


Report on Trip to Spain and Portugal (Mr. Mann)

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for
you*



WAR REFUGEE BOARD RECORDS

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
WAR REFUGEE BOARD


INTER-OFFICE COMMUNICATION

DATE August 30, 1944

TO Mr. Fehle

FROM Mr. Mann

There is attached a report on my visit to Spain and Portugal. I have not had an opportunity to read it over since I corrected it but trust that it will serve our purpose as a record of my dealings there.



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Report of James H. Mann
on Trip to Portugal and Spain

Pursuant to letter dated May 26, 1944, I left Washington on May 29, 1944 for New York, where I took the Pan American Airways clipper on May 30 for Lisbon, Portugal, arriving there 11:30 p.m. June 1, 1944. I remained in Portugal until June 19, when I left by air for Madrid. I left Madrid June 23, 1944, arrived in Barcelona June 24, 1944, where I remained until June 28, 1944, at which time I left for Madrid, arriving there June 29, 1944. I remained in Madrid until July 6, when I left for Lisbon, Portugal, arriving there the same day. On July 10, I talked with the Executive Director by telephone and he instructed me to take the first plane from Portugal to the United States. Accordingly, I secured passage on the Pan American clipper for Natal, Brazil and from there Pan American Airways passage to Miami. I departed from Lisbon the evening of July 14, 1944 and arrived in Washington 6:30 a.m. July 22, 1944.

There follows a report on my trip to Portugal and Spain. Such report is an attempt to summarize the conversations which I had with the various persons named and to make a record of them for the War Refugee Board files. The report is prepared from notes which I took on the trip but, of course, is not inclusive of all details.

The Dispute in Lisbon between the Joint
Distribution Committee and the World Jewish Congress

The primary purpose of my trip was to investigate the dispute between the Joint Distribution Committee (hereinafter referred to as the JDC) and the World Jewish Congress (hereinafter referred to as the WJC),

and if the facts warranted, to attempt to work out an agreement between the two.

The War Refugee Board had received numerous cables, mostly sent by the WJC representative in Lisbon, stating that children which had been brought out of occupied France through the efforts of the WJC had been taken by the JDC from the persons instrumental in bringing them out and that the JDC was claiming the credit for the rescue of many persons who in fact had been rescued by the WJC. In view of the delicate situation prevailing in Spain, the Board considered this dispute a serious matter since it focused attention to operations being carried out in the Iberian Peninsula area, which operations appeared to be unfavorably viewed by the American Ambassador and the American Embassy in Madrid.

It should be noted that prior to my departure, conferences were held with representatives of the two organizations involved, namely Mr. Leavitt of the JDC and Mr. Kubowitski of the WJC. In such conferences, each representative, of course, thought that the other side was wrong. Both agreed that they would accept the facts as found by me as the representative of the War Refugee Board. There were indications but no promises that any agreement which the Board sought to propose would be acceptable. Particularly was this true on the part of the JDC. The JDC made it very clear that it felt that the Board's representative in Portugal, Dr. Dexter, had wrongly handled the situation and that he was prejudiced against the JDC. The WJC stated that it felt that children should be sent to Palestine, provided they did not have relatives in the United States who could better care for them, and indicated

that they thought disagreement over this question was the major difference between the parties.

It was made abundantly clear to both representatives that I, as the War Refugee Board's representative, would thoroughly investigate the facts without prejudice and would attempt to bring the parties in Lisbon to an understanding, if such were possible. Both representatives were given to understand that regardless of right or wrong, the War Refugee Board felt that it was most unfortunate that a quarrel of this nature should develop at this time when all should be doing their utmost to save human life and that it was unthinkable that there could be interference with such a project by supposedly interested groups quarreling among themselves as to who actually was to get credit for saving human life. Each of the representatives understood that the Board's only interest was in saving the lives of those persons who were in danger of death because of Hitler's persecution and extermination policies.

When I arrived in Lisbon, I attempted to get at the facts in question by talking with various interested parties. My first conversation, of course, was with Dr. Dexter, the Board's representative.

Conversations with Dr. Dexter

I was met at the airport by Dr. Dexter, who very cordially welcomed me and introduced me to other members of the Embassy staff who apparently meet each clipper. Dr. Dexter informed me that he would get my baggage cleared through customs immediately, but I found him of little help since he couldn't speak Portuguese and found that I could

do better by speaking Spanish to the customs authorities. I gave Dr. Dexter the letter which Mr. Pehle had signed and after he had read it he seemed to feel greatly relieved since he apparently felt that he was going to be "raked over the coals" in the letter for the turn which things in Portugal had taken. Dr. Dexter accompanied me to my hotel room which he had reserved for me (Hotel Aviz, with rate of \$12.00 per day, whereas other hotels in Lisbon range from \$4.00 to \$7.00. This is an example of Dexter's planning.). On the way to my hotel, Dexter explained that the situation in Portugal was unfortunate, that everyone lamented it, and that the quarrel was seriously handicapping many of the Board's efforts towards rescue of human life. I inferred from his remarks that Dr. Joseph Schwartz, the European Director of the JDC, was an able man but one who felt that the JDC had a monopoly on rescue and relief operations. Dexter seemed to think that Weissman had been greatly mistreated and that he was the man who could really do the job. It was clear to me that Dexter didn't have too good an idea concerning just what the Board was attempting to do. I got the impression that he was carrying on as Special Representative of the Board in the same way in which he had conducted the affairs for the Unitarian Service Committee in Lisbon. His thoughts seemed to be largely in caring for refugees in Portugal, and it seemed obvious to me that he hadn't devoted too much thought to ways and means of working from Portugal and attempting to get more people from the occupied countries into Spain.

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The next day I called at the Embassy and spent considerable time talking with Dexter. During this interview, I gathered that Dexter's work for the Board consisted largely in paraphrasing of incoming and outgoing cables for private agencies which were transmitted through State Department facilities. (The JDC says that he does such a complete job of paraphrasing that the messages make no sense when they get into their hands and they often have to call him for an interpretation.) It was clear from their conversation that Dexter was strongly prejudiced against the JDC. The statements which he made at this time confirmed the impressions which I had gathered the evening before. We talked at length about Weissman and Dexter emphasized that this man had been greatly mistreated. He had done some very good things towards solving the refugee problem in Portugal. As he put it, Weissman was a go-getter and able to get results. He had many enemies in the Communidade (Jewish Community of Lisbon). However, I was told that I shouldn't pay too much attention to this since the Communidade's sympathies in the war were open to question. There were many people in the Communidade who were making a great deal of money out of the war, presumably by dealing with the Germans.

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Dexter informed me that he had checked with all of the intelligence sources concerning Weissman and had found him to be all right. He suggested that I check with the local intelligence services, which I did later. One thing which appeared to impress Dexter greatly was an offer on the part of the WJC to rescue non-Jews as well as Jews. He pointed out that the same could not be said of the JDC. He also asked me why the Board didn't devote more time to rescuing people other than Jews who appeared to be in imminent danger of death. I attempted to point out that the Board was interested in rescuing all who were in imminent danger of death, but that we must face the facts and that the rescue problem was primarily a Jewish question since all Jews in occupied territory were in danger of death because of German extermination policies. I questioned Dexter concerning the Gentiles who were in imminent danger of death and for whom the Board was not making a sufficiently great effort. He thought for a considerable time then mentioned a case of Alsatian girls. According to him, these girls were considered Germans by the German government but all of them didn't consider themselves as such and he had heard that these girls would be forced to bear German children. This, Dr. Dexter considered a fate worse than death and felt

that a widespread problem for rescuing Alsatian girls should immediately be instituted. However, there weren't any cases so far as he knew of Alsatian girls having crossed the French border into Spain in an attempt to save themselves from the fate which Dexter feared they would suffer.

In connection with the dispute between the JDC and the WJC, Dexter stated that the JDC was too conservatively operated and was not doing enough to rescue persons in imminent danger of death, whereas Weismann had been wanting to carry out some activity along these lines for quite some time. The JDC had always insisted in using legal means and had only gone into the rescue field around March of this year. That, I attempted to explain, probably was due to United States Government's financial control policies. However, he preferred to blame the JDC.

Subsequently, I had occasion to see something of Mrs. Dexter, who is now serving as Acting European Director of the Unitarian Service Committee. Mrs. Dexter apparently does the thinking for the family and no doubt does the War Refugee Board's planning in Portugal. Mrs. Dexter struck me as being much more intelligent than Dr. Dexter, but not without her prejudices. Apparently, the JDC has always considered itself on a little higher plane than the Unitarian Service Committee because of its larger operational staff, greater amount of funds, etc. That, I am sure, both the Dexters resent and I gathered that they had attempted to use the appointment of Dexter to the Embassy staff to bring Dr. Schwartz and the JDC to recognize them and their newly acquired authority--to heel so to speak.

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The remarks of both Dr. and Mrs. Dexter indicated that they were very pleased that he had been appointed to the Embassy staff, and I gathered that Dexter feels himself much more of a part of the Embassy staff than he does a representative of the War Refugee Board. He has, in his mind, become a career diplomat in short time. However, his activities as an intelligence officer should not pass unnoticed.

It will be recalled that he was and, so far as I know, still is employed by the OSS. He takes his security problems very seriously, so seriously, in fact, that at times I got the impression that he hesitated to give me information, which I requested, for fear that he might be giving it to the wrong party. While I am extremely glad that he can be of service in security work, I am afraid that his sense of balance is not good and that at times refugee work may be suffering unnecessarily when he is making no contribution to security work, but thinks that he is.

Dr. Dexter suggested that before talking with the two organizations involved, I should meet and discuss the JDC - WJC matter with Mr. Hart of the British Embassy.

Conversations with Mr. Hart

Mr. Hart is an old British consular officer who, before the war, had retired and was living in France, but who, upon the declaration of war, again assumed his duties in the British Foreign Service. He is stationed at Lisbon as an Attache and his duty seems to be to contact

the International Police. I am told that he is most effective in this work. He is about 70 years of age and has spent most of his life outside England. At one time, he was charged with handling refugee matters in the British Embassy and, notwithstanding that they have now been assigned to a Mr. Hepplethwaite, Hart insists on handling refugee matters whenever he can.

Mr. Hart lamented the dispute between the WJO and the JDC. As he put it, the JDC felt that it had a monopoly on refugee work and resented anyone else coming into the field. He spoke highly of Weissman, but stated that he came to see him so often on refugee matters that the man was "a damned nuisance." However, he was quite positive in stating that the JDC and the Comunidade had mistreated Weissman. He even went so far as to say that they had been the cause of Weissman's being placed in jail because of the "Ericera project." I asked him what proof he had of this and he said that so many things had happened to Weissman that it was clear that someone was responsible and he was sure that it was the JDC and the Comunidade because they were Weissman's rivals. I asked him for the details of the Ericera matter which he proceeded to give me.

It appears that back in 1942, there were many refugees clandestinely in Portugal who were afraid to surrender themselves to the police for fear that they would be imprisoned, punished and otherwise abused. Accordingly, they preferred to remain in hiding. Weissman had gone to the police, explained this situation, asked the police to designate a "forced residence" for these people who were clandestinely in Portugal and to

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provide that clandestines in the country could voluntarily surrender themselves and be sent to this forced residence to live with private relief agencies paying the expenses of their upkeep. The Portuguese police agreed to this plan and Weismann scheduled a big dinner to be given in celebration of this accomplishment. The dinner was much heralded, together with the fact that prominent persons from the Portuguese police would be in attendance. (I am told that he invited the Fox Movietone people to attend and bring their cameras.) At 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the dinner, it was suddenly called off and subsequently thereafter, Weismann found himself picked up by the police and sent off to a refugee forced residence where he was compelled to stay for about two days before he was freed and allowed to return to his former residence. Hart was certain that the JDC and the Communists were responsible for Weismann's mistreatment.

Hart was clearly prejudiced against the JDC and stated that he was cooperating with the WJC. He mentioned that he had instructions from the Foreign Office in London to cooperate with the WJC in all matters concerning refugees.

He stated that there were a lot of rumors concerning Weismann but that all of them were false. I told him that I had heard that Weismann had been

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on the British black list and he said that there was nothing to such story. He pointed out that Weismann had been thoroughly checked by the British Security people and that in January or February of this year he had been given a visa to London and had gone there and returned. According to Hart, Weismann had been trying to do something for refugee children for quite some time but had found various obstacles placed in his path, but given a chance to cooperate with the War Refugee Board's representative in Portugal he could accomplish a great deal. Hart mentioned that he would give Weismann support and facilities.

Hart made much of the fact that the dispute between the JDC and the Comunidade on one side against Weismann was such that it involved personalities and that I would never be able to make the parties sit down together, let alone work out some sort of an agreement between the two. Hart felt that the only way to settle this matter was by the use of strong measures, and by that I gathered he meant that such measures should be directed against the JDC. I pointed out to him that the main thing in which I was interested was determining the facts of the matter. It is interesting to note that throughout my conversations with Hart from the time when I first arrived in Portugal, Dexter approved and "Amened" everything which Hart said and it was clear that Hart had been a big factor in influencing Dexter to back Weismann against the JDC.

As stated above, a Mr. Heppelthwaite of the British Embassy has been designated to handle refugee matters but Hart refuses to give them up. Dexter is so fond of Hart that he insists on dealing with him, when possible, instead of consulting Heppelthwaite. Dexter feels that Hart

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is a man of the people whereas Heppelthwaite isn't because he speaks with an Oxford accent.

I had a short conversation with Heppelthwaite and was very much impressed by him. He is sympathetic to the refugee problem and appears to understand it. The same cannot be said of Hart. Hart's understanding of the refugee problem is something along the following lines: Weismann has a house in Lisbon which will accommodate sixty children which he would like to have in the house but can't because the JDC won't let him.

As Dexter put it, "you don't find many British Foreign Service Officers like Hart." With that I am inclined to agree.

Before leaving Lisbon, I attempted to explain to Dexter that any disagreement between Hart and Heppelthwaite concerning who should handle refugee matters was a problem for the British Embassy to solve, but that until such time as another person was designated, he should attempt to sever his official relationships with Hart and deal with Heppelthwaite on all refugee matters.

Conversation with Weismann

Isaac Weismann is of Polish nationality, and about 54 years of age. He came to Portugal in 1940 from Paris where he was in business prior to the war. He has a son presently fighting with the British army. Weismann states that he has represented the WJC since his arrival in Portugal and that he has been attempting to do something in the way of rescuing persons from enemy territory since the Germans occupied all of France in 1942. My impression of Weismann after talking with him was that he was sincerely

interested in saving human life. He has something of a persecution complex because of the various things that have happened to him since his arrival in Portugal. He appears to be impulsive and this no doubt has led to some of his difficulties. I think that he is inclined to seize upon an idea and attempt to execute it without consulting others who may be interested. Also, he may be inclined to accept the lack of an expressed negative as meaning consent on the part of others who are advised of his plans.

Weismann made no bones in saying outright that the JDC had kidnapped children which had been brought from France into Spain through his effort and the efforts of persons working for and with him. He mentioned to me a person by the name of Joseph Croustillon, whom he said had come out of France in May of 1943. Croustillon, according to Weismann, had contacts in France and in Spain and could successfully bring children from France to Portugal if he were not molested. He stated that the children "kidnapped" by the JDC had been brought out by Croustillon but since the latter was a refugee and since Sequerra of the JDC had found out about the arrival in Spain of such children the latter obtained them by threatening Croustillon and a man by the name of Herman with imprisonment if such children were not turned over to Sequerra.

Weismann said that his feud with the JDC and Comunidade was one of long standing. It apparently started when he had some business dealings with a man named Reznick, who was a popular figure in the Comunidade. According to Weismann, Reznick exercised bad business judgment in a deal but claimed that he had been cheated and set to work to poison the minds

of the local Jewish community against him. He mentioned the "Ericera incident" and stated definitely that the JDC and Comunidade had been responsible for his being sent to a forced residence. He told me that his agent who clandestinely brought from Spain to Portugal the children which had been evacuated from France had been arrested in Spain and this he attributed to the JDC (his agent was one Manuel Alves, who serves as an undercover agent for the OSS). Weissman stated that the JDC felt that it had a monopoly on rescue and relief work in the peninsula and resented any other organization having a hand in such. He condemned the JDC for doing nothing towards rescue, stating that in order to save lives at this time, one obviously had to use clandestine methods which the JDC had consistently refused to do until March of this year. I briefly mentioned that this was perhaps attributable to the United States Government, but Weissman apparently paid little attention to this.

Weissman stated that he had written a letter to the JDC asking that they provide him with funds for rescue work but the JDC had flatly refused him in what he considered an unkind letter. I mentioned to Weissman that I did not know all the facts of the matter but asked how we could settle the grievances which he mentioned. He stated that the only thing he desired to do was to be allowed to operate but this the JDC would not permit because it consistently put obstacles in his way. He was agreeable to sitting down with representatives of the JDC and discussing the matter and hoped that some solution could be found that would permit all the interested parties to work effectively.

He suggested that I go out to Pasco d'Arcos and see the thirteen refugee children presently there and, if I so desired, to talk with them. I told him I would do this.

Conversations with Pilpel and Margolis

Robert Pilpel is in charge of the JDC's Lisbon office and in the European organization is subordinate only to Dr. Joseph C. Schwartz, who at the time of my stay in Portugal was in Africa, Italy and Turkey.

Schwartz apparently made some effort to return to Portugal from Italy while I was in Lisbon but could not return because of the security regulations adopted for a while in French North Africa which did not permit travellers passing through.

Laura Margolis was in Lisbon on her way to Barcelona where she was to be stationed in the JDC offices. She previously had been in Shanghai and had been evacuated in a Gripsholm exchange.

Both Pilpel and Margolis were extremely courteous. They took the position that there was no problem with the WJC since they, the JDC, were doing nothing to interfere with the WJC's operations. They pointed out that the WJC had, so to speak, kidnapped 13 of their children but they felt this was all over since the WJC did not have sufficient funds to finance rescue work, that the disagreement had passed its worst stages and that now Weismann would have to be content to be quiet and do such work as he could. Incidentally, they thought he could do nothing in the rescue field.

They felt that I should go to Spain and look into the facts. At one point Margolis mentioned that if I found there that the JDC was in

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the wrong, then we could talk about that. The JDC representatives were not as bitter towards Weismann as I had expected. They admitted that they had not known him long but that what they had heard of him had been unfavorable. Pilpel pointed out that he was an impulsive fellow and explained the difficulties which Weismann had attributed to the JDC as occurrences which Weismann's own conduct had brought about. I mentioned to the JDC representatives the possibility of coordinating rescue work. They felt there was no necessity for such, pointing out that they alone had the organization and funds in Spain. According to them, Dr. Schwartz had recently been in Spain and had concluded that neither by working with the WJC nor giving the latter funds could more people be rescued.

Pilpel showed me copies of his correspondence with Weismann, in which Weismann had requested funds for rescue projects. Copies of such correspondence are attached hereto.

In my many talks with the JDC representatives, I discovered that they did not think very highly of Dr. Dexter, the Board's representative. I asked Pilpel why the relations between Dr. Dexter and the JDC were not more cordial and he replied that they had not had many dealings with Dexter since Schwartz had known him before his appointment and recognized his incompetence for such a position at the time of his appointment. Also, they thought that Dexter was doing all within his power to push the WJC, at their expense. Both Pilpel and Margolis made it clear that they were disappointed in what they had seen of the Board's operations in Lisbon. They had expected great things from the reports which they

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had received from their people in New York. I explained to the JDC representatives that my purpose was to get at the bottom of this problem and that I would be glad to talk with any people whom they would care to have me see. They mentioned that they would like to arrange conferences with some of the people in the Comunidade.

In the course of my stay in Lisbon, I saw the JDC representatives many times. In fact, I spent much more time with them than with Weismann and persons whom he had requested me to see.

Conversation with Dr. Amzalac

Pilpel and I spent one Saturday afternoon with Dr. Amzalac, who is the head of the Jewish Community in Lisbon. Dr. Amzalac, like most of the Lisbon community, is a Sephardic Jew. He is a man of around 60 years of age and in bad health. He is a professor in the university in Lisbon and apparently Portugal's foremost economic scholar. Dr. Amzalac has advised Salazar on many things and greatly prizes this friendship. (Incidentally, the visible economic development of Portugal is no indication that he has given Salazar good advice.)

Pilpel asked Dr. Amzalac to trace for me the refugee problem in Portugal and what the Comunidade had done in this connection. In a tedious manner, he gave me a history of the refugee situation in Portugal. It can be summed up by saying there were many refugees who came to Portugal. The Comunidade cared for them and obtained havens for most of them elsewhere. He was very proud of the fine relations which the Comunidade had with the police and the Portuguese government. In taking action in the refugee field, the Comunidade always considered this fine relationship, did nothing to disturb it, and always took into account the Portuguese mentality in planning and making decisions. It seemed clear to me that Dr. Amzalac did not have much interest in saving human life but was more interested in mere symbols of social welfare work. After a while, he got onto the subject of Weissman and it was very clear that he had had no relations with him and would have none. He told me that Weissman was not in good favor with the police and was always engaged in activity with which the Comunidade could not afford to be associated. Weissman did not understand the Portuguese mentality.

The Ericera project was mentioned and Dr. Amzalac said this was a serious mistake. The idea of having a forced residence for clandestines entering the country and where clandestines entering the country in the future could go, resulted in the Portuguese government's increasing its border restrictions (my conversation disclosed no evidence that this project resulted in the strengthening of Portuguese border controls).

Dr. Amzalac was very bitter on the subject of Weissman and stated that he had not properly conducted himself but refused to be concrete in his accusations. He concluded by saying that he had been invited to represent Portugal at the next meeting of the World Jewish Congress and while he would like to attend, he had refused because Weissman represented the World Jewish Congress in Lisbon. He admitted that he did not personally know Weissman.

From this conversation, I got the opinion that Dr. Amzalac was associated with welfare projects in Lisbon merely because it added to his prestige. I felt that he hadn't the slightest interest in rescuing Jews from occupied territory and I was certain that if it were up to me to arrange some sort of reconciliation between Weissman and Dr. Amzalac, that it was utterly impossible because the element of personalities loomed too large. I was most unfavorably impressed with Dr. Amzalac and felt that his interests were opposed to those of the Board, and probably society in general.

Conversation with Dr. Baruel

Dr. Baruel is a practicing physician in Lisbon. He was born in Brazil and is about 45 years of age. He is in charge of the relief and welfare operations of the Comunidade. Such operations have expanded to such an extent in the last few years, I am told, that he has dropped a part of his medical practice and devotes considerable time to Comunidade affairs. Dr. Baruel took me through the offices of the Comunidade and apparently was under the impression that I was

interested in seeing that JDC money was properly spent because he spent considerable time going over the Comunidade accounting system with me. I, of course, praised highly the system and the work done by the Comunidade and, I think, got over to him the interests and objectives of the TRB. In addition to paying subsistence, medical charges, etc. for refugees, the Comunidade runs what is known as a community kitchen, where refugees or other unfortunates are able to obtain food. The Comunidade also runs a hospital in Lisbon.

Dr. Baruel carefully traced for me what the Comunidade had done towards caring for refugees in Lisbon and obviously it has done a good job. It is clear, however, that its idea is to care for refugees once they get to Lisbon but does not concern itself with getting them there. And, I think it can be said that the Comunidade is indifferent if not opposed to the further entrance of refugees into Portugal.

Of his own accord, Dr. Baruel mentioned Weissman. He was not as bitter concerning him as was Dr. Amzalac, but made the point that Mr. Weissman did not understand the Portuguese mentality and that the Comunidade could not work with him. As Dr. Baruel put it, Weissman was duplicating adequate relief facilities already existing in Portugal and was attempting to "buck" the Comunidade. Dr. Baruel did mention that there was an understanding that Mr. Weissman's relations with the Portuguese International Police were not good. The Comunidade, of course, could not work with him since they worked with many relief organizations, such as the Portuguese Red Cross, which organization refused to have anything to do with Weissman. Dr. Baruel stated that he would like to have me meet some of the representatives of the Portuguese Red Cross, and such was arranged.

Conversation with Portuguese Red Cross

I met and talked with several members of the ~~Portuguese~~ Red Cross. They told me of their interest in caring for refugee children in Portugal and emphasized, of course, that their relations with the Government and the International Police were very good. They pointed out, however, that there were some working in the refugee field in Portugal whose relations with the International Police were not good, and finally, of their own accord, got around to mentioning Weissman. They took more or less the same line concerning Weissman that Dr. Amzalac had taken but were hardly as strong in their language. I appeared curious concerning this man and they promised to give me a secret document which would tell me a great deal about him. After many promises that the document would be treated in confidence (revealed only to my colleagues on the Board) I received the promised document from the Portuguese Red Cross. The document stated that the Portuguese Red Cross could not work with Dr. Weissman, because

1. His organization, the WJC, was not accredited to them.
2. Even if it were, they could not work with Weissman since they did not know that he was the representative of the WJC, as they had never seen his credentials.
3. They were informed that he was viewed with disfavor by the police since the Portuguese considered him to be trafficking in refugees and making money out of the refugee business. It is interesting to note at this point that Weissman makes the same allegation concerning individuals in the Comunidade.

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Conversation with Rabbi Disendruck

I met Dr. Disendruck in my tour of the Comunidade establishment. Dr. Disendruck is the Rabbi for the Jewish Community of Lisbon and also works in the relief offices of the Comunidade. He is a linguist, and his job at the Comunidade is to pass upon requests for relief made by refugees before passing such requests on to other administrative officials with his recommendations. Weissman asked that I talk with the Rabbi.

I opened my conversation with Rabbi Disendruck by telling him that I was interested in the dispute which had been raging for some time between the JDC and WJC, and, since he was Rabbi of the community, I felt that he could give a fair and impartial account as to what had happened in Lisbon. The Rabbi gave me a thumbnail sketch of the various personalities involved. He mentioned Weissman's getting off on the wrong foot through his dealings with Reznick and of the two men, Weissman and Reznick, he seemed to think there was no question but that Weissman was the man of more character. He appeared to know Reznick well since he was a member of his flock. He mentioned Anzalac as a man who was not interested in either religious or welfare work but was interested only in adding to the prestige of Anzalac. Anzalac and most of the Jewish community of Lisbon were Sephardic Jews who had more or less divorced themselves from Jewish problems and were not interested in rescue of Jews who were in imminent danger of death. Also, they hesitated before having anything to do with Polish and Central European Jews. He seemed to think that they (Sephardic

Jews) could not understand that there were Jews in Poland, Germany, France, Hungary, etc, who were being killed since the same thing had not happened to those living in Lisbon. He mentioned one case in particular. He said that in June of 1943, a woman had succeeded in leaving Paris and clandestinely making her way into Spain and from there to Portugal, where she applied to the Comunidade for relief. She talked with Amon, the chief accountant for the Comunidade, and he asked her "Madam, why did you leave Paris?"

The Rabbi apparently had tried to arouse the interest of the community in rescue work but had been unsuccessful. He had, he said, on many occasions taken this matter to Dr. Schwartz and asked the Doctor to use his influence to arouse the interest of the community and get the community to carry out concerted rescue efforts. According to the Rabbi, Dr. Schwartz understood the attitude of the community and lamented it as did the Rabbi but in their conversations would always tell the Rabbi "But Rabbi, it is your community. Why don't you straighten it out?" Nevertheless, the Rabbi greatly admired Schwartz. He didn't think so much of the Lisbon community. He disliked Amzalac intensely but thought that Baruel was a nice fellow, but completely under the domination of Amzalac. He pointed out that Baruel drew a salary of about \$300.00 each month from the JDC and that the JDC could compel the Comunidade to act according to JDC desires.

According to Rabbi Disendruck, Weissman had been active in trying to rescue children from Spain for quite some time. He had been handicapped because he had no money. When he did get money from the WRB, some children were brought out. The Rabbi knew of the allegations on each side that the other had taken its children. In the Rabbi's

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opinion, the JDC was in the wrong in this and he gave me a case in which he related that his sister had two children in France which he, the Rabbi, desired to have evacuated to Spain. Accordingly, his sister wrote a letter to the people in France who had the children, requesting them to deliver them up to a guide who would call for them. This letter was given by the Rabbi to Weissman, who in turn gave it to Croustillon. Time passed and the next thing the Rabbi heard was that the children had safely arrived in Spain and were in the hands of Dr. Sequerra.

The Rabbi stated that he had tried without success to bring the Comunidade-JDC and WJC together. He lamented greatly that in such a time as this, when human life was at stake, rescue activities should be disrupted because of internecine warfare.

Conversations with Refugees

1. Refugees at Caldas da Rainha

I spent one morning at Caldas da Rainha, which is a forced residence for refugees, talking with many refugees who had come in recent times from France. Most of these refugees were of military age who were attempting to go either to England or Palestine to fight. Most of them had been helped in their escape by what they described as the Jewish underground, which, they said, was composed of Zionists. They mentioned the difficulties in escape and that refugee parties took from two to five days to come across the Pyrenees. According to all of those people, it was extremely difficult to cross the Pyrenees

because of the terrain and the German patrols. The Germans, apparently, patrol the border with patrols of two men who stay together. They also use dogs. Some of the refugees crossing the border have been armed and have killed the German guards and dogs.

At Caldas da Rainha, I also talked with the camp representatives of the Comunidade, the Poles and Unitarian Service Committee. (These conversations were before the invasion). All pointed out, however, that it was becoming increasingly difficult to cross the border because the German patrols had been strengthened. They all made the point that the only way to save people was to increase clandestine rescue activity. Furthermore, they stated that prevailing conditions in Portugal and Spain did not offer much of an incentive to refugees in France to attempt to escape. In this connection, they mentioned the prisons in Spain in which many of the refugees were placed before finally being released, and they stressed the fact that in Portugal refugees were forced to live in fixed residences and could not work except with the permission of the Portuguese government. Such permission, I gathered, was seldom, if ever, given.

2. Refugee children at Pasco d'Arcos

Weissman, in the name of the WJC, has rented a house at Pasco d'Arcos (equipped with furniture purchased with War Refugee Board funds advanced by Dexter), and when I was in Portugal he had thirteen children there. During my stay in Portugal, the Portuguese International Police designated Pasco d'Arcos as the fixed residence for children coming into Portugal. I found that Dexter and Hart, without consulting the JDC and asking its plans, requested that Pasco d'Arcos be used as a fixed residence and that permission be granted for 300 children to

enter from Spain into Portugal provided they resided at Pasco d'Arcos. The request was granted by the Portuguese police. However, it appeared that the JDC had other plans.

The use of a very fine house about 20 miles from Lisbon had been given to the Comunidade and the JDC for refugee children. This, however, they were not able to use, at least at the time of my departure from Portugal, because of this ruling of the International Police which was given at the request of Dexter and Hart. This incident, I might add, came close to upsetting any plan for getting the respective parties together into any sort of agreement.

Pursuant to an invitation from Mr. Weisman, Mr. Hart, Dexter and I called at the house for the refugee children one afternoon and talked with several of the children, whom we picked at random. The children described the details of their escape, which are interesting. It appears that they had all been in Toulouse and their parents had been taken by the Germans. These children had come into Spain in two groups. In each case (groups of 6 and 7), they had been told that they were going for a walk and after they had walked from the homes in which they were stationed, they were picked up by truck and told that they were going to Palestine. They proceeded for a distance by truck until they were met by guides, who took them across the border in a trip which lasted better than two days. The children stopped regularly at cottages along the way and were fed. Sometimes, they slept a while at night, but never got a full night's sleep. In fact, most of their travel was at night and it seems they always walked along the railroad and through railroad tunnels. Just before they arrived at the French border, they were met by some women and men who took them across by train, giving the appearance of a family. After they had crossed the border, the men disappeared and the women turned them over to a person who took them to Barcelona, where they saw a Mr. Herman (who is a sub-

ordinate of Mr. Croustillon), Mr. Herman gave the children to a person designated by Manuel Alves, (mentioned previously as Weismann's agent and an informant of the OSS) who clandestinely took them into Portugal. After they entered Portugal, their entrance was legalized.

I questioned several of the children concerning the people they met and people whom they were told they would see when they got to Spain. They said that they were told that they would be given to Mr. Herman and some had heard the name of Mr. Croustillon. None of them had heard of Sequerra during the trip. The children all said that when they left Toulouse, they had been told that they were going to Palestine.

They appeared to be contented at the reception center managed by Weismann and they seemed to be receiving good care there. The oldest of the children at the reception center is 14 and the youngest is 5.

Conversations with the various Intelligence Services

1. The Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Inasmuch as I had received reports before leaving the United States that there was some question concerning Weismann's loyalty, I attempted to make a check of him with the various Intelligence Services. Dennis Flynn, Legal Attache in the Embassy in Lisbon, stated that he had absolutely no doubts concerning Weismann's loyalty. I surmised that Weismann from time to time gave the FBI information. Flynn knew of the dispute between the WJC and the JDC and voluntarily contributed that, as far as he knew, Weismann had been mistreated by the Jewish community in Lisbon.

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2. O. S. S.

I gathered that Weismann and Dexter had previously discussed this matter with certain OSS representatives. The OSS people with whom I talked stated that they had no doubts concerning Weismann's political sympathies. They considered him to be trustworthy and reliable. I am informed that Weismann is used by the OSS.

3. Military Attache

Colonel Solberg, Military Attache in the American Embassy at Lisbon, stated that he had little information concerning Weismann. He had nothing against the man but understood that he was very impulsive and was likely to act without thinking things through. He also mentioned that Weismann at one time had dealings with a person who subsequently turned out to be a double agent. However, he felt that this should not be held against Weismann.

4. British Embassy

Mr. Hart advised me that a complete check of Weismann had been made at the British Embassy and that he had been found to be all right. At one time, he had some dealings with a person by the name of Alexander, who represented himself as being able to influence the Portuguese police. It subsequently developed that Alexander was a double agent, acting for both the Allies and the Germans and his activities lead to the unmasking of some Allied agents in the French underground who were caught and shot by the Nazis. (Colonel Solberg also gave me this report, as stated above.) However, the information of the British Embassy and the American

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Intelligence Services was to the effect that Alexander was known to have been used by both Embassies at the same time that Weismann was having dealings with him.

Conversation with Jacques Chatain

It will be recalled that Jacques Chatain has been mentioned in the cables sent by Weismann as a Frenchman of Catholic faith residing in Spain who has contacts in France and is extremely interested in saving children. Chatain is an elderly man whom I judge to be well in his 70's. He was a French Consular Official in Spain at the time of the French armistice and he served for some time thereafter. He is said to be a friend of General Huntsieger, one of the signers of the armistice on behalf of France. Intelligence reports vary on Chatain's political sympathies. Some classify him as a Vichyite; others say that he is not.

He apparently has been interested in cases of juvenile delinquency in France before the war and now wants to do something towards rescuing children. He is not altogether clear as to just what he wants to do, but states he wants to see many more come out of France than are presently coming out. He told me that at present nothing was being done to bring children out; that the only man who could bring children out was Croustillon. While I was in Spain, I found that the Embassy there, while not too sure of Chatain, believed him to be all right but Blickenstaff felt that he could add nothing to the sum total of children or others being rescued. However, he probably has some contacts with the Spanish Foreign Office but they are of doubtful value.

Chatain, of course, felt that the WRB should throw all of its support behind Weismann since he was able to do something to bring children out and since Weismann was interested primarily in children. I take it that any role played by Chatain in this drama is a minor one, and that in any event the WRB should not become involved with him in any way.

Conversation with Fritz Lichtenstein

Fritz Lichtenstein is the representative in Portugal of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. He issues such Palestine certificates as are available. Lichtenstein gave me a thorough story of the disagreement between Weismann and the JDC. His story in general coincided with that given to me by Rabbi Disendruck. Lichtenstein stated that he had urged Weismann to interest himself in rescue work some time ago since the JDC was doing nothing. Lichtenstein claimed that all of the people operating in the rescue work, namely Jeffroykin, Croustillon and Yarblum (in Switzerland) were all Jewish Agency men, that they had worked for his predecessor, Wilbert Israel, (killed in the same airplane crash which killed Leslie Howard) who was the first person engaged in clandestine rescue operations in the Iberian peninsula. However, Lichtenstein pointed out that the Jewish Agency did not have much money with which to operate in the Iberian peninsula at this time. (Apparently the Jewish Agency had spent considerable sums in the Black Sea area and was trying to get reimbursement from the JDC. If such reimbursement were obtained, the Jewish Agency possibly would have funds for rescue work in Spain.)

He stated that on various occasions he had tried to work out the dispute between the JDC and the WJC but had had absolutely no success. He described himself as a neutral in the matter since he desired to get along with both parties. He thought there were rights and wrongs on both sides. He could not understand why the parties could not voluntarily sit down together and form some sort of committee with which to operate their rescue and relief activities in the peninsula. He had suggested this but had gotten nowhere with it. He said that Weismann as a WJC delegate was a ardent Zionist and that he did not trust the JDC and the Communidade to care for children the way they should be cared for, namely giving them proper training and education for Palestine. He stated that Weismann felt that all children turned over to the JDC would be sent to the United States if possible and that Weismann wanted them to go to Palestine. Therefore, as Lichtenstein put it, Weismann felt obliged to set up duplicate relief facilities before he started his rescue work.

Lichtenstein doubted that the parties could be brought to agreement. However, he pointed out that there was no reason why they shouldn't since there was no question now as to where the children were going to be sent because the people in France who sent the children to Spain requested that they be sent to Palestine and the JDC had agreed to this. He stated that it was largely a question of personalities--the parties mutually distrusted each other and one would have nothing to do with the other. However, he thought Weismann would like to arrive at some sort of settlement but felt that the JDC did not since it wanted to monopolize the field of rescue and relief on the peninsula.

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Conversation with Elishu Dobkin

Elishu Dobkin is chief of the Immigration Service in Palestine and arrived in Lisbon around the 10th of June. Shortly after Dobkin arrived, he called and asked for an appointment to see me which, of course, I was very glad to give him. When I first talked with him, he had already talked with Pilpel and Weismann, as well as Lichtenstein, his representative in Lisbon, and, of course, he was thoroughly familiar with the situation there regarding the JDC and the WJC.

Dobkin was familiar with the evacuation operations which were being carried out in Turkey. He immediately requested that I send a cable to Washington, urging that ships for evacuation be used without first having obtained a German safe-conduct. Dobkin pointed out that this was the only way to evacuate people from Rumania and he stated that while Hirschmann should realize this, he had been unable to get Hirschmann to send in a recommendation to the WRB on this point. Dobkin stated that as a result of this delay, many lives were being lost. I told Dobkin that I felt he would receive some clarification on this point from Washington soon and that since I was in Portugal and not Turkey, I hesitated to make recommendations concerning procedures to be followed in Hirschmann's territory. (In a few days thereafter, Dobkin received word that Hirschmann had returned to Turkey and both he and the JDC had agreed to use ships without safe-conduct.)

Dobkin then proceeded to review the facts concerning the disagreement between the JDC and the WJC. He said that the Jewish Agency was the first to enter the rescue field in this area since it was the policy of the JDC until recently not to engage in other than "legal"

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activities in rescue work. Dobkin said that Jews everywhere knew of this dispute and lamented it. He further stated that there was no reason why all of the interested parties should not be able to coordinate their activities in some way. He mentioned Yarblum, Jeffroykin and Croustillon, and said all of these men originally had been contacted by the Jewish Agency representative in the peninsula. He stated that while the Jewish Agency presently had little money for use in rescue work in the peninsula, he felt that he had prior call upon the services of the named persons and unless this dispute were settled by working out a plan of coordination he would be obliged to find ways and means for the Jewish Agency to take over the rescue work in the Iberian peninsula. I was not particularly impressed by this in view of his statement as to shortage of funds. However, I was much impressed with Dobkin as a go-getter and a person who could better organize rescue work than anyone with whom I had previously spoken.

Dobkin stressed the point that some means should be found to make all of the interested parties sit down together and coordinate their activities to save the lives of those persons in enemy territory in danger of death. He pointed out that the difference between the parties was really one of personal distrust and that this was severely handicapping the possibilities of rescue through Sapin. Dobkin mentioned that coordination of rescue activities on the border would eliminate each side's trying to hire the others guides, competing for them, etc. He regretted very much the fact that the Comunidade and the WJC could not work together in Lisbon and that there was a duplication of relief facilities. However, he pointed out that the duplication had already taken place; that we were confronted with a situation and that we

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should proceed to work out the best solution possible under the circumstances. He mentioned that there really should be no difference between the parties since the JDC had agreed to send all children to Palestine unless they had relatives in the United States who could better care for them. Since these children were going to be sent to Palestine, he could see no good reason why they shouldn't be given Jewish training, that is, training in geography of Palestine, Hebrew, etc. As Dobkin understood the situation, the JDC did not oppose this but wanted to keep the children in its care and provide such training whereas Weismann and Croustillon did not trust the JDC to do this and would not turn over to them children which they rescued.

Dobkin stated that he had the confidence of both the parties and was going to spend considerable time talking to them in attempting to get the two together. In this connection, Dobkin was of great assistance and the part he played in breaking down their mutual distrust was a great contribution towards eventually working out the agreement which was signed. Through Dobkin, I was able to determine from time to time just how the two parties were reacting to my attempts to bring about an agreement.

Shortly after Dobkin's arrival, Dr. Bernstein of the HICEM gave a dinner which was to be attended by members of the JDC, the Comunidade, and others. Dr. Bernstein called Mr. Hart of the British Embassy and invited him. Hart immediately asked if Weismann were going to be present and when informed that he was not, stated that in view of the present situation he had to remain neutral and accordingly could not

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attend the dinner. He immediately called Dexter and informed him of the action which he had taken. When Dobkin called to invite Dexter, he received the same reply that Hart had given. Dexter did not consult me before giving Dr. Bernstein his reply. When Dexter told me what he had done, I was utterly amazed and told him that Pehle would be both amazed and disgusted when he heard this story. Dexter seemed to regret it but said that he had already given his decision to Dobkin and could not change it. I told him that if he could gracefully accept at that time, I would suggest that he do so. He stated that he couldn't. Following this, I got in touch with Pilpel and told him that if Bernstein would invite me to the dinner, I would be glad to attend as a representative of the WRB but that I would prefer that he didn't mention it to Bernstein unless the latter gave him a good opportunity. Bernstein subsequently told Pilpel that he intended inviting me but hesitated to do so after the reply which he had received from Dexter. Pilpel advised him to invite me which he did and I accepted. However, it subsequently developed that I was unable to attend because my Spanish visa was granted and I immediately left for Spain. This was all explained to Dobkin and he understood.

This story further shows the ineptness (to put it mildly) with which Dexter has handled the JDC-WJC situation. His handling of the matter has, no doubt, added to the differences between the two parties.

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Conversation with David Blickenstaff

David Blickenstaff is the director of the Representation in Spain of American Relief Organizations. He was in Portugal on vacation while I was there. My talk with him in Portugal is of interest largely in connection with my securing a Spanish visa with the blessing of the American Embassy.

When I found that Blickenstaff was in Lisbon, I carefully avoided him until the day before he was scheduled to depart for Spain, at which time I saw him and we talked about relief and rescue problems in Spain, what the Board was doing, its objectives, etc. I, of course, regretted that I had not been able to see Blickenstaff before since I felt that we had so much to discuss. He asked if I were coming to Spain. I told him I thought such a trip would be of great benefit to me and if he felt that we could profitably spend our time in discussing refugee matters, I would be glad to come to Spain. He thought it would be a great mistake if I didn't. I asked if he would undertake to clear such a trip with the Ambassador and he stated that he would. Shortly after his return to Spain, I received a cable stating that the Embassy had approved the trip and that I should apply for a visa. I made application and the visa was immediately granted.

Blickenstaff, like everyone else, knew of the dispute between the JDC and the WJC, the charges and counter charges of kidnapping, etc. He did not know Weismann but had worked closely with the JDC. He felt

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that the "kidnapping" dispute had arisen by virtue of a mistake. He related the story of Croustillon.

It appears that Croustillon had presented himself to the JDC when he came out of France and since he had no identification, both the JDC and Blickenstaff had refused to have anything to do with him. This alienated Croustillon from the JDC and he became acquainted and started working with Weissmann. However, when Jeffreykin came to Spain, he satisfactorily identified Croustillon and the JDC then obtained the latter's services, or so the JDC thought, Croustillon apparently was only prepared to work with the JDC if he could not work with Weissman. However, Croustillon recently had turned a group of the children coming out of France over to Weissman's representatives and this had started the charges and counter-charges of "kidnapping". Such, Blickenstaff thought, was unlikely to occur again since Schwartz had been to Spain and had secured the services of Croustillon. According to Blickenstaff, Croustillon was now working for the JDC.

Blickenstaff mentioned that he was not engaged in rescue activities, since such activities were handled by Sequerra. Blickenstaff's organization was charged with the relief aspects of the program in Spain.

Conversations in Spain relative to JDC--WJC Dispute

Shortly after I arrived in Madrid, I got in touch with Joseph Croustillon, since my conversations with the other parties had indicated that Croustillon was a key figure in the dispute.

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Croustillen (the name used in Spain, I do not know his real name) was, I believe, a professor of science in a university in Paris before the war. He is a man of around 45 years of age and has been in Spain since May, 1943. Croustillen states that he was the first representative of the "Jewish Army" to come to Spain for the purpose of carrying out rescue operations. He worked closely with Jeffreykin while in France and was supposed to handle the Spanish end of rescue operations when he left France. He was very much displeased at the treatment which he had received from the JDC in Spain. The story has been related above concerning how he came out of France and presented himself to the JDC which would have no dealings with him since he was unable to produce satisfactory identification. Jeffreykin later confirmed that he had sent a letter to the JDC concerning Croustillen but unfortunately it never arrived.

In my first conversation with Croustillen, I was guarded in my comments to him. However he told me

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that he was an ardent Zionist and that all the people in France who were working to send people out to Spain, both adults and children, were ardent Zionists - these people apparently call themselves the Jewish Army and were affiliated with the French underground movement called the Maquis. The Jewish Army apparently had been sending out mostly Jews of military age with the idea that they would go to Palestine and join the Jewish Army there. Croustillon said his relations with Sequerra were not particularly good. Croustillon wanted to take an active part in rescue operations but the JDC would have nothing to do with him until Jeffroykin came out and identified him. Meanwhile, Croustillon said that he had been put in touch with Weissman, who wanted to do something in the way of rescue work; and, according to Croustillon, Weissman wanted to do much more than the JDC. He had attempted to work with Weissman who had sent him some money to pay guides and a part of the children brought out by these guides had been sent to Lisbon. Other children had been brought out by money sent him by Weissman but these children had been handed over to Dr. Sequerra. After the first two groups of children were sent to Lisbon, Sequerra told him that unless the others were handed over to him, Sequerra, he would have Croustillon put in jail. Since he was a refugee, he was, of course, dependent upon the JDC for support in Spain and protection. Accordingly, he had no alternative other than to direct Herman, his subordinate, to turn the rescued children over to Sequerra.

Croustillon stated that if the WRB would back him, he could bring many persons out of occupied France. He pointed out, however, that such was now much more difficult than formerly since the Germans had increased

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their border patrols. Furthermore, the underground movement was interested in seeing that none of the wrong people came through after the invasion, and accordingly were blowing up railroad tracks, etc.

Croustillon said that he desired to work with Weissman instead of the JDC.

Croustillon was the most ardent Zionist with whom I came in contact. His idea appeared to be that no effort should be made to rescue Jewish children from France if they were going to be sent to the United States. He felt that they should all go to Palestine and stated that the French underground which was instrumental in sending these children out of France had been assured that such children would be sent to Palestine.

I saw Croustillon later in Barcelona, after I had talked with Sequerra and Jeffroykin. In this meeting, Croustillon mentioned a possible "accord" being reached between the interested parties and stated that he understood that such was the purpose of my visit. I explained, of course, that I would like to see the parties work more harmoniously but that my mission was to sum up the situation in Portugal and Spain. In this meeting, Croustillon told me that he was very unhappy in the present setup; that the JDC was not taking sufficiently energetic measures and that nothing really was being done. He informed me that I could tell Sequerra that he was not happy about the situation and he asked me to tell Pilpel when I returned to Lisbon that he, Croustillon, would no longer work in rescuing refugees unless the parties arrived at some kind of an accord.

I asked Croustillon if he were not subordinate to Jeffroykin in the Jewish army. He said he was but that such was unimportant since he, Croustillon, had the contacts through which people could be saved and that Jeffroykin didn't. According to him, both had the same contacts in France but he had the contacts in Spain. I was very much impressed by Croustillon's sincerity and it was obvious to me without his mentioning it that this man since May of 1943 had been risking his life to save people who were in danger.

When Croustillon was discussing the JDC, he was very bitter because they had refused to engage in rescue work until very recently. I explained that this was perhaps due to United States Government regulations. Croustillon's reply was "What are regulations and laws when the lives of people are in danger? The most that could have happened to the JDC was a fine and imprisonment, which is nothing when human life is at stake."

Conversations with Sequerra and Margolis

Most of my conversations with Sequerra had to do with his operations under Treasury license. Such, however, will be discussed later. In the conversations with him and Margolis concerning the dispute between the WJC and JDC, Margolis did most of the talking. I explained to Margolis that the WRB had only one interest, namely that of saving the lives of people who were in imminent danger of death and that I felt that this dispute was hindering efforts in this direction regardless of who was right or wrong concerning the rescue of the children.

I expressed my feeling that if the situation was to continue as at present, Croustillon could not be relied upon to put forth his best efforts and that we could best assure ourselves of each doing his utmost by organizing and coordinating rescue activities on the border. Margolis replied that Croustillon was no problem; that he would work with the JDC; that he was presently working with the JDC; and, that Jeffroykin out ranked him in the Jewish Army and could keep him in line. She was sure that the JDC could control Croustillon. I pointed out that they had not been able to do so in the past, mentioning that rescued children had been sent clandestinely into Portugal and she said that all this had been straightened out when Schwartz was in Spain. (It was obvious to me from my conversation with Croustillon that this matter had not been straightened out by Schwartz's visit).

Margolis took the same line which she had previously taken in Lisbon viz. that the WJC had nothing to offer, had no funds, no organization, and so why should the JDC care to team up with them since everything was going well. I suggested a coordinating committee for rescue work which would be composed of Jeffroykin, Croustillon, and a representative of the Jewish Agency acceptable to each of the other two. I pointed out that the Jewish Agency had Palestine certificates and I felt had something to contribute towards rescue work even though it might be short of funds. At this point, Jeffroykin stated that he could see the point in the JDC's working with the Jewish Agency but could not understand why the WJC had to be brought into the picture. I mentioned that Croustillon would be the WJC representative and since

they had said that they could control him, what worries could they have. Their worries seemed to be that the WJC would publicize the fact that the two organizations were working together and that Croustillon would advise Weissman of all the guides, etc. being used and that this information might leak out and thus disrupt all rescue work. Insofar as the Jewish Agency was concerned, Margolis was willing to talk to Dobkin when he arrived and see what he had to offer. She continually talked in terms of what people had to offer and I gathered she was not thinking so much in terms of efforts and contacts, but rather in terms of money. She seemed to insist in putting the question of coordinating rescue activities on an accounting basis. My reply to her comments was that there was no reason why everyone working on rescue work should not work together since such would eliminate competition for guides, etc. Secondly, I felt that such an organization could insure that all would devote their best efforts - I had in mind Croustillon. Also, I mentioned that such work heretofore had been kept secret and there would be no publicity in the future. I tried to dispel her fears of telling Weissman the names of guides, etc., pointing out that Croustillon had worked for Weissman before. Margolis tried to make much of the fact that if such an organization were set up, it would be immediately heralded in the Jewish Telegraph Agency. She confessed, however, that such agency was not an instrument of the WJC or Jewish Agency so far as she knew. (In one conversation with Weissman in which I told him that rescue work was to receive no publicity in the future, he charged that the WJC had never publicized such work but that the JDC had.)

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Conversation with Jules Jeffroykin.

Jeffroykin left France and entered Spain around the first of May of this year. In France, he represented the JDC. Jeffroykin was born in Russia but has, I believe, acquired French nationality.

Jeffroykin stated that in France all the interested parties worked together - the Jewish Army, (the Zionists group) the JDC, etc. It was all one organization and no one gave thought to getting credit for any one particular group. He mentioned that the JDC was instrumental in raising large sums of money whereas the other groups, in addition to supplying some funds, contributed in other ways. Thus, Jeffroykin was surprised to come into Spain and find a quarrel between the JDC and the WJC. However, he was inclined to dismiss lightly the efforts of the WJC.

I asked Jeffroykin about Croustillon. He mentioned that their personal relations were the best; that they had worked together in France; and that they were working together at present. Jeffroykin related the unfortunate occurrence in which Croustillon presented himself to the JDC without identification and thus the latter would have nothing to do with him. He mentioned, however, that this had now been cleared up. He felt that Croustillon would offer no further difficulties and would be content to work with the JDC. I questioned him relative to the importance of ranks in the Jewish Army and so far as I could make out from his replies, he was Croustillon's superior, but if Croustillon wanted to communicate to the people in France he was free to do so, and, as a matter of fact, Jeffroykin said he had no alternative other than to help him get such communications through.

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As stated above, when I mentioned the matter of an accord, Jeffroykin stated he agreed that there should be collaboration between the JDC and the Jewish Agency but he could not understand why the WJC had to be taken into this arrangement since it was not a rescue or relief organization but was purely a political organization.

Jeffroykin briefly explained to me the way in which adults were brought over the border and while he talked of rescuing all people in danger of death, I take it that he was more interested in people of military age than any other. It appears that people are brought out of France in convoys the size of which differ. They leave France with a French guide and are met by prearrangement at the Spanish border by a Spanish guide. The Spanish guide brings the convoy into Spain and leaves it before it presents itself to Spanish officials. Such Spanish officials take the convoy into custody and send it to the nearest provincial capital where the refugees are in the hands of the police of that province. Sequerra's men are advised of this and they agree to support the refugees. Accordingly, all refugees not of military age (20 to 40) are sent to boarding houses or hotels where they are free except that they have to report periodically to the police, get travel permits, etc. Those of military age are sent to Miranda and it is up to Blickenstaff and his organization to get them released. (Apparently the refugees have gotten wise to the "military age restrictions" and all now declare themselves as under 20 or over 40.) This, Blickenstaff told me, he could generally do but that it required more time now than previously. Many people are in ^{as long} Miranda for/as six months before being released.

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At the time of my talk with Jeffroykin, the invasion was just getting under way and I asked Jeffroykin whether in his opinion we could expect large numbers of refugees. On this he said he could not give me an answer since the matter depended on the progress of the invasion and the policies carried out by the Germans. He pointed out that if the invasion made slow progress and the Germans intensified their persecutions, it was likely that the Pyrenees would be crossed by many people. On the other hand, if the invasion moved rapidly, there probably would be few stateless refugees coming to Spain since most of them would prefer to remain in hiding in order to see what was going to happen.

In connection with the dispute, I mentioned the possibility of a committee composed of Jeffroykin, Croustillon and a Jewish Agency representative. Jeffroykin said that if such a committee were formed it made absolutely no sense to him for the Jewish Agency to send a man from Palestine to do the Jewish Agency work. Rather, he thought, the Jewish Agency should find a representative who was on the spot and familiar with the situation.

The Signing of the Agreement in Lisbon

When I returned to Lisbon from my trip to Spain, it seemed clear to me that our rescue efforts stood a greater chance of success if an arrangement could be worked out whereby all parties would work together. Such an arrangement, I thought, would have to provide not only for the coordination of activities on the Spanish border but would have to

provide for the care of children, else we would continue to receive charges and counter charges of the kidnapping of children. The mere agreement to work together in rescue activities would solve nothing so long as the Zionist group did not trust the JDC and the Comunidade in Lisbon to properly care for the children. Accordingly, while the Board's interest, generally speaking, is not in who does relief work so long as it is properly done, it was definitely to the Board's interest to work out an agreement for Portugal. I felt that the one answer to the problem lay in turning rescued children over to a committee in Portugal on which all parties would be represented. I started on this approach by sounding out the various parties, including Dobkin who added the refinement that we make this a Youth Alyiah committee, which would be affiliated with the Youth Alyiah movement in Palestine. I found no objection on the part of Pilpel to this suggestion provided we limited the function of the committee to seeing that those children going to Palestine received proper training. Accordingly, after preliminary talks with the parties, a meeting was held in the American Embassy at which time I put forth the idea of cooperation through the two committees, one on the Spanish border and one in Lisbon. The parties generally were in agreement. Accordingly, an agreement was drawn up and initialed which contained roughly the provisions of the final agreement. The Youth Alyiah committee in the original draft of the agreement was to be composed of Dr. Baruel of the Comunidade, Rabbi Disendruck mentioned above, Mr. Pilpel, Mr. Lichtenstein of the Jewish Agency, and

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Weissman of the JDC. However, it was agreed that each person would serve not as a representative of an organization but in his capacity as an individual. We then adjourned. Dobkin was to consult Rabbi Disendruck to see if he would serve and Pilpel and Dobkin would talk to Baruel.

At a meeting the following day, it was discovered that Baruel and the Comunidade took the position that he could not serve on the committee and that Disendruck, as an employee of the Comunidade, could not serve. The justification for such position was that the Comunidade had entered into an agreement with the JDC to work solely with it and Baruel desired to talk to Schwartz before committing himself. Furthermore, Baruel, after talking to Amzalac, made the point to Pilpel and Dobkin that for the time being he could not serve with Weissman. In explaining his position, he used the following example. In Portugal, if a man says that his wife is a prostitute and subsequently discovers that she isn't, he must stick by his original public declaration and disown his wife. The idea was that since Baruel and Amzalac had previously denounced Weissman, they had to stick to their story regardless of the fact. However, Baruel stated that insofar as providing a house for the care and maintenance of the children as provided in the agreement, the Comunidade would gladly do this.

In view of these developments, Pilpel suggested that the agreement be drawn up with Lichtenstein, Weissman and himself composing the Youth Alyiah committee with a provision in the agreement for adding two more members to the committee upon the unanimous vote of the committee. This suggestion met with the approval of all parties who signed an agreement to this effect. A copy of the agreement as signed is attached.

After everyone had signed, I discovered that Hart of the British Embassy was somewhat put out because he had not been asked to participate in the discussions. I had purposely omitted Hart from these discussions because of his pronounced prejudice against the JDC. However, I had Dexter invite Hart to dinner and after feeding him and giving him several drinks, I proceeded to explain the agreement and referred to his earlier remarks that it would be impossible to obtain any agreement. I also reminded him that he had expressed himself as hoping that I would be successful and that he had told me to do everything possible to bring about an accord. I pointed out that we had obtained an agreement of the parties and that now it was up to him to approve it in his capacity as a representative of the British Embassy. After some discussion, Hart signed.

I asked the participants not to cable their principals in the United States but found that Weismann had beat me to the gun on this and had cabled as soon as an agreement in principle had been reached. I thought that I had made it clear previously that no such communications were to be sent. Weismann pleaded that he did not understand. I think it possible, but unlikely, that he didn't. I told ^{the} parties to the agreement that I would explain it to their principals in the States. I must be frank to say that I think Pilpel understood that I would sell it to his principals in New York.

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Conversations in Spain with Ambassador and
Others Concerning Board Problems There

I arrived in Madrid June 19, 1944 at 11:30A.M. and was met at the airport by Niles W. Bond, Third Secretary of the Embassy, who is charged with handling refugee matters, and Covey Oliver, Special Assistant to the Ambassador, who is in charge of economic warfare matters. When we arrived in downtown Madrid, Bond left us and after I had obtained a hotel room, Oliver and I went to lunch.

I lunched and talked with Oliver from 1 to 4. In this time, I tried to get background concerning the situation in Spain, our Embassy, etc. I roughly outlined to Oliver some of the problems with which the Board was confronted in its operations in this area, emphasizing that we did not have a representative in Madrid. Oliver mentioned that the Ambassador appeared to be very much interested in refugee matters and that refugee problems were one of the few Embassy matters in which the Ambassador took a personal interest. All communications concerning refugees, both to and from Washington, were brought to the personal attention of the Ambassador.

Oliver stated that the Board in dealing with the Ambassador, was handicapped to some extent by the fact that Charles McDonald of FEA had just spent some nine months in Madrid on refugee matters. Apparently, McDonald had completed his work after he had been there about six weeks but couldn't seem to get himself called home. Accordingly, he spent his time in Madrid playing golf and doing nothing.

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Oliver was of the opinion that the Ambassador and the Embassy felt that the WRB was an unrealistic organization. He emphasized the importance of getting over to the Ambassador the idea that the Board was not composed of singing preachers and broken-down evangelists, but rather people who knew what they were about and had a record of accomplishment. He stated that if I could sell this point to the Ambassador he thought we stood some chance of success in our dealings with him.

According to Oliver, the Ambassador was very reluctant to let any independent organizations come into the Embassy and be accredited to the Spanish Government. In this connection, he mentioned certain unfortunate cases of OSS operations in which the OSS had been caught by the Spanish authorities buying pesetas in the black market. He said the Ambassador had a natural prejudice against letting anyone other than State Department people come in and that his unfortunate experiences with the OSS and certain experiences with the OWI had served to strengthen the Ambassador's feelings on this point.

We discussed Bond who is handling refugee matters in the Embassy. Oliver described Bond as a nice fellow who is liberal in his political and economic views. He didn't know just how Bond's sympathies were on the stateless refugees. He mentioned, however, that Bond had worked under Bolack, a former Counselor of the Embassy, who recently had been made Ambassador to Paraguay. Bolack apparently was well known for his anti-Semitic views. Oliver, however, thought Bond did not share Bolack's views but thought it was possible that Bolack to some extent had influenced Bond.

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I told Oliver that I was seeing the Ambassador at 7 o'clock at his request and Oliver suggested that I plug the line that the Board was composed of people who had a record of accomplishment who were trying to do a difficult job and would do it if given a chance.

Conversation with Bond

From 5 to 7 in the afternoon, I talked with Bond concerning refugee matters. Bond does not give the impression of being too energetic and does not volunteer too much information. Our conversation was largely a question and answer session with my asking the questions. I mentioned the coming visit of McDonald to Spain and Bond stated that the Ambassador would be happy to see him since he was well known to the Ambassador. However, he stated ^{that} the Embassy felt there was no necessity for accrediting him to the Spanish Government and had so informed Washington. He mentioned too that the matter of the Beard's having an accredited representative in Spain was a matter which would be discussed with McDonald on his arrival.

Bond talked about the apparent lack of coordination in Washington between WEB and the State Department. He gave as an example a communication from the State Department instructing the Embassy to ask the Spaniards to have as little contact as possible with the satellite countries and if possible reduce their representations there. Bond said this was followed by an instruction from the WEB asking the Spaniards if possible to increase their representation in Hungary. These things, he said, were obviously inconsistent and apparently he had the idea that the Beard was operating without clearing its cables

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with the Department of State. I told him that all Board cables are cleared through the State Department and it was up to the State Department to discover these inconsistencies since the State Department did not keep us advised of political cables transmitted.

Bond mentioned Sequerra's license and the fact that there was evidence of recent date showing that there had been civilian interference with convoys of escaped airmen crossing into Spain. He indicated that he was of the opinion that Sequerra's license should be revoked. I asked to see the evidence at hand and he informed me that it was in the hands of the Military Attache and that he would arrange for me to see it. He also expressed certain doubts concerning Sequerra and said these were shared by the Embassy. I asked him to tell me specifically/^{the} grounds on which such doubts were based and he was not very clear. I gathered that the main difficulty was that Sequerra was a Portuguese, a neutral, and in the opinion of the Embassy was likely to deal with either side in this war. It was clear from our conversation that Bond saw no necessity whatsoever for a Board representative since he felt that everything in connection with refugees was being ably handled by the Embassy and the Blickenstaff organization.

First Conversation with Ambassador Hayes

Pursuant to the Ambassador's request, Bond and I went in to see him at 7 o'clock. After the usual greetings, he stated that he hoped our conversations would make for better understanding between the Embassy and the Board and, of course, I told him that I shared his hope.

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I mentioned at the outset to the Ambassador that I would like for this first talk to be considered purely exploratory since I had just arrived in Spain and had no concrete suggestions to make other than those previously made in Board cables which the Embassy had declined to carry out. The Ambassador was agreeable to my suggestion and said that we could talk more definitively after I had had an opportunity to study the situation in Spain.

The Ambassador then outlined the refugee problem in Spain for the last two years. Roughly, many refugees had come to Spain from France, they had been well cared for and most of them had been evacuated. He laid great emphasis on the fact that at present there were few refugees in Spain, few were coming in and really there appeared to be no great refugee problem in Spain at this time. However, he was extremely critical of the way the Spanish evacuation program was being handled outside of Spain and mentioned that there had been delay after delay in getting the Sephardic Jews sent to Camp Fedhale.

At this point, I traced the history of the Board and pointed out that the Board was set up to deal with a phase of the refugee problem which the President thought was not adequately being handled before the Board's creation. I mentioned some of the Board's accomplishments and what the Board was attempting to do in the way of psychological warfare, evacuations, food and maintenance programs, etc. To allay any fears concerning the replacement of ^{the} Blickenstaff organization, I emphasized that the Board worked with and through

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private organizations and was not intended to replace them.

Following the line laid down by Oliver, I mentioned the personalities charged with the carrying of the Board's policies, mentioning particularly Pehle, and that he had a record of accomplishment and for that reason had been asked to carry out the President's directive and that the Board proposed to carry out the President's directive or know the reason why. I mentioned the personal interests of the President, Secretary Hull, Secretary Morgenthau and various other Government officials. Finally, I brought the history of the Board up to the Spanish evacuation question and told him that the Board was responsible for the final evacuation of the Sephardics, that we had taken a firm stand on this question and insisted that these people be removed from Spain without further delay.

The Ambassador felt that some of the Board's proposals were unrealistic, such as the proposal for camps. He mentioned that there was not sufficient refugee traffic to justify such a proposal. Furthermore, it would irritate the Spanish since they would consider such a scheme an infringement of their sovereignty. To this I replied that the camp idea was intended to stimulate the refugee traffic and was not suggested with the idea that it would merely be set up to accommodate those refugees presently coming into Spain. Concerning the Spanish sovereignty point, I stated that it would be presumptuous for me to express an opinion on the possible Spanish reaction but I felt that if we really wanted to put the project over we could present it in such a way that their feelings would not be hurt. With regard to his

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statement of unrealistic suggestions, I mentioned to the Ambassador that it was quite possible that we had in the past and would continue to make unrealistic proposals so long as we did not have a representative in Spain. The Ambassador mentioned that the matter of a representative was going to be discussed with McDonald when he arrived.

Bend came in with his favorite point, namely that the Embassy had the feeling that the Board policies were not properly cleared in the Department of State and were at times inconsistent with other departmental policies. I repeated to him the answer which I had previously given. The Ambassador, however, said that not only were they inconsistent with certain over-all policies, but that they were inconsistent in Spain with what we were attempting to do there. He mentioned the proposal to relax the border at a time when we were trying to keep German agents out and were asking the Spaniards to stop shipments of wolfram that were being smuggled to Germany. I was able to make a distinction between human beings and bags of wolfram and on the German agent point, I could not see that it was a valid one if as the Ambassador previously has said, the Spaniards weren't turning any people back at the border anyhow. His answer was that the Board's program would give German agents facilities.

We had a long discussion concerning the attitude of the Spanish Government and ^{he} said that the Spanish Government was cooperating not only on refugee matters but on many other things about which the American public was apparently not informed. In connection with his

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statements as to the cooperation of the Spanish Government, it is interesting to note that Blickenstaff showed me a copy of a letter which the Ambassador had written to Jordana (Spanish Foreign Minister) relative to the treatment which Sephardic Jews had received in Spain, in which the Ambassador stated that such treatment could only lead one to believe that the Spanish were following a doctrine of anti-Semitism, comparable to that being followed by Germany.

Upon Bond's prompting, the Ambassador had a great deal to say concerning Sequerra's license. His attitude appeared to be the same as Bond's and apparently both were ready to team up with the military and put this up to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asking that the license be revoked. According to the Ambassador, these American funds should only be spent by an American and not by a Portuguese concerning whom there were some doubts. Also, the license as drawn could create many dangers by allowing dealing with the enemy, etc. Furthermore, there had been those cases which Bond had mentioned in which there had been interference with the passage of Allied airmen. The facts of these cases were to be given to me by the military. I mentioned to the Ambassador that before we took any action we should make a thorough investigation of Sequerra's operations and we should not take action against Sequerra if his operations were not responsible for the interference. With this, the Ambassador agreed. Bond mentioned that Sequerra's operations were in violation of Spanish exchange control laws. I told him that it was my understanding that Sequerra's pesetas were purchased by his organization in New York at the official rate and that he was only spending pesetas in Spain and was not sending

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funds to France. I asked how that could possibly violate Spanish control laws and Bond was unable to answer.

The Ambassador suggested that I go to Barcelona and carefully investigate Sequerra's operations and discuss such with him after I had returned. I was, of course, happy to be going to Barcelona with the Ambassador's blessings.

In connection with the Board's desire to get a representative into Spain, I mentioned to the Ambassador that we were receiving numerous inquiries from newspapers as to our operations in Spain and we were forced to tell them that we had no comment at the present time but that he, of course, appreciated such could not go on indefinitely. At this, the Ambassador went into a long discussion of the newspaper "PM" -- how unfairly it had painted his negotiations with the Spanish Government. He mentioned the wolfram articles and charged that this newspaper was guilty of making "irresponsible criticism". Having previously decided that I was going to say or do nothing which would in any way irritate the Ambassador, I replied that I supposed that he had long since ceased hoping for 100% approval of any action which he might take in either public or personal life. I gathered too from the Ambassador's statements concerning the newspaper criticism that while he was sensitive to such criticism, he would not be influenced by it. He would prefer to die for principle. He would do what he thought best regardless of what others did or said.

This first meeting with the Ambassador was extremely cordial and I had high hopes that the Board might be able to accomplish something in Spain.

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Conversations with Bond and other Embassy Officers

Following my conversation with the Ambassador, I spent three days in Madrid talking with Bond, people in the military attache's office, and some of the British and American security officers relative to the general refugee situation in Spain.

Bond and I went over the exchange of cables between the Board and the Embassy and I tried to ascertain specifically the Embassy's objections. On this point, I was not successful. However, I concluded that there was no one in the Embassy who had the same interests or feelings concerning refugees as the Board. Bond continually made the point that the Board was not relying upon the experience which the Embassy had obtained in working with these matters. I pointed out that in many of the cables it seemed that the Embassy had been unnecessarily harsh in its replies and that such had caused the Board to wonder about the Embassy's earnest desires to do anything on these matters. I noticed in looking at the Embassy's copies of cables that all were drafted by Bond except the cable in response to the Board's cable stating that McDonald was coming to Spain. In that case, the Embassy cable was drafted by Walton Butterworth, Counsellor of Embassy. It seemed abundantly clear that Bond felt that there was presently no refugee problem in Spain and that the Embassy was doing everything possible. At one point, I referred to my comment to the Ambassador concerning newspaper inquiries relative to the Board's program in Spain. Bond's idea was that the Board should reply that our program in Spain was being ably carried out by the Embassy.

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It is interesting to note that I was never given Embassy files on refugee matters, if such in fact existed. When I would tell Bond that I desired to see certain cables, he would always ask me to specify cables and he would obtain them. I asked to see general files on refugee matters and Bond produced certain dispatches which were not contained in any one file but which apparently had been selected for me to read. I subsequently discovered in talking with Blickenstaff that there was considerable correspondence in the Embassy concerning refugee matters which I had not seen.

My talk with the security officers in the Embassy consisted largely of inquiries about Sequerra, Croustillen and Jeffreykin. There was no adverse information concerning any of these people except that the FBI understood that Jeffreykin was a Communist agent. I took up this matter with Frank Siscoe, (who is the Legal Attache in Madrid and who is a good friend of mine, having been stationed with me for a while in Buenos Aires,) and explained to him that Jeffreykin was interested in refugee work and told him of the part which he had played. Siscoe stated that on the basis of our conversation, he felt that the reports concerning Jeffreykin were not true. He indicated that he would have no objection to clearing a visa application to the United States for him.

In my talks with various of the security and intelligence officers, I get the impression that they opposed the refugee traffic of the nature carried on by Sequerra because they felt it gave an opportunity for

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German agents to enter Spain, which argument as stated above makes no sense, since there is every reason to believe that German agents can come in anyhow if they so desire. Also, they felt that certain intelligence channels with France were possibly being prejudiced. This point they were never able to clarify for me. I suppose that they had the feeling that their work was the only important work and without stepping to think of what was involved in refugee matters, they automatically took the position that any other traffic across the border other than on the part of their intelligence couriers jeopardized the chances of their agents passing back and forth. The security officers were not particularly concerned by the fact that the Beard was attempting to save the lives of innocent people. They seemed to feel that refugees were expendable.

First Conversation with Butterworth

Walton Butterworth was supposed to have attended the first conference which I had with the Ambassador. He was, however, unable to attend and subsequently asked that I call on him for a talk. Butterworth started the conversation by referring to his former Treasury experience. He didn't seem too kindly disposed towards the Treasury. He mentioned the fact that he felt that the Treasury could always use more men on a single problem than any other Government organization and it was a mystery to him that anything was ever accomplished. After a few preliminaries concerning the Treasury and various personalities (including Dr. White) he asked what the WFB had in mind for Spain. I referred him, of course, to the exchange of cables between the Embassy and the Beard and told him that since I had just arrived in Spain, I felt hardly prepared to suggest anything more at the present. At this

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point, Butterworth went into a long song and dance about independent agencies in Washington all wanting to send representatives out to the various Embassies. As he put it, every independent agency felt that its work was written in capital letters and that its functions had to be performed regardless of all else. Many times there were independent agencies working at cross purposes. It was, of course, the duty of the Embassy to decide what best served the interests of our Government and iron out these differences between these independent agencies in the field. (I take it that he was subtly telling me that the interests of OSS and other security officers came first.) Likewise, there was a limit to the number of persons who could come into the Embassy and the Ambassador, of course, had to make the determination as to which performed the most useful functions in connection with the ever all war effort.

Butterworth then talked at length about the refugee situation and, of course, plugged the same line taken by the others—that while he hadn't been in the Embassy throughout the handling of all refugee matters, he was inclined to think that the Embassy had done a good job. Butterworth spent considerable time talking without having heard anything that I might have to say on the points which he raised. When he had finished, I told him that he seemed exceedingly well informed on the refugee problem and I asked his suggestions concerning action which the Board should take in Spain. He, of course, didn't know. I asked if he thought it would be wise for the Board to do nothing in the peninsula and when we wrote our report to the President explaining how we had carried out his directive, state that we had done nothing in the peninsula

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since the Embassy felt that there was nothing there to be done. Butterworth stated that he, of course, hadn't suggested this but had merely been talking in general terms about the refugee situation. He excused himself at this point, saying he had to see the Ambassador and hoped we would have an opportunity to talk again after I had looked over the situation in Spain. I did have another talk with Butterworth before leaving Spain, the substance of which will be set out below.

Conversation with Military Attache's Office

In view of the statements made by Bond and the Ambassador concerning Sequerra's activities and evidence in the hands of the military authorities, I arranged to have talks with Colonel Clark, who, in the past, had handled the evacuation of Allied airmen and Lieut. Col. Spillman, Assistant Military Attache for Air, who recently had undertaken to handle these matters. Col. Clark in my talk with him seemed a little less reasonable than Spillman. He seemed inclined to believe, without investigation, that Sequerra's activities were responsible for interference with the military convoys. I told him that if so, the matter would be corrected, pointing out, of course, that Sequerra's operations were not Board operations directly but operations in which the Board had an interest since it had been responsible for his license being granted and since it was charged with responsibility for rescue work. Col. Clark was agreeable that we should investigate to determine precisely what the facts were.

Lt. Col. Spillman in my conversation with him mentioned two specific cases in which civilian refugees had bought their ways into military

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convoys. One was a small group of civilians which had some elderly people in the group and a woman with a six months' old baby. These people had joined the military convoy on the French side of the border and with great delay, etc., it had proceeded to Spain. The case on which Lt. Col. Spillman placed the greatest emphasis was one that happened shortly before the 10th of June. In this case, there were some 35 civilian refugees, including a woman with a young baby and a man with a club foot. All of these refugees had many bundles which they were taking with them. The military convoy found these people waiting for them at a place in France some distance before crossing the border. The guides insisted that the aviators, some of whom had been wounded, help carry the bundles of the refugees. The progress of the convoy was very slow. Finally, the aviators got tired of carrying the bundles and being ingenious fellows, they proceeded to stump their toes and fall near cliffs, always managing to drop the bundles over the cliffs. Also, according to the story which the aviators had given Spillman, the refugees had food which they refused to share with the aviators. As a result of the mingling of convoys, a journey which should have taken two days, took five. When the convoy approached the place where the German patrols passed, it was near time for a patrol. Accordingly, the convoy broke up, some waiting until after the patrol passed to go ahead, others proceeding to Spain. The aviators, or what had been one group of eight aviators, broke up into two groups of four. Of those, four got across safely whereas the other four were apprehended because they were weak and could not escape when they saw the German patrol coming. Spillman

did not know what had happened to the four who were caught. He stated that such interference had to be stopped since Allied aviators should have priority on crossing the border, pointing out that the U.S. Government had a large investment in these trained men and that they should be rescued so they could fly again. With that, I agreed and told him I planned to leave for Barcelona soon to make a thorough investigation.

Spillman later introduced me to Mr. Hay, a civilian employee of the War Department, who had recently come to Spain as Special Attache and whose particular job there was to look after military refugees and speed their evacuation from Spain through Gibraltar as soon as possible. Hay and I discussed the question. He told me that he was going to Barcelona soon where he would see me and where we would make independent investigations of the civilian interferences with the military convoys. Both Spillman and Hay were anxious to find out whether Sequerra's operations were responsible for any of the cases mentioned. They did not take the attitude toward which Bond appeared to be inclined, viz. to stop Sequerra's operations and see if that improved things.

Conversation with Forsythe

On Friday, June 23, I left by automobile for Barcelona but did not arrive there on Saturday in sufficient time to talk with any of the people whom I wished to see. Early Monday morning, I called on Forsythe of our Consulate, who was charged with handling refugee matters.

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Forsythe appeared to have a good understanding of the refugee problem and was sympathetic with the Beard's point of view. He felt that everything possible should be done to save human life. As he put it, it was better if human life could be saved without resorting to clandestine operations. However, there were times when clandestine operations had to be used. Forsythe admitted that he had been engaged in some clandestine refugee activity back "when the situation was worse." Forsythe mentioned that the Embassy took a different view of the refugee situation from his because the Embassy looked upon the problem as being nothing more than dealing with the Foreign Office and other governments from time to time, whereas he was nearer to operations and saw many of the things that had to be done. He spoke very highly of Sequerra and thought he was an able operator. He had found him cooperative in all things and believed that there was no question concerning his loyalty. In order to save refugees, Sequerra had, he said, perhaps done some things that one doesn't do in peace time but Forsythe added "so have the rest of us."

I mentioned to Forsythe the stories which the military attaches' office had given me. Of these, Forsythe knew nothing. He had heard of some of the cases in which there had been interference with military refugees but had heard of no specific cases for some time and thought there would probably be no more cases. I inquired concerning Sequerra's operations and he stated that, so far as he knew, Sequerra was sending no funds into France but asked me to investigate this point, which I subsequently did.

I asked Forsythe whether he thought there would be a great influx of refugees. That, he could not answer definitely but he doubted that there would be. Such, he pointed out, depended upon future developments about which no one at the present time knew.

After I had talked with Sequerra, I again discussed the matter with Forsythe who said that my understanding of Sequerra's activities coincided with his.

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He mentioned, however, that Sequerra had filed no reports under the license which had been issued and he felt it advisable for Sequerra to report to him and he would report to the Embassy. With that I agreed. I understand that subsequent to my departure, Forsythe sent a report to the Embassy which stated that there was no ground for believing that the interferences with the escape of Allied air men was in any way related to Sequerra's operations.

Of the many State Department career officers with whom I discussed the refugee question, Forsythe was the only one who appeared to have a real understanding of the problem and who appeared willing to do something about it. I take it that all of his activities in the past are not known to the Embassy.

Conversations with Sequerra, Margolis and Jeffroykin

My conversations with Sequerra, Margolis and Jeffroykin relative to the JDC - WJC dispute are outlined above, and relate briefly to Sequerra's operations. In such talks, I mentioned the Embassy's fears and asked Sequerra to give me a very frank description of his operations. Sequerra stated that he had sent no money into France, notwithstanding that he was licensed to do so. His operations consisted in paying Spanish guides who went to the French border, met French guides, took from them the convoy of refugees and escorted them into Spain. He mentioned furthermore that he had never purchased pesetas in the black market since the pesetas were bought by the JDC organization in New York and made available to him.

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Both Sequerra and Jeffroykin stated that there was no mixing of convoys since each person engaged in refugee activities knew of the guides of the other groups engaged in such work. Jeffroykin said that he and the underground in France knew the guides both in France and in Spain used by the Czechs, French, Poles, Dutch, military (the evacuation of Allied air men is in charge of the British), and others. He had absolutely no knowledge of those cases which the Military Attache had mentioned to me and which are described herein above. He had not had a convoy come over in which there was a young baby or a man with a club foot. He pointed out that there were many people interested in the evacuation of refugees and that when such cases came up the Embassy shouldn't jump to the conclusion that the interference was caused by his activity. He and Jeffroykin stated that as a precautionary matter they would send a letter to the French underground pointing out that there was to be no mixing of convoys. According to Sequerra, the underground at times had put one or two military people in civilian convoys in order to get them evacuated. I told him I saw no reason why such shouldn't continue if the Allied airmen wished to join the convoy. Also, he pointed out that only a few days ago, one of his convoys had found two American aviators lost in the mountains and had brought them out on their shoulders and that those aviators were presently in Zaragoza. I told him that we should give every assistance to the military which they wanted, but that he understood the type of interference of which the military complained and that every precaution should be taken to see that there was no such interference. With this, all were in agreement.

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I told him of my conversation with Forsythe and of Forsythe's request for a report. Sequerra said that he would gladly give him such. He was very complimentary of Forsythe and said that he had been of great assistance. I asked the members of this group their opinion as to whether there would be a great exodus of refugees. They thought that such would depend entirely upon military developments and the policies followed by the Nazis. Marolis expressed herself as feeling that the "Jews would catch hell" before the Germans evacuated France.

As stated above, I urged Sequerra to step up his rescue operations every way possible and if possible to coordinate such activities with other groups, such as the French, Poles, Czechs, Dutch, etc. Sequerra stated that he was doing everything possible but that evacuation was more difficult at this time than at any time in the past because of (1) increased German border guards, (2) the fact that the French underground was blowing up railroads, stopping trains, etc., and (3) Allied bombers had disrupted rail traffic in France. I asked Sequerra whether the Spaniards were stopping people at the border. He said he occasionally got reports that people were being stopped. He thought this was not due to the Spanish government in Madrid but rather to action on the part of various provincial governments from time to time.

Conversation with Hay

After I had talked with Sequerra and his co-workers, I had a long conversation with Hay and Forsythe, in which I gave them the substance of my conversation with Sequerra relative to his operations under the Treasury license to JDC. Forsythe said that this account was in accord with such facts as he had. Hay stated that on the basis of these facts he thought it unlikely that Sequerra's activities had or were interfering

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with the escape of Allied airmen. However, he was going to proceed further with his investigation before reporting to the military attache in Madrid. I carefully explained to Hay that in determining whether Sequerra's activities were interfering with military conveyances, he should bear in mind that Sequerra gave aid to all stateless people coming into Spain. Thus the fact that he aided some people after they came in did not mean that he had evacuated them from France. Hay said he understood this.

Late Tuesday afternoon, when I returned to the Consulate after my conversation with Sequerra, I found that Bend, with his usual finesse, had called at lunch time and left a message for me with one of the Consulate clerks. The message was to the effect that the Embassy had received a cable stating that McDonald would not be coming to Madrid and that I was to take up with the Ambassador the questions which McDonald was to have discussed. This message worried me a great deal and I booked train passage back to Madrid the following night, arriving in Madrid Thursday afternoon.

Delays, Embassy Conversation, Etc.

I went to the Embassy on Thursday afternoon and told Bend that I would like to see him as soon as possible and discuss with him the results of my investigation in Barcelona. Also, I suggested that in view of the cable which I had received concerning postponement, at least for the time being, of McDonald's visit, he arrange a conference

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with the Ambassador. However, I made it clear that I wanted to talk with him before seeing the Ambassador. Bond appeared to be quite busy handling some sort of an exchange matter. It wasn't quite clear just what he was doing but he suggested that we try to make our conference on Friday morning. Friday morning, he kept delaying and said that we would be able to make it Friday afternoon. Friday afternoon, he still seemed very busy but hoped to be free at any time. By virtue of these delays, I waited from Thursday afternoon until Saturday morning to see Third Secretary Bond. Saturday morning, I was becoming very impatient and barged into Bond's office in the middle of a conference and asked when he would be free. In typical Bond fashion, he hesitated a moment about answering, whereupon I turned, slammed his door and left.

I went immediately to see the Ambassador's secretary and told him that I had waited from Thursday afternoon until Saturday morning to see a Third Secretary, which was a little too much for me and that, accordingly, I proposed to carry on the rest of my dealings with the Ambassador instead of Mr. Bond. The secretary said that Ambassador Hayes would be glad to see me at any time. I then made an appointment for Monday morning.

When I returned to my office (a nice little cubby hole about 15 feet long and 8 feet wide, which was shared with two other people), I found Bond there waiting for me. He was very apologetic for the delays and again told me how busy he was. He said that he had arranged a conference with Lt. Col. Spillman of the Military Attache's Office to take place when I was free and he offered to arrange a meeting with the Ambassador.

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I told him I had made an appointment to see the Ambassador and that if he cared to be present he should consult the Ambassador's secretary.

Bond had assured me all along that the Spanish Government was extremely cooperative and that no refugees were being turned back at the border, however, one day while waiting for my conference with Bond I was in his office while he was out and overheard a conversation carried on by his secretary which appeared to indicate that some people had been turned back at the border. Following the conversation the secretary wrote a memorandum and left it for Bond which by chance I happened to see. From this memorandum it appeared that a group of men, women and children had crossed into Spain from France and had inquired of a border guard the road which would take them to the nearest Spanish frontier town. The guard advised the people to go to the left which took them back into France and they probably would have been captured by the Germans had they not met another group of refugees. The two groups joined and all went back to the border at which time the Spanish border guards permitted the women and children to pass but turned back the men.

The next time I talked with Bond I questioned him about the border situation and finally he broke down and gave me the above-mentioned story which I already knew at that time. I asked him what he proposed to do and he answered that he was going to take up the matter with the Foreign Office. He brought this to the attention of the Foreign Office and the reply was that the men were turned back because they were armed.

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I told Bond I thought this was a curious procedure and that the Spanish border guards either should have disarmed the men or interned them but in no case should they have turned them back into France. While Bond had originally accepted the Foreign Office answer he now agreed with my comments and stated that he would look into the matter further which he was still doing when I left Spain.

In the conference with Spillman, I passed on to him the information which Sequerra had given me and Spillman said that in view of this and my talks with Hay, he thought it highly unlikely that Sequerra's activities were in any way connected with the interference with the escape of Allied airmen and that unless Hay had clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, he would so report to Washington. (In this matter, he showed me a cable from the War Department, asking him to consult me on this matter). Even Bond seemed to feel at this time that Sequerra's activities were not responsible for the interference with the military convoys. He mentioned that he had talked with the British while I was in Barcelona and that it was the consensus of opinion that the cases of interference were traced directly to wealthy refugees in France who desired to leave for Spain and had managed to buy their ways into convoys.

The Ambassador was summoned to the Foreign Office on Monday morning and so I had to wait until the afternoon to see him. In the meantime, I had talked with Bond, who indicated that the Ambassador was adamant in his view that there was no need for a new person to come to Spain to work on refugee matters since Blickenstaff knew the situation better than any one else and the Embassy felt, therefore, that he was the logical

person to be the Board's representative. In this connection, Bond mentioned the case of Charles McDonald of FEA; the fact that he came to Spain to work on refugee matters and that he was idle for six months except for some golf. This seemed to Bond to prove that there was nothing to be done in the refugee field. I told him that the Board had no intention of wasting the time of one of its good men and if it developed that there was nothing to be done, the Board would be even more anxious than the Embassy to recall such person. I pointed out, however, that the only way to determine whether there was a need for such a person was to let him come in and try his hand at working out something. After some discussion, Bond said he would be agreeable to this and felt that the Ambassador would be. He mentioned, however, that a specific person should, if possible, be named to the Ambassador.

Also, before seeing the Ambassador, I had a short conversation with Blickenstaff in which I reminded him that he was the Board's first choice for a representative and he could not be appointed because the Embassy seemed reluctant to let him give up his duties with the Representation in Spain of American Relief Organizations. I pointed out that it was not the policy of the Board to hire representatives on a part time basis. I asked Blickenstaff whether he would have any objection to a person coming to Spain as the WEB representative, such person, of course, to work with Blickenstaff. Blickenstaff said that he would be delighted if such a person would come to Spain; that certainly there was enough work, and that he could see no objection whatsoever to putting another shoulder to the wheel.

On the basis of my conversations with Blickenstaff and Bond, I felt fairly well armed for my coming conference with the Ambassador. I spent considerable time thinking over the approach to the Ambassador and I felt that I could only try to convince him on the merits and that regardless of what he said in the conference, I would not become angry or indicate in any way that the Board was fed up and would fight this battle as a matter of principle without further negotiations.

My Second and Last Conversation with the Ambassador

When I saw the Ambassador on Monday afternoon (Bond also present), he asked me to outline my views on the refugee situation in Spain. I told him that I felt that I could make no prediction on what was likely to happen in Spain since such would appear to depend on military developments and German policy towards the Jews and others in France. However, I stated that I was keenly disappointed that no more people were crossing the border than were at the present time and that in my opinion more people could be brought out of France. I pointed out the possibility that in the future there would be many more refugees than at present and that in addition to creating ways and means to get people into Spain, I felt certain that the Embassy would be confronted with many new problems in the refugee field which would arise in the case of German deserters, collaborationists, etc. Also, I pointed out there were many possibilities that refugees of the type in which we were interested would be coming into Spain which would raise new problems of feeding and evacuation and I pointed out that the Board, through a representative there, could, in my opinion, be much more effective in an evacuation program than could the Embassy. The Ambassador thought my comments were interesting.

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He referred to the splendid way in which refugee matters had been handled in the past and expressed his opinion that the Embassy was competent to carry out the policies of the WRB.

At this point, I mentioned the cable which stated that I should take up with him the matters which were to have been discussed with McDonald. Naturally, the first thing to discuss was the matter of a WRB representative. In this connection, I mentioned that the President had given the WRB responsibilities in this field and that the Board in each area was carrying out a successful program effectuating the President's directive except in the Iberian peninsula where no program really was being carried out because of the relations between the Board and the Embassy and the fact that the Board had no representative. I also mentioned that important as Spain is today, it may be even more important tomorrow.

The Ambassador asked what a representative could do in Spain. I told him I thought the work of such a person could be unlimited since there was really no one in the Embassy or in Blickenstaff's organization doing the type of work which the President envisioned in his directive setting up the WRB. I mentioned that Bond appeared to be

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tremendously overworked since I had had great difficulty in seeing him. Furthermore the work which occupied his time was contact between the Embassy and the Foreign Office, that he was really not close enough to the refugee problem, and so far as I could ascertain, he was not attempting to do any planning on ways and means of increasing the number of people coming into Spain. Blickenstaff, was interested only in running his organization (this according to Blickenstaff's own statement) and while I thought he was doing a good job, the fact remained that there was no one in Spain thinking and planning in the refugee field. Even assuming that both Bond and Blickenstaff were performing their duties to perfection, there still remained a tremendous gap between the work which each was doing. At this point, I mentioned my conversations with both Bond and Blickenstaff and that they were agreeable for a WRB representative to come to Spain. I attempted to emphasize the importance of Spain and the fact that at some point the Board had to account to the President for what had or had not been done in Spain. I casually mentioned that the officers of the Board had received many inquiries from the press asking what the Board was doing in Spain

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and that we were forced to state that we had no comment to make at the time. (At that time, I was unaware of Congressman Celler's attack on the Ambassador in which he quoted Mr. Pehle as saying that Hayes had not been cooperative. I consider it likely that Ambassador Hayes was aware of such attack).

The Ambassador very definitely stated that he could not agree that there was a job in Spain which a representative of the WRB could perform. At this point, I mentioned sending Saxon into Spain, provided the Board had no other plans. There followed much discussion as to whether there was a job to be done. I suggested then that Saxon or if he were not available some other Board member be allowed to come to Spain and be accredited to the Spanish Government and if it were discovered that there was nothing for him to do, the Board would be anxious to take him out of Spain and use him elsewhere. The Ambassador asked why the Embassy could not do the work for the Board. I replied that our representative would be a member of the Embassy staff and, of course, would work under the Ambassador's direction and supervision but since the President's executive order gave us the right to appoint attaches, I felt that we should be allowed to name men known to us to carry out our program, emphasizing again that there was no one in the Embassy actually working on the refugee problem except by carrying out a routine at the Foreign Office. The Ambassador replied: "I understand now. So this is all for the glory of the WRB." I told the Ambassador that I was certain that he did not know the personalities involved in the Board or he would not make such a statement. No one was seeking glory but seeking to save human life and that if it occurred to any one that

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glory was the purpose of the Board, I was certain that the Director and his entire staff would resign.

I take it that the Ambassador became a little ashamed of his statement but he did not retract it nor did he apologize. However, knowing the Ambassador, I did not expect that he would do either.

After we had cooled off from the surprising statement, I was asked what criticism I would make of the way refugee affairs had been handled in the past. I replied that I would make none, since I had not come to Spain to criticize the way matters had been carried out in the past but to try to plan something constructive for the present and the future. Furthermore, I didn't have adequate information. For some reason or another, best known to the Ambassador, he seemed to think my answer clinched the argument for him. He made such statements as "Oh, so you have no criticism." Finally, I told him that I hoped he understood my answer, that I was merely trying to be nice and that I had no intention of discussing the way things had been handled in 1942 and 1943 since I didn't know the facts but did feel there was plenty to be done at the present.

The Ambassador explained at length that there were many Governmental agencies desiring to come to Spain and this had been a thorny problem for him for some time. All agencies which wanted to send men to Spain obviously could not be allowed to do so. He mentioned his unfortunate experience with some of the OSS people. According to the Ambassador, our Embassy couldn't continually bother the Spanish government to accredit everyone because the Spanish government didn't

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like to do this. Accordingly, American representatives had to be kept to a minimum and those accredited had been chosen on the basis of their contribution to the war effort and the necessity for the presence of such persons. The Ambassador, of course, was the final authority in such cases. He mentioned also that if the Spanish government accredited a WRB representative at our request, it would feel that it had done something for the United States and would use this as an argument to get us to do something for Spain. I told the Ambassador that I couldn't see this point, since our sending a representative to Spain to help with refugee matters seemed more a case of our attempting to do something for Spain. Furthermore, I told him that I thought all of these negotiations relative to the WRB, its representatives, etc. should be put on a humanitarian basis and not confused in any way with political questions. I mentioned, perhaps unwisely, my belief that any reasonable government would see this point.

After much discussion and a re-hash of what had been said, the Ambassador said that he would be willing for Saxon to come to Spain and make a real study of the question and the length of time necessary for such would be determined by him (the Ambassador), but in any event, it should not exceed two months. If, at the end of two months, Saxon could write a statement of what a WRB representative could do and it were convincing to him and he felt that such would serve a useful purpose, he would ask that he be accredited to the Spanish government. I expressed myself as being very disappointed but said that if the Ambassador would agree to do nothing more, I could only suggest that he communicate it to Washington. I requested that I be advised in Lisbon of action taken

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by Washington. I was told that I might prepare a draft cable on this. My draft merely had to do with the suggestion that Saxon be appointed and that the Ambassador was not convinced that there was a job to be done, outlining the Ambassador's counter-proposals. The rest of the cable was added by the Ambassador.

The matter of Sequerra's license was discussed and after I had given a complete report, the Ambassador stated that he was reassured on this point.

After this discussion of about an hour and twenty minutes, the Ambassador had another appointment and so I left. On leaving, the Ambassador stated that he felt my visit had helped to give the Embassy a better understanding of the Board and he hoped that the Board now had a better understanding of the Embassy. I told him I thought the visit had been mutually profitable. I told the Ambassador that I would call upon him to say goodbye.

It should be noted that in this conversation the Ambassador's attitude was not as cordial as in our first meeting. Furthermore, it should be noted that the Ambassador left the following Friday for the United States and this was not mentioned to me by him or any members of his staff during my stay in Madrid. Also, it appears that he called on Jordana during my absence in Barcelona relative to refugee matters. (Such information was given me by Heinemann) The Ambassador did not mention this to me nor did any of his staff mention it.

I called to say goodbye to the Ambassador on the morning of my departure from Spain but he was at the Foreign Office and I was unable to see him.

Conversations with Blickenstaff and Parrish

American relief organizations do not operate individually in Spain as such. There is what is known as the Representation in Spain of American Relief Organizations, headed by Mr. David Blickenstaff. This organization was brought about, I am told, by Ambassador Hayes. Blickenstaff is a young man 30 years of age who has spent most of his time since graduation from college as a field representative for the Quakers. He did relief work in Spain during the Spanish Civil War and worked with the "Franco side." Following that, he was in France, spent considerable time at Marseille and subsequently went to Spain. Just when the present relief organization was set up in Spain, I do not know. Blickenstaff is assisted by Laurence Parrish who was formerly with the Quakers. Parrish is a quiet young man who apparently carries out Blickenstaff's orders and does not make the policy decisions.

The purpose of Blickenstaff's organization is to give relief to stateless and other refugees who cannot obtain relief from their own governments. Viewed simply as a relief organization, it is my opinion that Blickenstaff's organization is doing a good job. However, Blickenstaff and his organization are not interested in increasing the refugee flow into Spain except in cases where such can be done through legal means, and even then, such is secondary to the job of administering relief. Blickenstaff has good ideas on the refugee questions. However, he is not as effective an operator as the Board would desire in this area.

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because he is too completely under the domination of the Embassy (he realizes that in order for his organization to do an effective relief job, it must keep in the good graces of the Embassy) and secondly, he does not appear to be forceful enough. While it is my opinion that Blickenstaff would not be the proper person to represent the Board in the area I do feel that if the Board had a representative there who could furnish the drive and take on the battles with the Embassy, he would find Blickenstaff of great assistance. I feel, furthermore, that the stories which have come to the Board expressing dissatisfaction with Blickenstaff are unwarranted. Most of these stories have originated with the Unitarians because they have had differences with Blickenstaff concerning the people whom they desired to send to Spain. Also, the World Jewish Congress does not like Blickenstaff because of his close connection with the JDC.

I talked generally with Blickenstaff concerning the refugee situation and a great many of the points which we covered have been discussed elsewhere in this report and accordingly will not be repeated here.

Blickenstaff stated that the Spanish government was on the whole cooperative but not nearly as cooperative as it could be. He mentioned the treatment which the Sephardic Jews had received at the hands of the Spaniards. (Such treatment is set out completely in a copy of a letter which Blickenstaff gave me addressed to Monseigneur Boyer-Mas, of the French Red Cross, which is attached to this report.) In connection with the Sephardic Jews and the treatment which the Spanish government had

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accorded them, Blickenstaff showed me a copy of a letter which the Ambassador had written to the Spanish Foreign Minister, Jordana, stating that such treatment on the part of the Spanish Government could only lead one to believe that the Spanish Government was following a policy of anti-Semitism similar to that followed by the Germans.

He stated that the Spanish Government had given assurances that refugees would not be turned back at the border. There were, however, sporadic cases in which such had been done. Such, he attributed to governors of the provinces on the border and individuals under their control. He thought such "turn back" cases were not caused by the Spanish Government. He mentioned one case in which a young German refugee had been arrested in Spain and turned over by the police to the Gestapo. This case was immediately taken up with the Spanish Foreign Office and the refugee in question was released before he arrived at the border. Blickenstaff thought that there were some cases perhaps where the Germans had succeeded in obtaining refugees in Spain and taking them back across the border for execution.

We talked about the clandestine operations on the border and Blickenstaff stated that in his present position he could not engage in such activity but was sympathetic to it. He favored anything that would save human life. He pointed out that the work on the border could perhaps be much better coordinated than it was at present.

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I think Blickenstaff's comments concerning Varian Fry reveal his feelings on the refugee matter and how he considers his activities as limited by his present position. In discussing rescue activities Blickenstaff mentioned that he had been stationed with Varian Fry in Marseilles, however, they were working for different organizations. Fry was attempting to evacuate as many as possible in as short time as possible, whereas, Blickenstaff looked upon his job as a long term proposition. According to Blickenstaff, Fry did many things which he would have liked to do but felt that he could not because of his position. Fry forged documents, bribed officials, etc., and he did get a lot of people out of France into Spain. As Blickenstaff put it, viewed with the idea of rescuing as many people in as short time as possible he did a wonderful job, but considered from the standpoint of a relief organization which would be doing relief work for considerable time, his activities were detrimental to such organization. Blickenstaff observed that today Fry probably could not get a passport.

Following my talk on Monday with the Ambassador, I had asked Bond to arrange a conference with Mr. Roget of the Free French Committee who was in charge of French refugee matters. From time to time I asked Bond whether a conference had been arranged and he always replied that he had been unable to get in touch with Roget. Finally, I asked Blickenstaff to arrange such an appointment and I can say

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that Blickenstaff tried very hard to get Roget the last day I was in Spain but was unsuccessful. The purpose of relating this episode is to record Blickenstaff's sincere effort and my doubts that Bend made any effort.

Blickenstaff and I discussed the possibility of the Board's sending a representative to Spain and he was sympathetic to this idea. I told him the position which the Ambassador had taken and Blickenstaff could not understand it. Blickenstaff was unable to understand the attitude (as I outlined it) which the Ambassador had taken in all of his dealings with the Board. I asked him if the Ambassador could possibly be anti-Semitic and thus not particularly interested in the Jewish refugees which the Board was attempting to rescue and Blickenstaff replied that he would hate to think so.

My Second Conversation with Butterworth

Following my talk with the Ambassador, I spent most of my time with Blickenstaff. However, I was informed that Walton Butterworth wanted to see me again before I left and so the day before my departure I made an appointment with him for 10 o'clock. This time our conversation lasted a good hour. In our previous conversation Butterworth had taken the line that the Embassy had to look after the best interests of the United States and keep out certain of the independent agencies which wished to have foreign representation and he had made a number of statements concerning the Treasury which indicated that he did not hold the Treasury in too high esteem. In the present conversation, he was quite the opposite.

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I expressed to him my keen disappointment that Ambassador Hayes was not willing for a representative of the WEB being accredited to the government of Spain. Butterworth stated that he hoped the problem would be solved by the Ambassador's offer and, of course, that he could not modify the Ambassador's decision. He spent most of the time describing to me the operations of the USCC. I was surprised that he outlined in detail so many of its operations which appeared to me to be of a highly confidential nature. He gave them to me on the basis of "One old Treasury man to another." It was obvious that he hoped I would come back and tell people in the Treasury what a great job he had done. His purpose, of course, was to keep his Treasury connections and try to get the good favor of the Secretary and other officials of the Treasury. I am sure that he had given considerable thought to our first conversation and decided that it was a mistake.

Heinemann's Mission

I was on the same clipper from New York to Lisbon with Danny Heinemann, who, with the knowledge and approval of the State Department, was going to Spain to attempt to further the Board's program there. This, however, was not known to Ambassador Hayes.

Before Heinemann left on his mission he had numerous conversations with representatives of the Board, particularly Mr. Lesser. He continued such conversations with me during the clipper trip, during his stay in Lisbon and finally in Madrid when I arrived there. In each of the conversations, we rehearsed the same thing, namely the

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line which he was to take in dealing with the Spanish government. We discussed the importance of Heinemann's mission and I continually assured him that he was performing a great humanitarian service.

When we arrived in Lisbon, he introduced me to the Marquis de Foronda, who is Heinemann's trusted friend in Spain and apparently serves there as Heinemann's "fixer". According to Heinemann, the Marquis could see Jordana, the Spanish Foreign Minister, at any time he chose unless, of course, Sir Samuel Hoare, the British Ambassador, happened to be calling at the same time. In my first conversation with Heinemann and the Marquis, I spoke to the Marquis in Spanish, Heinemann spoke to him in French, and Heinemann and I talked in English. A pleasant time was had by all. It was decided that the Marquis would call upon Jordana as soon as he arrived in Spain, urge the Spanish to take the initiative in refugee matters, advise our Ambassador there of their interest and request him to wire his Government of the Spanish government's willingness to cooperate fully. In fact, Heinemann had a memorandum which summarized the unsuccessful requests which the Board had made of the Embassy in Madrid. Such requests were to be made of the Spanish government and Jordana was to indicate to our Ambassador the willingness of the Spanish Government to do these things. It was realized that the Spanish Government might be reluctant to take the initiative in this matter even though they agreed to do all requested. I emphasized, however, the importance of the Spanish Government's taking the initiative. Heinemann was to advise me in Lisbon of the results of the conversations with Jordana in order that I could advise Washington.

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After Heinemann had been in Madrid for about a week, I received a telephone call from Charles Wilners, Heinemann's secretary, stating that the Spanish Government was willing to do whatever we desired but the Spanish Government would not take the initiative and desired that our Ambassador make a formal request since they had already had talks with him concerning refugee matters. I communicated this information to Washington through special channels since the Embassy in Lisbon furnishes copies of all such messages to the Embassy in Madrid. My communication, however, was furnished to the State Department here.

When I saw Heinemann in Madrid, he told me that the Marquis had seen Jordana four times and that there had been considerable lapse of time between the Marquis' request and Jordana's answer. Heinemann concluded that the matter had been taken up with Franco.

The last time the Marquis saw Jordana was while I was in Barcelona. According to the Marquis, Ambassador Hayes had recently called on Jordana and talked to him along the lines of the above-mentioned memorandum which had been given Heinemann. According to the Marquis, Jordana stated that in such conversations Ambassador Hayes for the first time in his talks with him mentioned the WRB. I gathered from my repeated conversations with Heinemann that he was really in Spain on business of his own and used these many conferences to try to impress upon the WRB his great interest in the refugee situation. However, the importance of his obtaining such assurances as he did from Jordana cannot be minimized.



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C O P Y

REPRESENTATION IN SPAIN OF
AMERICAN RELIEF ORGANIZATIONS

Eduardo Dato 20
Madrid

December 7, 1944

Monseigneur Boyer-Mas
French Red Cross
Madrid

Monseigneur,

Having been informed of your generous intention to accept a group of 73 Sephardic Jews for evacuation to North Africa with the next French convoy, I take pleasure in sending you herewith a brief statement regarding the antecedents of this group, mentioning a few of the problems connected with the evacuation.

In March of this year I was informed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Spanish Government was willing to authorize the entry into Spain of certain Jewish groups of Spanish origin if I would guarantee their evacuation from Spain immediately after their arrival here. It is of course obvious that I could not give such a guaranty. I did assure the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, that the services of this office would be extended to these people in assisting them in their emigration from Spain. These people were represented to me as being of different nationalities, largely French, Belgian and Dutch to some of which Spanish documents might be granted to facilitate their exit from occupied territory.

On August 11 the first group of these Sephardic Jews, numbering 73, arrived in Spain.

Many difficulties have been found in the problem of this group's evacuation and the following, discovered after the arrival of this group in Spain, will be of interest to you:

1.- Every person in this group possesses a valid Spanish passport.

2.- With the exception of children and wives who have acquired Spanish nationality through marriage, every person in this group possesses an "Acta de Inscripción de Ciudadanía" in which is indicated the number and date of the Ministerial Order (Decreto Real) "por la que se reconoce la calidad de ciudadano español". Such an order, you will remember, was issued nominatively in favour of Spanish proteges living abroad who fulfilled between 1925 and 1930 the requirements of Spanish nationality according to the laws formulated by Primo de Rivera.

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3.- All persons of this group possess a Spanish nationality certificate issued by a Spanish Consular authority abroad.

4.- Entry into Spain in this convey was refused to Sephardic Jews recognized abroad as Spaniards who did not possess the Decree Real and other formal requirements.

5.- With the exception of a few children, not one person of this group was born in France.

6.- Before the arrival of this group on August 11, 1943, Sephardic Jews of Spanish nationality had for years past been arriving individually in Spain with valid Spanish documents. Some of these returning Spaniards even figured in repatriation groups organized by the Falangist party. Members of the same family, some arriving before August 11, others with the convey of August 11, are now being separated, those arriving before that date having the right of residence in Spain with all the rights of Spanish citizens.

7.- Men of military age arriving in Spain with the convey of August 11 were arrested at the Spanish frontier, spent several weeks in prison in Madrid to be subsequently released with the obligation of presenting themselves with their class for military service in Spain. They have not been included in the group scheduled for evacuation from Malaga.

The above facts in my opinion throw considerable light on the true nature of this group of 73 people. In addition to the many other important issues involved in their expulsion from Spain, the order to evacuate them as a group creates many difficult problems. A few examples will show you what some of these problems are:

1.- Alberte Cattedne, aged 19, is a member of the group. His father, Samuel Cattedne, with his mother, succeeded in entering Spain a few months previously. Alberte is forced to leave Spain with the group. His parents are obliged to remain in Spain.

2.- Hanen Jessau and his son Hector came to Spain in January 1942. Here they were able to arrange the entry of Mrs. Dora Jessau and the two remaining children, Susana and Jaime, arrived with the convey of 73 on August 11.

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Dora Jessua and the two children, Susana and Jaime, are obliged to leave Spain with the group while the father and elder son Hector must remain in Spain.

3.- In the convey of August 11 the Hassid family composed of Rene Hassid, his wife Ana, Pedro aged 5 and Colette aged 3, arrived in Spain. Rene Hassid is obliged to remain in Spain for his military service. All appeals to have his wife and children remain with him or to have him accompany them to North Africa have till now been fruitless. The wife and children are expelled, he must remain for military service.

4.- Jose Hassid, a relative of Rene Hassid, is obliged to remain while his wife is expelled with the rest of the group.

5.- Ascher Rafael Benveniste and his wife Esther arrived in Spain with the convoy of August 11. Their daughter Juanita Benveniste, aged 20, had arrived in Spain a few months previously. The parents must leave from Malaga with the group, the daughter must remain in Spain. The mother, Esther Benveniste, is very sick and several doctors have stated that it will be dangerous for her to make the trip. It appears that the police might have allowed her to remain behind upon the advice of the doctor, but the husband nevertheless will be obliged to leave.

6.- The Benesiglio family composed of Isaac Benesiglio, his wife, two daughters and son Raul, arrived in Spain with the convoy of August 11. The family is expelled with the rest of the group except for Raul who must remain behind to do his military service with the class of 1945.

7.- There are several cases of persons whose state of health is such that they are unable to undertake a long trip. In most cases these persons have nevertheless been obliged to leave their sick beds to go to Malaga for evacuation.

I leave these facts in your hands feeling that you will take whatever actions seem appropriate. In conclusion let me state briefly what my interest is in this

whole affair.

1.- I hope that everything possible will be done to save from Polish concentration camps the groups of Sephardic Jews remaining in occupied Europe who may have the possibility of entering Spain as this first group of 73 has done.

2.- Any tendency on the part of Spanish authorities to adopt an attitude of anti-semitism should be discouraged.

3.- If mass evacuations of Sephardic Jews from Spain must nevertheless take place, the conditions of such evacuations should be humane and just.

Respectfully yours,

David Blickenstaff

DB/JT

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MEMORANDUM

At a meeting in the American Embassy attended by Mr. Dobkin, representing the Jewish Agency for Palestine; Mr. Pilpel, representing the Joint Distribution Committee; and Mr. Weissman, representing the World Jewish Congress, with Mr. Mann and Dr. Dexter of the War Refugee Board present as intermediaries and observers, it was agreed by the interested parties that, in order to work more effectively for the rescue from enemy territory of those persons who are in imminent danger of death as a result of Nazi persecutions and oppressions because of their race, religion or political beliefs, there should be a cooperation and collaboration among the interested parties along the following lines:

1) There shall be created in Spain a Rescue Committee which shall have as its sole purpose the rescue of as many as possible of the above-described persecuted persons who are in imminent danger of death. Such Committee shall be composed of:

- a) Mr. Jules Jeffroykin, named by the Joint Distribution Committee;
- b) Mr. Joseph Croustillon, named by the World Jewish Congress; and
- c) Mr. David Sealtiel, named by the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

2) The Rescue Committee shall remain anonymous and no publicity whatsoever shall be given to it, its efforts, its members or the principals represented in connection with the work of such Committee. Such Committee shall act on behalf of all principals and there shall be a free and frank exchange of information and complete cooperation in all rescue work. The principals represented on such Committee shall conduct all rescue operations through it. It shall be the duty of the Rescue Committee to see that the principals in Portugal are informed of all operations of the Committee in Spain. Such information may be transmitted through such channels as the Rescue Committee may decide and such may be done by advising one of the principals in Portugal, who in turn will advise the others. However, the greatest care shall be taken to keep secret the work of such Committee and no reports of its activities shall be made to the United States except through the facilities of the War Refugee Board.

which of course will see that the interested parties are advised.

3) All persons entering Spain as a result of the efforts of such Committee shall be turned over to the representatives in Spain of the Joint Distribution Committee, who shall care for such persons in the same manner as they have cared for them in the past except that all children (persons under the age of 16) shall be sent to Portugal, where they will be turned over at the Spanish-Portuguese border to a person of Portuguese nationality designated by the Youth Alyah Committee of Portugal.

4) The Youth Alyah Committee of Portugal for the present shall be composed of:

- a) Mr. Lichtenstein
- b) Mr. Pilpel
- c) Mr. Weissman

all of whom shall serve on the Youth Alyah Committee as individuals and not as representatives of organizations with which they are affiliated. The Committee may name additional persons, not to exceed two, to membership on the Committee. Such Committee shall report to the head offices of Youth Alyah in Jerusalem, which are headed by Miss Henrietta Szold and the Committee shall govern itself by majority vote.

5) The Youth Alyah Committee shall approve the budget submitted by the Jewish Community of Portugal (Comunidade) of the money to be expended for the care and welfare of all children. The Youth Alyah Committee shall determine the destination, training and education of the children. The Comunidade shall be charged with the technical and financial operations connected with the care and maintenance of the children; however, employees used in all operations for the care and maintenance of the children shall be mutually agreed upon by the Comunidade and the Youth Alyah Committee.

6) All relations with the foreign Governments or organizations regarding reimbursement for child care shall be exclusively conducted by the Committee or persons or organizations delegated by it.

The subject memorandum is accepted as the agreement between the interested parties.

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The original of the subject memorandum shall be kept by Dr. Dexter, Representative of the War Refugee Board in Portugal. Initialled copies of such memorandum shall be given to each of the parties present at the discussion which gave rise to this agreement of cooperation and collaboration, and to Mr. Hart of the British Embassy, who in his capacity as an observer for that Embassy has seen and approved this agreement.

E. Dobkin

WITNESS:

Robert Pilpel

James H. Mann

Isaac Weissman

Robert C. Dexter

J. Hart

Lisbon, July 13, 1944

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