (Apparently these will not be seriously considered.)
3) Number of Jewish refugees in Spain is question of great importance. Flexner thinks probably not more than 1300. (Perhaps tomorrow will have full report from Becklman. Also we could ask George in State for guess.) If Flexner's guess is correct it perhaps is simply a question of requiring all to go to Spain.

Financial Arrangements

1) July 17, 1943 - President allocates to State $500,000 from Emergency Fund for purpose

2) Budget estimate of $714,170 made for 2000 people for one year. Flexner says that this is to be disregarded and new budget requested from people in Africa and Spain.

3) $50,000 deposited in August with Consul General in Morocco for project but apparently not yet used. This is to be transferred to F.E.A. after accounting. Other $450,000 was transferred to F.E.A. in December.

4) Procedure of creating joint revolving fund of $200,000 by U.S. and U.K. discussed. Apparently British now want us to pay all subject to reimbursement.

Operations Contemplated and Status

1) Army has not yet formally designated this as refugee camp. (Army says it is awaiting more definite opening date.)

2) Budget has to be prepared and funds made available to project Director.

3) Supplies and equipment must be purchased. Army agreed at first to make supplies available but apparently now wants as much as possible to be purchased here. Army now indicates that it will only lend assistance to emergency operations. Field representatives have been requested to give specific information as to supplies needed. Some cars for use of camp have arrived or are awaiting shipment.

4) UNRRA has full personnel to run camp, including Director - 6 already in North Africa; 1 in Spain; 9 in Washington to be sent.

5) Selection of refugees - Mr. Becklman, who is to be project Director is now in Spain finding how many will come.

6) British are to furnish sea transport from Portugal.
Negotiations with French

1. French did not want camp established at all.
   a) Because they want camp for themselves.
   b) Because they were anti-refugee.
   c) Because they felt the Moroccan economy would suffer bad effects.

2. After months of applying intense pressure the French consented establishment of camp at following conditions:
   a) Stables, maintenance, and transport responsibilities of U.N. and U.S.
   b) U.S. Army to aid in initiality and availability.
   c) Intersessional committees to handle responsibility for eventual resettlement of refugees (This theory may not be, for initial conditions, or actually found).

3. Maximum number 2,000 at any time. (This condition is not pending.)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF
FOREIGN RELIEF AND REHABILITATION OPERATIONS

Let by Israel, also apparently represents number of permanent accommodations, by use of tents Camp could hold about 15,000)

2) Original site of refugees of enemy nationality; displacement. On the point that refugees should not be subjected to internment another concentration camp

Conditions of refugees agreed upon examination of each case: juvenile, pregnant, and for

- how many can do so without disadvantage to local economy. How not given work permits can lead camp of they maintain permanent residence here. Note that the project is still proceeding on a voluntary basis as far as removal from Spain is concerned. A.M. apparently is opposed to forcible removal. Then Man

- Sacksman who is in Spain now as certain refugees condition under which they will go back them if it wants to. (Please write if you are willing that they can get through from the camp)

- Possibility of transfer of refugees to other
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

OFFICE OF

FOREIGN RELIEF AND REHABILITATION OPERATIONS

Locality.

2) Use of Service de Santé et Police Camp.

In addition to the subsequently mentioned 3 points to be considered in refugee selection: 1) Notable graduates, 2) employability, 3) general health...

(apparently this will not be seriously considered)

3. Number of refugees in question of great importance. "Flowers" thinks probably not more than 1300. Perhaps tomorrow will have full report from Brookline. Also we could ask George or State for latest. If Flowers' guess is correct it perhaps is simply a question of pinning all on Spain...

(?) Spain.
Financial Arrangements

1. July 17, 1943 - President allocates $50,000 from Emergency Fund for purposes unspecified.

2. Budget estimate of $719,170 made for 2,000 people for one year.

3. threesome says that the 20,000 to be disregarded in new budget estimated for people in Africa and Spain.

4. 50,000 deposits in Aug., 1943 to Adm. Gen. in Morocco for transportation funds, with $30,000 balance, transferred to FEES in Dec.

5. President of existing grant writing funds to NSF.

Operations Cordially and Gratefully

1. Army has not yet formally designated the as a "service camp." However, it is operating as such.

2. Budget to be prepared funds made available to project church.

3. Supplies/equipment must be purchased. Army guard at least 2 times supplies available but especially...
FOREIGN RELIEF AND REHABILITATION OPERATIONS

1. We need as much as possible 1 to conduct this. Army now indicates that it will rely
2. and assistance from emergency spending.
3. Field representatives have been requested to give
4. specific information as efficiently needed.
5. Send latest list of camps for arrival to Washington

6. URRAA for full personnel and supplies
7. including materials. - To be ready in 30
8. In Spain. - In Washington for sent.

9. Selection of refugees. - Balkan and
10. mid-1940 period. Please sending how many will
11. come.

12. British applied. 2 joined 10,000 transport from Portugal.
No. 3819
Madrid, Spain, January 8, 1945.

Subject: Transmitting Report on Evacuation of Stateless Refugees from Spain to North Africa

The Honorable The Secretary of State, Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose, as of possible interest to the Department, a copy of a report on the evacuation of stateless refugees from Spain to North Africa which has been prepared by Dr. David, ELICKSTEIN, director of the Representation in Spain of American Relief Organizations, for Dr. Ned Campbell, representative in North Africa of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, as a basis of discussion of plans for the possible evacuation of additional numbers of non-refugees to Philippeville and other UNRAA camps in the Mediterranean area.

Respectfully yours,

Carlton J. F. Hayes

Enclosure: Report, as stated

File No. 320
WNB/3f
Original to Department
(for Ozalid machine)
Copy to Embassy, Lisbon
Enclosure to despatch No. 381 dated January 8, 1945 from Carlton J. H. Hayes, American Ambassador, at Madrid, Spain on subject of
Evacuation of Stateless Refugees from Spain to North Africa.

Report to Ned Campbell, UNRRA, North Africa, from David Bickenstaff, Madrid

EVACUATION OF STATELESS REFUGEES TO NORTH AFRICA.

History

After it had been decided in the Spring of 1943 to evacuate stateless and other unprotected refugees from Spain to the camp at Fedhala in North Africa, an arrangement was made dividing the responsibility of this operation between the British and American Governments through their embassies in Madrid. The American Government was to assemble and transport the refugees in Spain to the port of embarkation, and the British Government was to provide transportation by sea to North Africa.

In a meeting held on January 31, 1944, between representatives of the British and American embassies, the French Diplomatic Mission, Mr. Seekelman (representing the UNRRA), and myself, it was decided that this office handle the applications made by refugees for admission to the camp, distribute these applications to the screening authorities, advise the refugees concerning the acceptance or rejection of their applications and negotiate with the Spanish authorities the release of the refugees from camp and their exit from Spain. The American Ambassador asked this office to also carry out for the American Embassy its functions of assembling and transporting to the port of embarkation the refugees accepted for entry into the camp.

In this way, three groups of refugees left for the North African Refugee Center:

- May 4 – 36 refugees
- June 21 – 573 refugees
- July 1 – 21 refugees
- Total 630 refugees

Need of Outlet to North Africa

In my opinion an outlet to North Africa for stateless and other unprotected refugees is still urgently necessary though the numbers of refugees to whom such an opportunity is attractive has been greatly reduced by the three convoys to Fedhala and by expeditions to Palestine and Canada organized by this office during 1944. There nevertheless remain in Spain roughly one thousand refugees who receive financial assistance from American relief organizations. These are almost entirely refugees who are either legally or practically stateless. For some of them solutions will perhaps be found when return to France and other parts of liberated Europe becomes possible. For others, however, return to pre-1939 places of residence is impossible and they will become a part of the "hard core" of the post-war stateless refugee problem. I assume that the UNRRA or the Intergovernmental Committee is working on some solution to this more or less permanent problem and will make representations in this direction to the United Nations Governments when the plans for the post-war world are being drawn. It seems logical therefore that this group of refugees now in Spain should come as soon as possible under the authority and control of some such organization as the UNRRA.

There
There are, furthermore, many cases where the transfer to an UNRRA camp is, for humanitarian reasons, urgently desirable. In this category are many stateless and unprotected foreigners some of whom have been resident for many years in Spain who, because of their participation on the Republican side during the Spanish civil war, are persons non-rata with the present Spanish Government. Life for such persons in Spain is extremely difficult because of the impossibility to obtaining legal employment. Many of them are detained in work camps and prisons from which release is authorized only when immediate departure from Spain can be assured. The conditions of such internment leave much to be desired and the future for such refugees must appear completely hopeless.

Number of Refugees to be Evacuated

Of the one thousand refugees remaining in Spain on the rolls of private American relief organizations it would be difficult to estimate the number that could be evacuated to an UNRRA camp. The following factors must be taken into consideration in making any estimate:

1.- Refugees look upon evacuation to a camp as only a last alternative, something to be avoided if possible. The number of those willing to accept evacuation to a camp increases or decreases as the events of the war cause hopes of return to liberated Europe to rise and fall in the minds of the refugees. The policies that will be followed by the national authorities, especially French and Belgian, will of course determine to a large extent how many refugees will look to an UNRRA camp as a solution to their problem. The French authorities in Madrid have recently been accepting applications for French visas. This has raised the hopes of some refugees that they will soon be able to return to France where many of them had been living for some years before the beginning of the war in 1939.

2.- The number of refugees who will apply for entry into an UNRRA camp is affected by the policy of the private relief organizations now supporting them in Spain. Increasing needs elsewhere may cause these organizations to try to decrease their obligations in Spain. This will force some refugees to accept evacuation to a camp and will encourage others to do so by shaking the sense of security that they have developed during their stay in Spain with all expenses paid. If financial assistance were at present completely withdrawn, almost all the refugees now being assisted would be obliged to apply for evacuation to a camp. Till now none of the committees represented by this office has intimated that economic pressure should be used to oblige refugees to make such a decision.

3.- Experience has shown that a rather high percentage of applications for admission to the camp in North Africa are rejected. The North African screening authorities have dealt with our application lists as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>List Date</th>
<th>No. applicants</th>
<th>Number accepted</th>
<th>Number rejected</th>
<th>Percentage of rejections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 Feb. 28</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Mar. 20</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Mar. 31</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Apr. 30</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 May 2</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 May 15</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 June 16</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 July 15</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 July 25</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 Aug. 24</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 Oct. 5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Totals
Thus, out of a total of 1,340 applicants, 977 or 73% were accepted.

(Note: Discounting lists 1 and 2 of Feb. 28 and March 30, which represent the applications screened for the three convoys that have so far left for North Africa, the percentage of rejections on applications screened after the three departures comes to 45%.)

Furthermore, during the preparation of the three convoys sent to Fedhala, there were many refugees who withdrew after their applications had been accepted. These three convoys, totalling 610 refugees, represented 950 applications of which 778 accepted. The 172 refugees who did not leave though their applications were accepted, withdrew from the convoy for the following reasons:

- Release from camp or prison or exit visa refused by Spanish authorities: 24%
- Emigrated to other countries, or evacuated by their diplomatic mission: 23%
- Remained in Spain with family member unable to leave for North Africa for health reasons or lack of exit permit: 16%
- Health and miscellaneous: 22%
- Applications withdrawn - no explanation given: 15%

At the present time, the situation of applications, acceptances and rejections stands as follows:

1. Number of refugees now in Spain whose applications are accepted: 322
2. Number of refugees now in Spain whose applications are rejected: 311
3. Number of refugees now in Spain whose applications are pending with the I.A. screening authorities: 57
4. Estimated number of accepted applicants who would be immediately ready to leave for I.A.: 150

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>No. of applicants</th>
<th>Number accepted</th>
<th>Number rejected</th>
<th>Percentage of rejections</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Nov. 2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Nov. 4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Nov. 15</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Nov. 22</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Nov. 16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,340</td>
<td>977</td>
<td>363</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Practical Problem

In order that these 150 refugees, and succeeding groups of refugees, be evacuated to North Africa, it is necessary that some competent authority (the UNRRA) undertake to obtain two things:

1.- That instructions be sent to the French authorities in Madrid for accepted applicants to be given documents that will permit them to disembark in North Africa.

2.- That permission be obtained from the competent military authorities to accept small groups (3 - 5 persons) of accepted, properly documented refugees on occasional ships leaving Gibraltar for North African ports; or that a ship be sent to some Spanish port especially to embark this first group of 150, and thereafter whenever a group of, say, fifty accepted applicants can be assembled.

We are prepared in this office to handle for the UNRRA the mechanics of preparing the refugees for evacuation, obtaining the necessary permits from the Spanish Government and arranging for transportation to the port of embarkation.

With regard to No. 2 above, I would very much prefer the first suggestion. It is much more useful to have the possibility of evacuating, say, ten refugees every two or three weeks, than fifty refugees every three or four months. A great deal could be done for many refugees if we could intervene at the Spanish police on their behalf with the possibility of giving assurance of immediate evacuation.

There has been, in recent weeks, an increasing tendency on the part of the Spanish authorities to intern foreigners who are thought to be dangerous or unfriendly to the present régime and to maintain in concentration camps refugees who should ordinarily have been released upon our assumption of financial responsibility for them.

For these refugees especially evacuation to an UNRRA camp is urgently desirable, for two reasons:

1.- Internment in Spain is, at best, under conditions that are sub-standard, and in company with interned Spanish criminals and Nazi Gestapo and military personnel.

2.- No progress toward finding an eventual solution to the cases of these internees can be made while they are in Spanish camps and prisons. Contrary to what their situation would be in an UNRRA camp, they are not in Spain, the subjects of efforts on the part of the interning authorities, to find a solution to the "displaced persons problem". Internment in Spain is "time lost" - under conditions of moral and physical suffering.
The cable below for Mann is WRB 28.

For your information following cable has been sent by State to American Embassy, Paris:

QUOTE Of more urgency at the present time than it was in August is the matter which is taken up in instruction from the Department to Algiers dated August 24, No. 213. Should it become possible to rescue any of the persons from Germany to whom reference is made in Resolution XXIV, the facilities of the Fedhala camp are urgently needed for use. There is no other destination available for these people at the present time. It is expected that these individuals will be released into Switzerland and from there will travel, either directly from France or by way of Spain and France, to the Fedhala camp, as transportation can be arranged, under the auspices of the War Refugee Board, if an exchange involving these people can be arranged. We would appreciate it, therefore, if you would urgently take up this matter with the Provisional Government of France and secure its consent in principle to the admittance into French territory from Switzerland of any persons included in such a movement, to their travel to a point of exit on the frontier of Spain, or to Marseilles, or to any other point which may be designated, and to their entrance into Switzerland for accommodation.
at Fedhala camp, subsequently.

If Reber would take up the question with SHAEF and secure agreement in principle to this kind of movement, along with a statement of requirements of SHAEF, it would likewise be appreciated. Screening of these people, it should be pointed out, cannot take place until they reach French territory; also that authorities in Germany who have the custody of the camps where they are held will apparently select the individuals for exchange. Jewish intellectuals from Poland comprise the majority of the individuals concerned, who can, it is presumed, be identified promptly as they are relatively well known in such circles.

The Government of the United States and the British Government have stated that they are opposed to the closing of the Fedhala camp, which still has definite purposes to serve; this for the information of Reber and the Embassy. UNQUOTE

STETTINIUS
(Abott.)
(GLM)

VB1: 1V1: 1:9
11/29/44
CABLE TO WINANT, LONDON, FOR MANN FROM WAR REFUGEE BOARD

For your information following cable has been sent by State to
American Embassy, Paris:

"Of more urgency at the present time than it was in August
is the matter which is taken up in instruction from the Department
to Algiers dated August 24, No. 213. Should it become possible to
rescue any of the persons from Germany to whom reference is made
in Resolution XXIV, the facilities of the Fedhala camp are urgently
needed for use. There is no other destination available for these
people at the present time. It is expected that these individuals
will be released into Switzerland and from there will travel, either
directly from France or by way of Spain and France, to the Fedhala
camp, as transportation can be arranged, under the auspices of the War
Refugee Board, if an exchange involving these people can be arranged.
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matter with the Provisional Government of France and secure its con­
sent in principle to the admittance into French territory from Switzerland
of any persons included in such a movement, to their travel to a
point of exit on the frontier of Spain, or to Marseille, or to any
other port which may be designated, and to their entrance into Morocco
for accommodation at Fedhala camp, subsequently.

"If Heber would take up the question with SHAEF and secure agree­
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requirements of SHAEF, it would likewise be appreciated. Screen­
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the custody of the camps where they are held will apparently select
the individuals for exchange. Jewish intellectuals from Poland com­
prise the majority of the individuals concerned, who can, it is pre­
sumed, be identified promptly as they are relatively well known in
such circles.

"The Government of the United States and the British Government
have stated that they are opposed to the closing of the Fedhala camp,
which still has definite purposes to serve; this for the information
of Heber and the Embassy."

THIS IS WHB LONDON CABLE NO. 28.

10:30 a.m.
November 21, 1944

Miss Chauncey (for the Sec'y) Abrahamson, Ackermann, Cohn, Diboia, Friedman, Hodel,
Kleeper, Narron, McGraw ok, files

J. E. F. Seager, "Whbd 11/29/44."
To: MISS HODEL - Room 2410

Mr. Lesser
Mr. Friedman
Mr. Stewart
Miss Hodel
Mr. Dubois
Mr. Luxford
Mrs. Taylor

Please discuss with me:
Should Jim Mann be advised?

JWP

J. W. Pahl
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
WAR REFUGEE BOARD
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT

FROM: Secretary of State, Washington
TO: American Embassy, Paris
DATE: November 16, 1944
NUMBER: 438

Of more urgency at the present time than it was in August is the matter which is taken up in instruction from the Department to Algiers dated August 24, No. 212.

Should it become possible to rescue any of the persons from Germany to whom reference is made in Resolution XXIV, the facilities of the Fedhala camp are urgently needed for use. There is no other destination available for these people at the present time. It is expected that these individuals will be released into Switzerland and from there will travel, either directly from France or by way of Spain and France, to the Fedhala camp, as transportation can be arranged, under the auspices of the War Refugee Board, if an exchange involving these people can be arranged.

We would appreciate it, therefore, if you would urgently take up this matter with the Provisional Government of France and secure its consent in principle to the admittance into French territory from Switzerland of any person included in such a movement, to their travel to a point of exit on the frontier of Spain, or to Marseilles, or to any other port which may be designated, and to their entrance into Morocco for accommodation at Fedhala camp, subsequently.

If Reber would take up the question with SNAEF and secure agreement in principle to this kind of movement, along with a statement of requirements of SNAEF, it would likewise be appreciated. Screening of these people, it should be pointed out, cannot take place until they reach French territory; also that authorities in Germany who have the custody of the camps where they are held will apparently select the individuals for exchange. Jewish intellectuals from Poland comprise the majority of the individuals concerned, who can, it is presumed, be identified promptly as they are relatively well known in such circles.

The Government of the United States and the British Government have stated that they are opposed to the closing of the Fedhala camp, which still has definite purposes to serve; this for the information of Reber and the Embassy.

S¥: AEC: BB

Paraphrase: DOR: LW: MEH
11/19/44
Miss Chauncy (for the Sec'y) Ackerman, Abrahamson, Akin, Cohn, Drury, DeBois, Friedman, Gaston, Hodel, Lesser, Marks, Nannon, McCormack, Fehla, Files.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date
SVP 1 5. 1972
OF more urgency at the present time than it was in August is the matter which is taken up in instruction from the Department to Algiers dated August 24, No. 213. Should it become possible to rescue any of the persons from Germany to whom reference is made in Resolution XXIV, the facilities of the Fedhala camp are urgently needed for use. There is no other destination available for these people at the present time. It is expected that these individuals will be released into Switzerland and from there will travel, either directly from France or by way of Spain and France, to the Fedhala camp, as transportation can be arranged, under the auspices of the War Refugee Board, if an exchange involving these people can be arranged. We would appreciate it, therefore, if you would urgently take up this matter with the Provisional Government of France and secure its consent in principle to the admittance into French territory from Switzerland of any persons included in such a movement, to their travel to a point of exit on the frontier of Spain, or to Marseilles, or to any other port which may be designated, and to their entrance.
entrance into Morocco for accommodation at Fedhala camp, subsequently.

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The Government of the United States and the British Government have stated that they are opposed to the closing of the Fedhala camp, which still has definite purposes to serve; this for the information of Heber and the Embassy.

STATIENUS
(Acting)
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Governmental agency. (BR)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1977, November 11, 10 p.m.
FROM MURPHY

Translation of reply of November 9 received from French in regard to camp for refugees from Spain at Fedhala Morocco follows:

The personal representative of President Roosevelt North Africa by note 36 of October 18 kindly advised the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the agreement of the Government of the United States to the proposals of the French Committee concerning the project for accommodating in Morocco certain stateless refugees or nationals of enemy countries who are now held in Spain.

Mr. Murphy has moreover called the attention of the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs to the interest which the American-British Governments attach to it not appearing that these refugees are being submitted to the internment regime of a concentration camp.

The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs has the honor to advise Mr. Murphy that it has never been the intention of the Committee to subject foreign refugees to measures
French Committee wishes as do the British and American Governments to assure as generous as possible an asylum to refugees but it has appeared indispensable to take certain precautions with regard to persons whose antecedents are not known and for whom a simple review of the file would not furnish sufficient guarantees.

It is of course understood that the French authorities are prepared after an examination of each particular case to grant permission to work in Morocco to refugees, who can continue their professional work without disadvantage to the economy of the protectorate. In this connection such refugees will enjoy the right to remain in the area where it will have been possible to obtain employment for them, with the sole reservations of conforming to such controls which may be deemed necessary.

With respect to refugees who will not have been authorized to work and who as a result will have to be cared for at the Fedala camp, it goes without saying that the French administration, if the occasion arises will grant them facilities to remain away temporarily from the Housing Center, on the condition
on the condition that they maintain their regular residence at the camp and observe scrupulously the laws and regulations of the country in particular those regarding immigration.

The Commissioner of Foreign Affairs hopes that these decisions, which have been taken with the two fold concern of treating unfortunate foreigners in a humane manner and of safeguarding order and security in the territories under French sovereignty, will meet with the approval of the American and British governments.

Repeat to Madrid and London.

WILEY

EJH

(Copied by VD:RU:GF)
AIR MAIL

September 22, 1944

SUBJECT: Report on Fedala Camp

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

I have the honor to enclose herewith for the Department's information a copy of a resume of part of a report on the Fedala camp, which was transmitted to this office by Mr. R. L. Cockran, Principal Representative of UNRRA, Mediterranean Theater.

Respectfully yours,

For the U.S. Political Advisor,

Carneral Office
Foreign Service Officer

Enclosures:

[Resume of report]

[TSR/28]

[Original copy to Department]

CONTROL COPY
Partial translation and resume

Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees
Representative with the French
Provisional Government, Algiers:
Governor V. Valentin-Smith

REPORT ON PEDALA CAMP

Left Algiers 6 August, returned to Algiers 22 August.

Before starting on my visit to Fedala I went to the Residence to check on certain questions:
(1) The final agreement about the Fedala Camp, between the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, the representatives of the U.S. and British Governments in Algiers, and Mr. Beckelman;
(2) the transfer of responsibility for the camp to UNHRA;
(3) the mobilization of the refugees. The question is this: since up till now all foreign refugees arriving in North Africa able to bear arms have been absorbed either into the French Army or into some other branch of the war effort, it would seem fair to apply the same rule to the refugee refugees. The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs considers that the refugees at Fedala camp should be asked to submit to this regime, and that those who refuse should not receive the same privileges as those who accept. My conversations with members of the War Refugee Board at Algiers indicate that the Board wishes to make no such discrimination between the volunteers for war service and the others. The question, which has been presented to the U.S. and British representatives in Algiers, is still undecided. There seems to be only a few dozen refugees who decline to enrol. Some foreign refugees who served in France in 1939-40 with the Foreign Legion are asking to enlist in French military units.

Residents at the camp

The camp now has (19 August) a population of about 650 persons. On 18 August a contingent of 150 British subjects (Maltese and Tripolitainian) arrived from Spain. Their stay should be limited, as the problem of repatriation seems to present few difficulties in their case. Also, about 30 gypsies, arrived from Spain with a convoy of French refugees, have been accepted by the camp; these form a separate element, showing lack of cleanliness and undisciplined habits.

The camp population is chiefly children and aged people, which necessitates certain precautions in view of the winter and rainy season.

Refugees having entered the camp are as follows: Sephardics, about 400; Maltese and Tripolitainians, about 150; other nationals, about 150; stateless, about 100; total about 800. Of these 850: 100 Maltese and Tripolitainians are awaiting repatriation; 400 Sephardics wish to return to the Near East; 100 refugees have enlisted in the armed forces or are employed in the war effort; about 150 have no assurance of repatriation yet, though about a third of them are citizens of former residents of South America and other countries.

How the camp functions

My stay at the camp confirmed my former excellent impression of it, and I heard many expressions of gratitude from the residents for the sympathetic efforts of the Director in their behalf.

An article of 8 August in "Vista Marocaina" gives a full report on the life of the camp.

The refugees arrived in Morocco about a month and a half ago. Families are lodged in large rooms, each with a table, chairs and...
no more than 3 beds. Refugees without families are grouped in dormitories by sex and age. The children (about 65) have their school, playground and 3 regular classes; instruction is given in French. The men work on the construction of the recreation hall, a special barracks, and the making of chairs, tables and toys. The atmosphere is one of perfect harmony. A number of the refugees have enlisted or re-enlisted in their respective armies . . .

Efforts have been made to remedy or compensate for the lack of school materials. Progress is slow, but it is hoped that better accommodations will be possible soon. Adult instruction has proved very satisfactory, with enthusiastic attendance. Experience has shown that an educational program can be carried out with a minimum of material supplies: sufficient blackboards and chalk, pencils and rulers, study hall space, a minimum of balls etc., for games and sports, paper, glue, etc. for manual training. The greatest aid to the elementary school program has probably been the cooperation and patience of the teachers in the face of discouraging conditions of the five teachers only one had any previous teaching experience; the others had given private lessons. They have shown great adaptability, and the school is showing a good influence in the camp.

Books are lacking, but the assistance of the Commissariat of Information and of Education has enabled me to send to the camp, through the American Friends, about 100 miles of books and pamphlets.

The camp directors have organized workshops where the refugees work at making furniture, pots and pans, etc. for the camp, using as materials old packing boxes and empty tin cans. They receive a daily salary. Recreation for the refugees has also been organized. Impression of kindness, understanding and efficiency on the part of Mr. Beckerman and his staff, who include a number of refugees as an auxiliary group. Illustrations of cleanliness, high morals, and good spirit of discipline among the refugees.

In general the functioning of the camp is so excellent that it would seem desirable for the Commissariat for Refugees and Depor tees to utilize it as a model for the information of future directors of refugee camps.
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a Government agency.

Secretary of State
Washington

96, September 20
BCC 2632 FROM FERGUSON FOR FEA.

Discussed CCB 2339 dated September 5 with Beckman whose basic minimum requirements in categories you specify were forwarded by him to UNRRA at their request with his letter AOX 26 of August 21.

Commanding General Mediterranean base section says army will continue provide food fuel medical and maintenance supplies from Atlantic base section as heretofore so long as that section exists. Regarding preparing camp for winter he will provide sufficient material and equipment when the time comes to prevent suffering in the event of emergency but will not (repeat, not) undertake to provide necessary material and equipment at this time to put camp on winter basis and make possible transfer camp population from tents to barracks. He cannot say how long army installations will remain this theatre but foresees possibility their departure before year’s end.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM
DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

Algiers. Dated September 20, 1944

CONTROL COPY

DECLASSIFIED clothing
State Dept. Letter, 11-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 15 1972
#96, September 20, from Algiers

clothing requirements available from FEA stocks here.

For your information UNRRA authorized Beckelman
transfer approximately 400 Greek origin refugees from NARC
to Middle East. Since British Government already obligated
move 150 British subjects from NARC to Tripolitania Beckelman
trying combine both movements one ship and would appreciate
your help. If these departures materialize Beckelman
believes arrangements can be made for remaining 200 refugees
either live outside camp or transfer Philippeville. Both
Beckelman and I feel the best solution would be to follow
procedure outlined this paragraph. In conversation with
Cochran last week in Italy he indicated his concurrence
with above.

LAWTON

WFS
FROM: American Embassy, London
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATED: September 8, 1944
NUMBER: 7395

Reference is made herewith to Department's cable No. 7017 dated August 31, 1944.

The Department's opinion that it would now be inopportune to close Camp Lyautey is agreed to entirely by the Foreign Office.

The War Refugee Board should be informed.

WIRGNT
Please refer to your 0230 of August 5 concerning Beckelman's proposal to close Camp Lyutsey.

Inasmuch as Camp Lyutsey is still under the joint jurisdiction of the British and American Governments (Department's 0466 August 15 to NER 612) Beckelman's proposal must of necessity be passed upon by the two Governments.

It is the United States Government's view that now would be a highly inopportune time to close Camp Lyutsey. Beckelman's statement that few newcomers are expected at Lyutsey indicates that he is unaware of the worthy offer (your 0296 of July 27 and our 0096 of August 2). The closing of Camp Lyutsey at a time when the British and American Governments have accepted the Hungarian proposal to permit certain categories of Jews to emigrate from Hungary might well prove tragic in its consequences, for in the eyes of the Hungarian Government it might easily throw open to question the sincerity of the British and American Governments in accepting the Hungarian Government's offer. Obviously all possible havens must be held available for any eventuality that may occur from accepting the Hungarian Government's offer.
Government's offer.

It would be appreciated if you would make known to the British Government and the IOC the United States Government's view concerning Beekelman's proposal to close Camp Lyautey at this time. This cable has been cleared with the Department, FBI and NEB.

HULL
CABLE FROM DEPARTMENT TO AMBASSADOR WILTSHIRE, LONDON, ENGLAND.

Please refer to your 6269 of August 5 concerning Beesleman's proposal to close Camp Lyceum.

Lenin as Camp Lyceum is still under the joint jurisdictions of the British and American Governments, Beesleman's proposal must of necessity be passed upon by the two Governments.

It is the United States Government's view that now would be a highly inopportune time to close Camp Lyceum. Beesleman's statement that few newcomers are expected at Lyceum indicates that he is unaware of the Horvath offer (your 6268 of July 27 and our 6096 of August 2). The closing of Camp Lyceum at a time when the British and American Governments have under consideration the Hungarian proposal to permit thousands of Jews to emigrate from Hungary might well prove tragic in its consequences, for in the eyes of the Hungarian Government, it might easily throw open to question the sincerity of the British and American Governments' profession of willingness to receive on United Nations' territory Jews and other victims of enemy oppression. Furthermore, in view of the promise which the United States Government is making to the Hungarian Government through Intercommunications, to arrange for the care of and to find homes for all Jews permitted to leave Hungary who reach neutral or United Nations' territory (our 6096 of August 2), all possible havens must be held available for any eventuality that may occur.

It would be appreciated if you would make known to the British Government and the IGO the United States Government's view concerning Beesleman's proposal to close Camp Lyceum at this time. This cable has been cleared with the Department, FRA and WIB.

1:30 p.m.
August 15, 1944
Miss Day (for the Secretary) Abrahamson, Cohn, Dubois, Friedman, Hodel, Laughlin, Leiber, Mann, Mannon, McCormack, Cable Control Files

[Signature]
This appears to be informative only, requiring no action by us.

Milton Sabey
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

A-367, August 16, 1944, 4 p.m.

A group of 410 French refugees departed from Spain for North Africa via Gibraltar on August 14, bringing to approximately 2,400 the total number of such refugees evacuated from Spain since beginning of year. It is estimated that not more than 200 French refugees remain in Spain as of this date.

BUTTERWORTH

Copies to Algiers.

NM/2

File No. 906

DISCLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 15 1972
Secretary of State
Washington

228, Sixteenth
CROWLEY AND LUMIAN FROM UNRRA
Number 7.
150 additional refugees arrived today.

RUSSELL
Reference is made to Mr. Selden Chapin's despatch No. 425 of July 26, 1944 to the Secretary of State concerning the Fedala Refugee Camp.

Inasmuch as the State Department has forwarded Mr. Chapin's despatch to the War Refugee Board, it is assumed that the Department is interested in the Board's comments concerning the contents of Mr. Chapin's despatch.

The War Refugee Board's primary interest in the refugee camp at Fedala is as an available haven for refugees escaping from Nazi-occupied Europe to Spain and Portugal. Only if Fedala or some equally available camp admits such refugees are the Spanish and Portuguese Governments likely to cooperate fully in facilitating their escape from Nazi territory. This is particularly true of the Sephardics whose evacuation from occupied territory the Spanish and Portuguese Governments actively sponsor on the understanding that they will depart as soon as possible after their arrival in Spain or Portugal. Thus although the Spanish and Portuguese Governments may, in order to facilitate their evacuation from occupied territory, claim such Sephardics as citizens, despite the fact that they emigrated from Spain and Portugal many centuries ago, they most certainly are not welcome to remain in these countries after their escape from the Nazis.

The French position in respect to Sephardics, as stated in the French letter No. 97829 of July 6 from the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Chapin, and in the note from the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Bedelmann is not clear. If Sephardics from occupied Europe are to be excluded from Fedala on the ground that they are Spanish or Portuguese citizens, the War Refugee Board can not agree to the French proposal, which would serve to discourage all further efforts on the part of the Spanish and Portuguese Governments to facilitate the escape of these unfortunate. If, on the other hand, the French position is that Sephardics from Nazi Europe whose stay in Spain or Portugal is not desired by these Governments are amenable to Fedala, the War Refugee Board is in full agreement with Mr. Chapin's observations concerning the French proposal.

As far as the compulsory mobilization of refugees in Fedala is concerned the War Refugee Board is in full agreement with Mr. Chapin's observations concerning the French proposal.
LONDON,
6466
FROM CROWLEY AND HANRICH, FRA, FOR REED

Your 6299, August 5, French Division,

Liberated Areas, FRA is responsible for the operation of
Federal Refugee Camp. Shocholsky and his American staff
belong to and are paid by U.S. but are loaned to FRA to
operate the camp until U.S. takes it over.

NOLL
(R.H.)
The attached cable indicates that Beckelman is still doing everything possible to close Camp Lyautey. I understand also that Dunlop of FIA has approached a number of persons at the State Department with a similar proposal. You are familiar with Miss Flexner's opinion on this subject.

In my opinion now is the time to slug it out, for two reasons: (1) Our own position is at the moment unassailable because of the Horthy offer and (2) The proposal to close Camp Lyautey has now reached the stage where it may be officially taken under consideration by the British. Unless we take a strong position on the subject and make this position known immediately, matters may get out of hand.

I recommend that the following cable be sent to Ambassador Winant after clearance with FIA and the State Department:

"Please refer to your 6289 of August 5 concerning Beckelman's proposal to close Camp Lyautey.

Inasmuch as Camp Lyautey is still under the joint jurisdictions of the British and American Governments, Beckelman's proposal must of necessity be passed upon by the two Governments.

It is the United States Government's view that now would be a highly inopportune time to close Camp Lyautey. Beckelman's statement that few newcomers are expected at Lyautey indicates that he is unaware of the Horthy offer (your 6956 of July 27 and our 6096 of August 3). The closing of Camp Lyautey at a time when the British and American Governments have under consideration the Hungarian proposal to permit thousands of Jews to emigrate from Hungary might well prove tragic in its consequences, for in the eyes of the Hungarian Government it might easily throw open to question the sincerity of the British and American Governments' professed willingness to receive on United Nations' territory Jews and other victims of enemy oppression."
Furthermore, in view of the promise which the United States Government is proposing to make to the Hungarian Government through Inter­cross to arrange for the care of and to find havens for all Jews permitted to leave Hungary who reach neutral or United Nations' territory (our 5096 of August 2), all possible havens must be held available for any eventuality that may occur.

It would be appreciated if you would make known to the British Government and the IGO the United States Government's view concerning Becksin's proposal to close Camp Lyautay at this time.

This cable has been cleared with the Department, TDA and WBA.
This morning, at a conference between Brown and Henderson of the Refugee Section of the Foreign Office, Vice Director of IGC, speaking for the Director, a problem was brought up, as follows:

Four hundred of the six hundred refugees in the camp for refugees at Fedhala are Sephardic Jews of Greek nationality, so Beckelman of FEA, Manager of the refugee camp there reports. Beckelman has made the recommendation to Valentin Smith that it is desirable to move these four hundred inmates from this camp to a camp in Palestine for Greeks, distribute the remaining 200 elsewhere, and then close up the camp, whose capacity is 2,000, with few newcomers expected. (Valentin Smith is the IGC representative in Algiers.) The departure of United States troops from Morocco, resulting in a lessening of supplies and other facilities, it is understood, is, to some extent, the reason for this recommendation.

Instructions have been asked of IGC by Valentin Smith, and IGC, in turn, conferred with the London Office of UNRRA, as it understood that the camp had been taken over, from the joint operations of the American and British Governments, by UNRRA. The London UNRRA states that it does not know who
is responsible for the camp, and that it has nothing at all to do with it. At the time the Congress passed the appropriation bill for UNRRA, the camp was transferred to UNRRA, the Foreign Office understood, but it doubts now whether its own responsibility toward the camp stopped at that time, in light of the present developments. In view of the fact that several of the officials of the camp are being paid by it, it urgently wishes to know the agency that is now operating the camp.

With reference to the proposal of Beckelman to move the 400 Greeks, IGC desires to give Valentin Smith instructions to act according to the decision which the operation of the camp made, but this it is unable to do until the name of the operation is known. There is no desire on the part of IGC to recommend approval or disapproval of the proposition, but IGC will strongly object to any action which might, in the end, hinder the final repatriation to Greece of Greeks, because this will be IGC's responsibility.

It is urgently requested that the name of the agency now responsible for the Fedhala Camp be transmitted.

WINANT.

DGH:LCW 6/5/44
No. 2

27 July, 1944

JIM:

I have just received a copy of WFB No. 34 of 18 July (State Dept. No. 2230) regarding commitment from French on movement of from 25 to 50 refugees on each convoy. If possible, let John Hrones know if you and Chapin will have time to handle this. If not, I can return to Algiers in about two weeks or less.

Sincerely,

LEN
NO. 435

OFFICE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

SUBJECT: Fedhala Refugee Camp.

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

I have the honor to enclose a translation of a note, dated July 6, received from the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs with respect to the Refugee Camp at Fedhala. The note was referred to the representatives of France and the president's war refugee board and upon their suggestion, it is being transmitted herewith for reference to Governor Lehman and the interested agencies of the United States Government for their comments.

The subject raised in the first numbered paragraph of the note from the Foreign Office, namely, the conditions imposed upon the settlement of the Sepharadic refugees in the Fedhala Camp, appears to be reasonable and in accord with the agreement entered into with the French authorities.

On the other hand, the subject dealt with in the second numbered paragraph of the note, namely, the mobilization of refugees in the Fedhala Camp, is formally raised by the French for the first time. In this connection the representative of UNRRA in charge of the Camp, Mr. Bedekman, has advised the Mission that he has encouraged recruiting among the refugees on a voluntary basis and that the French Army, the French Foreign Legion, the British Pioneer Corps, and the Yugoslav Army have each enlisted some of the men. This program of voluntary enlistment has been instituted as a means of aiding those refugees who are capable and desirous of participating in the Allied war effort. It is Mr. Bedekman's feeling, however, as well as that of the representatives of the War Refugee Board that to subject all physically fit men in the camp to compulsory mobilization would be wholly undesirable. Acceptance of the condition that those who refuse to participate in the common war effort should be kept within the camp and not benefit from the facilities envisaged in the agreement reached between the British
and American Governments and the French Authorities would mean making an internment center out of the camp insofar as those persons were concerned.

Early in the negotiations with the French it was expressly emphasized that all possible means should be taken to avoid the impression being given that the refugee center at Fedhala was a concentration camp. The French authorities concurred in this view, and moreover agreed that the refugees in the camp should be granted certain freedom of movement in accordance. It is therefore believed that care should now be taken that the conditions concerning the mobilization of the refugees do not prejudice these facilities or the purpose behind them.

A second consideration involved in the French proposal is the danger that if the enemy were to learn that any individuals from among the group in the camp coming out of enemy territory on Spanish papers were being mobilized into the Allied armies, this avenue of escape might be immediately closed. Moreover, this consideration is important in view of the representations currently being made to the Spanish authorities for the purpose of increasing the possibilities of rescuing victims of enemy persecution escaping from enemy-occupied territory.

It is to be noted that the French base their condition of compulsory mobilization of the Fedhala refugees upon the argument that the same treatment is accorded to all foreign refugees fit for mobilization who arrive in French North Africa. The facts that the refugees in the Fedhala camp have been admitted upon a purely temporary basis and that the Inter-Governmental Committee is obligated to move them to more permanent areas for settlement places them in an entirely different category from other foreign refugees arriving in French North Africa. These circumstances could easily justify the position that for the Fedhala refugees, mobilization should be kept upon a strictly voluntary basis. Otherwise the policies of the American and British Governments in facilitating the rescue of persons presently in danger of losing their lives at the hands of the enemy may be seriously prejudiced.

The British Mission which is in receipt of an identical note from the French Foreign Office is referring the communication to London for comment.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

Counselor of Embassy, In Charge

[Translation of note from Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, dated July 6, 1944.]

[Redacted]
The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to Mr. Selden Chapin and has the honor to call his attention to the two questions stated below with respect to the refugees camp of Fedhala.

I - Sephardic refugees.

Mr. Beckelmann, acting in the name of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, pointed out to the Department of Foreign Affairs the interest that would result if the Sephardic Jewish refugees would be temporarily accepted in the lodging center of Fedhala, in the same way as other stateless people.

The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs has given his approval, in a letter of which copy is attached to this note, to the request addressed by the Delegate of UNRRA, on two conditions:

that the installation of the Sephardics in the camp of Fedhala be made in accordance with the agreements entered into by the French and Allied authorities;

that the Sephardics whom the UNRRA intends lodging in Fedhala are not citizens of a nation that has been spared by the war and on whose territory they could find refuge.

II - Mobilization of refugees.

Up to now, all foreign refugees, fit for mobilization, have, on their arrival in North Africa, either enlisted in the French Army, or in British pioneer units, or have been placed under obligation to participate in some way or other in the Allied war effort. It seems only fair to apply similar rulings to stateless refugees.

The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs believes that the guests of Fedhala Camp who are fit for mobilization must be asked to comply with the rules stated above. Those who refuse to participate in the common war effort will be maintained in the camp and will not benefit from the facilities envisaged in the agreements arrived at between the French, American and British Governments.

To: Mr. Selden Chapin,
Counselor of Embassy,
American Diplomatic Mission, Algiers.
(A Translation)

From: Commissariat of Foreign Affairs

To: Mr. W. Bechelmann
Chief of Mission
Civil Affairs
Algiers.

Sir,

In your letter of April 29th you asked me whether it might be possible to accept in the camp of Fedhala Sepharadic Jewish refugees who are to be sent to Morocco shortly.

I have the honor to confirm to you that I do not see any objection to the temporary installment of the refugees in question, on condition that this right does not extend to those of the Sephardics who are citizens of nations untouched by the war, such as Spain or Portugal.

On the other hand, I believe I ought to add that:

(1) in no case, the total number of refugees to be admitted in Morocco must exceed 2,000 persons as stated in the agreement between the three Allied Governments;

(2) the measures of security that have been taken with regard to the first group of refugees coming from Spain, must be equally placed upon the Sephardic refugees, especially no person will be admitted into Morocco without the previous agreement of the French, American and British Security Services.

(3) the Sephardics will have to submit, in all matters, to the regulations settled under the agreement of the French, American and British Governments, for everything that concerns the sojourn of the refugees in the Protectorate.

I beg you to accept, Sir, my best consideration.
ALGIERS.

The following WRS cable 56 is for Saxon.

Sir Herbert Emerson has received in London through Governor Valentin Smith, the Intergovernmental Committee representative in Algiers, the recommendation of the local management of Camp Lyautet that the camp be closed and its 600 inmates be transferred to existing camps in Egypt and Palestine and to countries willing to receive them. This recommendation is based on the opinion of the local management that in view of the improved international situation it is improbable that further large contingents of refugees will arrive at Lyautet and that therefore the costly maintenance of 600 persons in a camp established to care for 2,000 refugees is not (repeat not) justified.

Emerson replied to Smith that the question of the future of Camp Lyautet is one primarily for the British and American Governments in consultation with the French authorities and that the Intergovernmental Committee had no instructions to give although it felt that a decision to close the camp now would be premature.

For your information the War Refugee Board has cabled Ambassador Winant in London as follows:
Quoted: The War Refugee Board is in full agreement with Sir Herbert Emerson that a decision to close Camp Lyautay now would be highly premature. In our opinion the international situation has not (repeat not) become stabilized to such a degree as to justify the taking of an irremovable step such as that suggested. Moreover, such a suggestion is difficult to understand, in view of the necessity of caring for increasing numbers of refugees escaping from enemy territory, and the recent decision to expand at once existing refugee facilities in the Middle East and to open new camps in French North Africa, Tripolitania and Oswego, New York. UNQUOTE.

HULL
(GIE)

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-78
By R. H. Parks Date: SEP 5 1972
July 20, 1944
10 p.m.

CABLE FROM WAR REFUGE BOARD TO AMBASSADOR WILSON FOR SAXON, ALGIERS.

Sir Herbert Emerson has received in London through Governor Valentin Smith, the Intergovernmental Committee representative in Algiers, the recommendation of the local management of Camp Lyndsay that the camp be closed and its 600 inmates be transferred to existing camps in Egypt and Palestine and to countries willing to receive them. This recommendation is based on the opinion of the local management that in view of the improved international situation it is improbable that further large contingents of refugees will arrive at Lyndsay and that therefore the costly maintenance of 600 persons in a camp established to care for 2,000 refugees is not (repeat not) justified.

Emerson replied to Smith that the question of the future of Camp Lyndsay is one primarily for the British and American Governments in consultation with the French authorities and that the Intergovernmental Committee had no instructions to give although it felt that a decision to close the camp now would be premature.

For your information the War Refugee Board has cabled Ambassador Winant in London as follows:

QUOTED: The War Refugee Board is in full agreement with Sir Herbert Emerson that a decision to close Camp Lyndsay now would be highly premature. In our opinion the international situation has not (repeat not) become stabilized to such a degree as to justify the taking of an irreversible step such as that suggested. Moreover, such a suggestion is difficult to understand, in view of the necessity of caring for increasing numbers of refugees escaping from enemy territory, and the recent decision to expand at once existing refugee facilities in the Middle East and to open new camps in French North Africa, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica.

This is WBR Cable to Algiers No. 39

McNiece/SFery/Abrahamson: 7/20/44
Please refer to your 5637 of July 17 concerning the recommendation transmitted by the Inter-Governmental Committee representative in Algiers that the refugee camp at Fedhala be closed.

The War Refugee Board is in full agreement with Sir Herbert Emerson that a decision to close Camp Lyautey now would be highly premature. In our opinion the international situation has not (repeat not) become stabilized to such a degree as to justify the taking of an irrevocable step such as that suggested. Moreover, such a suggestion is difficult to understand, in view of the necessity of caring for increasing numbers of refugees escaping from enemy territory, and the recent decision to expand once existing refugee facilities in the Middle East and to open new camps in French North Africa, Tripolitania and Oswego, New York.

Hull

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By D. H. Parks Date SEP 15 1972
CARLE FROM WAR REFUGE BOARD TO AMBASSADOR FINAN, LONDON, ENGLAND

Please refer to your 5637 of July 17 concerning the recommendation transmitted by the Inter-governmental Committee representative in Algiers that the refugee camp at Fedhala be closed.

The War Refugee Board is in full agreement with Sir Herbert Emerson that a decision to close Camp Lyndale now would be highly premature. In our opinion the international situation has not (repeat not) become stabilized to such a degree as to justify the taking of an irreversible step such as that suggested. Moreover, such a suggestion is difficult to understand, in view of the necessity of caring for increasing numbers of refugees escaping from enemy territory, and the recent decision to expand at once existing refugee facilities in the Middle East and to open new camps in French North Africa, Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, New York.

July 20, 1944
11:55 a.m.
The following WB cable is for Ackermann and Saxon.

Please refer to 2415 of July 11 from Madrid to Department repeated to Algiers as Madrid's 392 for Ackermann and Saxon urging that a commitment be obtained from the French for the evacuation from Spain of from 25 to 50 stateless refugees holding North African entry visas to Camp Fedhala on each French convoy calling at Spanish ports to evacuate French refugees to North Africa.

Board suggests that you use your utmost efforts to obtain this commitment from the French. Please advise us of any difficulties you may encounter.

HULL
(ALW)
TO AMBASSADOR WILSON FOR ACKERMANN AND SAXON AT ALGIERS FROM WAR REFUGEE BOARD.

Please refer to Madrid's 392 to Algiers for Ackerman and Saxon urging that a commitment be obtained from the French for the evacuation from Spain of from 25 to 60 stateless refugees holding North African entry visas to Camp Fedhala on each French convoy calling at Spanish ports to evacuate French refugees to North Africa.

Board suggests that you use your utmost efforts to obtain this commitment from the French. Please advise us of any difficulties you may encounter.

This is War Refugee Board cable to Algiers No. 34.

3:55 p.m.
July 17, 1944

Miss Chauncey (for the Sec'y) Abrahamson, Cohn, DuBois, Frieden, Hodel, Laughlin, Lesser, Mann, Stewart, Central Files, Cable Control Files
SECRETARY OF STATE
Washington
2500, Seventeenth

Fifteen members of supplementary exchange

Fifteen members of supplementary exchange

group left Iran July 15 by train for Lisbon.

Other seven members of group proceeded to Madrid

on same date and are now in care of Blickenstaff's

organization awaiting completion of arrangements

for their transfer to Fez, Meknes. Repeated to Lisbon

as 179 and London as 596.

BUTTERWORTH

BB
Secretary of State, Washington.
5637, seventeenth
FOR WAR REFUGEE BOARD

Sir Herbert Emerson has furnished the Embassy with a copy of a cable received by him from Gouverneur Valentin Smith, Inter-governmental Committee representative in Algiers, transmitting a suggestion that the refugee camp at Fedhala be closed. Smith says the camp now holds 600 persons, that because of improving international situation no more large contingents are to be expected and that costly maintenance of organization to care for 2000 persons is not justified. Local management of camp recommends closing it and transferring the 600 inmates to existing camps in Egypt and Palestine and to countries willing to receive them.

Emerson has replied that question of the future of the camp is one primarily for American and British governments in consultation with French authorities; that Inter-governmental Committee has no instructions to give
to give but feels that decision to close the camp now would be premature.
Secretary of State, Washington.

July 14, 1944

Docket 1915, July 11, 1944

FOR FILE FROM MANHEIM.

Blickenstaff, in my talks with him has emphasized the importance of evacuating stateless refugees now in Spain who hold North Africa entry visas to Camp Pedhale particularly in view of our delay to date in arranging evacuations. French convoys are regularly calling at Spanish ports to evacuate French refugees to North Africa in groups of 300 to 500 each trip. If a commitment could be obtained for the French to take between 25 and 50 stateless people in each convoy, our position here would be greatly improved. The Blickenstaff organization can deliver the refugees at the proper ports with necessary documents and the French would only have to furnish space in vessels.

I suggest that every effort be made to get such a commitment.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-73
By A. L. Parks Date, SEP 15, 1972
-2- #2415, July 11, 9 p.m., from Madrid.

Commitment. This message is being repeated to Algiers as Embassy's 392 for Ackermann and Saxon.

BUTTERWORTH

RR
June 26, 1944

Secretary Morgenthau

J. W. Pehle

I am sure you will be glad to know that Camp Fedhala is at last to be occupied by refugees. We have just been advised that 573 stateless refugees sailed from Spain on June 21st for the camp.

(Signed) J. W. Pehle

FHIro 6/26/44
The following has been repeated to Algiers.

You are informed that on June 21, there sailed from Cadiz en route to Fedhala, a group of 573 stateless refugees.
The cable below is from the War Refugee Board in reference to your 1931 of May 31 regarding failure of evacuation ship to sail on June 7 from Cadiz.

Repeated delays in evacuation of refugees in Spain to North Africa also disturbing to Board. The Board’s representative in Algiers has repeatedly tried to hasten sailing date, although under terms of understanding between British and United States Governments concerning transfer of refugees to Camp Lyautey from Spain, ocean transport to North Africa is a British responsibility. Ship will sail about June 25, with definite sailing date to be fixed about June 15, according to latest information from him.

STETTINIUS
ACTING
(GHo)

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
OUTGOING
TELEGRAM
AMBASSADOR
MADRID
1490X

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STETTINIUS
ACTING
(GHo)
CABLE TO MADRID

From War Refugee Board to Ambassador Hayes, Madrid, Spain

Reference your 1931 of May 31 concerning failure of evacuation ship to sail from Cadiz on June 7.

We too are disturbed by repeated delays in evacuation to North Africa of refugees in Spain. Although under terms of understanding between British and United States Governments concerning transfer of refugees from Spain to Camp Lyautey, sea transportation to North Africa is a British responsibility, the War Refugee Board's representative in Algiers has repeatedly endeavored to hasten the sailing date. Latest information from him is that ship will sail about June 25, the definite sailing date to be fixed about June 15.

**********
June 8, 1944
4:35 p.m.
June 30, 1944

AMENOSITY,

MADRID

The cable below is from the War Refugees Board in reference your 1937 of May 31 regarding failure of evacuation ship to sail on June 7 from Casablanca.

Repeated delays in evacuation of refugees to Spain to North Africa also disabiliing to board. The Board's representative in Algiers has repeatedly tried to hasten sailing date, although under terms of understanding between British and United States Governments concerning transfer of refugees to Camp Igoumen from Spain, cannot transport to North Africa in a British responsibility. Ship will sail about June 15, with definite sailing date to be fixed about June 15, according to latest information from him.

SIGNED

 Acting

(GBM)

Miss Channing (for the Secretary) Abrahamson, Adkin, Bernstein, Cohn, Dubois, Friedman, Garet, Gold, Laughlin, Lesser, Lowndes, Mais, McCormick, Pabst, Sargent, Smith, Stanic, Stewart, Weinstein, W. D. White, Wilke,
For security reasons this cablegram must be treated as CONFIDENTIAL. Date: Jun 9, 1944

The following telegram has been sent to Algiers:

US URGENT
326, June 9, 8 p.m.

FOR ACKERMAN

Blickensstaff states that necessary arrangements can (repeat can) be made in time to embark refugees at Cadiz on June 20 and is proceeding with preliminary steps. Your 105, June 8. I should like to emphasize again extreme importance of avoiding any further delays in departure of this group and should appreciate immediate confirmation that we can safely plan on arrival of vessel on date stated.

Repeated to Department.

Hayes to Madrid

WTD In view of cable sent to State on 6/13/44, no further action is necessary.
SECRETARY OF STATE,
Washington.

1944, June 9, 7 p.m.

FROM MURPHY AND ACKERMANN FOR DEPARTMENT AND VAR REFUGEE BOARD.

We are fully cognizant of problems mentioned in Madrid's no 306 of May 31 to the Department. The same matters have been communicated on many occasions by Ackermann War Refugee Board representative to British Foreign office representatives who were originally charged with procurement of shipping. However, since cancellation of sailing on June 7, Ackermann has requested intervention of War Shipping Administration representative who has taken strong position to prevent further delay. In addition I have taken up matter with Commander Naval Forces Mediterranean Area pointing out unfortunate results of any further delay. I feel confident that ship will now proceed as scheduled on June.
-2- 1914, June 9, 7 p.m., from Algiers

on June 20 unless extremely urgent operational requirements intervene.

Sent to the Department as 1914, repeated to (s)

106.

CHAIRIL

(s) apparent omission

HTH
Algiers
Dated June 3, 1943
Rec'd 7:06 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1933, June 3, 6 p.m.

FOR WAR REFUGEE BOARD FROM ACKERMANN. No. 25. Advised today by War Shipping representatives that ship should sail from Spain about June 25. Definite date will be fixed about June 15.

Sent to Department, repeated to Madrid for Blickenstaff.

CHAPIN
RR
REP

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INCOMING TELEGRAM

DISTRIBUTION OF true reading only by special arrangement.

Algiers
Dated June 3, 1943
Rec'd 7:06 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1933, June 3, 6 p.m.

FOR WAR REFUGEE BOARD FROM ACKERMANN. No. 25. Advised today by War Shipping representatives that ship should sail from Spain about June 25. Definite date will be fixed about June 15.

Sent to Department, repeated to Madrid for Blickenstaff.

CHAPIN
RR
REP
The following telegram from the British at Algiers now announces June 7 as date for refugees from Spain to depart to Camp Fedhala. Announcement of definite date will remove demoralization among those chosen who have become skeptical of the project, it is hoped. Expect 770 to depart from Cadiz. Pushing with French of permission for additional groups is important since none has thus far promised, and otherwise admission new people to Spain, particularly Sephardics, will be procured, if at all, with great difficulty. UNQUOTE.

Your comments on foregoing will be appreciated.
CABLE TO ALGIERS

From War Refugee Board to Chapin for Ackermann

JDC has received following message from Schwartz in Lisbon:

"Date departure refugees from Spain to Camp Fedhala now announced by British at Algiers as June 7. Hopeful announcement of definite date will remove demoralization among those chosen who have become skeptical of project. 770 expected to leave from Cadiz. Important that permission for additional groups be pushed with French or none promised so far. Otherwise admission new people to Spain, especially Sephardics, will be secured with difficulty, if at all."

Please send your comments on foregoing.

WEB ALGIERS CABLE NO. 16

*************
May 31, 1944
12:15 P. M.
SECRET

XCOMING TELEGRAM

DEI-601

Distribution of this reading only by special arrangement (W)

Madrid

Dated May 31, 1944

Rec'd 8:55 p.m., June 2

Secretary of State,

Washington,

1944, May 31, midnight.

British Embassy Madrid has been informed from Algiers that shipping cannot (repeat cannot) be made available for scheduled evacuation from Cadiz on June 7 of stateless refugees proceeding from Spain to Fedala center.

While fully cognizant of difficulties of procuring shipping for such purpose at present stage of war, I feel that it should be pointed out that further postponement of the departure of this group will have extremely unsatisfactory effect on position of stateless refugees in Spain and on position of Blichenstaff's organization vis-a-vis Spanish Government. Latter has become increasingly disturbed over repeated delays in evacuation of these refugees, most of whom have been ready to leave for over three months, and postponement of June 7 departure, for which arrangements have already been made and assurances given, may well cause it to question good faith of Blichenstaff and interested Allied authorities. This reaction may in turn result in reimprisonment and reinvestment of many stateless refugees who have been allowed to remain at liberty on basis of assurances of their early departure, and tend, therefore, to discourage entry into Spain of further numbers of such refugees.

Experience has shown that extent to which Spanish Government is willing to cooperate with Blichenstaff's organization in care of stateless refugees bears direct relationship to rate at which that organization is able to evacuate those persons from Spain and it is feared that willingness will be sorely strained by yet another delay in the evacuation of the approximately 700 persons comprising the Fedala group.

Repeated to Algiers.

HAYES

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept., Letter, 1-11-72

By H. H. Parke Date: SEP 15 1972

CC: Sec'y, Abrahamson, Akin, Bernstein, John, Dubois, Friedman, Garvan, Hodel, Laughlin, Lessor, Luxford, Mann, Mannon, Marks, McCarroll, Sargey, Smith, Standish, Stewart, Weinstein, H.D. White, Feible, Fikes.
DSH-601
Distribution of
true reading only
by special arrangement.

Dr. Distr. 6:55 a.m., June 2
(addressed to M.I., June 2)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

May 31, midnight.

British Embassy Madrid has been informed from Algiers that shipping cannot (repeat cannot) be made available for scheduled evacuation from Cadiz on June 7 of stateless refugees proceeding from Spain to Fedhala center.

While fully cognizant of difficulties of procuring shipping for such purpose at present stage of war, I feel that it should be pointed out that further postponement of the departure of this group will have extremely unsalutary effect on position of stateless refugees in Spain and on position of Blickenstaff’s organization vis-a-vis Spanish Government. Latter has become increasingly disturbed over repeated delays in evacuation of these refugees, most of whom have been ready to leave for over three months, and postponement of June 7 departure, for which arrangements have already been made and assurances given, may well cause it to question good faith of Blickenstaff and interested Allied authorities. This reaction may in turn result in reimprisonment and reinternment of many

DECLASSIFIED STATELESS
State Dept. Letter, 5-11-72
By R. H. Fiske Date SEP 15 1972
May 31, midnight, from Madrid. 

Stateless refugees who have been allowed to remain at liberty on basis of assurances of their early departure, and tend, therefore, to discourage entry into Spain of further numbers of such refugees.

Experience has shown that extent to which Spanish Government is willing to cooperate with Blinkenstaff's organization in care of stateless refugees bears direct relationship to rate at which that organization is able to evacuate these persons from Spain and it is feared that willingness will be sorely strained by yet another delay in the evacuation of the approximately 700 persons comprising the Prinaila group.

Repeated to Algiers.

HAYES

JT

EJH
May 29, 1944

Dear Mr. Leavitt:

The following message from Dr. Joseph Schwartz was received from Lisbon under date of May 23, 1944:

"Date departure refugees from Spain to Camp Fdchala now announced by British at Algiers as June 7. Hopeful announcement of definite date will remove demoralization among those chosen who have become skeptical of project. 770 expected to leave from Cadiz. Important that permission for additional groups be pushed with French as none promised so far. Otherwise admission of new people to Spain, especially Sephardics, will be secured with difficulty, if at all."

Very truly yours,

[Signature] J. W. Peble

J. W. Peble
Executive Director

Mr. Moses A. Leavitt,
Secretary,
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee,
270 Madison Avenue,
New York, New York.
Secretary of State
Washington
1554, May 23, Noon

JPD, VREB 43 FROM SCHWARTZ FOR LEAVITT, NEW YORK

Date departure refugees from Spain to Camp Fedha will now announce by Brit at Algiers on June 7. Hopeful announcement of definite date will remove demoralization among those chosen who have become skeptical of project. 770 expected to leave from Cadiz. Important that permission for additional groups be pushed with French as none promised so far. Otherwise admission new people to Spain, especially Sephardics, will be secured with difficulty, if at all.

NORWEB

JT RR

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 15 1972
Department of State

Incoming Telegram

Division of Communications and Records

DE-155
Distribution of true reading only by special arrangement

Algiers
Dated May 28, 1944
Rte'd 8:54 a.m., 28th

CONTROL COPY
Secretary of State
Washington

1759, May 28, noon

FOR WAR REFUGEE BOARD FROM ACKERMANN NO 22

After spending all week on supply and personnel problems for Fezahala which now appear to be working out satisfactorily have just been advised by British who are handling shipping question that French ship which was assigned to transport refugees on June 7 has been taken off this run by French for operational trip and will not be ready to move refugees until latter part of June. This is fourth disappointment we have had on ship question and since something may happen again on June 20 which is earliest date ship now stated to be available suggest you investigate as to what assistance can be given your end.

CHAPIN

EDA EGO

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-16
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 15 1972
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: American Consulate, Casablanca (via War)

TO: Secretary of State, Washington.

DATE: May 16, 1944

NUMBER: 132

CONTROL COPY

Following is no. 2 for Lehman and Crowley from Bookelma.

This has been repeated to Algiers for Ferguson, N.H.

Now well settled at camp are the 35 refugees who

arrived a few days ago and security check practically com-

pleted without incident. It is urgent that I know the

action taken on my message of May 10, no. 132, as in a few

days a boat is ready to proceed to Spain to embark main

refugee group of approximately 800. If it is not possible

to provide army guard you might possibly arrange external

guard reliable French civilians at cost of about $3,000

per month provided American Army issued fire arms, which

doubtful.

Accountant Ross arrived unannounced, expects to pro-

ceed to Algiers, for your information.

RUSSELL

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
No Refugee Board Files

No action required
5/15/44

Matthew J. Marks
TR-6
Number two expect to spend following amounts by June 30 in categories indicated reference your 68, April 28 administrative 1500, British personnel 3500, communications 300, transportation 2000, subsistence 13000, clothing 3000, refugee and local employment 7000, direct relief 5000, camp equipment and maintenance 12000, health and medical services 700, total 48000 estimated cash balance June 30 152000. Above figures exclude nonreimbursable supplies and services along lines my April 12 letter also cannot now indicate which Army supplies and services involved in repairing and outfitting camp will be absorbed by Army as necessary put camp in operating condition and which ones will be charged us but funds on hand obviously ample all purposes to July 1 above budget assumes arrival 800 before May's end and maintenance through June.

RUSSELL
TO: AMBEP, Algiers

DATED: May 11, 1944

NUMBER: 1428

TO AMBASSADOR WILSON, ALGIERS, FOR ACKERMANN FROM WAR REFUGEE BOARD

Please refer your No. 16 (Department's No. 1452) of May 3rd.

Your prompt action in taking up admission of Sephardic Jews to Camp Lyautey is appreciated. Please confirm our understanding that so long as total number of refugees in Camp Lyautey does not at any one time exceed 2,000, French will not object to entry of refugees merely because they arrived in Spain subsequent to March first.

We are not able to give you information as to number of Sephardic Jews who might be rescued from occupied territory. This information must come from Schwartz, and if you do not hear from him please advise us.

We are inclined to believe that camp quota should not be filled by bringing Jews there from Italy. If we are able to bring more from Spain in the future this may put us in a position to encourage entry of refugees into Spain from occupied territory. For your information it is understood that many Jewish refugees in Southern Italy already have certificates entitling them to enter Palestine and the possibility of their being taken to Palestine should not be overlooked. As you probably know the British Government is presently admitting into Palestine Jewish refugees who reach Turkey. It is understood that more than twenty thousand refugees may still be admitted to Palestine under the terms of the White Paper. When you have investigated the matter please give us your views.

This is WBD Cable to Algiers No. 8
CABLE TO AMBASSADOR WILSON, ALGIERS, FOR ACKERMANN FROM WAR REFUGEES BOARD

Please refer your No. 16 (Department's No. 1453) of May 3rd.

Your prompt action in taking up admission of Sephardic Jews to Camp Lysety is appreciated. Please confirm our understanding that so long as total number of refugees in Camp Lysety does not (repeat not) at any one time exceed 2,000, French will not object to entry of refugees merely because they arrived in Spain subsequent to March first.

We are not able to give you information as to number of Sephardics who might be rescued from occupied territory. This information must come from Schwarts, and if you do not hear from him please advise us.

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This is WRR Cable to Algiers No. 8

*************
May 8, 1944
2130 P.H.
CABLE TO AMBASSADOR WILSON, ALGIERS, FOR ACKERMANN FROM WAR REFUGEES BOARD

Please refer your No. 16 (Department's No. 1453) of May 3rd.

Your prompt action in taking up admission of Sephardic Jews to Camp Lyautey is appreciated. I am not understanding that so long as total number of refugees in Camp Lyautey does not (repeat not) at any one time exceed 2,000, French will not object to entry of refugees merely because they arrived in Spain subsequent to March first.

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We are inclined to believe that camp quota should not (repeat not) be filled by bringing Jews there from Italy. If we are able to bring more from Spain in the future this may put us in a position to encourage entry of refugees into Spain from occupied territory.

This is WRB Cable to Algiers No. 30.

As understood that many Jewish refugees in Southern Italy already have certificates entitling them to enter Palestine and the possibility of their being taken to Palestine should not be considered. As you probably know the British ship is presently admitting all Jewish refugees into Palestine who need funds. It is understood that twenty thousand refugees may be admitted and if needed under the terms of the White Paper. After you have investigated the matter please give us your views.
CABLE TO AMBASSADOR WILSON, ALGIERS, FOR ACKERMANN FROM WAR REFUGEE BOARD

Please refer your No. 16 (Department's No. 1455) of May 3rd.

Your prompt action in taking up admission of Sephardic Jews to Camp Lyantey is appreciated. It is now understood that so long as total number of refugees in Camp Lyantey does not (repeat not) at any one time exceed 2,000, French will not object to entry of refugees merely because they arrived in Spain subsequent to March first.

We are not able to give you information as to number of Sephardics who might be rescued from occupied territory. This information must come from Schwartz, and if you do not hear from him please advise us.

We are inclined to believe that camp quota should not (repeat not) be filled by bringing Jews there from Italy. If we are able to bring more from Spain in the future this may put us in a position to encourage entry of refugees into Spain from occupied territory.

This is XEB Cable to Algiers No.
Group of 221 French refugees sailed from Algiers May 7 for North Africa, bringing to 906 total number of such refugees evacuated from Spain since beginning of year. It is estimated that approximately 650 French refugees remain in Spain as of this date, with new arrivals crossing frontier at estimated rate of 10 a day.
In reply please refer to: 610

MAY 6 1944

Dear Mr. Spiegler:

Thank you for your letter of April 27, 1944, enclosing a copy of a letter on the "sheltering of refugees from Spain in North Africa".

Very truly yours,

J. W. Pohle
Executive Director

Mr. Louis E. Spiegler,
Council,
Hebrew Sheltering and
Immigrant Aid Society,
157 9th Street, N. W.,
Washington, D. C.
April 27, 1944.

Mr. J. W. Pehle
Executive Director
War Refugee Board
Washington, D. C.

My dear Mr. Pehle:

For your information and file, there is attached hereto copy of a letter on the "sheltering of refugees from Spain in North Africa".

Sincerely yours,

Louis E. Spiegler
Counsel

LES:nbk encl.
The French Committee of National Liberation, in agreement with the British and United States Governments, gave permission for refugees, at present in Spain who have no diplomatic representative in that country, be sheltered in Morocco pending their departure to another destination.

These persons will be accommodated in a sheltering center about 15 km. from Casablanca in modern military barracks, built in 1943 and occupied until recently by American troops.

This center will be administered by official British and American representatives who will do everything possible, under the circumstances, to enable the refugees to lead a normal and pleasant life.

The American and British authorities will take care of the food, the necessary medical care and, as far as possible, will furnish the indispensable clothes.

The refugees who are in good health may be requested to participate in the upkeep of the camp, thereby contributing to reduce their sheltering expenses.

The French authorities are prepared, after examining each particular case, to grant working permits for Morocco to those refugees who may exercise their occupational activities without inconvenience for the economy of the Protectorate. They will be granted the right to sojourn in the locality where employment can be found for them, under the only condition that they comply with all controls deemed necessary.

As to the refugees who are not authorized to work and consequently, must be sheltered at Camp Fedhala, if the occasion arises, the French authorities will grant them facilities to leave the center temporarily, provided they reside in the camp regularly and observe scrupulously the laws and regulations of the Protectorate, particularly those referring to immigration. These permissions will also be subject to the restrictions resulting from the necessity to maintain order and security on the territory of the Protectorate, and the transportation means available.

The North African Center would like to give the refugees a secure and pleasant shelter wherefrom they could pursue their steps for another emigration or for their return to their country of former residence, as soon as circumstances permit it.

The Administration of the Center, in cooperation with the "International Committee for the Refugees" will do everything possible to assist this returning emigration. Insofar as the materialization of these projects is subject to conditions independent from the Administration, such as military operations, the transportation facilities available, or the various immigration laws of the interested countries, it is impossible to evaluate the length of the sojourn of the refugees at the center.

The persons wishing to be admitted in this Center must fill in an application and present it to the office of the "Representation in Spain of American Relief Organizations, Calle Eduardo Dato 20 in Madrid and to Dr. Samuel Segarra, Hotel Bristol in Barcelona."
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVE, ALGIERS
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
Dated: May 6, 1944, 7 p.m.
NUMBER: 1477 (BCC 2540 Lend-Lease 1260)

The following message is from Ferguson for Hannigan and Merson.

See Cob 2106.

It is indicated by discussions held last week with Beckelman that Camp Fedhala is ready to receive the refugees who are expected soon. Minor difficulties have been encountered in securing certain requirements. However, it is expected that these will be worked out almost at once to aid satisfactory execution on the basis of minimum requirements.

CHAPIN

US FEO DISTRIBUTION

5/8/44
INTER OFFICE COMMUNICATION

DATE
May 5, 1944

TO : Mr. Friedman

FROM : Mr. Marks

Re : Whether under the terms of the agreement between the British and American Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation, the French are required to admit into Camp Lyautey refugees arriving in Spain after March 1, 1944.

It is my view that under the terms of the understanding between the British and American Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation, the French are under no legal obligation to admit into Camp Lyautey refugees who arrived in Spain after March 1, 1944, regardless whether the 2,000 agreed capacity of Lyautey has been filled.

The agreement between the Governments concerned relating to the conditions of admission into Camp Lyautey was finally affected in an exchange of notes after much prior informal discussion. In a letter to Robert Murphy dated October 2, 1943, from the Political Division of the French Committee of National Liberation, the French agreed to accept a maximum of 2,000 refugees in Camp Lyautey. The first paragraph of this letter reads as follows:

"In Letter No. 45, dated August 10, 1943, you informed me that the Governments of the United States of America and of Great Britain would be very much interested in securing permission for temporary residence in Morocco for refugees who are today living in Spain and who are either without nationality or enemy subjects. ***" [Underlining supplied]

As in a subsequent part of the above letter the French proposed severe restrictive conditions upon the liberty of refugees to be admitted to Camp Lyautey, the American Government apparently pressed for a liberalization of those conditions in a letter dated October 18, 1943, from Robert Murphy to the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the French Committee of National Liberation. Apparently, the French construed Murphy's reply of October 18, 1943, as an acceptance of the French proposal with certain limitations, for on November 9, 1943, the French answered Murphy's letter as follows:

"The personal representative of President Roosevelt, North Africa, by Note 36 of October 10, kindly advised the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of the agreement of the Government of the United States to the proposals of the French Committee concerning the project for accommodating in Morocco certain stateless refugees or nationals of enemy countries who are now held in Spain. ***" [Underlining supplied] (Cable No. 977, dated November 11, 1943, from Algiers to State). The rest of the French letter dealt with the security measures which it would be necessary to put into effect at Camp Lyautey.
On November 26, 1943, Washington approved acceptance of the French proposal, as modified by Murphy's letter of October 13, which modification was agreed to by the French in their letter of November 9. Washington's approval was set forth in Cable No. 12, dated November 26, 1943, from State to Algiers. This cable reads as follows:

"The offer of the French Committee of the assembly center for refugees at Fedhala, which is set forth in the letter of the French Commissioner of Foreign Affairs of November 9, translation of which is quoted in your No. 1777, November 11, 10 P.M. is accepted with appreciation. Special note is taken that there is no intention to subject the refugees to measures which will deprive them of liberty on the part of the French Committee. ***"

Although the terms of the understanding between the United States and the French Committee of National Liberation would appear to be unambiguous insofar as refugees not "today living in Spain" are concerned, the question of interpretation was raised at a meeting held at the General Residence of the Resident General of Morocco on March 25, 1944. Present at this meeting were British, American and French officials interested in the establishment of Camp Lyautey. The following is an extract from a translation of the minutes of the meeting:

"MR. MARCHAT. [Minister Plenipotentiary, Diplomatic Advisor to the Protectorate and Chairman of the meeting] To come back to the 360 Sephardics [the 360 Sephardics arrived in Spain late in February, 1944] they must be admitted, it being well understood that if others arrive that will be the end. We shall admit those who are in Spain as of today.

"MR. BECKLEMAN. [UNRRA and FEA representative, who is referred to in the minutes of the meeting as a Delegate of the American Government] It seems to me that this is not the question. The three governments have signed an agreement to take in stateless persons who are now in Spain; it seems to me that there is no question in making a decision for the future. A new agreement among the three governments will be necessary.

"MR. MARCHAT. We agree. The new refugees are excluded from the present agreement.

"MR. LEVASSEUR. [A member of the Cabinet of the Resident General] It was said: stateless refugees who are now living in Spain. We can go no further. There may perhaps consequently be other negotiations in Algiers. For the moment the only question is to put into practice the agreement recently concluded. There remains only to settle the latest date of application.

"MR. BECKLEMAN. We can settle upon the date.

"MR. BAYONNE. [A French representative at the meeting] The first of March, since the last contingent of Sephardics was at the end of February.

"MR. MARCHAT. We hereby declare that the present agreement is no longer applicable after March 1".
In addition to the above evidence, which appears convincing, to say the least, numerous cablegrams and one letter concerning Camp Lyautey also point to a similar interpretation of the agreement in question. They refer to refugees "now in Spain" (Cablegram No. 1722, dated September 21, 1943, from State to Algiers; also letter dated December 28, 1943, from Governor Lehman to Secretary of State Hall) or "at present in Spain" (Cable No. 1383, dated July 27, 1943, from State to Algiers; also Cable No. 1400, dated July 29, 1943, from State to Fryer; and Cable No. 1475, dated August 10, 1943, from Lehman to Algiers).

On May 3, 1944, I discussed this matter at some length with George Warren. The latter, although not in the least surprised at the French attempts to construe the Lyautey agreement as restrictively as possible, was quite taken aback that the language used in the formal agreement lent itself to the French interpretation insofar as refugees arriving in Spain after March 1, 1944, are concerned. Mr. Warren stated that he, as one of the persons who originally planned the Lyautey project in Washington, could assure me that no such restriction was ever intended so far as Washington was concerned. Mr. Warren added that his view would, undoubtedly, be supported by the three other men who worked on the Lyautey project with him in Washington, i.e., Governor Lehman, Mr. Hugh Jackson and Mr. George L. Brandt.

As indicative of what was really intended in Washington, Mr. Warren directed my attention to a letter, dictated on July 16, 1943, from the President to Secretary of War Stimson. After referring in the first two paragraphs to the refugees in Spain at that time, the President continued as follows in this letter:

"You will note that I have decided with Mr. Churchill's concurrence that these refugees shall be moved on to French North Africa to a place of temporary residence to be designated by Generals Eisenhower and Giraud, where they and others who may be able to escape from Axis territory into Spain may remain until they can be transferred to a place of more permanent settlement for the duration of the war. The selection of a place of more permanent settlement and the removal of the refugees to that place are matters to which the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, of which this Government is a member, will attend." [Underscoring supplied]

Similar language was used in a draft prepared by Mr. George Brandt of a proposed message from the President to Prime Minister Churchill, which was attached to a memorandum for the President dated July 5, 1943. The following language appears in paragraph numbered two of that draft:

"I am asking Generals Eisenhower and Giraud to designate Mogador or some other place in French North Africa as a place of temporary residence for these refugees and others who may be able to escape from Axis territory into Spain. They have already agreed in principle to the establishment of such a place of temporary residence." [Underscoring supplied]

A cable from State to Madrid (No. 1770) substantiates in part Mr. Warren's statement to me that Washington never noted the possible restrictive significance of the phrase "who are today living in Spain", as it appeared in the French letter of August 10, 1943, and subsequent French proposals which were finally accepted after certain modifications by our Government. On August 19, 1943, long after the
Ilyauty negotiations had commenced, and nine days after the phrase "who are today living in Spain" had appeared in the French reply to Robert Murphy's original Ilyauty proposal in his letter of August 10, 1943, the State Department sent the following cable to Madrid in order to advise Ambassador Hayer of what had taken place to date:

"This [agreement between the President and Mr. Churchill] follows a recommendation of the Bermuda conference to relieve Spain of the refugees in question and to facilitate the escape of additional refugees of the same category from Axis territory into Spain who may also be similarly evacuated to French North Africa. [Underlining supplied]

The initials on this cable indicate, according to Mr. Warren, that it was prepared by Mr. George Brandt, who, as it was stated above, was one of the four persons in Washington completely familiar with the entire Ilyauty arrangement.

Recommendation

Because of the language used in the formal Ilyauty agreement with the French, I recommend that our efforts to urge the French to admit Ilyauty refugees arriving in Spain after March 1, 1944, not be based on the terms of the agreement which, as it has been seen, favor the French restrictive interpretation, but rather on humanitarian and political considerations.

With your approval, I shall now draft a cable for Jean Monet to send to Algiers and another cable explaining our present viewpoint to Ackermann. If Ackermann confirms Schwartz's report that the French are refusing to accept Ilyauty refugees arriving in Spain after March 1, 1944, a cable should be sent to Ambassador Wilson asking him to raise the matter formally with the French Committee of National Liberation.
I suggest that this case be cleared informally with UNRAA before it is sent. If UNRAA here is in accord, we shall mention it at the end of the cable, and request UNRAA to cable Backalman directly advising him of the party line.

Matthew J. Marks

TR-6
Ambassador Wilson and
TO ACKERMANN, ALGIERS FROM WAR REFUGEE BOARD
Reference our No. 1253 of April 25.

This is WAR Cable to Algiers No. ______.

After studying pertinent documents available in Washington we conclude that under terms of Lyautey agreement as set forth in exchange of letters between Murphy and French Comité representatives, there is some technical (repeat technical) basis for a French refusal to admit in Lyautey refugees arriving in Spain after March 1, 1944. We also note that position of Beckelman as set forth in minutes of meeting held on March 25 at General Residence is substantially in accord with what Schwartz reports to be the present French position.

Notwithstanding technicalities of language used in Lyautey agreement we reiterate our view expressed in No. 1253 that a refusal to accept in Lyautey refugees arriving in Spain after March 1 would cause breakdown in plans to rescue Sephardic Jews and other refugees still in Nazi territory. We have notified Mr. Beckelman of our view and he has agreed to cable Algiers requesting, on humanitarian grounds, such restriction be rescinded re refugees arriving Spain after March 1.

We are awaiting message from you concerning accuracy of Schwartz report. If report proves accurate, we shall request Ambassador Wilson to present our view formally to the Comité unless our discussions with French representatives at a lower level prove successful.
In accordance with agreement between Comité and British and American Governments, refugees of stateless and enemy nationality were authorized to be brought to Camp Lyautey so long as the number in the camp at any one time does not exceed 2000. One of main purposes of this agreement was to encourage the entry of refugees from enemy territory into Spain by taking these refugees off the hands of the Spanish Government. The importance of this objective was recognized by President Roosevelt in an exchange of views with Prime Minister Churchill last summer.

It is understood that arrangements are presently being worked out for the removal from Spain to the camp of somewhat less than a thousand refugees and that appropriate security checks have been made in this connection. Included in this group are a number of Sephardic Jews who have entered Spain during the last year as a result of negotiations carried on with the Germans by the Spanish Government. It is understood that no objection to the admittance into the camp of Sephardic Jews arriving in Spain before March 1 has been made by the local Moroccan officials. However, these officials have now stated that other groups of Sephardic Jews who arrive in Spain after March 1 of this year will not be accepted into the camp. It is known that other groups of Sephardic Jews are now in France ready to enter Spain. They cannot, however, enter Spain unless the Spanish Government is assured that they will be taken to Camp Lyautey shortly after their arrival in Spain. Accordingly, for humanitarian considerations the
Moroccan officials should be advised to permit all Sephardic Jews and other stateless refugees or refugees of enemy nationality entering Spain at any time to enter Camp Lyautey subject to the usual security check, so long as the total number of refugees in the camp does not at any time exceed 2,000.
Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO: WAR REFUGEE BOARD, TREASURY - Mr. Marks
FROM: WAR REFUGEE BOARD - Mr. Warren

DATE: May 4, 1944

SUBJECT: Concerning use of Camp Marshal Lyautey at Fadhala North Africa for refugees from Spain; The following references apply to the interpretation of the agreement covering additional refugees who may enter Spain after the date of the final acceptance of the terms of the agreement:

(1) Letter of July 16, 1943 from the President to Secretary of War Stimson. President refers in first part, to refugees now in Spain but later states: "Where (North Africa) they and others who may be able to escape from Axis territory into Spain may remain until they can be transferred to a place of more permanent settlement for the duration of the war".

(2) Telegram to Madrid, No. 1770, August 19, 1943. "This (Agreement between the President and Mr. Churchill) follows a recommendation of the Bermuda Conference to relieve Spain of the refugees in question and to facilitate the escape of additional refugees of the same category from Axis territory into Spain who may also be similarly evacuated to French North Africa".

(3) Telegram to Algiers, No. 1476, August 10, 1943. FROM LEBLAN: The selection of refugees of enemy nationality or stateless presently in Spain to be cared for temporarily in North Africa at a site to be designated by the Army will be made by the American Embassy in Spain".
Documents relating to establishment of Camp Lyseyat at Fezalana, Morocco.

See also Joseph Murphy's memorandum in the Project File.

Matthew J. Marks
Extract of letter from President Roosevelt to Secretary of War
Stimson, dictated on July 16, 1943.

"There are now in Spain a number of refugees who have escaped from Axis and Axis-controlled territory. The large majority of these refugees are of French nationality. Those of French nationality are being moved onward by the French North African authorities to French North Africa where the French authorities are providing for their care, taking many of them who are qualified into the French military forces and giving civilian employment to others. A smaller number of the refugees in Spain are of Allied nationality and are being taken care of by their respective governments.

"There is a remainder estimated at present to be about 5,000 or 6,000 persons who are of enemy nationality or stateless, the larger number of these being of the Jewish race. It is essential that these people should be removed from Spain in order, first, to relieve the Spanish Government of its concern for them and, secondly, as a humanitarian measure, to keep open, by their removal, the channel for the escape of additional refugees into Spain. The shipping situation makes it very advisable that some place nearby should be selected for their reception.

"I discussed this matter with Mr. Churchill on his recent visit to Washington and I have been in communication with him in further regard to it since his return to London. I enclose for your information a copy of a telegram which I sent Mr. Churchill and paraphrases of two telegrams I received from him in that connection. You will note that I have decided with Mr. Churchill's concurrence that these refugees shall be moved on to French North Africa to a place of temporary residence there to be designated by Generals Eisenhower and Giraud, where they and others who may be able to escape from Axis territory into Spain may remain until they can be transferred to a place of more permanent settlement for the duration of the war. The selection of a place of more permanent settlement and the removal of the refugees to that place are matters to which the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, of which this Government is a member, will attend. [Underlining supplied]

Final paragraph omitted."
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: American Mission, Algiers

TO: Secretary of State, Washington

DATED: May 3, 1944

NUMBER: 1465

CONTROL COPY

FOLLOWING IS NO. 16 FROM ACKERMANN FOR WHA.

The question of admission of additional Sephardic Jews had already been informally discussed by me with a member of Comite prior to the arrival of your Algiers no. 5, dated April 26, 1944. Beekelman talked with Massigli after your cable arrived and Massigli replied that there would be no change in the original agreement providing for admission of 2000. This has been confirmed by us by note and we asked for reply to make the understanding certain and definite.

Taking request to the French regarding admission of about 750 Jews now in Italy to Peshala is being considered by AFHQ. I am requesting Robert Murphy and others concerned to consider relative priorities of further Sephardic Jews as the group in Italy plus refugees arriving soon from Spain will practically fill the quota. Please inform us how many more Sephardics might be rescued from occupied territory, if it is possible to do so. In order that Schwartz

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 11-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date: SEP 15 1972
that Schwartz can inform us as to his information on the question, we have repeated the foregoing message to Lisbon as our cable no. 97.

CHAPIN
AM REP

ALGIERS
1332, May 2, 1944
CAB 2106, PEA 301.
SUBJECT: Refugee Camp.

For Ferguson from Emerson and Hannigan. Is refugee camp ready in all details to receive group reported due there shortly? Important there be no slip-up.

HULL

US FRC DISTRIBUTION

5/4/44
MAY 6 1944

Dear Dr. Wise:

The following message for you from Mr. Weissman was received from Lisbon under date of May 1, 1944:

"Regret despite intervention of others Joint will not collaborate or finance maintenance rescued children unless children headed to them. Consider absolutely indispensable that arriving orphans should remain in our care for preparation and expedition to Palestine. Have arranged with respective Governments for payment maintenance of their Nationals. Majority of children Allied Nationals. Concerning few stateless children sending mail report with suggestions. Have already organized reception centers here. Will send Congress regularly data and photos children.

First group six children arrived May first. Following children have relatives in US: Helene Spielmann, 14 years, and Paul Spielmann, 10 years, Uncle Hermann Spielmann, Brooklyn, watchmaker, street address unknown; Edith Tieberg, 15 years, Uncle Margosches first name unknown, Editor THE DAY, New York; Edith Affendkraut, 14 years, married sister Sophie Speeter, 3729 North Seventeenth, Philadelphia; Malvina Bodner, 12 years, Uncle Jacob Bodner, diamond cutter, Brooklyn, street address unknown. Spielmann, Tieberg and Affendkraut all have additional relatives in Palestine and desire go there. Please trace relatives in America through Jewish Press if necessary and advise relatives opinion regarding children's destination.

Second group arriving May 3. Cable reply.

Very truly yours,

Sincerely, J. W. Pehle

J. W. Pehle
Executive Director

Dr. Stephen S. Wise,
World Jewish Congress,
1834 Broadway,
New York, New York.

Philab 5/5/44
Secretary of State
Washington,
1317, May 1, 6 p.m.,
WRB 15.
FOR WAR REFUGEE BOARD AND RABBI STEPHEN WISE
NEW YORK FROM WEISSMAN.
Regret despite intervention of others Joint (§) will not collaborate or finance maintenance rescued children unless children handed to them. Consider absolutely indispensable that arriving orphans should remain in our care for preparation and expedition to Palestine.
First group six children arrived May first.
Following children have relatives in US: Helene Spielmann, 14 years, and Paul Spielmann, 10 years, Uncle Hermann Spielmann, Brooklyn, watchmaker, street address unknown.
-2-#1317, May 1, 6 p.m., from Lisbon
unknown; Edith Tieberg, 15 years, Uncle Margoschos
first name unknown, Editor THE DLY, New York; Edith
Affenbraut, 14 years, married sister Sophie Speeter,
3729 North Seventeenth, Philadelphia; Malvina Bodner,
12 years, Uncle Jacob Bodner, diamond cutter,
Brooklyn, street address unknown. Spielmanns Tieberg
and Affenbraut all have additional relatives in Palestine and desire go there. Please trace relatives in
America through Jewish Press if necessary and advise
relatives opinion regarding children's destination.
Second group arriving May 3. Cable reply.

NORWEB

EJH
WTD

(a) apparent omission
Secretary of State
Washington

3449, Twenty-sixth.

FOR EMMERSON FROM KULLMANN

Following is text of American Embassy letter
dated March 9th to IGC (Reference Department's 3131,
19th):

"I am glad to inform you that it is the view of
the Department of State that the choice of a final
destination for refugees accommodated at the refugee
center in North Africa should fall within the sphere
of the Intergovernmental Committee, and that it is
suggested that the committee examine this question.

It is believed that this is also the view of the
Foreign Office, which I am informing of the present
communication to you. It is the desire of the Department
of State that the referring of this matter to the
Intergovernmental Committee be in association with
the Foreign Office."

WINANT

RR
FROM: SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON
TO: AMREF, Algiers,
DATED: April 25, 1944
NUMBER: 1253

FROM WAR REFUGEE BOARD TO AMBASSADOR WILSON AND ACKERMAN

We have just received report from Schwartz in
Lisbon that French are refusing to accept in
Lyons Sephardic Jews arriving in Spain after March 1, 1944.
Report states further that 50 Sephardic now in
Perpignan, France, awaiting admission into Spain and
others still en route will be excluded under this
ruling.

Such a ruling would cause breakdown in plans to
rescue Sephardic Jews still in Nazi territory, as
Spanish Government will do nothing to rescue Sephardics
unless assured that they will be removed from Spain
soon after arrival. If after investigation you feel
report is accurate, please take up at once with Comite
representatives indicating unfortunate effects of such
a step.

Schwartz has advised Beckelman concerning matter.

THIS IS WRB ALGIERS CABLE NO. 5

HULL

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept, Letter 1-1478
By R. H. Fuchs Date SEP 1 1972
CABLE TO ALGIERS

From War Refuge Board to Ambassador Wilson and Ackermann

We have just received report from Schwartz in Lisbon that French are refusing to accept in Lyons Sephardic Jews arriving in Spain after March 1, 1944. Report states further that 50 Sephardics now in Perpignan, France, awaiting admission into Spain and others still on route will be excluded under this ruling.

Such a ruling would cause breakdown in plans to rescue Sephardic Jews still in Nazi territory, as Spanish Government will do nothing to rescue Sephardics unless assured that they will be removed from Spain soon after arrival. If after investigation you feel report is accurate, please take up at once with Comité representatives indicating unfortunate effects of such a step.

Schwartz has advised Beekman concerning matter.

THIS IS WNB ALGIERS CABLE NO. 5

***************
April 24, 1944
1:45 P.M.
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WAR REFUGEES BOARD

INTER-OFFICE COMMUNICATION

DATE April 22, 1944

TO Mr. J. W. Pohle

FROM Mr. Friedman

Re: Reported French refusal to accept in Camp Lyautey Sephardic Jews arriving in Spain after March 1, 1944.

Attached is a copy of the cablegram received by Leavitt from Schwartz in Lisbon, indicating that the French are refusing to accept at Camp Lyautey Sephardic Jews arriving in Spain after March 1, 1944. If this report is accurate it may well cause the collapse of plans to rescue Sephardic Jews now in occupied Europe, for the Spanish Government will do nothing in their behalf unless it is assured that these Sephardic Jews will be removed from Spain as soon as possible after their arrival. I cannot understand what weighty objection the French can have to accepting these Sephardic Jews, inasmuch as it has already been agreed that up to 2000 refugees at a time will be permitted to remain in Camp Lyautey.

I recommend that you discuss this matter with Jean Monet as soon as possible indicating the unfortunate effects which such a step would have.

Attached is a proposed cable to Ackermann in Algiers.
April 22, 1944

Mr. J. V. Pehle

Mr. Friedman

Re: Reported French refusal to accept in Camp Lyantey Sephardic Jews arriving in Spain after March 1, 1944.

Attached is a copy of the cablegram received by Leavitt from Schwartz in Lisbon, indicating that the French are refusing to accept at Camp Lyantey Sephardic Jews arriving in Spain after March 1, 1944. If this report is accurate it may well cause the collapse of plans to rescue Sephardic Jews now in occupied Europe, for the Spanish Government will do nothing in their behalf unless it is assured that these Sephardic Jews will be removed from Spain as soon as possible after their arrival. I cannot understand why the French objection the French can have to accepting these Sephardic Jews, inasmuch as it has already been agreed that up to 2000 refugees at a time will be permitted to remain in Camp Lyantey.

I recommend that you discuss this matter with Jean Monet as soon as possible indicating the unfortunate effects which such a step would have.

Attached is a proposed cable to Ackerman in Algiers.
Cable sent from Lisbon on April 14, 1944, to Mr. Leavitt of the Joint Distribution Committee and received on April 20, 1944.

(Dictated over the telephone from New York)

Regarding Sephardic group of refugees now in Spain, French authorities have agreed admit them to North Africa camp but have ruled permission limiting to Sephardim arrive Spain before March 1. This will exclude group of 50 Sephardim now in Perpignan awaiting admission into Spain as well as other groups still en route. Have asked Moses Beckelman, UNRRA Representative Casablanca intervene French authorities for modification this ruling and consider it important you take every possible step your end. Advise.

Joseph Schwartz
AMNEF,
ALGIERS.
1944. April 20th.

Agreement has been reached in principle between American and British Governments to transfer to UNRRA full responsibility for operation and maintenance of refugee camp at Fedhala near Casablanca.

Detailed arrangements as to transfer of responsibility are now being worked out. It is proposed that the American and British Governments should retain responsibility of transporting refugees to North Africa and that UNRRA's primary responsibility would be to maintain refugees after their arrival in North Africa. Responsibility for eventual resettlement of refugees not to be repatriated will remain unchanged, although under terms of UNRRA Agreement UNRRA will assist in repatriation of refugees who are to return to their original countries. Effective date of transfer will occur after appropriation by United States Congress of funds for contribution to UNRRA, which is expected before the middle of June.

UNRRA is instructing Reckelman to talk with French authorities in Algiers with respect to proposed transfer in order to obtain their consent as required.
by UNRRA Agreement to operations in French territory.
You are requested to join with Deckelman in discussions
with the French to the extent necessary, although, since
French Committee is member of UNRRA, the initial approach
should be made by Deckelman on behalf of UNRRA. UNRRA
has informally notified French representatives here of
these plans. It is understood that the British Govern-
ment is issuing similar instructions to Algiers.

LILL
(DA)

Accompanied by hostagreement.
April 20, 1944.
REPORT ON NORTH AFRICAN REFUGEE CENTER AT FEDHALA

20 April, 1944.

This is in the nature of a preliminary report which is being dictated and typed within a very short time since I just returned from Casablanca and Mike is leaving very early tomorrow morning. I will try to expand it a little more fully in my next letter to you.

Physical setup of center

Camp Marechal Lyautey is located near Fedhala, about ten miles from Casablanca. It covers an extensive piece of flat ground and is only a few hundred yards from the Atlantic Ocean. The camp site is a good one. It now has on it 40 or 50 buildings with stone walls and concrete floors, which are well constructed. There are wash houses, shower rooms, and latrines in the Army style, located in separate buildings. There is also one extra large building which is approximately 50 yards from the other buildings which will be used as a recreation hall.

The buildings for the most part have no partitions in them and at the present time it will be impossible to secure enough material to make them into a series of rooms. For this reason, it is planned in the first instance to use the stone buildings as dormitories for single men and single women and to set up a number of tents for family use.

The camp is now partially occupied by Italian service troops. These men are former prisoners of war who now are made up into work battalions and who furnish services of varying nature to the Allied Forces. However, since in the first instance only approximately 500 refugees will be brought to the Center, the remaining buildings will be more than sufficient to accommodate them.

A short time ago the Army cleared all physical equipment, including beds, screens, stoves, etc., out of the premises to be occupied by the refugees and it is now necessary to re-equip these quarters. When I arrived in Casablanca the other day, it appeared that the supply situation might be tight. The Army did not appear too cooperative in granting its services, facilities and supplies to the camp administration. However, I was able to be of assistance in this situation (as Mike will explain to you in greater detail), and the camp staff now feels hopeful that it will get supplies and equipment in sufficient quantity and in sufficient time.
The date of the opening of the camp

As I have previously advised you there has been a good deal of trouble in connection with securing a ship. We were originally promised a British ship which would leave some time between the 15th and 30th of April. Just before I left Casablanca I was advised that a British ship would not be available, but that a French ship would be substituted. There was a question as to whether or not a French ship could land in Spain since no such ship has been there since the Allied landing. I was just advised a few minutes ago that the Spanish have agreed to permit the ship to operate from a Spanish port for the purpose of carrying the refugees. The exact date is not known but should be close to the end of the month. I will know the exact date in a day or two.

Operational problems

There are several problems in connection with the operation which may cause some difficulty. The French, at least at the moment, appear strenuously opposed to the granting of work permits or even permits to circulate to persons at the camp. This means that the camp will be somewhat akin to a concentration camp, for although the people will have many acres of land in which to move, they will still be hemmed in by a wire fence which will be guarded. Of course it is necessary for security purposes until the refugees have been thoroughly screened that a guard be maintained. At the present moment it may well be that the French will post Senegalese guards around the camp. We have asked the American security authorities whether or not other guards can be placed but as yet have received no reply one way or the other. I intend to discuss the concentration camp aspects of the center with those members of the Comite with whom I am acquainted in an effort to ascertain whether or not restrictions can be relaxed.

Admission of further refugees

The original agreement between the American and British authorities on the one hand and the French on the other provided for the admission of a maximum of 2,000 refugees to the center. However, when Beckelman, the camp director, was at Rabat the other day, the Moroccan Residency authorities stated that the present group would be the maximum. Beckelman, of course, raised some protest with regard to this decision but the Moroccan authorities said that they would insist upon this. They also raised some question with regard to the Sephardic Jews who hold Spanish
passports, and to this group they said that they would not permit the immigration of any Sephardic Jews holding Spanish passports who had arrived in Spain subsequent to March 1, 1944. At the present time this is no problem since the present group arrived prior to that date. If, however, additional groups succeed in reaching Spain, this decision will have to be overcome. I might add that the decisions expressed by the Moroccan authorities is apparently contrary to the Algiers authorities. When I had a discussion with Melamede, Frenay's assistant, Melamede stated that I should not press the question of the pre-1933 refugees too strongly since the admission of these persons might use up the quota of 2,000 set for the camp and thereby preclude the admission of persons more recently arrived. It can therefore be inferred that Melamede, at least, did not consider the present group as the total group and he probably will not oppose the admission of further Sephardic Jews. I intend, of course, to proceed further with this question.

**Pre-1933 refugees**

Originally approximately 160 persons were rejected because they arrived in Spain prior to 1933. This number was reduced to 107 by permitting the admission of those in concentration camps or prisons. There are now under consideration approximately 40 additional cases as to which there may be similar relaxation, leaving about 67 persons rejected because of their early arrival in Spain. I went over each of these applications carefully and find that some of them are not what might be called genuine refugees. In addition, there are a number of cases where the persons are so old that a move of this sort might endanger their lives. I discussed the cases with Bockelmaan who had interviewed the majority of these persons when he was in Spain. He could remember no case which might be considered a hardship case and did not think it too advisable to bring these persons to the camp for several reasons. These reasons were that most of the persons were already established in Spain; that under present circumstances the camp may be a concentration camp; and he did not want to press the French too much on this point since there are more important matters on which they must be convinced. We finally came to this decision - to cable to Blichemstaff in Spain and request him to advise us immediately of any persons who presented cases of genuine hardship who would be much better off at Fedhala. We intend to press on those cases only.
Additional applications

Since I last wrote you an additional 49 applications have arrived which have been forwarded to the French and Allied Security Authorities for preliminary screening.

Leonard E. Ackermann
1. British and American Governments have agreed in principle to transfer to UNRRA responsibility for maintenance and operation of refugee center at Casablanca.

2. Plans are to develop as soon as possible detailed agreement as to conditions and date of transfer. Under proposals that British and American Governments should retain responsibility for transport of refugees to North Africa, UNRRA's primary responsibility, being for care and maintenance of refugees after arrival at North African ports, responsibility for finding new places for their eventual settlement will remain unchanged by transfer although UNRRA is prepared to assist in readjustment of such persons as can and are willing to return to countries of origin or of former residence. Expectation is that terms of transfer will also include some understanding as to supply arrangements as for example, possible extension of present agreement with military for furnishing of supplies. Proposed date of transfer is some time after 26th December, probably in May or June.

3. Take up with French authorities in Algiers the proposed transfer in order to obtain their consent pursuant to Article 1, paragraph 1 (d) of the above agreement, clearing with them also as to any discussions which you deem necessary with authorities in Algiers. British and American representatives in Algiers are being instructed to join with you in discussions with French authorities necessary although these French authorities are probably in Algiers.

4. I would appreciate your cabled recommendations as to terms to be included in understanding referred to in paragraph 2. Also cable results of your talks with French in line with paragraph 3.

Hull: Forwarded by

(CHA) 30th January 44

Department of State

Casablanca

April 20, 1944
April 19, 1944

Please cable text of British Foreign Office or American Embassy letter asking Intergovernmental Committee to take responsibility for ultimate disposition of occupants of North African camp.

HULL
(OLW)
UNITED NATIONS RELIEF AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION

April 10, 1944

Mr. L. J. Marks
Treasury Building
Room 176
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Marks:

I am enclosing for your files a copy of the minutes of the meeting held in my office yesterday. If you have any modifications to suggest in the minutes, I would appreciate it if you would send them to me and I will have a new set of minutes circulated.

Since the meeting we have been in touch with Mr. Miller and have his final approval of the cable. It is therefore being sent out today.

Sincerely yours,

Dewey Anderson
Assistant Chief, Bureau of Areas

Enclosure
DRAFT

UNRRA

AMLEGATION

ALGOUS

For Beekelman from Salter and Menshikov

1. British and American Governments have agreed in principle to transfer to UNRRA of responsibility for maintenance and operation of refugee center at Casablanca.

2. Plans are to develop as soon as possible detailed agreement as to conditions and date of transfer. UNRRA proposes that British and American Governments should retain responsibility for transport of refugees to North Africa, UNRRA's primary responsibility being for care and maintenance of refugees after arrival at North African seaport. Responsibility for finding new places for their eventual settlement will remain unchanged by transfer although UNRRA is prepared to assist in repatriation of such persons as can and are willing to return to countries of origin or of former residence. Expectation is that terms of transfer will also include some understanding as to supply arrangements as for example possible extension of present agreement with military for furnishing of supplies. Proposed date of transfer is some time after U. S. Congress appropriates money for UNRRA probably in four to six weeks.

3. Take up with French authorities in Algiers the proposed transfer in order to obtain their consent pursuant to Article I,
paragraph 2(a) of the UNRRA Agreement, clearing with them also as to any discussions which you deem necessary with authorities in Morocco. British and American representatives in Algiers are being instructed to join with you in discussions with French whenever necessary although since French Committee is member of UNRRA initial approach should be made by you as UNRRA representative. We are informally notifying French representatives here of the above plans.

4. Would appreciate your cabled recommendations as to terms to be included in understanding referred to in paragraph 2. Also cable results of your talks with French in line with paragraph 3.
April 18, 1944

Minutes of meeting held in Mr. Dewey Anderson's office on Monday, April 17, 1944 at 3:45 p.m.

Subject: Transfer to UNRRA of responsibility for maintenance and operation of refugee center at Casablanca.

Present: For British Embassy
- Mr. John Russell
- Mr. Edward Miller
- Mr. M. J. Marks

Department of State
- Mr. Wallace Cohen
- Mr. Daggett Howard
- Mr. Milbert F. Zerkey

War Refugee Board
- Mr. Dewey Anderson
- Mr. Fred Hoehler
- Mr. James G. Johnson, Jr.
- Miss Carolin Plaxner

Foreign Economic Administration

United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

1. There was general discussion of the attached draft cable to Mr. Beekelman, the UNRRA representative in North Africa, instructing him to begin discussions with the French authorities in Algiers with respect to the proposed transfer of the refugee center.

This draft cable, which had been previously circulated, was approved for transmission to Mr. Beekelman, with the addition of the clause at the end of the first sentence of paragraph 2, contemplating the possibility that discussions might have to be undertaken with the French authorities in Morocco as well as those in Algiers. Mr. Russell stated that he was planning to send the substance of the cable to London, calling particular attention to the second sentence in paragraph 2, which states that UNRRA proposes that the British and American Governments "should retain responsibility for transport of refugees to North Africa." Since the cable states that this is merely an UNRRA proposal, Mr. Russell did not feel that it was necessary to hold up sending the cable until a reply should be received from London. On behalf of the American Government, however, Mr. Miller
suggested that the cable should be held overnight until information could be obtained as to the arrangements that would be necessary for the United States to continue to bear a portion of the expenses of transport to North Africa.

2. During the course of the discussion Mr. Cohen of FIA raised several questions as to the meaning of particular portions of paragraph 2 of the draft cable. On these points the conclusions were as follows:

(a) That the second sentence of paragraph 2, referred to above, meant simply that the existing responsibility for the transport of the refugees should continue after the transfer or in other words that this contemplated no new obligation or responsibility on the American Government. It was pointed out that one important purpose of this proposal was to avoid placing upon UNHRA responsibility for operating in neutral countries, such as Spain and Portugal, where UNHRA was not yet prepared to undertake any substantial operations. Under this proposal, UNHRA's responsibility would begin at a clearly defined point in time and place, i.e., on the arrival of the refugees at their port or debarkation in North Africa.

(b) That the phrase "to assist in repatriation" as used in the third sentence of paragraph 2 of the draft cable contemplated that UNHRA would assist (i) the governments of which the refugees are nationals, (ii) any other agency or agencies, public or private, working in this field, or (iii) in appropriate cases, the individual refugees themselves. It was pointed out that this phrase was taken directly from the resolutions and reports of the UNHRA Council.

(c) That with respect to the supply arrangements contemplated in the fourth sentence in paragraph 2, the general objective should be the continuance of existing supply arrangements after the transfer to UNHRA, at least until other supply sources can be drawn upon, the only change being that from and after the date of transfer the supplies furnished should be charged against the American or British, as the case may be, contributions to UNHRA. To accomplish this objective it was agreed that the FIA, with the assistance of the appropriate UNHRA supply authorities, would begin at once (i) to negotiate with the military authorities for the extension of the present agreement under which the military is to furnish basic supplies for the camp until early in June, and (ii) to make such arrangements as may be necessary for the furnishing of supplementary supplies to meet
requirements not furnished by the military. In the discussions with the military the FIA indicated that it would also explore the question of title to the camp installations and of the necessary arrangements to assure to UNRRA the right to the use of the camp for as long as may be necessary. With reference to the furnishing of supplementary supplies from the United States, it was agreed that, because of the relatively small amounts that would be involved, the procurement of some of those supplies might be handled through the working fund which FIA proposes to establish for UNRRA as soon as the UNRRA appropriation is passed by the Congress.

3. It was stated that the informal discussion with the French representatives in Washington, as contemplated in the last sentence in paragraph 2 of the draft cable, had already been undertaken and that the plan was, immediately after the meeting, to read them a copy of the draft cable.

4. Mr. Russell and Mr. Miller, on behalf of the British and American Governments, respectively, agreed to make the necessary arrangements for sending instructions to the British and American representatives in Algiers in accordance with the second sentence in paragraph 3 of the proposed cable.

Attachment
1-Draft cable to Mr. Buckelman

Johnson/Th
18 Apr 44
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WAR REFUGEE BOARD

INTER-OFFICE COMMUNICATION

DATE April 18, 1944

TO: Mr. J. W. Fehle
FROM: Mr. Friedman

Res: Camp Lyautey

I had Matt Marks attend the meeting yesterday in Dewey Anderson’s office at UNRRA. The matter for discussion was a proposed cable to Algiers arranging for the transfer of responsibility over Camp Lyautey to UNRRA. Representatives of the State Department, FDA, UNRRA and the British Embassy were present at the meeting.

The proposed cable states that transportation expenses to North Africa will be shared equally by the British and American Governments. Mr. John Russell of the British Embassy stated, subject to confirmation from London, that the British Government was prepared to share this obligation with the American Government.

Marks was asked whether the War Refugee Board was prepared to pay the American share of this obligation. He replied that he was unfamiliar with the Board’s financial arrangements and therefore could not presume to speak officially for the Board in this matter. An FDA representative asked whether there was any objection to the Board’s assuming this expense. Marks answered that so far as he knew there was no legal objection, but that the matter would have to be cleared with you before any commitment could be made. Ed Miller of the Department of State agreed to accept responsibility for clarifying this question. He asked Marks to ascertain whether the War Refugee Board would be prepared to pay the American share of the transportation expenses to North Africa. According to Miss Flexner, the combined sea and rail transportation expense from Spain to North Africa will probably amount to not more than $30,000.

After discussing the matter with me, Marks called Zarky at FDA and pointed out to him that an allocation from the President’s Emergency Fund covering among other things the transportation expenses from Spain to North Africa had been made to OFFRO long before the War Refugee Board had been created. Inasmuch as FDA had inherited this allocation from OFFRO, it appeared only right
that FEA should pay the American Government's share of the transporta-
tion expenses from this fund. Zarky raised the point that
UNRRA might well take over jurisdiction of Camp Lyautey before the
transportation of refugees from Spain to North Africa had been com-
pleted. He explained that if this occurred, FEA would no longer
have any interest in the Lyautey project, and therefore would be in
no position to make any further payments in regard thereto. Marks
replied that this was not likely, and pointed out that the problem
raised by the proposed cable related to the transportation expenses
for the 500 or 600 refugees who had already agreed to go to North
Africa. Of course, if it subsequently were decided to transfer
more refugees from Spain to North Africa—the payment of the trans-
portation expenses for these refugees would be an entirely differ-
ent matter. Zarky agreed in principle that FEA should assume the
American Government's share of the transportation expenses insofar
as these 500 or 600 refugees are concerned.

Marks then called James Johnson of UNRRA, who stated
that it was immaterial to him whether FEA or the War Refugee Board
paid the American Government's share of the transportation expenses.
Marks thereupon called Ed Miller of the State Department and ad-
vised him that Zarky had agreed that FEA would pay the American
Government's share of the transportation expenses.
April 10, 1944

Mr. J. W. Pehle

Mr. Friedman

Res: Camp Lyantey

I had Matt Marks attend the meeting yesterday in Dewey Anderson's office at UNRRA. The matter for discussion was a proposed cable to Algiers arranging for the transfer of responsibility over Camp Lyantey to UNRRA. Representatives of the State Department, FIA, UNRRA and the British Embassy were present at the meeting.

The proposed cable states that transportation expenses to North Africa will be shared equally by the British and American Governments. Mr. John Russell of the British Embassy stated, subject to confirmation from London, that the British Government was prepared to share this obligation with the American Government.

Marks was asked whether the War Refugee Board was prepared to pay the American share of this obligation. He replied that he was unfamiliar with the Board's financial arrangements and therefore could not presume to speak officially for the Board in this matter. An FIA representative asked whether there was any objection to the Board's assuming this expense. Marks answered that so far as he knew there was no legal objection, but that the matter would have to be cleared with you before any commitment could be made. Ed Miller of the Department of State agreed to accept responsibility for clarifying this question. He asked Marks to ascertain whether the War Refugee Board would be prepared to pay the American share of the transportation expenses to North Africa. According to Miss Flanner, the combined sea and rail transportation expense from Spain to North Africa will probably amount to not more than $30,000.

After discussing the matter with me, Marks called Zarky at FIA and pointed out to him that an allocation from the President's Emergency Fund covering among other things the transportation expenses from Spain to North Africa, had been made to OFFRO long before the War Refugee Board had been created. As much as FIA had inherited this allocation from OFFRO, it appeared only right
that FEA should pay the American Government's share of the transportation expenses from this fund. Zarky raised the point that UNRRA might well take over jurisdiction of Camp Lyautey before the transportation of refugees from Spain to North Africa had been completed. He explained that if this occurred, FEA would no longer have any interest in the Lyautey project, and therefore would be in no position to make any further payments in regard thereto. Marks replied that this was not likely, and pointed out that the problem raised by the proposed cable related to the transportation expenses for the 500 or 600 refugees who had already agreed to go to North Africa. Of course, if it subsequently were decided to transfer more refugees from Spain to North Africa, the payment of the transportation expenses for these refugees would be an entirely different matter. Zarky agreed in principle that FEA should assume the American Government's share of the transportation expenses insofar as these 500 or 600 refugees are concerned.

Marks then called James Johnson of UNRRA, who stated that it was immaterial to him whether FEA or the War Refugee Board paid the American Government's share of the transportation expenses. Marks thereupon called Ed Miller of the State Department and advised him that Zarky had agreed that FEA would pay the American Government's share of the transportation expenses.
Dear John:

Since my letter to you of 21 March, 1944, I have received your two letters. The mission mentioned in one has been accomplished and the information contained in the other proved very helpful.

Since last writing you I have had further discussions with AMIC on the Yugoslav situation. The contents of the cable from the Combined Chiefs of Staff (Jan 347) regarding the refugees on the Island of Rab were discussed at a conference attended by representatives of the Military Government Section, G-2 and G-3. None of the representatives of these staff sections raised any objection thereto except that it was suggested that an effort be made to land the refugee boats as near as possible to Barl in order that the refugees might be screened at that point by G-2. Of course, landing refugees at this point would make the boat trip from Rab much longer and it was admitted by the Military Government Section representative that the boatmen might want to land further north in which case G-2 would have to make other arrangements. The proposal made at that time was that a message be sent to Marshal Tito which would transmit the message of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and ask which of the procedures would be more acceptable to Tito. I called the Military Government Section representative this morning and was advised that action had been slightly delayed because of the Vesuvius situation, but that he expected to clear the matter with the Chief of Staff during the next two days. I might add that the AMIC people were quite cordial and appeared sympathetic to the project and that I did not get the same reaction previously mentioned, to wit, a questioning attitude as to my presence in the picture. The Military Government people also advised me that they thought it improbable that too many refugees would be assisted by this project because of the distances involved and because of the location of Rab. They promised, however, to keep me fully advised not only of this situation but of any similar ones in the future.

To assist in future operations in connection with the Yugoslav refugees, and also for any other financial problems that might arise, Jim Buxon and I called on General Sins.
He explained to him the background and purposes for which the Board had been established and referred to the two recent War Department cables, the one announcing the establishment of the Board and the second concerning the Island of Lab. He said he would do anything in his power to assist us and mentioned that he had on hand a quantity of gold which he would attempt to make available to us if the need should arise.

Jim has been examining all of my files and making copies of certain portions thereof in the event that he should be sent to Spain. We have had full discussions on the problem and he has also arranged for us to meet some French G-2 people to discuss further plans.

The Fedsala project is not moving as rapidly as I had hoped. The principal stumbling block at the moment arises from the fact that the second batch of applications have not as yet arrived from Spain. Approximately twelve days ago a cable was received from Spain asking for instructions on the disposition of this second group of approximately 415 applications received after the French security representative had left Spain. I immediately cabled back that they should be forwarded to Algiers by the fastest possible means. I had hoped that they would arrive within a few days thereafter but up to the moment they have not put in an appearance. Accordingly, I have sent off a follow-up cable asking for their whereabouts. This cable has not been replied to as yet. I expect to hear today or tomorrow from Labor on the final decision as to the first group of refugees. As I previously advised you, a small group were objected to on security grounds and a second group was tentatively objected to because they had arrived in Spain prior to 1933. The latter question should be settled today and the French representative plans to leave for Madrid today or early tomorrow so that he may check the accepted refugees prior to their boarding ship. With the assistance of the British, who have been extremely helpful, I am now endeavoring to get a separate ship for this first group in view of the delay in the arrival of the applications for the second group. I should have the answer on this question within the next few days.

Within the last two days I have talked to Governor Lehman and to Congressman Vorys of Ohio. In neither case did I receive much in the way of information, but I spent a fair amount of time, especially in the case of the Congressman,
explaining the work of the Board both here and in other areas. The Congressmen raised several questions with respect to the possible conflict of the functions of the Board with the Inter-
governmental Committee and UNRRA. I told him that it was my opinion that there should be little or no conflict since the Board was operating in an emergency field and taking action at this time while the other groups would principally be concerned with postwar relief and movement. Governor Lehman leaves today for Cairo where he will continue to make his office from a hospital bed since his knee injury does not permit him to move about freely.

Your recent letter mentioned the fact that I should use the services of Gaby here as much as possible. In this connection I might say that Gaby has been extremely helpful in discussing the day to day problems that have arisen. However, it is my opinion that he might be more useful elsewhere. By this I mean that he might be of great assistance to Ira Hirschmann now in Turkey, not only because of his knowledge of languages but also because of his knowledge of the geography and the political and economic situations of Germany and the Balkans. If it could be arranged, I think that it might be advisable to send him to one of the neutral countries. This proposal has Mike's approval, even though he would be sorry to lose him. I might add that since the recent developments in Hungary and Rumania, it is my opinion that the refugee problem has become interwoven with the Resistance movement which might be up Gaby's alley.

In my letter of March 7th I mentioned the Spanish refugees in this area. The representatives of the American Friends Service Committee have again brought up a problem which was raised with the Treasury Representatives last summer. I refer to the blocked Spanish funds. In brief, the story is this: In March or April, 1940, the Spanish Republican Government, or at least former members thereof in Mexico, sent 6,000,000 francs through the Mexican Government to the Comité d'Entraide des Refugiés Espagnols in Paris to transmit to Tunisia for the aid of Republican Spanish refugees. A few weeks after the funds arrived in Tunisia, the Spanish representative at this place, a Commandante Sanchez, was instructed to invest the funds in French Republic bonds. In November, 1940, the Secretary to the Mexican Legation in Paris came to Tunisia to take charge of the funds. The Vichy authorities evidently got word of this and caused a Court Order to be issued in Vichy which was transmitted to Tunisia after which the bonds were seized under a Tunisian Court Order and deposited with the Tunis Treasury. In July, 1943, the former Spanish Ambassador then in London asked the London Embassy for the status of these funds. The London Cablegram stated that the Spanish Ambassador was fearful of difficulties if the funds were deblocked immediately. Del Snyder, then in Tunis, looked into the matter
and Harold Glasser, through the State Department, then sent a cable to London setting forth this information and asking for further instructions. A memorandum had previously been sent to M. Gouze de Merville on this request. The present situation is the following: The Friends' representatives are now receiving funds from the United States which they use for the support of the Spanish refugees. Part of the funds are sent pursuant to Treasury license by the Joint Anti-Fascist Committee. It is the opinion of the Friends' representative that these funds, if we are able to have them unblocked, should be used for the support of the Spanish refugees. Sanchez, who is still in Tunis and who now receives a small salary from the Tunisian Government for work in connection with these refugees, is of a different opinion. He states that the funds were sent to him at the instructions of Indalecio Prieto, a former officer of the Spanish Republic Government who is now in Mexico. It is Sanchez' belief that Prieto wanted the funds used to defray the cost of transporting Spanish refugees to Mexico. We have not again approached either the Comite or the Tunisian authorities with reference to unblocking these funds, especially since no reply has been received to the aforementioned cable to London. However, in connection with the Spanish refugee problem which I mentioned in my earlier letter, this question might also be taken under consideration. As a purely legal matter, I believe that it would be impossible to unblock the funds and deliver them to anyone but to Sanchez or a representative of the Mexican Government and, as I told you previously, the Mexicans have no representative here. If the opportunity arises, I believe that both of these matters might be presented to the Mexican representatives in Washington who might, in turn, approach the French Mission. The present feasible French dollar position may be somewhat of a stumbling block, but should not be too difficult to overcome because of the small size of the sum involved.

While I was in the hospital Salton Chaplin presented an Aide Memoire to Massegli concerning the circular airmail of 29 February which instructed all American missions to approach the Governments to which they were accredited and request the issuance of a declaration of policy similar to that made by the President. A letter had been sent by the French Foreign Ministry previous to his presenting this Aide Memoire which was not received, however, until after it was presented. This letter in very general terms expressed the policy of the French Government to cooperate in any way possible. Massegli, at the time the Aide Memoire was presented, told Chaplin that
He would discuss the matter further with the Comite and submit a reply thereto. I asked Chapin about this yesterday. He advised me that as yet no reply had been received. He promised that he would bring up the matter again on the next occasion when he visited Massigli.

Jim and I also made a first call today on the French G-2. We were cordially received and arranged to meet again next week after the French have discussed the matter further among themselves. I have also sent out some tentative feelers in the direction of the C.S.S., but thus far have met with a rather cold reception because the local C.S.S. people feel that assisting our program may interfere with their work. If possible it would be helpful if you discussed with General Donovan the possible use of his staff either here or in Spain in connection with the work of the Board. I am sure that we would get a much better reception if he were to instruct his men accordingly.

I am enclosing two recent clippings which should be of interest to you.

Sincerely,

Leonard E. Ackermann, Special Representative, War Refugees Board.

[Address and signature]
NOTE

A meeting was held at the General Residence on March 26, 1944, to discuss thoroughly various questions dealing with the temporary sheltering in Morocco of stateless refugees who are now in Spain.

M. MARCHAN, Minister Plenipotentiary, Diplomatic Adviser to the Protectorate, presided at this meeting at which the following were present:

a) representing the Americans:
   - MR. GIBB, U.S. Counsel at Rabat
   - MR. BROOKMAN, Delegate of the American Government
   - MR. CORBET, American Welfare Organizations delegate

b) representing the British:
   - COL. CRAW

c) representing the French:
   - CAPT. GENTIN
   - CAPT. BLOMAX
   - M. GABRIELLI, of the Division of Political Affairs
   - M. LAUZAR, of the Security Services
   - M. RAYMOND
   - M. ENFASHER, Cabinet of the Resident General

MINUTES OF THE MEETING

M. MARCHAN opened the meeting and gave the floor to MR. BROOKMAN.

MR. BROOKMAN - We are meeting to arrange the details of the arrival of stateless refugees who are now in Spain, at Camp de Pedral and their establishment there. How must the question be put forth? I don't know. Transportation will have to be taken care of. One contingent will probably leave around the 10th or 15th of April.

M. ENFASHER - The British Embassy in Madrid was to have taken care of the question.

M. MARCHAN - What is the origin of this affair?

M. ENFASHER - It's about stateless refugees who are in Spain. The American and English Governments have expressed a desire that certain persons be temporarily sheltered in Morocco while awaiting for their return to their native countries or to countries of their choice. The French Committee of National Liberation has agreed. This means the groundwork of this affair in Madrid. (Read a memorandum). Here is the groundwork. The details must be settled. What will have to be arranged.
M. MAROHA - How many refugees are there?

MR. BECKMAN - If a contingent leaves around April 10, there will be around 400 people. Another convey of equal size will follow later.

M. MAROHA - Do there will be about 800 people who will arrive in Morocco fairly soon. Once they have arrived at Casablanca will they be directed to Camp Fedala? Under what conditions?

M. LEVASSEUR - The American authorities will take charge of them.

M. BAYONER - There is a first section of 46 candidates. Of these 46 or 47 have been eliminated for reasons of military security. One very important question is whether we can consider as refugees/ people who have been in Spain since 1930, for example?

M. MAROHA - I don’t believe so.

M. LEVASSEUR - They cannot be considered as refugees; it is out of the question, it would seem, that they would be permitted to come to Morocco.

M. MAROHA - On the other hand, there are at the basis of this movement of refugees across the peninsula, past agreements between the German and Spanish authorities. These people come from a country occupied by the Axis and the Military Security will have immense difficulties in exercising the control; many agents will mingle with the refugees. It is a precedent and the Spanish authorities will not fail to call upon it consequently to send us people they consider undesirable; we cannot accept without taking all the necessary precautions.

M. MAROHA - (to M. LEVASSEUR) We have as a starting point the agreement which you negotiated in Madrid.

M. LEVASSEUR - Yes, it is true in particular upon the conditions under which the refugees who were volunteered to come to Camp Fedala, will be admitted to it.

MR MAROHA - We are obviously obliged to receive these people under certain conditions; it’s a question of security. I am turning toward French and Allied Military authorities. I consider that a certain number of refugees cannot, about, be considered as suspects. We are hence obliged to keep them in Camp Fedala while waiting for their relocation in an undetermined camp.

Firstly, these shall have, to exercise the control at the point of departure; secondly, we shall have to exercise another control at the place of arrival for the camp and thirdly, we shall have to supervise what could be called relocation: three chapter headings to be studied.

M. LEVASSEUR - It is out of the question that these people remain in Morocco; these people are being transported simply going through and there is no question of relocation. My impression is that what we said before has been slightly modified.
M. LEVABEUR - (after having read a note concerning the eventual relocation of refugees) It's about possibilities for work which might be granted to certain people.

M. MARCHAT - Each individual case will have to be examined; if an individual is suspect we shall refuse the work permit.

M. LEVABEUR - There are other considerations which will have to be taken into account and this conforms with what had been understood with Beckman in Madrid: compatibility with the economy of the Protectorate, transportation and housing conditions.

M. MARCHAT - The relocation and departure of an individual from Camp Fedala Camp will be subject to certain restrictions. Who will make the necessary inquiries?

M. LEVABEUR - M. Beckman who will be the camp director, agrees to have with him a French assistant.

M. MARCHAT - You have every guarantee of security; suspects will not be allowed to leave camp and only those whose profession will be of profit to the economy of the Protectorate, will be allowed to work.

M. BECKMAN - May I remind you of the exchange of notes between the British and American representatives in Algiers and the French Committee of National Liberation in which all three parties emphasized that placing the refugees in a concentration camp could not be considered.

M. MARCHAT - It's not a question of concentration camps, but there are, nevertheless, a certain number of precautions which must be taken, and this in the common interest.

COL. GIBRAN - The inhabitants of the camp will have to be confined in it for at least three weeks so that the identity of the refugees can be established as accurately as possible. It is better to be able to track down suspects and separate them from others who will thus be allowed more freedom.

CAPT. BLOCHER - There are three categories of people: the suspects, the homeless ones, and those who are completely unknown. If they are allowed to go out from the very start, it will be impossible to separate them.

M. MARCHAT - Let us take up the problem of the date, beginning with which the stateless people who had established themselves in Spain, can be considered refugees.

M. BAYONNE - What have you decided about the 116 stateless persons who arrived in Spain before 1939? Can we accept them?

M. CARMELLI - They are not refugees.

M. MARCHAT - Is Spain expelling them?
M. BAYONNE - No.

M. MARCHAT - My point of departure is that our object is a humanitarian one. But the present times are not propitious for family traveling. On the other hand, it is a question of transit and we should take into consideration only the candidacy of refugees whose chances are good of obtaining fairly quickly the necessary visas. How much time will this require?

MR. SELD - I have not the slightest idea.

M. MARCHAT - People living in Madrid or Barcelona will be less comfortable in Camp Pedala. I don't know if they will be willing to leave, or if they won't prefer to remain in Spain.

M. BECKLEMAN - These people asked of their own free will if they could come here.

M. MARCHAT - Of their own free will, but not knowing the conditions.

M. LEVASSUR - They have all read the circular written by Mr. Beckleman, Mr. Bayonne and me, in which are pointed out the conditions under which they will be admitted into Morocco.

M. MARCHAT - They know they can leave Spain to go into other countries but only to live under conditions that lack both comfort and attraction.

M. LEVASSUR - (reading the agreement which must be signed by the refugees wishing to come into Pedala Camp and by which they undertake to comply to the conditions indicated in the circular) I think that these people imagine that they will be able to leave very soon, and it is for this reason especially that they are coming.

M. BECKLEMAN - I should like to point out that among the people who arrived in Spain before 1938, and who requested to come here, there are a few dozen who are now in prisons or in concentration-camps in Spain because they did not leave the country after an order of expulsion. They are stateless from the point of view of the Spanish government which is in power at present. It concerns those who were ordered out in 1938, 1939 and 1940, and who, unable to leave Spain, were put in prison. They can now leave prison or the concentration camp only under condition that they leave Spain. It seems to me that it is for them that the three governments—French, American and British—wanted to do something, those people can be considered as refugees for whom even lack of comfort at Pedala would be better than their present situation in Spain.

M. MARCHAT - I am differentiating between the two cases. --The prisoner and the person who lives in a hotel. I should be more disposed to accept the first rather than the second.

M. BAYONNE - On condition that no one murder by common law be considered.
M. MARCHAT - There is a sitting at the point of departure, isn’t there?

MR. BROOKS - If it’s a matter of political prisoners, Spain considers them undesirable, and if the Secrecy has no objection, I propose that the stateless persons who arrived in Spain before 1933 and who are now in prison, be considered as refugees.

COL. ORMAN - The British Embassy has asked me to say that from its point of view there are people among the 116 candidates who arrived in Spain before 1933 who are suffering in prison.

H. BAYONNE - Agreed on condition that individual cases be examined.

M. MARCHAT - How many are there in prison? About 60?

MR. BROOKS - Not 60. 40 or 50.

M. MARCHAT - There is obviously every reason to get these people out of prison.

H. BAYONNE - We shall make up the list of these people.

M. MARCHAT - What is your opinion about those who lived in Spain before 1933 and who have their freedom?

MR. BROOKS - They cannot be considered as refugees.

Q - MR. BAYONNE - The persons whom we examined in Spain are those who had been there for a long time and when we left Spain a contingent of 360 stateless persons, back by the Germans, arrived.

MR. BROOKS - They were almost all of them born in Salonika. They spent 6 months in German camps and as the result of an agreement between the German and Spanish governments they were sent to Spain.

M. BAYONNE - The question of principle, i.e., can we accept these people? There is a group of 360 who have just arrived. The Germans are in the process of making up other contingents to achieve mass evacuation to Spain. This raises the question of principle. The Spaniards will intervene so that they may be sheltered in Fedala Camp.

M. MARCHAT - I notice that they fall under the terms of the agreement.

M. LEMASSON - Under what conditions do they live in Spain?

MR. BROOKS - They arrived at Port-Bono on February 16 or 17. They left for Barcelona in the hope of leaving Spain. The Spanish Government asked the British and American Ambassadors if they were prepared to include these people among those who could be worked up at Fedala Camp. The American Ambassador at Madrid answered yes to this question and discussed it the other day with Mr. Gairns in Algiers and we all agreed to include these people among the refugees who could be admitted into Morocco.
M. LEVASSEUR - This is about Spanish refugees. (reading a document).

M. MARCHAT - But by what right?

M. LEVASSEUR - It's ancient.

M. MARCHAT - Either they are Spanish nationals or they are not. I don't understand the word Spanish proteges.

M. LEVASSEUR - It's a reversion which goes back to the 16th century.

M. GABRIELLI - I think that it has to do with capitulation.

M. MARCHAT - The capitulations were given up in Bulgaria not very long ago; it is a Spanish reversion. It's a matter of non-official protection; but what is their nationality?

M. RAYONNE - I haven't seen them. Their dossiers are in Madrid, we have not received them here. The organization which is working over there has begun setting up the dossiers. If you decide to accept them here these people will have to be examined much more thoroughly than the others.

M. LEVASSEUR - Are there other Sephardics who are to arrive in Spain?

M. RAYONNE - They will arrive as the Spanish situation clears up.

M. MARCHAT - We could then terminate the list of those who were to leave and oppose the departure of the second contingent. We could accept those who are in Spain now and new negotiations would be necessary among the three governments for the admission of other refugees.

M. BRICENIAN - In Spain we always spoke of a single contingent.

M. MARCHAT - If those people come from Salonica, where will they go?

M. RAYONNE - To the country which is willing to take them in.

M. MARCHAT - I suggest that we accept the contingent of 360 Sephardics, that they be examined much more carefully than the others by an extremely strict commission; those arriving in Spain later will be the subject of a new examination. I should like to ask one question. Supposing this close examination uncovers people whom you would not want to accept, undesirable ones, what will you do with them?

M. RAYONNE - The sitting of the 400 when we examined in Madrid is almost finished. As for the 360 Sephardics, according to instructions from Algiers, we, as the Military Security, along with the Allied Services, shall have to make a preliminary examination in Spain just as we did to the others.
M. MARCHAT - Those declared suspects will not leave.

M. LAJIAO - And those who are undercover here?

M. RAYOUME - There is no reason for our treating these people differently from the way we treat the French who come here to fight.

MR. BROOKS - We will get them out of camp to place them on call for Military Security. These people will no longer be considered in the center.

M. RAYOUME - As for the people who have been in the camp for 8 or 10 days, for example, if we request that such and such a person be allowed to leave, we shall have to agree so that there will be no possible objection and so that these people will not use your services as a blind.

M. MARCHAT - To come back to the 800 Sephardics, they must be admitted, it being well understood that if others arrive that will be the end. We shall admit those who are in Spain as of today.

MR. BROOKS - It seems to me that this is not the question. The three governments have signed an agreement to take in stateless persons who are now in Spain; it seems to me that there is no question in making a decision for the future. A new agreement among the three governments will be necessary.

M. MARCHAT - We agree. The new refugees are excluded from the present agreement.

M. LEVASSEUR - It was said: stateless refugees "who are now living in Spain". We can go no further. They say perhaps unconditionally consequently be other negotiations in Algiers. For the moment the only question is to put into practice the agreement recently concluded. There exists here remains only this to settle the latest date of application.

MR. BROOKS - We can settle upon the date.

M. RAYOUME - The 1st of March, since the last contingent of Sephardics was at the end of February.

M. MARCHAT - We hereby declare that the present agreement is no longer applicable after March 1.

MR. BROOKS - There remains the details to be settled.

M. MARCHAT - When these people arrive in Casablanca, what do we do with them?

M. LEVASSEUR - It's the Military Security which will take charge of them.

M. MARCHAT - You have made your preparations. Where is this camp?

MR. BROOKS - At Fedala.
H. LAUJAC - It's quite far from Fedala; it's Camp Lyons.

M. BAYOHN - It is understood that upon arrival, under no pretext will the refugees have contact with the civilian population.

MR. BOYESMAN - That's understood.

M. BAYOHN - There remains the question of identification cards. These people will have to be given identification cards.

CAPT. CHEVALIER - We shall do as they do the French.

H. LAUJAC - I shall ask that it not be an identification card, since they have nothing to determine their identity.

M. LEVASSURE - A special card would be needed.

M. MARC'HIAT - Let us take the case of a person who leaves Spain as a Greek and who declares himself Spanish upon arrival; there is no way of proving it. It looks as though it were a question that should be settled by the Security. What is important from the point of view of the government is that they be provided with an identification card or a document made up by some authority.

H. LAUJAC - Those outside the camp should be granted alien registration cards. Inside the camp nothing will be given.

M. MARC'HIAT - Why not give a card? It could be specified: "Declaring himself to be," which would allow the camp authorities to identify him and not to take him for his neighbor. It's only a suggestion.

H. LAUJAC - The American authorities ought to give that.

M. LEVASSURE - It's up to us to give those cards.

M. BAYOHN - In Spain such identification cards are given.

M. MARC'HIAT - It's a little subtle: a card of identification and not of identity. Has the information written upon this card any jurisdictional validity?

M. LEVASSURE - At any rate, no civil status value. This question could be settled consequently.

M. MARC'HIAT - This card could be set up as follows: "I declare myself Jewish. I have no means of proving it." It's up to the Consul to decide if he can trust the person in question and on the face value of his declarations, grant him the visa which he requests.
MR. OLEO - Agreed.

M. BAYOUN - Is the camp ready to receive these people?

MR. BEECHERMAN - We have done all we could.

M. BAYOUN - Why do you see any reason why one of the French services, either civil or military, should not get in touch with you in order that the boat will leave to get the refugees only when everything is ready?

MR. BEECHERMAN - None.

M. BAYOUN - And the camp guard?

M. MARGAIS - American or French authorities?

MR. BEECHERMAN - The camp is the property of the American army. The question will have to be put to the American government.

M. BAYOUN - There are American soldiers accused to prison; there are Italians, etc. Placing the French guard would seem difficult.

MR. HOOGER - At the moment we have Italian prisoners of war who are undergoing training which will finish next week. The camp will be empty. The center will continue to be guarded in case there were other prisoners to be put there. Consequently there will be a guard, no matter what happens.

M. MARGAIS - Who will have the responsibility for the refugees who are in the center? Will it be a civil or military directorship? That's my question.

MR. LEVASSER - The director of the center must have the responsibility of internal discipline.

CAPT. GHEVALIER - It is the responsibility of American authorities. That's provided for in the agreement.

M. LEVASSER - (reading a name about the responsibility of the director of the camp)

M. BAYOUN - Not from the military point of view. If there are rights of extraterritoriality, we shall be unable to go to the center to seek a suspect.

M. MARGAIS - And if a refugee escapes from the center?

MR. BEECHERMAN - I think you asked: If someone escapes from the center?

M. MARGAIS - ... then the French police will intervene?

MR. BEECHERMAN - By leaving the center they place themselves outside the jurisdiction. They have violated the laws of the territory and it is the authority of the territory who must look after it.
M. MARCHEAT - If someone escapes, the French police will be notified.

CAPT. CHEWALIEE - There is also the problem of accessibility; visits to the camp. These questions must be decided by agreement with the American authorities.

M. BAYONNE - What about correspondence?

MR. BECKELMAN - Anyone can write via the French mails, and the censorship rules of the French mails will be applied to the letters of those in the center in the same way as to those of everyone in this territory.

M. LEVASSER - Couldn't the Administration of the center stamp the letters?

MR. BECKELMAN - Certainly, if it seems useful. If we consider that it is simply a question of 760 persons who happen to live in a camp instead of somewhere else, and who write letters and receive letters through the French mails, the simplest thing would be to censor these letters in the same way as those of anyone else.

M. BAYONNE - To come back to the question of visits to the camp, will there be someone from the Military Security permanently at the camp to act as liaison?

M. LEVASSER - Provided that there is someone from the administration of the Prefecture with you.

MR. BECKELMAN - I think that will be sufficient as liaison.

M. MARCHEAT - Who would be in charge of that? An assistant from the office of the Sûreté Générale Fédale or a retired employee of civilian control of Morocco?

M. LEVASSER - There is also the question of lodging the sick and aged. How would you arrange for this lodging under normal conditions? If these are old men, would you put them in barracks? At the end of the week they would say that they cannot live in the center and would ask to go to a hospital or to rent an apartment.

MR. BECKELMAN - I think you will give them the chance of going to a hospital.

M. LEVASSER - There are also the invalids. Can they live in the center?

MR. BECKELMAN - I don't know. I can't answer that question without seeing them.

M. MARCHEAT - Have you an infirmary?

MR. BECKELMAN - Yes.
M. LEVASSEUR - Do you think that living conditions in the center will be bearable for persons in delicate health?

M. BAYOREN - You are putting people into a camp where the climate is not very good. I know that there are: an old man, a paralytic, and a tubercular person; you will have the difficulties; the climate is rigorous.

M. LEVASSEUR - We shouldn't want you to tell us after a while that these people simply must leave the camp.

MR. BRUCKNER - The only problem is that of security. If these people leave the camp they will not be the responsibility of the French.

M. MARQUET - They must not be a burden to the Protectorate; if they occupy a hospital bed, that will make one bed less for the hospital.

M. LAUJAS - As a matter of fact, there is no space; we have a sanatorium at Arrou and it's full. There are French people who have been waiting for several months, not to mention the foreigners.

M. BAYOREN - There are entire families among these refugees; there are old people and children.

M. MARQUET - The problem is serious.

M. BAYOREN - We suggested the idea of a medical examination before they leave Spain. Then the idea was abandoned because it would further complicate operations. It will not be required unless the countries where these people are going demand it.

M. LAUJAS - There is a dahir (decree of the Sultan) on immigration. For the cases that we know of, why not have them take a special examination? It seems to me that it is not to our best interests nor to those of the American authorities to bring here old people or invalids who are at present comfortably settled in Spain.

M. MARQUET - Is there a dahir of the Sultan forbidding an invalid from entering the Protectorate?

M. LAUJAS - No.

M. MARQUET - With the discretionary powers which are at our disposal, we can rule that in war time the entrance of a person with tuberculosis is detrimental to the war effort.

M. LAUJAS - The system of individual entry permits allows us to refuse entrance but it is not applicable in this case because the visas are group visas; there is only the dahir on immigration.

M. MARQUET - We should have to rule that material conditions of living at Fedale exclude a certain category of individuals -- invalids; etc.
MR. BROOKMAN - That would be a little difficult. There are going to be many special cases—an entire family including the grandmother who is old and in poor health—the others will not want to leave without her.

M. LAMUÀ - But if there are only two or three cases they must be known.

M. BAYONNE - I myself have seen one invalid, one case of tuberculosis—in all there are not more than four or five cases, but there might be difficulties regarding the contingent because of the question of proximity.

M. LAMUÀ - There is some control exercised at the point of departure. In this case we have the quarantine inspectors for more serious diseases, both on board and at the port of entry of the country agreed upon; there are general rules that can be applied; we have a stringent juridical basis of an international character for eliminating people...

M. BAYONNE - Could we perhaps leave the question to Mr. Bickmann at Madrid? He has the necessary medical personnel. We have not decided the question of visits to the camp of people coming from outside.

M. MARSHAT - These people don't know anyone in Morocco.

M. LAFASSEUR - They have many references, they have relatives, and they know people who have passed through Spain.

M. MARSHAT - We must follow certain principles. We have already had refugee camps, camps for prisoners, a certain number of camps where visiting hours are limited. To what extent this ruling can be adapted to the special case of the camp at Fedala remains to be seen. Also, certain precautions must be taken. There must be visiting hours, but we must have a special understanding between the camp authorities and the French civil and the military authorities.

M. BAYONNE - There is the questioning done by the Military Security, these are the same services which are qualified to say whether or not a particular person may have contacts with people from outside. Requests to visit the camp should be transmitted for decision to the Military Security.

MR. BROOKMAN - Once this questioning and sifting at the camp is finished, what will be the situation of these people? What are the reasons for limiting their contacts with the outside world—going on the assumption that all the people who live outside are people we are sure of?

M. BAYONNE - None at all.

M. MARSHAT - I should define the situation by saying that they are in a state of quarantine. They are transients who are waiting to leave sooner or later for other countries. It is a transitory state...
between freedom and lack of freedom. It's not complete liberty but neither is it a concentration camp. It's a mixture of the two. We have this sort of quarantine in the American regulations.

MR. BECKELMAN - Yes, after all the idea of a quarantine cannot be prolonged beyond three or four months. The period of quarantine is temporary - questioning - sifting...

M. MARCHAT - It can last a month; when the questioning is finished there are the suspected and those who are not. We can take the question as follows: What to do with the suspects and what to do with the rest.

M. LEVASSEUR - All these questions have been discussed in Madrid. The decision arrived at is indicated in the circular note addressed to the refugees.

M. BAYONNE - In other words, there is no chance of relocation. So long as they are at camp, they will have to conform with the rules of the camp.

M. LEVASSEUR - (reading the memo)

MR. BECKELMAN - It is to our interest to avoid a situation where the three democracies, having decided to do something humanitarian for people who suffered during four or five years, can find nothing to offer them but a concentration camp.

M. MARCHAT - We are at war. These people who come in here under more or less suspicious circumstances must be closely watched.

MR. BECKELMAN - It seems to me that once the sifting is done, the situation will be quite different.

M. BAYONNE - There is no guarantee. On what can we base our cross examinations? Without animus and from the point of view of security, there are precautions to be taken. One must take into account the war situation of the territory in which they are going to be sheltered. We are going to be forced to take in regard to them measures which are harder than those to which they have been subjected in Spain.

M. LEVASSEUR - (to Mr. Beckelman) I often told you so in Madrid.

M. MARCHAT - Morocco is living under siege conditions.

M. BAYONNE - When there are suspects, one must be very strict at first, if only to relax subsequently the measures taken.

M. LEVASSEUR - We shall have to stick to what has been anticipated. These people have been prepared. They agreed to comply with the conditions imposed upon them for their arrival in Morocco.
CAPT. BLOOMBY - We shall have to speed up the consular formalities and get the refugees on board ship.

H - M. BAYOINE - There are contingents going to Canada, others to Palestine. Among these people, there are special cases. Some of them have asked to come to Morocco and return to Spain; there are some who wish to settle definitely in North Africa.

COL. GEMAYEL - Some of them say they are coming to Morocco to trade; they won't want to stay in Camps.

M. BAYOINE - I repeat there are odd cases. Some want to return to Spain later.

M. MARCHAT - Let them make a formal request. Those cases fall outside the terms of the agreement.

M. BAYOINE - What have you decided about those who want to come to North Africa and return to Spain?

M. MARCHAT - This falls outside the agreement; these requests will be examined through normal channels.

MR. BRIKELMAN - From the point of view of the agreement, it seems to me that all these people signed a request after having read the explanations saying that it is a matter of transit through Morocco and each person who enters Fedala Camp enters it under the protection of the American and British Governments who have given the French Committee of National Liberation assurance that everything will be done to speed up the exit of all those people.

M. MARCHAT - The agreement entirely excludes a subsequent return to Spain.

M. LEVASSOR - The agreement provides that these people may return to their native country or go to a country of their choice.

M. MARCHAT - If they ask to leave Spain, it is not to return there.

MR. BRIKELMAN - There are many people who today wish to leave many countries in the hope that they may return there after the war.

M. MARCHAT - I agree—for the occupied countries. But it's different in neutral countries. The country of their choice cannot be Spain since they are not satisfied there and want to leave it. That is how I interpret this agreement. I see no reason why they should want to leave Spain and then return there a few days later. For those who wish to stay definitely in North Africa, it is not a question of transit. It is a question of legal application.
M. LEVASSEUR - The question of visiting has not been definitively settled.

M. MARCHAT - What do you think - those of you who know about this?

M. LAUJAC - That is a question that can be settled only after we have had some experience. In theory, the assistant should see the people entering the camp.

M. BECKELMAN - The camp visits - everyone's comings and goings in Morocco, are regulated by the French services. Everyone who wants to go to the center to see anyone presents a request for a pass. It seems logical that a circulation permit must be had for the trip between Casablanca and the camp.

M. LEVASSEUR - I suppose that these people who go to the camp could be provided with a pass.

M. LEVASSEUR - I have M. Massigli's answer to Mr. Murphy. (reading)

M. BECKELMAN - That was the first letter. There was another.

M. LEVASSEUR - Yes, in November. (reading)

M. LAUJAC - Those having exit permits will also have to be checked on; it is an important question.

CAPT. HOOKER - Since the Military Security has dossiers, it is easier for them than for the Americans to exercise this control.

M. LAUJAC - That settles the question.

CAPT. BLONDET - Someone living in Marrakesh and who wants to go to camp will have to ask for a permit.

M. LAUJAC - This is necessary because people arrive by various means of transportation. Some could arrive in great numbers and raise a rumpus because they are not allowed in.
M. MAROHAT - Since Camp Fedda is a special camp, more flexibility is needed. For example, when someone puts in a request, if identification is produced a broader point of view will have to be manifested.

M. LAUJAO - People will say that they didn't know that they had to get permission.

CAPT. BLONDET - No visits for at least one month.

M. LAUJAO - Many among these people will certainly have contacts. People will come to the camp.

M. BAYONNE - Many of them have established relations with those who have already left Spain.

M. LEVASSEUR - There is another matter which takes precedence over the humanitarian question - security comes first. We must apply the necessary measures for security.

M. MAROHAT - The agreement was prepared with a maximum of humaneness in view.

M. LEVASSEUR - There are some who want to enlist either in the British, American or French armies. Cooperation on every side will be needed to settle all these questions. Nothing can be decided in advance, time will tell.

M. BAYONNE - As for volunteers, there aren't very many.

MR. COLE - Foreigners are admitted into our army. We could separate those subject to mobilization from those not subject to it. (to Mr. Beckelman) What's the American point of view?

MR. BECKELMAN - They cannot enlist in the American army because they're on foreign territory.

M. BAYONNE - There is a precedent: the ones subject to mobilization have their choice; either they serve in the army or they are interned. Those who enlist will have the same freedom as the other soldiers. But for those who do not wish to enlist, what regulation can be applied to them in camp? There are young Germans who cannot be left at liberty.

M. LEVASSEUR - Other enemy subjects are interned.

M. MAROHAT - We can decide only as we go along.
M. BAYONNE - What have we decided about the visits?

M. MARCHAT - Permission granted by the French military authorities (Military Security).

CAPT. BLONDET - You can tell them that they can write to their friends that they must obtain permits at the Military Security office at Rabat.

J. M. WAGHAN - Are there any other questions?

MR. BECKELMAN - There are many questions of detail which will come up as we go along. What we can do now is indicate the general tone.

M. MARCHAT - I asked a question so that you will think about it. We have met as a sort of administrative council for these refugees; if need be, we could perhaps meet again. It is the function of our council to settle questions that cannot be settled directly by the camp director and the local authorities.

M. LEVASSOR - Or between Mr. Beckelman and the Frenchman who will assist him.

M. MARCHAT - Is there anything else?

Answer: No.

M. MARCHAT - We should like to thank those who initiated this humanitarian undertaking; we hope that the contingents will arrive safely; that there will be very few suspects - that's the most important point, needless to say; there would be no trouble were there no suspects.
TO: Mr. L. Leonard
FROM: Lucienne O. Olinger
SUBJECT: Summary of Mr. W. Beekman, UNRRA, with French and British officials, on the Casablanca Camp.

The minutes of the March 26th meeting are a summary of the statements made, the discussions which went on and the agreements reached with French and British officials at that meeting.

1. Purpose of meeting:
The purpose of the meeting was:
(a) To settle different questions concerning the temporary (hospitalization) in Morocco of "refugees espatriés" actually in Spain.
(b) To settle the details of the arrival in Morocco and the admission at the Fedala Camp, of about 600 refugees from Salonika and Spain.
(c) To settle the question of military security.

2. Questions to be settled upon:
The following questions were discussed:
(a) Conditions of admission, transportation, lodging and freedom of movement of the refugees in Morocco.
(b) Questions of the internal discipline, military guard of the camp, control of the refugees mail, leaves, and authorization to work outside.
(c) Question of the hospitalization of the sick, aged, or the crippled people; the question of the refugees becoming public charges of the Protectorate.

3. Agreements reached:
The following points were agreed upon:
(a) The departure and the transportation of refugees from Spain to Morocco will be undertaken by the English Embassy in Madrid.
(b) At their arrival in Morocco, the refugees will be taken into custody by the American authorities.
(c) The French military and civilian authorities will receive the refugees in Morocco only under the following conditions:

2) The strict control at the time of departure and arrival by the French Military Security.
3) A month's quarantine of refugees upon their arrival at the camp.
4) The regulation of visits to the camp and of the refugees' leaves and freedom of movement by the French Military authorities.
5) The discipline and the control of the refugees in the camp will be the responsibility of the camp's director.
6) The liaison between the American and French authorities (military and civilian) will be the responsibility of the Frenchman appointed as assistant to the camp's director.

(d) The American, British and French officials, who were present at the March 26th meeting, would be considered as a kind of board of directors of the Fedela Camp who will settle questions which could not be settled by the camp's director and the local French authorities.

Attachments:
1. French translation of Summary of
   Mr. Beikelman, UNRRA, with French and British officials, on the
   Casablanca Camp.

Clinger/ad
18 apr 44
UNE RÉUNION S'EST TENU À LA RÉSIDENCE GÉNÉRALE LE 25 MAI 1944, POUR MÊTRE AU POINT DIVERSES QUESTIONS CONCERNANT L'HEBERGEMENT PREVIDE DU MAROC DES ÉTRANGERS SPATRIDES ACTUELLEMENT EN ESPAGNE.

M. RACMET, MINISTRE PLÉNIPOTENTIAIRE, CONSUL SAÏDIA DIPLOMATIQUE DU PROTECTORAT, A PRÉSIDÉ CETTE RÉUNION À LAQUELLE ASSISTAIENT :

a) DU CÔTE AMÉRICAIN

Y. MCNEAL, CONSUL DES ÉTATS-UNIS À BARCELONE.

G. RACMET, DÉLÉgué DU GOUVERNEMENT AMÉRICAIN

LIEUTENANT KROH.

M. COFF, DÉLÉgué DES ORGANISATIONS DE SECOURS AMÉRICAINES.

b) DU CÔTE BRITANNIQUE

COLONEL SMITH.

c) DU CÔTE FRANÇAIS

CAPITAINE FUGUERER

CAPITAINE BLANCHET

L. CABRERA, DE LA DIRECTION DES AFFAIRES POLITIQUES

M. LAIIOU, DES SERVICES DE LA SECURITÉ

M. RAYON

L. LEVASSOR, DU CABINET DU PRÉSIDENT GÉNÉRAL.

COMPTES RENDUS DE SÉANCE

M. RACMET OUVRE LA SÉANCE ET DONNE LA PAROLE À M. RACMET.

M. RACMET - NOUS SOMMES REUNIS POUR FIXER LES DÉTAILS DE L'ARRIVÉE ET DE L'INSTALLATION AU CAMP DE MADALE D'ÉTRANGERS QUI SONT ACTUELLEMENT EN ESPAGNE. SONT QUELQUE FORTE ON DOIT PRÉSENTER LA QUESTION ? JE L'IGNORE. IL FAUT TOUT D'ABORD S'OCCUPER DU TRANSPORT. UN DEPART EST LIÉ PROBABLEMENT VERS LE 10 OU LE 15 AVRIL.

M. LEVASSOR - C'EST L'AMBASSADE BRITANNIQUE À MADRID QUI DEVRAIT S'OCCUPER DE CETTE QUESTION.

M. LEVASSOR - L'AMBASSADEUR FRANÇAIS À MADRID?

M. LEVASSOR - IL S'AGIT DE RÉFUGIÉS SÉPARDIS ÉTRANGERS QUI SE TROUVENT EN ESPAGNE. LES GOUVERNEMENTS AMÉRICAIN ET ANGLAIS ONT MANIFESTÉ LE DÉSIR QUE CERTAINES PERSONNES SOIENT HÉBERGÉES PROVISOIREMENT AU MAROC EN ATTENDANT DE
rejoindre leur pays d'origine ou un pays de leur choix. La Convention de la Libération Nationale a donné son accord. Nous avons posé à Madrid les bases de cette affaire (lecture d'une note). Voici les bases, il faut régler les détails.

M. DEGRAT - Combien y a-t-il de réfugiés?

M. BECHFUAN - Si un départ est prévu vers le 10 avril, il faut compter sur 400 personnes environ. Un autre convi d'égale importance suivra plus tard.

M. DEGRAT - Donc, il faut compter 900 personnes et peu qui arriveront au Maroc dans un délai plus ou moins proche. Arriveront-elles obligatoirement sur le camp de Fès? dans quelles conditions?

M. LEVAVIEU - Ce sont les autorités américaines qui les prendront en charge.

M. FAZIOUK - Il leur aura été déclaré que des réfugiés, des personnes qui se trouvent en Espagne depuis 1970, par exemple,

M. DEGRAT - Je ne crois pas.

M. LEVAVIEU - Ou ne peut les considérer comme réfugiés; Il ne peut être question, semble-t-il, de les autoriser à venir au Maroc.

M. BAYOUL - D'autre part, il y a tout lieu à la base de ce mouvement et relatif à travers la péninsule espagnole passées entre les autorités espagnoles et l'Espagne. Ces personnes viennent de pays sous l'occupation de l'Allemagne et la sécurité militaire avec d'énormes difficultés pour les repérer et les dénoncer. Des agents ont été chargés de suivre ces personnes. Le camp de Fès est un précédent, et les autorités espagnoles ne chercheront pas à l'imiter par le biais pour ne pas causer de nouveaux cas. Nous avons besoin d'une mesure préventive, s'il nous est possible de prendre certaines précautions nécessaires.

M. DEGRAT (s'adressant à M. LEVAVIEU) - Nous avons donné pour parti de ne pas les autoriser à venir au Maroc.

M. LEVAVIEU - Ce ne serait pas étrange. En tout cas, les conditions sous lesquelles les réfugiés, espagnols ou espagnols, pourront entrer en camp de Fès, il faut les connaître.

M. DEGRAT - Ce qui est également le fait de régler ces cas de haut

M. LEVAVIEU - Nous avons donné pour parti de ne pas les autoriser à venir au Maroc. En tout cas, les conditions sous lesquelles les réfugiés, espagnols ou espagnols, pourront entrer en camp de Fès, il faut les connaître.

M. FAZIOUK - Ce qui est également le fait de régler ces cas de haut...
M. LAHMAC - Il n'est pas question pour ces personnes de rester au Maroc; ces gens sont amenés en transit tout simplement et il n'est pas question de recasement. J'ai l'impression qu'on a modifié un peu ce qui avait été dit avant.

M. LEVASSEUR (après avoir lu un texte concernant le recasement éventuel des réfugiés). Il s'agit des possibilités de travail qui pourront être accordées à certaines personnes.

M. MACKAT - Il faut voir chaque cas particulier; si un individu est suspect, nous refusons le permis de travail.

M. LEVASSEUR - Il y a d'autres considérations dont il faudra tenir compte et ceci est conforme à ce qui avait été entendu avec BUCHERAN à Madrid: compatibilité avec l'économie du protectorat, conditions de transport et de logement.

M. MACKAT - Le recasement et la sortie d'un individu du camp de Fedala seront soumis à certaines restrictions. Qui fera les enquêtes nécessaires?

M. LEVASSEUR - M. BUCHERAN, qui sera directeur du camp, est d'accord pour avoir auprès de lui un adjoint français.

M. MACKAT - Vous avez toutes garanties de sécurité; on ne laissera pas sortir du camp les suspects et seuls seront autorisés à travailler ceux dont la extradition sera profitable à l'économie du protectorat.

M. BUCHERAN - Je me permets de vous rappeler l'échange de notes entre les représentants britanniques et américains à Alger et le Comité Francilien de la Libération Nationale dans lequel il y a les trois parties soucieuses qu'il ne puisse s'agir de mettre les réfugiés dans un camp de concentration.

M. MACKAT - Il n'est pas question d'un camp de concentration; mais nous avons tout de même un certain nombre de précautions à prendre, et ceci dans l'intérêt commun.

Colonel CUBAN - Le camp devra rester sous la conduite pendant trois semaines au moins afin qu'on puisse établir l'identité aussi exacte que possible des réfugiés. Il vaut ainsi être en mesure de déplorer les suspects et de les séparer des autres auxquels plus de liberté pourra ainsi être laissée par la suite.

Capitaine DUMONT - Il y a donc trois catégories de gens: les suspects, les inoffensifs et ceux qui sont parfaitement inconnus. Si on les laisse sortir dès le début il sera impossible de faire le tri.

B- M. MACKAT - Franchis le problème de la date à partir de laquelle les apatrides installés en Espagne pourront être considérés comme réfugiés.

M. BAYONNE - Que décidez-vous en ce qui concerne les 116 apatrides qui sont arrivés en Espagne avant 1939. Pouvez-vous les accepter?
M. CARRELLI - Ce ne sont pas des réfugiés.

M. MARCHAT - L'Espagne les expulse-t-elle?

M. BAYONNE - Non.

M. MARCHAT - Je pars de ce principe que nous poursuivons un but humanitaire mais l'espèce actuelle n'est pas favorable aux voyages de familles. Si s'agit d'autre part d'un transit et nous ne devrions prendre en considération que les candidatures des réfugiés ayant des chances d'obtenir assez rapidement les visas nécessaires. Combien de temps faudra-t-il pour cela?

M. COUK - Je n'en sais absolument rien.

M. MARCHAT - La personne qui vit à Madrid ou à Barcelone dans des conditions moins confortables. Je ne sais pas si elle sera disposée à partir et si elle ne préfère pas rester en Espagne.

M. BECKELMAN - Ces gens-là ont fait leur demande pour être reçus ici tout à fait volontairement.

M. MARCHAT - Volontairement, mais sans savoir les conditions.

M. LESASSER - Ils ont tous la la circulaire rédigée à Madrid par M. BECKELMAN, M. BAYONNE et moi, et qui leur indique les conditions dans lesquelles ils seront admis à résider au Maroc.

M. MARCHAT - Ils savent qu'ils peuvent quitter l'Espagne pour aller dans d'autres pays mais dans des conditions qui manquent de confort et d'agrément.

M. LESASSER (lecture de l'engagement) que devront signer les réfugiés désireux de venir au camp de Pedala et par lequel ils s'engagent à se soumettre aux conditions indiquées dans la circulaire.

Je crois que ces gens-là aimeraient qu'ils puissent partir très vite et c'est surtout pour cela qu'ils viennent.

M. BECKELMAN - Je voudrais signaler que parmi les gens qui sont arrivés en Espagne avant 1939 et qui ont fait des demandes pour être reçus ici, il y en a quelques dizaines qui se trouvent actuellement en prison ou dans des camps de concentration en Espagne pour ne pas avoir quitté ce pays après un ordre d'expulsion. Ce sont des apatrides du point de vue du gouvernement espagnol qui est actuellement au pouvoir. Il s'agit de ceux qui ont reçu des ordres d'expulsion en 1938-39-40 et qui n'ayant eu aucune possibilité de sortir d'Espagne ont été mis en prison; ils peuvent, maintenant, sortir de prison ou du camp de concentration à la seule condition de quitter l'Espagne. Il ne semble que c'est pour eux que les trois gouvernements français, américain et britannique ont eu le désir de faire quelque chose; on peut regarder comme réfugiés ces gens-là pour qui nous le manque de confort à Pedala sera quelque chose de mieux que leur situation actuelle en Espagne.

M. MARCHAT - Je fais une différence entre les deux cas; le prisonnier et celui qui vit dans un hôtel. Je serais plutôt disposé à accueillir le premier cas plutôt que le second.
M. BAYONNE - A condition qu’il ne s’agisse pas de condamnés du droit commun.

M. HACHET - Il y a un triage au départ, n’est-ce pas?

M. BECKELMAN - S’il s’agit de prisonniers politiques, l’Espagne les regarde comme indésirables et si la Sécurité n’a pas d’objection, je propose qu’on considère comme réfugiés les apatrides qui sont arrivés en Espagne avant 1933 et qui se trouvent actuellement en prison.

Colonel CHEAN - L’Ambassade britannique m’a demandé de dire qu’a son point de vue il y a des gens qui souffrent en prison parmi les 116 candidats arrivés en Espagne avant 1933.

M. BAYONNE - D’accord, sous réserve de l’examen des cas particuliers.

M. MARCHAT - Comptez-y en a-t-il en prison? Une cinquantaine?

M. BECKELMAN - Pas une cinquantaine, 40 ou 30.

M. MARCHAT - Evidemment, il y a tout intérêt à faire sortir ces gens de prison.

M. BAYONNE - Nous établirons la liste de ces gens.

M. MARCHAT - Quel est votre avis pour ceux qui étaient en Espagne avant 1933 et qui y vivent librement?

M. BECKELMAN - On ne peut pas les considérer comme réfugiés.

C- M. BAYONNE - Les gens que nous avons examinés en Espagne sont ceux qui étaient depuis quelque temps et au moment où nous avons quitté l’Espagne, est arrivé un lot de 360 Sephardites renvoyés par les Allemands.

M. BECKELMAN - Ils sont presque tous nés à Salonique; ils ont passé six mois dans des camps allemands et comme suite à un accord passé entre les gouvernements allemand et espagnol, on les a fait entrer en Espagne.

M. BAYONNE - La question de principe se pose de savoir si on peut accepter ces gens. Il y a un lot de 360 qui vient d’arriver; les Allemands sont en train de constituer d’autres groupes pour faire des évacuations massives sur l’Espagne. Cela pose une question de principe. Les Espagnols interviennent pour qu’ils soient laissés au camp de Pedrala.

M. MARCHAT - Je remarque qu’ils tombent sous le coup de l’accord.

M. LEWASSEUR - Dans quelles conditions vivent-ils en Espagne?

M. BECKELMAN - On les a reçus à Portbou le 16 ou le 17 février. Ils ont partis à Barcelone et attendent la possibilité de sortir d’Espagne. Le gouvernement espagnol a demandé aux ambassadeurs américain et britannique où leurs gouvernements étaient disposés à comprendre ces gens parmi qui peuvent être hébergés au camp de Pedrala. L’ambassadeur américain à Madrid a répondu oui à cette question et nous en avons discuté l’autre jour avec M. Ouraound à Alger et nous étions tous d’accord pour comprendre ces gens parmi les réfugiés pouvant être admis au Maroc.
M. LEVASSEUR - Il s'agit de protectorats espagnols.
(lecture d'un document)

M. MARCHAT - Espagnols, mais à quel titre?

M. LEVASSEUR - C'est très vieux.

M. MARCHAT - Ils sont encore nationaux espagnols ou bien ils ne le sont pas... Je ne comprends pas le mot de proteges espagnol.

M. LEVASSEUR - C'est une survivance qui date du même siècle.

M. GABRIEnLi - Je crois que cela se rapporte aux capitulations.

M. MARCHAT - Les capitulations ont été abandonnées en Bulgarie il y a assez peu de temps; c'est peut-être, en effet, une survivance. Il s'agirait d'une protection officielle; mais quelle est leur nationalité?

M. BAYOMA - Je ne les ai pas vus. Les dossiers sont à Madrid, nous ne les avons pas reçus ici. L'organisation qui travaille là-bas a commencé à établir ces dossiers. Si vous prenez la décision de les accepter ici, ces gens doivent faire l'objet d'un examen beaucoup plus approfondi que les autres.

M. LEVASSEUR - Est-ce qu'il y a d'autres séphardites qui doivent arriver en Espagne?

M. BAYOMA - Il en arrivera au fur et à mesure que nous dégagerons l'Espagne.

M. MARCHAT - Nous pourrons alors la liste des séphardites et nous opposer au départ d'un second convoi. Nous acceptons ceux qui sont en Espagne actuellement et de nouvelles négociations seraient nécessaires entre les trois gouvernements pour l'admission d'autres religieux.

M. HENLEMAN - En Espagne nous avons toujours parlé d'un seul convoi.

M. MARCHAT - Si ces gens-la viennent de Salonique, ou ailleurs?

M. BAYOMA - Dans les pays qui voudront bien les accepter.

M. MARCHAT - Je propose d'accepter ce convoi de 500 Séphardites, de les faire examiner avec beaucoup plus de soin que les autres par une commission de triage extrêmement soignée; l'admission de ceux qui arriveront en Espagne par la suite sera l'objet d'une nouvelle étape. Je vous demande de poser une question : supposons que ce triage s'avère réellement difficile, que ne feriez-vous, pas accepter, ces indésirables, qu'en feriez-vous?

M. BAYOMA - La seule question que nous avons examinée à Madrid, le tri est déjà presque fait. Pour les 500 séphardites, il n'y a pas d'indications d'ailleurs, il faut que nous, bureau d'études, nous insitions en commun avec les autres allées un examen préliminaire en Spagna, comme nous l'avons fait pour les autres.

M. MARCHAT - Les uns devront être expulsés, nous parlerons plus.

L. LACAB - Et ceux qui seront découverts ici?
M. BAYONNE - Il n'y a pas de raison que nous traitions différemment ces gens que les Français qui viennent ici pour se battre.

M. HECCHARK - On leur fera sortir du camp pour les mettre à la disposition de la sécurité militaire. Ces gens ne compteront plus au centre.

M. BAYONNE - Pour les gens installés au camp depuis 8 ou 10 jours par exemple, si nous demandons la sortie de telle ou telle personne, il faut se mettre d'accord pour qu'il n'y ait aucune objection possible et que ces personnes ne se manifestent pas durant vos services.

M. LGRAJ - Pour en revenir aux 360 Sephardites, il faut les mettre, étant bien entendu que s'ils en arrivent d'autres, c'est fini. Nous souhaitons ceux qui sont en Espagne à la date d'aujourd'hui.

M. HECCHARK - Il ne semble que la question ne se présente pas sous cette forme. Les trois gouvernements ont clairement un accord pour recevoir des réfugiés espagnols actuellement en Espagne. Il ne semble que la question ne se pose pas de prendre une décision pour l'avencer; un nouvel accord entre les trois gouvernements serait nécessaire.

M. MACHAT - Nous sommes d'accord. Les nouveaux réfugiés sont exclus de l'accord actuel.

M. LEWASKI - On avait bien dit : les réfugiés espagnols "vivant actuellement en Espagne" on ne peut pas aller plus loin. Il y aura peut-être d'autres négociations à Alger par la suite; pour le moment il ne peut s'agir que de la mise en pratique de l'accord recemment intervenu. Reste à fixer la date limite d'application.

M. HECCHARK - Nous pouvons fixer une date.

M. BAYONNE - Le 1er mars puisque le dernier convol de Sephardites est de fin février.

M. MACHAT - Nous déclarons que l'accord actuel cesse d'être appliqué à la date du 1er mars.

M. LEWASKI - Restent à régler les détails.

M. MACHAT - Ces gens arrivent à Casablanca. Qu'en faisons-nous?

M. LEWASKI - C'est la sécurité militaire qui s'en occupe.

M. MACHAT - Vous avez pris vos dispositions? Ou se trouve ce camp?

M. BELHADJ - À Fedala.

M. LAMK - C'est assez loin de Fedala, c'est le camp Lyauta.

M. BAYONNE - Il est entendu qu'elles arrivent, sous aucun prétexte, les réfugiés n'auront de contact avec la population civile.

M. BELHADJ - C'est entendu.

M. BAYONNE - Il reste la question des cartes d'identité. Il va falloir
doter ces gens de cartes d'identité.

Capitaine CHEVALIER - On fera comme pour les Français.

M. LUWAC - Je demanderai à ce que ce ne soit pas une carte d'identité puisqu'ils n'ont aucune pièce établissant leur identité.

M. HSUSSAN - Il faudrait une carte spéciale.

M. NOUGATY - Il faudrait prendre le cas d'une personne qui sort d'Espagne avec un passeport qui ne déclare pas espagnol à l'arrivée; il n'y a aucun moyen de le prouver. C'est une question qui m'a bien souciée et qui doit être réglée par la sécurité. Ce qui importe du point de vue du gouvernement, c'est qu'il y ait un document dont une carte d'identité ou un document établi par une autorité quelconque.

M. LUWAC - On devrait mettre de côté d'autres cas qui seraient à l'extérieur du camp. A l'intérieur, on ne donnerait rien.

M. NOYOTT - On va perpétuer cette inconvenante voici. Vous avez sous une carte que vous pourriez spécifier "Je déclare me nom de tel, un qui permettrait à l'autorité de se faire confiance et qui ne puisse pas prendre pour son voisin. Ce n'est qu'une suggestion.

M. LUWAC - Ce sont les autorités américaines qui devraient donner ça.

M. LEWISER - C'est une chose de donner ces cartes.

M. NOYOTT - En Espagne on donne un certificat d'identification.

M. NOUGATY - C'est un peu subtil; carte d'identification et non d'identité. Les renseignements portés sur cette carte n'ont aucune valeur juridique?

M. LEWISER - Aucune valeur d'état-civil en tout cas. Cette question pourrait être réglée par la suite.

M. NOYOTT - Cette carte pourrait être ainsi rédigée: "Je déclare Juif, je n'ai pas le moyen de le prouver". C'est au Conseil de déclarer si on peut, par la foi des déclarations dites, faire confiance au déclarant et lui accorder le visa qu'il sollicite.

M. LUWAC - D'accord.

M. NOYOTT - Le camp est-il prêt à recevoir les Juifs?

M. RODRIQUEZ - Nous avons fait tout notre possible.

M. NOYOTT - Voyez-vous un inconvenient à ce que quelqu'un des services français, soit civil, soit militaire, se mette en relation avec vous, de façon à ce qu'on ne laisse partir le bateau pour aller chercher les réfugiés que lorsque tout sera prêt?

M. RODRIQUEZ - Aucun.
M. BATONNE - Et la garde du camp?

M. MARCQHAT - Autorités américaines ou françaises?

M. BEECHMAN - Le camp est la propriété de l'armée américaine. Il faut poser la question au gouvernement américain.

M. BATONNE - Il y a des soldats américains punis de prison, il y a des Italiens, etc. Mettre une garde française semble assez difficile.

 Lieutenant HUNGER - Pour le moment nous avons des prisonniers de guerre italiens qui subissent un entraînement qui va se terminer la semaine prochaine. Le camp sera vide. On va continuer à garder le centre pour le cas où il y aurait d'autres prisonniers à y mettre; par conséquent, il y aura une garde de toutes façons.

M. MARCQHAT - À qui va incomber la responsabilité des réfugiés qui seront dans le centre? Direction civile du camp, direction militaire du camp? C'est la question que je pose.

M. LEVASSEUR - Le directeur du centre doit avoir la responsabilité de la discipline intérieure.

Capitaine CHEVALIER - C'est sous la responsabilité des autorités américaines. C'est prévu dans l'accord.

M. LAMBEAUD - (lecture concernant la responsabilité du directeur du camp).

M. BATONNE - Pas au point de vue militaire. S'il y a extraterritorialité nous sommes dans l'impossibilité d'aller chercher dans le centre un suspect.

M. HUNGER - Et si un réfugié s'évade du centre?

M. BEECHMAN - Je crois que vous avez raison: si quelqu'un s'évade du centre?

M. MARCQHAT - ...alors la gendarmerie française intervient!

M. LAMBEAUD - Le sortant du centre ils se mettent en demeure de réglement; ils ont viole les lois du territoire et c'est les autorités du territoire qui doivent s'en occuper.

M. BEECHMAN - En cas d'évasion donc vous prévenez la gendarmerie.

Capitaine CHEVALIER - Il y a une question de permisibilité: les visites dans le camp. Ces questions doivent être réglées d'accord avec les autorités américaines.

M. BATONNE - et la correspondance?

M. BEECHMAN - Tout le monde peut entrer par la poste française et tous les contrôles de la poste française seront appliqués aux lettres des gens au centre pour tout le monde sur de territoire.

M. LAMBEAUD - L'administration du centre ne pourrait pas mettre un visa?
M. BRÖLICH - Si on en vient l'utilité, d'accord; si on considère qu'il s'agit de 750 personnes qui habitent par hasard un camp au lieu d'autre part, ils sortent des lettres par la poste française et ils en reçoivent; la chose le plus simple serait de regarder ces lettres comme des lettres de l'importer quelles gens.

M. BAYNNE - Pour revenir à la question des visites au camp, est-ce qu'il va y avoir en permanence quelqu'un de la sécurité militaire pour faire la liaison?

M. LEVASSEUR - Étant donné qu'il y aura quelqu'un de l'Administration du Protectorat auprès de vous.

M. BRÖLICH - Je crois que cela suffira pour faire la liaison.

M. BRASCHE - Qui serait chargé de cela? Un sous-chef de bureau du SGO, ou un retraité du contrôle civil?

M. LEVASSEUR - Il y a aussi la question de l'hébergement des gens malades ou âgés. Comment envisagez-vous cet hébergement dans des conditions normales? S'il y a des vieillards, allons-nous les mettre dans des baraqués? Au bout de 8 jours ils pourront dire qu'ils ne peuvent vivre dans le centre et demanderont à aller dans un hôpital ou à louer un appartement.

M. BRÖLICH - Je pense que vous leur donnerrez la possibilité d'aller dans un hôpital.

M. LEVASSEUR - Il y a aussi des infirmiers. Ces gens-là pourront-ils vivre dans ce centre?

M. BRÖLICH - Je ne sais pas. Je ne puis répondre à cette question avant de les voir.

M. BRASCHE - Avez-vous une infirmerie?

M. BRÖLICH - Oui.

M. LEVASSEUR - Vous croisez que les conditions de vie dans ce centre seront possibles pour ces personnes de santé délicate?

M. BAYNNE - Vous allez mettre des gens dans un camp avec un climat qui n'est pas très bon. Je sais qu'il y a des vieillards, des malades, des infirmiers; vous allez avoir des enfants, le climat est dur.

M. BRÖLICH - Nous ne voulons pas qu'au bout d'un certain temps vous nous dites, il faut absolument que ces gens sortent du camp.

M. BAYNNE - Il ne s'agit pas alors du problème de la sécurité. Ces gens-là, s'ils sortent du camp, ne seront pas à la charge des Français.

M. BRASCHE - Ce ne serait pas qu'ils soient une charge pour le Protectorat; s'ils vont à l'hôpital prendre un lit, ce sera un lit de moins pour l'hôpital.

M. LAJUG - En effet, il n'y a pas de place. Nous avons un sanatorium à Asrou et il est complet. Il y a des nègres qui attendent depuis plusieurs mois, sans compter les étrangers.
M. BAYONNE: Il y a des familles complètes parmi ces réfugiés; il y a des vieillards, des enfants.

M. LEBAUD: Ce problème est assez grave.

M. BAYONNE: Nous avons posé le principe d'une visite médicale avant le départ d'Espagne; mais le problème est que l'on abandonne parfois l'intervention, ce qui l'émigre que si les pays où ils veulent aller le demandent.

M. LEBAUD: Il y a un débat sur l'immigration. Pourquoi pour ces pays connus en fait-on pas une visite préalable ? Je crois que nous n'avons pas d'intérêt, quant bien que les autorités américaines, à faire venir les visiteurs ou les infirmières qui sont, actuellement, souverainement installées en Espagne.

M. DELAPORT: Y a-t-il un arrêt suspendant l'entrée au Protectorat à un infirmier ?

M. LEBAUD: Non.

M. DELAPORT: Avec le pouvoir discrétionnaire dont nous pouvons user nous pouvons accorder qu'un temps de guerre, l'entrée à un tubercule est contraire à l'intérêt du pays.

M. LEBAUD: La règle des visas permet de refuser l'entrée, mais cela ne peut pas intervenir jusqu'à où les visas sont délivrés globalement; il n'y a qu'un débat sur l'immigration.

M. LEBAUD: Il faudrait décider que les conditions matérielles de vie à l'étranger excluent une certaine catégorie d'individus: malades, infirmières, etc.

M. LAUDAT: C'est un peu difficile. Il y a beaucoup de cas particuliers: une famille entière comprenant le ménage, très vieille et inférieure, les autres ne pourront pas sortir sans elle.

M. LEBAUD: Suis-je d'accord que dans ces cas-là, ils doivent être examinés.

M. LEBAUD: Suis-je au même, un infirmier, un tubercule; cela peut se renouveler à 4 ou 5 personnes; mais cela peut prévenir des difficultés pour le convoy, à cause de la procédure.

M. LEBAUD: Il y a un contrôle au départ.

M. LAUDAT: Il y a la grande loi de police sanitaire à bord et à l'entrée d'un pays déterminé il y a des règles générales qu'on peut appliquer; nous avons une base juridique très solide et d'ordre international pour éliminer les gens...

M. BAYONNE: Veuillez-vous que nous laissions à soin à D. BERGIAULÉ, à Madrid? Il y a le personnel médical nécessaire. Nous n'avons pas réellement de visiteurs au camp pour les gens qui viennent de l'extérieur.

M. LAUDAT: Les gens ne connaissent peut-être personne au Maroc.

M. LEBAUD: Ils ont beaucoup de références, ils ont de la famille et ils connaissent des gens qui sont passés par l'Espagne.
M. BAYONNE - Il n'y a pas de garantie. Sur quoi baser ces interrogatoires? Sans aucune ambiguïté, du point de vue sécuritaire, des mesures sont à prendre. Il faut se rendre compte de la situation de guerre du territoire dans lequel on va les héberger. Nous allons être obligés de prendre vis-à-vis d'eux des mesures qui seront plus dures que celles qu'ils supportent en Espagne.

M. LEVASSOR (à L. BERTRAND) - Je vous l'ai souvent dit à Madrid.

M. BARRAT - Le Maroc est sous le régime de l'état de siège.

M. BIENVILL - Quand il y a ces suspects il faut être très dur au début quitte à relâcher les mesures prises par la suite.

M. LEVASSOR - Il faut s'en tenir strictement à ce qui a été prévu. Les personnes sont prévenues; elles sont engagées à respecter les conditions mises à leur venue au Maroc.

Capitaine BLOMBERT - Il faudrait héler les formalités consulaires et les embarquer.

M. BIENVILL - Il y a des convois qui vont au Canada, d'autres en Palestine. Il y a pas d'anciens des ces spectateurs; certains ont demandé à venir au Maroc et à retourner en Espagne; il y a des gens qui veulent rester définitivement en Afrique du Nord.

Colonel CASSILL - Il y en a qui disent qu'ils viennent au Maroc pour faire du commerce; ils ne veulent pas rester au camp.

M. BIENVILL - Il y a des anciers, de la rentrée, certaines personnes veulent retourner en Espagne par la suite.

M. BARRAT - qu'elle fassent une demande officialisée. Ces cas-là sont en dehors de l'accord.

M. BIENVILL - que decidisse-t-on pour ces qui veulent venir en Afrique du Nord et retourner en Espagne?

M. CASSILL - C'est en dehors de l'accord; ces demandes seront examinées par la voie normale.

M. BARRAT - Du point de vue officiel il est évident que tous ces gens ont pris une décision prématurée et que les explications qu'il est dit qu'il s'agirait être transmis par le haut et que personne qui entre dans ce camp de Pedala entre sous la protection des deux gouvernements américain et britannique qui sont avec l'administration et la France de la Libération Nationale que tout sera fait pour assurer la sortie de tout le monde le plus tard possible.

M. CASSILL - L'accord a été absolument bien établi et il est de notre part.

M. BIENVILL - D'accord, mais quand on peut retourner dans leur pays ou non, c'est à l'issue des accords.

M. BARRAT - S'ils devraient à sortir de l'Espagne ce n'est pas pour y retourner.
M. BECHEMAN - Il y a beaucoup de gens qui veulent sortir d'une vingtaine de pays aujourd'hui pour avoir la possibilité d'y rentrer après la guerre.

M. CHARRET - Je suis d'accord pour les pays occupés mais pour les pays neutres, c'est différent, le pays de leur choix ne peut être l'Espagne puisqu'ils n'y trouvent pas et ne veulent pas partir. C'est comme ce que j'interprète cet accord. Je ne vois pas l'intérêt que peut servir l'Espagne puis à y repartir quelques jours après. Pour ceux qui veulent rester définitivement en Afrique du Nord ce n'est pas une question d'esclaves, c'est une question de demande régulière.

M. LEWESTER - La question des visites n'a pas été traitée.

M. CHARTET - Qu'en pensent ceux qui ont l'expérience de ces choses?

M. MAGNAC - C'est une question qui ne peut être abordée qu'après un temps d'expérience. En principe, l'adjoint devrait voir les personnes qui viennent au camp.

M. BECHEMAN - Les visites au camp - la circulation au Maroc pour tout le monde ont été réglementées par les services français; chaque personne qui veut aller au centre pour voir n'importe qui présente une demande de circulation. Je crois qu'on peut dire légalement qu'il faut avoir une roulante pour faire le voyage entre caser et le camp.

M. LEWESTER - On pourrait admettre que les gens qui iraient au camp devraient être associés d'un balancier-passer.

M. MAGNAC - Il y a deux sortes d'attractions: l'ambiance et l'habit. Donc les autorisations devraient être demandées soit à Casablanca, soit à Asmara.

M. BECHEMAN - Je ne repars, ence qui va de notes échangées entre les représentants des trois gouvernements, je comprends que ce n'est pas l'intention de priver ces gens de l'échange culturel et la possibilité de garder la beauté de leur culture. Nous n'avons pas l'intention de priver ces gens-là de leur liberté, il n'est même pas de trouver une solution.

M. LEWESTER - J'ai le plaisir de vous présenter MM. Buhot et Adj (lecteurs).

M. BECHEMAN - Ce n'est pas la première lettre, elle est arrivée ces jours-ci.

M. LEWESTER - Oui, de la Société de... (lecteur).

M. MAGNAC - Il est étonnant qu'il n'y ait pas de conséquences de sortir; c'est une question importante.

Capitaine PHATE - La sécurité militaire est liée à la sécurité de toute la région, est-elle face à une situation inquiétante?

M. MAGNAC - Cela règle la question.

Capitaine PHATE - Une fois qu'il n'y a plus de gens qui vont aller au camp doit-on arrêter une permission?

M. MAGNAC - C'est nécessaire, car les postes d'observation sont occupés par des transporteurs variés; des personnes pourraient arriver en maître et pousser...
les hautes cris parce qu'on ne les laisse pas entrer.

L'entrée - le champ de rassemblement est un endroit social, il faut plus de
sécurité. Il faut, par exemple, lorsqu'une personne se présente, du
membre rapide à des pièces d'identité de contrôle plus large.

Le fait - nous avons dit qu'il ne serait pas qu'il était une
permission.

Capitaine Schmeltz - Pendant un mois ou moins tarder à élire.

L'entrée - aussi des gens avaient-nous des relations avec ceux qui
sont côté part de l'armée.

L'entrée - il y en a beaucoup qui ont moins des relations avec ceux qui
sont côté part de l'armée.

L'entrée - il y a un autre cas où la question humanitaire, c'est
géant ou se soucie qui cause avant tout, nous sommes ciblés à appliquer
les mesures de sécurité nécessaires.

L'entrée - L'accord n'a pas été prévu que dans les limites extrêmes
d'humanité.

Le cas - ici nous qui vont sortir en soi dans les zones
britanniques, américaines ou françaises. Il faut le temps selon le parti et
sur le territoire pour que toutes ces questions s'arrangent, ou ne peut
avoir la décision, il faudra voir par la suite.

L'entrée - il faut à être volontaire, il n'y en a pas beaucoup.

L'entrée - nous nous en premiers les étrangers dans l'arme. Nous pourrions
faire un triage entre les contrefaits et les non contrefaits (à
l'attention) quel est le point de vue américain?

L'entrée - ils ne pouvaient pas... de moyens dans l'arme américaine parce
qu'ils se trouvent dans un territoire étranger.

L'entrée - il y a un précédent - nous avons un endroit, selon le desirs
ou le travail, ou de la milice, ou de la police qui serait devant la même
liberté que les autres soldats. Mais pour ceux qui ne voulaient pas servir
quel est le régime qu'on peut leur appliquer au champ? Il y a encore
Allemagne qu'on ne peut pas laisser en liberté.

L'entrée - les autres sujets annulé rester internes.

L'entrée - on ne pourra voir grâce fur et à mesure.

L'entrée - qu'est-ce que nous devons pour les visites?

L'entrée - permission accordées par les autorités militaires françaises
(Sécurité Militaire).
Capitaine BLONDET — Vous pouvez les prévenir qu'ils peuvent arriver à leurs endroits pour leur dire de se munir d'autorisations à demander au bureau S. M. de Hambat.

J.- 2. JACOBY — Vous voyez d'autres questions?

M. VEGIS — Il y a beaucoup de questions de détail qui viendront au fur et à mesure. Ce qu'on peut faire maintenant c'est indiquer l'esprit.

2. JACOBY — Je pose la question en vous demandant si j'y réfléchirais. Nous sommes réunis en une sorte de conseil de sauvegarde de ces réfugiés; nous pourrions peut-être si le besoin s'en présente nous réunir à nouveau. Nous sommes un autre conseil d'administration. A ce moment, pour revoir les questions ne pouvant pas être réglées directement entre le directeur du camp et les autorités locales.

J.- 2. BOISSEL — C'est entre M. VEGIS et moi qu'il faudra.

M. JACOBY — Voyez-vous autre chose?

Réponse: non.

M. JACOBY — Nous n'avons plus qu'à remercier les initiateurs de cette œuvre humanitaire, exprimer le souhait que les convois arriveront à bon port, qu'il y aura le moins de suspects possible; c'est le point important bien entendu tout le reste n'aura aucun sens.

La séance est levée.

Le 12/1/44 — chb