EVACUATION OF 1000 REFUGEES FORMERLY OF TOPUSKO

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5 December 1944

Mr. John C. Pehle,
Executive Director,
Refugee Board,
Executive Office of the President,
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Pehle:

With further reference to your letter of November 15, 1944, to Dr. McCloy, concerning possible movement of 2000 Hungarian Jews through Switzerland, I now enclose a copy of MAT 135, dated 4 December 1944. It indicates that JDC and USAHA representatives in Italy have agreed to hold the Philippville camp in Algeria in reserve for emergencies such as may be presented by this group of Hungarian refugees.

The last paragraph of the message refers to co-ordination with USAHA regarding transportation across France and into Algeria.

Sincerely,

J. H. Hiller CM
Major General
Director, Civil Affairs Division

1 incl: MAT 135
From: Allied Force Headquarters, Caserta, Italy
To: War Department

4 Dec 1944

Subject: Camps for Italian displaced persons

To APWAR for CCS for CGAC repeated for information to Central District UK SSO Section London for British Chief's of Staff and DQ CO/28E Main E70E4 signed Wilson 22 63014 site Fricco near 50472, 20 342.

1. It has been agreed by UNRRA Italian Representative and by Hugh Jackson, special representative UNRRA now here, that Pulhinouveille Camp be used to meet emergency needs such as that created by possible movement of Hungarian Jews.

2. UNRRA have not yet taken responsibility for any Italian camps, must cannot, in any case, hold additional 9,000 displaced persons unless all present Yugoslav and other refugees evacuated.

3. Further study required of practicability of bringing large groups of displaced persons into Italy in view of present commitments respecting repatriation of Italians from Greece and other countries, as well as care of displaced persons coming to Italy as a result of military operations and evacuations.

4. Remainder of Fedhala population, numbering 234 now at Pulhinouveille and contemplate that such persons would in future be sent Pulhinouveille except when expediency or necessity dictate use of Fedhala. It has been urged that Fedhala camps also be held in reserve and understand that UNRRA will do so.

5. SFASF has been advised and he will coordinate plans with them.

ACTION: CGAC

INFO: OC/S ASF OPD 0-2 Admiral King, Mr McGow

CM-IN-4228 (6 Dec 44) 0052Z m/m
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN PEHLIS:

Subjects: UNRRA's participation in French North Africa in refugee problems.

1. There is inclosed herewith, for your information, a copy of paraphrase of an outgoing cable, dated 6 July 1944, regarding the above subject.

2. For reference purposes in case of reply to this memorandum, the inclosed paraphrase has originated in the Government Branch (Room 38 863, Extension 5988) of this Division.

J. H. HILLDRING,
Major General,
Director, Civil Affairs Division.

[Signature]

1 Incl.
Paraphrase of cable.

CHAS. L. KADES
Lt. Colonel, GSC
Asst. Executive

Date: 10-5-44
Signature: CLS
From: War Department
To: CO, ETO, and CO, NATO
Date: 6 July 1944
No: WAX 62209

UNRRA's participation in French North Africa in refugee problems.

After discussion with UNRRA of your cable No. F-52229, 14 June 1944, UNRRA submits following proposition:

1. UNRRA has agreed to accept 14,500 additional refugees and in order to expand facilities to care for them is presently recruiting 71 nurses and 23 doctors for refugee camps in Middle East. 40,000 will then be the total quota. By 1 August 32 nurses and 9 doctors will be dispatched to Cairo, it is estimated. Balance will be dispatched by 1 October at latest. So that as soon as possible the Middle East quota can be filled, the military is requested by UNRRA to supply doctors and nurses until foregoing replacements arrive.

2. UNRRA will assume top administrative and financial responsibility for French North African camp for 10,000 after Middle East quota of 40,000 is filled if military will

a. On reimbursable basis provide and deliver all necessary supplies, equipment and accommodation stores until supply and procurement responsibility is assumed by UNRRA which, if military will provide shipping facilities or if they are otherwise available, it undertakes to do by 1 January 1945.

b. Assign nursing and medical personnel for adequate hospital operation, furnish hospital facilities, and provide other essential confiden

CONFIDENTIAL
sanitary and medical services.

3. Furnish personnel for utilities, plant and certain building maintenance.

4. Provide operational personnel, equipment, and maintenance facilities for transportation.

5. Supply necessary cooks and mess equipment.

6. Furnish guard services necessary.

7. Complete with Comite negotiations for Philippeville site.

3. UNRRA within framework of paragraph 2 will

A. Finance project exclusive of transportation of refugees to North Africa, plant construction and assigned army personnel.

B. For operation assume administrative responsibility.

C. Provide expert personnel for administration.

D. From refugee and local sources provide supplementary personnel.

E. Within 8 weeks after acceptance of these terms, dispatch about 20 technical and administrative personnel for operation and supervision, including chief medical officer, project director and chief nurse who would within 4 weeks after acceptance be dispatched.

F. With the exception of guards if they are still required, replace all military personnel between 1 October 1944 and 1 January 1945. Nursing and medical personnel would be included in this also but none could be supplied before 1 October with exception of chief nurse, chief medical officer and public health nurse.

4. UNRRA asks information concerning reason for estimate of 600 bed hospital which it feels is far too high.

The director general has been informed by CCAC that they are not satisfied with the indicated delay in supplying UNRRA personnel. To supply
all personnel at earlier dates than stated above, the director general has promised to use every effort. It is OCAO's intention to continue insisting all dates be advanced. In view of previous War Department directives to Devers to close out U.S. North African installations before finally accepting terms of UNRRA, your views are requested with regard to ability to carry out military responsibilities listed in paragraph 2 above and advisability of doing so.
6 July 1944

Commanding General
USAF North African Theater of Operations
Algiers, Algeria.

Commanding General
USAF European Theater of Operations
London, England

Number: MARR 62209

To Wilson for FSHA and FSHA and for Devers cite MAGBS and MAGOT
TAM 219 from GOS cite CGAO repeated RTUSA information British Chiefs
of Staff refer NATO 201 NATO 214 and TAM 188.

Participation of UNRRA in refugee problems in French North Africa.
Your cable NATO 232, 14 June 1944, has been discussed with UNRRA which
submits following proposition:

1. UNRRA is presently recruiting 25 doctors and 71 nurses for Middle
East refugee camps to expand facilities to care for 14,500 additional
refugees it has agreed to accept. Total quota will then be 40,000. Esti-
mated that 8 doctors and 22 nurses will be dispatched to Cairo by 1
August, balance by 1 October at latest. UNRRA requests military to sup-
ply doctors and nurses until foregoing replacement arrive so that
Middle East quota can be filled as soon as possible.

2. After Middle East quota of 40,000 is filled UNRRA will assume fi-
nancial and administrative responsibility for French North African
camp for 10,000 if military will:

(A) Provide and deliver all necessary supplies, accomodation
stores and equipment on reimbursable basis until UNRRA assumes
procurement and supply responsibility which it undertakes to do by 1 January 1945, if shipping
facilities are provided by

(B) Furnish hospital facilities and assign medical and nursing
personnel for operation of adequate hospital and provide other
essential medical and sanitary services.

(C) Furnish plant, utilities and certain building maintenance
personnel.

(D) Provide transportation equipment, maintenance facilities and
certain operational personnel.

(E) Supply mess equipment and necessary cooks.

(F) Furnish necessary guard services.
(G) Complete negotiations for Philippeville site with Comite.

3. Within framework of paragraph 2 URRHA will

(A) Finance project exclusive of plant construction, assigned army personnel and transportation of refugees to North Africa.

(B) Assume administrative responsibility for operation.

(C) Provide expert administrative personnel

(D) Provide supplementary personnel from local and refugee sources.

(E) Dispatch about 20 administrative and technical personnel for supervision and operation within 8 weeks after acceptance of these terms, including project director, chief medical officer, and chief nurse who would be dispatched within 4 weeks after acceptance.

(F) Replace all military personnel, except guards if they are still required, between 1 October 1944 and 1 January 1945. This would include all medical and nursing personnel too but with exception of chief medical officer, chief nurse and public health nurse, none could be supplied before 10 October.

4. URRHA feels estimate of 600 bed hospital is far too high and asks information concerning reason for it.

G-14O are not satisfied with the indicated delay in supplying URRHA personnel and have so informed the director general. He has promised to use every effort to supply all personnel at earlier dates than stated above. G-140 intends to continue insisting on advance in all dates. Before finally accepting URRHA's terms and in view of previous War Department directives to Devens to close out United States installations in North Africa, your views with regard to ability to carry out military responsibilities listed in paragraph 2 above and advisability of so doing are requested.

New Subject. Do you wish comment on your cable HAF 291 concerning Unitarian Service Committee personnel, in view of the foregoing?

Rec'd OSD 7-13-44

COPY 7-13-44

cc: Mr. Bell, Mr. Feible, Mrs. Gold, Miss Maloney (2), Mr. Brooks, Mr. Luxford, PVO (4).
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN PEHLE:

Subject: UNRRA Participation in French North Africa in Refugee Problems

1. There is inclosed herewith, for your information, a copy of paraphrase of an incoming cable, dated 16 July 1944, regarding the above subject.

2. For reference purposes in case of reply to this memorandum, the inclosed paraphrase has originated in the Government Branch (Room 35 863, Extension 5988) of this Division.

J. H. HILLDRING,
Major General,
Director, Civil Affairs Division.

1 Incl. Paraphrase of cable.

[Signature]

CHAS. L. KADES
Lt Colonel, GSC
Asst Executive
PARAPHRASE OF CABLE

From: Algiers
To: War Department
CG, US Army Forces in ETOH, London
Number: FX 72717
Date: 16 July 1944

UNRRA participation in French North Africa in refugee problems. Paragraphs numbered are same as WARX 62209, 16 July 1944.

1. For Mideast. No nurses or doctors from military available.
2. (A) Accommodation equipment and stores will be left on loan pending agreement on reimbursement terms.
   (B) Satisfactory. On handover six Italian doctors will be available. It is expected that amongst refugees some assistant nurses will have received training during military period of responsibility. If available from refugees other essential sanitary and medical services.
   (C) Satisfactory.
   (D) The 203 ton vehicles which have been provided can stay.
   (E) Satisfactory.
   (F) Camp duties and guards found from 250 Yugoslav soldiers and their 4 Yugoslav officers. They include 22 tradesmen (carpenters, cooks, bakers, bricklayers and butchers) and 25 drivers.
   (G) Satisfactory.
3. (A) Satisfactory but not if it is meant that Yugoslav EX-FWS now considered Army of Yugoslav mentioned in part 2 (F) or included in the clause "Assigned Army personnel". It has been agreed with Marshall Tito that no pay will be received by Yugoslav soldiers. What accounts should be charged if KFI tokens are given to those men? G/F
4. Middleast advise: 600 bed hospital absolutely essential as indicated by progressively worse physical condition of refugee. On this the medical authorities are insistent.

5. Must disembark BOHE involving 5 hour rail journey or Algiers with 40 hour rail journey owing to closure of Philippeville as refugee port. A transit camp in the vicinity of the port of disembarkation will be necessitated by either operation.

6. I desire to emphasize that after 1 October military can accept no responsibility whatever for personnel for maintenance and administration of camp at Philippeville.

7. Advances of cash to refugees. TAM 193 8 June authorized small relief payments in Italy where AFA operates on Allied basis. No comparable Allied financial source exists in North Africa in the absence of UNRRA with authority to make advances of small pocket money nor to make loans such as those for Americans and British in Italy as authorized by TAM 70 of 6 November. Please furnish advice.

8. We assume existing channels from U.S. and British Empire to North Africa may be used as to personal remittances to refugees from outside Africa.

9. Refugees must exchange currencies they hold which are not legal tender in North Africa. The British Army paymaster be authorized to exchange these
currencies at official exchange rates against North African francs pending decision on basis of MAT AIDGRAM 6 of 12 June. As per TAM 160 of 5 April Kunas and Dinars could first be exchanged into EHA pounds or lire in Italy. Cochran of UNRRA offers these comments. Necessity for personnel of new camp at Philippeville and available time to recruit UNRRA personnel which may be influenced by following factors:

1. At the moment the total number of Yugoslav refugees now in Italy and their future rate of arrival there are indefinite.

2. Some ten thousand additional refugees can be absorbed at camps at present in the middle east.

3. As per Beckleman recommendation advisability of liquidating Casablanca camp thus relieving administrative and medical personnel for use in other places. It is planned by Cochran to visit Philippeville and report thereon in the near future.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION
WASHINGTON 25

WAR DEPARTMENT
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ALITY FOR PRIVATI"
PAYMENT OF BE TO AVOID POSTAGE, SOO"

Mr. John J. Horne
Refugees Board
Department of State

Mr. Horne

Handwritten Notes
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN FEHLE:


1. There is inclosed herewith, for your information, a copy of paraphrase of an incoming cable, dated 17 July 1944, regarding the above subject.

2. For reference purposes in case of reply to this memorandum, the inclosed paraphrase has originated in the Government Branch (Room 3B 863, Extension 5988) of this Division.

J. H. HILLDRING,
Major General,
Director, Civil Affairs Division.

1 Incl.
Paraphrase of cable.

CHAS. L. KADES
Lt. Colonel, GSG
Asst. Executive

OCT 30 1972
PARAPHRASE OF CABLE

From: Algiers
To: SHAEF, London
Date: 17 July 1944

URRRA participation in Italian and French North African refugee problems.

Details of cable F 56992, 9 June paragraph 2 amended to July 1 as follows:

(A) 3791 plus 1802 ex-internees of various nationalities are now in Italy.

(B) 37784 received to date in Italy.

(C) 28120 gross total evacuated to mideast EX Italy.

(D) 2218 arrivals in Italy since May 28. 444 is average for 5 weeks.

As information is received from Italy, the figures will be amended.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN PHILBRICK

Subject: Participation of UNRRA in Refugee Problem
Philippeville, French North Africa.

1. There is inclosed herewith, for your information, a copy of a paraphrase of an incoming cable, dated 12 July 1944, regarding the above subject.

2. For reference purposes in case of reply to this memorandum, the inclosed paraphrase has originated in the Government Branch (Room 38 853, Extension 5968) of this Division.

J. H. HILDRING,
Major General,
Director, Civil Affairs Division.

CHAS. L. KADES
Lt. Colonel, GSC
Asst. Executive

1 Incl.
Paraphrase of cable.
PARAPHRASE OF CABLE

From: Algiers
To: War Department
No: FX 71343 (MAT 341)
Date: 12 July 1944


Head nurse and chief physician should be sent to arrive soonest reporting Cochran and FREEDOM G-5. Travel is authorized by air.

You will be notified of priority which is being established. Their instructions should state they are under AHWQ command.

As from 25 July would appreciate services of Assistant Chief Administrative Officer.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN PEELE:

Subject: Refugee Problems

1. There is inclosed herewith, for your information, a copy of a paraphrase of cable No. F-59229, 14 June 1944, regarding the above subject.

2. For reference purposes in case of reply to this memorandum, the inclosed paraphrase originated in the Government Branch (Room 38-863, Extension 3968) of this Division.

J. H. HILLDRING,
Major General,
Director, Civil Affairs Division.

CHAS. L. KADES
Lt. Colonel, GSC
Asst. Executive

Incl. 1
Paraphrase of cable
1. UNRRA medical personnel needed in Middle East within 4 weeks.
2. UNRRA medical personnel required in W.A. within 6 weeks.
3. UNRRA organizers needed in W.A. at once.
4. UNRRA administrative personnel required in W.A. before Sept.

Call meeting of Agency at UNRRA at once.

M. J. Marks
16 June 1944.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN PEILE:

Subject: Refugee Problems

1. There is inclosed herewith, for your information, a copy of a paraphrase of cable No. F-59229, 14 June 1944, regarding the above subject.

2. For reference purposes in case of reply to this memorandum, the inclosed paraphrase originated in the Government Branch (Room 38-663, Extension 3966) of this Division.

J. H. HILLDRING,
Major General,
Director, Civil Affairs Division.

1 Incl.
Paraphrase of cable
PARAPHRASE OF CABLE

From: Algiers
To: War Department
No: F-59229
Date: 14 June 1944

Participation UNRRA in refugee problems French North Africa is subject. Present situation conditioned by following factors:

1. 26,901 Yugoslav refugees held in Middle East on 3 June. Impossible Middle East accept over 40,000. Until UNRRA medical personnel received not more than 30,000 of these can be accepted.

2. Up to 10,000 can be held in Italy on transit basis. On 3 June evacuation greater part 3,313 in Italy will complete present quota of 30,000 in Middle East, enabling further 10,000 on transit basis to be brought into Italy.

3. Accumulation in Italy up to total 10,000 to be evacuated when UNRRA medical personnel arrive Middle East and then to full extent transit facilities can be reutilized.

4. By time Italian facilities under par. 3 exhausted probably end July, it is intended that "FNA Camp" with initial capacity 10,000 and hospital of 600 beds will be opened with later expansion if needed to 1,250 bed hospital and capacity 40,000.

5. Therefore it will be seen that problem is one of timing dependent on provision for Middle East of UNRRA medical personnel from your end and our ability with or without UNRRA assistance to open FNA camps. From now on estimate maximum 2,000 refugees can be accepted weekly for months (1,480 weekly average to 3 June), provided...
(a) UNRRA medical personnel as indicated in our cable 50606-P, dated 5/25, for Middle East are provided within 4 weeks;
(b) UNRRA medical personnel as indicated in par. 6 hereafter are provided for FNA within 8 weeks;

Military exigencies might compel restriction of free flow should UNRRA assistance not be forthcoming in accordance with this program.

6. Now being prepared from military and other local resources is accommodation in FNA, Phillipeville area for 10,000 with 600 bed hospital. After end of September military responsibility cannot be contemplated. UNRRA should be fully responsible from that time. Recommend UNRRA personnel nucleus with an organizing executive be sent forward earliest with remainder in 8 weeks allowing time to take over from Army. On basis camp for 10,000 refugees with 600 bed hospital estimated personnel requirements:
(a) 8 for controlled headquarters;
(b) 18 administrative for camp; medical - one nurse, 2 doctors, 2 dispensers;
(c) 10 doctors for hospital, including 1 anesthetist, 1 gynaecologist, 2 surgeons. Nursing staff in proportions 2 female to 1 male - 90 administrative personnel - 20.
(d) Requirements in our cable 50082-P, dated 5/24, amended by foregoing details.

7. Army providing necessary equipment for project including hospital. Will be notified separately as to detailed equipment UNRRA
required to furnish suggestions relative disposal to UNRRA of
military property.

8. In 4 months position to be reviewed, when it may be necessary that
separate camps be established in Italy or as envisaged in our cable 50082-F,
dated 5/24, FMA project be expanded to 40,000 capacity. As suggested in
48567, dated 5/20, presence in Algiers with AFHQ of UNRRA representative
would ensure UNRRA information of requirements in advance and greatly
facilitate planning.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN PEHLE:

Subject: Refugee Problems.

1. There are inclosed herewith, for your information, a copy of a paraphrase of cable No. F 56992, 9 June 1944, and a copy of a paraphrase of cable No. F 57664, 10 June 1944, regarding the above subject.

2. For reference purposes in case of reply to this memorandum, the inclosed paraphrases have originated in the Government Branch (Room 3B 855, Extension 3968) of this Division.

J. H. HILDBRING,
Major General,
Director, Civil Affairs Division.

Incl 1 - Paraphrase of cable No. F 56992, 9 Jun 44
Incl 2 - Paraphrase of cable No. F 57664, 10 Jun 44.

CHAS. L. KADES
Lt. Colonel, GSC
Asst. Executive

DECLASSIFIED
OSD Legal, 3-25-72
OCT 30 1972
PARAGRAPHS OF CABLE

From: Algiers
To: War Department
No: F 56993
Date: 9 June 1944

UNION participation Italy and French North Africa (FNA) in refugee problems

1. Following are details concerning Yugoslav refugees in theater

   a. 56,366 received in Italy to date.
   b. 26,902 evacuated from Italy to Middle East.
   c. Average 1497 per week have arrived in Italy since 1 January.
   d. 3643 plus 1006 en-internes of various nationalities are now in Italy.

2. Here and in middle east, area needs at earliest date in for medical personnel and nursing staffs.

3. Refer to recent cable requesting information on plans for handling surplus refugees:

   a. At present due to operational situation existing facilities in Italy cannot be expanded.
   b. New proceeding are plans for camp in FNA at Phillipsville initially for 600-bed hospital and 10,000 refugees. These will be the first of a group for accommodating 40,000 with 1200-bed hospital available. Planned to confer with French earliest as their attitude not yet ascertained.
PARAPHRASE OF CABLE

From: Algiers
To: War Department
No: F 57664
Date: 10 June 1944

Movement of refugees from Yugoslavia into Italy is subject.

Fully appreciate desirability of permitting refugees' free flow consistent with military exigencies. We are endeavoring to implement this policy having discussed the matter with General Wilson. On this we are grateful for your assistance. Of first importance, as we have indicated is provision of civilian personnel, particularly medical personnel.
Serial No.  
File No. or Subject  
Document No. 0 1988  
Date  12 June 1944  

Address: John Fehle, Executive Director  
War Refugee Board, Treasury Dept.,  
Washington, D.C.  

Notice—Sheet 2 (address's copy) to be retained by  
address.  

(DUPPLICATE)
WAR DEPARTMENT

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

TO:

CIVIL AFFAIRS DIVISION
WAR DEPARTMENT
ROOM 38837 - BUILDING
WASH. D. C.

Penalty for private use of mail.

Postmaster will return to sender.

Mail and will mail on request for payment of penalty.

Watermark: "Postmaster will return to sender."

Penalty for private use of mail.

Postmaster will return to sender.

Mail and will mail on request for payment of penalty.

Watermark: "Postmaster will return to sender."
PARAPHRASE OF INCOMING WAR DEPT. CABLE DATED 25 May 1944 RE YUGOSLAV REFUGEES.

Middle East informs it cannot accept more than 50,000 refugees because of shortage of medical personnel. Additional medical staffs requested from UNRRA not received. Requests urgent consideration of this in view of the cable dated 24 May.
PARAPHRASE OF INCOMING CABLE DATED 24 May 1944 on PARTICIPATION OF UNRRA IN REFUGEE PROBLEMS IN ITALY AND FRENCH NORTH AFRICA.

1. Some 30,000 Yugoslav refugees received in Italy up to present, of which 28,000 have already been evacuated to the Mideast Area. Mideast has agreed to accept gross total of 40,000 refugees, but no more.

2. An average of 1,850 Yugoslav refugees per week have been arriving in Italy for the past 8 weeks. This rate of inflow is expected to continue, with a majority of women and children.

3. Italy's accommodations are limited and more than 8,000 refugees cannot be held permanently.

4. Possibility of acceptance of these refugees in French North Africa is being looked into. Very early non-military assistance is desired, presumably UNRRA, because of the shortage of Allied military personnel for camp supervisory and medical staffs. Estimated personnel requirements, based on accommodation of 40,000 refugees, are as follows:

   a. Initially 40 supervisory administrative and welfare people on scale of 8 to each 5,000 refugees, plus an overall directing staff of 8. Additional 30 required to accommodate total 40,000 refugees expected.

   b. For each 5,000 refugees one medical officer and a skeleton staff for the medical inspection room are required. For each 15,000 refugees, staff for 300 bed hospital is required.

5. In the event the refugees could not be accepted in French North Africa, would like to know if UNRRA would be able to assist on same scale in Italy were greater number refugees to be accepted in Italy at later date.

6. Will advise whether refugees can be accepted into French North Africa from other than personnel points of view. Would like to know as soon as possible what assistance can be expected and when.
PARAPHRASE OF INCOMING WAR DEPT. CABLE DATED 25 May 1944 on Balkan Refugees.

UNRRA will submit request to us for medical and personnel assistance from Middle East for handling Balkan refugees on hand and to arrive.

UNRRA, in agreement with Middle East Relief and Refugee Administration, agreed to accept responsibility for camps housing 25,000 refugees. General Headquarters, Middle East, to provide supply assistance.

Movement of refugees is now nearing total of 43,000. Construction program contemplates total of 75,000 refugees.
October 13, 1944

Dear Mr. Leavitt:

The following message for you from Robert Pilpel was received through the American Legation in Lisbon under date of October 10, 1944:

"Within a few days Kastner and another Jewish member of the delegation will see Mayer. It is requested by Saly that you authorize him to talk with the delegation in terms of Swiss francs 20,000,000. The possession of a document indicating that he is authorized to that extent is all that he requires."

Very truly yours,

(Signed) J. W. Pehle

J. W. Pehle
Executive Director

Mr. M. A. Leavitt, Secretary,
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee,
270 Madison Avenue,

Mr. M. A. Leavitt, Secretary,
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee,
270 Madison Avenue,
FOR LEAVITT FROM ROBERT KIFFEL

This is WRB 215 JDC 86.

Kastner and another Jewish member of the delegation will visit Saly within a few days. Saly requests you authorize him to talk to delegation in terms of 20,000,000 Swiss francs. All he requires is possession of a document showing he is authorized to that extent.
653, October 6, 5 p.m.

Ackermann's 113.

Following is a summary of the situation evacuation of refugees from Yugoslavia referred to in WRB 60. On September 18 only 29 were evacuated and none since then. Delay due in part to bad flying weather but may also be caused by political situation which has reduced the number of planes substantially. Board may wish to discuss latter factor with State Department. When and if plane traffic commences again it is planned to resume evacuations but it is expected this will take several months since wounded and airmen have priority. Balance of approximately 650 refugees are in neighborhood of Topusko where I am informed they are relatively safe from Germans unless retreat should go through this section. In such case danger will increase substantially since this group with many old persons and children is difficult.
difficult to move rapidly. Representative of British Military Mission which has handled preliminaries on this matter stated he would recommend allocation of additional planes as urgent humanitarian measure if retreat goes in this direction. He believes, however, that temporary relief he is trying to arrange will suffice meanwhile. I suggest you follow situation closely and if you learn that this area is about to become path of German retreat you recommend to appropriate authorities your end allocation of additional planes to back up our recommendations here. Approximately 20 transport planes can do job in one trip.

KIRK

RR
CONTROL COPY

LONDON
6004

The cable below is WH 8.

Please deliver paraphrase of the following message

You are advised to arrange for approximately 650 Jews from

Yugoslavia to be evacuated from their occupied territory to Italy. Between that date.

A group of 120 Jews, 18 families, 70 children, 14 Hungarians, and includes about 150 orphan children.

The fact that these people fall into the category of persons rescued from the occupied territory can you arrange for their evacuation by giving them Palestinian certificates for them. Advice is received at UN JDC.

Following for relief from the War Refugee Board,

Please discuss foregoing with JDC and give all possible support to JDC request.

For security reasons, the text of this message must be closely guarded.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 811-72
By R. H. Parks Date SE 27 1972
CABLE TO AMBASSADOR SHAPIRO, LONDON, FROM WAR REFUGEE BOARD.

Please deliver the following message to Joseph Linton, Jewish Agency, 77 Great Russell Street, London, from Joseph Schwartz, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee:

QUOTE OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN ITALY ADVISES ARRANGEMENTS BEING MADE EVACUATE APPROXIMATELY 600 JEWS FROM YUGOSLAVIA TO ITALY DROP GROUP COMPOSED OF 519 YUGOSLAVS, 16 POLISH, 77 AUSTRIANS, 9 SIZIES, 14 HUNGARIANS, BALANCE MISCELLANEOUS, AND INCLUDES ABOUT 150 GERMAN CHILDREN. STOP VIEWS FACT THESE PEOPLE FALL INTO FOUR GROUPS, PERSONS RESCUED FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORY CAN YOU ARRANGE HAVE AVAILABLE PALESTINIAN CERTIFICATES FOR THEM STOP PLEASE ADVISE UNQUOTE

Following for Mann from War Refugees Board.

Please discuss foregoing with Linton and give all possible support to JDC request.

THIS IS WAR CABLE TO LONDON NO. 5

10:40 a.m.
September 27, 1944

Miss Chauncey (for the Sec'y) Abrahamsen, Cohn, DuBois, Friedman, Resell, Laughlin, Lesser, Mannen, McCormack, Cable Control Files

Copy 09/27/44
War Refugee Board

September 27, 1944
8 p.m.

Amplad

Caserta

The following for Ackermann is WRB 80.

For your information, Ackermann has cabled 300 here that he is arranging evacuation approximately 650 Jews from Yugoslavia and that he is attempting to arrange evacuation further groups. Palestine certificates are being requested for the 650. Please lend every assistance to Ackermann in this project and keep board advised of any difficulties encountered.

Hull
(120V)

For security reasons the text of this message must be closely guarded.
CABLE TO AMERICAN POLITICAL ADVISOR, CASERTA, FOR ACKERMANN FROM WAR REFUGEE BOARD.

For your information Perlmann has cabled JDC here that he is arranging evacuation approximately 650 Jews from Yugoslavia and that he is attempting to arrange evacuation further groups. Palestine certificates are being requested for the 650. Please lend every assistance to Perlmann in this project and keep Board advised of any difficulties encountered.

THIS IS THE ADN. NO. 50

10:40 a.m.
September 27, 1944

Miss Chauncey (for the Sec'y) Abrahamsen, Cohn, DuBois, Friedman, Hodel, Laughlin, Lesser, Mannen, McCormack, Cable Control Files
The following is for Ackerman in ARB 49.

Please refer to your 106 of August 11 and other reports suggesting the establishment of stockpiles in Italy to be available for the relief of Yugoslavs upon the liberation of their country. Your efforts in bringing the need for such stockpiles to the attention of Army and UNHRA officials are highly praiseworthy and should certainly be continued if you deem it desirable to do so.

We have considered carefully what action the Board could take here to support your efforts, particularly in the light of present military operations and successes in Yugoslavia and elsewhere in Europe. In addition to the fact that post-war or postliberation relief is not strictly within the province of the Board, we have concluded that there is little effective action we can take at this end to hasten the creation of stockpiles which you have not already taken by drawing the attention of the responsible agencies to the urgency of the problem.

Hull

[Handwritten note: DECLASSIFIED]

DEPARTMENT OF
STATE

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

[REDACTED]

Car refugee board

ARPA

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Hull

[Handwritten note: DECLASSIFIED]

DEPARTMENT OF
STATE

OUTGOING
TELEGRAM

DIVISION OF
COMMUNICATIONS
AND RECORDS

[REDACTED]
Cable from War Refugee Board to Ackerman, American Consulate General, Naples, Italy.

Please refer to your 106 of August 11 and other reports suggesting the establishment of stockpiles in Italy to be available for the relief of Yugoslavs upon the liberation of their country. Your efforts in bringing the need for such stockpiles to the attention of Army and UNRRA officials are highly praiseworthy and should certainly be continued if you deem it desirable to do so.

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9:00 a.m.
September 11, 1944
Miss Chauncey (for the Sec'y) Abrahamson, Cohn, DuBois, Friedman, Hodel, Laughlin, Lesser, Mannon, McCormack, Cable Control Files

Sargent/da 9/11/44
The cable below is for Taylor.  

Please refer to your 237 of July 17, the Department No. 18 of July 24, and your 267 of August 5.

As a result of negotiations with the British, the following cable was received from Ambassador Winant at London:

"Attention of the War Refugee Board.

This morning discussed with refugee section of the Foreign Office the Papal intervention on behalf of refugees of northern Italy.

Sir Noel Charles' reply to inquiry as to accommodations was received this morning by the Foreign Office. According to Charles' report, an additional five thousand refugees may be accommodated in liberated Italy and use of North African camps was also suggested.

It is the understanding of the Foreign Office that there are far more than five thousand refugees north of the battle line, but since it believes the military situation is changing so rapidly that the problem of accommodating this five thousand additional will not arise, it feels that it will be safe to give assurances of accommodation without numerical limitation.

The Foreign Office, however, does not know whether or not the Pope

\textit{DECLASSIFIED \\
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72 \\
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972}
-2-114, August 30, 1944, 7 P.M. to 10:10 A.M.

Pope has already appealed to German authorities and presuming we will take parallel action, they will take the following steps:

Issue instructions to Charles to ascertain whether or not an appeal has been made by the Pope. Provided he has not, to request him to do so with assurance that the persons rescued will be cared for and received by Allied authorities. Provided he has made an appeal, to suggest that these assurances be repeated by him.

It is hoped by the Foreign Office that this action will meet with the approval of AMB and that appropriate instructions will be issued to our representative in Rome. WILKES.

The above action suggested by the British is satisfactory both to the War Refugees Board and the Department. Accordingly, please join with your British colleague in taking the action called for in the above quoted cable.

WILKES

6/30/44
Secretary of State
Washington

106, August 11, 2 p.m.
FOR WAR REFUGEE BOARD FROM ACKERMANN NO. 106.

Just returned from Bert where survey made Hungarian
Yugoslav situations. Discussions with British American
Partisans indicate responsibilities from Hungary not
(repeat not) favorable presently because Yugo-Hungarian
border too well guarded. I am informed Partisans now
control isolated region their side Drava River where
Hungarians are safe if they reach there by own efforts.
A handful have reached safety in last few months. Allied
and Partisan forces in this area not even sufficient for
intelligence purposes but situation expected to improve.

Yugoslav situation improving. In July over 2,500 re-
fugees evacuated, 800 being orphan children, by air from
interior balance old men, women, children by boat from
coast. However, there is great immediate need for supplies
to be brought into liberated areas to prevent several

millions people

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-78
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972
-2- 106, August 11, 2 p.m., from Caserta

million people from starving or freezing to death. Approximately four million are homeless. Tents would aid tremendously but require plane transport. Many without proper clothing. Some small boats available from time to time to bring clothing to Viz for distribution from there by young men who evade Boer guards regularly. Latter statement by Partisans confirmed by Allied authorities. Food and medicine also urgent, particularly dry or condensed milk for nursing mothers and children. Much difficulty envisaged to get transport these supplies but believe there will be space occasionally for small amounts. Again urge that stockpile be created so that if transport available or Germans pull out this aid could be carried immediately. Will discuss with Murphy, Army and UNRRA representative next few days but urge you do all possible your end. Proper agency for procurement supplies appears AML now Cairo but this may change rapidly. Will advise. Report also comes by pouch.

MURPHY

BB
OFFICE OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES

Algeria, August 3, 1944

SUBJECT: Proposed Yugoslav Refugee Camp at Phillippeville

THE HONORABLE

THE SECRETARY OF STATE.

WASHINGTON.

SIR:

With reference to telegram No. 2371 of July 12, 6 p.m. for the War Refugee Board from Mr. Murphy, and previous, I have the honor to enclose the minutes of a meeting concerning the proposed camp for Yugoslav refugees at Phillippeville.

It is believed that the record of the meeting will be of value to UNRRA in view of the responsibility of that organization to administer the camp beginning October 1, 1944. While it has not been made a matter of record in the minutes of the meeting, Brigadier Clark emphasized in no uncertain terms that the British military will relinquish direction of the camp on September 30. In these circumstances it will be absolutely necessary for UNRRA to have an adequate administrative staff available in advance of that date to take over the direction of the camp at Phillippeville.

It was agreed at the meeting that the French authorities would be asked to accept as a basis for dealing with offenses committed by the refugees a set of general principles to be drawn up by Brigadier Clark in agreement with Allied Force Headquarters. These principles would be applied in framing the military directive to the commander of the camp by which he would deal with offenses committed within the camp, that is between minor offenses, which, though punishable under French law, could be adequately dealt with by camp discipline, and serious offenses, which would be tried by the French courts.

It had been hoped to show this despatch to Governor H. L. Cochran, the representative of UNRRA attached to Allied Force headquarters, but his departure for Cairo, the uncertainty of the date of his return and the urgent need for UNRRA to despatch personnel to the camp at Phillippeville...

DECLASSIFIED

State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72

By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972
RECORD OF MEETING held at 9, Rue Professeur Curtillot, Algiers, on Friday 28th July, concerning the proposed camp for Yugoslav refugees at Philippeville.

Present:

Mr. Kingsley Hooker. Office of the British Representative (in the Chair).
M. de la Tournelle. Commissariat aux Affaires Étrangères.
M. Marcel Grau. Commissariat aux internés et hémisphères.
Carlaire Chance, reil. Sous-Major Défense Nationale.
Mr. R. E. Cochran. Chief representative Mediterranean Area, UNHRA.
Mr. G. W. Hanchard. Office of the U.S. Representative.
Major S. A. Gaulsmith. Office of the British Representative.
Mr. D. P. Heilly.

Mr. Hooker opened the meeting by explaining the origins of the proposal and by expressing warm appreciation of the ready response shown by the French authorities and of the willingness of the British military authorities to assist in tackling the problem by maintaining the camp at Philippeville until UNHRA could take it over. Referring to the note No. 143/629 of the 7th July by which M. Massili had agreed to the reception of the refugees in French North Africa, Mr. Hooker asked whether the French representatives could specify exactly what was intended by the statement that the refugees "devront être soumis entièrement aux lois et règlements français".

M. de la Tournelle replied that the French authorities assumed that since the refugees were all civilians, there would be no question of extraterritoriality of the camp and that any offences committed by the refugees whether inside or outside the camp, would be tried before French courts under French law.

Mr. Hooker said that the view of the British military authorities was that within the camp the British military Commandant should have jurisdiction. The British Army had no desire to see the commitment of running the camp. But neither UNHRA nor the French authorities were now in a position to maintain it. The British military authorities felt bound to insist that if they were to accept responsibility for the camp, their jurisdiction within its perimeter should not be in question.

M. de la Tournelle
M. de la Tourmalet said that he saw no difficulty at all over the Commandant having full responsibility for punishing offences against the disciplinary rules of the camp, but that it was very difficult for the French authorities to admit that the Commandant could have jurisdiction as regards offences against French law.

M. Creau said that it was not possible to make a distinction between offences against French law committed inside and outside the camp. The French authorities wished to treat the refugees as allies with the right to circulate freely outside the camp. In return they must ask that the refugees should at all times subject to the jurisdiction of the French courts.

Brigadier Clark said that so long as the British army was responsible for the camp, refugees would be forbidden to circulate freely. The aim would be to keep them in the camp area, but as it was not feasible, it was impossible to guarantee that they would not break out. The great majority would, however, be women with small children, old people and cripples, so that they would certainly not be able to do so easily. So long as the British army was responsible for the camp none would be employed outside the camp and arrangements would be made to give them occupations inside it such as nursing, boot repairs, etc.

He considered that a distinction should be made between day-to-day offences, such as theft, which would be adequately dealt with by camp discipline, probably administered by the refugees themselves under the supervision of the Camp Commandant, and any serious offences committed in the camp and beyond the power of the Commandant to deal with which would normally be handed over to the French civil courts for trial. He thought that serious offences would be rare. Offences committed outside the camp would be tried by the French Civil Courts, though he hoped that in the case of minor offences, the French authorities would allow offenders to be dealt with under camp discipline. The French authorities would of course be entitled to ask that refugees committing offences outside the camp and then taking refuge in it, should be handed over to them for trial but he considered that the decision whether to hand over the refugees should be with the superior British military authority.

Brigadier Clark emphasised that the small British staff of the camp and their Yugoslav assistants would have a very heavy task. He could not guarantee that difficulties would not arise. But he greatly hoped that they would be settled locally in a spirit of conciliation and of give and take, and that only major matters of policy would be referred to higher. He appreciated to the fullest the difficulties which the whole proposal involved for the French authorities concerned. It was his earnest desire to cooperate with them to the utmost possible extent.
In answer to an inquiry from the French representatives regarding the position of the Yugoslav Government in relation to the Camp, Brigadier Clark said that no one would have access to the camp without permission from the British military authorities. There was of course no intention of allowing the representatives of the Yugoslav Government, but he had no intention of allowing representatives of unauthorized bodies to visit the camp.

The French representatives said that the views for the camp had changed to them, entirely changed the proposal, as they had understood it. They did not think that the Camp would be free from the French every day for work etc and it was mainly for this reason that they had been particularly anxious that the refugees should have access to two separate jurisdictions. In the light of the information given at the meeting, they would have to refer the matter question back to the Commissioners concerned. They thought that the distinction proposed for offences committed within the camp, i.e., between minor offences, which, though punishable under French law, could be adequately dealt with by camp discipline, and serious offences, which must be tried by French courts, would prove acceptable. M. de Tournay suggested that it should be the task of the proposed Joint Committee to decide which offences should be punishable under Camp discipline and which should be reserved for the French courts. For this purpose the rules of the camp should be drawn up in agreement with the Joint Committee.

Brigadier Clark stated that as principles and precedents were involved it would be necessary for the General Officer Commanding North Africa District to refer the matter to AMIC. He further stated that, when agreement had been reached with AMIC, he would be willing, with the permission of the General Officer Commanding North Africa District, to make himself available to explain to the Committee the general principles to be applied in framing the military directive to the Commandant of the Camp, on which the latter would frame his military Standing Orders.

After further discussion the meeting agreed that the French authorities should be asked to accept this as a basis for dealing with the question of jurisdiction.

If agreement could be reached the proposed Joint Committee would then have no raison d'être. An ad hoc meeting could be called to deal with any special point that might arise and was incapable of solution on a lower level.
Secretary of State
Washington

2371, July 12, 6 p.m.

For WSB from Murphy.

Reference my 1937, June 10, 9 p.m.

In connection with proposed establishment of refugee camp near Philippeville reply has now been received from French authorities accepting in principle Allied proposal for establishment of such camp and suggesting the setting up of a commission composed of representatives of the Inter-Allied General Staff, of representatives of the PONLP and eventually a representative of Yugoslav Government, which would establish without delay rules and regulations for administration of the refugees for duration of their stay in North Africa and establish conditions under which Allied authorities will coordinate with French authorities all arrangements necessary in connection with lodging, feeding and maintenance of such refugees.
Secretory of State,
Washington.

2366, July 12, 1 p.m.
FROM MURPHY FOR WRB.

Your 2011, June 26, 7 p.m.:—

My 1937, June 10 was prepared and sent after full consultation with Allied military authorities at AFHQ who are in final analysis best qualified judges as to how much can be done in connection with general subject of refugees consistent with military duties.

From second paragraph of your telegram under reference, it seems evident that the WRB is not aware that Allies do not have a single port on Yugoslav mainland and that practically everything that is going into that country now is by air and priorities are fixed in accordance with close coordination between Marshal Tito and military officials at AFHQ.

As reported

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972
2366, July 12, 1 p.m., from Algiers

As reported in Algier's 2217, June 30, midnight, the military directive referred to in fifth paragraph of your message was removed by Supreme Allied Commander on June 14. The memorandum referred to in your telegram was based on staff study prepared at APhQ. The substance of the staff study was that these instructions had been issued at a time when the shortage of medical personnel in mid-East had become acute and facilities for receiving additional Partisan refugees both in Italy and mid-East were on point of exhaustion. The communication as of that date shows that 21,499 out of a total of 25,000 persons agreed for acceptance had already been evacuated to mid-East. 8638 persons in Italy where new arrivals were being held/averaging 1722 per week. An added consideration at that time was the presence at APhQ of a mission of Marshal Tito's which on the one hand was endeavoring to obtain a commitment for the acceptance of additional Partisan refugees at a rate of from 4 to 5 thousand a month while on the other there were complaints at facilities and arrangements provided in mid-East were inadequate and that the refugees already in Egypt should best be moved to a suitable climate. In these circumstances further complicated
complicated by fact that AFIN was quite understandably according first priority with respect to both transportation and accommodation facilities to Partisan wounded, it seemed advisable temporarily to discourage an increase in rate of evacuation of refugees from Yugoslavia pending a solution of the problem. At same time immediate negotiations were initiated with mid-East with a view to raising quota for acceptance in that area and a general investigation was instituted of possibility of developing reception facilities in other areas elsewhere in North Africa. The latter part of May mid-East agreed to raise its quota to 40,000 on condition that UNRRA would provide the necessary medical personnel MERRA-UNRRA had previously applied for.

With regard to statement in paragraph five of your message under reference, that flow of refugees decreased substantially during month of May, I am authorized by AFIN to inform the WRB for its secret information that an extensive German campaign against Partisan Forces of Marshal Tito was largely responsible for this delay and even Partisan officials have admitted this fact. There may have been some slowdown due to this order.
this order but there is little doubt in minds of
highest military officials that military events were
the large factor in connection with drop in evacuation
of refugees for month of May 1944. There are now no
restrictive measures outstanding aimed at discouraging
flow of refugees from Yugoslavia.

With regard to your inquiry as to finding havens
of refuge in Mediterranean area, everything possible
is being done for increased accommodations and facilities
in Italy. Mr. Ackermann who has been in Italy for
almost a month has been canvassing the situation.

As I reported in an earlier message today, French
authorities have given their agreement in principle
to establishment of a refugee camp: Philippeville
(see my 1937, June 10).

I should like to invite attention of UNRRA to fact
that the various officials of UNRRA have always been most
sympathetic and understanding in connection with
refugee question and are doing everything possible
under very difficult conditions to alleviate refugee
situation in Balkans and Italy. They are disappointed,
however, that UNRRA has not yet been able to operate
on a substantial scale. A further complication from
military point
July 12, 1 p.m., from Algiers

Military point of view is fact that considerable pressure has been brought to bear on the SAC in connection with evacuation of large numbers of military wounded from Yugoslavia.

LAWTON

LIS-WTD
Secretary of State
Washington

2217, June 30, Midnight.

FOR WAR REFUGEE BOARD FROM MURPHY AND SAXON.

One. Refer your 2011, June 26 (War Refugee cable 29) Murph is preparing complete answer reference cable. However, please note text cable sent by SACRED to SOLTC June 14.

Accommodation and maintenance situation refugees now improved. Last 3,313 in Italy 3 June can be evacuated so that another 10,000 can be accommodated. Within four weeks expect another 10,000 to Middle East. Evacuation of 10,000 to FHA should commence some time in July.

"There is hereby removed restriction imposed by paragraph three our P-H 41657."

Two. In connection with paragraph one, section one above, Spofford and others here stress great urgency of assumption by UNRRA of responsibility for refugee camps and hospitals in French North Africa (Phillipville) and Italy.

REGRADED
UNCLASSIFIED
-2-, 2217, June 30, midnight, from Algiers

Three. It is assumed you have seen LAM 222,
June 14 to AGVAR for CC² from Wilson.

CHAPIN

WTD
LJS
No. 568

Subject: Accommodation and maintenance of Refugees in French North Africa.

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I have the honor to transmit as of possible interest to the Department a copy of a letter addressed to General Bethouart, Chief of Staff of National Defense of the French Committee of National Liberation, by Lt. General Galliénil, Chief of Staff, AFIQ, with regard to the accommodation and maintenance of refugees in French North Africa.

respectfully yours,

Robert D. Murphy
American Ambassador.

Enclosure:
1. Copy of letter described above.

File No. 711.5
CC: Sec

Ozalid copy to Department.
I2 June 1944

General Bethouart
Chief of Staff of National Defense

My dear General Bethouart:

I wish to draw to your attention a problem which, in the opinion of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, is becoming of great importance in the Mediterranean Theater.

Consequent upon operations now in progress, particularly in the Balkans, large numbers of innocent civilians are being rendered homeless by German acts of terror and oppression. Also, due to the normal dislocation of war, numbers of refugees, principally women and children, are necessarily endeavoring to escape from the zones of operations.

Our forces in the Adriatic have for some time been assisting in the evacuation of refugees from Yugoslavia. The Allied authorities in Italy have made provision to receive and process these refugees and to maintain a substantial number of them. A large number have been evacuated to the Middle East where Allied authorities are maintaining camps to care for these unfortunate until they can be repatriated. The facilities in both these localities are now or will shortly be extended to their capacity.

The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, is, therefore, preparing to use certain of the installations and facilities which are no longer required for military purposes in North Africa to house and care for these refugees until repatriation. The immediate proposal is to complete arrangements for the accommodation of approximately 10,000 Yugoslav refugees in a camp situated near Philippville. The camp will be operated by the Allied military authorities until United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration or other qualified agencies assume the responsibility. The supply, maintenance and administration of the camp will, of course, be the responsibility of these authorities or agencies and no expenditure or other commitment in respect to the camp or its administration will fall upon the French authorities, either now or at any later period.

I am asked by the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, to inform you of these proposed arrangements and to express his confident hope that, in view of the urgency and the humanitarian aspect of the problem, they will meet with the approval of the French military authorities.

Sincerely yours,

J. A. H. GAMMELL
Lieutenant General
Chief of Staff
OUTGOING TELEGRAM

KEN
Distribution of turc reading only by special arrangement.

ALGER, ALGERIA

2011
FOR MURPHY FROM WAR REFUGEE BOARD

Board will appreciate clarification of your 1937
June 10 and desires at same time to make its views in
the matter clear. Board is aware that in order to
increase the flow of refugees substantially from Yugoslavia
it is important to find havens and to provide additional
transportation facilities, clothing and food.

Consistent with military necessity and to the extent
possible the Board is most anxious that additional shipping
facilities be made available for evacuation and food and
clothing supplied both for the relief of refugees on the
Yugoslav mainland and for their care in Italy. Your
recommendations with respect to what can be done in this
connection will be welcomed.

In Board's cable 1668 of May 27 the importance of
finding additional havens to which refugees could be
removed from Italy was stressed. Board believed that

the flow

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter 1-11-42
By R. H. Parke Date: SEP 8 7 1972
June 20, 7 p.m., to Algiers.

The flow of refugees from Yugoslavia should not (repeat not) be discouraged because of conditions in southern Italy and that refugees should be brought out to the limit of available transportation facilities.

It is the Board's understanding that your memorandum of April 29 made the following points and was followed by the issuance
EM 2011, June 20, 9 A.M. to Algiers

In answer to a directive by the military authorities on May 8.

(1) We should not only not encourage the Partisans to send further refugees out of Yugoslavia, but should take positive action in fact to discourage them in this effort. (2) Instructions to discourage the evacuation of refugees from that area should be issued to all Allied personnel in contact with the Partisans.

(3) Instructions should be issued to Allied personnel operating landing craft used to carry provisions across the Adriatic not to provide transportation, except in such cases where it is impossible to refuse to do so, to Yugoslav refugees, when returning to Italy UNNCCD.

The latest information available to the Board is that the directive issued "as still in effect as late as June 8. The Board is also informed that the flow of refugees decreased substantially during the month of May. Information from the War Department is to the effect that refugees had been arriving in southern Italy during the eight-week period from the middle of March to the middle of May at the average weekly rate of 1,800. The flow slowed down to less than 500 persons weekly late in May. Undoubtedly the situation in Yugoslavia had some effect on this flow, but the Board is concerned that the restrictive order issued by the Army may also have contributed to this reduction in movement.

The
-3- # 6011, June 20, 7 p.m. to Algiers

The Board will appreciate being promptly advised whether any directives are still outstanding aimed at discouraging the flow of refugees from Yugoslavia.

Finally refer to Board's 1616 of May 27 and 1879 of June 16 with respect to the question of finding havens of refuge in the Mediterranean area. If accommodations for refugees can be increased in Italy, as suggested in your cable, our efforts in this respect will be aided.

The Board has noted your suggestion with respect to moving large numbers of refugees for temporary stay in camps in French North Africa. The Board fully concurs in the desirability of establishing additional refugee havens there. However it is recalled that this Government has been endeavoring to move a very small number of refugees from Spain to Camp Aginlay for more than a year.

Conferences have been initiated with UNRRA with a view to providing medical and administrative personnel for refugee camps and hospitals. Likewise the whole question of how UNRRA will be prepared to assume the responsibility of feeding and caring for refugees in Italy or elsewhere has been considered. You will be kept advised.

Consistent with military necessity, the Board is most anxious that every effort be made to encourage the escape of Balkan
#

June 26, 7 p.m.; to Algiers

The situation in Yugoslavia and the physical condition of the refugees upon arrival; the majority of whom are reported to be women and children, high lights the importance of this movement on humanitarian considerations. Consideration should also be given to the provision of relief for those refugees in Yugoslavia who can not be evacuated to Italy immediately.

The stockpiling of food and clothing is hard for use in Yugoslavia at the appropriate time; should be looked into. If Marshal Tito is at all able to assist in the evacuation and relief of refugees in the Balkan countries his assistance should of course be enlisted. The Board will appreciate any recommendations that you and Acherman can forward as soon as possible.

This is the Refugee Board cable to Algiers no. 29.

HILL
(GLW)

S/CW

6/26/44
CABLE

TO: AMBASSADOR ROBERT MURPHY, ALGIERS
FROM: WAR REFUGEE BOARD

Section I.

We shall appreciate clarification of your cable of June 10, No. 1937, and desire at the same time to make clear our views in this matter.

FIFTH PARAGRAPH SHOULD READ AS FOLLOWS:

We understand that your memorandum of April 29 made the following points which were later implemented in a directive by the military authorities of May 5:

PAGE 2

FIRST PARAGRAPH

Our latest information concerning the directive which was issued indicates that it was still in effect on June 8 (two days before this cable). Our information further indicates that during the month of May, the period referred to in your cable, the flow of refugees decreased substantially. The information which we have received from the War Department indicates that refugees had been arriving in Southern Italy during the eight-week period from the middle of March to the middle of May at the average rate of 1850 refugees per week. Whether or not this figure is accurate, there appears to have been a great slackening in the flow of refugees during the last two weeks in May. In fact, our information indicates that the flow had decreased from the average of 500 refugees weekly.

In view of the fact that you now indicate in your cable that June 18 that the question of finding havens of refuge to which people can be promptly removed from Italy is not too difficult an operation, we would appreciate being advised promptly whether any directives which have been issued designed to discourage the flow of refugees are still outstanding.
CABLE

TO: AMBASSADOR ROBERT MURPHY, ALGIERS
FROM: WAR REFUGEE BOARD

Section I.

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In view of the fact that you now indicate in your cable of June 19 that the question of finding havens of refuge to which people can be promptly removed from Italy is not too difficult, we would appreciate being advised promptly whether any directives which have been issued designed to discourage the flow of refugees are still outstanding.
CABLE

TO: AMBASSADOR ROBERT MURPHY, ALGIERS
FROM: WAR REFUGEE BOARD

Section I.

We are somewhat puzzled by your cable of June 10, No. 1937, and desire to make clear our views in this matter.

We are fully conscious of the fact that in order to increase substantially the flow of refugees from Yugoslavia it is important not only to find havens for these people, but also to provide, insofar as possible, additional transportation facilities, clothing, food, etc.

The War Refugee Board is most anxious that insofar as possible, consistent with military necessity, additional shipping facilities be supplied for evacuation purposes and additional food and clothing be furnished not only for the care of refugees in Italy but also for their relief on the Yugoslav mainland. In this connection we would appreciate your recommendations as to what can be done in this direction.

In stressing in our cable No. 1669 the importance of finding additional havens of refuge to which refugees could be removed from Italy, we had in mind the fundamental point that the flow of refugees from Yugoslavia should not (repeat not) be discouraged because of the overtaxing of refugee facilities in Southern Italy, and that whatever refugees could be brought out under existing transportation facilities should be brought out.

Specifically, we were gravely concerned with the directive which we understood was issued by the military authorities on May 5, following your memorandum of April 29, in which memorandum we understand you made the following points:

(1) Not only should we not encourage the Partisans to send further refugees out of Yugoslavia, we should in fact take positive action to discourage them in this regard.
(2) All Allied personnel in contact with the Partisans should be instructed to discourage the evacuation of refugees from that area.

(3) Allied personnel operating landing craft used to carry provisions across the Adriatic should be instructed not to provide transportation to Yugoslav refugees when returning to Italy except in such cases where it is impossible to refuse to do so.

Our latest information concerning the directive which was issued indicates that it was still in effect on June 8 (two days before your cable). Our information further indicates that during the month of May, the period referred to in your cable, the flow of refugees decreased substantially. The information which we have received from the War Department indicates that refugees had been arriving in Southern Italy during the eight-week period from the middle of March to the middle of May at the average rate of 1850 refugees per week. Whether or not this figure is accurate, there appears to have been a great slackening in the flow of refugees during the last two weeks in May. In fact our information indicates that the flow had so slowed down that for the two weeks ending May 27 an average of less than 500 persons arrived.

Although obviously the situation in Yugoslavia may have had some effect on this flow, our information indicates that the restrictive order which was issued by the Army following your memorandum of April 29 may well have contributed to this reduction in the flow of refugees.

In view of the fact that you now indicate in your cable of June 10 that the question of finding havens of refuge to which people can be promptly removed from Italy is not too difficult of solution, we would appreciate being advised promptly whether any directives which have been issued designed to discourage the flow of refugees are still outstanding.
Section II.

With respect to the question of finding havens of refuge in the Mediterranean area for refugees, please refer to our No. 1669 of May 27, and our No. 1879 of June 14. To the extent that the accommodations for refugees on the mainland in Italy can be increased, as suggested in your cable, this would of course aid us in our efforts.

Your suggestions as to moving large numbers of refugees to camps in French North Africa for temporary lodging and care have been noted. The War Refugee Board fully concurs in the desirability of establishing additional refugee havens in North Africa. In this connection, however, it should be borne in mind that this Government has been endeavoring for more than a year to move a very small number of refugees from Spain to Camp Lyantey.

Section III.

Discussions have been undertaken with UNRRA with respect to providing medical and administrative personnel for the administration of refugee hospitals and camps. In addition, the whole question as to what point UNRRA will be able and willing to assume the responsibility of feeding and caring for refugees, whether in Italy or elsewhere, is under consideration. You will be advised of developments.

Section IV.

We are most anxious that every effort be made, consistent with military necessity, to encourage the escape of refugees from the Balkan countries. Our information concerning the situation in Yugoslavia and the physical condition of these refugees upon their arrival, the majority of whom we are informed by the War Department are women and children, highlights the importance of this movement from a humanitarian standpoint. At the same time consideration should be given to providing relief to those refugees in Yugoslavia who can not be immediately evacuated to Italy. The possibility of providing stockpiles of food and clothing in Bari for use in Yugoslavia at the appropriate time should be explored.
To the extent that Marshal Tito's cooperation in the evacuation and relief of refugees in the Balkan Countries can be productive, it should, of course, be obtained.

We would appreciate it if you and Ackermann would forward your recommendations in this matter to us as soon as possible.

This is our refugee board cable to Algiers No. 27.
Murphy sends the following for the War Refugee Board.

While I was in Italy I received your message dated May 27, No. 1669. I have had opportunity, in the interval, to discuss this problem with the Supreme Allied Commander, Heathcote-Smith, Ackermann and other competent British and American officers.

I should like to make it quite clear that there has been no intention on the part of AFHQ to discourage escape of refugees from the Balkan countries. Whatever reservations may have existed in the past on this subject have related only to concern over the welfare of the refugees once they are rescued.

It does not seem to me that the crux of this matter is the finding of suitable places of removal for these refugees as stated in your cable under reference but rather that the primary difficulty lies in their rescue from enemy-occupied territory. As important as it is, post-rescue treatment should be far simpler of solution. Actually there seem to be three main divisions of the problem: (1) rescue; (2) transportation, clothing and feeding; and (3) havens or places of refuge.

It appears to me that in the actual rescue of these unfortunates we leave very much to chance and to the individual efforts of the
efforts of the refugees themselves. Obviously under prevailing conditions in Yugoslavia only the hearty, halo and courageous are able to make physical efforts to run the great risk incidental to escape. It seems to me that only through military and/or paramilitary instrumentality can results of greater consequence by achieved. No schemes neglecting this basic fact can result in more than an odd refugee here and there being brought out.

The present rate of arrivals from Yugoslavia into Italy is considerably lower than the figure of 1800 weekly mentioned in your cable under reference. This average figure represents a period when considerable batches of refugees were successful in leaving through favorable circumstances. This figure has been decreased by present difficult circumstances in Yugoslavia. 3540 Yugoslavs were brought across the Adriatic to Italy according to Allied Control Commissions' recent statistics from May 1 to 31. Heathcote Smith informs me that during that month there were no Hungarian Jews brought out.

Fortunately, according to our information from that area, enemy authorities are generally so preoccupied with the pressure of military events that momentarily their attention is distracted from the racial question.

As you will also be aware, recent happenings which have affected Marshal Tito make it extremely doubtful that his cooperation will be very productive, temporarily at least.

APHQ has been active in a study of the problem of arranging maintenance and accommodation of refugees ex-Yugoslavia over and above the
above the total of 40,000 agreed for acceptance by Mid-east. This quota is temporarily reduced to 30,000 pending procurement of additional medical personnel, about which Ackermann is keeping you advised. Also it is studying the question of preparation on a larger scale to maintain and accommodate refugees from other European countries received in Italy and elsewhere in the Mediterranean theater during the next six to nine months. Also study has been given to the question of helping such refugees in Italy, removing them to North Africa, or possibly to such places as Cyprus, Sardinia or Sicily. (See your ME of June 3).

Personally I feel that the mainland at Italy can accommodate a larger number of refugees than it is now handling. Serious arguments, however, are advanced against holding ex-Yugoslav refugees on the Italian mainland because: (a) The supply problem concerned in their feeding and care might be dealt with more readily in North Africa; and (b) battle conditions require use of all facilities for military operations.

It is revealed from preliminary results of AFHQ study that camp equipment in Philippeville and Bone areas (Algeria) is of prime interest. Accommodation sites in Philippeville area are available for about 40,000 refugees, including some buildings suitable for hospital. Location of sites would allow organization of camps for 10,000 which I considered most economical size for administration. Certain construction work would be necessary, requiring at least six weeks' notice before first camp or accommodation of 10,000 could be ready.
There is a camp site in the Bone area with capacity of 10,000. This location is near Italian prisoner-of-war Yugoslovak military camps.

In the light of our negotiations with the French concerning the use of the camp site at Fedhala for refugees from Spain, it is anticipated that the French authorities may resist our efforts to employ other camp sites in French North Africa for temporary lodging and care of non-French European refugees. Therefore, it is believed best to treat this subject as a military matter, and accordingly it is proposed that the French Chief of Staff will be informed by the Chief of Staff Allied Force Headquarters that we propose to use whatever camp sites might be needed for this purpose. It might be desirable, after this has been done, for the American and British diplomatic representatives here to make a joint démarche on the subject. We believe that public opinion could be rallied in support of this question should the French prove intransigent on it.

Also it seems that blankets, stores and equipment on a summer basis are available for about 36,000 in French North Africa.

On the subject of personnel for administration of hospitals and camps, as a matter of urgency the Combined Chiefs-of-Staff have been asked to provide UNRRA medical and administrative personnel as military personnel is not available. AFHQ consider that acceptance of refugees in French North Africa is practicable only if UNRRA or other civilian personnel, especially medical, is
medical, is available. We would like to know if in this
connection you could supply any information concerning UNRRA
plans and possible practical support.

Concerning the feeding and care of these refugees, whether
in Italy or elsewhere, the question arises at what point UNRRA
will be able and willing to assume this responsibility.
Undoubtedly you do not consider that this function should be
performed over an indefinite period of time by either the
military authorities engaged in operations or the Allied
Control Commission in Italy.

CHAPIN
Facilities in southern Italy for caring for refugees who have escaped from enemy territory are becoming so over-crowded that it is essential to remove refugees rapidly to other areas. It is particularly important that this be done without delay so that the flow of refugees into southern Italy is not in any way discouraged or impeded. The following cable which has been sent to Robert Murphy in Algiers indicates more fully the nature of this problem and its importance:

"Our information indicates that refugees have been arriving from Yugoslavia to Italy at the average rate of over 1800 per week and that this flow is expected to continue and may well increase. It also appears that unless these refugees can be removed rapidly to other areas, the military authorities are fearful that the facilities in southern Italy for refugees may become seriously overtaxed.

The whole matter has been discussed with the President who has made it clear that under no circumstances should the escape of refugees to Italy from the Balkan countries be discouraged. The flow of refugees from Yugoslavia to Italy is important not only from the standpoint of saving the lives of Yugoslavs but also in order that as many refugees..."
refugees as possible from other Balkan countries may be able to escape through Yugoslavia. In this connection, Cable No. Yugos 102 from Cairo, dated April 23, indicates that support in rescuing Hungarian Jews has been promised by Tito. In view of the plight of Jews today in Hungary, it is essential that we do what we can to facilitate their escape.

We recognize that the crux of this matter is finding suitable places to which these refugees can be removed. In this connection, the following should be borne in mind:

1. As many as possible of these refugees should be moved to camps in the Middle East. UNRRA is making every effort to supply sufficient medical and other personnel.

2. In so far as Jewish refugees are concerned, present plans to move as many as possible to Palestine should be carried out without delay. In this connection it should be borne in mind that in the case of Turkey, the British have adopted the the policy that all Jews escaping into Turkey from the Balkan countries will be permitted to go to Palestine. These refugees are then placed in camps in Palestine, where they are checked for security purposes.

3. For some time we have been pressing the British to establish with our cooperation havens of refuge for these people in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, but without any results to
results to date.

(4) The President suggested the possibility that some of these refugees might be taken to Sicily. This should be carefully explored together with the possibility of a substantial expansion of facilities on the Italian mainland.

(5) While we do not consider it desirable to bring refugees from Italy to Camp Lys-tey at Fedhala since all of the accommodations of that camp must be kept available for refugees from Spain, the possibility of establishing other camps in French North Africa for refugees from Italy should, of course, be borne in mind.

Bearing in mind that the flow of refugees into Italy from the Balkan countries must not be interfered with, you are requested to submit as soon as possible your views and recommendations as to all possible havens of refuge in which these people might be temporarily placed.

Please convey the contents of this cable to representatives of UNRRA and Ackermann of the War Refugee Board, as well as to appropriate military authorities. You should discuss this whole matter with them and cooperate with them in solving this most urgent problem.

According to the best information available there are in southern Italy several thousand Jewish refugees. The prompt removal of these refugees to Palestine would constitute an important step in helping to solve the problem indicated. Accordingly, the Department and the War Refugee Board would like to know at the earliest possible
earliest possible moment whether the British Government will grant
Palestine certificates to these Jewish refugees and will facilitate
their prompt removal to Palestine.

In taking up this matter with the British Government you
should bear in mind the following:

Since the closing of the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier in
May 1943, the British Government has been following the policy
of authorizing, after a preliminary security check in Turkey,
the onward transport to Palestine of all Jews who succeed in
escaping to Turkey from enemy territory. Once in Palestine
the British place these people in camps where another security
check is made, and if found satisfactory, they are gradually
released as legal immigrants to Palestine against the current
half-yearly immigration quota. It is apparent that the
application of a similar policy in the case of Jews now in
southern Italy would make possible the prompt removal of such
refugees to Palestine.

Please advise us urgently of the attitude of the British
Government in this matter.

This message has been repeated to Murphy, Chapin and Ackermann
in Algiers.

STETTINIUS
(Acting)
Facilities in southern Italy for caring for refugees who have escaped from enemy territory are becoming so over-crowded that it is essential to remove refugees rapidly to other areas. It is particularly important that this be done without delay so that the flow of refugees into southern Italy is not (repeat not) in any way discouraged or impeded. The following cable which has been sent to Robert Murphy in Algiers indicates more fully the nature of this problem and its importance:

CABLE. Our information indicates that refugees have been arriving from Yugoslavia to Italy at the average rate of over 1600 per week and that this flow is expected to continue and may well increase. It also appears that unless these refugees can be removed rapidly to other areas, the military authorities are fearful that the facilities in southern Italy for refugees may become seriously overtaxed.

The whole matter has been discussed with the President who has made it clear that under no circumstances should the escape of refugees to Italy from the Balkan countries be discouraged. The flow of refugees from Yugoslavia to Italy is important not only from the standpoint of saving the lives of Yugoslavs but also in order that as many refugees as possible from other Balkan countries may be able to escape through Yugoslavia. In this connection, Cable No. Pages 102 from Cairo, dated April 29, indicates that support in rescuing Hungarian Jews has been promised by Vito. In view of the plight of Jews today in Hungary, it is essential that we do what we can to facilitate their escape.

We recognize that the crux of this matter is finding suitable places to which these refugees can be removed. In this connection, the following should be borne in mind:

1. As many as possible of these refugees should be moved to camps in the Middle East. UNRRA is making every effort to supply sufficient medical and other personnel.

2. In so far as Jewish refugees are concerned, present plans to move as many as possible to Palestine should be carried out without delay. In this connection it should be borne in mind that in the case of Turkey, the British have adopted the policy that all Jews escaping into Turkey from the Balkan countries will be permitted to go to Palestine. These refugees are then placed in camps in Palestine where they are checked for security purposes.

3. For some time we have been pressing the British to establish
with our cooperation havens of refuge for those people in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, but without any results to date.

(4) The President suggested the possibility that some of these refugees might be taken to Sicily. This should be carefully explored together with the possibility of a substantial expansion of facilities on the Italian mainland.

(5) While we do not (repeat not) consider it desirable to bring refugees from Italy to Camp Antony at Pedales since all of the accommodations of that camp must be kept available for refugees from Spain, the possibility of establishing other camps in French North Africa for refugees from Italy should, of course, be borne in mind.

Bearing in mind that the flow of refugees into Italy from the Balkan countries must not be interfered with, you are requested to submit as soon as possible your views and recommendations as to all possible havens of refuge in which these people might be temporarily placed.

Please convey the contents of this cable to representatives of UNRRA and Ackerman of the War Refugee Board, as well as the appropriate military authorities. You should discuss this whole matter with them and cooperate with them in solving this most urgent problem. UNRRA.

According to the best information available there are in southern Italy several thousand Jewish refugees. The prompt removal of these refugees to Palestine would constitute an important step in helping to solve the problem indicated. Accordingly, the Department and the War Refugee Board would like to know at the earliest possible moment whether the British Government will grant Palestine certificates to these Jewish refugees and will facilitate their prompt removal to Palestine.

In taking up this matter with the British Government you should bear in mind the following:

Since the closing of the Bulgarian-Syrian frontier in May 1943, the British Government has been following the policy of authorizing, after a preliminary security check in Turkey, the onward transport to Palestine of all Jews who succeeded in escaping to Syria from enemy territory. Once in Palestine the British place those people in camps where another security check is made, and if found satisfactory, they are gradually released as legal immigrants to Palestine against the current half-yearly immigration quota. It is apparent that the application of a similar policy in the case of Jews now in southern Italy would make possible the prompt removal of such refugees to Palestine.

Please advise us urgently of the attitude of the British Government in this matter.

This message has been repeated to Murphy, Chapin and Ackerman in Algiers.

JEF 5/30/44
TO:       OASIS, Algiers
DATE:    May 27, 1944
NUMBER:  69

FOR ROBERT MURPHY'S ATTENTION, ALGIERS

Our information indicates that refugees have been arriving from
Yugoslavia to Italy at the average rate of over 1500 per week and that
this flow is expected to continue and may well increase. It also appears
that unless these refugees can be removed rapidly to other areas, the
military authorities are fearful that the facilities in southern Italy
for refugees may become seriously overtaxed.

The whole matter has been discussed with the President who has
made it clear that under no circumstances should the escape of refugees
to Italy from the Balkan countries be discouraged. The flow of refugees
from Yugoslavia to Italy is important not only from the standpoint of
saving the lives of Yugoslavs but also in order that as many refugees
as possible from other Balkan countries may be able to escape through
Yugoslavia. In this connection, Cable No. Yugoslav 1153 from Cairo, dated
April 30, indicate that support in rescuing Hungarian Jews has been
promised by Nazi. In view of the plight of Jews today in Hungary, it
is essential that we do what we can to facilitate their escape.

We recognize that the crux of this matter is finding suitable places
to which these refugees can be removed. In this connection, the following
should be borne in mind:

(1) As many as possible of these refugees should be moved to
camps in the Middle East. OASIS is making every effort to supply
sufficient medical and other personnel.

(2) To so far as Jewish refugees are concerned, present plans
to move as many as possible to Palestine should be carried out without
delay. In this connection it should be borne in mind that in the case of
Turkey, the British have adopted the policy that all Jews escaping
into Turkey from the Balkan countries will be permitted to go to
Palestine. These refugees are then placed in camps in Palestine where they
are checked for security purposes.

(3) For some/

Sd, Mr. Abrahamson, Mr. Akin, Mr. Bernstein, Miss Chevone (for the Sec'y,
Mrs. Cohen, Mr. Ochoa, Mr. Friedman, Mr. Doak, Mrs. Kelly, Mrs. Kallon,
Miss Laughlin, Mr. Lesser, Mr. Burk, Mr. Akin, Mrs. Manon,
Kean, Marks, McCormack, Murphy, Paul, Polis, Paul, Bargy, Smith,
Stallard, Stewart, Weinstein, H. D. White
(3) For some time we have been pressing the British to establish with our cooperation havens of refuge for these people in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, but without any results to date.

(4) The President suggested the possibility that some of these refugees might be taken to Sicily. This should be carefully explored together with the possibility of a substantial expansion of facilities on the Italian mainland.

(5) While we do not consider it desirable to bring refugees from Italy to Camp Lyantey at Fedhala since all of the accommodations of that camp must be kept available for refugees from Spain, the possibility of establishing other camps in French North Africa for refugees from Italy should, of course, be borne in mind.

Bearing in mind that the flow of refugees into Italy from the Balkan countries must not be interfered with, you are requested to submit as soon as possible your views and recommendations as to all possible havens of refuge in which these people might be temporarily placed.

Please convey the contents of this cable to representatives of UNRRA and Ackerman of the War Refugees Board, as well as the appropriate military authorities. You should discuss this whole matter with them and cooperate with them in solving this most urgent problem.

Forgoing repeated to Cairo for MacVeagh with the opening sentence: "For your information the following has been sent to Murphy" and repeated to Naples for Kerk as No. 118.

BILL
Secretary of State,
Washington.

US URGENT
1727, May 25, 4 p.m.

FROM MURPHY FOR WAR REFUGEE BOARD FROM ACKERMANN

NO. 21.

Continued evacuation of Yugoslav refugees to
Italy depends on their continued removal to Middle
East or other areas. Middle East recently agreed
accept additional 14,500 but now reports that acceptance
was on condition that UNRRA would supply additional
medical personnel. Such additional help not provided
and efforts to secure assistance locally not suffi-
ciently productive. Since this will impede refugee
flow recommended you investigate and urge UNRRA to
secure needed personnel immediately. Refer my cable
No. 17 of May 3. Also suggest you ask War Department
for copy of my 201 of May 24 referring to request to
UNRRA for assistance in staffing refugee camps French
North Africa and Italy.
PARAPHRASE OF TELEGRAM RECEIVED

FROM: American Mission, Algiers
TO: Secretary of State, Washington
DATED: May 5, 1944
NUMBER: 1460

FROM ACKERMAN FOR ATTENTION OF WRB.

No. 17.

In connection with the rescue of Hungarian refugees, MacVeagh in Cairo reports that information has been received from the British Embassy indicating that Marshal Tito has promised support. Tito will assist them to join his forces or to be evacuated when possible.

The help that Tito can furnish partly depends upon the assistance given him is my opinion.

In order to get more information on shipping and related problems I will leave for Italy on the advice of Kalloch as soon as arrangements are completed. While there will also follow up Tito proposal.

Since reception facilities in Italy are again becoming overtaxed the Army here is issuing a directive prohibiting temporarily the transport by Allied vessels of Yugoslav refugees. The directive will slow up the refugee flow, but it will not be stopped. Arrangement of additional evacuation areas in France or British North Africa will depend on whether the Army restriction will be relaxed.

DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27 1972
relaxed. An immediate effort will be made to arrange such additional areas.

CHAPIN
The Following Pages Are the Best Available
DECLASSIFIED
STATE DEPARTMENT LETTER
OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

RE: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THE
STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
BUDDHIST CONGRESS IN AFGHANISTAN

DATE: APRIL 25, 1944

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THE
STATUS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
BUDDHIST CONGRESS IN AFGHANISTAN

Dear Mr. Parks,

I am writing to request information regarding the status of the negotiations between the United States and the Buddhist Congress in Afghanistan. As you are aware, negotiations have been ongoing for several months, and I am eager to know the current status of these discussions.

I have been informed that the Afghan government has expressed a willingness to engage in talks aimed at resolving the ongoing conflict. However, I understand that there are still several outstanding issues that need to be addressed before a final agreement can be reached.

I would be grateful for any information you can provide regarding the progress of these negotiations. Please let me know if there is anything else I can do to assist in this matter.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

[Name]

[Title]

STATE DEPARTMENT LETTER

DECLASSIFIED

By R. H. Parks Date

S. PARKS

[Signature]

[Name]

[Title]
Staff, fan (fan) 347, being forwarded Marshall, etc. for his views. AMFA (AMFA) has been designated as agency to handle financial matters. AMFA representatives inquire as to method of reimbursement, also raise question as to whom cost of caring for refugees will be charged once they arrive in Italy. Cost of care for some earlier Yugoslav refugees charged to Italian Government on basis that they come either from Italian concentration camps or were refugees as a result of Axis oppression.

CHAPIN

WBH

ociated Chauncey (For the Sea'y), Abrahamsen, Akzin, Bernstein, Cohn, DuBois, Friedman, Gaston, Hodel, Laughlin, Lesser, Lucford, Mann, McCormack, Paul, Pollak, Rains, Sargent, Smith, Stendahl, Stewart, H. D. White, Pohle, Files
The following message, number 4, is from Ackermann for the War Refugee Board.

Section 1. With reference to a cable from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, FAN 347 dated March 10, 1944, a captain on the staff of General Caffey G-3 yesterday called at the office of Robert Murphy. My letter dated March 7 concerning the movement of refugees to Italy from Yugoslavia referred to this same matter. I strongly urged, when my opinion was requested, that only military necessity should interfere with the program, explaining the underlying reasons for the Board's establishment.

Section 2. Since I have not heard whether you have a representative in Italy and only North Africa was mentioned in your cable dated February 26, I have hesitated to inject myself too strongly into the Yugoslav situation. A military government officer with whom I have had discussions pointed out this latter fact to me. Since Italy is an important region I suggest that a representative be appointed there and that I be given certain directives with reference thereto so that AFHQ and I can work together. Also, since the job requires people both in Italy and

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CHAPIN
DECLASSIFIED
State Dept. Letter, 1-11-72
By R. H. Parks Date SEP 27, 1972
July 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES:

Re: Conference in McCloy's office, July 29, 1944, concerning UNRRA's participation in management of refugee camp at Philippeville.

Present for the War Department:
Assistant Secretary McCloy
Major General Hilldring
Major Gray

For UNRRA:
Governor Lehman
Messrs. Fryer, Jackson and Crabtree

For the British:
Mr. Russell
Col. McGovern
Major Garner

For War Refugee Board:
Mr. Friedman

General Hilldring opened the meeting by stating that General Wilson is apparently insisting that UNRRA take complete charge of the camp by October 1. Hilldring stated that UNRRA in its most recent letter had not committed itself to this request of General Wilson's and that the purpose of the meeting was to resolve this point.

Governor Lehman then stated UNRRA's great interest in doing all it can to comply with the Army's request, but indicated that in view of the difficulties of recruiting personnel he simply could not guarantee to take charge of the camp by October 1. The principal problem which Governor Lehman outlined was the difficulty of obtaining doctors and nurses for the camp. (As I understand it, the number of doctors required is twelve, and nurses twenty.) Governor Lehman said UNRRA would do its best to meet the October 1 deadline but, in view of the difficulties of recruiting and processing, he doubted whether they could do it.

General Hilldring then stated unequivocally that General Wilson had to be out of Africa by October 1.

Mr. McCloy asked what alternative there was if neither Army nor UNRRA could handle the matter, and suggested that perhaps the only thing that could be done in such circumstances would be to tell the War Refugee Board and the State Department that the flow of refugees from Yugoslavia had to be stopped. Governor Lehman interjected to ask what the interest of the War Refugee Board was in the matter. I then explained that both the War Refugee Board and the President were interested in seeing that nothing was done to impede the flow of

00072
McCloy stated that if the situation were such that neither UNRRA nor the Army could take the responsibility for the camp, the President could only insist on the Army's furnishing the necessary medical personnel at the cost of depriving military personnel of necessary medical care. I stated that obviously the President would not take any such step, but he would be interested in knowing why the organizations in charge of the care of displaced persons could not handle the problem.

The discussion again turned to the question of procuring medical personnel with Mr. Jackson indicating the difficulties involved. I interjected the comment that I understood that the services of refugee doctors now in the United States had been offered during the last week to UNRRA, and that I felt sure that this reservoir could be tapped to obtain the limited number of doctors required by the project in question. Crabtree said he had canvassed this matter with the representatives of the refugee doctors' committee and had concluded that at best only ten doctors could be obtained because of many security and other regulations imposed by the State Department and the Army. Crabtree then went on to describe the long process involved in processing doctors even if any could be found.

Subsequent to his discussion on this point I asked Governor Lehman whether my impression was correct that no effort had actually been made to recruit doctors for the Philippeville camp. The Governor stated that this was the case and that no effort had been made to recruit doctors for the project in question because UNRRA has been waiting to receive from the Army an answer to their letter about general camp responsibilities. He indicated that UNRRA could not recruit medical personnel unless they had a specific project. The Governor said that they would be glad to try to recruit these doctors and nurses at once if the Army would tell them that it wanted them to recruit the doctors. General Hilldring immediately stated that he thought this was understood, but that if he had to sign any documents or say anything else to make it clear he thereby requested UNRRA to recruit the doctors in question. This seemed to be generally understood by the UNRRA people present, but they said that they would need help in getting priorities and in getting State Department's approval for travel. The Army hastened to assure UNRRA that if the doctors and nurses were obtained the Army would arrange transportation. McCloy added that such obstacles as State Department regulations could certainly be overcome after discussions with State Department officials. It was agreed that UNRRA would now commence to recruit doctors and nurses.

Mr. Jackson also raised the question of whether the Army would manage the transit camps which apparently will be necessary since the port at Philippeville is not open to refugees. Hilldring said it was his understanding that the Army could not handle these matters since they are leaving Africa, and indicated that this was UNRRA's responsibility. Jackson stated UNRRA could not assume such a responsibility. It was agreed to request further information from General Wilson.
UNRRA also raised the question as to whether the Army would handle the supply problem at least until January 1. General Hilldring stated he thought this had been made clear but hastened to repeat his assurance that the Army would handle the supply problem.

At the conclusion, Mr. Jackson stated that perhaps the War Refugee Board, which seemed to have some interest in the matter, could do some of the work. I stated that while the War Refugee Board had neither the obligation nor organization to run a camp we would be glad to be of any help to UNRRA. Mr. McCloy indicated to Governor Lehman he felt sure that the War Refugee Board was ingenious and inventive enough to be of some help to UNRRA. One of the UNRRA people then asked me if we could help them on the matter of clearing doctors through the State Department, and I stated we would be glad to be of all possible assistance on this problem.

The main thing to be deduced from this third or fourth in a series of long discussions is that Army has made the mistake of arguing with UNRRA about assuming full responsibility by October 1, instead of pushing them to recruit doctors and other personnel as fast as they can. As a result nothing has been done by UNRRA up to now to get ready for its job. It seems to me that the practical approach for the Army is to stop talking about responsibility by October 1 and push UNRRA hard to see that they are actually getting as many doctors, nurses, and other personnel as they can. After the meeting I indicated this to Major Gray who agreed and stated they would proceed on that basis.

-3-
July 29, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

Re: Conference in McCloy's office, July 29, 1944, concerning UNRRA's participation in management of refugee camp at Philippeville.

Present for the War Department:
Assistant Secretary McCloy
Major General Hilldring
Major Gray

For UNRRA:
Governor Lehman
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For the British:
Mr. Russell
Col. McGowell
Major Garner

For War Refugee Board:
Mr. Friedman

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Governor Lehman then stated UNRRA's great interest in doing all it can to comply with the Army's request, but indicated that in view of the difficulties of recruiting personnel it simply could not guarantee to take charge of the camp by October 1. The principal problem which Governor Lehman outlined was the difficulty of obtaining doctors and nurses for the camp. (As I understand it, the number of doctors required is twelve, and nurses twenty.) Governor Lehman said UNRRA would do its best to meet the October 1 deadline but, in view of the difficulties of recruiting and processing, he doubted whether they could do it.

General Hilldring then stated unequivocally that General Wilson had to be out of Africa by October 1.

Mr. McCloy asked what alternative there was if neither Army nor UNRRA could handle the matter, and suggested that perhaps the only thing that could be done in such circumstances would be to tell the War Refugee Board and the State Department that the flow of refugees from Yugoslavia had to be stopped. Governor Lehman interjected to ask what the interest of the War Refugee Board was in the matter. I then explained that both the War Refugee Board and the President were interested in seeing that nothing was done to impede the flow of
Yugoslavian refugees. McCloy stated that if the situation were such that neither UNRRA nor the Army could take the responsibility for the camp, the President could only insist on the Army's furnishing the necessary medical personnel at the cost of depriving military personnel of necessary medical care. I stated that obviously the President would not take any such step, but he would be interested in knowing why the organizations in charge of the care of displaced persons could not handle the problem.

The discussion again turned to the question of procuring medical personnel with Mr. Jackson indicating the difficulties involved. I interjected the comment that I understood that the services of refugee doctors now in the United States had been offered during the last week to UNRRA, and that I felt sure that this reservoir could be tapped to obtain the necessary number of doctors required by the project in question. Crabtree said he had canvassed this matter with the representatives of the refugee doctors' committee and had concluded that at best only ten doctors could be obtained because of many security and other regulations imposed by the State Department and the Army. Crabtree then went on to describe the long process involved in processing doctors even if any could be found.

Subsequent to his discussion on this point I asked Governor Lehman whether my impression was correct that no effort had actually been made to recruit doctors for the Philippeville camp. The Governor stated that this was the case and that no effort had been made to recruit doctors for the project in question because UNRRA has been waiting to receive from the Army an answer to their letter about general camp responsibilities. He indicated that UNRRA could not recruit medical personnel unless they had a specific project. The Governor said that they would be glad to try to recruit these doctors and nurses at once if the Army would tell them that it wanted them to recruit the doctors. General Hildring immediately stated that he thought this was understood, but that if he had to sign any documents or say anything else to make it clear he thereby requested UNRRA to recruit the doctors in question. It seemed to be generally understood by the UNRRA people present, but they said that they would need help in getting priorities and in getting State Department's approval for travel. The Army hastened to assure UNRRA that if the doctors and nurses were obtained the Army would arrange transportation. McCloy added that such obstacles as State Department regulations could certainly be overcome after discussions with State Department officials. It was agreed that UNRRA would now commence to recruit doctors and nurses.

Mr. Jackson also raised the question of whether the Army would manage the transit camps which apparently will be necessary since the port at Philippeville is not open to refugees. Hildring said it was his understanding that the Army could not handle it since they are leaving Africa, and indicated that this was UNRRA's responsibility. Jackson stated that UNRRA could not assume such a responsibility. It was agreed to request further information from General Wilson.
UNRRA also raised the question as to whether the Army would handle the supply problem at least until January 1. General Hilldring stated he thought this had been made clear but hastened to repeat his assurance that the Army would handle the supply problem.

At the conclusion, Mr. Jackson stated that perhaps the War Refugee Board, which seemed to have some interest in the matter, could do some of the work. I stated that while the War Refugee Board had neither the obligation nor organization to run a camp we would be glad to be of any help to UNRRA. Mr. McCloy indicated to Governor Lehman he felt sure that the War Refugee Board was ingenious and inventive enough to be of some help to UNRRA. One of the UNRRA people then asked me if we could help them on the matter of clearing doctors through the State Department, and I stated we would be glad to be of all possible assistance on this problem.

The main thing to be deduced from this third or fourth in a series of long discussions is that Army has made the mistake of arguing with UNRRA about assuming full responsibility by October 1, instead of pushing them to recruit doctors and other personnel as fast as they can. As a result nothing has been done by UNRRA up to now to get ready for its job. It seems to me that the practical approach for the Army is to stop talking about responsibility by October 1 and push UNRRA hard to see that they are actually getting as many doctors, nurses, and other personnel as they can. After the meeting I indicated this to Major Gray who agreed and stated they would proceed on that basis.

J B. Friedman

JBFriedman:1hh 7/29/44
In Cable No. 1669, dated May 27, 1944, the War Refugee Board advised Ambassador Murphy that according to information at hand refugees had been arriving from Yugoslavia into Italy at the average rate of over 1,200 per week, and that this flow was not only expected to continue but might well increase. After referring to the apparent fear of the military authorities that facilities for refugees in Southern Italy would be seriously overtaxed by this influx, the Board stated in its cable that the entire matter had been discussed with the President, who had made it clear that under no circumstances should the escape of refugees to Italy from the Balkan countries be discouraged. Concluding that the finding of suitable havens to which the refugees could be moved was the crux of the situation, the Board requested Ambassador Murphy to submit as soon as possible his views and recommendations concerning possible havens of refuge in which refugees from the Balkans might temporarily be placed.

On June 12, the War Refugee Board received Cable No. 1937, dated June 10, from Ambassador Murphy, in which the Ambassador stated:

"I should like to make it quite clear that there has been no intention on the part of ARH to discourage escape of refugees from the Balkan countries. Whatever reservations may have existed in the past on this subject have related only to concern over the welfare of the refugees once they are rescued.

"It does not seem to me that the crux of this matter is the finding of suitable places of removal for these refugees as stated in your cable under reference WAR Cable No. 1669, dated May 27, 1944, but rather that the primary difficulty lies in their escape from enemy-occupied territory. As important as it is, post-rescue treatment should be far simpler of solution. Actually there seem to be three main divisions of the problem: (1) rescue work; (2) transportation, clothing and feeding; and (3) havens or places of refuge.

"It appears to me that in the actual rescue of these unfortunate we leave very much to chance and to the individual efforts of the refugees themselves. *** It seems to me that only through military and/or paramilitary instrumentality can results of greater consequence be achieved. No schemes neglecting this basic fact can result in more than an odd refugee here and there being brought out. The present rate of arrivals from Yugoslavia into Italy is considerably lower than the figure of 1,200 weekly mentioned in your cable under reference. This average figure reports a period when considerable batches of refugees were successful in leaving through favorable circumstances. This figure has been decreased by present difficult circumstances in Yugoslavia. 3,540 Yugoslavs were brought across the Adriatic to Italy"
according to Allied Control Commission's recent statistics from May 1 to 31.

Ambassador Murphy states further in this cable that the mainland of Italy can accommodate a larger number of refugees than it is presently accommodating, although he admits that there are weighty arguments against this view, particularly the supply problem and the necessity under present 'battle conditions that all facilities be used for military operations.

In his message to Congress on June 17, the President referred to the substantial movement of refugees into Italy before and since the Allied landing in that country, which served to swell the stream. In his message, the President made the following statement:

"** in view of the military situation in Italy, the number of refugees who can be accommodated there is relatively limited. The Allied military forces, in view of their primary responsibility, have not been able generally speaking to surmount the escape of refugees from enemy territory. * * *

"Recently the facilities for the care of refugees in Southern Italy have become so overtaxed that unless many refugees who have already escaped to that area and are arriving daily, particularly from the Balkan countries, can be promptly removed to havens of refuge elsewhere, the escape of refugees to that area from German-occupied territory will be seriously impeded. It was apparent that prompt action was necessary to meet this situation. Many of the refugees in Southern Italy have been and are being moved to temporary refuges in the territory of other United and friendly nations. However, in view of the number of refugees still in Southern Italy, the problem could not be solved unless temporary havens of refuge were found for some of them in still other areas. * * "

In view of the fact that the statements made in the President's message to Congress were based in large part on information furnished to the President by the War Refugee Board, and in view further that these facts as presented by the President are at variance with the statements made in Ambassador Murphy's telegram referred to above, it would appear desirable to set forth the material upon which the War Refugee Board's information was based.

Intention of Allied Military Authorities and Ambassador Murphy to Discourage the Escape of Refugees into Italy from the Balkan Countries Until Havens of Refuge Could be Found Elsewhere.

On May 8, 1944, the War Refugee Board received a cable from its representative in Algiers, Mr. Leonard Ackermann, (No. 1450, dated May 3, 1944) indicating that because reception facilities in Italy were becoming overtaxed, the Army in Algiers was issuing a directive prohibiting temporarily the transportation of Yugoslav refugees to Italy on Allied vessels. Mr. Ackermann stated in his cable
that this directive would slow the flow of refugees into Italy, although it
would not be stopped. In this cable and in a subsequent letter to the Executive
Director of the War Refugee Board, dated May 11, 1944, Mr. Ackermann emphasized
the unfortunate consequences which such a directive would have, particularly in
view of Marshal Tito's promise made just a short time before to assist the rescue
of Hungarian refugees through Yugoslavia.

Mr. Ackermann's letter of May 11 points in detail the background behind
this directive. Without prior knowledge, a cable had apparently been prepared
in the Military Government Section of AFRQ directing the restricting of the
movement of refugees into Italy. This action was taken as a result of the
receipt of a cable from the officer in charge of the Displaced Persons Sub-
Commission at Paris, raising a number of problems caused by the influx of refugees
into Italy from Yugoslavia. Copies of a memorandum prepared by Colonel Charles W.
Soford outlining the problem set forth in the cable from Paris had been trans-
mitted to Ambassadors McMillan and Murphy. In a reply memorandum British
Ambassador McMillan apparently agreed with the view of AFRQ, Military Government
Section, that new evacuation areas had to be found, that the Middle East refugee
quota should be increased, and that no encouragement should be given to the
evacuation of refugees from Yugoslavia. Ambassador Murphy's reply to Colonel
Soford's memorandum went much further. In his memorandum, dated April 29, 1944,
to the Military Government Section, AFRQ, Ambassador Murphy stated as follows:

*** I have seen Mr. McMillan's comments with which I agree
in general, but I feel that not only should we not encourage the
Partisans to send further refugees out of Yugoslavia, we should in fact
take positive action to discourage them in this regard. It appears to
be clear that whatever our policy may be, a large number of refugees
will succeed in making their way across the Adriatic to Italy and we
shall, of course, have to do our best to take care of them. At the
same time the potential proportions of this immigration are such that
we cannot accept formal responsibility for their care. ***

"In view of the foregoing, it is believed that all Allied
personnel in contact with the Partisans should be instructed to dis-
courage the evacuation of refugees from that area. Allied personnel
operating landing craft used to carry provisions across the Adriatic
should be instructed not to provide transportation to Yugoslav refugees
when returning to Italy except in such cases where it is impossible to
refuse to do so." (Underlining supplied).

On May 5, 1944, Ackermann, the Algiers representative of the War Refugee Board,
prepared a memorandum for Ambassador Murphy indicating not only that the issuance
of a directive restricting the movement of refugees into Italy would be extremely
unfortunate in its consequences, particularly in view of Marshal Tito's recent
agreement to aid in the evacuation of Hungarian refugees through Yugoslavia, but
also that the issuance of such a directive would be inconsistent with the President's
policy as expressed in Executive Order No. 9417 and in his statement of March 24,
1914. Although Mr. Ackermann was unaware of this at the time he prepared his memorandum, the AFRQ, Military Government Section, directive recommended by Ambassador Murphy had already been issued. When Mr. Ackermann conferred with Ambassador Murphy five days later or May 10, the latter advised Ackermann that the order restricting the movement of refugees from Yugoslavia into Italy would be modified.

The accuracy of Ackermann's account of the Yugoslav refugee situation was subsequently confirmed by the Assistant Secretary of War. On May 26, 1944, Mr. McCloy telephoned the General Counsel of the War Refugee Board, Mr. Josiah DuBois, and described the refugee situation in Italy as fast becoming critical because the constant influx of refugees into Italy at a large rate was taxing the facilities of the military authorities there. Mr. McCloy added that something would have to be done to stop the flow of refugees at least temporarily, as the rate at which they were now escaping was putting a burden on General Wilson.

Ambassador Murphy's Statement that the Rate of Arrivals of Yugoslav Refugees into Italy from Yugoslavia is Considerably Less than 1800 Weekly.

Furthermore, Ambassador Murphy's view is apparently also at variance with that of the War Department. In his telephone conversation with Mr. McCloy on May 26, Mr. DuBois stated to the Assistant Secretary of War that it was his understanding that the difficulty in the Yugoslav situation was not one of transportation, but rather of finding havens to which the refugees could be taken. Mr. McCloy replied that this was his understanding; that there was ample shipping and that the problem was finding places to put the refugees.

The War Refugee Board's statement in its cablegram to Ambassador Murphy of May 27 concerning the number of refugees arriving in Italy from Yugoslavia was based on the following:

(a) A War Department cable, dated May 24, 1944, from Algiers reading in part as follows:

"An average of 1,250 Yugoslav refugees per week have been arriving in Italy for the past 6 weeks. This rate of inflow is
expected to continue, with a majority of women and children."

(b) A statement in Colonel Scofford's memorandum referred to above that as of April 24, 1944, arrivals during the preceding 6 weeks had averaged around 1,250 per week.

My Mark
My Mark

* It should be noted that the information in this War Department cable is wholly inconsistent with Ambassador Murphy's statement in his cable that "under prevailing conditions in Yugoslavia only the hearty, hale and courageous are able to make physical effort and run the great risk incidental to escape."
A critically urgent situation has developed in Italy as a result of a large and constant influx of refugees from Yugoslavia. The Army reports that facilities there are inadequate to take care of more than a very small proportion of these refugees.

Unless havens outside of Italy are found immediately, one of two alternatives is inevitable: the burden of caring for refugees in Italy will seriously hamper military operations there; or, what is far more likely, and what is temporarily occurring and threatens to continue in the future, the flow of refugees to allied Italy will be severely curtailed by the military. The latter alternative means the sacrifice of thousands of innocent lives.

Aware of this, the President has made it clear that under no circumstances should the escape of refugees from the Balkans to Italy be discouraged. Therefore, it is of the utmost urgency that existing facilities for the care of refugees outside of Italy be expanded at once and additional havens be established.

The Army reports that Italy's capacity to provide for refugees is limited to 10,000. If the average rate of influx of 1,450 weekly for the first six months of this year continues, as appears likely, this capacity will rapidly become exhausted. Accordingly, the Army, Ambassador Murphy, the War Refugee Board representative in the Mediterranean area and others all agree that emergency measures must be taken immediately. The Army has submitted the following proposals for immediate action:

1. Within four weeks medical/personnel sufficient to care for an additional 10,000 refugees must be furnished to the MRRA camps. It is understood that it is only the lack of such medical personnel which prevents these camps from being expanded from their present 30,000 limit to the 40,000 quota agreed upon between MRRA, UNRRA and the Army. The military states that it is impossible for the Army to furnish the necessary medical personnel. If the MRRA camp facilities are expanded to provide for the 40,000 quota, this will enable the Army to receive in Italy on a transit basis 10,000 additional refugees.
2. To take care of a still further influx of refugees, the Army is now preparing in the Philippeville area of Algeria, a camp for 10,000 refugees containing a 300 bed hospital. The Army has indicated its willingness to administer this camp until the end of September, at which time it is hoped that UNRRA will take over the administration. It is understood that the Army will agree to furnish, against reimbursement, basic stores and supplies until such time as UNRRA is able to obtain such items from other sources.

If UNRRA agrees to administer the Philippeville camp, it will be necessary for UNRRA to send to French North Africa at once an organizing executive and personnel nucleus, to be followed in eight weeks by the remainder of the staff. The requirements for an administrative staff for the Philippeville camp are set forth by the Army in a cable dated June 14, 1944, a copy of which is attached hereto.

If UNRRA agrees to carry out the above action within the time limits indicated, the Army states that it will be able to receive 2,000 refugees weekly in Italy for months. In view of the urgency of the above situation, I would very much appreciate your prompt decision on this matter.
From: Algiers
To: War Department
No.: P-5225
Date: 15 June 1944

Participation UNRRA in refugee problems Franco-North African is
subject. Present situation outlined by following factors:

1. 36,500 tragedy refugees held in Middle East on 3 June.
   Immediate Middle East accept over 60,000, until USAA medical
   personnel received not more than 39,000 of these can be accepted.

2. Up to 10,000 can be held in Italy on transit basis. On 3 June
   evacuation greater part 3,303 in Italy will complete present quota
   of 10,000 in Middle East, enabling further 10,000 on transit basis to be
   brought into Italy.

3. Accumulation in Italy up to total 10,000 to be evacuated when
   UNRRA medical personnel arrive Middle East and then to full extent
   transit facilities can be utilized.

4. By now Italian facilities under par. 3 exhausted probably end
   July, it is intended that "FHA Camp" with initial capacity 10,000
   and hospital of 600 beds will be opened with later expansion if needed
   to 1,250 bed hospital and capacity 40,000.

5. Therefore it will be seen that problem is one of timing
   dependent on provision for Middle East of UNRRA medical personnel
   from year end and our ability with or without UNRRA assistance to open FHA
   camps. From now on estimate maximum 2,000 refugees can be accepted
   weekly for months (1,400 weekly average to 3 June), provided:

   (a) UNRRA medical personnel as indicated in our cable
   29566-2, dated 5/25, for Middle East are provided within 4
   weeks;

   (b) UNRRA medical personnel as indicated in par. 5 here-
   after are provided for FHA within 6 weeks;

Military exigencies might compel restriction of free flow
should UNRRA assistance not be forthcoming in accordance with this
program.

DECLASSIFIED
955 Letter, 6-20-72
SEP 27 1972
6. Now being prepared from military and other local resources is accommodation in FGA, Phillipville area for 10,000 with 100 bed hospital. After end of September military responsibility cannot be contemplated. UNHRA should be fully responsible from that time. Recommend UNHRA personnel males with an organizing executive be sent forward earliest with remainder in 6 weeks allowing time to take over from Army. to basic camp for 10,000 refugees with 60 bed hospital estimated personnel requirements:

(a) 6 for controlled headquarters;

(b) 10 administrative for camp; medical - one nurse,
   2 doctors, 2 dispensers;

(c) 10 doctors for hospital, including 1 anaesthetist,
   1 gynaecologist, 2 surgeons, Nursing staff in proportions
   2 females to 1 male = 30 administrative personnel = 20.

(d) requirements in our cable 3062-V, dated 3/20, amended
   by foregoing details.

7. Any providing necessary equipment for project including
   hospital, will be a listed separately as to detailed equipment UNHRA
   required be furnish with suggestions relative disposal to UNHRA or
   military property.

8. To a month position to be reviewed, then it may be necessary that
   separate camps be established in Italy or as envisaged in our cable 5062-V,
   dated 3/24, the project be expanded to 40,000 capacity. As suggested in
   4658, dated 3/29, presence in Algiers with aim of making representative
   would ensure UNHRA information of requirements in advance and greatly
   facilitate planning.
Memorandum for Mr. Stettinius

I was somewhat surprised by certain statements in Ambassador Murphy's cable No. 1937, dated June 10, to the effect that AFRQ had no intention of discouraging the escape of refugees from the Balkan countries, and minimizing the problem of finding additional havens of refuge for the refugees.

Our information indicates that because of insufficient refugee facilities in Italy and elsewhere for the reception of refugees from Yugoslavia, AFRQ issued on May 5, pursuant to a memorandum of April 29 from Ambassador Murphy, an order discouraging the evacuation of refugees from Yugoslavia to Italy.

Attached is a copy of Ambassador Murphy's memorandum of April 29 recommending that AFRQ take this action. This memorandum speaks for itself.

I would appreciate having the attached cable, in reply to Ambassador Murphy's cable of June 10, dispatched as soon as possible.

Att.

(Signed J. W. Pehle)

JED:ijej 6/17/44
April 29, 1944

To: Military Government Section

S/1Jet: Evacuation of Refugees from Yugoslavia

Reference is made to your memorandum (MEM 312.7-2) of April 25, with which was enclosed copy of a draft appreciation on this subject to be submitted to the Chief Administrative Officer.

I have seen Mr. Lansdell's comments with which I agree in general, but I feel that not only should we not encourage the Partisans to send further refugees out of Yugoslavia, we should in fact take positive action to discourage them in this regard. It appears to be clear that whatever our policy may be, a large number of refugees will succeed in making their way across the Adriatic to Italy and we shall, of course, have to do our best to take care of them. At the same time the potential proportions of this evacuation are such that we cannot accept formal responsibility for their care.

General Velebit's recent complaints regarding the facilities provided Yugoslav refugees already in the Middle East is an indication of the type of difficulties that may be expected to develop.

In view of the foregoing, it is believed that all Allied personnel in contact with the Partisans should be instructed to discourage the evacuation of refugees from that area. Allied personnel operating landing craft used to carry provisions across the Adriatic should be instructed not to provide transportation to Yugoslav refugees when returning to Italy except in such cases where it is impossible to refuse to do so.

ROBERT D. WARD
American Ambassador
MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Stettinus
FROM: J. W. Fehle

I am frankly amazed by Ambassador Murphy's cable to the War Refugees Board concerning the refugee situation in Italy, in which the following two points are stressed:

(1) There has been no intention on the part of AFRQ to discourage the escape of refugees to Italy from the Balkan countries; and

(2) The finding of suitable havens of refuge is not the crux of the Yugoslav refugee situation.

(Cable No. 1937, dated June 10, 1944)

Reading this cable, it is difficult to believe that less than two months ago, on Ambassador Murphy's recommendation, AFRQ issued a directive to prohibit the evacuation of refugees from Yugoslavia to Italy by prohibiting their transportation on Allied ships returning to Italy from Yugoslavia except in cases where immediate danger of life was involved or where there was some other compelling necessity.

Furthermore, this restrictive order recommended by Ambassador Murphy was still in full effect two days before Ambassador Murphy's cable was dispatched. Small wonder, therefore, that the number of refugees flowing from Yugoslavia to Italy has recently decreased, as stated by Ambassador Murphy in his cable! Surely it is no coincidence that the first week after the above directive took effect, the flow of refugees to Italy was cut by more than 75%, and the second week by a similarly large percentage!

Finally, I may add, that as of June 5, an Ambassador Murphy is surely aware, AFRQ was still reluctant to modify the restrictive directive without receiving some assurance that refugees arriving in Italy would be rapidly moved out elsewhere where there would be facilities for receiving them.

Without going into further detail, I shall quote verbatim a memorandum signed by Ambassador Murphy on April 25. This memorandum is in reply to a
memorandum dated April 25 of Colonel Charles N. Speofford in which it is pointed out that refugees were arriving in Italy from Yugoslav at the rate of 1,650 a week and that the problem of finding havens was a serious one.

*Reference is made to your memorandum (CGS 343, 7-R) of April 25, with which was enclosed copy of a draft appreciation on this subject to be submitted to the Chief Administrative Officer.*

*I have seen Mr. MacMillan's comments with which I agree in general, but I feel that not only should we not encourage the Partisans to send further refugees out of Yugoslavia, we should in fact take positive action to discourage them in this regard. It appears to be clear that whatever our policy may be, a large number of refugees will succeed in making their way across the Adriatic to Italy and we shall, of course, have to do our best to take care of them. At the same time the potential proportions of this immigration are such that we cannot accept formal responsibility for their care.*

*General Velebit's recent complaints regarding the facilities provided Yugoslav refugees already in the Middle East is an indication of the type of difficulties that may be expected to develop.*

*In view of the foregoing, it is believed that all Allied personnel in contact with the Partisans should be instructed to discourage the evacuation of refugees from that area. Allied personnel operating landing craft used to carry provisions across the Adriatic should be instructed not to provide transportation to Yugoslav refugees when returning to Italy except in such cases where it is impossible to refuse to do so.*

ROBERT D. MORPHY
American Ambassador

In view of the distress expressed by Ambassador Murphy in his cable to the War Refugees Board "that in the actual region of these unfortunate we leave much to chance and to the individual efforts of the refugees themselves", I am, to say the least, astounded by his recommendation to ARFQ that "Allied personnel operating landing craft used to carry provisions across the Adriatic should be instructed not to provide transportation to Yugoslav refugees when returning to Italy except in such cases where it is impossible to refuse to do so". Finally, I should like to point out that
the Ambassador’s statement in his cable that “under prevailing conditions in Yugoslavia only the hearty, bale and courageous are able to make physical effort and run the great risk incidental to escape” is not borne out by information conveyed to the Board in a War Department cable from Algiers, dated May 24, which indicates that the majority of the refugees arriving in Italy from Yugoslavia are women and children.
A conference was held on May 30, 1944, in the office of Oscar Cox of FWA, to discuss means for financing the care of additional refugees in Italy or in havens of refuge elsewhere to which refugees entering Italy may remove. The conference was attended by Mr. Cox, Majors Grey and Gros of the War Department, Mr. Koehler of UWA, and Messrs. DeBols and Friedmfth of the War Refugee Board. This conference was held for the purpose of exploring certain possibilities considered in the conference in General Hildring's office on May 27.

Various means of financing the acquisition of supplies for the refugees in question were discussed.

The possibility of lend-leasing supplies to the Royal Yugoslav Government or to Tito for the care of refugees was discussed and Cox indicated that there was clearly legal authority to do so. He also indicated that if no other means were found he felt that this should and could be done. Cox, however, suggested that in his judgment it was most feasible way for handling the matter would be to assimilate it to the present procedure for furnishing supplies to the civilian population in Italy and Sicily. According to Cox, the possibility would be explored by FWA and the Army respectively.

The possibility was also discussed of having UWA use the contribution already made to it by the British Government for handling the Yugoslav refugee problem. Mr. Koehler clarified the discussion in General Hildring's office at this point by saying that so far as any refugees removed to Egypt from Italy were concerned, UWA could and would finance their care and maintenance from funds advanced by the British. He stated, however, that he doubted that the Egyptian Government would permit the entry of substantially larger numbers of refugees from Italy so that the question of finance really related only to the care of refugees in Italy or in some other refugee center outside of Egypt. He indicated his belief that the British would strongly oppose UWA's using the British contribution for this latter purpose. He stated that he would discuss the matter further with the UWA people. Mr. Cox pointed out that if UWA went ahead on this important problem, using the British contribution, they might be in a better position to get through Congress the now pending request for appropriations. Cox indicated that there appears to be some disposition on the part of certain members of Congress to inquire why UWA needs so much money since up to now they have not engaged in many operations. This attitude might well be dispelled if UWA actively entered the Yugoslav refugee picture and thus clearly indicated its need for funds.
MEMORANDUM

A conference was held on Saturday, May 27, 1944, in the office of General Mildring, to discuss the refugee situation in Italy. The conference was attended by General Mildring and Major Gray of the War Department, Mr. Mosher of UNRRA, and Messrs. Pehle, Sanford, Bollen and Friedman.

At the outset Pehle briefly indicated the War Refugee Board's connection with this matter. He mentioned the project which we submitted to the President some time ago to bring a number of refugees to this country from Italy in order to relieve congestion there; the discussion of the matter at a cabinet meeting on May 26, and Stimson's suggestion that Pehle discuss the problem with General Mildring. Pehle mentioned also the President's desire that nothing be done to discourage the entry of refugees into Italy.

General Mildring referred briefly to the present refugee situation in Italy, mentioning the congestion there as a result of the continuous entry of large numbers of refugees from Yugoslavia. He indicated that General Wilson is insisting that some place be found to which refugees in Italy can be removed. General Mildring stated that the Army, without any mandate from anyone, had been and is taking care of refugees that enter Italy and financing their maintenance out of Army funds on the grounds of military necessity.

The possibility of taking additional people from Italy to Egypt was discussed. Mr. Mosher indicated that UNRRA had recently agreed to take responsibility for receiving into Egypt an additional 18,000 refugees from Italy (making a total of 40,000 to be taken there). He indicated certain possible obstacles to receiving more than this number in Egypt: (1) The Egyptian Government has begun to raise questions about the ultimate disposition of these people and probably would object to taking more; (2) UNRRA does not yet have any funds and when it receives its appropriation will need a substantial part of it for other commitments; (3) The British Army which has been furnishing supplies for the camps in Egypt has indicated its desire to be relieved of this responsibility.

The possibility of increasing refugee facilities in Italy was then discussed. General Mildring said that General Wilson is now having two surveys made to determine whether it would be possible to increase facilities in Italy over the present limit of 4,000.

The sense of the meeting was that the possibility of keeping more people in Italy should be explored and that to this end the following steps should be taken:

1. Mr. Mosher will discuss with Governor Lehman whether UNRRA will assume the responsibility of caring for refugees in Italy if asked to do so by the Army and if necessary supplies and funds can be obtained.
2. The Army and UNRRA will explore with FHA the possibility of land-leasing supplies to the Yugoslav Government for the care of refugees in Italy, the use of the supplies to be administered by UNRRA.

In connection with the discussion of finding additional havens of refuge, Fehle indicated his understanding that the President, in the Cabinet meeting, had referred to the possibility of taking care of refugees in Sicily.

Mr. Fehle emphasized the interest of the War Refugee Board in keeping open the flow of refugees into and out of Yugoslavia, mentioning not only the necessity of rescuing people in Yugoslavia who are being indiscriminately slaughtered by the Germans, but also the desirability of obtaining the cooperation of the Partisans in evacuating people from Hungary.

General Wildring said that the Army would do nothing to discourage the flow of refugees into Italy and that he would cable General Devers today, instructing him accordingly, mentioning the President's desire in this regard.
24 April, 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR FILES:

Subject: Conversation with General Velebit.

Jim Saxon and I called on General Velebit at his request on 22 April, 1944, at the Hotel St. George. We briefly reviewed some of the more important questions in connection with the evacuation of and assistance to Yugoslav refugees.

He stated that the Yugoslavs had considerable schooners but that they needed repair parts. The Yugoslavs are unable to use a large ship as they can only move small parties at a time. The plan would be to use ships of 100 to 200 tons in size to move refugees from Vis to Italy and 1 to 2 ton boats to take the refugees from the Yugoslav mainland to Vis. Both types of craft should have a speed of at least 10 knots and in the small boat field fast motor boats would be preferable. At the present time they have no small motor boats but only small fishing boats. Slow boats of both categories are now very dangerous since the weather has become clearer and the nights shorter. It is safer and preferable to make each leg of the trip in one night and only boats of a speed of at least 10 knots can accomplish this.

General Velebit stated it would be impossible to move food in by a big ship. This might be done later but in order to prepare for this, supply dumps should be set up in Italy. He was not very hopeful about aiding Hungarians and Romanians because of the almost complete lack of supplies in Yugoslavia. In addition, this would require some organization for which time was needed. No organization could be built up in any event unless supplies and facilities were made available to the Yugoslavs.
General Velebit stated that his present mission, which will take him both to Cairo and to London, has two purposes. He first wanted to try to secure a few transport planes. The Yugoslavs now control five or six landing fields and feel that they could accomplish much if they had the planes to fly to them. He also said that he needed money for the repair of ships and the purchase of food, and that he did not want to be continually asking various sources for small sums. He told us that he had requested $90,000 a month from the Special Balkan Service for ship repairs, but had been allowed only $15,000 as he was advised by General Niles that the balance might be used for subversive purposes. He stated that this attitude was very disheartening and that he hoped to get one substantial loan to cover all of their needs.

He told us that he had discussed with Major Jackling the question of opening a refugee camp in North Africa for the Yugoslavs; that all they needed was a good piece of land with a sufficient supply of food. I told him that I thought the French would only be agreeable to this plan if the Allies would supply food and other equipment since the French would not permit any further burden on the North African economy. The General told us that the conditions at Al Shatt were rather difficult for the Yugoslavs since it was extremely hot and there was almost a complete lack of clothing. He said that if we went to Cairo we should get in touch with Major Jaksie, who is the Cairo representative.

We told General Velebit that we were transmitting all of his requests to Washington and would do our best to aid him in his effort to get money, supplies and material.

Leonard M. Ackermann
Special Representative
Mediterranean Area
U.S. War Refugee Board.
For: Mr. John W. Pehle, Executive Director
War Refugee Board

This refers to my conversation of Thursday, April 13th, with Messrs. Ackerman and Saxon in Algiers.

Mr. Ackerman asked me to report that he found himself in a position where it was not possible for him to obtain information which he considered essential for the War Refugee Board's program from Bari, Italy and Yugoslavia. As he informed you he appointed Mr. Saxon an associate under the W.R.B.'s auspices and instructed him to proceed to Bari and to bring a report to him on the situation in that area relating to refugees in Yugoslavia, and the possibilities of developing a program for the evacuation of refugees from Yugoslavia. On Monday, April 17, I handed you a sealed envelope containing a memorandum of a proposed telegram from Messrs. Ackerman and Saxon. On Wednesday, April 19, I sent you through your secretary two memoranda from Mr. Saxon, one of which had come from Popovic, a representative of Tito.

Ackerman and Saxon asked me to inform you that in Bari, Saxon had established contact directly with the Tito organization through the help of: (a) Joe Martin of the Associated Press, who "went all out" to help him. (b) Lt. Com. Young of the OSS; Major Arnold and Ensign Bucinich (?)

In Bari, Saxon asserted, all governments are represented including the emigre governments. The matter of their relations with the Partisans is "questionable." The situation in Bari is "badly organized" from our point of view, as it is concerned with a deep political question which has dominated this situation.

Ackerman's first steps were taken with General Devers who referred the matter to General Caffey's efforts, as I understood it, were in connection with sending a representative of the W.R.B. to Bari and winning the support of the U.S. Army in furthering the program of the W.R.B. General Caffey reported to Ackerman and Saxon that the above-mentioned subject was presented formally to General Maitland-Wilson "in General Caffey's own way." General Caffey replied to Ackerman to the effect that the program of refugees was decidedly a secondary matter and that General Maitland-Wilson could not subscribe actively to any participation of the Board's program at this time.

Saxon asked me to further inform you that while the word "America" is magic in Yugoslavia, the Partisans are bewildered at our failure to help them. Also, the Partisans had never heard of the President's order creating the War Refugee Board. Saxon was under the impression that the above was the result of the political policy of the British and what he termed the "typical U.S. Army policy." Saxon recommended that you obtain from...
Secretary Stimson the agreement to have "strong instructions" sent to Algiers regarding the WRB's authorized program.

Saxon also requested me to inform you of the delicacy of the entire question of the U. S. Government's relation with Tito and his organization; that Washington in his opinion is not aware of the enormous potential possibilities at this time in cooperating with the latter Yugoslav interests.

Saxon asked me to reiterate his request for:

1. A direct letter to the Partisan Yugoslav delegate at Bari in which the WRB will supply $50,000 for re-equipment of vessels in Bari and as evidence of the good faith of the U. S. Government and the WRB.

2. The necessary documents to General Devers from the Secretary of the Treasury authorizing him to release $50,000 to the Tito organization for operations within the Yugoslav country. Saxon termed this "good faith money," and requested me to reiterate to you his conviction that as a result of his talks with the representatives of the Tito organization that he is satisfied that they are sincere. The latter is in spite of the opinions to the contrary expressed by General Caffey, who maintains that the Partisans "exaggerate and lie."

3. The memorandum of Popovic which I delivered to you through your secretary requesting assistance is to be followed by another memorandum from Popovic (Tito) supplying practical and concrete answers to questions put by Saxon to Popovic.

Saxon urged that the energies of your Board be directed toward sending a resourceful and energetic representative to Bari. (He recommended Joe DuBois.) This representative to be invested with authority in order that he may act "without explanations" and to commit the Board in reasonable proportions. Saxon also asserted that the OSS will convey messages to the War Refugee Board through Algiers. Saxon also asked me to inform you that:

(a) Spain is not to be worked from Algiers.

(b) Albania is passive and not important at this stage.

(c) He was confident that you could secure the necessary funds and materials to recondition the Yugoslav ships in the port of Bari under Lend-Lease.

(d) There were numbers of Partisan ships now in Bari under the Italian flag.

(e) Colonel Kirkwood, who is head of the Displaced Persons Sub-Commission of the AUC, would be perfectly happy if civilians would be able to arrive in Italy and help.
(f) We should adhere to our main line and discontinue fighting the Russians in the Balkans as we are today.

(g) Malin of the Inter-Government Committee proceeded to Bari several weeks ago and asserted that the WRB was a political instrument since this is a presidential election year. "Why didn't they give us the powers?"

(h) Saxon was impressed with the fact that Malin and his organization could be useful in the postwar long-term era.

(i) Our prestige in North Africa among the French was dwindling rapidly and that OMI makes no efforts to offset the propaganda through the French newspapers who daily publish information regarding the lack of delivery of supplies by the British and U.S. Governments.

(j) There is a lack of perfect candor between the representatives of the British and U.S. Governments and the representatives of the alleged French Government.

(k) Murphy and Wilson deal exclusively with the Royalist French who are all Algerian, and that they secure only the colored opinions of the "old guard."
HEADQUARTERS, S.B.S.
APO 777

April 20, 1944

SUBJECT: Refugees and the Yugoslav Partisans.

TO: Dr. William L. Langer, Director R & A Branch

VIA: Lt. Comdr. Edward J. Green, CO, S.B.S., Bari

ATTENTION: Mr. Robert Wolff

Enclosed you will find a short report prepared by R & A Section, Bari, for the War Refugee Board on the Partisan attitude to the question of the refugees. The Partisans are very much interested in this matter of refugees; it is a very serious problem in Yugoslavia. They are, however, slightly suspicious that the War Refugee Board is more interested in the political refugees from Hungary and Hungary (i.e. Jews) than it is in refugees from Yugoslavia. There is that feeling that if it is intended to help the refugees, why not help those refugees whose countries have been on the side of the Allies from the very beginning? While they have always received sympathetically all refugees that came to Yugoslavia, the Partisans can hardly go out of their way to promote such a movement. They can hardly go so far as to endanger their own position for the sake of some foreign refugees, unless they are given means and protection necessary for evacuation of the refugees to safety. Their attitude is logical, it seems to me.

The Yugoslavs could not evacuate their own people from the Yugoslav interior because of the lack of food and transportation facilities. How can they then assist other refugees who are still farther inland. The whole thing could be reduced to the following: (a) in order to go out of their way to help other refugees, the Yugoslav refugees and the National Liberation Army must first be fed and provided with the transportation facilities; and (b) those outside refugees that happen to enter Yugoslavia will be, as usual, treated with great sympathy and care.

Thus the old problem is revived! Are funds for the repairs of the Partisan ships available? If they are, will naval authorities in Italy grant adequate docks for the repairs? If funds are available and the ships are repaired will they be escorted across the Adriatic? If they do cross over, is there still a place where they can safely dock and take on the refugees?

It is obvious that the humanitarian aims of the War Refugee Board will not be completely realized. Instead of evacuating thousands of refugees, the Board may succeed to evacuate hundreds of them. But even if a very small number of refugees are saved the efforts of the Board will have been sufficiently compensated.
The Board should start its machinery at once and it should, I think, have a representative here at Bari. Some refugees are already trickling into Jugoslavia, and they are a burden to the National Liberation Army which can not even feed itself. With some material assistance the Partisans would take the question of refugees more seriously. Their sole aim at present is to feed and arm the National Army of Liberation, overlooking thereby some provinces in which the civilians have been known for some time to be starving from hunger.

I am also sending you a copy of the letter with three appendices, addressed to Mr. James Saxon, Representative, War Refugee Board, from the Partisan Hq. The letter is signed by Col. Milentije Popovich, CO. The letter and the appendices had been translated and typed out by R & A section from the original Partisan notes; the Partisans submitted to us their various notes and statistical tables, which meant little unless put into a presentable form. When the Partisan information had been compiled and typed it had to be taken to the HQ for CO's signature. We lost two days in doing that. The notes originally submitted had been retained by the Partisans.

I am expecting additional information on the status of the Partisan ships, and when it reaches me I shall transmit it to the War Refugee Board via GSS.

Because this question of war refugees is an urgent one, I would appreciate very much if the two sets of documents are immediately transmitted to the following persons:

Mr. John W. Pehle
Acting Director
War Refugee Board
c/o U.S. Treasury Department

and to:

Mr. Leonard A. Ackermann
Representative of the War Refugee Board
c/o North African Economic Board
AFHQ, Civil Affairs
APO 534

Copies of letter and enclosures:
Mr. Pehle, Mr. Ackermann, Mr. Wolff
HEADQUARTERS, S.B.S.
AFO 777

April 16, 1944

SUBJECT: National Committee of Jugoslavia and the Question of War Refugees

TO: Mr. James J. Saxon, Representative, U.S. War Refugee Board


After preliminary investigation of the question of War Refugees and the attitude of the National Committee for Liberation of Jugoslavia to that question, we are in position to make following general conclusions:

A. Jugoslavia is the most important of the Balkan countries as much as the refugees are concerned. Hungarians, Romanians and any other people, who are threatened by the Nazis and their satellites, will naturally seek protection in Jugoslavia;

B. Partisans are ready and willing to assist any refugees, and they have already done so. Naturally they shared with them what they had, and that was unfortunately not too much;

C. The Partisans have not even attempted to evacuate their own people from the interior of Jugoslavia, whose lives are threatened either by the enemy or by war operations. They did not do so because of inadequate transportation facilities and lack of food and clothing;

D. If adequate food, clothing and transportation is made available to the Partisans, they could evacuate a considerable number of refugees, or at least find reasonably secure shelters for them in the mountains of Jugoslavia;

E. Since the question of refugees is very urgent, and because many refugees will enter Jugoslavia from Hungary, Romania and even Germany, certain preliminary steps ought to be undertaken at once:

1. Supply bases must be established as quickly as possible and at the most conveniently located areas vis-a-vis Jugoslavia. These bases should have enough food, clothing, medical supplies, and construction materials, to meet all emergency requirements.
2. A reasonably large fund should be established from which the Partisans can easily be supplied with the money for the purpose of ship repairs, certain administrative needs pertaining to the refugee matters, and for the purpose of assisting those refugees that may at any moment ask for their protection;

3. Because the Partisans cannot on their own obtain the fullest measure of Allied military and naval cooperation, it is suggested that a representation of the War Refugee Board be established at Bari which can obtain shipping facilities and air and naval protection adequate enough to meet any needs that may suddenly arise. The same body should see that numerous Partisan schooners now anchored at various Italian ports are repaired and put into service;

F. To attain maximum cooperation from the National Committee of Yugoslavia it will be necessary to feed the National Liberation Army and give it all possible assistance. The National Liberation Army is the foundation of any refugee plans, and unless the foundation is sound there is no hope for a successful solution of the refugee problem.

sgd/ Wayne W. Vucinich
Ens, U.S.N.R.
R & A Officer

Copies to:
Mr. John W. Haile, Director, War Refugee Board
Mr. Leonard B. Ackermann, Representative, War Refugee Board, Algiers.
In connection with my reply to your memorandum of 3 April 1944, and your subsequent request, I can only provide you with an approximate estimate of the material needs most urgently needed for the immediate organization and handling of the refugees from the fascist terror.

The question of evacuation and bringing to safety of the refugees is dependent to a considerable extent on the standard of living both of the refugees themselves and of the people which will care for the refugees. This aspect of the refugee problem, therefore, can not be viewed separately. It would be most urgent to provide help in food, clothing, shoes, living quarters, transportation, etc., the areas along the south-western parts of our country, which gravitate toward the Dalmatian coast, because that route will be followed by the refugees. Once the coast is reached the refugees can more easily be evacuated from Yugoslavia to Italy.

This estimate in fact is not realistic; it concerns only the immediate present. It is not realistic also because it does not consider the fact that in other parts of our country the people are starving from hunger and fleeing from under the occupying forces.

The materials listed below should be made available as soon as possible to the representatives of our state authority in the country and in Italy. They are needed in the country, because the situation is critical and is steadily growing worse. The trans-Adriatic shipments depend on general navigation conditions and on the development of military operations, but once the supplies are available in Italy they can at a given moment be shipped across the Adriatic for immediate use.

The refugee needs consist of the following:

1. Food for a month for 250,000 people (Appendix 3);
2. Shoes, clothing, transportation means, tools, machines for manufacture and repair of the tools (Appendix 3);
3. Materials and equipment for repairs (Appendix 1) and nautical needs, and for the ships which ply between our and Italian coast (Appendix 2);
4. Financial means for immediate use for buying the above mentioned materials and for a fund to be used for liberating and evacuating persons from the territory occupied by the fascists, a sum needed for the present time is estimated at 100,000,000 Italian lire (hundred million Italian lire).
APPENDIX NO. 1

Requirements for nautical and ships' needs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Dalekoezora prizamcinih</td>
<td>100 pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>&quot; noonih</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Busola za jedrenjake</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Brodskih satova</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>&quot; barometara</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Plent logova (komplet)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Goniometara</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>Delektora</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>Sextanata</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>kronometara</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>Boćnih sviđetala (crvenih 60 zeljenih 50) petrolj</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>Pramenih sviđetala petrolj</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>Crvenih sviđetala</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>Srodskih sviđetilijska (furican lamps) petrolj</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>Pistolja za rakete</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>Rasnobojnih raketa</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>Sviđetiljska za dnevnu signalizaciju</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.</td>
<td>Džepnih elektronički ažurija</td>
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<tr>
<td>19.</td>
<td>Seterije</td>
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<tr>
<td>20.</td>
<td>Navigacijskih trokuta za pomorske karte</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.</td>
<td>Paralele za pomorske karte</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.</td>
<td>Pojasa za spasavanje gumenih</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.</td>
<td>Sivo uljene boje</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>24.</td>
<td>Crno uljene boje</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>Bijele</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>Zelenoe</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27.</td>
<td>Zute</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28.</td>
<td>Crvene</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Zelene</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Podvodne boje</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Plaža za jedra</td>
<td>2,000 m²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>&quot; okrivace spremista</td>
<td>3,000 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Konopa od manile opsega 7 engl. palca</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; 5 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
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<td>35.</td>
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<tr>
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<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; 5.1/2 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
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<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>500</td>
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<tr>
<td>41.</td>
<td>Konop za cajalo (iverlibe)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>42.</td>
<td>Zastavni konop (flag line)</td>
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<tr>
<td>43.</td>
<td>Konop za log (log line)</td>
<td>60 pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>44.</td>
<td>Mrlin za povijanje</td>
<td>5,000 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45.</td>
<td>Spag za sivanje plata</td>
<td>100 kgms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46.</td>
<td>Celik celo opsega 3 engl. palca</td>
<td>1,000 meters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; 2.2/5 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>48.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; 2.1/2 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>2,000</td>
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<tr>
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<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; 2 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>51.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; 0.7/8 &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
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<td>53.</td>
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<tr>
<td>54.</td>
<td>Vunene tkanine za zastav crvene boje</td>
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<tr>
<td>55.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; bijele &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
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<td>56.</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; plave &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Requirements for the repairs of Partisan vessel

1. Marine glue
2. Grey paint
3. Fire proof
4. White (zinc)
5. Lead
6. Black paint
7. Fire proof
8. Linseed oil
9. Red Lead
10. Turpentine
11. Drier
12. Green paint (waterline)
13. Bottom paint (anticorrosive)
14. (antifouling)
15. Paint brushes, diff. sizes
16. Code solway
17. Soda (crystalline)
18. Soap
19. (Hard water)
20. Carbide
21. Oxygen
22. Enery paper (various grade)
23. White metal 30
24. " 75"
25. " 50"
26. Rubber gasket material 1/16-1/16 of each size
27. Welder
28. Asbestos for 1/64 to 5/32 of each size
29. Asbestos gaskets 1/32 to 1/8 of each size
30. Rubberized asbestos (plates 1/32-1/8 of each size)
31. " width 1/2, 3/4, 1, 1/4 of each size
32. Asbestos rope 3/4"
33. Asbestos sheeting
34. " thread, (sawing)
35. Graphite powder
36. Graphite flakes
37. Rubber plates 1/22
38. " 3/4"
39. Fiber 1/4"
40. Zinc 3/4"
41. Brass plates 1/16-3/16 of each size
42. Copper 1/16-1/32"
43. Tin 1/32"
44. Steel 1/32-1/16"
45. Brass plates 0.1mm - 1mm of each size
46. Wire 0.5 - 2 mm.
47. Copper 0.5 - 2 mm.
48. Steel 0.5 - 2 mm.
49. Lead 1.5 - 6 mm.
50. Brass mesh with holes 0.5 x 5 mm.
51. Straight wrench (2 way 1/4 - 1 1/2"
52. Adjustable wrench (English)
53. "(Spanish)
54. Files (flat, round, half-round, triangle & knife)
55. Steel waskers 1/4, 7/8"
56. Files diff. sizes
57. Hedge hammers (15 lbs.)
58. Sulphuric acid
59. Muriatic
60. Distilled water
61. Wool (oil cup)
62. Waste (white and coloured)

4,000 lbs.
150 "
1,000 "
1,000 "
300 "
1,000 "
6,000 lbs.
200 gal.
200 "
1,000 "
1,000 "
1,000 "
5,000 lbs.
4,000 "
2,000 "
3,000 "
1,000 "
500 containers
2,000 pieces
1,500 lbs.
3,000 "
1,000 "
200 pieces
200 "
200 lbs.
30 lbs.
30 "
200 "
300 "
200 "
1,000 "
100 "
100 "
30 "
100 "
30 "
100 "
200 "
50 "
50 "
50 "
24 sets.
24 "
24 "
200 lbs.
12 sets
12 pieces
20 gal.
40 "
100 "
10 lbs.
4,000 "
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Unit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>65</td>
<td>Wax tape</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Sperplugs 12 mm, 13 mm, 20 mm, 22 mm</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Screw drivers diff size</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>Pipe wrenches</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Oxygen and acetylene gauges</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Oil gauges to 75 lbs per sq. inch</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>&quot;150&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; (wilmaster)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; (pipe)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Breast Drill</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>74</td>
<td>Twist drills up to 1&quot;</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>sets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75</td>
<td>Dividers and Calipers</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>76</td>
<td>Calibrated thickness gauge</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>77</td>
<td>Screwdrivers diff size</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Micrometer</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>79</td>
<td>Pots (for heating metal 3 gal. = no. gal.)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Carborundum (Fine and heavy)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>81</td>
<td>Steel for tools (round, halfround, square)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>&quot; rods (square, angle, round, half-round)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>83</td>
<td>Brass &quot; (square, round, halfround, hexagonal)</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>84</td>
<td>Hack-saw blades</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>85</td>
<td>Coke (for foundry)</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>86</td>
<td>Castiron</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>87</td>
<td>Bronze for foundry</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>88</td>
<td>Bolts &amp; nuts diff. size</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>89</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; (brass)</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>Voltmeter to 250</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>Ampermeter to 20 A</td>
<td>15</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Ohmmeter 50,000 nano</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>93</td>
<td>Insulated pliers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>94</td>
<td>Wire cutters</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>95</td>
<td>Blow torch 1/2 gall.</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>Soldding irons</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>97</td>
<td>Hydrometer (batteries)</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>Batteries 6 v. 200 - 150 Amp/H</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>99</td>
<td>Friction tape</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>Rubber</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>101</td>
<td>Safety 6, 8, 15 Amp. each size</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>102</td>
<td>Shellac for dynamo insulation</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>103</td>
<td>Wood; fir</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>m³</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>104</td>
<td>&quot; pine</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>105</td>
<td>&quot; oak</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106</td>
<td>&quot; beech</td>
<td>200</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>Rubber hose from 3/4 to 1&quot; each size</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>feet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108</td>
<td>Cast iron especially for pistons rings</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>109</td>
<td>Bolt rises for shaft from 40 to 80 mm. each size</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>110</td>
<td>The same but for thrust each size</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>Autogone welding plant</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>plants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112</td>
<td>Oxygen blow pipes and tips for welding and cutting</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>pieces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>113</td>
<td>Diesel engines (complete) 250 HP, about</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 200 &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 100 &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 60 &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>117</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 40 &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 100 &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>119</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 75 &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>120</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 125 -150 &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>121</td>
<td>Injectors for engines from 12 - 16 HP</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>122</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 50 - 70 &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>123</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; 125 -150 &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>124</td>
<td>Autogene welding rods for cast iron 3-5 mm</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>lbs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>400</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>&quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot; &quot;</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Quantity</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>128.</td>
<td>Phosphoryc for foundry</td>
<td>50 lbs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>129.</td>
<td>Rubber ropes 1/4 - 3/8&quot; for cylinders each size</td>
<td>100 feet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>130.</td>
<td>&quot; 1/4 for water</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>131.</td>
<td>Steel for engine shafts; 2, 2 1/2, 3, 3 1/2 &amp; 5 of each size</td>
<td>60 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132.</td>
<td>Copper tubes; 5/8, 1 1/4, &amp; 2&quot;/600 lbs. per sq. inch of each size</td>
<td>400 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133.</td>
<td>Hempt fiber</td>
<td>50 lbs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134.</td>
<td>Steel tubes 1 1/2 to 5&quot; of each size</td>
<td>150 feet</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>135.</td>
<td>Nails; 1 - 3&quot;</td>
<td>500 lbs.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>136.</td>
<td>&quot; 1/2 -</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137.</td>
<td>&quot; 1/2 - 6&quot;</td>
<td>400 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>138.</td>
<td>&quot; (galvanized) 1 - 3&quot;</td>
<td>600 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139.</td>
<td>&quot; 3/4 - 6&quot;</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>140.</td>
<td>Lead plates 1/2&quot;</td>
<td>500 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141.</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>50 &quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX NO. 3

Materials needed for the evacuation of refugees

Because of constant terror of Hitler's bands perpetrated on our people in various regions of our liberated territory, our national authorities are forced constantly to evacuate the people from the endangered to the liberated regions and when the danger passes to send these same people back to their original homes.

Therefore, because of the continuous retreating from and incredible Fascist terror, about 250,000 civilians are in a state of permanent movement. They are leaving their villages without any equipment, and what is worse they come unto the regions which are totally destroyed by the Fascist. When immediate danger passes, they go back to their original villages, where they find their homes robbed and burned. If one considers the fact that these movements were repeated several times in the three years of struggle, then we can in part understand the poverty of the people which is continuously retreating before the Fascist terror.

On that road to Golgotha many of them perish. The struggle is difficult, and evacuated people are frequently hungry. They find themselves without any means of transportation, without the roof over their heads, without clothes, medical care and tools to repair their destroyed and burned homes - in one word without basic needs for maintenance of their livelihood.

Our national authorities and our army are able to organize the evacuation, but they do not possess material things with which to accomplish it. In order to lighten the difficult fate of our refugees we would need the following things:

1. Food for 250,000 people @ 1 kgm per day, for one month 500 tons
2. Shoes for 250,000
   250,000 pairs
3. Necessary materials for shoe repairs:
   a. soles
   b. leather for shoe's top (box, arm, calf, and cows)
   c. "Brandol" and similar
   d. Shoe lining, threads, glue, wax, wooden nails, heelirons, and shoe lasts
   30 tons
   20 "
   10 "
   8 "
4. Textile material:
   a. different threads
   b. suits for men (woolen and cotton)
   c. " for women
   d. " for children
   e. Laundry for men
   f. " for women
   g. " for children
   h. Linen for beds
   i. Different flax for socks and clothes, including diff. materials for it
   20 tons
   100,000 men
   100,000 women
   50,000 children
   100,000 men
   100,000 women
   50,000 children
5. Machines for clothes and shoes:
   a. Sewing-machines common type
   b. " for the use of shoe-makers
   c. " " " " " tailors
   200 pieces
   50 "
   50 "
d. spools, needles for different machines, sewing needles (common type) including different parts of the machines 10 tons

6. House building material:
   a. window glasses 500 tons
   b. nails different size 100 "
   c. Different tools as: hammers, pliers, files (round, flat, square, half round) 100 "
   d. Lumber production would be necessary to repair the existing saw-mills, for which is needed: tools for saw-mills including the tools for unloading logs, and "Pulley belts - 5/10-10/15-15/15-15-20/15-20/20-25/20-30/20-30 for 10 saw-mills 200 tons

7. Trade workshop and tools for:
   a. tools for carpenter 500 complete furniture 12 "
   b. " cabinet maker 500 complete furniture 12 "
   c. " shoemaker 300 "
   d. " blacksmith as: horseshoes, and nails for it, tools to shoe, fire ventilators, etc. 250 complete furniture 75 "
   e. Engine and mechanic complete sets of tools including the equipment and motors, dynamo, lathe tables, drill press shape machine and "SCHLIF-MACHINES" for 50 workshops 200 "
   f. Coach maker tools as:
      iron for wheel rims including other necessary material and tools 500 "

8. Means of transportation:
   a. Trucks 1,000 pieces
   b. Jeeps 100 "
   c. Complete horse harnesses 5,000 sets

   The material stated under 7 and 8 is indispensable for the transportation of the refugees, whether they be transported by trucks or by their own peasant carts. If one considers the fact that the refugees are exhausted during the evacuation because of the rapid advance of the enemy, and that the evacuation should be carried on in many cases covering the distance of over 200 km., the means of transportation are of the vital importance to the refugees.

9. Agricultural tools and machines:
   The refugees are coming into places totally destroyed by the invaders, and later they return to their homes which they also find destroyed.
   For that reason is needed:
   a. Scythes, axes, sickles, mattocks, showels, grind stones, field rakes, scythe stones, and vineyard pumps 100 tons
   b. Complete tractors with ploughs 100 pieces

10. Carbide and paraffine lamps 10,000 "
11. Carbide 100 "
12. First aid medicine 50 "
13. Tents (big size) to shelter the refugees 1,000 pieces
TO: SECSTATE

WASHINGTON

Code: 

FOR WAR REFUGEE BOARD FROM ACKERMANN

WAR REFUGEE REPRESENTATIVE NO. 11

Saxon has returned from Bari and requests following message be transmitted to you:

Initial minimum essential recommendations for immediate action in extremely important Balkan area follow:

1. Present efforts by Allied authorities in Italy appear to be limited to measures dictated by military necessity. Roughly 17,000 persons have been evacuated from coastal islands by Allied naval service since December 1 because of military operations. Partisans said little material assistance has otherwise been given to Partisans who are key to refugee problem and that they were not officially informed of our government's policy on this matter.

2. Strongly recommend that you urge appropriate authorities to alter policy to provide Partisans with following needs they consider minimum:

   (a) Repair facilities, materials, and funds should be made available to Partisans to repair at least some of 65 small Partisan boats now tied up on Italian coast. There are sufficient Partisans available to man these ships.
(b) Food, medical and other supplies should be allocated to Partisan Committee at Bari directly by United States Government under complete control and responsibility of Partisans. Thus, if problem in (a) above is solved to some extent, Partisans state they can and will move needed supplies on their own responsibility although air cover may be necessary if a large ship or many small ships are used at one time. Ships can evacuate refugees on return voyage.

(c) Funds and gold should be made available to Partisan Committee at Bari to finance refugee activities in other Balkan countries and to finance transport, feeding and shelters for refugees including the establishment of relay centers and to evacuate people from occupied and unoccupied territory both inside and outside Yugoslavia.

4. It is necessary to seek to keep this problem entirely divorced from Balkan political questions.

5. Roughly 5,000 people were evacuated from the coastal area in February. Substantially less arrived in Italy in March. The situation at this moment is tighter than in March as the Germans have occupied several additional islands including the Island of Rab and apparently increased their control of the coast. This situation is however very fluid and preparations should be made immediately so that full advantage can be taken of favorable changes in the situation. In addition Partisan leaders state that it may be possible to open a section.
of the mainland whenever that is warranted by guaranty of supplies, and that supplies can be transported and refugees evacuated from certain of the coastal islands even at the present moment.

6. Partisans state that the extent to which they can practically cooperate depends to some extent on the help which we can give. They state that there is not sufficient food to feed the Partisan army units who necessarily come first, and that their own persecuted civilians as well as refugees from other areas must and do share alike what remains. 18,000 women, children and invalids were recently saved from slaughter by the Germans by evacuation from Dalmatia, Makarsko Primorje and from the islands to other areas. The remainder who were left at Brach were decimated by the Germans. Of the 70,000 Yugoslav Jews, 65,000 have been killed by the Germans and the remaining 5,000 were evacuated by the Partisans from a concentration camp on the island of Rab to another region in Yugoslavia occupied by the Partisans. Only 12 trucks taken from the Germans and Italians were available for this and other large evacuations effected from September to December, 1943. The entire cost and difficulty of moving and feeding all of these people has been borne by the Partisans.
7. A detailed memorandum follows by mail.

CHAPIN

AUTHORIZATION:

I hereby certify that no copy of this cable is being kept in my files.

L. E. Ackermann
Special Representative
War Refugee Board