

Joel Brandt Proposal

Folder 1, 29-59

Note: Reverse filing

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JERIL BRANET TROPICAL

CAR REFUGEE BOARD RECORDS

CONTAINER 70

700200

GERMAN PROPOSAL TO RELEASE JEWS FROM BERRY TERRITORY
 SUBMITTED TO BARRAS BY JOHN SHANDY

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000210

59

000211

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION with Mr. Joel Brandt in Jerusalem
on October 7, 1944.

While in Jerusalem I had been informed that Mr. Joel Brandt had been released by the British from Cairo and was a free agent in Jerusalem. He requested permission of the Jewish Agency to talk with me and I saw him first at the home of Mr. Eleazer Kaplan, an official of the Jewish Agency. In order to talk with him quietly and ~~talk with him~~ in confidence, I invited him to my suite at the Hotel King David. Brandt disclosed the following:

1. He had been held in a prison in solitary confinement by the British since June 5. In the last two weeks he was released to a prison camp, from which place he wrote a letter to the Jewish Agency officials (intended for the hands of the British Intelligence), which he read to me. In effect it stated that were he not released by October 5 he would regard himself as an enemy of the British and act accordingly. Brandt had been on two hunger strikes and informed me that he had made arrangements to make a break for freedom or to commit suicide.

Mr. Kaplan of the Jewish Agency had informed me that they were given the choice of sending Brandt back to Hungary or permitting him to go to Palestine. They chose the latter. Apparently Brandt was not aware of this when I talked with him.

2. I asked Brandt why he had chosen to go to Syria while in Turkey, since he should have known that he would be captured by the British. He stated that after the Turks had arrested him, prior to my arrival in Ankara, he was given the choice of returning to Hungary, but had he done so it would have been interpreted as a definite refusal by the Allies of his proposals, and he saw only dangers of additional reprisals from this eventuality. Now Brandt contends that even in spite of the great trials occasioned by his incarceration that he made the right decision; that at least he accomplished something connected with the cessation of the deportations of the 1,700 refugees who did come through Hungary. Brandt believes that the British continued to infer that he was insincere and playing a "double game" in order to keep him in Cairo so that he could not further his project.

3. Brandt, in spite of his arduous experience, is still intent on breaking the ring around Hungary for refugee release. He asked me to propose that someone should directly contact Tito. He would like to see Tito and states that he knows the situation and people in Hungary who could arrange easy access from Hungary through Yugoslavia; that there are peasants who could arrange quick access for messengers through to Budapest. Brandt said he also has friends who can reach Tito.

000212

4. Brandt states his reliable information is such that it is much easier to travel within Germany and outside of Germany to Switzerland than is imagined. He asserts that, with armies and German evacuees on the move constantly, it is constantly possible for groups to slip out of Germany.

5. Brandt is emphatic in his insistence that a deal could have, and can yet be worked out with the Germans. He wishes to return to Hungary and to talk with the German leaders with whom he was conferring--to say that if they will release fifty to a hundred thousand Jews, that as an evidence of their determination to play the game, a meeting could be arranged, probably in Switzerland within three days, and that then they could come to terms. He believes he could have made such a deal, and that it still can be made. He has apparently been informed of the activities of Saly Meyer, who, he claims, is not the man for this type of negotiation; that Meyer is an old man; and that unorthodox methods are needed in dealing with these bandits.

6. I questioned Brandt further regarding the background of his previous activities and negotiations with the German leaders. He states categorically that Eichman had been reaching the "top man", namely, Himmler, who eventually had to contact Hitler; that it was impossible for these men to make any such moves as the kind that were in contemplation without orders from the top. Brandt also insisted that he knew that the Hungarians alone could not make any deal without the Germans, which he interprets as the reason for the failure of release of refugees from Hungary. Brandt wants assistance in being released from Palestine to go to Hungary to continue his proposals. He believes that he can bring out at least fifty thousand Jewish refugees. He would like then to go to Switzerland and asked that he could meet with me or some representative of our Government in Switzerland. He insists that he has connections in Switzerland which will help him to bring out refugees through this area. He asserted that he believes it is necessary now to forget Rumania through Istanbul as an exodus route.

7. The nature of the proposal that Brandt now wishes to make was as follows: That for every week that they will let out X number of Jews that they will be paid X dollars thereafter. He believes such a deal can be made without delay.

It was after some hesitation ^{that} I determined to confer with Brandt since he was released and apparently not under British surveillance, in order to secure any additional information that might be of value to the War Refugee Board in its program; also for purposes of the record and confirmation, I deemed it desirable to answer any question that may have resulted from the testimony taken with Brandt in my interview, and to determine if any efforts could be made through him or his associates to break the bottleneck in Hungary. While in Istanbul in the last months, there had been

000213

several unconfirmed rumors that Brandt had confessed to being a double agent. This was categorically denied by the British Intelligence Officer, Colonel Gibson, and the release of Brandt by the British demonstrated that he was no longer suspect.

In my conversation with Brandt I was again convinced without reservation of his frankness and integrity; that he was an impassioned young man, ready to risk his life for the sake of his people. His testimony taken in Cairo by me has now been confirmed as having been truthful.

I am not convinced that Brandt can be especially useful at this time, since he is a marked man. What impresses me is his zeal and resourcefulness. I am confident now that he represents the leaders of the Hungarian Jewish community; that he has connections in Hungary which could render any possible illicit movement of refugees out of Hungary a feasible operation.

American Legation, Cairo, October 10, 1944.

I. A. Hirschmann

000214

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on October 7, 1944.

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000215

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5. Brandt is emphatic in his insistence that a deal could have, and can yet be worked out with the Germans. He wishes to return to Hungary and to talk with the German leaders with whom he was conferring--to say that if they will release fifty to a hundred thousand Jews, that as an evidence of their determination to play the game, a meeting could be arranged, probably in Switzerland within three days, and that then they could come to terms. He believes he could have made such a deal, and that it still can be made. He has apparently been informed of the activities of Saly Meyer, who, he claims, is not the man for this type of negotiation; that Meyer is an old man; and that unorthodox methods are needed in dealing with these bandits.

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000216

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American Legation, Cairo, October 10, 1944.

I. A. Hirschmann

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000218

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

August 5, 1944

BAS
Distribution of true
reading only by special
arrangement. (W)

7 TO BE SENT IN

CONTROL COPY

EMBASSY,

ANKARA.

682*

The following for Hirschbaur is forwarded.

For security reasons, the text of this message must be guarded.

Reference is made to your 1335 of July 21 requesting information about the proposals received through Bern and Stockholm which were mentioned in our 814 of July 7.

The Bern proposal is similar to the one set forth in your 1356 of July 24 and to the Joel Brandt proposal with which you are familiar. After due deliberation, Bern was advised that it was not (repeat not) feasible to undertake the transaction in question.

Through Stockholm a vague proposal was made by some dubious individuals to exchange Latvian Jewish refugees for money or non-military supplies or both. Existing conditions in Latvia render it unnecessary to go into this proposal.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
(LIAISON)
1944 AUG 8 AM 10 16

STETTINIUS
ACTING
(GHW)

WRB:MMV:KG
8/5/44

S/CR

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WE

NOE

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-78
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

000219

CABLE TO KELLEY FOR HIRSCHMANN, ANKARA, TURKEY FROM WAR REFUGEE BOARD.

Reference is made to your 1335 of July 21 requesting information about the proposals received through Bern and Stockholm which were mentioned in our 614 of July 7.

The Bern proposal is similar to the one set forth in your 1356 of July 24 and to the Joel Brand proposal with which you are familiar. After due deliberation, Bern was advised that it was not (repeat not) feasible to undertake the transaction in question.

Through Stockholm a vague proposal was made by some dubious individuals to exchange Latvian Jewish refugees for money or non-military supplies or both. Existing conditions in Latvia render it unnecessary to go further into this proposal.

THIS IS WRB CABLE TO ANKARA NO. 95.

11:20 a.m.
August 5, 1944

MS YBZ
MSargoyich 8/4/44

Miss Chauncey (for the Sec'y) Abrahamson, Cohn, DuBois, Friedman, Hodel, Laughlin, Lesser, Mann, Mannon, McCormack, Cable Control Files

000220

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000221

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

Miss Hodel

7 was let Bl - Pella
INCOMING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

CONTROL COPY

M&E-624
Distribution of true
reading only by special
arrangement. ([redacted])

Lisbon

Dated August 1, 1944

Rec'd 3:56 p.m.

1944 AUG 2 PM 12 45
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
(LIAISON)

Secretary of State,
Washington.

^X2374, August 1, 1 p.m.

Have given Schwartz orally conclusion Department's
^X2112, July 28, 5 p.m. This is WRB 131. He apparently
reluctantly accepts Department's decision.

NORWEB

EH

EMB

For security reasons the
text of this message must
be closely guarded.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date **SEP 27 1972**

000222

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

[REDACTED]

MAE-674
Distribution of true
reading only by special
arrangement. ([REDACTED] W)

Lisbon

Dated August 1, 1944

Rec'd 3:56 p.m.

COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS
(LIAISON)

1944 AUG 2 PM 12 45

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF

Secretary of State,
Washington.

2374, August 1, 1 p.m.

Have given Schwartz orally conclusion Department's

2112, July 28, 5 p.m. This is WRB 131. He apparently *re*
reluctantly accepts Department's decision.

NORWEB

EH
EMB

For security reasons the
text of this message must
[REDACTED]

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

000223

000224

DEPARTMENT

OF DISTRIBUTION OF TRUE
STATE COPIES ONLY BY SPECIAL
ARRANGEMENTS (SECRET W)

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

2 pamps

1944 DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF

1944 AUG 1 PM 4 45

For security reasons the text of this message be closely guarded.

COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS DIVISION
CONTROL COPY

AMBASSY

LISBON
2101

FOR NORWEB AND McCLELLAND FROM PEHLE

Ankara's 1320 to the Department on July 20 for Pehle from Hirschmann follows for your information:

QUOTE For your information, Bader of the Jewish Agency who is liaison officer with the Jewish communities and groups in occupied territories, received a telegram dated July 15 from Kastner who is an important member of the Jewish Relief Committee in Budapest and is reported to be well known to other communities as a reliable person. The following is a translation of the telegram.

INNERQUOTE Consult Schroeder's friend Istanbul about your flight to Budapest Saturday. Your proposal about a purely financial arrangement uninteresting (repeat uninteresting). Cable whether Schroeder meeting next week with Schwartz at Lisbon would lead to quick results. Schroeder's proposed meeting with Schwartz, who should have full power, is urgently important. In matters of emigration I am also in contact with Dobkin. Regret Bader's trip here impossible. END INNERQUOTE

Concerning

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

000225

-2- #2191, July 17, 1944, Lisbon.

Concerning the above we are informed that Bader had been urgently invited by a member of the German Consulate in Istanbul to proceed to Berlin or possibly to Budapest to discuss matters relating to the Hungarian Jews. Bader, acting under instructions from his superiors in the Jewish Agency, referred the matter to Shertok in London who, I am informed, discussed it with 'highest authorities' and cabled back that Bader was not to proceed under any condition.

In his exchange of telegrams on the subject with Budapest, Bader inquired whether it would be possible to negotiate on the basis of a financial arrangement instead of the supply of commodities. The telegram quoted above gives the reply that this suggestion is not acceptable but indicated that Schroder himself would like to discuss the matter in Spain or Portugal, preferably with a representative of the JDC.

In this connection, Joseph Schwartz of the JDC received today the following telegram from Pilpel in Lisbon transmitting a message from Kastner dated July 15.

INNERNOTE 1700 people are waiting for a solution by the Germans. Cable whether Schwartz and Dobkin are ready to proceed to Spain in order to meet with a German representative

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-5- 2101, July 27, 2 p.m., to Lisbon

representative to settle the matter. Advise whether Madrid or Barcelona will be the meeting place in ten days time. END INNER-NOTE

The 1700 mentioned above have been referred to in information received from several sources namely Schwab in Switzerland, Dobkin in Lisbon and Kastner in Hungary and also from passengers recently arrived on the SS KASBAK. Joseph Schwartz is proceeding to Lisbon from Turkey July 22 and is requesting my advice and your authorization to meet with Schroeder or his representative in connection with the above matter.

I have informed Schwartz that my instructions preclude any action at this time connected with the above situation and that I am merely reporting the matter fully to Washington and requesting for Schwartz advice from you regarding the possibility of his meeting in Portugal or Spain with Schroeder. Schwartz will report to the American Embassy in Lisbon upon his arrival there which he expects will be approximately July 29. We are assisting Schwartz in arrangements for his transportation to Lisbon.

From the above telegrams, there would appear to be
a potentiality

000227

-4- #2101, July 27, 1944, to Lisbon.

a potentiality which might result in the rescue of some refugees and which suggests the possible usefulness of such a meeting. Schwartz requests that Baerwald be informed of these developments if it meets with your approval. UNQUOTE

You are requested to advise Schwartz that he is not (repeat not) authorized to make any contact with Schroeder or any other German agent in Lisbon or any other place. If and when any such action by Schwartz is decided upon by the War Refugee Board specific directions will be sent to Lisbon for him.

HULL
(GLW)

WRB:GLW:HJ
7/27/44

S/CR

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000224

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Distribution of this telegram by special arrangement.
(W)

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF COMMUNICATIONS AND RECORDS

5 - War Dept
TO BE SENT IN [redacted] [redacted]

War Refugee Board

July 26, 1944

AMEMBASSY,
MADRID
2121*

AUG 1 1944

CONTROL COPY *(initials)*

The Department has been advised by the British Embassy here that your British colleague has been in communication with the British Foreign Office with respect to a proposal of the Jewish Agency for Palestine that Joseph Schwartz representative of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee meet with a German agent named Schroeder with respect to the emigration of refugees from Hungary. For your information and that of your British colleague, the American Embassy Lisbon has been requested to advise Schwartz that he is not (repeat not) to have any contact or communication with Schroeder or any other German agent at Lisbon or at any other place.

*Noted
JBS*

SWETTINIUS
ACTING
(GEM)

WRB:GLW:OMH
7/28/44

WE

NE S/CR

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

000230

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000231

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

War Refugee Board

TO BE SENT IN ~~SECRET~~ ^{TOP SECRET}
July 28, 1944

Distribution of this
reading only by special
arrangement. (W)

5 p.m.

AMEMBASSY,

ANKARA

CONTROL COPY

*for Ry Bd
Behle*

x 664
FOR KELLEY AND HIRSCHMANN

After full consideration of all information available concerning contents your 1320 July 20 you are advised that American Embassy Lisbon has been requested to advise Schwartz that he is not (repeat not) under any circumstances or at any time or place to make contact with or communicate with Schroeder or any other German agent.

STETTINIUS
ACTING
(GLW)

*11/6/1
1947*

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
AUG 1 1944
DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS & RECORDS

WRB:GLW:CMH
7/28/44

NE SE WE S-CR

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

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000234

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

*5 - War Ref
Bd (Mr
Pehl)*

MAC
Distribution of true
reading only by special
arrangement. ~~()~~
AMEMBASSY,

July 28, 1944
5 p.m.

LISBON

2112x
FOR NORWEG AND DENVER

CONTROL COPY

With further reference to Department's 2101 of July 27
you are requested to advise Schwartz representative of
Joint Distribution Committee that after thorough considera-
tion of all available facts decision has been reached that
Schwartz should not (repeat not) have any contact ~~xxxx~~ or
communication with Schroeder or any other German agent at
Lisbon or at any other place.

STETTINIUS
ACTING
(GLW)

S/CR

WPA:GLW:OMH
/46

WE

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DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

000235

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000236

Edward R. Kelly

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM SENT

FROM: Secretary of State, Washington
TO: American Embassy, London
DATED: July 28, 1944
NUMBER: 5949

CONTROL COPY

You are advised, with further reference to Department's cable of July 7, 1944, No. 5353, and specifically to the second sentence of numbered paragraph four, that as a result of communications from Budapest the Jewish Agency for Palestine has recently proposed that Joseph Schwartz, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee representative, meet in Lisbon with Schroeder for the purpose of further discussion regarding the Brandt proposal. We also wish to inform you that we have requested the American Embassy in Lisbon to advise Schwartz that he does not have authority to have any communication or contact with Schroeder or any other German agent at Lisbon or anywhere else. The Foreign Office and the British Embassy Madrid have recently exchanged communications regarding this matter and information regarding the message to Lisbon has been given to the British Embassy here.

The foregoing message was repeated to Moscow as No. 1812 referring to Department's cable dated July 7, 1944, No. 1641.

STETTINIUS
Acting

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

000237

51

000231

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

*Noted
7/27*

July 27, 1944

Dear John:

Thank you for your memorandum of July 27 regarding the proposed meeting between Dr. Schwartz and a representative of the German authorities in Spain and Portugal.

I think you have made the right decision and we have already sent appropriate instructions to the missions at Lisbon, Madrid, and Ankara. We have also advised the British.

With best wishes,

Sincerely yours,



Mr. John Pehle,
Executive Director,
War Refugee Board,
Executive Office of the President,
Washington, D. C.

000234

July 27, 1944

TO: Mr. Stettinius

FROM: J. W. Pehle

Late in the afternoon of July 26, George Warren called to my attention a telegram from the British Mission in Madrid to the British Foreign Office dated July 20, and the reply of the Foreign Office thereto of the same date, both with respect to a proposed meeting between Dr. Schwartz of the JDC and a representative of the German authorities to take place in Spain or Portugal in the near future.

This same matter is also referred to in a cable from Ankara No. 1320 of July 20.

I promptly requested Warren to despatch a cable to Lisbon requesting the Embassy to instruct Schwartz not to have any meeting whatsoever with the German authorities pending instructions from Washington.

After carefully considering this matter it is our firm view that Schwartz should be given definitive instructions not to have any meeting with the German authorities. There is at least a reasonable chance that the Germans are attempting to maneuver us into a situation which would enable them to create suspicions in the mind of the Soviet Government that the British and American Governments are trying to establish an independent contact with the German Government, not limited to refugee matters. Particularly at this stage of the war it seems to me imperative that any possibility of this happening should be avoided. Secondly, even assuming that the Germans are in good

000240

faith willing to negotiate on refugee matters, cable No. 1320 of July 20 from Ankara indicates that the Germans are not interested in a purely financial arrangement but are going to insist on some supply of commodities. There is no disposition here or elsewhere in this Government to my knowledge to even negotiate on supplying the Germans with commodities. Thirdly, it is my view that no such meeting should be held without the prior approval of the Russian and British Governments. In view of the attitude which both of these governments have expressed and the time factor involved it seems clear that no such approval could be obtained.

Accordingly, I strongly urge that definitive instructions be sent which will effectively prevent any meeting between Schwartz and the German representative. I would also urge that the American Missions in Lisbon, Madrid and Ankara be advised of this action and the British be informed of our decision.

I am sending a copy of this memorandum to Assistant Secretary McCloy of the War Department for his information.

(Signed) J.W. Pehle

JWP:lh 7/27/44

000241

000242

July 26, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

I spoke to George Warren about the attached cable No. 1320 of July 20. Warren said the matter had just come to his attention and that in the meantime the British had furnished him with a cable from the British Embassy, Madrid, to the British Foreign Office, and the Foreign Office's reply which also related to a proposed meeting of Schwartz with the Germans. Warren said that the British were very clear in their view that no civilian should have any contact of this nature with the Germans but that Schwartz, being an American, should of course receive appropriate instructions from the United States Government.

I have urged Warren to immediately dispatch a cable to Lisbon repeating cable No. 1320 of July 20 from Ankara, and indicating that Schwartz should not take any steps toward a meeting pending definitive instructions from Washington.

Warren indicated he would take this action promptly.

J. W. Pehle

000243

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(Signed) J.W. Pehle

JWPehle:1hh 7/26/44

000244

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000245

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

INCOMING
TELEGRAM
CONTROL COPY

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

dw

HM-911
Distribution of true
reading only by special
arrangement. ██████████ (7)

Copy only Ankara

Dated July 21, 1944

Rec'd. 6:35 p.m. 22d.

W. A. P. J.
B. B. J.

Secretary of State

Washington "1, " . . .

1335, July 21, 3 p.m.

FOR PEHLE WRB FROM LIRSCHMANN. Ankara no. 102

If you deem it advisable I would like to be
informed regarding the proposal received through
Stockholm and Bern referred to in paragraph numbered
eight of your 614 July 7.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
JUL 24 1944
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

KELLEY

BB

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

000246



000247

July 21, 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

Dr. A. Leon Kubowitzki, World Jewish Congress, called me from New York yesterday afternoon and told me that Dr. Nahum Goldmann called him from New Hampshire to say that he had received a message from Shertok to the effect that the British were not permitting Bader to go to Budapest and the suggestion had been made that Kullmann be allowed to go in his stead. Dr. Kubowitzki explained that this was in connection with the Brandt matter and when I asked who Bader was, he indicated that he was connected with the Histadruth. Dr. Kubowitzki asked me whether the War Refugee Board was prepared to support the suggestion that Kullmann be permitted to go to Budapest. I told Dr. Kubowitzki that I was not familiar with this proposal and asked whether the message that Dr. Goldmann had received was available in Washington or New York. Dr. Kubowitzki replied in the negative, stating that Dr. Goldmann had received the message personally in New Hampshire. I told Dr. Kubowitzki that I would check and see what I could find out. He said he would call me this afternoon.

Neither Mr. Pehle, Mr. Friedman, nor Miss Hodel had any knowledge as to any proposal to permit a man named Bader to go to Budapest, nor of any suggestion that Kullmann be permitted to go. I have asked Mr. McCormick to make a search in Censorship and the State Department for the message that Dr. Goldmann was supposed to have received in this connection.

Since dictating the above, Mr. McCormick was able to procure from Censorship the following telegram from Shertok in London to Dr. Goldmann in New York City:

"BADER PROPOSAL NEGATIVED STOP HAVE PROPOSED KULLMANN
SHOULD PROCEED MEET KRAUS EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES THIS BEING
CONSIDERED PLEASE ASSIST YOUR END ALSO WITH RUSSIANS".

It is assumed that this is the message that Dr. Kubowitzki had reference to. A copy thereof is attached.

J. S. Lesser

Attachment

000248

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NYC 117809 - C

R. MUSSMAN HIAS 85573 1128 ITT 7/13/44 7/15/44

DOR

N/AM CAML1013 LONDON 30 13 NIL NLT

TO: HANUM GOLDMAN 342
MADISON AVENUE NEW YORK CITY

FROM: SHERTOK

((SWI/154 BN7000,4601,3837))

NOTE: 1, ((SWI/154 YN4601,7468))

NOTE: 3

BADER PROPOSAL NEGATIVED STOP HAVE PROPOSED KULLMANN SHOULD
PROCEED MEET KRAUS EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES THIS BEING CONSIDERED
PLEASE ASSIST YOUR END ALSO WITH RUSSIANS

NOTE: 1. NYC - JERUSALEM

NOTE: 3. BADER, ROBT. NYC - 07000, OTHERS LISTED

000249

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000250

COPY

TEXT OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM
MADRID, DATED JULY 20th, 1944.

Mr. Dobkin has received a telegram from Keesztner in Budapest saying that a representative of German authorities is anxious to meet him and Doctor Schwartz of American J.D.C. in Spain on July 25 to discuss emigration of Jews from Hungary.

2. He has asked whether there would be objection to this meeting from the point of view of His Majesty's Government. If not he is anxious to be fully briefed on recent German proposal to release these people against deliveries of goods (reported by Joel Brandt) and on His Majesty's Government's attitude to it or to any other proposal involving for example money payments. For this purpose he suggests he should visit London first or else that someone should be sent out from Jewish Agency in London with necessary detailed information.

3. Please inform Shertok of Jewish Agency.

000251

COPY

TEXT OF TELEGRAM FROM FOREIGN OFFICE

TO MADRID, DATED 20th JULY, 1944

These proposals have just been made public both here and in the United States and have been exposed as blackmail. Further, we have secret evidence which we are conveying to the United States Government that the Nazi authorities are using Jews in order to make contact with British and American authorities as a cover for peace proposals with the obvious motive of dividing His Majesty's Government and United States Government from the Soviet Government whose suspicions the Nazi authorities desire to arouse. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government, who at once informed the Soviet Government of German and Hungarian approach are proposing to the United States Government to refuse to have anything to do with these "proposals" and there would in our opinion be every objection to Dr. Schwartz or to anybody else making contact with the German Authorities. But Dr. Schwartz is an American citizen and you should discuss the matter at once with your United States colleague informing him of all the foregoing and asking him whether he agrees or will submit the point to his Government. If the Germans or Hungarians, who are credited with having made offers to the International Red Cross in regard to exit permits for refugees, who possess visas for other countries, are serious, they can easily pursue their schemes without involving Allied citizens. We are in consultation with the United States Government and Jewish Agency about the reported Hungarian intentions. In the meantime, it is essential especially in the interests of our relations with Moscow that no suspicions should be aroused that Allied persons are negotiating with the enemy.

000252

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000253

STANDARD TIME INDICATED
RECEIVED AT
TELEPHONE YOUR TELEGRAMS TO POSTAL TELEGRAPH



THIS IS A FULL RATE TELEGRAM, CABLE-GRAM OR RADIOGRAM UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED BY SYMBOL IN THE PREAMBLE OR IN THE ADDRESS OF THE MESSAGE. SYMBOLS DESIGNATING SERVICE SELECTED ARE OUTLINED IN THE COMPANY'S TARIFFS ON HAND AT EACH OFFICE AND ON FILE WITH REGULATORY AUTHORITIES.

W. BA159 B. PDC444NL= WY JACKSON NHAMP 20
 DR JOHN W PEHLE=
 WAR REFUGEE BOARD TREASURY (WASHDC)=

1944 JUL 20 PM 8 44

K
 288 1/2

HAVE CABLED MR STETTINIUS TODAY AS FOLLOWS AM INFORMED BY DR WEIZMANN THAT HE SUGGESTED TO BRITISH GOVERNMENT THAT CHARLES K ULLMAN ASSISTANT HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES IN LONDON BE AUTHORIZED PROCEED MEET KRAUS FROM BUDAPEST TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITY SAVING HUNGARIAN JEWS IN LIGHT OFFER MADE BY KRAUS STOP URGE YOU RESPECTFULLY IN SYMPATHETIC CONSIDERATION THIS PROPOSAL WHICH NOW BEING CONSIDERED BY BRITISH GOVERNMENT REGARDS UNQUOTE REGARDS=
 DR NACHUM GOLDMANN,==

000254

45

000253

DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

Control copy

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

LC - 303
Distribution of
true reading by
special arrangement
[redacted] W)

For security reasons
text of this message must
be closely guarded
Ankara No. 98
Dated July 20, 1944
Rec'd 11:38 p.m.

*War Ref
Bel (m)
Pehle*

Secretary of State,
Washington.

1320, July 20, 2 p.m.

FOR PEHLE WRB FROM HIRSCHMANN.

Ankara No. 98.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DIVISION OF
JUL 20 1944
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

For your information, Bader of the Jewish Agency who is liaison officer with the Jewish communities and groups in occupied territories, received a telegram dated July 15 from Kastner who is an important member of the Jewish Relief Committee in Budapest and is reported to be well known to other communities as a reliable person. The following is a translation of the telegram.

"Consult Schroeder's friend Istanbul about your flight to Budapest Saturday. Your proposal about a purely financial arrangement uninteresting (repeat uninteresting). Cable whether Schroeder meeting next week with Schwartz at Lisbon would lead to quick results. Schroeder's proposed meeting with Schwartz, who should

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date **SEP 27 1972**

000256

-2- #1320, July 20, 2 p.m., from Ankara

who should have full power, is urgently important. In matters of emigration I am also in contact with Dobkin. Regret Bader's trip here impossible".

Concerning the above we are informed that Bader had been urgently invited by a member of the German Consulate in Istanbul to proceed to Berlin or possibly to Budapest to discuss matters relating to the Hungarian Jews. Bader, acting under instructions from his superiors in the Jewish Agency, referred the matter to Shertock in London who, I am informed, discussed it with "highest authorities" and cabled back that Bader was not to proceed under any condition.

In his exchange of telegrams on the subject with Budapest, Bader inquired whether it would be possible to negotiate on the basis of a financial arrangement instead of the supply of commodities. The telegram quoted above gives the reply that this suggestion is not acceptable but indicated that Schroeder himself would like to discuss the matter in Spain or Portugal, preferably with a representative of the JDC.

In this connection, Joseph Schwartz of the WRB received today the following telegram from Pilpel in Lisbon transmitting a message from Kastner dated

July 15.

000257

4/

-3- #1320, July 20, 2 p.m., from Ankara

July 15.

"1700 people are waiting for a solution by the Germans. Cable whether Schwartz and Dobkin are ready to proceed to Spain in order to meet with a German representative to settle the matter. Advise whether Madrid or Barcelona will be the meeting place in ten days time".

The 1700 mentioned above have been referred to in information received from several sources namely Schwalb in Switzerland, Dobkin in Lisbon and Kastner in Hungary and also from passengers recently arrived on the SS KASBEK. Joseph Schwartz is proceeding to Lisbon from Turkey July 22 and is requesting my advice and your authorization to meet with Schroeder or his representative in connection with the above matter.

I have informed Schwartz that my instructions preclude any action at this time connected with the above situation and that I am merely reporting the matter fully to Washington and requesting for Schwartz advice from you regarding the possibility of his meeting in Portugal or Spain with Schroeder. Schwartz will report to the American Embassy in Lisbon upon his arrival there which he expects will be approximately July 29.

We are assisting

000258

-4- #1320, July 20, 2 p.m., from Ankara

We are assisting Schwartz in arrangements for his transportation to Lisbon.

From the above telegrams, there would appear to be a potentiality which might result in the rescue of some refugees and which suggests the possible usefulness of such a meeting. Schwartz requests that Baerwald be informed of these developments if it meets with your approval.

KELLEY

JJM WMB

000254

44

000260

References:

5353 - repeat message - in
secret file under 1641 to
Moscow.

4283 - instructions - transmits
cable to London 676, June 5,
cable from Ankara 679, June 8

000261

*2-war Refugee rel. ...
Mr. Fehle*

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: American Embassy, London.
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATED: July 20, 1944.
NUMBER: 5721.

CONTROL COPY
(S)

██████████
Please refer to secret instruction of July 8, Number 4283, and telegram from the Department, July 7, Number 5353, when reading telegram from the Embassy dated July 20, regarding recent German proposal to exchange Jews for war materials, as reported in the British press.

WINANT

DGR:LCW 7/24/44

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

000262

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000263

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OF
STATE

was by Board
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FE-119

PLAIN


London

Dated July 20, 1944

Rec'd 12:30 p.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.

5724, Twentieth



Several newspapers today carry articles regarding recent German proposal to spare lives of remaining Jews in Hungary in exchange for war materials including 10,000 trucks "not to be used on the western front". All articles strongly condemn the proposal under such terms as "monstrous", "blackmail" etc. All point out that the British Government has kept American and Russian Governments fully informed. None gives the names of the emissaries who reached Turkey with the proposal.

Diplomatic correspondent of the TIMES calls the offer to "barter Jews for munitions" one of the "most loathsome" stories of the war. He states that the British Government knows that only defeat of Germany will provide security for Jews and other oppressed peoples in Europe and concludes that the proposal "seems to be simply a fantastic attempt to sow suspicion among the Allies".

d

Diplomatic

000264

-P-#5724, July 20, from London.

Diplomatic correspondent of DAILY TELEGRAPH is more objective, giving a concise outline of the story and stating that "it is characterized in authoritative British quarters as a barefaced attempt to blackmail the Allies".

Article in MANCHESTER GUARDIAN covers fully the facts of the proposal as known, which it describes as "a recent German attempt to barter human lives in order to secure a negotiated peace or to secure, at any rate, a split in the United Nations". In short editorial in same paper, entitled "Blackmail", it is stated that the proposal shows that German persecution of Jews in Hungary was not due to mere hatred of Jews but that it was part of a wider scheme to split the Allies by attempting to range the tender-heartedness of the Anglo-Saxons against the realism of the Russians. "The plot failed".

DAILY HERALD reporter characterizes proposal as "cold-blooded", "fantastic" and "incredible" and, after discussing possible German motives, concludes "whatever the evil purpose it is bound to fail".

DAILY MIRROR's article is equally condemnatory. Its conclusion is that proposal represents effort by Nazis to discover how far Allies may be "blackmailed" in an attempt to save lives.

As request

000265

~~3~~-#5724, July 20, from London.

At request of ASLOR, please furnish copies to
Secretary of the Treasury and PEHLE, War Refugee Board.

WINANT

MRM

000266

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000267

JUL 20 1944

My dear Mr. McCloy:

I am sending to you herewith, for the attention of Military Intelligence, a copy of a report from our representative in Ankara, Mr. Ira A. Hirschmann. The report deals with various phases of recent discussions on the so-called Brandt proposal for the release of the Jews of Hungary.

Sincerely yours,

(Signed) J. W. Peble

J. W. Peble
Executive Director

Honorable John J. McCloy,

Assistant Secretary of War.

Enclosure.

*Original signed
by Mr. Peble.*

724
FHodel/ag 7/19/44

000268



000269

German blackmail bid:

Trade lives for lorries

Daily Mirror
By BILL GREIG 7/20/44

AN attempt has been made by the German Government to get war supplies in exchange for the lives of Jews in Hungary.

The British Government has refused to bargain in the lives of men, women and children, and both Russia and America, informed of our attitude, have shown themselves in complete agreement.

I can reveal full details of this astonishing piece of blackmail which will go down in history as one of the most extraordinary incidents of the war.

At various times in the past few months there have been indirect hints from German agents abroad that Germany might be persuaded to change her attitude to the Jews in return for some concession not named.

Then came the news of the massacre of Jews in Hungary which caused an outcry of indignation and anger throughout the world. It was reliably reported that 100,000 Jews had been taken to Poland and gassed.

Almost immediately afterwards two Germans identified as Gestapo representatives arrived in a neutral capital, and through diplomatic channels suggested that a deal might be made regarding the lives of the surviving Hungarian Jews.

They suggested that if the Allies would agree to supply Germany with certain war materials there would be no more executions, and in addition the Nazi policy towards the Jews would be considerably modified.

All Transport

Goods required were all forms of transport, principally rail and road trucks, and they suggested that these could be supplied from stocks now in the Middle East.

At the same time Jewish leaders in Hungary were approached with a similar suggestion and were able to transmit it to neutral countries.

At all times the Gestapo representatives tried to take the line that they were acting on their own responsibility from purely humanitarian motives and not representing the German Government.

There is no doubt, however, in official circles, that an attempt was being made by the Nazis to discover how far the Allies will be blackmailed in an attempt to save lives.

SUBS. SINK 14

r and a naval auxiliary were
apanese ships listed last night as
ted States submarines in the

Daily Herald
7/20/44

Nazis Offer Human Barter

By W. N. EWER

A COLD-BLOODED offer to barter Jewish lives for lorries, foodstuffs and medical supplies has been put forward by the Germans.

The story is so fantastic, so diabolical that it sounds incredible. But it is nevertheless true.

Of Hungary's 800,000 Jews, 400,000 have already been sent by the German and Hungarian Governments to Poland to be slaughtered.

Admiral Horthy has announced that no more are to be deported. The other 400,000 are being held in the hope of trafficking them for goods.

The "Watchdog"

To a Turkish city there came recently a prominent Hungarian Jew, accompanied by a German "watchdog". They made contact with British officials, established their identity, produced the offer they were authorised to make. It was this:

The 400,000 Hungarian Jews still remaining would be handed over to the Allies, in exchange for 10,000 lorries, for medical supplies and for certain specified foodstuffs.

In a naive belief that it would

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Barter

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The 400,000 Hungarian Jews still remaining would be handed over to the Allies, in exchange for 10,000 lorries, for medical supplies and for certain specified foodstuffs.

In a naive belief that it would make the proposed bargain more attractive to British and American minds, it was hinted that guarantees might be given that the lorries would only be used on the Russian front.

It was implied that unless the offer were accepted, the 400,000 Jews would suffer the fate of their brethren.

What is in the evil minds that have thought out this sinister proposal is not easy to diagnose.

Test Blackmail

It may be a sort of test blackmail. Were the Allies to fall into the trap, then other proposals might come: hints that other Jews, that foreign slave workers, can be ransomed at a price which would enable Germany to avoid defeat, or its consequences.

Or was the calculation rather that the Allies must clearly refuse, and that refusal would bring a storm of protest from Jews the world over, and that in turn bring anti-Semitic outbursts?

Or, again, does that hint about the Eastern front betray a hope that there might here be a chance of soving discord between Russia and the Western Allies?

Whatever the evil purpose it is bound to fail.

Allies In Form

The American and Russian Governments were, of course, immediately informed. And if—as seems certain—an official statement is made, it will be made with the authority of all three Governments.

Jewish leaders both in Britain and the United States have also been kept fully advised, and the policy being followed, it is understood, has their agreement.

000271

GERMANS OFFER TO BARTER JEWS' LIVES

ONE of the most fantastically macabre stories of the war has come to light in reports reaching London from the Middle East.

It tells of a German offer, apparently made in all seriousness, to barter the lives of 400,000 Jews still living in Hungary in exchange for a specified list of "non-military" material from the Allies, including 10,000 motor lorries, medical supplies and foodstuffs.

Recently a prominent Hungarian Jew, accompanied by a German "watch-dog," arrived in Turkey. They let it be known that they had an official offer to make regarding the remaining Jewish population of Hungary, about half of which has already been deported to Poland by the Gestapo with the connivance of the quisling Hungarian Government.

Blackmail

The Jews still in Hungary face the same fate of deportation, slave labour and finally extermination in the Gestapo gas-chambers. It apparently occurred to the Germans that they might be more

useful as counters for a blackmailing bargain.

It was naively suggested—or was it so naive?—that the lorries would only be used on the Eastern front, not against the Western Allies.

Here, possibly, is one of the clues to the real purposes of a manoeuvre which on the surface seems too incredible to be taken seriously.

The Germans who conceived the plan may have hoped that, even if it failed, it would reach the ears of the Russians and foment Russian suspicions of the Allies. But even that hope has been frustrated, for as soon as the details came to the knowledge of the British Government Moscow was informed.

Sinister motives?

There may be sinister motives in the background of the affair. Himmler's Gestapo, which is in charge of the deportation and extermination of the Hungarian and other European Jews, may have wanted to test out how far Allied humanitarianism would influence Allied political decisions in the event of a German peace offer accompanied by threats of wholesale massacres by the Gestapo throughout Europe, including prisoners of war and foreign workers in Germany, as well as Jews, if it were not accepted.

NAZIS WANT TO EXCHANGE JEWS FOR SUPPLIES

Daily Telegraph 7/20/41

ALLIES REFUSE TO BE BLACKMAILED

By Our Diplomatic Correspondent
Two Hungarian envoys, with German backing, who recently arrived in Turkey, took with them an offer from the Gestapo and the Hungarian Government to allow all the remaining Jews in Hungary to leave the country on conditions.

It was stipulated that Britain and America supply Hungary with an unspecified quantity of material, including lorries.

They promised that this material would not be used on the Western Front. They gave no guarantee that the German Army, which controls Hungary would not use it elsewhere.

The envoys, whose names are for the present withheld, got into contact with intermediaries in Ankara or Istanbul. These brought the proposal to the notice of British representatives.

It has since been examined in London. It is characterised in authoritative British quarters as a barefaced attempt to blackmail the Allies, whose sympathy with the Hungarian Jews is well known.

MOSCOW INFORMED

As soon as the British Government received this proposal they consulted Washington and informed Moscow. In British official circles the scheme is regarded as a plain attempt to divide the Allies by suggesting that Britain and America should supply material which the Germans will use in their struggle with Russia.

There is not the slightest chance that the British and United States Governments will do so, much though they would like to save the lives of the Hungarian Jews.

It is not yet clear how far the plan had the approval of the highest German and Hungarian authorities. The British authorities are satisfied that it was put forward with the knowledge of the Gestapo.

On the other hand, the reported intervention of Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, suggests that he disapproves and is trying to put a stop to the wholesale massacre of Hungarian Jews.

Horthy has promised the headquarters of the International Red Cross in Switzerland, as reported in THE DAILY TELEGRAPH yesterday, that no more Jews will be deported from Hungary. He may have taken this step in response to the appeal of the King of Sweden.

A MONSTROUS "OFFER"

GERMAN BLACKMAIL

BARTERING JEWS FOR MUNITIONS

Times 7/20/44
FROM OUR DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENT

It has long been clear that, faced with the certainty of defeat, the German authorities would intensify all their efforts to blackmail, deceive, and split the allies. In their latest effort, made known in London yesterday, they have reached a new level of fantasy and self-deception. They have put forward, or sponsored, an offer to exchange the remaining Hungarian Jews for munitions of war—which, they said, would not be used on the Western front.

The whole story is one of the most loathsome of the war. It begins with a process of deliberate extirpation and ends, to date, with attempted blackmail. The background is only too well known. As soon as the German army occupied Hungary in March of this year, anti-Jewish measures were applied with a brutality known, until then, only in Poland. At the end of last month 400,000 of the 750,000 Jews in Hungary had been "liquidated"—which means that the younger ones had been put into labour camps, where they work under conditions of appalling harshness, and the older ones were sent to the lethal camps in Poland. After reports had come that more than 100,000 had already been done to death in the gas chambers which are known to be there, both Mr. Eden and Mr. Cordell Hull expressed the horror of the civilized world and promised punishment for the guilty.

A short time ago a prominent Hungarian Jew and a German official, whose job obviously was to control his actions and movements, arrived in Turkey and managed to get a message passed to British officials. The Hungarian Jew said he had "every reason to suppose" that the German authorities were prepared to spare the lives of the remaining 350,000 Jews in Hungary, and even let them leave for abroad, if the British would send Germany important war stocks, including 10,000 army lorries. These stocks, he said, would not be used on the Western front.

THE ONLY ANSWER

Such were the terms of the offer as reported to London. The British Government know what value to set on any German or German-sponsored offer. They know that there can be no security for the Jews or the other oppressed peoples of Europe until victory is won. The allies are fighting to achieve that security; and they know, as well as the Germans, what happens when one begins paying blackmail. The blackmailer increases his price. Such considerations provided their own answer to the proposed bargain.

Whether the German authorities seriously believed that Britain would heed the offer cannot be known at this stage. Probably even before making it they had decided for one reason or another—perhaps for transport difficulties—to drop the deportations to Poland; yesterday, in fact, the International Red Cross announced that the Hungarian Government had agreed to put a stop to the deportations and even allow some Jews to leave. In the light of that announcement (which will be judged by events) the German offer seems to be simply a fantastic attempt to sow suspicion among the allies.

Fantastic though it was, London made sure that Moscow and Washington were quickly in possession of all the facts.

Blackmail

M. G. Mason 7/20/44
The story of the German attempt to blackmail the United Nations through the Hungarian Jews is one of the most dreadful of the war. Nothing shows more clearly the depths of satanic wickedness to which the Germans will sink or their perverted ingenuity. When the Nazis took over Hungary at the end of March the full apparatus of Jewish persecution was set going with unparalleled speed. This, it appears, was not through mere hatred of the Jews but as part of a wider scheme. By exploitation of their humanity the United Nations, it was thought, might be split. If the Russians would not respond, all the better; the Anglo-Saxons would be so tender-hearted that they would not mind helping Germany with supplies to withstand the "Bolshevik hordes": the edge of the combined offensives would be blunted if not turned. The plot failed, and the Nazis have gone on with their extermination of the Hungarian Jews. But it is not only the German Nazis who are responsible; those Hungarians who have carried out their will, from the Regent Horthy downwards, are equally culpable. The Roman Catholic Church and the neutrals have protested without avail. Hungary is bringing on herself a terrible retribution. Now is the moment for a strong concerted effort to make the mass of decent Hungarians turn while there is still time and save what few of the miserable victims can be saved.

7m WRB

London Dispatch
JULY 16, 1944 5

France And Jews: A Strange Statement

M. MICHEL le Troquer, prominent Paris lawyer and son of the de Gaulle Commissar Delegate for Liberated Territories, recently escaped from France.

He has since written the following curious suggestions in the official French newspaper in Algiers, the *L'Alger Republicain*:

"If the French Jews, now living under the appalling Vichy anti-Jewish laws, should automatically have their industrial, commercial, and political rights as French citizens restored, certain French (non-Jewish) elements in liberated France might be very irritated."

He tells responsible leaders of Free France that "... undoubtedly a proper solution can be found (of the problem of the dispossessed French Jews) if great prudence and political wisdom is exercised by those in charge of repairing injustices, without making psychological errors ..."

Propaganda

He also admits that the spreading of anti-Semitic propaganda by the Vichy and German authorities throughout France has had some effect on the French population.

This article was passed by the official French Press and Information Service, equivalent to the British Ministry of Information. So far neither M. le Troquer senior nor junior have been asked to give account of their strange attitude by the French Provisional Government. On the contrary, certain Government agencies were used to spread this article in the U.S.

It thus has the open approval of the de Gaulle Government.

New Law Passed

Our Diplomatic Correspondent states: I am informed by official de Gaulle quarters in London that the Provisional Government in Algiers has passed a law making null and void the racial and anti-Semitic laws of the Vichy Govern-

USING JEWS AS BARTER

Nazi Blackmail

N. Guardian 7/20/44

ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN ALLIED SUPPLIES

From our Diplomatic Correspondent

LONDON, WEDNESDAY.

It is now possible to reveal the salient facts about a recent German attempt to barter human lives in order to secure a negotiated peace or to secure, at any rate, a split in the ranks of the United Nations. At least 400,000 of Hungary's Jewish population—if not the whole of the 800,000 still alive three months ago—were destined to be the tools of a German effort at international blackmail.

The story begins early in May when a special German plane arrived at Istanbul carrying as passengers a very highly placed Gestapo official, together with a member of the Jewish community of Budapest. The latter was then coerced into seeking contact with prominent Jews in order to forward to Britain the following German proposition:—

Germany would be prepared on certain conditions to forgo the extermination of Hungarian Jews, who would instead be handed over to the Allies. It was suggested that they should be sent in batches to Spain and Portugal, there to be dealt with by the appropriate bodies on behalf of the United Nations.

As a token of Germany's "goodwill" and sincerity it was proposed that 5,000 to 10,000 Hungarian Jews should be transferred to Spain before the conclusion of the bargain. In return Germany asked for 10,000 lorries of food, medical, and other supplies. The emissary had been instructed to make it plain that none of these materials would be employed on either the Western or the Southern fronts; in other words that they would be used in the Russian campaign.

What at first appeared to be a suggestion so fantastic as to be beyond belief, or perhaps a trap, turned out on deeper investigation to be a serious German proposal.

A FULL REPORT

A leading member of the Jewish Agency in Palestine was the first to

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New Law Passed

Our Diplomatic Correspondent states: I am informed by official de Gaulist quarters in London that the Provisional Government in Algiers has passed a law making null and void the racial and anti-Semitic laws of the Vichy Government.

It is intended to undo by progressive stages the work of racial discrimination and persecution inaugurated by Vichy.

As regards the views reported to have been expressed by M. Michel le Troquer, these would be the expression of a personal opinion and would not voice official policy.

It is claimed that there is not a censorship of expressions of political views in the de Gaulist Press.

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A FULL REPORT

A leading member of the Jewish Agency in Palestine went to the Middle East to conduct and complete inquiries already proceeding from other quarters. He later reported in person to the authorities concerned in this country. His impression was that the Hungarian Jewish emissary was truthfully stating the position confronting his brethren.

From the British side the Governments of the United States and Russia were kept fully informed. Recent statements on the subject of the Hungarian Jews by Mr. Roosevelt and by Mr. Cordell Hull have to be read in the light of this knowledge.

The Pope has since intervened in Budapest, and probably also in Berlin, in an effort to stop the wholesale massacre of Hungarian Jews, which began some time ago and is still in progress. It is highly doubtful, however, whether any of these protests will avail.

There is no official confirmation in London of the reports that Admiral Horthy, the Hungarian Regent, has given a promise to the International Red Cross that further deportation of Jews to Poland will be stopped. Horthy may, of course, have done so. The question is whether he is in a position to see that the promise is obeyed.

CALL TO HUNGARIANS

Nothing but their own defeat will turn the Germans aside from their systematic extermination of the Jews. But the Hungarians may be stopped if it is again impressed upon them by the Allied leaders that they will be held responsible for their share in the German crime.

Hungarian railway workers should be called upon to hinder, by sabotage and by other means in their power, the mass transference of Jews from Hungary to the death camps of Poland. Farmers too, should be urged to hide Jews who may succeed in evading their guards. All such measures must, indeed, form an integral part of an agreed policy.

Nazis Reported In Bid to 'Spare' 400,000 Jews

London Hears of Huge Extortion Demand for Supplies by Allies

From the Herald Tribune Bureau
Copyright, 1944, New York Tribune Inc.
LONDON, July 18.—The fate of perhaps 400,000 Hungarian Jews is currently being offered in barter by the Germans in what is probably the most monstrous blackmail attempt in history, according to information reaching London.

Already the Nazis have deported from Hungary nearly 400,000 Jews. They have been transported to Poland to face either death or

forced labor. An equal number is slated for similar transportation.

According to reliable reports here, the Germans have allowed a prominent Hungarian Jew to proceed to a city in the Middle East to negotiate with the Allies for the release of the second 400,000 Jews. The German offer is fairly simple. The Hungarian Jews will be released into Allied hands in return for various "non-military" supplies to Germany from the Allies. The items reported to constitute the German blackmail demands include 10,000 trucks, medical supplies and some special foodstuffs.

The blackmail proposition, it was pointed out in London, has certain devilish aspects. Among the unthinking in some Allied countries, it may be provocative of anti-Semitism, because it seems superficially to present the Allies with the issue of either prolonging the war or accepting responsibility for the fate of hundreds of thou-

sands of Jews. Neither choice is palatable to the Allies.

There is good reason to believe that the Soviet government has been fully advised of the latest developments. In London, one of the main hopes of the German blackmail manipulation is believed to be that it will drive a wedge between Russia and her western allies.

Because the British and American governments are fully conscious of this element in all German foreign policy, they have hastened to reassure the Russian government that no move will be taken without full consultation with Moscow. In this respect, at least, the German device seems to have fallen far short of its purpose.

Jewish leaders in both Britain and the United States have been kept advised of the developments, and the policy being followed, it

is understood, has their agreement.

It is regarded in London as likely that an appeal will be made to Switzerland, as the neutral protecting power, to intercede.

The possibility that the blackmail stratagem may not necessarily have the full connivance of the German government, but may be the work of a Gestapo gang in Hungary, has been suggested here, but in any case the German government is held fully responsible.

Horthy Promise Reported

BERN, Switzerland, July 18 (AP).—Admiral Nicholas Horthy, Regent of Hungary, has promised the International Red Cross Committee that no more Jews will be transported forcibly out of Hungary, it was learned Tuesday, and has authorized the committee to direct evacuation of Jewish children to countries willing to receive them.

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Istanbul, July 18, 1944

Dear Bob:-

I would appreciate it if you would arrange
for the prompt transmission of the enclosed
telegram to Washington.

Cordially yours,

I. W. Hirschmann

Robert W. Kelley, Esquire
Charge Affairs
American Embassy
Ankara

000274

July 19, 1944

I. A. Mirschmann to S. Pinckney Tuck,
Cairo

Joseph Schwartz of American Joint Distribution Committee is arriving in Cairo approximately July 25 on urgent matter. He requires transportation and high priority to proceed without delay to Lisbon. I should appreciate it if you would accord him all possible assistance.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-78
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

000280

July 19, 1944

From Mr. Hirschmann to Mr. Lehle
War Refugee Board

For your information Bader of the Jewish Agency who is liaison officer with the Jewish communities and groups in occupied territories received the following free translation of a coded telegram dated July 18 from Mastner who is an important member of the Jewish Relief Committee in Budapest and is reported to be well known to other communities as a reliable figure.

"Consult Schroeder's friend Istanbul about your flight to Budapest Saturday stop Your proposal about a purely financial arrangement uninteresting repeat uninteresting stop Cable whether Schroeder meeting next week with Schwartz at Lisbon would lead to quick results. Schroeder's proposed meeting with Schwartz who should have full power is urgently important stop In matters of emigration as also in contact with Sobkin stop Regret Bader's trip here impossible."

Concerning the above we are informed that Bader had been urgently invited by a member of the German Consulate in Istanbul to proceed to Berlin or possibly to Budapest to discuss matters relating to the Hungarian Jews stop Bader acting under the direction of his superiors in the Jewish Agency referred the matter to Shertock in London who I am informed discussed it with "highest authorities" and cabled back that Bader was not to proceed under any condition.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

July 20 1944
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During Bader's exchange of telegrams on the subject with Budapest he inquired whether it would be possible to negotiate on the basis of a financial arrangement instead of commodities. The telegram quoted above gives the reply that this suggestion is not acceptable but indicates that Schroeder himself would like to discuss the matter in Spain or Portugal preferably with a representative of the Joint Distribution Committee.

In this connection Joseph Schwartz of the Joint Distribution Committee received today the following free translation of a coded telegram from Pilgel in Lisbon transmitting a message from Kastner dated July 15:

"Seventeen hundred people are waiting for a solution by the Germans stop Cable whether Schwartz and Dobkin are ready to proceed to Spain in order to meet with a German representative to settle the matter Advise whether Madrid or Barcelona shall be the meeting place in ten days time."

The reference to the above seventeen hundred seems to have connection with information from sources, namely Schwalb in Switzerland, Dobkin in Lisbon and Kastner in Hungary and also from passengers recently arrived on the S. S. Kazbek. Joseph Schwartz is proceeding to Lisbon from Turkey July 22 and is requesting my advice and your authorization to meet with Schroeder or his representative in connection with the above matter.

I have informed Schwartz that my instructions preclude any action at this time connected with the above situation and that I am reporting the complete information to Washington and requesting for Schwartz advice from you regarding the possibility of his meeting in Portugal or Spain with Schroeder. Schwartz will report

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to the American Embassy in Lisbon upon his arrival there which he expects will be approximately July 29. We are assisting Schwartz in arrangements for his early arrival in Lisbon.

From the above telegrams there appears to be a concrete possibility which could result in the rescue of some designated refugees and which suggests the possible usefulness of such a meeting. Schwartz requests that Gaerwal be informed of these developments if it meets with your approval.

*I was Refugee Fed
Mr. Kelle*

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

CONTROL COPY

FROM: American Embassy, London
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATED: July 19, 1944
NUMBER: 5691



Transmission of following paraphrased message to Nahum Goldberg, Jewish Agency Office, 1720 16th Street, N. W., Washington, is requested by Shertok of the Jewish Agency for Palestine:

No decision has yet been made with regard to Brandt but even if he is permitted to return, he will not be given authority to give any information. The offer made to Bader Istanbul to proceed to Budapest clearly indicates that other side ready discuss release. It may be your desire to talk over with WRB the possibility of contact with Bader Istanbul being made by them. Suggestion that Kullman go to Budapest refused. Fear it is now too late Hirschmann come here view his first-hand impression Brandt, as originally proposed.

WINANT

DCR/GFW

7-20-44

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

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BRITISH EMBASSY

WASHINGTON 8, D.C.

18th July, 1944.

Dear Mr. Warren,

I enclose herein a copy of a personal message which His Majesty's Ambassador at Moscow has been instructed to hand to M. Molotov. His Majesty's Ambassador was to show this message, before delivering it, to his United States colleague, and to explain that the reason for this action was that the suggestion was pressed on His Majesty's Government with particular earnestness by high and responsible Jewish circles here.

I also enclose, for your information, a paraphrase of a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Stockholm about the approach made through the Swedish channel.

Yours sincerely,

K. I. POATE

Mr. G. Warren,
Department of State
of the United States,
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

British

Gov't. telegram, 1-12-72

By RHP

Date SEP 27 1972

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PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM
HIS MAJESTY'S MINISTER AT STOCKHOLM
OF 14th JULY, 1944

The acting Secretary General believes that Kleist's activities are directly inspired by Himmler whose opposition to Ribbentrop is so strong that the mere fact that Ribbentrop refused to allow Estonia "Swedes" to take refuge in Sweden was enough to cause Himmler to arrange for it. Himmler detests both Terboven and Quisling and is no doubt responsible for maintaining Dr. Best in Copenhagen even after the loss of German prestige produced by last week's successful strike there. Himmler is known to favour a friendly policy towards Sweden whereas Hitler and Ribbentrop are violently anti-Swedish. Assarson thinks that Kleist's offer to barter Baltic Jews against Red Cross supplies of beds, chairs, etc., for bombed out Germans aims both at increasing Himmler's popularity in bombed German Cities and at gaining credit for himself in Sweden and elsewhere for more humane policy towards the Jews. This is no doubt with an eye to saving his own skin later.

000288

COPY

TEXT OF TELEGRAM ADDRESSED BY
FOREIGN OFFICE TO MOSCOW, DATED
JULY 13th, 1944.

You will remember that on December 17, 1942 a declaration was issued in the names of the Governments of the Soviet Union, United States and United Kingdom and of the other Allies calling attention to the bestial measures of extermination which the German authorities were applying to the Jewish population in areas occupied by them and solemnly affirming that those responsible for these crimes should not escape retribution.

2. In spite of an unbroken series of military reverses during the past two years and the certainty of final defeat the Germans are in no way desisting from their barbarous treatment of the Jews. Indeed the contrary would appear to be the case. All our information goes to show that since the Germans occupied Hungary measures of gassing and burning have been applied with increasing ferocity by the Germans and that the present Hungarian Government are collaborating as willing accomplices in these outrages. As a result appeals are frequently made to His Majesty's Government to issue some further declaration condemning these crimes. It has occurred to me that given victorious advance of Soviet armies a declaration by your government couched in terms of unambiguous frankness and proclaiming that Soviet armies and retribution for these crimes would enter Hungary together might have effect at least of reducing the scale of these horrible outrages against the Jewish population.

000289

COPY

TEXT OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED
FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE
DATED 18th JULY, 1944

Please inform United States Government that since receiving their views we have had fresh evidence which in our view compels us to take a different attitude. Details of this evidence will be passed by British Security in the Middle East to their American opposite numbers. From the beginning we have shared the view of the United States Government that proposals brought by Brandt constituted a political warfare trap set up by the Gestapo, but that we should investigate them and retain Brandt in the hope that a serious proposal might emerge or that in the interval the murder of the Jews would cease. Neither has occurred. On the other hand in the last few days we have had our suspicions confirmed and the conviction forced upon us that it would be highly dangerous to give even the appearance of a response to the Gestapo's suggestions. For we now have evidence that the Brandt mission was intended as cover for an approach to us or to the Americans on the question of a separate peace not seriously intended no doubt except in an attempt to prejudice our relations with the Soviet Government. (Another of our original suspicions confirmed). In view of this we feel that it would be extremely dangerous to send Brandt back with any message or send any message through Protecting Power which would inevitably be interpreted as a response to the Gestapo. We feel furthermore that it would be both unfair and unwise to place on the Soviet Government any responsibility for a rejection which we are sure they would strongly advocate.

2. His Majesty's Government therefore propose that the Gestapo agent should be retained in any case and that Brandt if he still wishes to return and the security authorities have no objection should be told before departure that the British and United States authorities cannot be expected to take any cognizance of suggestions he brought or channels through which they were conveyed.

3. If this results in German propaganda to the effect that a scheme of saving the Jews had been suggested but contemptuously rejected by the United States and British Governments, then we should be ready with an exposure of the Gestapo's plot and a reiteration of all our respective Governments have done and are

000290

willing to do to relieve Jewish suffering. Meanwhile such schemes of assistance as we have drawn up independently or through inter-Governmental Committee would proceed and when possible publicity would be given to these, but never in such a way as to appear to be connected with the Gestapo initiative.

4. Please obtain United States Government's views urgently. If they agree we propose to inform Dr. Weizmann and instruct His Majesty's Ambassador to concert with his United States colleague, similarly instructed, to inform the Soviet Government that as nothing worth taking seriously had emerged from the Brandt proposals and as slaughter of the Jews was apparently continuing we had decided to have nothing further to do with Brandt's suggestions but for security reasons would keep the Gestapo agent in custody.

COPY

July 19, 1944.

To Washington, Moscow.

Repeated to Ankara, Cairo and Jerusalem.

Please inform Government to which you are accredited that two American press correspondents in London (Chicago Sun and New York Herald Tribune) have secured and are sending their papers fairly accurate accounts of Brandt's proposals about Jews and that in answer to inquiries we are giving the press immediate guidance contained in my immediately following telegram. Considered formal statement for publication will be suggested as soon as possible for concurrence of United States Government.

000292

Following is guidance, not a hand-out.

For some time past, concurrently with well-substantiated stories of horrible maltreatment of Jews, vague suggestions have been put about in certain neutral capitals that Germany, or this or that satellite Government, was preparing to modify its Jewish policy. Recently, in particular, two (? Bulgarians) arrived from Hungary in Turkey bringing proposals for the release on certain conditions of large numbers of Jews and a cessation of extermination. These proposals were found to have no serious backing or practical meaning. They amount in fact to blackmail and threats designed to confuse the Allies and to prejudice efficient conduct of the war.

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000294

*2 War Refugee Bd.
Mr. Peble*

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: American Consulate General, Jerusalem
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATED: July 12, 1944
NUMBER: 98
x

CONTROL COPY

It is requested by the Jewish agency that the following information, which has also been sent to the British Government, be sent to the War Refugee Board with particular reference message for Goldman contained in my cable of July 11, no. 97.

One. With a view to meeting the contingency that the Budapest proposal may emanate from some Nazi organization independent of the German Foreign Office, the proposal should also be sent concerning meeting of representatives of the War Refugee Board with members of the Budapest group at Istanbul. Two. The emissary should be allowed to return to Budapest at once. Three. Although it is obviously preferable that the emissary should carry with him a decision of readiness to negotiate, if this will further delay his return he should be sent back at once with instructions to report to the other side that his message had been delivered, ~~it~~ was being considered by the highest quarters, and that prompt action would follow. Four. So as not to give any excuse to the enemy which is not necessary, the second emissary should also be returned if possible.

PINERTON DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

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*War Refugee Bd.
Mr. Ruffe*

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: The American Consul General, Jerusalem
TO: The Secretary of State, Washington
DATE: July 11, 1944
NUMBER: 97

CONTROL COPY

I have been asked by **Bengurion**, Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive, to transmit through the War Refugee Board the following message to **Nahum Goldman**:

On behalf of the Jewish Agency Executive, please transmit to President Roosevelt the following:

A proposal emanating from apparently influential enemy sources at Budapest has been received by this agency. The readiness of the Nazis to release one million Hungarian Rumanian Jews, after two years of continuous slaughter of European Jews, on the condition known to the Department of State and proposing negotiations to that end is indicated in this proposal. Jewish Agency immediately transmitted this proposal to the Governments of America and Britain. A well known Budapest Zionist was the Jewish Emissary whom the Nazis sent with this proposal. At the present time he is detained in Cairo by British security authorities. The Jewish Agency earnestly appeals to you not to allow this unique and possibly last chance of saving the remains of European Jewry to be lost although it is fully realized that the exigencies of war are primary consideration. Even if there may be some doubts concerning the proposal in its present form we would urgently and

respectfully

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

000297

respectfully submit that suitable arrangements be made to discuss the proposal with representatives of the enemy group from which it emanated, and that the door should not be closed. Therefore we plead that you may see fit to give your support to the following proposals which the Jewish Agency has also submitted to the Government of Britain: (1) Through appropriate channels to intimate to other side immediately, readiness to nominate representative to discuss rescue and transfer the largest number of Jews possible, and (2) to intimate to the other side that the preliminary condition to any discussion is the discontinuance of deportations immediately.

PINKERTON

DCR:MPL
7/13/44

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7/8/44

Memorandum for the Files

At Secretary Morgenthau's suggestion, I discussed with Admiral Leahy today the various offers that have been received from German sources on the rescue of the Jews, particularly the offer received from Joe Brandt. I told Admiral Leahy how these matters are being handled and he agreed fully and said that we could rely on the State Department keeping him advised on phases of such matters which are of military significance.

He said that he would mention the matter to the President when convenient.

Attached hereto is a memorandum of points which I discussed with Admiral Leahy.

J. Paul C.

000300

18/44

Memo for Discussion with Admiral Leahy

1. Joe Brandt with agent arrived in Ankara in May by German plane.
2. Discussions held at Ankara, Palestine and Cairo.
3. Brandt and agent now held in Cairo.
4. Significant points of offer:
 - a. 10,000 trucks--possible guarantee
 - b. 2 million cakes of soap
 - c. 200 tons cocoa
 - d. 800 tons coffee
 - e. 200 tons tea
5. Germans would agree to stop deportation and extermination of Jews and agree to exit of Jews principally through Spain
6. Background of Brandt dubious.
7. Jewish Agent now in London for conversation.
8. Russians promptly advised--Russian reply: neither permissible nor expedient to discuss such matters with Germans.
9. Russians now being advised more fully: also to be advised that we appreciate undesirability of dealing through these channels and may wish to deal directly through Swiss. Asking Germans to show good faith by accepting previous proposals principally relating to children.
10. Germans having indicated they are very angry with Allied detention of their agents and that it was proposed that further discussions be conducted in Lisbon.
11. Similar proposals now coming from Sweden and Switzerland.
12. British and American views are that Germans were merely attempting to split the Allies, but we cannot afford to slam the door on any conceivable negotiations.
13. *35 prominent Hungarian names in Lisbon*

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000302

C O P Y

[REDACTED]

Paraphrase of Telegram from American Embassy,
London, as No. 39, July 7, 6 p.m.

The following is for Barlas from Shertok and is with reference to your June 30 telegram:

"Message sent by you has been received. Without British Government's authority Bader will not be able to proceed. The Foreign Office has been urged to grant permission and promises an early reply. No definite decision has been made with respect to Brandt since Washington's reactions are being awaited by British Government. Copies of my reports to Jerusalem by telegraph regarding negotiations made here are being transmitted by the Foreign Office through the British Embassy at Ankara to Kaplan at my request. It would be appreciated if you would inform Hirschmann that we urged inter alia that authorization should be given WRB representatives to meet at Istanbul representatives of Brandt's backers. This is suggested with a view to clarifying the whole matter out it is likely that more determined and admittedly unorthodox steps even of explanatory nature will not here be accepted."

WVM MB

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-73
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

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000304

*I was Refugee Bd.
on file*

ORIGINAL TEXT OF TELEGRAM SENT

FROM: Secretary of State, Washington
TO: AMEMBASSY, MOSCOW
DATED: July 7, 1944
NUMBER: 1641

CONTROL COPY

SECTION ONE

Reference is made to Dept.'s 1460 of June 9 and 1529 of June 21 and to your cable 2184 of June 19. The following additional facts are now available.

(1) Joel Brandt is presently being held in custody at Cairo after having previously proceeded to Jerusalem for discussions there. There have been discussions in Cairo between the American and British authorities, Brandt and Shertok of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

(2) Gyorgy, who arrived from Vienna with Brandt on May 19, was taken into custody by Turkish officials on May 25, released in a few hours and departed for Cairo where he is held in custody with Brandt.

(3) Shertok of the Jewish Agency is in London pursuing conversations with officials of the British Government.

(4) Word has been received through the Jewish Agency, that the Gestapo are very angry about the failure of Brandt and Gyorgy to return to German territory. The Gestapo is alleged to have indicated that Brandt's journey was merely a preliminary to future discussions to be carried on in

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

Lisbon

000305

Lisbon by Schroeder, presumably a Gestapo agent. The British Government has proposed that Brandt and Gyorgy be permitted to return to Budapest with message that Allied circles are concerned with the fate of Jews and ready to consider any practicable scheme for relieving their fate and that Brandt understands that the Allies will convey their views through the protecting power and that the German Government might shortly expect to hear something through this source.

(5) Although no such information was contained in our earlier reports with regard to this matter, it now appears that Brandt has indicated in several informal conversations that the German Government would be willing to agree that the 10,000 trucks would not (repeat not) be used on the western front.

(6) We are requesting Ambassador Steinhardt to forward to you promptly Ankara despatches to the Department Nos. 676 of June 5 and 679 of June 8 which supply additional background information with respect to this matter.

(7) British Ambassador in Moscow has cabled the British Foreign Office suggesting that the information on the trucks will increase the possibility of a completely negative response from the Soviet Government. Nevertheless

it is

it is the feeling here that information with respect to the trucks should be presented directly at this time in order that the Soviet Government be fully informed. He also believes that Brandt and Gyorgy should not be permitted to return to Budapest until the attitude of the Soviet Government on this point has been determined.

(8) Two additional proposals for the release of Jews from enemy territory have been received through Stockholm and Bern, the details of which will be sent to you for transmission to the Soviet Government promptly.

SECTION TWO

It is requested that this matter be taken up with the Soviet Government in such manner as you deem appropriate and all of the facts brought to the attention of the Soviet Government promptly within your discretion and after concurrence with your British colleague.

It should be emphasized to the Soviet Government that neither this Government nor the British Government has been deceived as to the character of this alleged offer of the German Government and that the two governments have been convinced from the outset that the offer is part and parcel of the German psychological warfare effort. This is borne out particularly by the facts which have now come to light
on the alleged

on the alleged German willingness to guarantee that the trucks would not be used on the Western Front.

You will understand the reluctance of the British and American Governments to shut the door completely to any offer. Other offers of this nature are expected and eventually one may be received which can be given serious consideration. It is our view that by appearing to explore such matters we not only have the possibility of saving lives while the discussions are going on, but also clearly leave the way open for further offers which we anticipate and which might possibly be made in good faith.

You should inform the Soviet Government that we are fully aware of the undesirability of such direct contacts with representatives of the German Government and we are searching for a method of rescue through the intermediary of the Swiss. Details of any practical proposal will be communicated to the Soviet Government and the Soviet Government will of course be currently informed of developments and no action will be taken without prior agreement with the Soviet and British Governments.

It is suggested that you consult fully with the British Ambassador with respect to this matter and in discussions with the Soviet Government make it clear, if the British Ambassador is in agreement, that the views expressed by you are also the views of the British Government. The British authorities here are in agreement.

Repeated to Ankara
X
S
N

000300

DEVISION
CLASSIFICATION
SECRET

Repeated to Ankara as no. 614 for Steinhardt; Cairo
as no. 1727 for Tuck; and London as no. 5353 for Winant.
X

HULL
(GLW)

~~CODE ROOM: Repeat to London for Winant, to Ankara for
Steinhardt and Hirschmann and to Cairo for Tuck.~~

000309

*Cleared
with Chan
and eaten with
Warren - July 6, 3:00
JB 7*

DRAFT OF CABLE TO MOSCOW FOR AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN'S PERSONAL ATTENTION

SECTION ONE

Reference is made to Dept.'s 1460 of June 9 and 1529 of June 21 and to your cable 2184 of June 19. The following additional facts are now available.

(1) Joel Brandt is presently being held in custody at Cairo after having previously proceeded to Jerusalem for discussions there. There have been discussions in Cairo between the American and British authorities, Brandt and Shertok of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

(2) Gyorgy, who arrived from Vienna with Brandt on May 19, was taken into custody by Turkish officials on May 25, released in a few hours and departed for Cairo where he is held in custody with Brandt.

(3) Shertok of the Jewish Agency is in London pursuing conversations with officials of the British Government.

(4) Word has been received through the Jewish Agency, that the Gestapo are very angry about the failure of Brandt and Gyorgy to return to German territory. The Gestapo is alleged to have indicated that Brandt's journey was merely a preliminary to future discussions to be carried on in Lisbon by Schroeder, presumably a Gestapo agent. The British Government has proposed that Brandt and Gyorgy be permitted to return to Budapest with message that Allied circles are concerned with the fate of Jews and ready to consider any practicable scheme for relieving their fate and that Brandt understands that the Allies will convey their views through the protecting power and that the German Government might shortly expect to hear something through this source.

(5) Although no such information was contained in our earlier reports with regard to this matter, it now appears that Brandt has indicated in several informal conversations that the German Government would be willing to agree that the 10,000 trucks would not (repeat not) be used on the western front.

(6) We are requesting Ambassador Steinhardt to forward to you promptly Ankara despatches to the Department Nos. 676 of June 5 and 679 of June 8 which supply additional background information with respect to this matter.

(7) British Ambassador in Moscow has cabled the British Foreign Office suggesting that the information on the trucks will increase the possibility of a completely negative response from the Soviet Government; Nevertheless it is the feeling here that information with respect to the trucks ~~will eventually become known to the Soviet Government through other sources and might therefore better~~ be presented directly at this time. He also believes that Brandt and Gyorgy should not be permitted to return to Budapest until the attitude of the Soviet Government on this point has been determined.

(8) ^{Two} additional proposals for the release of ~~some~~ Jews from ^{enemy territory} ~~the~~ ^{should} ~~the~~ Soviet Govt would be fully informed.

000310

~~Latvia to Sweden~~ has been received ~~in Sweden~~ ^{as promptly as possible} through Stockholm, the details of which will be sent to you for transmission to the Soviet Government later.

SECTION TWO ^{and Bern,}

It is requested that this matter be taken up with the Soviet Government in such manner as you deem appropriate and all of the facts brought to the attention of the Soviet Government promptly within your discretion and after concurrence with your British colleague.

It should be emphasized to the Soviet Government that neither this Government nor the British Government has been deceived as to the character of this alleged offer of the German Government and that the two governments have been convinced from the outset that the offer is part and parcel of the German psychological warfare effort. This is borne out particularly by the facts which have now come to light on the alleged German willingness to guarantee that the trucks would not be used on the Western front.

You will understand the reluctance of the British and American Governments to shut the door completely on any offer. Other offers of this nature are expected and eventually one may be received which can be given serious consideration. It is our view that by appearing to explore such matters we not only have the possibility of saving lives while the discussions are going on, but also clearly leave the way open for further offers which we anticipate and which might possibly be made in good faith.

You should inform the Soviet Government that we are fully aware of the undesirability of such direct contacts with representatives of the German Government and we are searching for a method of rescue through the intermediary of the Swiss. Details of any practical proposal will be communicated to the Soviet Government and the Soviet Government will of course be currently informed of developments and no action will be taken without prior agreement with the Soviet and British Governments.

It is suggested that you consult fully with the British Ambassador with respect to this matter and in discussions with the Soviet Government make it clear, if the British Ambassador is in agreement, that the views expressed by you are also the views of the British Government. The British authorities here are in agreement.

Sent to Moscow. Repeated to Ankara, Cairo and London.

CODE ROOM: Repeat to London for Winant, to Ankara for Steinhardt and Hirschmann and to Cairo for Tuck.

000311

CABLE TO AMBASSADOR HARRIMAN, MOSCOW, FROM THE DEPARTMENT AND THE WAR REFUGEE BOARD.

Please refer to our Nos. 1460 of June 9 and of

The following is a recent telegram from the British Foreign Office concerning the matter referred to in the above cables:

QUOTE Please inform the United States Government that first discussions have been held here with Shertok. They have strengthened our conviction, supported by much independent evidence including detailed report placed at our disposal by United States Ambassador Angora, that however influential the Germans who authorized the offer, it was designed (a) to extract material concessions of war material from Allied Government, (b) to embroil United Kingdom and United States Governments with the Soviet Government by representing to the latter that the former were negotiating with the enemy (c) to elicit a rejection which would then be represented as justification for extreme measures against the Jews. Shertok appeared to agree with this analysis.

2. The offer in fact was not serious and especially as coming through such insignificant or suspected channels, should on its merits have been contemptuously ignored. But we have kept it in play in the hope of staving off disaster and seeing whether something acceptable might not emerge.

3. We must now consider our next steps. Choice appears to lie between (a) keeping Brandt and doing nothing in expectation that Goetapo may produce further offer, (b) sending Brandt back with message that he had found Allied circles concerned with the fate of the Jews and ready to consider any practicable scheme for alleviating the fate of the Jews and that he understood the Allies were conveying their views through the protecting power, and the German Government might shortly expect to hear something.

4. If (b) is decided upon, as we would propose, then we suggest that British and American Ministers in Berne should be instructed to address Swiss Government as follows:-

Begins.

Reports of further extreme measures by the German authorities against the Jews are reaching the United Kingdom and United States Governments. At the same time both Governments have been informed from what appear to be authoritative German quarters that the German Government might be disposed to modify their policy if Allied cooperation in a solution could be obtained. Such cooperation would it appears take the form of transferring a stated number of Jews in conditions of particular distress to the responsibility of other countries. The United Kingdom and United States Governments would be willing with due regard to military necessities to consider practical measures in this connection and would be glad if the Swiss

Government would so inform the German Government. Swiss Government should then state in particular that: (a) Swiss Government has invited the German Government to give facilities for the departure of 1500 Jewish children who would be given temporary hospitality in Switzerland. Similar offers have been made by other neutral Governments. As an earnest of good faith the German Government shall agree to give effect to all these offers (b) 5000 Jewish children from south eastern Europe with a proportion of accompanying adults would have been received in Palestine long ago in accordance with an offer made by the British Government had the necessary exit and transit permits been provided by the Governments (Bulgarian, Roumanian and Hungarian). The German Government is requested to facilitate the grant of such permits. (c) Transport of Jewish refugees to the various homes offered them has been hindered by the absence of German safe conducts for various ships proposed to be employed. The German Government is requested to withdraw its objection to safe conducts, in particular in the case of S.S. Tari which would be used solely for transport of civilian refugees. (d) For some considerable time past lists of Jews who would be given immediate entry into Palestine have been communicated to the German Government. It is suggested that as many of the persons as can be identified should now be given permits to leave and on hearing that this has been done transport arrangements will be taken in hand by the United Kingdom and United States Governments.

Ends.

Mr. Shertok agreed in suggested method of approach to Germans but urged (a) the United Kingdom and United States Governments should make a further offer to approach the Spanish Government regarding reception and temporary maintenance of some manageable number of Jewish refugees; (b) a "carrot" should be dangled before the Germans in the shape of agreement by the United Kingdom and United States to discuss with them the question of Jewish rescue; (c) in advance of such discussion we should decide what quid pro quo could be offered to the Germans.

2. In regard to (a) subject to views of His Majesty's Ambassador Madrid I see no difficulty. On (b) and (c) the reply given Shertok was that there could be no direct contact between the Allies and the Germans, to which he retorted that direct contact with the enemy was he understood in certain circumstances permissible to the War Refugee Board. On this (the observation was made that, whatever the truth about the War Refugee Board's powers (on which I should be glad to be enlightened) such a conversation would ruin Soviet confidence in the Allies unless they had been asked and had agreed. The idea of compensation, trading in concert with a Gestapo agent, Jewish blood against Allied goods, looked equally dangerous. S. agreed, and said the Russians should, of course, be asked to concur, and that only compensation contemplated was that of no military or economic importance. It would be for us to discover such. UNQUOTE

This Government is inclined to agree with the British analysis of the so-called Brandt offer.

As indicated in No. of , in our consideration of the procedure to be followed in this matter we have been seeking a formula which would not (repeat not) involve any direct negotiation with the Germans, but which at the same time would leave the door open for any subsequent offers which might receive favorable consideration of the British, Soviet, and United States Governments. After consideration it is felt that the suggestion that an approach be made to the Germans through the Swiss offers the best means available for achieving this purpose. Accordingly, this Government is prepared to make a representation to the German government through the Swiss in conjunction with the British along the lines suggested, provided that the Soviet government expresses no objection. Moreover, the British and United States Governments are prepared to request the Swiss to advise the Germans that we would be willing, with due regard to military necessities, to consider measures for the reception in allied and neutral territory of all Jews permitted to leave areas under the control of Germany or allies of Germany.

The foregoing information should be conveyed to the Soviet Government and the Government should be requested to indicate whether it has any objection to the procedure contemplated.

In order that the Soviet Government may be kept fully informed in this and related matters, there are repeated herewith cables recently received from our legations in Stockholm and Bern.

STOCKHOLM CABLE

QUOTE Information has reached Olsen that several approaches have been made locally by certain influential German officials connected with Baltic affairs on the general proposition of freeing Jews in Latvia against a cash consideration. We allowed the situation to develop and it resulted in the following concrete proposal.

All Jews in Latvia (a guaranteed minimum of 2,000) would be free from ghettos and allowed to come to Sweden against a cash payment of 2 million dollars (revised later to 2 million Swedish kronor). This amount was to be deposited in Riksbank subject to the conditions as follows.

- A. Guaranteed release of these funds when and if refugees arrived safely in Sweden.
- B. Funds could be used without restriction for purchase of certain supplies other than war materials, such as medicines, Red Cross supplies, et cetera.
- C. Balance of funds available for transfer to German clearing. The group would require assurances from Sweden, in turn, that these refugees would not be allowed to spread anti-Nazi propaganda.

These discussions were communicated to the Swedish Foreign Office and it has advanced the following information regarding the three individuals involved. The most important individual is Kleist, said to be Himmler's man in the Baltic and reputedly one of the cleverest intelligence operators in Germany. He is also connected with the German Red Cross. The Foreign Office has had some experience with him in that, contrary to strict orders from Ribbentrop, Kleist facilitated escape to Sweden of certain Swedes in the Baltic. The name of the second individual is Boening, and he is considered somewhat of a mystery to the Foreign Office, although he is known to represent Kleist in Sweden on various matters. The third and last individual is named Klause. He is stated to have been a former member of the German Military Intelligence but recently he asked the Swedish Foreign Office to consider him a political refugee, based on the fact he is considered a Jew by the Germans. From other sources we are informed that at least on previous occasion Klause obtained funds from individuals in Sweden on the promise of rescuing certain Jews in Europe; he never fulfilled the promise. On subsequent approach, it was intimated by this group that very little, if any, of the 2 million kronor would go into the German clearing, or even to buy Swedish goods for Germany. Instead, they would use some of the funds to bribe certain minor German officials in the Baltic, and the three would pocket the balance. It was suggested by Olsen, simply to explore the mysterious background of these negotiators, that the German group be informed that it was impossible to raise the money in Sweden and then to ask whether there was any objection to exploring the possibilities of securing American funds. This could be done only by raising the problem with Olsen at the American Legation who probably would want to get all the details directly. It was then stated by the group to this proposal, that money was not necessarily a consideration, that perhaps no money at all would be needed. The important consideration was stated to be that the Swedish Foreign Office must express a strongly sympathetic attitude towards this rescue operation, a willingness to receive these refugees gladly, and to promise that the refugees would not agitate against the German authorities. While baffling and not a little fantastic in scope, the foregoing situation presents the following interesting intelligence aspects. If the government of Germany is behind these feelers, it becomes a simple ransom proposition from which they would hope to trap us into a series of other extortions on a much larger scale. We know that the Germans are extremely pressed for foreign exchange and are experimenting with all possible devices to ease the situation. Too, if German authorities are behind these negotiations, they may be setting a trap for anti-Jewish propaganda in the United States - playing these refugees against prisoners of war, et cetera. On the other hand, the individuals involved may simply be making a last minute effort to purchase good will in the United States and Sweden. (The Swedish Foreign Office believes this latter to be the true basis of the feelers made locally.) At least Kleist is a marked man and the situation in the Baltic may have prompted him to look towards the immediate future. Treasury should be informed and also War Refugee Board as our No. 41. Johnson UNQUOTE

BERN CABLE

QUOTE McClelland sends the following for WRB. Reference is made herein to the Legation's cable of June 24, no. 4041.

The Jews of Budapest have no illusion as to the fact that deportation is probably in store for the majority of 300,000 Jews concentrated in houses and restricted blocks all over that city, according to information dated June 18 and received from responsible Jewish circles in Budapest. It is openly admitted by the Germans that selection of those to be deported will be made on a basis as follows: (A) men who are able-bodied, (B) children, women and girls who are able-bodied, (C) all persons unsuited for work and children. No doubt the last mentioned category will be sent to Auschwitz for extermination while the first two groups will be used as forced labor in occupied territories and Germany.

There seems to be some possibility, as result of recent discussions in Budapest between responsible Jews and Germans, of the following: (1) rescue of a small number of children and prominent persons who will be allowed to leave Hungary in an initial convoy of 1000 persons; and (2) rather than being immediately exterminated, the lean concession that 30,000 Hungarian Jews unsuited for work will be maintained in three camps in Germany. The success of these two proposals depends in turn on two conditions: (1) that there can be secured for the initial group of 1,000 and for others to follow emigration possibilities via Spain; and (2) that the three camps of 10,000 persons each in Germany can be supported by the supply of funds from Jewish organizations. To do this it is estimated that at least 500,000 Swiss francs monthly would be necessary. It was intimated by the Germans that further contingents would be allowed to leave Germany from these camps as Spanish transit and overseas (Palestine, North Africa or elsewhere) emigration visas became available.

These propositions have been discussed with Salymayer of Joint to whom appeal has been addressed, to find funds required for the support of such camps in Germany. We both feel that a serious attempt should be made to secure initial block of 1,000 or more Spanish transit visas at least for the children, even though we both consider them highly improbable and incomprehensible from many angles. To care for such transit groups arrangements should be made in Spain and for further destinations also. A great many have Palestine certificates, according to information we have received from Budapest. We recommend that approach be made to the Spanish Government.

In at least trying to comply with requests of persons sur(*) place in Hungary there is nothing to lose and possibly something to gain, even though these propositions may seem to be far fetched. Even though remote, every channel of aid must be explored in view of the desperateness of the situation of Jews there. Over 400,000 have already been deported, according to reports. (*) Apparent omission - Harrison. UNQUOTE

000316

You will note that these cables appear to indicate that the Germans are putting out additional feelers somewhat comparable to the Brandt proposal. You may indicate to the Soviet Government that we will not negotiate with the Germans on these proposals or any others which may be received without the previous agreement of the Soviet Government.

The British government has been informed of the contents of this cable and the British Ambassador in Moscow is being advised thereof by his government.

JB7 aa L.S.L. *JMX*
JBF:AA:LSL:ro 2/6/44

Sent to Mr. Warren of State
after telephone consultation.
5/7/44 - 3:30 PM - JB7

000317

32

000318

MEMORANDUM

Mr. Eden's telegram of July 1, 1944, with regard to the so-called Brandt proposal and discussions with Shertok, has been carefully considered. The following are the views of the United States Government with respect to this matter:

1. Upon the basis of present information, the United States Government is inclined to agree with the analysis of the Brandt proposal contained in Mr. Eden's telegram.
2. The United States Government is in accord with the suggestion contained in paragraph 3 (b) of the Eden telegram that Brandt be permitted to return to enemy territory with the message that the allies are conveying their views to the German government through the protecting power. This Government is also prepared to join with the British in making a representation to the German government through the Swiss government along the lines suggested in paragraph 4 of the Eden telegram. This Government, however, suggests that the following be substituted for the third and fourth sentences of the proposed instructions to be sent to the British and American ministers in Bern:

"Such cooperation would it appears take the form of transferring Jews now in German controlled territory to the responsibility of other countries. The United Kingdom and United States Governments would be willing, with due regard to military necessities, to consider measures for the reception in allied and neutral territory of all Jews permitted to leave areas under the control of Germany or allies of Germany and would be glad if the Swiss Government would so inform the German Government."

3. The United States Government is of the opinion that neither of the steps mentioned in point 2 should be taken until the Soviet Government has been fully informed of the procedure contemplated and its approval obtained. Attached hereto is a proposed cable to Ambassador Harriman in Moscow which outlines the situation and requests that the views of the Soviet Government with respect thereto be obtained. It will be appreciated if the British Government will indicate its concurrence in the proposed cable.

4. The United States Government has noted that Mr. Eden sees no difficulty in Shertok's suggestion that a further approach be made to the Spanish Government regarding the reception and temporary maintenance of some manageable number of Jewish refugees. This Government is of the opinion that this suggestion should be followed vigorously and it will be appreciated if the views of the British ambassador in Spain are obtained as soon as possible.

JBF:zo 5/8/44
L.S. L. All

Sent to Mr. Warren of State
after telephone conversation
5/7/44 - 3:30 P.M. - JBF

000319

000320

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WAR REFUGEE BOARD

INTER-OFFICE COMMUNICATION

DATE July 5, 1944

TO : Mr. Pehle
FROM : F. Hodel

In your absence, I informally advised Dr. Nahum Goldman of the World Jewish Congress of the contents of the attached message from Gruenbaum of the Jewish Agency.

Dr. Goldman advised me that he had just received through commercial channels a cable from Shertok in London requesting that efforts be made to obtain the release of the two men. The cable also strongly urged that Ira Hirschmann be sent to London at once to participate in the present discussions there on the Brandt proposal. Dr. Goldman requested that the contents of this message be given to you. Before calling at your office, he advised Mr. Warren of this message.

Dr. Goldman also wished to know whether the proposals he had submitted to Mr. Stettinius with respect to a possible answer to the Brandt proposal had been sent on to Ambassador Steinhardt. I advised Dr. Goldman that I had no information on this matter but I would bring it to your attention.

F. Hodel

000321

PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

*2 copies
sent to [unclear]*

FROM: American Consulate, Jerusalem
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATED: June 29, 1944
NUMBER: 89

[REDACTED]

The War Refugee Board is requested by Isaac Gruenbaum, Jewish Agency, to send the following to Rabbi Wise.

We have received information from Istanbul that confirms deportation of 400,000 Hungarian Jews to Poland and the imminent deportation of remaining 350,000 now concentrated in Budapest and neighborhood. Information that we have received expressly states that direct causes of intensified deportation is the detention of two men. Competent authorities are urged to be impressed their assistance was asked fully trusting, if they are not able to help at least it will not make things worse which they did by the detention two men. Urge therefore, first, immediate return of the two men; second, immediate agreement meeting Lisbon; and third, adoption meanwhile of extraordinary measures, including retaliatory measures, repeatedly suggested with view to interfering with deportation.

PINKERTON

DCR: VAG

7/1/44

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972

000322

COPY

THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE

7/17/44
Dear Mr. Secretary

June 7, 1944

Mr. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.
Under-Secretary of State
State Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

After I left you this morning I gave some further thought to the information you were kind enough to give me, and I would like to make one or two suggestions which I did not think of while we were discussing the matter.

1. I think it would be advisable to inform the Soviet Government about it. It is quite likely they will learn about it through their contacts in Istanbul, and you know how touchy they are, they may be inclined to be suspicious. I do not believe they will have the slightest objection to the policy you intend to pursue, and it would be much better for them to learn about it through you than through their own channels.

2. I am glad you do not take the line that the offer should be flatly refused, but that the impression should be given that it is being considered. I have been told by Mr. Russell of the British Embassy that the Foreign Office is inclined to take the same line.

It may be necessary to make some counter offers, so as to give the impression of serious consideration. Would it not be possible to offer some financial compensation through funds deposited in Switzerland, if they are ready to let the Jews out?

There may be an even more practicable proposal, in view of all the technical difficulties of moving so large a number of people: that all these Jews be kept where they are in camps under the supervision of the International Red Cross, or a neutral power, which would also assist in feeding them. For German consent to such a scheme, a monetary compensation could be offered. This would remove all the difficulties of transportation, and of getting countries to accept them during the war; moreover, it would guarantee the safety of those Jews who may have to remain where they are for the duration. The main thing is to try to save them and prevent their extermination, and there are indications from past experience that an offer of monetary compensation may be acceptable instead of the demands presented.

I am submitting these proposals for your consideration, so that you may discuss them with the British, as it would be necessary if the contact is to be maintained, to make some counter offers. I am sure that you will receive additional information from Mr. Shertok when he arrives in Istanbul and hope that you will keep me informed and give me an opportunity for further discussion with you. With many thanks for your courtesy, Sincerely yours,
Nahum Goldmann

30

000324

AIRMAIL

No. 680

3 War Refugee Board (Foreign)
CONTROL COPY

Lisbon, July 4, 1944

Subject: Proposal Made by German Authorities to Exchange Jews in Occupied Countries for Various Supplies

The Honorable
The Secretary of State
Washington

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a report prepared by Reuben B. Resnik, an American citizen representing the American Joint Distribution Committee, which was sent to the European office of the above committee, together with a copy of covering letter from Robert Pilpel, the acting European Director of the above committee.

The Embassy assumes that the information contained in the enclosed report has already been received by the Department from Ankara with appropriate comments; however, we feel that certain observations are in order. In the first place the Embassy would like to invite attention to the objectivity with which Mr. Resnik has made his report. On the other hand, it is felt that Section V on Page 4 and 5, POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS, does not give the interpretations in their proper order or significance. The important element in the interpretation, is Section D-3 at the top of Page 5; viz., that this is a definite attempt to create an open split between the Allies. This split would be threatened by publication of the agreement, if it were made, mentioned in the second paragraph on Page 3, to the effect that the Germans would not use trucks on the western front.

In addition it seems that the Germans have created a very unpleasant situation for the United States, whatever action is taken regarding this proposal. It seems obvious that it would not be accepted under any conditions, but if it is not accepted, then as Resnik points out in D-1, the United States and the Western Allies will be accused of a lack of sincerity in their attempts to rescue Jewish refugees.

It also occurs to Americans here to query whether or not this proposal has any connection with the recent incursion into Portugal of thirty very prominent Hungarian Jews (Embassy's telegram 2054, July 1st, 1944), who came here obviously with the consent if not under the direction of the German Government.

There is one other point in Resnik's memorandum, Section H on Page 6, which this Embassy questions. Resnik states that

"everyone...."

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972


000325

"everyone believes that all should be done to continue exploration until it is definitely determined that no further good can be served by its continuance." This is probably the best procedure from the point of view of the strictly limited humanitarian aim of Resnik's work but it would seem that a continuation of these negotiations might at any moment lead to the fact of their existence becoming known to the Russians with resultant serious difficulties. In fact, the Germans would have every reason to see that the Russians were advised of them.

It is felt that the War Refugee Board would be interested in this report and the accompanying letter, and if the Department perceives no objection, it is requested that copies be forwarded them with the request that a copy of the letter and the report be sent by the Board to the Joint Distribution Committee.

Respectfully yours,

For the Ambassador:


Edward S. Crocker,
Counselor of Embassy

✓ Enclosures:

1 Copy of letter from Robert Filpel and
and report from Reuben E. Resnik

RCD:ew

000326

Enclosure to despatch No. 680, dated July 4, 1944, from
the Embassy at Lisbon.

DEPARTMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN JOINT DISTRIBUTION COMMITTEE

242, Rua Aurea

Lisbon, Portugal

June 27, 1944

Lisbon Letter No. 1107

To: AJDC NEW YORK

We send you herewith, for your confidential information, a copy of a memorandum we have just received from Mr. Reuben Resnik regarding certain proposals of a Mr. Joel Brand for the rescue of Jews from German-occupied territories. This memorandum ties up with the subject of our recent War Refugee Board cables regarding the plan that has been brought to the attention of Saly Mayer in Switzerland.

(sgd.) Robert Filpel

MSG:ms
Encs.

Via Pouch

000327

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

I. INTRODUCTION

This report is being prepared at the request of His Excellency, Laurence A. Steinhardt, Ambassador of the United States to Turkey. It is based on personal interviews with Mr. Brand and interviews and conferences with persons who have had close contact with Mr. Brand during his visit to Istanbul and while he was a resident of Budapest. The report is incomplete in some details, especially with respect to the activities of one Andre Gyorgy, alias Andre Gross, but the United States Military Intelligence, the American Consulate General of Istanbul and other allied services have fuller details on the nature and scope of his varied operations and his possible relationship to the subject matter of this report.

II. This report will contain the following:

- A. Statement Facts.
- B. Description of the Principals.
- C. Possible Interpretations.
- D. Developments and Likely Developments.

III. STATEMENT OF FACTS

On Friday, May 19, 1944 one Joel Brand and Andre Gyorgy, alias Gross, arrived on a German courier plane in Istanbul, Turkey. These men, it is reported, were placed on this plane at Vienna, Austria, after having been taken to the airport in a Gestapo car from Budapest to Vienna. Their names were not added to the official passenger list and it is reported that Mr. Brand had a letter of instructions from the Gestapo or their representatives to German Government and Military representatives in Sofia to facilitate his movement to Turkey. I do not know whether Mr. Gyorgy had similar credentials. In addition, Mr. Brand had letters of introduction from the Central Rat der Juden, Budapest, signed by Samuel Stern and Baron Freudinger. These letters were in the nature of "To whom it may concern" and were designed to place a badge of authenticity on Joel Brand, at least from the standpoint of that Jewish organization. In connection with this and other letters in Brand's possession, it is important to make the following observations. It is quite possible that this letter was given under duress. It conceivably could have been prepared by the Gestapo or it might have been given freely and voluntarily. In any event, the important fact is that the Gestapo and/or other German government or military organizations were fully aware of the contents of this letter. In addition, Brand had two other letters, one from a relief committee with whom certain persons in Istanbul had

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By R. H. Parks Date

SEP 27 1972

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established a contact beginning in March, 1943 for purposes of extending relief and assistance to needy persons in Hungary and also for the transmission of relief to other occupied areas. This letter said in effect that everything possible be done to carry out the major proposal which Brand was bringing because according to the committee it was serious and it represented the only means of rescuing a large number of people who might otherwise be doomed. The third letter was from a United Youth Movement urging favorable consideration of the major plan and urging that specific plans for youth be carried out, among which was the transfer of substantial numbers from Hungary to Roumania through underground methods. Brand was permitted to take all of these letters and was not searched; as a matter of fact, he was instructed to say that if he were asked if he had anything on his person, he had nothing. He was also permitted to carry twenty-five hundred American dollars.

Brand travelled on a German passport issued in Vienna in the name of Engineer Eugene Brand. He did not have a Turkish visa although efforts were made here by people whom he was to see to secure such a visa for him immediately upon his arrival. Brand had previously cabled to one of the persons in Istanbul with whom he had previously established contact when he was a member of a relief committee in Hungary. For several days after Brand arrived, he was free to make contact with persons with whom he had previously established relationship but on May 25 he was taken into custody by the Turkish police because he did not have a Turkish visa. A series of negotiations followed which ultimately released him from custody on Wednesday, May 31, 1944, although during the time he was under protective custody, he was permitted to sleep at the Pera Palace Hotel in Istanbul.

Shortly after Brand arrived a cable was received from Bratislava sent by a person regarded as trustworthy and with whom contact had been previously established by local persons. This cable requested large-scale assistance for Hungarian Jews, reported that 10,000 Jews (Brand said 12,000) were being deported daily to concentration centers in Poland and that the railroads carrying these persons between Budapest and the Polish frontier be bombed by the Allies in order to decelerate, if not stop, the deportation.

On June 1, 1944 another cable was received from Bratislava urging that the suggestion in the first cable be implemented simultaneously, that is to say, that relief be sent and that the railroads be bombed and further that the proposals that Brand brings be given serious consideration.

The proposal, which is known to you and which was made by the German Bureau for Jewish Affairs in Hungary and had the consent and approval of one Eichmann (a leading figure in

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carrying out Nazi policy with respect to Jewish matters) is as follows: for goods, including 10,000 trucks, 2,000,000 bars of soap, 800 tons of coffee, 200 tons of cocoa, and 800 tons of tea, etc., the Germans would liberate all of the Jews in Nazi-occupied countries and permit them to travel to neutral areas, mainly in the west; for example, Spain and Portugal and a limited number to Turkey. They are willing to permit the first transport of Jews to leave immediately after negotiations are completed between a responsible person representing the German bureau and a representative of responsible Jewish organization and/or the Allied governments. (There seems to be a difference of opinion with respect to the latter matter. Brand claims that his instructions were to have a representative of a so-called responsible Jewish organization negotiate with the representative of the German bureau. Gyorgy claims that the German Bureau insisted that a representative of the Allied governments be designated as the person to negotiate.) It is understood that the first shipment of goods would follow immediately after the first transport of Jewish persons left the border of German-occupied territory.

The Germans also added that they would agree not to use the trucks on the western front.

IV. DESCRIPTION OF PRINCIPALS

I did not meet Gyorgy. He left Turkey for some point in the Middle East on June 1, 1944. Andre Antol Gyorgy, also known as Andre Gross, is said to be in his early forties. He is known to the British and American Intelligence and it is also reported that he has worked for the German Intelligence. Because Gyorgy acted as a courier for persons in Istanbul who were responsible for extending relief to occupied areas, he had established contact with a relief committee in Hungary of which Brand was one of the leading members. The reports are that Gyorgy performed his duties without difficulty and carried them through in a satisfactory and helpful manner. It is reported that he assisted Jewish persons to perform underground activities in occupied areas on numerous occasions. It is significant, however, that on his recent visit persons with whom he has had previous contact did not see him. It is said that American and British Intelligence regard him as a Gestapo agent and as completely unreliable.

Jed Brand appears to be in his late thirties, is a well-dressed, neat appearing, articulate person who speaks English fairly fluently. He was born in Budapest, but lived during the greater part of his life in Germany and returned to Budapest about nine years ago. In recent years he operated a small knit-wear factory which employs about forty persons. He is married, has two children, and the other members of his family who reside in Hungary include a mother and three

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sisters. He has been associated with a relief committee in Budapest for about two years, and during the past year and a half has taken a leading part in its activities. He has had contact with people in Turkey and in Switzerland and has received relief funds for use in occupied areas. He impressed most observers here as straight-forward, sincere and direct. I had several interviews with Brand and saw him shortly after he was released from custody and after he had been under considerable pressure, both by the authorities and by the people with whom he conferred. I had the impression that he was not as sincere and straight-forward as other observers thought him to be. He had ready and direct answers for all questions and was apparently very cooperative and reiterated on several occasions the seriousness with which he was carrying out this mission. It is important, of course, to observe that Brand is not completely without anxiety and fear about his assignment and its possible consequences and any subjective judgments about him should be evaluated in terms of this man's present uneasiness. The question naturally arises as to why Brand and Gyorgy were chosen for the present assignment. The Gestapo had known that Brand had received funds from sources in neutral countries for relief purposes in Hungary and other occupied territory and was regarded by persons in neutral areas as a responsible person. Therefore, any proposal addressed to the Jewish interests would have to be made to a person known to these interests, and regarded as responsible by them.

The German authorities knew that Andre Gyorgy had acted as a courier for persons in Turkey calling on Brand and others in Hungary and it was known that these persons regarded Gyorgy as having performed his functions satisfactorily. It appears also that the German authorities regarded Gyorgy as a trustworthy person from their standpoint and finally it appears Gyorgy had other functions to perform on this trip of which Brand claims he did not know the details.

V. POSSIBLE INTERPRETATIONS

A. These proposals, if carried out in their entirety or partially would inure to the benefit of a small group of Germans in control of Hungarian matters.

B. The proposals brought by Brand and Gyorgy are a cover for the beginning of peace proposals and that they are designed to enlist the interests of persons who might ultimately be used for these purposes

C. These proposals may be designed to enlist so-called Jewish influence to disrupt the present efforts on the part of the Allies to have neutrals break commercial relationships with the Axis.

D. These proposals may be designed to:

1. To place the Allied Governments in a position of being unable to comply with the demands and therefore the Germans would be in a position to say that the Allies too are refusing to assist the Jewish people and therefore the anti-Jewish policy of the Germans has validity in that the Jewish people of Europe are in effect being ignored by the Allies.

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2. Underground propaganda in Germany and other occupied areas says that Germany is losing the war, among other reasons because of its strong anti-Jewish policy. By these proposals it can be said that Germany is adopting a new policy favoring the Jews and it would follow then that those who were responsible for carrying out the strong anti-Jewish policy could have it said later in mitigation of their acts that they ultimately established a program favoring the Jewish people.
3. Used as a means of effecting a split between the Allies - that is - United States and Great Britain from Russia.

E. It is conceivable that if the Germans are more or less serious about these proposals, they desire the large scale transfer of Jews from occupied territory because they want to be relieved of the responsibility of providing even a minimum subsistence for these persons while they may be in concentration centers or even awaiting death. Moreover, if the present proposals are not carried out, it is thought that these might lead to other offers of assistance to the Jewish persons who may remain in occupied areas, and in this way the Germans will be relieved of the responsibility of whatever care they might be compelled to give.

F. It is also conceivable that a sharper conflict has developed between the various German groups and that one group is prepared to effect some type of "Putsch" and in order to swing Allied sympathy to their contemplated plans, have made this offer. In this connection it is thought that possibly Gyorgy may have carried word about the plans for this "Putsch."

VI. DEVELOPMENTS AND LIKELY DEVELOPMENTS

A. Gyorgy left for some point in the Middle East with the full knowledge of American and British Intelligence. Brand expects to leave for Palestine on June 5, 1944, to confer with leaders of the Jewish Agency.

B. The American and British Embassy in Turkey and the Palestine Government have more or less full knowledge of these proposals.

C. These proposals are known to American and Palestinian philanthropic agencies in Turkey and also in Switzerland.

D. Brand states that he must not return to Hungary without Gyorgy.

E. Brand claims that he has the approval of the German authorities and of his own group in Budapest to travel further to carry on these negotiations and while time is of the essence, no definite deadline has been set. Brand or persons acting for Brand at his request, or with his consent and approval, have communicated with persons in Budapest indicating

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Brand has been received and that his proposals are being examined and that one of the first conditions toward further exploration is that there be immediate cessation of deportation of Jews from Hungary. Brand, or others for him, also intends to inform Budapest that he will leave for Palestine and perhaps other centers where he believes his proposal can receive more authoritative consideration. It is clear that the United States Government and His Majesty's Government will have to be kept fully informed of all developments as they occur and that any proposals should first be discussed with representatives of these governments.

F. It has been suggested that the German Geschaeftsdienst for southeastern Europe is probably completely informed of these proposals and possibly some representative of that group should be authorized to come to a neutral country for further discussion with persons designated by the governments interested.

G. It is clear that it appears advisable to keep all avenues for negotiation open first because of major military and political implications involved and also because of the possibility of effecting the rescue of a substantial number of Jews.

H. Everyone with whom I have talked recognizes the impossibility of carrying out the proposals as they have been stated, but everyone believes that all should be done to continue exploration until it is definitely determined that no further good can be served by its continuance.

Finally, I wish to state that this report represents an analysis of the views of persons with whom I have talked and my own views. I cannot vouch for all of the facts but I am reporting them as I learned them.

May I also say that the report has been prepared in great haste and under considerable pressure and I should ask your indulgence on that score.

Respectfully submitted,

REUBEN B. RESNIK

June 4, 1944

In care of the American Consulate General
Istanbul, Turkey

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