SUMMARY OF PROJECTS ON BEHALF OF REFUGEES IN WHICH THE DEPARTMENT IS ENGAGED

1. Bermuda recommendation on neutral shipping. One of the recommendations of the Bermuda Conference was that the United States and the United Kingdom should negotiate for the use of neutral shipping for the transportation of refugees. Repeated efforts have been made by the two governments to obtain neutral shipping for various projects under consideration but a number of difficulties have arisen. In general, neutral shipping is reluctant to agree to any voyages which take ships into heavily-mined or submarine-infested waters unless extremely high rates are paid. Arrangements are now complete, however, for one vessel to carry refugees from Spain to Palestine.

Comment: Two considerations: (a) the improved military situation permitting us to take a stronger position with neutrals than we could a year or even six months ago and (b) the fact that the Mediterranean is practically an Allied lake should make a solution of this Bermuda recommendation possible now.

2. Bermuda recommendation that the United States and the United Kingdom negotiate for release of refugees in Spain. The Bermuda Conference recommended that the United States and the United Kingdom negotiate with Spain for the release of French and other allied refugees held there. Virtually all of the approximately 26,000 French refugees in Spain have been admitted to North Africa. There remain roughly 1,800 stateless refugees who are now being examined by Mr. Beekman, the director of the refugee center at Fedhala, Morocco. Mr. Beekman is now in Madrid arranging for the transportation of these refugees to Morocco and it may be another month or two before the movement actually begins.

Comment: The release of refugees in Spain appears to be moving satisfactorily. Why shouldn't such of the refugees as might desire to go to Palestine be transported directly there rather than being taken to the Moroccan camp which is more distant?

3. Bermuda recommendation that the United States and the United Kingdom negotiate with the French National
Committee concerning the camp in North Africa. The Bermuda Conference recommended that negotiations be undertaken with General Eisenhower and the French National Committee concerning the movement of refugees through North Africa and the possibility of creating a camp where they could be held temporarily. After considerable difficulty these negotiations have now been completed and the approval of General Eisenhower and of the French National Committee has been obtained to the operation of a distribution center for refugees at Fedhala, Morocco. This camp is located twelve miles from Casablanca and was a former French army post.

Comment: The Moroccan camp is ready for operation. Jurisdictional difficulties as to what organization the director should report to, etc., should be worked out promptly.

4. Bermuda recommendation on Madagascar and other French territories as settlements for refugees. The Bermuda Conference recommended that the United States and the United Kingdom should negotiate with the French National Committee regarding the use of Madagascar and other French territories as havens for refugees. The United States and the United Kingdom have agreed in principle on this but have not approached the French Committee because it has been felt that refugees outside of Europe are now being adequately cared for and it has not been necessary up to now to search for additional places of refuge. It is believed, however, that the French Committee would not be responsive to suggestions to construct a large refugee center on Madagascar.

Comment: Why not attempt to complete negotiations to provide against a possibility that through threats to the Satellites, some formula acceptable to the Germans, or similar measures another large exodus from the continent might occur.

5. Bermuda recommendation that refugees should be free to return to their homes after the war. The Bermuda Conference recommended that the governments concerned should guarantee that refugees would be free to return to their homes after the war if they desired. A declaration to this effect is now being circulated among the governments-
in-exile for their approval.

Comment: This recommendation appears to be in process of adoption, but slowly.

6. Bermuda recommendation that the mandate of the IGO should be extended. The Bermuda Conference recommended that the mandate of the IGO should be extended in order to permit it to negotiate directly with any government including the German government. At a meeting of the IGO on August 4 in London the revised mandate was agreed upon and referred to the governments for ratification. The United States and the British have, I believe, ratified it but other governments have not done so as yet. It is expected, however, that the new mandate will be ratified and the committee is proceeding on that assumption.

Comment: Yes and the British should press for its early adoption.

7. Bermuda recommendation on broadened membership in the IGO. The Bermuda Conference recommended that the other governments be asked to join the IGO and invitations have been extended to seventeen other governments. Russia and a few others have accepted.

Comment: It was previously recommended that pressure should be exerted on others to join.

8. Bermuda recommendation on expenses of IGO. The Bermuda Conference recommended that the United States and Great Britain should temporarily assume on a 50-50 basis all expenses of the projects approved by the Executive Committee, with the expectation of repayment by the several member governments. It was originally proposed that the administrative expenses of the Committee would be borne equally by the members of the Executive Committee, but Brazil objected and requested that the so-called Latin scale should be followed, which places the greater share on the United States and the British. This has been accepted and is in effect.

9. Bermuda recommendation on a secretariat for the IGO. The Bermuda Conference recommended that a secretariat
should be organized to serve the IRO, and a Secretary, who is Dutch, has been appointed to serve with the Director and Vice Director. It is not clear, however, whether an additional staff has been assembled.

Comment: It was previously recommended that a Secretariat should be provided for the IRO.

10. Bermuda recommendation with respect to Polish refugees in Iran. The Bermuda Conference recommended that study be given to the transportation of Polish refugees in Iran to other countries. Very little if anything has been done in this connection. There are about 8,000 to 9,000 Poles remaining in Iran, and these seem to be relatively well cared for. There remain in India at Karachi and at Bombay an additional group of Polish refugees formerly in Iran and 10,000 to 12,000 former Polish refugees in Iran are now located on the east coast of Africa in camps which were made available for these refugees by the removal of war prisoners to the United States. The Polish refugees now in Mexico came from India, and were a part of this original Iranian group.

Comment: There are not over 8,000 Polish refugees in Iran now, but nearly 12,000 in East Africa, and some in India. If they have not been incorporated into the economies of these countries, which is believed to be the case, aggressive steps should be taken through classification of skills, etc., to do so.

11. Bermuda recommendation on admission of refugees elsewhere. The Bermuda Conference recommended that negotiations should be undertaken with various governments to examine the possibility of their admitting refugees. Nothing conclusive has been done in this field, but it appears that Canada may admit some.

Comment: Why should this not be pushed forward?

12. Bermuda recommendation on admission of French children to the United States. The Bermuda Conference recommended that efforts should be continued to obtain the release of French children. The United States offered some time ago to permit 5,000 children to come from France to the United States. The German authorities had
firmly declined this offer. Recently, however, the IGO indicated it would consider at its January 4 meeting asking the Swiss to give refuge to as many as 5,000 French children if the United States would agree to issue visas for them. The Department's attitude is that the issuance of visas can be granted provided the children enter the United States before June 30, 1946, but that it is not possible for the Department to bind this Government beyond that date because another administration might well be in power or the immigration laws might be radically changed.

*Comment:* This raises the question as to whether the regulations governing visas should be liberalized for the duration or the law itself broadened for the duration.

13. **Swedish plan for Jewish children.** The Swedish Government has attempted to secure German consent to the release of 30,000 Jewish children from Germany and the occupied areas who would be taken to Sweden and cared for until the end of the war. The German Government has firmly refused this proposal. The Swedish Government has also failed in efforts to obtain the release of Norwegian children under the same conditions.

14. **Revolving plan for nourishing children.** A revolving plan has been proposed under which as many as 100,000 children could be removed from the occupied areas to a neutral country, say Switzerland, and there nourished for two or three months and then sent back. An additional lot would then be taken out, nourished, and so on. The Swedish Government will probably not be willing to undertake negotiations for this purpose in view of its failure on previous negotiations of this nature. The Swiss Government has indicated it might possibly agree to negotiate with the Germans but no definite answer has been received.

*Comment:* Recently, the IGO has exhibited some interest.

15. **Feeding plan for Jews in Transnistria.** The Jewish Joint Distribution Committee is planning to send food obtained within the blockade area to Jews in Transnistria where food is very scarce. The funds used would be private and the International Red Cross would be called upon to administer the plan. The Department has sponsored
this plan with the Treasury Department which is involved to the extent of freezing funds and there is every expectation that this plan will be put into effect.

16. Removal of Romanian Jews from Transnistria. The Romanian Government has in the last year or two sent a substantial number (roughly 80,000) of Jews from their homes in Romania to Transnistria. Because Transnistria is expected shortly to become a battle ground, efforts have been made to persuade the Romanian Government to transfer these Jews back to their Romanian homes. Unfortunately, the German Government intervened, and latest advices have indicated that no more than 4,000 of these Jews will be repatriated. The Department has since attempted to urge the Romanian Government to find ways to carry out its original plan of repatriating all these Jews.

Comment: The Department should continue its efforts.

17. Polish refugees in Mexico. The Mexican Government has an agreement with the Polish Government under which 28,000 Polish refugees will be accepted in Mexico. At the present time about 1,600 are there, having been transported from India to Mexico, the cost being borne by the United States through the use of the President's Emergency Fund. They are confined in a camp near Mexico City. Additional refugees are expected to be taken to Mexico, but at the present time no more can be received until the facilities of the camp are expanded. Refugees in Mexico are not permitted to engage in any activities which might compete with the Mexican economy.

Comment: What is the purpose of transporting these refugees to Mexico, confining them to camps, and not allowing them to work? Shouldn't we try to change Mexico's attitude before more are brought over?

18. Transportation of Spanish Republicans to Mexico. A number of Spanish Republicans who were confined in concentration camps in North Africa at the time of the Allied invasion are to be transported to Mexico to join a substantial number of Spanish Republicans now in exile there. The United States Army has agreed to provide free transportation for these refugees to a port in the United
States, and the Mexican Government has indicated it will bear the expenses of rail transportation to Mexico. A recent development, however, has been the willingness of the Anti-Fascist Refugees Committee to bear the expenses of rail transportation in lieu of the Mexican Government.

19. Visas for Palestine for Jewish children. There are several thousand Jewish children in Switzerland or hidden in France for whom the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee has requested visas to admit them to Palestine. Because the British are uncertain about the future political status of Palestine, they are unable to approve visas for these children, who will not be able to proceed there until after the war.

20. Dodecanesian refugees. There are a number of Dodecanesian refugees who were displaced from those islands by the British military authorities during the recent occupation by British forces of those islands. At present these refugees are being cared for by MHERA and it is expected that they will be taken care of shortly by UNRRA. While the British have asked the Department’s view on the advisability of transferring these refugees to the care of the Intergovernmental Committee, it might be unwise to do so because of the administrative problems involved. It would not seem advisable for UNRRA to take this responsibility on for only a short time. It is estimated in London that the number of Dodecanesian refugees will eventually total as high as 30,000.

21. Warning to Bulgaria. In conjunction with the British the Department sent a very strong warning to the Bulgarian Government urging it to cease its anti-Semitic activities. The telegram was shown to the Bulgarian Minister in Bern by the Swiss Foreign Office, and Bulgaria indicated that German pressure would preclude any change in its attitude.

22. Jewish refugees on the Island of Rab. It was recently reported to the Department that there were 4,000 Jewish refugees on the island of Rab off the Dalmatian coast. The Department approached the Joint Chiefs of Staff in an effort to obtain shipping with which to evacuate these refugees. The Joint Chiefs of Staff replied
that only 1,600 refugees were on that island, and that
they opposed the use of any shipping for that purpose.
This island has changed hands several times, but latest
advices indicated the Germans had evacuated it.

23. United States visas for refugees holding South
American passports. Representatives of one Jewish agency
in the United States recently proposed to Mr. Long that
the United States give visas to certain Polish refugees
escaping to Hungary who might be able to obtain passports
of certain South American countries. They pointed out
that these refugees would receive favorable treatment at
the hands of Hungarian authorities if they possessed
South American passports and United States visas, and
stated further that the refugees did not intend to use
the visas to come to the United States. Mr. Long replied
in a letter stating that the United States would be glad
to give visas to these persons if they presented them-
selves to an American Consul. It is clear, however, that
if the refugee is able to present himself to a Consul he
has already solved his difficulty by having escaped from
Europe.

Comment: The decision may be sound, but why
not say no directly rather than in this round-about way?

24. South American passports for refugees. The
Department was recently asked by one of the Jewish agen-
cies to request the Governments of Haiti, the Dominican
Republic and others to issue passports or the refugees, right unseen, to
various refugees in Europe. The Department has declined
to bring this matter to the attention of the various gov-
ernments but has urged the Jewish representatives to con-
tact the embassies of those governments here and to make
their requests directly.

25. Establishment of ICG offices and camps in
neutral capitals. The Department proposed that the ICG
establish offices in Madrid, Lisbon, Algiers, Naples, and
Ankara to assist escaping refugees. A proposal that camps
be established nearby to serve as assembling points for
refugees was not transmitted to the ICG by the Department
because it was felt that the offices should first be es-
ablished and that the camps could be established later
if they proved to be necessary. At its January 4 meeting,
the IGO approved the establishment of offices at Algiers, Lisbon, Naples, and Madrid, and approved in principle the appointment of a representative to serve with UNRRA in Cairo, and also to represent the IGO's interests at Ankara until a special representative was appointed. Until the relationship between UNRRA and UNRRA is clarified, however, it is not expected that a representative of the IGO will proceed to Cairo.

26. Plan to Feed Jewish Refugees in Czechoslovakia and Poland. In Mr. Long's testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee he mentioned a proposal of the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee under which a $10,000,000 fund would be raised to feed Jewish groups remaining in Poland and Czechoslovakia. Of the $10,000,000 the United States and Great Britain were each to provide $4,000,000. The publication of Mr. Long's testimony with the publicity given to this plan has aroused considerable protest in London where it is felt that the chances for the plan's success have been considerably reduced. Mr. Long has pointed out the insufficiency of the Foreign Affairs Committee on the release of his testimony. An appropriation request for this purpose is being considered.

Comment: This should be pushed.

27. Financial assistance to Romanian and French Jewish groups. The World Jewish Congress and the Joint Distribution Committee have proposed that financial assistance be given to French and Romanian Jews with which to bribe German officials and to obtain false papers necessary to escape from France. The details now appear to have been cleared by the British, and operations, financed at the outset by private funds, are ready to start. The Department has written Admiral Leahy to inquire if the Joint Chiefs of Staff are prepared to approve the use of shipping for this purpose.

Comment: A plan for the use of neutral shipping would appear to offer more of an opportunity for success than one using Allied shipping.

28. Deportation to Poland of Paraguayan Jews may in France. It was reported to the Department by one of the Jewish agencies that a number of Paraguayan interned
in France were deprived of their citizenship by the Paraguayan Government and that the German Government seized upon this to deport them to Poland. The Department is attempting to learn through the Swiss Government and also through the Paraguayan Government if these facts are true. It has been denied by Paraguay. Recently, moreover, it has been reported that the Germans have seized the passports of Jewish internes of the following countries: Peru, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Haiti, Chile, and Venezuela.

29. Netherlands refugees in Spain. The Netherlands Ambassador has asked the Department if some 500 Netherlands refugees now in Spain could be sent to North Africa to the Fedala camp. It is intended that they would arrive there before the stateless Jews and would have left before the others arrived. On examining this plan more closely, however, it has been suggested that rather than transport these refugees to Fedala it would be simpler to send them to Gibraltar whence they could proceed to the U.K.

30. Nalin's visit to Italy. Mr. Nalin, the Vice Director of the IIO, has asked for permission to go to Italy to study conditions there. The State Department and the War Department have approved, and Mr. Nalin will arrive in Algiers shortly en route to Italy.

31. Financial assistance to Jewish groups in Rome. Recently a telegram was received from Bern stating that the Jewish charity which have been caring for Jews in the city of Rome have run out of funds. It is believed that if assurances could be received from the United States and the U.K. that funds would be forthcoming from them in the future, it might be possible to negotiate a loan in Rome using these assurances as security. In a cable from London, the Ambassador in London reports that the Director of the IIO has asked the Department to call this proposal to the attention of Jewish private agencies which may be disposed to contribute if the Treasury will permit the transfer of funds. Several Jewish agencies have already responded.

Comment: The Department should take the necessary steps to carry this out.
32. Aid to Switzerland. Switzerland has taken in refugees and is naturally finding it quite a burden to take care of them in view of its limited resources. The United States has offered to assist Switzerland economically in various ways in order to lighten the burden and to insure a continuing friendly attitude on the part of Switzerland. Switzerland, moreover, is willing to give employment to the refugees there but this has raised a serious blockade question with regard to the ultimate destination of the goods produced by these people. It may well be we would prefer not to permit certain raw materials to go through to Switzerland if the refugees labor there simply convert them into war materials for use by Germany.

33. Aid to Sweden. Sweden has taken in a number of Danish refugees and is, of course, continually receiving Norwegians who have escaped across the border. The United States has repeatedly offered Sweden any assistance which may be needed, but Sweden has not as yet felt the need to request assistance.

34. Movement of refugees from Bulgaria to Palestine. After considerable difficulty the British were on the verge of succeeding with a plan to remove 4,000 children from Bulgaria to Palestine and had arranged for ships to receive them at Istanbul. At the last minute, however, the German Government heard of the plan and closed the border. In the last few days, there has been an indication in the cables from London that this project has not been entirely abandoned.

Comment: The Department should do everything in its power to assist the British in developing this plan.

35. Investigation by the International Red Cross of atrocities in Poland. The Department approved a proposed investigation by the International Red Cross of German atrocities in Poland. Germany has refused flatly, however, to permit the International Red Cross or any other agency to study conditions in occupied Poland.
36. Evacuation of Rumanian children. Arrangements appear to have been concluded for the movement of approximately 150 Jewish-Rumanian children a week to Palestine. They are to be transported by rail to Istanbul where they will board a Turkish-flag ship.
WASHINGTON,

amba (SWITZERLAND).

Please convey following message to Swiss Government
with request that they communicate it to the Governments
of Romania and Bulgaria:

NOTE: The United States Government recognizes that
while comparatively few Jewish people may have died while
in the countries of Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary as a
result of brutal treatment from the Nazis, nevertheless,
large numbers of Jewish people have been deported from
these countries to other areas, notably Poland, where
many have either been murdered by the Nazis or forced to
live under conditions which resulted in their death.

The Government of the United States therefore warns
the Governments of Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary that
they will be punished for every Jew forcibly deported
from the respective countries as such deportation may
result in inhuman treatment and murder by the Nazis.

U.S. Govt.

[Signature]

[Classification]

State Dept. Office: 2-11-72

WASHINGTON,

AMERICAN EMBASSY,

HABISCO AND OTHER NEUTRAL NATIONS,

You are requested to convey the following message to appropriate officials of the Spanish Government and to repeat the message to the American Embassy at Lisbon with the request that they convey it to appropriate officials of the Government of Portugal.

NOTE: The Government of the United States is deeply appreciative that many allied and neutral Governments have given asylum to large numbers of Jewish persons and other refugees fleeing from Nazi persecution. This Government, which has already received many refugees, is prepared to receive more, and it is our hope that other Governments will continue their humanitarian endeavors in this connection. The United States Government earnestly desires that all neutral and allied Governments shall admit and give temporary shelter to every Jew and other refugee who may be so fortunate as to escape death and persecution by the Nazis. It is realized that this may impose a considerable burden on these Governments and therefore it is hoped that the Governments now belligerents will admit to their countries all of their nationals who may have been displaced by the war into other countries. TIEDSUG
Subject: Refugee Problem.

Introduction.

I have been deeply concerned over the plight of the persecuted minorities in Europe and have asked members of my staff to make a searching review of all aspects of the refugee problem, partly for my own information, but primarily in an effort to learn if fresh minds could discern new ways in which to assist these unfortunate persecuted peoples.

In my opinion, this review has advanced a number of important suggestions or observations. Some should be put into effect immediately, and others should be promptly considered and further developed. I realize, of course, that many considerations will occur to the officers in the Department who have been closely associated with this problem which may have escaped the members of my staff in their analysis. Obviously, my staff does not have the complete knowledge of this complicated subject and its ramifications possessed by the officers of the Department who have followed and worked on it from day to day for a considerable period of time.

In weighing the arguments for or against any specific program or plan of action, I feel we may in the past have been inclined to place the broad political and humanitarian considerations in a subservient position with respect to military or financial arguments. The Army, for example, delayed the establishment of the Fedhala Assembly Center because of reluctance to add the refugee problem to the great responsibilities which General Eisenhower already bore. One of the major reasons, I understand, for the delay in transporting refugees from Spain to Palestine has been the excessively high charter rates demanded by neutral shipping for this voyage. Financial considerations appeared for some time to have entangled the arrangements to forward funds to Rumanian and French Jews to be used for various purposes. While military and financial arguments must be given the closest attention, they should not, I think, necessarily be deemed controlling.

I believe it is very important that the most careful and sympathetic study be given to all proposals which offer even a remote hope that some unfortunate group can be saved. We should consider ourselves adequately rewarded
if only 5% or perhaps even a smaller share of the plans submitted proved practicable and successful.

I have divided the accompanying report into the following groups:

I. Release of Persons from Axis Europe.

II. Public Relations.

III. Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees.

IV. Treatment of Refugees Who Have Escaped from Axis Europe.

Under each heading I have outlined the observations made, the points to be considered and studied, and the specific actions which, in my opinion, should be taken immediately.

With regard to the projects which the Department has under way, I have prepared a separate report describing briefly each of them, and commenting on some of them. This is attached as Exhibit 1.

I. Release of Persons from Axis Europe.

A. Observations

Although efforts along these lines are continuing, the Germans appear to have rejected a number of proposals designed to effect the release of children and of other people from Axis Europe. This was the experience of the Swedish Government in its offer to take 20,000 children from Germany for the duration. The United States' offer to take 5,000 French children was similarly rejected. Further examples are the revolving plan to nourish children and the plan to move 4,000 children from Bulgaria to Palestine. While this attitude on the part of the German Government is discouraging, I do not feel we should consider it as final. We cannot afford to relax in our efforts. It may be that we have not yet devised a formula acceptable to the Germans and at the same time acceptable to British and
American military authorities. In future years our record will not look well if by accepting as final the German attitude which has existed in the past, we cease our efforts to save the persecuted minorities of Europe.

It is a cold fact that the flow of refugees escaping from Axis Europe has dried up to a mere trickle. This is generally attributed to increased German control of internal transportation and to the more vigilant guarding of the borders.

E. Points for Consideration

While the following suggestions may seem very tenuous and upon further consideration may be rejected, I believe it is our duty to give them and others of like type the most careful attention:

(1) Every conceivable proposal which might be presented to the Germans should be carefully reviewed. A few possible proposals of this type are

a. As the German cause appears more and more hopeless, it may be effective to extend to the German Government or to individual groups within Germany some hope for less severe terms, retaining, however, the unconditional surrender formula. Rather than to extend this hope through some diplomatic or official channel, such an appeal might be made through some unofficial means or over the short-wave radio as part of a propaganda campaign. This appeal would be the converse of the Mosco Declaration on atrocities.

b. Instead of an offer extending some hope, psychologists might prefer resumption of the threat approach.

c. It might be difficult for the German Government to refuse a proposal under which, in return for the release of a specified
number of refugees, we offered to German women and children some degree of security from our bombing attacks. For example, a small city in Germany without important industrial or military objectives, selected by us, could be filled with women and children. In return for our granting this city immunity from bombing, the Germans would undertake to release an equivalent number of refugees.

(2) We should carefully consider whether every possible type of assistance is now being rendered to the existing underground escape routes. Support might take the form of financial assistance, the loaning of equipment and personnel, or the providing of papers of identity, etc.

C. Specific Actions Recommended

(1) The President should enter into negotiations with Hitler through the Vatican or through the head of a neutral government to reach some understanding which would in principle permit the release of Jews at a certain rate per month, the rate to be determined by the availability of neutral shipping to transport them from Axis ports to neutral or belligerent territories and by the capacity of Spanish and Turkish railroads and receiving centers.

(2) We should communicate to Bulgaria and Rumania, through appropriate intermediaries, a warning along the lines of the telegram attached (Exhibit 2). Consultation with the British and Russians would have to be undertaken if it were felt these constituted peace terms, but otherwise only the President would have to be consulted. The message to Rumania might contain a special reference to the Jews in Transnistria. In view of the relatively better treatment of Jews by Hungary, it might not be wise to send any such special message to Hungary at present but conditions there should be carefully watched. In that connection, a special instruction should be issued to Bern. With respect to France, while we
could not send a message to Vichy, we might consider whether the French Committee could make it known through the underground and by short-wave radio that the perpetrators of atrocities inside France and those ordering deportations to the East were known and would be duly punished.

(3) The President should direct the Army and Navy to assist refugees to the fullest possible extent. Every opportunity for saving refugees which presents itself should be seized upon vigorously and positively within the limits, of course, of military security. The feeling of indifference toward refugees which some commanders appear to have should promptly be replaced by a determination to pursue aggressively any possibility of saving groups of refugees.

(4) American diplomatic missions in Europe should be asked to discuss all phases of the refugee and of the feeding problems with the Governments to which they are accredited and also with their colleagues from other countries. Reports should be requested based thereon outlining the current opinions obtained on all the questions concerned. Any suggestions or plans obtained could be considered further by this Government or by the Intergovernmental Committee. The British should be urged to follow a similar course and to exchange information with us.

(5) Mr. Malin's proposed trip to Italy should be encouraged. In addition to the general information he should obtain, it would be valuable to obtain his confirmation on the reports that as the Germans retreat they have generally left Jews behind undisturbed. If these reports should be confirmed, it might, perhaps, indicate that the Jewish position is not so serious within Europe as has been feared.

(6) With respect to the neutral governments, messages should be sent making clear our hope that they will continue to receive and to care
for such refugees as may escape from Axis Europe. We should encourage the neutrals to invite our aid at any time. A sample of such a communication is attached as Exhibit 3.

I feel that the proposed message as drafted would be improved if we added a paragraph suggesting that the individual governments make special announcements over the radio to the effect that they are willing to admit and temporarily to care for all refugees crossing their borders. Also, we should request permission to short-wave those assurances on the part of the neutrals to the occupied territories in the hope that they might give more people the courage to make the attempt to escape. In our messages to Switzerland and Sweden, moreover, we might state again our support for a number of specific projects which they are attempting to promote.

It is my understanding that Turkey has not always been so cooperative as the other neutrals. For example, I am informed that the Turks have not permitted refugees to establish temporary residences, but have insisted that they pass through Turkey without stopping. If this is true, and if it is consistent with the recent discussions at Cairo, we might make strong representations to the Turks requesting a change in their attitude.

II. Public Relations.

A. Observations

Although I realize fully the great secrecy under which the formulation of plans and the undertaking of negotiations on behalf of refugees must be carried on, I believe this Government should seize upon every opportunity to release information to the public concerning this Government's efforts on behalf of refugees. As illustrations, I suggest the following:
(1) A statement setting forth clearly the eagerness of the Government to receive and to consider the suggestions and plans of the public with respect to refugees.

(2) A release announcing the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the invitation to join the Intergovernmental Committee could include some general information on the activities and purpose of the Intergovernmental Committee.

(3) A release on the decision to open offices in Madrid, Lisbon, Naples, and Algiers could also mention some of the past activities of the IGC.

B. Specific Actions Recommended

(1) The President should issue a strong public statement, either singly or in conjunction with Stalin and Churchill, guaranteeing that any persons escaping from Axis Europe will be cared for during the remainder of the war and will be offered the opportunity of returning to their homes after the war. This statement should be given the widest circulation possible, and should be short-waved to the occupied territories.

(2) The full resources of the Office of War Information should be marshalled to conduct a propaganda campaign for the purpose of encouraging Jews and other persecuted peoples within Europe to escape and of inducing Germans and satellite nationals to assist them and to lighten the severe measures directed against them.

(3) The Government should seize every opportunity to release information regarding this Government's efforts on behalf of refugees.

III. Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees.

1. Powers and Administration.
A. Observations

The Committee has acted very slowly. While this may be inevitable for international bodies of this type, we must take every measure to accelerate its activity. Illustrative of this slowness are:

(1) Although on November 20, we suggested the opening of offices in certain neutral countries to assist refugees, the Committee did not consider this officially until its meeting on January 4.

(2) The January 4 meeting was only the fourth meeting of the Executive Committee in spite of the fact that all its members reside in London.

(3) Several of the studies or actions recommended by the Bermuda Conference last spring have apparently not been completed.

B. Points for Consideration

(1) Would a committee of neutrals only or an executive committee of neutrals only be in a stronger position in dealing with Germany, its satellites, and other neutrals, or is British and American representation necessary in order to obtain action?

(2) Although I understand the Argentine representative on the Executive Committee has been helpful, should Argentina continue to be represented on the Committee in view of present developments and the anti-Semitic character of certain acts of the Argentine Government?

(3) In view of the acceptance by the Soviet Union of membership on the Intergovernmental Committee, would the Executive Committee be strengthened if Russia were made a member of the Executive Committee perhaps in place of Argentina?
C. Specific Actions Recommended

(1) An adequate staff for the secretariat should immediately be provided.

(2) We should inquire confidentially of Ambassador Winant if the Directors and the Executive Committee could be strengthened. We should be prepared to follow his recommendations.

(3) In conjunction with the British we should urge prompt acceptance by the several nations of the invitations extended to them to join the Intergovernmental Committee.

(4) We should take steps to see that the Executive Committee functions actively and holds regular and frequent meetings. Otherwise we should not be able to avoid the delays which have occurred in the past. I think meetings should be held at least once a month, and that special meetings should be convened promptly whenever important matters, such as the opening of offices, are presented to the Committee.

(5) In conjunction with the British, we should press the other member governments to ratify promptly the revised and broadened mandate submitted to them.

(6) The other member governments should be pressed to ratify the declaration now being circulated among them which would guarantee the right of any refugee to return to his native land after the war if he desires.

(7) The relationship between UNRRA and the IGC should be clarified, as should also the relationship between UNRRA and MERRA.

2. Opening of Offices.

A. Observations

At its meeting on January 4, the Committee approved the opening of offices in Lisbon, Madrid,
Algiers, and Naples. It approved in principle
the appointment of a liaison officer with MERRA
at Cairo, who would also represent the IGO at
Ankara. Negotiations are required with the
Spanish and Portuguese Governments, however,
before offices there may be opened. Mr. Malin
is expected to make necessary arrangements for
the Algiers and Naples offices on his forthcom-
ing trip.

B. Points for Consideration

Should additional offices of this type be es-
established in special centers as Bern and Stock-
holm?

C. Specific Actions Recommended

(1) The negotiations with the Portuguese and
Spanish Governments should be pressed in
order for the offices to be established in
time to assist in any movements of refu-
gees which may develop as a result of the
actions herein recommended or from other
causes.

(2) In view of the expected movement of refu-
gees out of Rumania and perhaps Bulgaria,
we should ask the IGO to reconsider the
need to open an office at Ankara or Istan-
bul.

IV. Treatment of Refugees Who Have Escaped from Axis
Europa.

A. Observations

In many of the countries in which they have
taken temporary asylum, refugees have been con-
fined in camps, and their economic and social
activities have been most severely restricted.
This undoubtedly has had a most depressing effect
on them psychologically. Also, many refugees
with visas for Palestine and for other countries
are unable to proceed there because of the lack
of available shipping in which to transport them.
In addition, it seems unfortunate that in view of
the conditions of labor scarcity which exist in many countries including the United States, there should be immobilized relatively large groups of people among whom there may be a few highly skilled persons and many useful laborers. A partial solution to this question might be achieved through vigorous action on the part of the Intergovernmental Committee or perhaps by the British and American Governments.

B. Points for Consideration

(1) In considering various countries which might be willing to receive large groups of refugees, have we given appropriate thought to the possibility of admitting similar groups to the U.S.? While our visa policy has been most liberal, not all the persons to whom visas have been issued have been able to make their way to the U.S. It may be appropriate, therefore, for us to reexamine the situation with a view to undertaking to transport to this country for temporary residence large groups of refugees such as we contemplate moving to Mexico. It might not be necessary to extend to these people all the economic and social advantages which ordinarily accrue to immigrants but perhaps we shall not be bearing our full share of the burden of refugees unless we are willing to transport to this country and to receive in this country large groups of destitute and helpless refugees.

(2) Can a movement of refugees to Palestine be initiated from existing temporary havens? If such a movement were started and if it could be demonstrated that additional immigrants were being admitted to Palestine by the British, a certain amount of criticism might be allayed.

(3) If it is true that the majority of persons now escaping from Europe are young men, can they be inducted into appropriate armies of the several Allied powers and given an opportunity to liberate their homelands?
C. Specific Actions Recommended

(1) All refugees should be carefully classified as to skills in order that they might be used most effectively.

(2) Once classified, the appropriate persons should be transported to countries where labor shortages exist.

(3) Where refugee camps are necessary, the physical surroundings should be made reasonably healthful and attractive.

(4) If the volume of escaping refugees should warrant it, additional camps in which to receive and to assemble them should immediately be constructed.

(5) Negotiations should be undertaken with neutrals immediately to obtain shipping with which to transport refugees in Spain and elsewhere to Palestine or to other havens of refuge. In Spain at the present time there are several hundred so-called stateless Jews with visas for Palestine who are unable to proceed there because there is no shipping available. (One ship has now been obtained for this purpose.) By reason of the strength of our position with respect to the neutral governments and inasmuch as the Mediterranean is no longer dominated by Axis planes and submarines, it should be possible to obtain the small amount of neutral shipping required to transport these people from Spain.
CIRCULAR AIRGRAM TO ALL U.S. MISSIONS EXCEPT LONDON, CIUDAD TRUJILLO,
SAN SALVADOR, PORT-AU-PRINCE, TEGUCIGALPA, LA PAZ, AND BUENOS AIRES

February 29, 1944

THE FOLLOWING AIRGRAM IS SENT AT THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT'S WAR
REFUGEE BOARD:

REFER TO DEPARTMENT'S CABLE OF JANUARY 25 CONCERNING THE PRESIDENT'S
EXECUTIVE ORDER ESTABLISHING THE WAR REFUGEE BOARD AND DECLARING THE
POLICY OF THIS GOVERNMENT.

ROUNDING THIS MATTER WITH THE FOREIGN OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT
TO WHICH YOU ARE ACCLIMATED, YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WAR REFUGEE BOARD REPRESENTS THIS GOVERNMENT'S
DETERMINATION EFFECTIVE TO CARRY OUT WITHOUT DELAY THE POLICY TO TAKE
ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES FOR THE SPEEDY RESCUE AND RELIEF OF THE REFUGEES
OF EUROPE.

ALTHOUGH THIS GOVERNMENT ON ITS PART INTENDS TO TAKE ALL POSSIBLE
ACTION WITH ALL POSSIBLE SPEED, WE FEEL certain THAT THIS EFFORT WILL
NOT BE UNILATERAL AND WE WISH TO MAKE IT CLEAR THAT IT CONTINUES TO BE
THE POLICY OF THIS GOVERNMENT TO ENHANCE AND PARTICIPATE IN EFFECTIVE
COOPERATIVE EFFORTS WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS.

AS THE PRESIDENT HAS STATED, THE BOARD OF COURSE WILL COOPERATE
FULLY WITH ALL INTERESTED INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.

YOU ARE REQUESTED TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE GOVERNMENT TO WHICH YOU
ARE ACCLIMATED THE POLICIES OF THIS GOVERNMENT AND OUR DESIRE FOR ITS
COOPERATIVE ACTION. YOU SHOULD EXPLORE WITH THE APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS
OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE THE POSSIBILITY OF IMPLEMENTING SUCH COOPERATION
THROUGH THE ISSUANCE BY THEIR GOVERNMENT OF A DECLARATION OF POLICY
SIMILAR TO THAT MADE BY THE PRESIDENT AND THE ISSUANCE BY THE FOREIGN
OFFICE OF INSTRUCTIONS TO ITS REPRESENTATIVES IN OTHER COUNTRIES
COMPARABLE TO THE INSTRUCTIONS CONTAINED IN THE DEPARTMENT'S TELEGRAM
OF JANUARY 25.

PLEASE KEEP US INFORMED ON THIS MATTER.

STETTINUS

( This copy made from
the bible)
FEB 17 1944

Re: Relief and Evacuation Projects for Refugees in European countries.

1. Jews with Turkish Passports in France.

This matter was apparently raised in a letter from Rabbi James Waterman Wise of the World Jewish Congress to Breckinridge Long, of the State Department. The letter quoted a cable from the World Jewish Congress representative in Lisbon stating that about 10,000 Jews of Turkish nationality, living in France for generations were in danger of being deported to Poland as apatrides. Both the letter from Rabbi Wise and the cable from the Lisbon representative of the WJC urged intervention with the Turkish Government to save these persons, probably through provisional recognition of them as Turkish citizens.

On the basis of this communication, draft cables were prepared in the Visa Division of the State Department for transmission to our Embassies at Ankara, Turkey, and London, England. The gist of the cable to Turkey was to call attention to the plight of the Turkish Jews in France and contained the following language:

"Please bring to the attention of appropriate Turkish officials the fate of these persons if they are to be considered as stateless and endeavor to have Turkish Government recognize them provisionally as Turkish subjects."

The cable to London merely quoted the text of the cable from WJC in Lisbon, asking that it be brought to the attention of the IGO Director for his views.

These cables were killed by the following note, on January 10, 1944, from the Division of European Affairs, written by Mr. Achilles:

"Even in an election year it seems a little rough to endeavor to have Turkish Government recognize as Turkish citizens persons who have been living in France 'since generations'. This is your worry rather than ours but you may wish to tone down that sentence."

References are to titles as given in study transmitted by Department of State in letter of 1 February 1944 from Mr. Howard K. Travurs, Chief, Visa Division.

Not dealt with in material submitted with Travurs' letter.

Dated December 29, 1943 - In file Refugee Groups - Jews with Turkish Passports in France. Unless otherwise indicated all material under this heading is from this file, which was found in the Visa Division of the Department of State.
Evidently Rabbi Wise had sent a personal cable to Ambassador Steinhardt in Turkey with reference to this problem for, on January 10, 1944, Steinhardt asked the State Department to tell Rabbi Wise that he had discussed the matter informally with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs. The latter agreed to do "whatever he finds possible to afford protection" and that "[i]nsofar as concerns those who are able to establish Turkish citizenship he will demand the same treatment for them as is accorded other Turkish citizens." However, it was indicated that "[i]nsofar as concerns those who are unable to establish Turkish citizenship he [the Turkish Foreign Minister] is doubtful the Vichy authorities will recognize his right to intervene on their behalf." In the light of this communication it was decided by Mr. George V. Allen, of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs, that the draft cable to Ankara was entirely unnecessary and that the proposed cable to London should be changed.

Mr. Travers, Chief of the Visa Division, telephoned Steinhardt's message to Rabbi Wise on 11 January 1944 and on the same day confirmed his conversation by a letter which summarized the cable from Steinhardt.

On 23 January 1944, Steinhardt sent a cable, evidently in response to a cable No. 67 of January 25, 1944, which was not contained in the file. This cable related that he had again discussed the jeopardy of the Turkish Jews in France with the Turkish Foreign Minister and urged the latter to extend the maximum possible protection. The reply from Numan, the Turkish Foreign Minister, was, according to Steinhardt, "that on humanitarian grounds the Turkish Government would exert itself to the utmost to afford protection in those cases."

This is the last communication in the file and there is no evidence that the matter was ever discussed with the Turkish Embassy in Washington. Both that course, and the making of further representations to the Turkish Foreign Office, would appear in order. It would seem that the line to be taken would be to urge the Turkish Government provisionally to recognize the Jews of Turkish nationality in France as citizens and to press the Vichy and Nazi Governments for their release, presumably to Turkey.

2. Stateless Refugees from Spain to North Africa.

The problem of dealing with the variously estimated figure of some 1600 stateless refugees in Spain, most of whom are Jews, was evidently first raised by the British. Our Ambassador to Spain, Mr. Hayes, cabled the State Department on April 13, 1943 that he had been approached on this subject.

This had evidently been preceded by discussions in Washington between the British Embassy and Assistant Secretary Long. The initial proposal apparently covered the establishment of a camp in North Africa for refugees of all nationalities, including

\[footnote{No. 173, January 28, 10 p.m. from Ankara.}

\[footnote{Madrid's No. 804, April 2, 1944, 10 p.m. to Department - En file Refugees Groups - Stateless Refugees from Spain to North Africa. Unless otherwise indicated all other material under this heading is from this file, found in the Visa Division of the Department of State.}
stateless persons who could be evacuated from Spain. Hayez in Madrid, professing lack of information on the question, took the position with the British Ambassador that the matter was one which would require considerable thought, that it might not prove practical to add this burden to the other very heavy burdens on our representatives and on the French in North Africa and that, anyway, a conference on refugees was shortly to meet to discuss the whole question. 9

A conference had, in fact, been held in Washington on 24 March 1943, between Sir Ronald Campbell, of the British Embassy, and Assistant Secretary Long. At this conference the British wanted immediate action for the evacuation of all refugees from Spain and the establishment of a camp in North Africa. Long, apparently following the "party line" laid out in advance, replied that "that suggestion could not be accepted, that it was not practical from the viewpoint of being feasible, nor was it possible from the political viewpoint. He stated that because of the political entity of French North Africa we would not be in a position to establish an internment camp there under conditions now existing." 9

In the course of this discussion it was indicated that, as of 24 March 1943, plans were under way for the evacuation of 1,000 persons, for whose vessels were being provided by the British Government; that 180 had already been transferred; that our Embassy had been active and made funds available, as had private individuals; that the British had agreed to send 1,000 to Palestine; and that, as of 24 March 1943, there were 10,000 refugees in Spain, of which 7,500 were French. It would appear that those actually evacuated were French.

British pressure continued, however, and the Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, was evidently obliged to write a letter to the United States Chiefs of Staff on 23 April 1943. This letter was not contained in the file. From the tone of the responding letter from Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, it would appear that Hull had pressed the British, enrolling the transportation of from 3,000 to 5,000 refugees, largely Jewish and of enemy nationality or stateless, to North Africa. The Joint Chiefs of Staff rejected this proposal 10/ because (1) it would require the utilization of personnel shipping capacity which is urgently needed for military purposes; (2) it would require a constant utilization of cargo shipping for food and supply; (3) it would put an added and unwarranted administrative responsibility on the Supreme Commander in North Africa; and (4) "the influx of a considerable group of Jewish refugees to North Africa might cause such resentment on the part of the Arab population as to necessitate military action to maintain order." In this connection it is interesting to note that the following pencilled comment appears in the margin alongside objection (4) "Not pertinent French ships available."

8/ See Madrid's 627 of April 6, 1943, 8 p.m.
9/ See Department's No. 777 of April 6, 1943, 5 p.m. to Madrid, quoting conference memo of Long.
10/ See letter from Admiral William D. Leahy to the Secretary of State, dated 26 April 1943.
Two days later Sir Ronald Campbell, British Minister, called again at the State Department, this time conferring with the then Under Secretary, Mr. Welles. He presented an aide memoire, dated 27 April 1943, urging the establishment of a North African camp for Allied and stateless refugees in Spain and Portugal. To the aide memoire was attached a copy of proposal presented by the British Delegation to the Bermuda Refugee Conference. 12/ The British Delegation at the Bermuda Conference, evidently at the behest of Foreign Secretary Eden, had urged the establishment of this camp. The proposal pointed out that there were about 21,000 refugees in Spain; 11,000 French nationals, mostly of military age and for whom removal arrangements were then under way; about 3000 were Poles and Czechs of military age; and the remaining 4000-5000 are largely Jewish and of enemy nationality or stateless. At the Conference referred to above, Welles outlined that General D'Allem, of French North Africa, had been requested to agree and that, if he did and the J.C.S. persisted in their objections, the matter would be taken up with the President. 13/ Evidently the British also submitted their views to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, through the British Chiefs of Staff on 30 April 1943, and Hull was informed on 7 May 1943 by Admiral Leahy 14/ that, after reconsideration of the matter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff adhered to their objections.

At this point the matter was presented by Secretary Hull to the President who approved it, as follows: "I agree that North Africa may be used as a depot for these refugees but not as a permanent residence without full approval of all authorities. I know, in fact, that there is plenty of room for them in North Africa, but I raise the question of sending large numbers of Jews there. That would be extremely unwise." 15/ The issue was apparently presented to the President in a letter from Hull and the President's reply was evidently written. Such documents were not contained in the file. The memorandum referring to this matter concludes as follows:

"It is assumed that the President's point that large numbers of Jews should not be sent to North Africa is not applicable in this present case. The total number of stateless and enemy refugees in Spain does not exceed 6000. Not all of these people will be able to leave Spain even though transportation can be arranged and not all of those who can go will be Jewish. It is not possible at the present time to state definitely the number of Jewish people who could be evacuated from Spain but several thousand such persons will hardly be considered as excessive in number."

Governor Lehman was informed of the decision to establish the camp for Jewish persons who are stateless or of enemy nationality. 16/ However, the arrangements evidently were still regarded as tentative, this time to await a reply to an inquiry made to Prime Minister Churchill by the President. At least, at a conference between Sir Ronald Campbell, of the British Embassy, and Assistant Secretary Long, it was pointed out that the President had discussed the matter with the Prime Minister, on the occasion of the latter's recent visit. He stated that he had

12/ Both the aide memoire and the proposal presented at Bermuda are contained in the file referred to above.
13/ Letter in file referred to above.
14/ From memorandum to Secretary Hull, dated 22 June 1943.
15/ Letter of 5 June 1943 from Long. In file referred to above.
to refer it to London. Assistant Secretary Long added the following paragraph to his memorandum of this conference: 16

"I also told Sir Ronald of a very interesting telegram which had been brought to our attention from Rabbi Perlweig which possibly his Government had also had access to and which indicated a change of policy and possibly of mind of some of the gentlemen who had been very active, and which further indicated that they were convinced that no very real results could be obtained in the movement for the evacuation of Jewish people from territory held by the enemy. Their new point of view seemed to be realistic and in line with the beliefs of our two Governments as indicated at Bermuda." *(Underlining supplied.)*

Under date of 30 June 1943, the Prime Minister sent the following personal message to the President with respect to the assistance of refugees:

"The need for assistance of refugees, in particular Jewish refugees, has not grown less since we discussed the question and all possible outlets need to be kept open. Of these the most practical still is North Africa, and I hope the difficulties over the proposed refugee camp have now been cleared up, and that an early practical decision is now possible. Our immediate facilities for helping victims of Hitler's anti-Jewish drive are so limited at present that the opening of the small camp proposed for the purpose of removing some of them to safety seems all the more incumbent on us, and I should be grateful if you could let me know whether it has been found possible to bring the scheme into operation. General Giraud has given the project his general approval." 17

Sometime between 5 July 1943 and 9 July 1943 the President transmitted to the Prime Minister the details of the plan for the establishment of the refugee camp in North Africa and for the transportation of refugees there to. Generally speaking it covered 5000-6000 stateless or enemy nationality refugees in Spain; called for Generals Eisenhower and Giraud, who had agreed to the plan, to designate a campsite in Morocco as a place of temporary residence for those refugees escaping from Axis territory into Spain; the United States transporting the refugees by land to a selected Portuguese port of embarkation; the British arranging for sea transport from Portugal to a port in North Africa; the American military authorities arranging for cots and tents to meet emergency needs; the United States arranging for a temporary reception center of more substantial character; the cost of transportation and maintenance at temporary residence, pending permanent disposition, to be borne equally by both Governments; OPM to carry on administration for refugees at place of temporary residence, with aid and cooperation of the British; expressing agreement that a permanent place, such as perhaps, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica or Madagascar, be decided upon; and that the transportation to such place and care while there be under the

16 Long's memorandum of conference held 1 June 1943. See Exhibit "A".
17 Mr. Churchill's No. 339, 30 June 1943. See Exhibit "B".
18 Draft of cable sent to Churchill, and explanatory memo. from Hull to the President, dated 5 July 1943. See Exhibit "C".
Executive Committee of the ITO. The Prime Minister concurred completely with these suggestions on 10 July 1943. 27

Appropriate instructions were transmitted to the War Department 28 and to Mr. Robert B. Murphy, at Algiers, Algeria. 29 On 17 July 1943, 5000,000 were transferred from the President's Emergency Fund to OFNO to defray the expenses of this operation. 30 Further details were transmitted to OFNO's representative, Fryer, at Algiers, indicating generally that the American and British Embassies in Spain and Portugal would handle matters in those areas with the assistance of Charles Hockaday of OFNO, already in Spain. 31 Mr. Fryer's attitude on the project had, perhaps, been epitomized in a confidential letter which he wrote to Governor Lehamn on 30 June 1943, containing the following statement with respect to bringing the refugees to North Africa: 32

"But if they are to be subjected to the same hindrances and indignities on the part of the French or the political prisoners only recently released from concentration camps, then I think we should have nothing to do with it, because no matter what we call our project, it would be a concentration camp."

Fryer then goes on to point out that he prefers to have them there as free members of society or not at all.

On 11 August 1943, Algiers advised that Camp Harechal Lyautay, 10 miles north of Casablanca near Fedala, had been selected by the American authorities as the site for the refugee center, and the French had been requested to agree. 33 This selection was approved by Washington on 17 August 1943. 34

On 13 August 1943, the American Embassy at Madrid was advised in detail of the arrangements made, the cable indicating that immediate quarters would be available for 1500 with the understanding that additional space for the entire number, about 6000, might subsequently be required. It was emphasized, as it had been from the start, that freedom would be accorded to the refugees to avoid the implication that the United States was running a concentration camp. 35 A copy of this cable was ordered furnished to Lisbon. Madrid advised, on 24 August 1943, that there were between 1500 and 2000 enemy and non-nationality refugees in Spain, 600 of whom held visas for Palestine and about 60% of them were able-bodies males. 36

27 No. 367 of 10 July 1943 from the Prime Minister to the President of the United States. See Exhibit "88.
28 Letter of 16 July 1943 from President to Stimson.
29 Cable No. 1393 of 17 July 1943 from Department to Algiers.
30 Letter of 16 July 1943 from O. Hanlon Shaw, Assistant Secretary of State, to Harold D. Smith, Director, Bureau of the Budget; letter of 17 July 1943 from the President to the Secretary of the Treasury.
31 Cable no. 1076 of 10 August 1943, 2 p.m. from Department to Murphy and Fryer.
32 Letter of 30 June 1943 from Mr. Fryer, Chief, Relief and Welfare Division, NARR, to Governor Herbert Lehamn, contained in file of R. Richard Wolff, UHRRA.
33 Cable no. 1397, 11 August 1943, 2 p.m. from Algiers.
34 No. 1570 of 17 August 1943, 10 p.m. from Algiers.
35 No. 1770 of 19 August 1943, 11 p.m. from Department to Madrid.
36 No. 2275 of 24 August 1943, 1 p.m. from Madrid to Department.
In the period while the collection of the campsites was being considered, and the ascent of the French thereto obtained, various miscellaneous arrangements were made. On London's suggestion, it was agreed that the initial selection of miscellaneous internes in Spain for transfer to North Africa would be made in Madrid by joint action of the United States, the United Kingdom and the U.S., with the United States Ambassador in Spain designating the chairman and the American representative. This scheme did not, however, meet with the approval of ambassador Hayes in Madrid, and he proposed an alternative involving selection of evaucues by David Brickmoff, the Madrid representative of American charitable organizations, as the one best equipped with all information. This was accepted by the Department and detailed information on refugees asked for. It was understood that the Spanish would not be approached on the matter until the location of the campsites had been agreed to by the French.

A preliminary cross-section analysis of the refugees without nationality, or with enemy nationalities, in Spain revealed a total of 1600. 74% were males and 26% females. 11% were under 20 years of age; 33% were 21–30; 25%, 31–40; 18%, 41–50; and 12% over 50. 29% were formerly Polish; 26%, German; 13%, Austrian; 10%, Hungarian; and 2% of other nationalities. 3% are without profession or of unknown profession; 11%, children or students; 5% represented all common trades and professions in small percentages.

After numerous cable exchanges, all of which indicated that the delay in choosing the campsites was due to the French, General Eisenhower having agreed to the use of Camp Laresch in Syria, a limited and quite unsatisfactory concurrence was finally given on 4 October 1943. Since most of the refugees were of enemy nationality, the counterparts of whom would ordinarily be interned in French Africa (unless they had served in the foreign legion, had relatives in the Allied Armies, or had rendered exceptional service to France), the French did not feel they could allow them out of the camp, or permit them to accept outside work unless they fell within the excepted classes, and then only on residential permit. The French also insisted on their security services taking charge, in cooperation with the persons running the camp, of the surveillance of refugees, and limited the maximum number of refugees to 2000 at any one time.

In other words, to concur with the French conditions would mean virtual internment.

27/ No. 3717 of 30 August 1943, 7 p.m. to Department from London.
28/ No. 5913 of 1 September 1943, midnight, to London from Department.
29/ No. 2622 of 7 September 1943, 4 p.m. to Department from Madrid.
30/ No. 2674, 20 September 1943, 5 p.m. to Department from Madrid.
31/ No. 2020, 28 September 1943, 6 p.m. from Department to Madrid.
32/ See footnote 32.
33/ No. 2792 of 29 September 1943, 11 p.m. from Department to Madrid.
34/ No. 1519 of 1 September 1943, 6 p.m. to Department from Algiers; no 1722 of 21 September 1943, 6 p.m. from Department to Algiers; no. 1692 of 23 September 1943, 10 p.m. to Department from Algiers.
35/ No. 1700, 4 October 1943, 2 p.m. from Algiers to Department.
for the refugees. This was vigorously objected to in a cable to Algiers, and Mr. Robert D. Murphy was urged to induce the French to adopt a liberal and more humanitarian stand. The British Foreign Office urged concurrence, provided that the French would interpret the conditions liberally.

The next month was devoted to an exchange of cables discussing various aspects of the arrangements and further delays were occasioned by French reconsideration of their position. This was indicated in a cable from Algiers which, among other things, contained the following comments:

"Information which has reached us from Spain through the Jewish Distribution Committee and other persons dealing with the refugees problem in Spain, however, indicates that the problem of providing temporary refuge in North Africa may have changed materially since the question was first discussed at the Bermuda Conference. We understand that the majority of the refugees are now at liberty in Spain, where they are being supported through the efforts of the J.D.C. and others, and evidence little desire to be removed further from their homelands. The progress of the war has apparently altered their situation and there seems little likelihood that they will be deported to Germany."

The cable then goes on to suggest that it might be wise to canvass the refugee sentiment in Spain, outlining the program to the refugees, before deciding upon the size of the camp. London, to which this cable had been repeated, communicated the objections of the Foreign Office and the F.C. to Murphy's plan, pointing out that present estimates placed the number wishing to go at from 1500-2000. Madrid expressed the feeling that the Spanish were annoyed at the presence and long stay of refugees and might well intern or imprison them if their stay was prolonged. The Department concurred in these views.

The British apparently altered their position on the desirability of the French conditions imposed and agreed to approach the French along the lines of our reaction. On 9 November 1943 the French in Algiers responded to Murphy's note with respect to the conditions sought by the French to be imposed on the refugees. The note of the French spoke as if Murphy had agreed to the French plan, but had suggested changes. The French relaxed somewhat, admitting the right to work, after permission was granted, provided it would not cause

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No. 2969 of 35 October 1943, 11 p.m., from Department to Algiers.
37 No. 7319 of 31 October 1943, from London to Department.
No. 1811 of 21 October 1943, 5 p.m., from Algiers to Department. See Exhibit No.
No. 7317 of 23 October 1943, 5 p.m., from London to Department.
No. 3106 of 25 October 1943, from Madrid to Department.
No. 2071 of 8 November 1943, 11 a.m., to Algiers from Department.
No. 7311 of 25 October 1943, 4 p.m., and No. 7452 of 28 October 1943, 4 p.m., from London to Department.
disadvantage to the local economy and indicating that those who did not work might be allowed to leave the camp under certain circumstances.\textsuperscript{12} The Foreign Office urged approval\textsuperscript{13} and the Department accepted on 26 November 1943, so advising Madrid and London.\textsuperscript{14} The battle over the campsites was concluded.

More details were, however, further to delay the evacuation. OFFSHO decided to send Moses William Beckelman, who had left the United States on 13 November 1943, from North Africa to Madrid and Lisbon to aid in making the arrangements.\textsuperscript{15} His commission was to be to investigate the type of refugees to be evacuated and to return with an advance party of selected refugees to assist in arranging the camp and to receive the main body of refugees as soon as they are accepted and could be transported.\textsuperscript{16} Beckelman left French North Africa sometime shortly after the first of the year.\textsuperscript{17}

There were also many administrative details to be worked out. Of the initial $500,000 made available for the project, \$450,000 were transferred from the State Department to the Director of the FIA in the first week of December 1943, \$50,000 having been previously allotted to the American Consulate General, Algiers, Algeria, the unexpended balance of which was expected to be transferred to FIA.\textsuperscript{18} It was planned that Great Britain and the United States each make \$100,000 available to their respective Consulates at Casablanca, to be deposited in a bank account to be drawn upon by the project director.\textsuperscript{19}

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\textsuperscript{17} No. 1977, 21 November 1943, 10 p.m. from Algiers to Department.
\textsuperscript{18} No. 12, 26 November 1943, 10 p.m. to Algiers from Department.
\textsuperscript{19} No. 8211, 21 November 1943, from London to Department.
\textsuperscript{20} No. 6 of 21 November 1943, from London to Department; No. 102 of December 6, 1943, 9 p.m. to Department from Algiers.
\textsuperscript{21} No. 102 of 6 December 1943, 8 p.m. to Department from Algiers.
\textsuperscript{22} No. 121 of 21 January 1944, 6 p.m. from Department to Madrid.
\textsuperscript{23} Memorandum from H. K. Travess to Mr. Grant, 7 December 1943.
\textsuperscript{24} Memorandum of 15 December 1943 from E. G. Burland, Acting Chief, Division of Field Operation, to Howard K. Travess, Chief, Visa Division; No. 19 of 17 December 1942 from Department to London; Letter of 31 December 1943 from S. S. Sheppard, Acting Assistant Administrator for Budget and Administrative Planning to G. Howland Shaw, Assistant Secretary of State; cable of 5 January 1944, 11 a.m. from London to Department; no. 367 of 15 January 1944, midnight, to London from Department; no. 121, 17 January 1944, 6 p.m. to Department from London; no. 576, 21 January 1944, to Department from London.
The problem of collecting and screening the refugees for health purposes was also a cause for delay. It was indicated that the refugees were scattered throughout Spain, that they would have to be collected at a central point, given physical examinations, checked with intelligence groups, etc., before being sent on.

It was reported that about 567 persons left for Palestine on 25 January 1944, and that about 1,000 stateless persons, as well as several hundred Poles, Czechs, Belgians, Dutch, remained in Spain. Screening is now being done by the Beckerman Group, with the assistance of the British, against a check in French North Africa by the French, after which the deportees will be requested to issue exit visas and travel documents. Meanwhile, food, clothing, and shelter arrangements, including medical supplies, have evidently been worked out in North Africa.

It is not at all clear just how this group of refugees is being supported while in Spain. It was the view of Miss Flexner, of UNRRA, that the United States has not made any financial contribution to the support of enemy nationality or stateless refugees in Spain who were not in camps, but that the JDC had always supported such refugees, contributing three dollars a day per person. There was evidence that the United States had contributed about $240,000, first from OPA funds, but later reimbursed from the President's Emergency Fund, which was used exclusively for French and American refugees. The Red Cross sent several tons of food for the purpose of supplementing the diets of refugees in camps. Likewise the Governments in Exile were said to have aided their nationals who are refugees in Spain.

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57 No. 239, 27 January 1944, 10 a.m., from Madrid to Department; Airgram No. A-39, 27 January 1944, 12 noon, from Madrid to Department.
58 No. 309, 3 February 1944, 9 a.m., from Madrid to Department.
59 No. 313, 23 January 1944, 12 p.m., from Airgrams to Department.
60 This material was obtained from conference with Miss Flexner of UNRRA. See Mr. Friedland's memorandum of 12 February 1944, summarizing this situation.
61 Idem. See, generally, file "Refugee Groups - Stateless Refugees From Spain to North Africa."
62 Idem.
Memorandum of Conversation
A-I
June 4, 1943

Subject: Refugees to North Africa and related subjects.

Participants: Sir Ronald Campbell, British Embassy; Mr. Long.

Copies to:

Sir Ronald came in this morning at his request and asked for an answer, if possible, to the inquiry made to the Secretary of State by Lord Halifax and subsequently referred to by Sir Ronald in a conversation with Mr. Welles and which was the subject of a memorandum from Mr. Welles.

I told Sir Ronald that perhaps Lord Halifax had received from his Government information which indicated to him that arrangements of a definite character had been made for the reception of refugees in North Africa when that was not exactly the case. I then proceeded to explain that while the Jewish authorities had agreed in principle and while the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had disagreed, and while the matter had been brought to the attention of the White House, it was all related to the general subject of refugees, which had been the reason for the Arcadia Conference. This Conference had reported and recommended the convocation of the Executive Committee of the Inter-governmental Committee on Refugees. Before we attended that Committee meeting or specifically sponsored its convocation, the American Government had felt that the American delegate ought to have certain definite authority. The matter had been referred to the President during the visit of the Prime Minister. We have now been informed that the President discussed the matter with Mr. Churchill but that Mr. Churchill had stated that it would be necessary for him to consult his authorities in London before he could give a definitive answer and go along with the President. The President had not yet heard from Mr. Churchill. Consequently, while the matter had been referred "across the street" by us, it had been referred "across the ocean" by Mr. Churchill and we were still waiting to hear from England.

I went on to express the deep interest we had had in reviewing the situation as it existed in Spain, stating that we would be very glad to see that whole situation picked up by the Intergovernmental Executive Committee and carried forward.

I also told Sir Ronald of a very interesting telegram which had been brought to our attention from Rabbi Perlisweig which possibly his Government had also had access to and which indicated a change of policy and possibly of mind of some of the gentlemen who had been very active, and which further indicated that they were convinced that no very real results could be obtained
in the movement for the evacuation of Jewish people from territory held
by the enemy. Their new point of view seemed to be realistic and in
line with the policies of our two governments as indicated at Bermuda.

E.L.

A-1:165:42
EXHIBIT "B"

BRITISH EMBASSY
WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 30th, 1943.

Dear Mr. Hull,

I send you herewith a copy of a message sent by the Prime Minister to the President on June 30th about the proposed refugee camp in North Africa.

Yours very sincerely,

Signed—Halifax

The Honorable
Cordell Hull,
Secretary of State of the United States,
Washington, D. C.
Text of a telegram received from the Foreign Office on June 30th.

Following is text of a message sent by the Prime Minister to the President on June 30th.

Personal and

Begins,

The need for assistance of refugees, in particular Jewish refugees, has not grown less since we discussed the question and all possible outlets need to be kept open. Of these the most practical still is North Africa, and I hope the difficulties over the proposed refugee camp there have now been cleared up, and that an early practical decision is now possible. Our immediate facilities for helping victims of Hitler's anti-Jewish drive are so limited at present that the opening of the small camp proposed for the purpose of removing some of them to safety seems all the more incumbent on us, and I should be grateful if you could let me know whether it has been found possible to bring the scheme into operation. General Giraud has given the project his general approval.
July 9, 1943.

To the Secretary of State:

I thank you for your memorandums numbered 309 of July 5th, by which you have forwarded to me a recommended message to the Prime Minister in response to his 339.

I have sent the message and I request that you initiate the measures listed in the fourth paragraph of your memorandum.

Signed—P.D.S.
Attached is a proposed draft of a message for you to send to the
Prime Minister in response to his letter.

I believe I can confidently state that funds which have been made
available out of your funds are still available in sufficient quantity to
cover our share of the cost of rail transportation out of Spain and our
share of the sea transportation from Portugal to the west coast of North
Africa. So I shall not have to trouble you on that account.

However, it means that the cost of maintenance of those persons in Africa
will have to be arranged. It probably can be done partly through Lend Lease
and partly through the use of military cargo and tents supplied by the Army.
There are certain other costs of an administrative nature and probably extending
to certain items of maintenance which may have to be delayed. Governor
Lahan will be in charge of these phases of the operation and will continue
in charge as at least until the refugees can be removed from their place of
temporary residence in Africa to a more permanent place of settlement.
There are between 5,000 and 6,000 of these refugees with probably more to
come. While the total bill for maintenance is indeterminate Governor Lahan feels
that he should be assured of a sum which for different items and over
an indefinite period may run to five hundred thousand dollars of United
States funds.

In order to institute this program a few authorizations are necessary:

1. To ask Mr. Murphy to obtain from Generals Eisenhower and Giraud a
definite location;
2. To Lend Lease to supply necessary items of food and supplies;
3. To the Army to supply tents, cots and pertinent equipment;
4. To allot to Governor Lahan $500,000 or as much thereof as may
   be necessary, to meet other administrative and maintenance costs.
The initial will assume an equal part of the total cost.

In this connection there should be noted that the project to open
a temporary residence on the Atlantic coast of North Africa (which
is the subject matter of the Prime Minister's cable but which is
only one phase of this whole program) has been approved in principle
by Generals Eisenhower and Giraud, by the London Conference and the
Combined Chiefs of Staff and by the Department of State, but the
U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have withheld their agreement.

The proposed telegram to the Prime Minister is based on the assumption
that you will care to proceed with this broad policy and to authorize the
directives necessary to its implementation.

Enclosure:
Draft message to Mr. Churchill.
A-L:31313 7/3/13 OFR A-S Br A-1/B
This refers to your 339, June 30, 1943, regarding provision for refugees in North Africa.

I will set out the elements of the problem as I understand them:

1. There are at present an estimated five or six thousand stateless or enemy-nationality refugees in Spain to be moved, largely of the Jewish race.

2. I am asking General Eisenhower and Giraud to designate Logsdon or some other place in French North Africa as a place of temporary residence for these refugees and others who may be able to escape from Axis territory into Spain. They have already agreed in principle to the establishment of such a place of temporary residence.

3. I will arrange for the transportation of these refugees by land from Spain to the selected port in Portugal for their disembarkation.

4. You will arrange for their sea transportation from Portugal to a port in North Africa.

5. I will request the American military authorities to make available tents and tents in sufficient number to meet the emergency needs of the refugees arriving at the temporary place of residence.

6. I will also arrange that preparations will be begun immediately for a temporary reception center of more substantial character where the refugees can be housed and cared for until subsequent arrangements are made for their disposition which should be at the earliest possible moment.

7. The costs of the refugees' transportation from Spain and their maintenance in the place of temporary residence until such time as a more permanent settlement is agreed upon will be borne equally by our two Governments.
1. The work of administration for the refugees at the temporary place of residence will be the responsibility of the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Operations under Governor Lehasen, with representatives of your government cooperating and assisting.

2. I am in complete accord with the thought of the French military authorities in that area that both for political and military reasons it is essential to transfer the refugees, after their arrival at the temporary place of residence, to a place of more permanent settlement for the duration. In this connection the Department of State has just been informed by your Embassy here in response to conversations Lord Hallifax has had with Mr. Lyron Taylor that certain places, among them Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Madagascar, are under active discussion and it appears not impossible that sites may be available there for the refugees. It is also my understanding that a limited number of the refugees may be admitted into Palestine.

3. The subsequent transportation of the refugees from the temporary place of residence to places of more permanent settlement and their continued care thereafter would be provided under the auspices and jurisdiction of the Executive Committee of the Inter-Governmental Committee, the costs thereof to be underwritten jointly by the British and American Governments.

I trust that you will let me know at the earliest convenient moment that we are in complete accord when I shall issue the necessary directives to complement those which you will issue.

Ara

A-1/4/1911

Mr. K. A. Rees

FA/1911

VD EU (Lyron Taylor agrees—3.1)
EXHIBIT #93

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 10, 1943.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE:

The President has directed that the attached paraphrased copy of message No. 357 from the Prime Minister to the President, dated 10 July 1943, be furnished the Secretary of State for preparation of a reply.

Very respectfully,

Signed—CHESTER HAMMOND,
Lt. Colonel, General Staff,
Assistant to the Military Aides.

1 Incl.

DECLASSIFIED
By Deputy Archivist of the U.S.
By W. J. Stewart Date SEP 21 1972
From: The Prime Minister

To: The President of the United States

No.: 357, 10 July 1943

For your message Number 308, I am most grateful.

I agree completely with your suggestions which will provide a solution for our difficulties in Spain. I will give the complementary instructions to our authorities as soon as I hear from you that you have issued the directives to General Eisenhower and Giraud, and to the American Ambassadors in Madrid and Lisbon.

*NOTE: Number 308 was message with reference to refugees in North Africa, prepared by the State Department on 8 July 1943.*
No. 1811, October 21, 5 p.m. from Algiers to the Department.

Department's 1889, October 15, 11 p.m.

Department's views concerning the conditions imposed by the French authorities with regard to the plan for temporary residence of refugees from Spain have been communicated to Massigli who has promised to review the situation in light of the Department's observations and to give an early reply. Massigli fully understands our objection to the establishment of a refugee center organized as a concentration camp and equally wishes to avoid any adverse public criticism.

Information regarding the number of other enemy internes in Morocco was also requested.

With regards to paragraph five of the Department's telegram under reference, the "second replacement center of the Atlantic base section at Fedhala" is the army designation for camp Marshal Lyautey.

Information which has reached us from Spain through the Jewish Distribution Committee and other persons dealing with the refugee problem in Spain, however, indicates that the problem of providing temporary refuge in North Africa may have changed materially since the question was first discussed at the Bermuda Conference. We understand that the majority of the refugees are now at liberty in Spain, where they are being supported through the efforts of the J.D.C. and others, and evidence little desire to be removed further from their homelands. The progress of the war has apparently...
Algeria

21st October, 1943.

Lille, October 23, 1943. to: Algeria

altering their situation and there seems little likelihood that they will be deported to Germany.

Under these circumstances, might it not be desirable before finally determining upon the size of the camp at Pechete to endeavor to ascertain from the individuals in question how many would wish to proceed to French Morocco under the conditions of the Anglo-American plan? Estimates of the total number of refugees involved have already been reduced from 6,000 to 1,600 of whom a large number are said to have visas for Palestine and would probably wish to proceed direct from Spain or Portugal when conditions of travel permit. In other words, we consider it would be desirable before proceeding further with the scheme to ascertain exactly how many persons would wish to take advantage of the temporary asylum afforded them in French Morocco under the changed conditions in Spain.

Sent Department, repeated to Madrid and London.

Lilley
MEMORANDUM

February 14, 1944

Discussion of Proposed Cable to Ambassador Hayes

A conference was held in the office of Under Secretary of State Stettinius, February 14, 1944 at 3:30 p.m.

Present for State Department:

Under Secretary Stettinius
Assistant Secretary G. Howland Shaw
Philip W. Bonsal
James G. Dunn

Wallace S. Murray
Stanley K. Hornbeck
Haven Raynor
George Warren

Present for War Refugee Board and Treasury:

Messers. Pehle, Luxford, DuBois and Friedman

Mr. Stettinius opened the meeting by saying that he had called the group together in order that there might be a full and frank discussion of the question of cooperation between the State Department and the War Refugee Board. He indicated that the proposed cable to Ambassador Hayes which the Board had sent over had called forth certain objections from the political people, and he felt that this offered a good opportunity to bring out in the open any differences of opinion that might exist between the State Department and the War Refugee Board.

Stettinius asked Pehle to outline his general ideas concerning the question of cooperation by State. Pehle indicated briefly that he felt it to be the job of the Board to take prompt action in resuing refugees, and that from time to time it would be necessary to call upon the State Department, not only to use its facilities, but to take a definite stand in support of the Board's action. Pehle stated that up to the present he had been receiving cooperation. Pehle then asked for a statement of the objections which the political people had in connection with the Spanish cable. Mr. Stettinius called upon Mr. Dunn to state his point of view in the matter. Mr. Dunn first addressed himself to the question of whether the cable should be sent out simply as a cable of the War Refugee Board or as a State Department cable. He indicated that there would be no trouble at all in sending the cable out as a War Refugee Board cable, and that in such event it would be unnecessary for the political people to express any opinion as to the merits of the proposed action. He apparently took the position that this would be true even if the Board's proposed action conflicted with general Government policy in the country involved. Pehle and Luxford at once made it clear that the Board was not simply interested.
in sending out cables; that they had been advised by State Department people themselves that a cable from the Department generally produces much more effective action on the part of our Ministers and Ambassadors than does a cable from one of the other Government agencies; that the program suggested in the proposed cable goes to the very heart of the Board’s effort because unless we are successful in moving refugees from Spain in order to get more refugees into that country the Board may as well stop its operations right now, and that it is necessary to have State Department’s full approval and support of the project. Dunn stated that he did not know that the Board wanted the State Department to consider the policy aspects of this matter since we had not specifically said so. Peble made it clear that in sending to State a proposed cable of this nature we obviously wanted State to consider the matter carefully to avoid possible policy conflicts and if possible to support fully the Board’s position. It was emphasized that in matters of this kind which involve dealings between governments it is useless to undertake a project unless the State Department is in full accord with the Board’s proposal.

Mr. Statindius stated in the future it should be clearly understood in cases of this kind that the War Refugee Board wants the State Department’s full concurrence and that all such cables will be so studied by State. He indicated that this would, of course, delay somewhat the sending out of cables. This pronouncement was generally agreed to by State Department representatives. It was also agreed that from time to time the Board will wish to send out cablesgrams directly which will not need State Department study.

Mr. Dunn was then asked to state his further objections to the proposed cable in question. They were as follows:

1. That we are presently engaged in negotiations with Spain to have that Government prohibit the export of wolfram; that in this connection the Spanish Government has asked us to make a public statement practically apologizing for putting on the oil embargo. According to Mr. Dunn we have refused to make any such statement, and in his view we asking Spain to make a statement with respect to refugees at this time would be completely without results and perhaps would interfere with our wolfram negotiations.

2. Dunn wanted to know how we could possibly make the commitment in our cable that we would remove refugees from Spain when we knew that under the agreement with the French the facilities in the North African camp are extremely limited.

Mr. Dunn, when pressed for a statement of further objections, said that he was not prepared to make other comments on the cable since he had
not previously known that policy matters were to be gone into, and it would
be necessary for him to consult all of the interested people in his division.

There was only a very brief discussion of the points raised by Dunn.
As to the question of securing ourselves of facilities for refugees before
taking measures of this kind to get them out of Axis occupied territory, it
was plainly stated by Pohle that if the Board were to adopt such a policy
months would go by without effective rescue measures being taken; that as
long as there presently exist facilities for a fairly substantial number of
refugees, the first task of the Board must be to fill up such existing refugee
centers, dealing with the question of additional facilities when this comes
to be a real practical problem.

Mr. Settinianus stated that he thought the most practical way of resolving
these questions was for us to get together with the political people and agree
on a cable. He stated that he had appointed Mr. George Warren of the staff of
Charles P. Taft with the responsibility of clearing through the State Depart-
ment as rapidly as possible all matters emanating from the War Refugee Board.
He asked Mr. Warren to take this cable at once and as soon as possible clear
it with everyone concerned. He indicated that Mr. Warren would be freely
accessible to him (Mr. Settinianus) in all these matters and made it clear that
he expected State to take action promptly.

After the adjournment of the meeting, Messrs. Pohle and Luxford had a
brief conversation with Mr. Dunn. Dunn made the point that if the State
Department is to be called upon to approve projects such as that involved in
the proposed cable to Spain, it will be necessary for State to study fully
the proposal in the light of all existing relationships and dealings between
the United States and the government involved; that this study frequently
will require some time, it being impossible to clear cables of this kind in
a few hours. He emphasized that if the Board desires its action to be 100%
effective instead of 25% effective the political people will need time in
order to be able to advise the Board what, in view of the existing situation
with respect to the country involved, should be the proper timing of proposed
action, etc.

Luxford pointed out to Dunn that our proposed negotiations with Spain
in regard to refugees is on an entirely different level than the political
and economic negotiations which we have with that country. In other words,
it was indicated that our proposed appeal to Spain is a humanitarian appeal
in which all we are asking of Spain is that it be made at our expense.
The comparison was made with the negotiations which we carry on through the
Red Cross even with Germany with respect to the exchange of war prisoners, etc.,
the point being made that humanitarian negotiations of this class are presently
being carried on without reference to our economic and political attitude toward the people with whom we are dealing. Accordingly, there is no ground for holding up the present cable on the basis of some supposed interference with our other negotiations with Spain.

Pohle, Luxford, DeBois and Friedman also discussed with Warren the cable in question. Warren agreed to push the matter at once and it was understood that he would call us tomorrow afternoon to see what progress has been made. Warren was also advised that if objections arise at any point he should call us for explanation.

[Signature]
FEB 11 1944

Dear Mr. Travers:

Thank you for your letter of February 4, 1944, enclosing a summary of Relief and Evacuation Projects for Refugees in European Countries.

Your good wishes for the success of the Board are greatly appreciated.

Very truly yours,

[Signature] J. N. Pehle
J. N. Pehle
Acting Executive Director

Mr. Howard E. Travers,
Chief,
Visa Division,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.
February 4, 1944

Dear Mr. Pehle:

In connection with your efforts on behalf of the War Refugee Board, it is possible that the attached will be of use to you. I fear that it is not complete and there are, of course, many things that have been done that have not been listed.

I hope that you will be very successful in saving the lives of many of these persecuted peoples.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Howard N. Bowers
Chief, Visa Division.

Enclosure:

Summary of Relief and Evacuation Projects

Mr. John W. Pehle,
Room 208-1/2, Main Treasury Building,
Washington, D. C.
RELIEF AND EVACUATION PROJECTS
FOR REFUGEES IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES
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Yugoslav Refugees on Island of Rab .......... 36
AID TO SWITZERLAND FOR CARE OF
ALLIED, EX-ENEMY AND STATELESS REFUGEES

Following the surrender of Italy a large number of Italians, both military and civilian, and refugees of other nationalities or stateless, escaped into Switzerland, a country whose economic structure was already heavily burdened by many thousands of refugees who had escaped from Axis-controlled territories.

During the latter part of September 1943 the proposal was made following certain suggestions made by the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee that the British and American Legations at Bern simultaneously approach the Swiss Government to ascertain whether it would be willing to facilitate the further entry of refugees from German-controlled countries, and particularly from Italy. It was also suggested that a statement be obtained from the Swiss Government as to the conditions under which it would be willing to receive and maintain these refugees.

Numerous telegrams were exchanged between the Department, the Embassy at London and the Legation at Bern concerning the amount and nature of the aid which might be given to Switzerland to help her maintain the more than 60,000
60,000 refugees within her borders in October 1943.

In December it was decided that the matter should be referred to the Intergovernmental Committee and London was informed that favorable consideration would be given to requests from Switzerland for the purchase and import through the blockade of supplies of foodstuffs and textiles.

The Embassy at London was asked to collaborate with the British Government in drawing up terms of reference of the matter to the Intergovernmental Committee and to advise the Department concerning the terms but London has not yet submitted the form of presentation.

(See: telegram number 5962 from London, September 9, 1943; 8533 from London, December 8, 1943; 7946 to London, December 16, 1943 and 3159 to Bern, December 17, 1943; also airgram number A-1666 to London, December 7, 1943. filed: Refugee Groups - Allied and Stateless Refugees in Switzerland.)
BRITISH CHILDREN TO THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

In June, 1940 the British Government announced a plan of evacuation of British Children to the Dominion of Canada and the United States.

In August, 1940 it was announced that the parents and guardians of 12,365 children had been notified and their applications approved. In September of the same year two ships with children bound for this continent were torpedoed and as a result the plan ended abruptly and was finally abandoned in January, 1941. Prior to that date, 1,632 children reached Canada and 835 reached the United States.

(See: Despatch no. 11,742 from London, October 19, 1940)
(Filed: Refugee Groups - British Children in Canada)
CAMP FERRAMONTE AND LIPARI ISLANDS

WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS PROJECT

At the request of a representative of the World Jewish Congress the Department requested Algiers to ascertain the present whereabouts and condition of Jewish refugees reported to have been in Camp Ferramonte (Italy) in July 1943 and on the Lipari Islands (Sicily).

A report was received from the Allied Force Headquarters Civil Affairs Office at Algiers, dated November 8, giving detailed information concerning the Camp. Our representative at Algiers early in December advised that the Military Government Section of the Allied Force Headquarters had been requested to obtain information concerning refugees on the Lipari Islands.

(See Airgram nos. A-56 to Algiers, November 30, 1943; A-10 from Algiers, December 11, 1943 and despatch no. 380 from Algiers, November 8, 1943, filed: Refugee Rmpe- Camp Ferramonte).
CHILDREN FROM FRANCE TO UNITED STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES

In 1942 this Government agreed to accept 5,000 refugee children of various nationalities located in France but before the proposal could be put into operation all of France was over-run by Germany and it was impossible to obtain exit permits for the children.

The Governments of Argentina and Canada had also indicated a willingness to accept groups of these children as had the Jewish Agency of Palestine.

The project has now been referred to the Intergovernmental Committee and the Swiss Government has intimated that it would accept the children if it could have assurances that the children would be moved after the war. Negotiations are continuing concerning this proposal and the Department has stated that this Government is prepared to renew its offer depending on quotas and the possibility of the children leaving for the United States in the near future, but that no post war commitments can be made.

The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee is active on behalf of these children and the Committee for the care of European children has made definite commitments for the care and maintenance of the children in this country. (see: telegrams number 8967 from London, December 27, 1943 and 107 to London January 5, 1944; also enclosure to despatch number 13011, December 31, 1943 filed: Refugee Groups — Children from France to United States and other countries)
CHILDREN FROM OCCUPIED AREAS INTO SWEDEN

The original proposal made by the United States Government to the Swedish Government was that it accept 20,000 Jewish children from occupied areas, and that it negotiate with the German Government for exit permits for them. The project was not pressed because it appeared that it would be better to ask Sweden to intervene for children of various nationalities and negotiations along that line have been in progress since early in 1943.

As a condition precedent upon her considering the proposal, the Swedish Government has asked the British and United States Governments to permit the passage into Sweden of foodstuffs, medical supplies and other necessities and to bear the expense of maintaining the refugees.

As late as October 30, 1943 the Swedish Government expressed the belief that the German Government would not accede to the request and called attention to the fact that the Guelling Government in Norway had refused a similar request involving Norwegian children.

However, early in January 1944 the Ministry of Economic Warfare at London suggested that it approach...
the Swedish Government, representing the Governments of Great Britain and the United States and request that the Swedish Government present to the German Government a proposal that it grant permission for children from occupied areas and Jewish children from Germany to leave those countries to enter Sweden.

The Ministry of Economic Warfare planned also to discuss with representatives of the Norwegian Government in London the proposal that children from Norway be permitted to leave in rotation and return to Norway after a stay in Sweden.

This project has been negotiated through the Intergovernmental Committee.

(See: Telegram nos. 7617, from London, October 30, 1943; 259 from London, January 11, 1944 and 301 to London January 18, 1944, filed: Refugee Groups - Children from Occupied Areas into Sweden).
CHILDREN FROM OCCUPIED AREAS INTO SWITZERLAND

The United States Government has had extensive negotiations with the Swiss Government concerning the evacuation of about 100,000 children from occupied areas into Switzerland.

The Swiss Government has now assured us that if arrangements could be made to do so it would accept the children. This Government and the Government of Great Britain through the British Ministry of Economic Warfare have requested the Swiss Government to approach the German Government to obtain permission for the children to leave occupied territories. While the children are to come from various Axis-controlled countries the request will include Jewish children from Germany.

(See Despatch number 11336 from London September 24, 1943 and telegram number 327 from London, January 13, 1944, filed: Refugee Groups - Children from Occupied Areas into Switzerland.)
DANISH JEWS INTO SWEDEN

The recent threat to Danish Jews of deportation caused Sweden to open her doors to them. The Intergovernmental Committee was ready to assist, but the Danes themselves and the Swedish people and authorities were able to rescue and care for these refugees without outside aid.

(See: Telegram No. 3843, from Stockholm, October 29, 1943. Filed: Refugee Groups - Danish Jews into Sweden)
DODECANESIAN REFUGEES

In December 1943 the Embassy at London advised the Department that the Foreign Office had addressed a letter to them concerning maintenance for Dodecanesian refugees including women and children, mainly of Greek origin but Italian subjects.

Because of the urgency of the problem the British Government had assumed initial financial responsibility for them but that they would expect the Italian Government to refund any necessary expenditures.

The British Government asked whether this Government would share with it on a 50-50 basis the cost of maintaining these persons, or should the question be presented to the Intergovernmental Committee.

After careful consideration in the Department it was suggested to London that these Dodecanesian refugees might be included with those being cared for by the Middle East Refugee and Relief Administration. London was asked to supply additional information.

(See: telegrams number 8405 from London, December 2, 1943 and 410 to London, January 16, 1944, filed: Refugee Groups - Dodecanese Refugees.)
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC SETTLEMENT ASSOCIATION, INC.

In January, 1940 there was established at Soleda in the Dominican Republic, a settlement incorporated under the name Dominican Republic Settlement Association, Incorporated. The settlement was for the purpose of offering refugees or other persons desiring to establish themselves in a new land a place where they could through their own efforts build a home and learn to farm the land.

From the inception of this plan the Government of the United States was interested, through the cooperation of the Intergovernmental Committee. The settlement was incorporated under the laws of the State of New York.

The land which was given for this colony by the Dominican Republic was estimated to suffice to accommodate 100,000 persons. Jewish organizations are interested in the project although it was not planned as a Jewish center and of the 514 non-Dominicans now residing at Soleda, 468 are Jewish. The settlement to date has not been a success, but those interested in it are endeavoring to find a solution of the problem presented.

(See: Dominican Republic folder.)

(VD:RU:1000:FOO 1/27/44)
DUTCH REFUGEES IN SPAIN

In November, 1943 the Netherlands Ambassador presented to the Department a proposal that certain Dutch nationals in Spain be permitted to go to the camp in North Africa which has been prepared for the stateless refugees also in Spain.

The Ambassador assured the Department that the Dutch refugees would remain at the camp not longer than thirty days, that they would leave the camp before the first contingent of the stateless refugees arrived there and that they would leave North Africa for South America.

When the proposal was first presented it was understood that these subjects of the Netherlands numbered about 1500. However after further negotiations it developed that there were only forty-eight whom it was urgent to move, and the Department suggested that these forty-eight be sent from Gibraltar to England instead of to North Africa.

The Netherlands Ambassador has not advised the Department the attitude of his Government toward this suggestion.
(See: Note from Netherlands Ambassador, November 17, 1943, Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. Trevers and the Ambassador, December 17, 1943 and Telegram No. 237 to Algiers, December 27, 1943. Filed: Refugee Groups - Dutch Refugees in Spain)

(VD:HU:NGO:POC 1/28/44)
JEWISH REFUGEES FROM POLAND TO HUNGARY

UNION OF
ORTHODOX RABBIS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

On January 18, 1944 a representative of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United States and Canada presented to the Department a project to rescue Jewish refugees who are hiding in the forests of Poland and evacuate them to Hungary.

On January 22, 1944 the Treasury Department authorized a license to the Union of Orthodox Rabbis to send the equivalent of $100,000 to Switzerland to purchase Swiss francs to be used in carrying out this rescue program.

(See: Copies of memoranda from Mr. Riegelman to Dean Ribble January 21, 25 and 26, 1944 and copy of letter from Mr. Riegelman to Mr. Pehle, January 21, 1944, filed: Jewish Refugees from Poland to Hungary.)
JEWISH REFUGEES IN ITALY

SPONSORED BY

AMERICAN JEWISH JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE

Late in December 1943 the Embassy at London advised the Department that the Jewish people in Italy, particularly the children of persons who had been deported, were in desperate circumstances because the funds of those who had been helping them were about exhausted.

The Government of Great Britain planned to request its Treasury to permit funds to be paid into the account of the British Minister to the Vatican. The suggestion was made that charitable organizations in the United States might also contribute.

A license has been authorized by the Treasury Department for the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee to transmit $20,000 for the purpose of aiding these persons and the World Jewish Congress has also approached the Department with a tentative plan to send $50,000.

(See: Telegrams nos. 9021 from London, December 26, 1943 to London, 1/7/44 and memo of conversation between Mr. Long, Dr. Wise and Dr. Goldman, 1/5/44, filed: Refugee Groups - Jewish Refugees in Italy.)
This Commission was set up in January, 1943 under the joint chairmanship of the United States and the British Consular General in Algiers to assist in the release, relief and repatriation of prisoners and refugees.

On June 24, 1943 a press release was issued by the State Department reviewing the work done by the Commission. It was stated that liberation had proceeded in an orderly manner, as swiftly as military security and the making of arrangements for the maintenance of the internees after their release would permit.

The Commission reported that all those released from work companies, given the status of civilian workers employed by the Mediterranean Niger Railway or the coal mines of Kenadza and whose residence had been restricted to the areas in which they worked, had been given complete liberty to leave and accept work where they wished.

The former internees, members of work companies and persons in forced residence have all been provided with useful occupations of their own choice.

This Commission has been cooperating in an effort to effect the transfer of the Spanish Republican refugees from North
North Africa to Mexico. The United States Army has agreed to employ these refugees until such time as they can be actually transported to Mexico.

Released internees unable to work because of advanced age or physical disabilities are being cared for by the Public Welfare and Relief Division of the NABS with funds contributed by private sources.

There were in prison in June, 1943 about two hundred political prisoners mostly Spanish Republican refugees. The French authorities had agreed to release these prisoners for the purpose of proceeding to Mexico but the Joint Commission suggested that they should be liberated and allowed to make their own dispositions. Assurances were given that an amnesty would be granted to these prisoners after their cases had been examined in regard to military security.
POLISH RABBIS IN THE SOVIET UNION

The Polish Ambassador informed the Department that his Government would include 500 Rabbinical students now in the Soviet Union in the list, to be submitted to the Mexican Government, of Polish refugees to be evacuated to Mexico.

The Department at the instance of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis asked the Embassy at Moscow to advise of the latest development in connection with this proposal.

On December 14, 1943 a reply was received that it was believed that the names of a large number of their group had been included in the lists of those to be evacuated. The Embassy at Moscow further stated that the lists would be checked further and such names as were not included would be submitted for inclusion. A further report is to be made to the Department.

(See: Note from Ambassador of Poland, February 16, 1943 and telegram no. 2213 from Moscow, 12/14/43 filed: Refugee Groups – Rabbi and Students in Soviet Union).

YDIRUMCOILH 1/27/44

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POLISH REFUGEES INTO MEXICO

In the spring of 1943, 750 Poles were transported from India and the Middle East to a camp in Mexico. An additional 750 have since arrived at the camp and it is planned to receive 3,500 more.

This movement of refugees was effected through an agreement between the Polish and Mexican Governments on the initiation of the British Government. The United States Government has agreed to provide the funds for the transportation and maintenance of these refugees after their arrival in Mexico. (See telegram number 150 to Bombay, April 7, 1943, filed: Refugee Groups - Polish Refugees in Mexico).
REFUGEE FROM BULGARIA TO PALESTINE

Protests have been sent to the Bulgarian Government unofficially through the Swiss Government concerning its persecution of the Jews there. Bulgaria closed its borders and until she re-opens them there is no hope of rescuing people from that area. This applies also to children for 4,000 of whom permission to leave had been previously obtained. Through negotiations between the British and American Governments jointly with the Swiss Government it seemed possible that a very limited number might be released from Bulgaria if the Bulgarian Government was given the right to designate those who could leave. The British Government had further instructed its representatives in Turkey to act immediately on matters of evacuation of Jews from the Balkans to Palestine when shipping was available.

The existing arrangement between the Governments of Great Britain and Turkey is that Turkey will allow a limited number of refugees (seventy-five every 10 days) to go through Turkey to Palestine or other countries of asylum. (See: Folder on Bulgaria and also enclosure #2 to despatch Number 18868, from London, December 17, 1943. Filed: Intergovernmental Committee.)

VD:RU:NC:BE 1/27/44
REFUGEES IN CAMP VITTEL, FRANCE

HOLDING PARAGUAYAN, PERUVIAN AND OTHER PASSPORTS.

Late in December 1943 the Department was informed by the Polish Embassy and also by the Agudath Israel Youth Council of America of a report that the German Government planned to deport from Camp Vittel, France certain Jewish refugees holding passports issued by the Paraguayan, Peruvian and other Governments because the Governments concerned had revoked the citizenship of the refugees in question.

Negotiations were conducted between the Department, the Embassy at London, the Legations at Asuncion and Lima and the consul at Istanbul. The Intergovernmental Committee also presented the matter to the Swiss Government for investigation.

The Paraguayan Government has assured this Government that it has not revoked the citizenship of the refugees in question. Apparently, however, issuance of the passports was quite irregular.

The attitude of the other Governments concerned has not as yet been made known.

(See despatches number 12822 from London, December 18, 1943 and 8855 from Lima, December 29, 1943; also telegrams number 8141 to London, December 21, 1943 and 813 to Asuncion, December 24, 1943, filed: Refugee Groups - Paraguayan Citizens in France.)

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REFUGEES IN SPAIN

In Spain there were three groups of refugees:

(1) French estimated at 14,000. Their destination was North Africa, and the principal problem was to obtain permission for them to leave. Negotiations between the American and British Governments jointly and the Spanish Government resulted finally in the granting of exit permission to this group and practically all of them are now in North Africa.

(2) Approximately 800 Allied Nationals who had been accepted into the armed services of their countries. They were mainly Poles and would be taken to the United Kingdom and some few to North Africa. Permission for them to depart was also obtained through negotiations with the Spanish Government.

(3) Approximately 2,000 stateless refugees, mostly Jews, whose destination also was North Africa. For them extensive negotiations have been in effect for many months preparing a camp which has now been established near Casablanca. It required the services of the military authorities, the French North African authorities, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration as well as our Government's representatives to establish the camp and prepare the way for the transporting of the refugees.
refugees who are now scheduled to leave in the very near future.

(See Files: Refugee Groups - Stateless Refugees from Spain to North Africa and Refugee Groups - French Refugees in Spain)
RELIEF AND EVACUATION OF JEWISH REFUGEES
IN RUMANIA AND FRANCE
SPONSORED BY WORLD JEWISH CONGRESS

In June 1943 Dr. Rieger, the Geneva representative of the World Jewish Congress, presented to our legation in Bern a plan for relief and evacuation of approximately 75,000 Jewish refugees in Rumania and France, which was thereafter referred to as the Rieger plan.

The proposal involved the purchase of food and clothing for refugees in Rumania and also the extending of relief to and purchasing of supplies for refugees in France. The so-called Rieger plan was quite involved and although negotiations were held during June and July between State and Treasury Department representatives concerning the request of the World Jewish Congress for a license, and the American Legation at Bern was authorized by the Treasury Department to issue a license in September 1943, the plan was not put into effect at that time. Negotiations concerning it were not resumed until the latter part of November.

The British Ministry of Economic Warfare at London and the British Embassy at Washington objected to the granting of the license and the Foreign Office at London was apprehensive concerning the problem of finding refuge for so large a group
a group of persons but a license was finally issued for an initial amount -- the equivalent of $25,000 and delivered to Dr. Riegner on December 23, 1943.

That license authorized Dr. Riegner to communicate with persons in Rumania and France to arrange for the evacuation of refugees from those countries. The funds are to be deposited in the name of the World Jewish Congress in the Geneva branch of the Union Bank of Switzerland and he will alone have the power to draw upon the account. He is to file periodical reports with the American Legation at Bern and to the best of his ability, to insure that the suppliers of the currency used for the relief and evacuation of these refugees are persons acceptable to the American Legation at Bern.

The question of where places of refuge might be found for these people has also been under consideration. A tentative suggestion has been made that such places as Tripoli and Cyrenaica, which have been deserted by the Italians and the Arabs might be utilized. However, nothing concrete has been decided concerning this phase of the project. (See telegrams number 3667 from Bern, June 14, 1943; 7006 to London, November 27, 1943; 5096 from Bern, December 23, 1943; 492 to London, January 10, 1944 and 371 to London, January 14, 1944. Also, memorandum of conversation between Mr. Long and Sir Ronald Campbell, January 11, 1944. Filed: Refugee Groups - Rumania and France, World Jewish Congress.)

VD:RU:NGO:GF 1/26/44
RELIEF FOR JEWISH REFUGEES IN FRANCE

SPONSORED BY

THE AMERICAN JEWISH JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE

In August 1943 a report from our Legation at Bern outlined the condition of Jewish refugees in France particularly Jewish children.

In September the Treasury Department sponsored a telegram to the Legation at Bern stating that financial arrangements would be permitted to support Jewish children evacuated to Southern France and for the evacuation of children at that time hidden in or near Paris.

The Joint Distribution Committee had evidenced a desire to supply the amounts needed and their representative in Switzerland was authorized to borrow in France French francs up to the equivalent of $600,000 for a period of six months. However, in the event this amount was not sufficient additional funds would be authorized.

While the plan originally was designed to care for children it developed that adults also would be aided and evacuated. (See telegrams number 4643 from Bern, August 2, 1943; 2286 to Bern, September 17, 1943; 6102 from Bern, September 30, 1943 and 2836 to Bern, November 17, 1943 filed: Refugee Groups - Jewish Refugees in France -- JDC.)
REMNANT GROUPS OF JEWISH REFUGEES IN CENTRAL EUROPE

In September of 1943 a representative of World Jewish Congress presented a proposal to the Department designed to save and aid remnant groups of Jews remaining in Nazi-occupied territories. The plan was that food, clothing, medicines and other supplies should be purchased and disbursed by International Red Cross. It was estimated the total cost might reach $10,000,000 of which $2,000,000 could be raised by private organizations.

The plan was referred to the American Embassy at London for presentation to the Intergovernmental Committee. Before formally presenting it to the Executive Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee the Director entered into negotiations with the International Red Cross to ascertain if they would consider acting as the disbursing agent for this project.

In November the Department committed itself to support an application to the Treasury for the issuance of a license to the World Jewish Congress for $260,000 to be held in Switzerland as a reserve for emergency purposes in connection with this proposal.

The International Red Cross has favorable considered the plan and the Director of the Intergovernmental Committee has stated
-2- Remnant Groups of Jewish Refugees in Central Europe

has stated he would present the project to the Executive
Committee of the Intergovernmental Committee as soon as
certain phases of the financial arrangements have been
clarified. The Department has replied to the Director's
inquiries and has asked to be advised when the matter is
presented to the Executive Committee. (See despatch
number 12650 from London, December 6, 1943 and reply
drafted January 26, 1944, filed: Refugee Groups - Remnant
Groups sponsored by World Jewish Congress.)
REPARTITION

At the Bermuda Conference a draft resolution on Repatriation was prepared but it was not found to be entirely acceptable. In June another was prepared and since that time constant negotiations have been in effect to have it ratified by all of the interested nations. The negotiations are now drawing to a close and it is expected that an announcement will be made in the near future concerning the repatriation of refugees by the Governments of which they are nationals.

(See File: Repatriation)
RUMANIAN REFUGEES IN TRANSNISTRIA

At the present time two projects affecting Rumanian refugees are active. One, the endeavor to have the Rumanian Government repatriate approximately 65,000 refugees who are in Transnistria and are in grave danger. About 4,000 of these refugees were permitted to return when pressure by the German Government forced Rumania to abandon the plan. The Department has been in communication with Stockholm and Istanbul in a continuing endeavor to have Rumania repatriate the remainder of this group and has been in communication with representatives of the World Jewish Congress. In a conversation between representatives of the British Embassy and the World Jewish Congress the British Embassy suggested that the World Jewish Congress take the matter up also with the Russian Government. (See telegrams number 1399 to Stockholm, December 20, 1943 and 303 to Istanbul, December 29, 1943 Filed: Refugee Groups - Transnistria.)

The other project concerning Rumanian refugees is listed under: Relief and Evacuation of Jewish Refugees in Rumania and France, page 24.
RUMANIAN SHIPS FOR BALKAN REFUGEES

Negotiations were held with the Rumanian Government through the Turkish Government in connection with the proposed use of two Rumanian vessels lying in Turkish harbors. These vessels were to be used for transportation of refugees from Balkan territories to Palestine. Just when it seemed that the Rumanian Government would consider the plan favorably, it announced that it had referred the matter to Berlin and no action has been taken. (See: Folder on Bulgaria.)
SPANISH REPUBLICAN REFUGEES

The Department has had extended communications and negotiations relative to the proposed plan to bring about 2,000 Spanish Republican refugees to Mexico. Lists totalling 1600 names have been sent to the American Embassy at Mexico, D. F. for transmission to a Mexican-Spanish Commission established for the purpose of screening the names.

Where the plans for receiving the refugees have been completed by the Mexican Government, the United States War Department will transport them from Africa to a point of disembarkation in the United States. The cost of their maintenance and transportation from that point to the Mexican border will be borne by the Mexican Government.

(See: Despatch No. 5011 to Mexico, D. F., December 30, 1943. Filed: Refugee Groups - Spanish-Republican Refugees)

(VD:RU1NO:FOO 1/27/44)
STATEMENTS CONCERNING ATROCITIES

Several statements have been issued by
the President and the State Department warning the enemy powers
that the perpetrators of crimes against the people of oc-
cupied countries would be brought to retribution by the
Governments of the United Nations.

August 21, 1942: the President issued a statement
in connection with a declaration signed by the representa-
tives of nine Governments whose countries had been occupied
by German forces. This declaration recorded the
determination of the contracting Governments to see to
it that those guilty of crimes of violence and barbarity
would be brought to justice.

October 7, 1942: the President stated that it is
the intention of this Government to co-operate with the
British and other Governments in establishing a United

October 30, 1942: In commemoration of the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the publication of the Balfour
Declaration Secretary of State Hull issued a statement
voicing the deep abhorrence of the Government towards the
acts of barbarity against the Jewish peoples of Europe.

December 16,
December 16, 1942: The Department of State issued a press release stating that eleven governments, including the United States Government, and the French Committee of National Liberation joined in denouncing the acts of persecution and barbarity which had been directed by the German Government against the Jewish people of Europe. The statement further warned that the perpetrators of these acts would be held strictly accountable.

July 30, 1943: The President issued a statement which warned that the United Nations would make use of information and evidence in respect to barbaric crimes in Europe and Asia and the instigators of those crimes would have to stand in courts of law to answer for their acts.

November 1, 1943: A joint statement was issued by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Premier Stalin warning that the perpetrators of crimes against the peoples in occupied countries particularly in those countries where the enemy forces were retreating would be brought to stern justice and made responsible for their crimes.
TURKEY AS A REFUGE

The Turkish Government has been approached a number of times concerning the possibility of allowing refugees from the Balkans to enter Turkey. It has definitely declined to permit any refugees to stay in the country. It will permit them to go in transit through the country on normal railroad schedules which amounts to seventy-five persons in ten days.

(See: Despatch No. 12008, from London, December 17, 1943, filed Intergovernmental Committee)
YUGOSLAV REFUGEES ON THE ISLAND OF RAB

On the Island of Rab in the Adriatic is a group of refugees, estimated by the World Jewish Congress at 4,000, recently freed from internment camps in Yugoslavia. At present the refugees are badly in need of food and medical supplies and there is the further danger that the Island might be recaptured by the Germans.

The World Jewish Congress appealed to this Government for help and Admiral Leahy for the Chiefs of Staff was requested to advise us what action might be taken in view of the military situation. The decision of the Chiefs of Staff was that it would not be possible for aid to be rendered to these people through military channels. The Intergovernmental Committee is however still considering the problem.

In the letter from the Chiefs of Staff it is stated that the number of refugees on the Island is approximately 1600.

(See: Airgrams number A-1391 to London, October 12, 1942 and A-12 to London, January 3, 1944; also telegram number 370 to London, January 14, 1944. Filed: Refugee Groups - Yugoslav Refugees on Island of Rab.)

VD:RU:MCC:OF 1/27/44

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Mr. H. W. Kurth  
Budget Officer  
State Department  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Kurth:

Attached for your information is a copy of a letter from Mr. J. W. Pehle, Acting Executive Director, War Refugee Board, to Mr. Harold D. Smith, Director, Bureau of the Budget with respect to the budget estimate of $5,000,000 for the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees.

Yours very truly,

(Signed) Ward Stewart  
Ward Stewart

Attachment.
Dear Sirs:

Reference is made to the submission made to you by letter of January 23, 1944 from the State Department of an estimate in the sum of $5,000,000 "for the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees". The views of the War Refugee Board on this matter have been solicited by the Bureau of the Budget.

In accordance with a decision made by the War Refugee Board at its meeting yesterday, at the suggestion of the Secretary of State, you are requested to hold this matter in abeyance for the time being.

Very truly yours,

(Signed) J. W. Pehle
J. W. Pehle
Acting Executive Director.

The Honorable
Harold B. Smith,
Director, Bureau of the Budget.
CONTROL COPY

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

February 1, 1944

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The Department has had under consideration and has discussed with the British a project for assisting Jewish and other refugees now located in France and Rumania. While these plans have not taken definite form, it is proposed that efforts be made to enable the persons in question to leave Rumania and France and be transferred to places of temporary residence in the colonies formerly occupied by the Italians. The Department has been informed that there are at the present time in North Africa partially abandoned cities where buildings and water supply exist anywhere food could presumably be supplied by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. This plan, to be successful, would, of course, require the close cooperation of the military authorities.

We were just on the point of communicating with the Joint Chiefs of Staff to obtain an expression of opinion from them regarding locations in North Africa which might be made available for this purpose and also as to whether there might be any valid military objections to such an undertaking.

In connection with this plan, the problem of transportation is, of course, an important one since refugees might arrive out of France into Spain or out of Rumania into Turkey in considerable numbers. We had also intended to raise with the Joint Chiefs of Staff the question of transportation to determine whether or not the military might be able to make shipping available for this purpose. Our experience would seem to indicate that complete dependence could not be

The Honorable
Henry Morgenthau, Jr.,
Secretary of the Treasury.
placed on the utilization of neutral shipping for this purpose. As you know, neutral shipping has been used in the past especially from Portugal to African destinations, but it seems doubtful that a considerable volume of refugees could be handled through that means alone.

In view of the creation of the War Refugee Board, it would seem more appropriate to us that this proposal now be made by the Board to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, if the Board decided to pursue the project, particularly as the War Department is represented on the Board. Several members of our staff are quite familiar with the details of the preliminary discussions and studies which have taken place on this matter in the past and will, of course, be glad to confer with representatives of the Board on the matter.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,

[Signature]
This telegram must be paraphrased before being communicated to anyone other than a governmental agency. (BR)

Assembly
London.

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The President has instructed the Secretaries of State, Treasury and War to make action for the immediate rescue and relief of the Jews of Europe and other victims of enemy persecution. In an executive order issued January 22, the President declared "it is the policy of this Government to take all measures within its power to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who are in imminent danger of death and otherwise to afford such victims all possible relief and assistance consistent with the successful prosecution of the war." This order established special governmental machinery for executing this policy. It created a War Refugees Board consisting of the Secretaries of State, Treasury and War. The board is charged with direct responsibility to the President in seeing that the announced policy is carried out. The President indicated that while he would look directly to the board for the execution of this policy, the board would cooperate with the Intergovernmental Committee, UNRRA, and other interested international organizations. The President stated that he expected the cooperation of all members of the United Nations and other governments in carrying out this difficult but important task. He stated that the existing facilities of the State, Treasury and War departments would be employed to furnish aid to Axis victims to the fullest extent possible. He stressed that it was urgent that action be taken to forestall the plot of the Fasists to exterminate the Jews and other persecuted minorities in Europe.

You should do everything possible to effectuate this policy of this Government, bearing in mind that time is of the essence. You should cooperate closely with all public and established private agencies who are active in your area in this field, aiding them in the development of coordinated programs and in the effectuation of integrated measures for the rescue, transportation, maintenance and relief of victims of enemy oppression, etc.

The communication facilities should be made freely available to these private agencies for all appropriate messages for carrying out the policy of this Government herein stated, keeping the War Refugees Board advised through the Department. You should give them every assistance in obtaining and verifying information.

You are requested to render an immediate report concerning the actual situation as it exists today in the country to which you are accredited. This report should include a full statement as to what is being done to rescue the Jews and other persecuted minorities from Hitler, including particularly (a) the extent to
which these war refugees are permitted to enter the country to which you are accredited (b) the extent to which such country actually encourages and cooperates in their entry and (c) the extent to which such refugees are not able to enter such country because of the failure of such country to cooperate in their entry. This report should cover actual cases which have come to your attention involving refugees being turned back at the border and the reasons why such refugees were turned back. You should also report periodically on cases of this character which come to your attention in the future.

You should include in your report your recommendations as to what you feel this Government can do to facilitate with all possible speed the rescue and relief of the victims of enemy oppression, including particularly what can be done to make the government of the country to which you are accredited cooperate more fully in carrying out this policy. Your report should cover any special obstacles which you feel are interfering with the rescue and relief of these victims and your recommendations as to what can be done to remove those obstacles.

You are requested to approach the Government to which you are accredited, explain the policy expressed in the President's Executive Order referred to above, and ascertain from such Government the extent to which it is prepared to cooperate.

Diplomatic and consular officers are instructed to do everything possible to carry out the policy expressed in the President's Executive Order. This telegram has been transmitted by telegram or airgram to all diplomatic and consular offices.

Repeat to consular offices under your jurisdiction.

HULL

(28)

CONFIDENTIAL

CORE ROOM - Report to Missions at Lisbon as 200, Madrid as 277, Stockholm as 131, Bern as 251, and Rangoon as 68.

840.48 Refugees.

Financing 1/25/44, WEA 1-A.

Copy 2-1-44

Distributed to: Secretary (Mr. E.M. Bernstein), Mr. D.B. Bell (Mr. Dietrich), Mr. Paul; Mr. White (Mr. E.M. Bernstein-Orig.), Mr. Luxford; Mr. Pehle; Mr. E.M. Bernstein; Mr. Oakes; Mr. Taylor; Mrs. Rees.

From Miss E. Nyman - Km. 225