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<td>Memorandum</td>
<td>Donovan to President</td>
<td>2 Oct 1944</td>
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**FILE LOCATION**
PSF, OSS Reports Box 150

**RESTRICTION CODES**
(A) Closed by Executive Order 12356 governing access to national security information.
(B) Closed by statute or by the agency which originated the document.
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16 October 1944

Miss Grace Tully
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Grace:

Will you please hand the attached memorandum to the President?

Thank you.

Sincerely,

William J. Donovan
Director
Miss Grace Tully  
White House  
Washington, D. C.  

Dear Grace:  

Will you kindly hand the attached memorandum to the President.  

Thank you.  

Sincerely,  

William J. Donovan  
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

You may be interested to see the following summary of a letter dated 22 September 1944, which was received by an OSS representative from Jacques Asseoff. The letter contains observations on members of the new Bulgarian Cabinet, several of whom are known personally to Mr. Asseoff who was formerly a member of the Supreme Economic Council in Bulgaria and of the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce:

"The character of the new Bulgarian Cabinet is leftist, but not Communist. The most influential member is the War Minister, Damian Velchev, for many years Chief of the Military College at Sofia. The Minister President, Kimon Georgiev, and the Minister of Propaganda, Dimo Kazassov, are friends of his, and the three represent the political group of Zveno in the Cabinet. All three are honest and incorruptible. They are strongly anti-German and in favor of a federation with Yugoslavia; they are anti-Communist, but in favor of an understanding with Russia."

"Asseoff is well acquainted with these men and is therefore
in a position to know what their ideas are. For the same reason he can speak with regard to two other Cabinet members, Dimitr Neikov and Grigor Cheshmedgiev, who are representatives of the Independent Social Democrats. At one time they were members of the Second Socialist International and were opposed to Bolshevism. They are now strongly democratic and in favor of a federation of the Balkan states."

"Two other members of the Cabinet who are pro-democratic and anti-Communist are Professor Petko Stainov and Professor Petko Stojanov. The former was once a member of the Democratic Union, but became associated with the Zveno group after the revolt of 1934. The latter once belonged to the Radical Democratic Party. Of the other Cabinet members, two are known as Communists with connections in Moscow: Minister of the Interior Anton Jugov, and Neichev."

"The Cabinet is supported by the Left Farmers Party, which is represented by Nicolai Petkov, Bumbarov, and Derjanski. These men are said to be democrats and friendly to the United Nations."

"The Cabinet is democratic in nature and intends to liquidate quickly the Fascist and pro-German elements in the country, and then give the people a chance to form their
own government. Asseoff believes that the Minister President is sincere in this intention."

"In the approaching elections, there may well be a bitter fight between the democratic and the pro-Bolshevik elements, but Asseoff believes that the former will prevail with a large majority. This will be certain if the Right Agrarian Party, whose leader is Gichev, is represented in the Cabinet. In any event, Asseoff believes it is sure that the large majority of the people will favor a federation with Yugoslavia.

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JWA/rh                                 William J. Donovan
                                        Director

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**Withdrawal Sheet (Presidential Libraries)**

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**Restriction Codes**

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**File Location**

PSF: OSS, March 16-31, 1945

Box 171
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representative in London, has been obtained by British intelligence from a senior Spanish official in Madrid who is in close contact with the "old guard" Falangists:

One of the "old guard" asked source's opinion with respect to "making some sort of attack on the new American ambassador upon his arrival." The "old guard" member wondered whether such a step would evoke a declaration of war. Source attaches some importance to these remarks since the individual in question is a violent Falangist who was responsible for two assaults prior to the civil war. Source reports that the Falange hotheads are more rabidly anti-British and pro-German than ever before, and declares that the Falangists, in the face of mounting opposition and violence, feel less secure.

William J. Donovan
Director
21 March 1945

Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

I believe the President will be interested in the enclosed report from our London representative. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan
Director

Enclosure.
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

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NARA 2311 Date 10/18/2012

William J. Donovan
Director
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**PSF Office of Strategic Services, March 1-15, 1945**

**RESTRICTION CODES**

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The OSS representative in Bern has forwarded the following information, supplementary to my memoranda of 8 and 9 March:

Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, who has arrived in Zurich to discuss a definite program for taking German forces in North Italy out of the war, is accompanied by the two men who made the preliminary contact with the OSS representative (Standartenfuehrer Dollman and his aide, Zimmern) as well as by Wolff's military expert, Sturmbandfuehrer Wenner, and an Italian intermediary, Baron Pirelli. The OSS representative consented to see only Wolff, who came to the former's apartment with a Swiss intermediary on the evening of 8 March. The OSS representative and an associate, a former German Consul in Zurich, then talked with Wolff alone. The former Consul later saw Wolff and Dollman together.

Wolff is a distinctive personality, and evidence indicates that he represents the more moderate element in Waffen SS combined with a measure of romanticism. He is probably the most dynamic personality in North Italy and, next to Kesselring, the most powerful.
Wolff stated that the time had come when some German with power to act should lead Germany out of the war in order to end useless human and material destruction. He says he is willing to act and feels he can persuade Kesselring to cooperate, and that the two control the situation in North Italy. As far as the SS is concerned, Wolff states that he also controls Western Austria, since his authority includes the Vorarlberg, Tyrol, and the Brenner Pass with both its northern and southern approaches. Wolff declares that joint action by Kesselring and himself would leave Hitler and Himmler powerless to take effective countermeasures like the ones they employed in the 20 July crisis. Also Wolff feels that joint action by Kesselring and himself would have a vital repercussion on the German Army, particularly on the Western Front, since many Generals are only waiting for someone to take the lead. Wolff made no request concerning his personal safety or privileged treatment from the war criminal viewpoint.

Wolff envisages the following procedures to bring about action: (1) He will meet Kesselring during the week-end of 10 March in order to obtain a definite commitment to joint action. Wolff says he has had the closest possible personal relations with Kesselring for several years, and indicated that Kesselring's
problem was to reconcile such action with his oath of allegiance. Kesselring has insisted that, after a long military career throughout which he had always kept his oath, he was too old to change. Nevertheless Wolff believes he can be won over to see the senselessness of the struggle and admit that his duty to the German people is higher than that to the Fuehrer.

(2) With Kesselring, Wolff will draft an appeal to be signed by themselves, Rahn (the German Ambassador to the Musso- lini regime in North Italy), and others. The appeal will set forth the uselessness of the struggle and the signers' responsibility to the German people to end it, will call on military commanders in particular and Germans in general to disassociate themselves from Himmler-Hitler control, and will state that the Germans in North Italy are terminating hostilities.

(3) Wolff will make preparations to get this message to the German people and military commanders via radio and wireless.

(4) Provided Kesselring is won over, Wolff believes that he and Kesselring would come clandestinely to Switzerland within the week in order to meet Allied military men and coordinate purely military surrender moves with the appeal. Apparently no one on Kesselring's immediate staff is suited to represent him
for this purpose, his chief of staff not yet having been acquainted with the plan.

As evidence of his ability to act, Wolff has already unconditionally delivered Ferruccio Parri, Italian patriot from North Italy, and Major Usmiani, a former OSS agent in Milan, to the OSS representative in Bern. Parri had been imprisoned in Verona, Usmiani in Milan. Their release was requested of Dollman during the preliminary negotiations of 2 March, and both men assumed at the time they were taken away by the SS that they were being led to execution. Neither yet knows the reason for the release. Wolff fully realizes Parri's importance, and remarked to an intermediary that he was giving up his most important hostage.

Wolff is prepared to demonstrate further his ability to act by: (1) discontinuing active warfare against Italian partisans, merely keeping up whatever pretense is necessary pending execution of the plan; (2) releasing to Switzerland several hundred Jews interned at Bozen (Bolzano); Wolff claims he has refused any ransom money offered in this connection, although some has possibly already been swallowed up by intermediaries; (3) assuming full responsibility for the safety and good treatment of 350 British and American prisoners at Mantua, of whom 150 are in the hospital and 200 on the southern outskirts; Wolff claims that
these are all the British-American prisoners held in North Italy, since they had been currently transferred to Germany; (4) releasing to Switzerland, if he can be found, Sogno Franci, an Italian patriot working with CLNATI and the British; his release is particularly desired by Parri; (5) facilitating as much as possible the return to North Italy of Italian officers presently held in Germany, who might be useful in the post-hostilities period.

In reference to Alexander Constantin von Neurath, the German Consul at Lugano whose part in earlier peace feelers is described in my memoranda of 9 and 26 February, Wolff will welcome von Neurath's help since he feels that von Neurath has considerable influence on Kesselring. Wolff will invite von Neurath to join him in Italy on 10 March.

Wolff claims that Himmler knows nothing of his present activities. He saw Himmler and Hitler early in February and advised them of the general hopelessness of the North Italy situation, but received no definite instructions from them.

The OSS representative has made no commitments, merely listening to Wolff's presentation and stating, with no refutation from Wolff, that unconditional surrender was the only possible course. The OSS representative comments that, if the results of the Wolff-Kesselring talks are favorable, this plan may present
a unique opportunity to shorten the war, permit occupation of North Italy, possibly penetrate Austria under most favorable conditions, and possibly wreck German plans for establishment of a maquis.

The OSS representative in Caserta has advised AFHQ of the information transmitted by the OSS representative in Bern. General Alexander has outlined to Marshal Brooke the procedure which AFHQ proposes to follow, including a plan for two senior staff officers to go to Switzerland to meet with German representatives. Apparently Alexander has furnished this information to Brooke as a matter of courtesy and will go ahead on his own initiative, although he will cooperate with Brooke if London wishes to send other people to join in the meeting. OSS has been directed to submit a plan to carry out all necessary steps, including arrangements for a Swiss meeting place, transportation to and from that place to the French-Swiss border, as well as transportation from the Annemasse airport or vicinity to French-Swiss border. In addition, OSS will be called upon to provide communications, clerical assistance (including interpreters), and all necessary safeguards for the security of operations. The OSS representative in Bern will select a safe meeting place, arrange transportation from Annemasse to and from that place,
and issue appropriate instructions to secure and provide arrangements for meeting the party at the Annemasse airport and supervising arrangements to and from the French-Swiss border. The total number of the party is unknown at this time, but all plans are being made to include arrangements for 15 to 20 people. OSS is withholding all these plans from the German representatives until directed by AFHQ to suggest a date for the meeting.

Donovan
William J. Donovan
Director

If it turns feasible I plan to go to Italy as soon as possible and be designated to set up communications.
Miss Grace Tully
The White House

Dear Grace:

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Director

Enclosure.
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William J. Donovan
Director
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

I think the President will be interested in the enclosed message from our Bern representative. Will you kindly see that it reaches his desk? Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representatives in Bern and Caserta, is a summary of preliminary negotiations and arrangements concerning approaches looking to the termination of German resistance in North Italy and on the Western Front:

On 8 February, Alexander Constantin von Neurath, the German Consul at Lugano, asserted to the OSS representative in Bern that he had just returned from a meeting with Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Rudolph Rahn (German Ambassador to the Mussolini regime in North Italy), and Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police leader in Italy and chief of Himmler's personal staff. Kesselring, who has close relations with Field Marshal Gert von Rundstedt, had just returned from a conference with him. Neither Kesselring nor von Rundstedt was then ready to come over to the Western Allies. Von Neurath, who served for two years in Africa as liaison officer with Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal, Rundstedt's Chief of Staff, suggested that he confer with Westphal.
He was advised by Kesselring not to attempt to see Westphal immediately in view of the suspicions which such a trip might arouse.

On 10 February, however, while von Neurath was visiting his father near Stuttgart, Marshal Kesselring advised him by telephone to go to a secret rendezvous where he found General Westphal and Marshal Johannes Blaskowitz, until recently commander of Army Group "G" on the Western Front. The three frankly discussed the possibility of opening the Western Front to the Allies. Westphal and Blaskowitz were reluctant to take this step, if they were merely to be considered as war criminals. They added that it was increasingly difficult to organize such a move because of SS control and the state of mind of the troops. They said that their armies included many Germans from East Prussia and eastern Germany whose will to fight had been stiffened by the Soviet occupation of their home areas. These troops, they explained, felt that they had already lost everything, and preferred to stay on and fight.

Although neither Westphal nor Blaskowitz made definite suggestions, they appeared to be working with Kesselring, and to be approaching the point where they might discuss, on purely military lines, the opening up of the Western and Italian Fronts.
Von Neurath declared that he would report the results of this conversation to Kesselring. 

On 24 February, the OSS representative in Caserta reported that AFHQ was interested in obtaining authentic confirmation of Kesselring's disposition to negotiate with the Allies. AFHQ felt that if Kesselring wished to dispatch an emissary with an official message, he could find means to do so.

On 2 March, Standartenfuehrer Dollman, who has in the past claimed that he represented Kesselring, Rahn, Wolff, and Harster, made indirect contact with the OSS representative in Bern, and promised to return on 8 March with credentials and definite proposals. It was suggested to Dollman that he bring with him an important Italian partisan leader, then held as prisoner, as evidence of his good faith and ability to act.

On 8 March, General Wolff and a German High Command representative, presumably from Kesselring's staff, arrived in Lugano, allegedly prepared to make definite commitments in regard to terminating German resistance in Italy. Wolff was accompanied by his military expert, Sturmbandfuehrer Wenner; by an Italian intermediary, Baron Pirelli; by Standartenfuehrer Dollman; and by the latter's aide, Zimmern. As evidence of his
good faith, Dollman brought along Ferruccio Parri, chief of the North Italian Patriots Unified Command. General Wolff also brought with him Major Usmani, a former OSS agent in Milan. Both of these men, who were in good health, were delivered unconditionally to the OSS representative. Neither of them was aware of the reason for his release.

The OSS representative consented to see only Wolff, who came to the former's apartment with a Swiss intermediary on the evening of 8 March. The OSS representative and an associate, a former German Consul in Zurich, then talked with Wolff alone. The former Consul later saw Wolff and Dollman together.

Wolff stated to the OSS representative that the time had come when some German with power to act should lead Germany out of the war. He said he was willing to act and felt he could persuade Kesselring to cooperate, and that the two controlled the situation in North Italy. As far as the SS is concerned, Wolff stated that he also controls Western Austria, since his authority includes the Vorarlberg, Tyrol, and the Brenner Pass with both its northern and southern approaches. Wolff declared that joint action by Kesselring and himself would leave Hitler and Himmler powerless to take such effective counter-measures.
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(1) He would meet Kesselring during the week-end of 10 March in order to obtain a definite commitment to joint action. Wolff says he has had the closest possible personal relations with Kesselring for several years, and indicated that Kesselring's problem was to reconcile such action with his oath of allegiance. Wolff, however, believes Kesselring can be won over to see the senselessness of the struggle and to admit that his duty to the German people is higher than that to the Fuehrer.

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Wolff is prepared to demonstrate further his ability to act by (1) discontinuing active warfare against Italian partisans; (2) releasing to Switzerland several hundred Jews interned at Bolzano; (3) assuming full responsibility for the safety of the 350 British and American prisoners who have not been sent on to Germany from North Italy; (4) releasing to Switzerland, if he can be found, Sogno Franci, an Italian patriot working with CLNAI and the British (whose release is particularly desired by Parri); (5) facilitating as much as possible
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Wolff said he welcomed von Neurath's help in the peace negotiations since he feels that von Neurath has considerable influence on Kesselring. Wolff said he would invite von Neurath to join him in Italy on 10 March.

Wolff claimed that Himmler knows nothing of his present activities. He saw Himmler and Hitler early in February and advised them of the general hopelessness of the Italian situation, but received no definite instructions.

The OSS representative made no commitments, merely listening to Wolff's presentation and stating, with no refutation from Wolff, that unconditional surrender was the only possible course.

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directed to submit a plan to carry out all necessary steps, including arrangements for a Swiss meeting-place, and for transportation to and from that place to the French-Swiss border. In addition, OSS will be called upon to provide communications, clerical assistance (including interpreters), and all necessary safeguards for the security of the discussions. The OSS representative in Bern, in conjunction with the representative at Caserta, have undertaken to make all these arrangements. OSS is withholding all these plans from the German representatives until directed by AFHQ to suggest a date for the meeting.

William J. Donovan
Director
Miss Grace Tully  
The White House

Dear Grace:

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Sincerely yours,

[Signature]

William J. Donovan  
Director

Enclosure.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, transmitted by the OSS representatives in Bern and Caserta, is a summary of preliminary negotiations and arrangements concerning approaches looking to the termination of German resistance in North Italy and on the Western Front:

On 8 February, Alexander Constantin von Neurath, the German Consul at Lugano, asserted to the OSS representative in Bern that he had just returned from a meeting with Field Marshal Albert Kesselring, Rudolph Rahn (German Ambassador to the Mussolini regime in North Italy), and Obergruppenfuehrer and General der Waffen SS Karl Wolff, the Higher SS and Police leader in Italy and chief of Himmler's personal staff. Kesselring, who has close relations with Field Marshal Gert von Rundstedt, had just returned from a conference with him. Neither Kesselring nor von Rundstedt was then ready to come over to the Western Allies. Von Neurath, who served for two years in Africa as liaison officer with Generalleutnant Siegfried Westphal, Rundstedt's Chief of Staff, suggested that he confer with Westphal.
He was advised by Kesselring not to attempt to see Westphal immediately in view of the suspicions which such a trip might arouse.

On 10 February, however, while von Neurath was visiting his father near Stuttgart, Marshal Kesselring advised him by telephone to go to a secret rendezvous where he found General Westphal and Marshal Johannes Blaskowitz, until recently commander of Army Group "G" on the Western Front. The three frankly discussed the possibility of opening the Western Front to the Allies. Westphal and Blaskowitz were reluctant to take this step, if they were merely to be considered as war criminals. They added that it was increasingly difficult to organize such a move because of SS control and the state of mind of the troops. They said that their armies included many Germans from East Prussia and eastern Germany whose will to fight had been stiffened by the Soviet occupation of their home areas. These troops, they explained, felt that they had already lost everything, and preferred to stay on and fight.

Although neither Westphal nor Blaskowitz made definite suggestions, they appeared to be working with Kesselring, and to be approaching the point where they might discuss, on purely military lines, the opening up of the Western and Italian Fronts.
Von Neurath declared that he would report the results of this conversation to Kesselring.

On 24 February, the OSS representative in Caserta reported that AFHQ was interested in obtaining authentic confirmation of Kesselring's disposition to negotiate with the Allies. AFHQ felt that if Kesselring wished to dispatch an emissary with an official message, he could find means to do so.

On 2 March, Standartenfuehrer Dollman, who has in the past claimed that he represented Kesselring, Rahn, Wolff, and Harster, made indirect contact with the OSS representative in Bern, and promised to return on 8 March with credentials and definite proposals. It was suggested to Dollman that he bring with him an important Italian partisan leader, then held as prisoner, as evidence of his good faith and ability to act.

On 8 March, General Wolff and a German High Command representative, presumably from Kesselring's staff, arrived in Lugano, allegedly prepared to make definite commitments in regard to terminating German resistance in Italy. Wolff was accompanied by his military expert, Sturmbandfuehrer Wenner; by an Italian intermediary, Baron Pirelli; by Standartenfuehrer Dollman; and by the latter's aide, Zimmern. As evidence of his
good faith, Dollman brought along Ferruccio Parri, chief of the North Italian Patriots Unified Command. General Wolff also brought with him Major Usmiani, a former OSS agent in Milan. Both of these men, who were in good health, were delivered unconditionally to the OSS representative. Neither of them was aware of the reason for his release.

The OSS representative consented to see only Wolff, who came to the former's apartment with a Swiss intermediary on the evening of 8 March. The OSS representative and an associate, a former German Consul in Zurich, then talked with Wolff alone. The former Consul later saw Wolff and Dollman together.

Wolff stated to the OSS representative that the time had come when some German with power to act should lead Germany out of the war. He said he was willing to act and felt he could persuade Kesselring to cooperate, and that the two controlled the situation in North Italy. As far as the SS is concerned, Wolff stated that he also controls Western Austria, since his authority includes the Vorarlberg, Tyrol, and the Brenner Pass with both its northern and southern approaches. Wolff declared that joint action by Kesselring and himself would leave Hitler and Himmler powerless to take such effective counter-measures.
as were employed in the 20 July crisis. Also, Wolff feels that joint action by Kesselring and himself would have a vital repercussion on the German Army, particularly on the Western Front, since many Generals are only waiting for someone to take the lead. Wolff made no request concerning his personal safety or privileged treatment from the war criminal viewpoint.

Wolff envisaged the following procedures to bring about action:

(1) He would meet Kesselring during the week-end of 10 March in order to obtain a definite commitment to joint action. Wolff says he has had the closest possible personal relations with Kesselring for several years, and indicated that Kesselring's problem was to reconcile such action with his oath of allegiance. Wolff, however, believes Kesselring can be won over to see the senselessness of the struggle and to admit that his duty to the German people is higher than that to the Fuehrer.

(2) With Kesselring, Wolff will draft an appeal to be signed by themselves, Rahn, and others. The appeal will set forth the uselessness of the struggle and the signers' responsibility to the German people to end it, will call on military commanders in particular and Germans in general to disassociate
themselves from Himmler-Hitler control, and will state that the Germans in North Italy are ending hostilities.

(3) Wolff will make preparations to get this message to the German people and military commanders via radio and wireless.

(4) Provided Kesselring is won over, Wolff believes that he and Kesselring would come secretly to Switzerland within the week to meet Allied military men and coordinate purely military surrender moves with the appeal. Apparently no one on Kesselring's immediate staff is suited to represent him for this purpose, his chief of staff not yet having been acquainted with the plan.

Wolff is prepared to demonstrate further his ability to act by (1) discontinuing active warfare against Italian partisans; (2) releasing to Switzerland several hundred Jews interned at Bolzano; (3) assuming full responsibility for the safety of the 350 British and American prisoners who have not been sent on to Germany from North Italy; (4) releasing to Switzerland, if he can be found, Sogno Franci, an Italian patriot working with CLNAI and the British (whose release is particularly desired by Parri); (5) facilitating as much as possible
the return to North Italy of Italian officers presently held in Germany who might be useful in the post-hostilities period.

Wolff said he welcomed von Neurath's help in the peace negotiations since he feels that von Neurath has considerable influence on Kesselring. Wolff said he would invite von Neurath to join him in Italy on 10 March.

Wolff claimed that Himmler knows nothing of his present activities. He saw Himmler and Hitler early in February and advised them of the general hopelessness of the Italian situation, but received no definite instructions.

The OSS representative made no commitments, merely listening to Wolff's presentation and stating, with no refutation from Wolff, that unconditional surrender was the only possible course.

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