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<td>Memo</td>
<td>Donovan for the President</td>
<td>5/8/42</td>
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**FILE LOCATION**
PSF OSS, Donovan Report, April 29-May 16, 1942

**RESTRICTION CODES**

(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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May 8, 1942.

MEMORANDUM for The President.

From: William J. Donovan.

The following report has been sent to me, by mail, by one of our representatives abroad. It is dated April 17th. You probably already know the information contained in it, but I send it in the remote possibility that you may not have had it called to your attention.

In the summer of 1940, after the collapse of France, Spain's entry into the war on the side of the Axis was considered imminent, as at that time the Spanish Government and most of the Spanish high army officials firmly believed in German victory. In view of the vulnerability of the British naval base at Gibraltar, the matter of keeping Spain out of the war was of the utmost concern to the British Government, and it was Sir Samuel Hoare's chief endeavor to prevent Spain from joining Axis forces. Captain Allen Hillgarth, due to his long residence in Spain and profound knowledge of Spaniards and Spanish military and naval officers, was entrusted with the task of finding a way out of what seemed to be an important situation where the usual diplomatic and political means would be of no avail because of sweeping German victories and the weak position of the British Government.
It was decided that an endeavor should be made to create a hostile attitude in the Spanish Army circles toward Spain's entry into the war, and the best means to bring this about was judged to be suborning of the Spanish generals through gifts of money. The man selected for this action was the well-known Spanish capitalist, Juan March, who, it will be recalled, was the man instrumental in financing Franco's campaign.

A group of the top Spanish generals, numbering about 30, was approached by March, and his arguments to the generals were supported by a sum of $10,000,000.00 put at their disposal by the British Government, and an agreement was made for six months, which was to expire in May, 1941, to the effect that the generals would insist on Spain maintaining her neutrality during that period of time. The money was deposited in New York, but the generals were allowed to draw certain amounts in pesetas which would be discounted against the total amount at an agreed rate when the "pay-off" day would arrive. I don't know the names of all the generals in the group, but I know that it includes the General Aranda, the famous defender of Oviedo, who now fills the post of Commandant of the War College in Madrid; General Orgaz, Commander-in-Chief in Spanish Morocco, and the High Commissioner of Canary Islands. General Aranda shares to the extent of $2,000,000.00, as he is expected to be in charge of the Spanish armed forces when the "Falanga" is overthrown.
In May, 1941, the agreement was extended for another six months, and a further $1,000,000.00 was added to the pool to cover the participation of new members.

A financial complication intervened late in 1941 with the advent of the United States Treasury freezing accounts of belligerents in the American banks, and I understand that with considerable difficulty it was finally arranged to have these funds transferred to Switzerland by a special, secret arrangement between the British and our Government. This money was deposited in Swiss banks and a company was formed in which these Spanish parties to the agreement held shares. Meanwhile, further advances in pesetas were made to the generals to cover their current and special expenses.

In the fall of 1941, the agreement was further extended until July, 1942, and another sum of $2,000,000.00 was added to the fund, making a total of $13,000,000.00 devoted to this purpose up to now.

It goes without saying that the entire negotiations were conducted with consummate skill, of which Juan March is capable, carefully covering up the British tracks and making it appear as an entirely Spanish move, financed by Spanish banks and invested interests, with the sole object of sparing Spain the horrors of another war.
With the shifting of scenery on the international stage, with the Russian success and our entry into the war, these Spanish generals, while at first reluctant to enter into the agreement, today are most anxious to maintain it and have even gone so far as to suggest a definite, written pact to be made with the British Government, guaranteeing support and help to the generals when they decide to overthrow the present government and throw their lot in with the Allies. There is no insistence on the part of the Spaniards to have a bi-lateral agreement. They content themselves, according to my information, with binding themselves to an action in favor of the Allies when the opportune time comes, and simply desire that such an understanding be signed by an authorized representative of the British Government. Sir Samuel Hoare is hesitant in signing such an instrument, and Captain Hillgarth has been summoned to London for a conference with the Prime Minister on this subject, and is leaving Lisbon on the plane next Wednesday.

The source of the above information is absolutely unimpeachable, and the fact that Britain has been able to maintain Spain in a non-belligerent attitude in the face of all the British reverses adds weight to the above information. The importance of this plot cannot be underestimated when one considers that the Gibraltar naval base is at the mercy of Spanish guns, and that if anything should happen to Suez, Britain will need all the support in Spain to keep this country non-belligerent.
I am anxious to bring this information to the attention of my Government because it is indispensable in our own evaluation of the Spanish situation. I need not add that the slightest indiscretion would forever discredit me in the eyes of my trusted British friends, and would, of course, dry up for me all sources of information.

Generally speaking, the situation in Spain is very critical and pregnant with all kinds of possibilities. Franco will soon have to decide whether he is going to part with the Army or with the Falanga. The animosity of the Army to the party is all but open, and it is only fear of consequences which keeps the pot from boiling over. Serrano Suner is openly pulling for the Axis, but it is believed that he will be removed from his present post of Minister of Foreign Affairs and will be sent in some diplomatic capacity to a foreign country. Graft and corruption are rampant, and the black market seems to be a chief means of revenue to all classes, high and low. The ordinary people suffer, as usual, as there is a great deal of hunger and misery throughout the land.

Invasion of Spain by Germany is not believed probable at the present time, as it is estimated that it would take at least 100,000 troops to do it, and all supplies would have to be brought in. At the present juncture, invasion by Germany would be opposed by guerrilla warfare, especially by
the Navarrese and northern Spaniards, but it is not difficult to conjecture what might happen if Britain should meet with further reverses in the Mediterranean. The Spanish popular sentiment is overwhelmingly pro-Ally, and one or two successes on our side would bring this country into our fold completely. The Germans are thoroughly disliked because of their arrogance, bad judgment, and rapacity for Spanish food products which the country can ill afford to send away.
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<tr>
<td>Memorandum</td>
<td>Donovan to President (Sanitized version in file)</td>
<td>11 Dec 1944</td>
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<td>Memorandum</td>
<td>FDR to Donovan with attachments (Sanitized version in file)</td>
<td>5 Dec 1944</td>
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**FILE LOCATION**

PSF Office of Strategic Services, December 1-15, 1944

**RESTRICITION CODES**

(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
(C) Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in the donor's deed of gift.
11 December 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Attached is a memorandum of the utmost secrecy for the President. Please place it in his hands.

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

I wanted you to know that our chief representative in Stockholm was able to obtain three diplomatic codes and one military through special sources of the Turkish government. We have made the necessary payments and have just turned over these codes to the State Department and War Department respectively. At the same time we were able to discover and to have it confirmed by our experts that certain codes of the State Department had been tampered with by the enemy. A new system has now been put into effect.

You are the only one to whom I have disclosed these facts.

William J. Donovan
Director
11 December 1944

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William J. Donovan
Director
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

December 5, 1944.  

MEMORANDUM FOR  
BILL DONOVAN  

I think you should show  
Mr. Landau's report on Latin America to Ed Stettinius and  
Nelson Rockefeller.  

F. D. R.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached a report on Latin America which has been made available to us by Mr. Jacob Landau, Secretary and Managing Director of Overseas News Agency, Inc. I think it may be of interest to you.

William J. Donovan
Director
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<td>Letter</td>
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**Restriction Codes**

(A) Closed by Executive Order 11652 governing access to national security information.
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**File Location**

PSP: Office of Strategic Services, July 13, 1944, Box 166

**General Services Administration**

GSA Form 7122 (7)
Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Would you please place the attached memorandum before the President?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Bill

William J. Donovan,
Director.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Before D-day in France, I favored placing our espionage and intelligence people forward with corps and division. Instead it was decided to leave them back with army, which was the British plan. My objection to this plan was based on experience with former landings that there would be fluidity coming from the campaign, thus enabling us to infiltrate our agents. I talked to General Bradley at the beachhead on D plus 1 and was able to get some of our men ashore.

I believe the attached report from our chief intelligence officer there, dated 18 June 1944, will be of interest to you, and I send it as it came to me.

William J. Donovan
Director
SUBJECT: General Intelligence.

The striking fact from OSS operating view point is the open fluid nature of the front lines permitting large flow of civilians through the lines and the great demand of the Corps and especially divisions for trained assistance for espionage. Missions requested by VII Corps alone would occupy time of all the full S I Det. were it there. The front of the 4th Div. on the north is especially open. The 82 Airborne Div. itself is picking up civilians at random to go through. The next most striking operating fact is the complete unity of Intelligence and Action Activity of resistance group contacts locally. One cannot distinguish between SF and SI work - the local French members of old chains themselves make no distinction. These people, however, were chiefly engaged in Renseignements rather than Action in LaManche Dept. and the intelligence they can develop is the most important contribution they can make here now. G-2's of Corps and division ask our SO men for intelligence missions as well as G-3's requests for sabotage. Practically SI and SO are working on a joint basis, so as not to confuse all concerned, with the G-2 contact open to all, but attempted coordination through SI to Army G-2.

The third striking operational point is the general lack of interest - if not outright coolness on part of the Army G's to OSS espionage and other work, as contrasted to the heavy demands for help from Corps and divisions. Army is too high up - fighting the logistical battle - but leaving the conduct of operations largely to the Corps. The VII Corps particularly has the big job and is fighting its own war without Army interference.

Battle order and operational intelligence and what is being gathered re defenses of Cherbourg, troop concentrations, enemy C P's is not included in this report, for it is of primary interest to Divisions and Corps. Only a little has yet been developed by OSS/SI because of lack of means.
Following are observations of a more general strategic nature.

a. Military:

1. Axis troops do not fight as hard as in Tunisia and early Italian campaigns.
2. Foreign leves in German units surrender easily, but are being told they will be shot by Americans.
3. Most divisions on north and north-west front of beach-head are now less than one-half normal strength.
4. I have not seen one German plane in daylight. Luftwaffe attacks beaches regularly one hour after dark, flak very heavy - enemy damage to us usually nil. Our planes everywhere.
5. French report most German soldiers rarely discussed future, but implied they expected war to be lost eventually ever since last year.
6. German prisoners not as fine type nor as arrogant as in early days Tunisia, Sicily, etc. Most seem happy to be captured and out of it.
7. German Army morale definitely weaker - absence of Luftwaffe a constant blow to their confidence.
8. Guts of our paratroopers and assault troops tops. G.I.'s fought like demons. Where bodies our airborne troops found isolated, frequently surrounded by six or more dead Germans.
9. Mechanical equipment captured such as radio controlled small tanks (doodle-bugs) etc. all show fine workmanship - no deterioration electrical and mechanical parts. Excellent strong night flares - very bright.

b. Civilian - French - Social - Political:

1. French still shocked by suddenness and fury of our attack. At Isigny - Carentan and other towns have suffered greatly from bombardment. 33 killed at Isigny and one-quarter town wrecked. Sad that they (at Isigny) could not advise us that there were only 40 Germans there (douaniers and few soldiers). The warmth and humaness of our G.I.'s mixing with people, and the vision of the magnitude of our resources is rapidly thawing them out. Even in the ruins of their villages, children give the V-sign and smiles appear. Many are "abrous" and capable of concern only of their own little homes and families. The four years of German occupation has had a telling and dam-
pening influence on their spirits - especially older people.

2. Few seem concerned here of politics. They cannot understand why two French generals, Giraud and DeGaulle should fight when the Germans are still in France. I spoke to a group in St. Mere 1'Eglise, June 16 who said DeGaulle was fine but Giraud they liked too. The old lady I lived two nights with (70 years old, widow of World War I soldier) was spiritually defeated - "what can one do?" German non-com's had been billetted with her four years. She and other older people defend Petain as having spared them by his attitude, even greater sorrows for France. They admit he is too old - maybe misguided, but apparently he was something for them to hold to.

3. Yves Greslin - the local resistance leader kept functioning through all this period. After an X-2 check intend to use this man for dope on Cherbourg through his chain.
Miss Grace Tully,
The White House,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Would you please place the attached memorandum before the President?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan,
Director.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C.

4 July 1944

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

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Director

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 13526
Authority: Filer CFI Draft Review
NARA Date: 01/21/12
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: General Intelligence.

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<td>Memorandum</td>
<td>Donovan to President</td>
<td>1 April 1945</td>
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FILE LOCATION
BSF Office of Strategic Services, April 1945

RESTRICTION CODES
NA FORM 1429 (6-86)
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The following triple priority dispatch has just been received from the OSS representative in Bern relating to the most recent developments in connection with the possible surrender of German Forces in Northern Italy:

"1. Wolff arrived Fasano Friday morning and immediately summoned Parrilli and Zimmer to Fasano where they spent Friday afternoon together. Zimmer was then sent here by Wolff, Parrilli remaining in Fasano.

"2. Wolff endeavored contact Vietinghoff before he went to see Kesselring, but was unable to reach him.

"3. Trip to Kesselring most difficult and when he reached Kesselring's headquarters, hell had already broken loose. First conversation took place only 15 km. from our advancing forces. Wolff presented his plan for Italian surrender and Kesselring
advised him to go through with it. He, Kesselring, regretted he was not also in Italy.

"4. In a second conversation with Kesselring, latter again expressed his agreement with Wolff's plan and that he should so advise Vietinghoff, but said that on his front he could not go along (Mitmachen). Kesselring found himself largely surrounded by strangers whom he did not trust. Zimmer gained impression from Wolff Kesselring was half a prisoner (Our representative in Bern comments that no mention was made of Westphal).

"5. Immediately on his return, Wolff had tried to reach Glazier but he was on an inspection trip at the front and was returning to his headquarters only night of 31. Wolff proposed to see him immediately and would spend Sunday with him. Wolff gave this message to Zimmer for our representative in Bern: I am ready to come to a final conversation in order to arrange matters. I hope to come with Rahn, Dollman and either Vietinghoff or a staff officer.
"6. Hahn had been called back to Germany but avoided the trip by alleging serious strike conditions North Italy which he had to handle. Harster did return Germany, but apparently on account of a row with Gauleiter Hofer of the Tyrol. Neither summons believed to be connected with the main subject in question.

"7. While in Germany and one of the reasons for delay, Wolff was summoned by Himmler, who asked him to explain his surrender of British agent Tucker. Wolff replied that he was arranging an exchange and he wanted to give the Fuehrer Wünsche as birthday present. Himmler also accused him of having been in Switzerland and asked the reasons. Wolff answered that he had a contact in Milan who promised to bring him in touch with Allies and that he was acting pursuant Fuehrer's recent secret order to seek any possible contact with Allies. Wolff had heard that many efforts had failed and wanted to see what he could do. Himmler ordered Wolff to wait around for couple of days as he wanted to think the matter over.
However, Himmler was suddenly called urgently to Hungary and referred Wolff to Kaltenbrunner. Himmler told him that he should not leave Italy and particularly that he should not go to Switzerland. Wolff did not see Kaltenbrunner but left for Italy.

"6. In his conversation with Kesselring, latter said to Wolff our situation is desperate, nobody dares tell truth to Fuehrer who surrounded by small group of advisers who still believe in a last specific secret weapon which they call 'Verzweiflungs' weapon. Kesselring believed this weapon can prolong war but not decide it, but might cause terrible blood bath on both sides. Kesselring said if Fuehrer gave him order to use weapon he would surrender his command. End of Zimmer report.

"9. Under foregoing program and assuming no further delays which may be inherent in situation, Wolff should come to a meeting sometime Monday or early Tuesday. Any action by Kesselring via Wolff seems excluded. Whether Wolff will win over Vietinghoff is still matter of conjecture, despite Wolff's apparent optimism.
Zimmer understands Wolff has support of one of Vie-
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Signed

William J. Donovan
Director
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.  

Dear Grace:  

I think the attached memorandum  
will be of interest to the President. Will  
you please see that it reaches his desk.  

Thank you.  

Sincerely,  

[Signature]  
William J. Donovan  
Director  

Attachment  

DECLASSIFIED  
E.O. 13526  
Authority 7/1/11 or 7/1/06  
NARA 12/13/2011  
TOP SECRET  
CONFIDENTIAL
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Washington, D. C.

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